diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp deleted file mode 160000 index 046de51c..00000000 --- a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -Subproject commit 046de51c11722416030d7a5006157f8036162fa0 diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/.clang-format b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/.clang-format new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9d159247 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/.clang-format @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +DisableFormat: true +SortIncludes: false diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/.gitattributes b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8493f5b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +project/thirdparty/*/** linguist-vendored +* -text diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/.gitignore b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ba961117 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +obj +bin +lib +project/cppia_bin +test/ndlls/cpp +test/ndlls/cpp64 +test/std/arm32 +test/std/arm64 +test/std/cpp32 +test/std/cpp64 +test/std/mybase.db +test/std/hxcpp.db +test/opMatrix/Ops.hx +test/opMatrix/cpp +test/haxe/cpp +test/telemetry/cpp +test/extern-lib/gen-externs +test/cffi/project/ndll +test/snippets/messagebox/cpp +test/haxe/gc/big.txt +hxcpp.n +.DS_Store +include/hxcpp.h.gch + +*.swp +*.exe +*.pdb +*.ilk + +.vscode diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/Changes.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/Changes.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6e0efab3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/Changes.md @@ -0,0 +1,650 @@ + +4.3 +------------------------------------------------------------ + +* Bug fixes +* Upgrade to 4.3 API +* Use PCRE v2 + +4.2 +------------------------------------------------------------ + +* Update MIN_IOS_VERSION +* Bug fixes +* Upgrade to 4.2 API +* Fixed mysql_select_db failing for newer mariadb versions due to extra 0x00 byte after database +* Fixed mysql_close not sending COM_QUIT before closing socket + +4.1.15 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Added Arm64 suport on windows +* Fixed crash with zero-sized alloc and generational GC +* Fixed crash with generational GC when old objects come back to life +* Fixed compile error with @:fixed Anons and arrays (socket select) +* Fixed lastIndexOf +* Optimized some equality functions + +4.1.1 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Added functions for haxe 4.1 Api. +* Added HXCPP_DEBUG_LINK_AND_STRIP to preserve symbolic information when creating android release binaries. +* Added optional HXCPP_SIGNAL_THROW to convert memory errors to haxe exceptions without needing additional code +* Added string_hash_map_substr and __hxcpp_parse_substr_float/int to allow some substring processing without extra allocation + +4.0.64 +------------------------------------------------------------ + +* Upgrade buildserver to 4.01 +* Better generational collection in high fragmentation case +* typeinfo include fix for MSVC +* Fix MySQL connections +* Fix bugs with HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL +* Add map.clear +* Better c++11 iOS support + +4.0.19 +------------------------------------------------------------ + +* Add Array.keyValueIterator +* General Utf16 string improvements +* Limit the amount of recursion in toString function +* Add float32 support to cppia +* Fix Gc race condition +* Throw exceptions according to the spec when casting +* Introduce hxcpp_smart_strings for unicode text + +4.0.4 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Compile Cppia against haxe 4.0 preview 4 + +4.0.2 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Default Cppia to 64 bits on windows + +4.0.1 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* More logic for determining the android NDK version +* Updated various opensource libraries (thanks robocoder) +* Updated version of zlib +* Updated version of sljit +* Updated version of pcre +* Updated version of sqlit3 +* Updated version of mbedtls +* Some work on supporting utf16 strings (hx_smart_strings) +* Added process_kill +* Change root when calculating haxelib in build.xml files +* Fix cppia super calls across cpp boundary +* Add Array.resize +* Be consistent with mod in cppia +* Fix Sys.stderr +* Add 'embedName' file attribute to allow text to cpp conversion +* Updates for Msvc +* Updates for Xcode + +3.4.188 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Fix some threading crashes + +3.4.185 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Do not ship static libraries +* Use more lock-free structures in GC processing +* Added some documentation +* Added HXCPP_GC_SUMMARY option +* Added HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL option +* Added HXCPP_GC_DYNAMIC_SIZE option +* Some MSVC 2017 support +* Compile Cppia with JIT as an option by default + +3.4.64 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Fixed cppia native interface implementation +* Fixed debugger breakpoints +* More compatibility for inet_pton and inet_ntop +* Correct the order of thread housekeeping data + +3.4.49 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Fixed 2d-Arrays and unserialize + +3.4.43 +------------------------------------------------------------ + +* Added more options for code-size optimizations on android (thanks madrazo) +* Added version of stpcpy on android to allow building with platform > 21, and running on older devices +* Added some initial support for ipv6 +* Experimental support for Cppia JIT +* Fixed issue with stale objects that use new pch files in cache +* Rethrowing exception now preserves stack correctly + + +3.4.2 +------------------------------------------------------------ + +* Align float reads from memory for Arm architecture +* Removed some virtual functions not needed by newer versions of haxe +* Reworked the logic for compacting fragmented heaps with HXCPP_GC_MOVING +* Expose StackContext to allow inlining of allocation routine, and combine with Cppia context +* Fix some compare-with-dynamic issues +* Added WatchOs support +* Fixed for android NDK 13 +* Fix Array closure equality +* Refactor the Cppia code +* Fix return codes for atomic decrease +* Fix some GC zone issues in the standard library +* Set minimum MacOS deployment target to 10.6 +* Do not use typedefs for 'Int' and 'Bool' for newer api levels +* Added dll_link to create output dll +* Improved ObjC support +* Make Cppia order of operations of '+=' et al consistent with other targets +* Added NO_RECURSE flag to PCRE +* Fix bsd_signal undefines on android +* Add create/free abstract + +3.3.49 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Fix Dynamic != for haxe 3.2.1 +* Fix Command line parsing on windows for triple quotes + +3.3.45 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Much better compile cache support +* Added tags to compiler flags to allow better targeting +* Added UCP support to regexp +* Added Array::fromData +* Added AtomicInt operations +* Added _hx_imod +* More improvements for tvos +* Fix blocking deque issue +* Improved native testing +* Added 'hxcpp run hxcpp cache ...' commands for managing cache +* Added cpp.Variant class for query of field values to avoid boxing +* Added more efficient version of finalizer +* Add non allocating version of __hxcpp_print +* More WinRT fixes +* Output 'HxcppConfig.h' with defines included for easier external integration +* Output list of output files if requested +* Add support functions for StdLib - alloc/free/sizeof +* Fix crash when marking stack names from GCRoots +* Add bitcode support for iOS +* Rename RegisterClass to avoid conflicts with windows +* Added 'VirtualArray' for arrays of unknown types +* Split Macros.tpl +* Added optional ShowParam to process_run +* Added inline functions for Int64 externs +* Add error check for allocating from a finalizer +* Fix null strings on Cffi Prime +* Use slow path if required for Win64 Tls +* Expand logic for detecting android toolchain from NDK name +* Remove the need for hxcpp binaries by compiling source directly into target +* Adjust the default verbosity level, and add HXCPP_VERBOSE/HXCPP_QUIET/HXCPP_SILENT +* Added some control options for copyFile directive +* Fix cppia decrement +* Add Array.removeRange, which does not require a return value +* Do not call setbuf(0) on stdin, since it messes with readLine +* Cppia now throws an error if loading fails +* Allocate EnumParam data inline to cut down on allocations +* Allow anonymous object data to be allocated inline to avoid allocations +* Add SSL library code +* Add NativeGen framework for interfaces +* Add macros to allow neater generated code +* Allow larger memory space with -D HXCPP_GC_BIG_BLOCKS +* Improve Array.join speed + +3.2.205 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Initial support for HXCPP_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE +* Support HXCPP_DEBUG_LINK on more targets +* Support for cross compiling to windows from linux +* Added array removeAt +* Some telemety fixes (thanks Jeff) +* Check contents when comparing Dynamics with same pointer (Math.Nan!=Math.Nan) +* Numerous WinRT fixes (thanks madrazo) +* Fixed bug causing GC to crash marking constant strings (eg, resources) +* Updated default SDK for Tizen (thanks Joshua) +* Fixed command line args on linux (thanks Andy) + +3.2.193 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Some improvements for tvos +* Start on some GC defragging code +* Fix android thread access to GC structures +* Add socket socket_recv_from and socket_send_to +* Fixed memory leak in GC collection code +* Allow cross-compile to windows via MINGW +* Fix overflow error that meant GC would work with a too-small buffer in some cases + +3.2.180 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Initial support for tvos +* Change name of ObjectType to hxObjectType to avoid clashes with iOS +* Try to keep windows.h out of haxe-generated code +* Fix null access bug in array-of-array +* Create separate library for msvc 19 + +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Try to get the pdb server working better for MSVS 2015 +* So not export symbols on windows unless HXCPP_DLL_EXPORT is set (-D dll_export) - makes exe smaller +* Avoid dynamic-cast if possible when converting 2D arrays +* Some RPi fixes +* Some CFFI Prime fixes (thanks Joshua) +* Fix build tool for next version of neko +* Improve msvc cl.exe version checking for non-English environments +* Add more control over how much Gc memory is used +* Add faster(inline) thread local storage for Gc on windows. +* Add some Gc load balancing when marking large arrays with multiple threads +* Change the Gc memory layout to be a bit larger, but simpler. This allows most of the allocation to be simplified and inlined. +* Explicitly scan registers for Gc references because the stack scanning was missing them sometimes +* Some additions to Undefine.h for windows +* When static linking using MSVC 2015, compile the libraries directly into the exe to avoid compatibility issues +* Move standard libraries into their own build.xml files +* Make it easier to change the generated output filename +* Allow targets from one build.xml file to be merged into another +* Some more work on HXCPP_COMPILE_CACHE +* Allow automatic grouping of obj files into librarys to avoid linking all the symbols in all obj files +* Add implicit conversion to referenced type from cpp.Reference +* Allow build.xml files to be imported relative to importing file +* Allow '-' in command-line defines +* Fix warnings from Hash class +* Fix setsockopt for Mac +* Support to MSVC2015 +* Fix for Blackberry 10.3 +* Fix debug break by linenumber +* Better objc integration (thanks Caue) +* Increase number of variables captured in closures to 20 +* Initial support for telemetry (thanks Jeff) +* Align allocations for better emscripten support + +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Fix gc_lock error in remove_dir +* Some cppia bug fixes - enum and resources overrides +* More android atof fixes +* Improved haxelib seek logic + +Haxe 3.2.0 +------------------------------------------------------------ + +* Improve testing +* Allow dll_load path to be set programatically and simplified the dll search sequence. +* Improved cffi_prime, and added String class +* Fixed static linking of mysql5 +* Moved static link code in general to cpp.link package, not hxcpp package +* URL decode now does not need to performe reallocs +* Ensure HXCPP_API_LEVEL is always defined +* Added __hxcpp_unload_all_libraries to cleanly unload dlls +* Added some utc date functions +* Better support for non-console apps in windows XP 64 +* Increased use of HXCPP_DEBUG_LINK for gcc based targets +* Class 'hasField' is now more consistent with other functions/targets +* 'haxelib run hxcpp test.cppia' will run Cppia on the specified file +* Add fast-select option for sockets +* Allow code to run without HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS defined +* Fix debugger thread deadlocks +* Allow up to 27 dynamic arguments +* Fixes for Emscripten - byte align access and disable threads +* Allow emscripten to generate 'executables' (.js/.html) and add options for specifying memory +* Allow spaces in exe names again +* Make cpp::Struct compare via memcmp, and mark correctly +* Fix catch block in cppia +* Treat '-debug' as an alias for "-Ddebug" +* Expose ArrayBase for use with some generic or external code +* Clarify the role of 'buffer' in cffi + +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Only put a minimal run.n in source-control, and use this to boot hxcpp.n +* Added cpp.Struct and cpp.Reference classes, which are handy for extern classes +* Moved Class to hx namespace +* Simplified 'main' logic +* Allow new android compilers to work for old devices (thanks google) +* Correctly read hxcpp_api_level from Build.xml +* Verbose logging prints which file is being compiled +* Handle undefining the INT_ constants differently to allow std::string to still compile +* Remove entries form Options.txt that do not influence the cpp build +* Add optional destination= command-line option to allow copying the result to named file +* Static libraries will be prefixed with 'lib' now +* val_is_buffer always returns false on neko +* Add val_iter_field_vals, which is like val_iter_fields but consistent with neko +* Remove NekoApi binaries +* Add Cppia binaries +* Add Windows64 binaries +* Make compares between Dynamic and numeric types false, unless the Dynamic is actaully numeric + +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Even more optimizations for hashes +* Some more optimizations for small hashes +* Fix for google changing inlining in platform21 headers (atof, rand, srand) +* Re-tuned Hash for small objects too (improves Anon object perforamce) +* Reverted change that automatically threw 'BadCast'. Now required HXCPP_STRICT_CASTS + +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Cached dynamic versions of small ints and 1-char-strings for speed +* Added support for weak hashes - needs latest haxe version +* Use internal hash structure for maps - now faster. New version of haxe makes it faster still. +* Changed the way development versions are bootstrapped to avoid committing binaries +* Improved mingw support +* Dont append -debug to dll name +* Reorder xml includes to allow early parts to correctly influence older parts +* Fix busy wait in semaphore lock +* Fixed GC issue when constructing exrernal primitive objects +* Added armv7s and arm64 targets for ios +* Some fixes for neko cffi - wstring and warning for neko_init +* Fix file read (and copy) from thread + +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Compile fix for blackberry +* Pass on haxe_api_level +* Add -nocolor flag + +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Add support for prelinker +* Cygwin toolchain fix +* Add HXCPP_NO_COLOUR and HXCPP_NO_M32 +* Fix windows trace output +* Add initial support for GCWO compile +* Fix bug with losing GC references in Array.sort +* Fix bug with zombie marking +* Add support for optimised sort routines +* Add support for haxe.ds.Vector optimisation +* Add support for cpp.Pointer, cpp.NativeArray, cpp.NativeString + +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Add BlackBerry and Tizen binaries +* Fix issues when using names like ANDROID or IPHONE in an enum +* Added more info in verbose mode (setenv HXCPP_VERBOSE) +* Refactor build files to allow greater customisation +* Fix bug with 'lock' where some threads may not get released +* Add optimised arrays access +* Add optimised memory operations for arrays and haxe.io.Bytes +* Avoid blocking in gethostbyname +* Upgrade run tool output and layout +* Restore sys_time for windows + +3.1.1 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Fixed MSVC support for 64-bit targets (vc11, vc12) +* Initial work on cpp.Pointer (not fully functional) +* Fixed callstack when throwing from native function + +3.1.0 +------------------------------------------------------------ + +* VC 2013 support - used as default now +* Add winxp compatibility flags +* Allow cross-compiling from mac to linux +* Added NSString helper conversion +* Better auto-detection for android toolchain +* Allow foreign threads to easily attach and detach from GC system +* Weak references to closures keep object alive +* Added HXCPP_API_LEVEL define to allow for future compatibility +* Fixed clearing finalizers twice +* Int multiply and minus are performed with integers now +* Fix comparing +- infinities +* Use multiple threads in the mark phase of GC +* IOS now defaults cpp11 binary linkage +* Added HXCPP_VERBOSE environment var to enable extra output +* Fixed spin loop in pthread_cond_wait +* Added ability to link several .a files into a single .a file +* Removed dependence on STL runtime for supplied modules +* Renamed some directories to be more standard +* Moved some extra build files into obj directory +* Use sys.io.Process instead of Sys.command to avoid threading slowdown writing to console +* Add hxcpp.Builder to help with building multiple binaries +* Add android x86 support +* Drop pre-compiled support for everything excepth windows,mac,linux,ios and android +* Allow libraries and files to accumulated in the build.xml +* Supply pre-build lib files for static linking on supported platforms +* Support for static linking of all modules +* Support for hxcpp-debugger project +* Binaries have been removed from repo, and are built using a server +* Use build.n script to build all appropriate binaries +* Some initial support for mysql and sqlite databases +* Add free_abstract for safe releasing of data references +* Change process lauching to get better thread usage on mac +* Fix GC error in string resources +* Give obj files in libraries unique names + +3.0.2 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Fix Dynamic + Int logic +* Reverted linux compiler to older version +* Cast Array at call site if required +* Tweak Array.map return value + +3.0.1 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Added nekoapi for linux64 +* Upgrade nekoapi to v2 +* Added haxe vector support +* Added socket_set_fast_send +* Fixed android build +* Expanded native memory access methods +* Fix exception dump +* Added initial Emscriptm support +* Allow specification of ANDROID_HOST +* Inital work on auto-setup of win64 +* Support call-site casting of Arrays + + +3.0.0 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Support haxe3 syntax +* Added socket poll function +* Added some initial support for dll_import/dll_export +* Allow full path name when loading dynamic libraries +* Allow dynamic toString function +* Added initial support for Raspberry Pi +* Array sort now uses std::stable_sort +* Fixed Dynamic+null string output +* Fix splice size calculation +* Add object ids for use in maps +* Add map/filter functions to arrays +* GC will now collect more often when big arrays are used +* You can specify a number of args > 5 for cffi functions if you want +* Fix internal hash size variable +* Class static field list does not report super members now +* Fix casting of null to any object +* Do not read input twice in sys_getch +* Link in PCH generated obj data on msvs 2012 +* Date is now consistent with UTC +* Hash 'remove' now returns correct value +* CPP native WeakRef now works, and has a 'set' function +* Fixed compile error when assigning to a base class +* Fixed compile error when using != and Dynamic +* Math/floor/ceil/trunc/min/max now pass unit tests +* More control over android sdk installation +* Regexp_match fix +* Fix val_callN CFFI + +2.10.3 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Added initial build support for WinRT +* Android toolchain improvements +* Minor compile fixes +* Other minor improvements + +2.10.2 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Fixes for BlackBerry 10 compatibility +* Fixes for iOS 6 compatibility +* CFFI improvements +* Minor Linux improvements +* Minor OS X improvements + +2.10.1 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Fix trace() output +* Clang options for OS X compiler +* Small fixes + +2.10.0 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* GC upgrades - moving/defragging/releasing +* Built-in profiler +* Build-in debugger +* Fix mac ndll finding bug +* Add Int32 member functions +* Clang options for ios compiler +* Add a few pre-boxed constants +* Some general bug fixes + +2.09.3 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Fix Xml enum usage + +2.09.2 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Resolve library paths when launching Mac apps from Finder +* Compile fix for the BlackBerry toolchain +* Fix interface comparison +* Fix api_val_array_value for NekoApi +* Add workaround for optional Strings in interfaces +* Tweak the timing og the GC run +* Remove setProperty conditional compiles +* String charCodeAt only returns positive values +* Fix modulo for negative numbers +* Remove extra space from array output +* Treat '.' and '_' as literals in urlEncode +* Dynamically generated, 0 param, enum instances match the static version + + +2.09 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Improved precision in random implementations +* Added some experimental support for float32 +* Added some experimental support for generic getProcAddress +* String::fromCharCode generates single-byte strings +* Fix method compares +* Plug memory leak in finalizers +* Fix debug link flags +* Separate get/SetField from get/setProperty +* Added Null for optional parameters + +2.08.3 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Actually add blackberry toolchain + +2.08.2 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Add blackberry support +* Add armv7 options +* Support new xcode layout +* Fix const qualifiers on interface functions +* Fix webOS obj directory + +2.08.1 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Fix Math.random returning 1.0 sometimes +* Std.is( 2.0, Int ) is now true +* Make static library building more separated - refactor defines to control this +* Do not use @files for linking on mac +* toString on Anon objects will now get called +* Fix fast memory access with --no-inline +* Android tool host now set to linux-x86 +* Allow use of __compare as operator== overload +* Add toNativeInt +* Add weak references +* Implement some neko/cffi compatibility operations +* Fix mac deployment using environment variable +* Fix reentrant mutexes +* Do not explicitly specify version of g++ +* Speedup some code by avoiding dynamic_cast if possible +* Some fixes to allow Android multi-threading in normal operation + +2.08 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Do not create a new class definition for each member function +* Allow 5 fast and up to 20 slow dynamic function arguments +* Support utf8 class +* Added "Fast Memory" API similar to flash +* Added support for webOS +* Fix uncompress buffers +* Added file to undefined pesky processor macros +* Setup default config in user area +* Auto-detect msvc and iphone version +* Force compilation for mac 10.5 +* Some support for cygwin compilers +* Remove Boehm GC as an option +* Integrate properly now with Android ndk-r6 +* Make Int32 pass haxe unit tests (shift/modulo) +* Fix bug in "join" +* Fix bug with marking the "this" pointer in closures +* Fix bug with returning NAN from parseFloat +* Fix linux link flags +* Fix bug where string of length 0 would be null +* Made String cca return value consistent +* Added control over @file syntax +* Removed need for nekoapi.ndll +* Allow for neko.so to end in ".0" + +2.07 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Added initial support for Mac64, Linux64, MinGW and GPH and refactored build tool. +* Return the count of traced objects +* Fix interface operator == +* Initial work on msvc10 batch file +* Add bounds check on String.cca +* Build static libraries, if requrested +* Added exe stripping +* Added val_field_name, val_iter_fields +* Fixed nekoapi string length +* Fixed Sys.args + +2.06.1 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Close files if required in GC +* Added fix for File.write +* Fixed String UTF8 Encode +* Nekoapi is now a "ndll", not a "dso". +* Fix array compile issue on linux +* Fix stack setting on firced collect + +2.06.0 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Updates to match haxe 2.06 compiler features +* Numerous bug fixes +* Add additional context to GC collection process +* Swapped from wchar_t* to utf8 char* +* Added templated iterators +* Use strftime for Dates +* Fix socket select and "_s" members +* Seed Math.random +* Fixed dynamic integer compare +* Added __hxcpp_obj_id +* Added some Android support + +2.05.1 +------------------------------------------------------------ +* Updated windows nekoapi.dll binary +* Added -m32 compile flags to force 32 bit + +2.05.0 +------------------------------------------------------------ + +* Default to IMMIX based internal garbage collection. +* Reorginised files - split big ones, and moved common ones out of "runtime". +* Put internal classes in "hx" namespace, or HX_ prefix for macros. +* Remove multiple-inheritance, and use delegation instead. +* Write "Options.txt" from compiler so dependency can be determined. +* Require -D HXCPP_MULTI_THREADED for multi-threaded classes - to avoid overhead if not required. +* Build thread code into executable for better control. +* Fix return values of parseINt/parseFloat. +* Added comprehensive list of reserved member names. +* Put if/else statements in blocks. +* Added assert, NULL, LITTLE_ENDIAN, BIG_ENDIAN as keywords. +* Added control over how fast-cffi routines are created by requiring cpp.rtti.FastIntergerLookup to be "implemented". +* Construct anonymous object fields in deterministic (as declared) order. +* Fix code generation for some complex inline cases. +* Added cpp.zip.Compress +* Change "Reflect" class to be more standard +* Use array of dynamics for StringBuf. +* Fix setting of attributes in XML nodes. + +Build-tool: +* Allow multiple build threads (via setenv HXCPP_COMPILE_THREADS N) for faster building on multi-code boxes. +* Added FileGroup dependencies +* Added pre-compiled headers (windows only, at the moment since gcc seems buggy) + + +1.0.7 +----------------- +Changelog starts. diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/LICENSE.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..70c5e21f --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +* Copyright (c) 2008 by the contributors +* All rights reserved. +* +* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +* modification, are permitted provided that the following condition is met: +* * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +* +* See individual source files for additional license information. +* +* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE HAXE PROJECT CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY +* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +* WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE +* DISCLAIMED. + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/README.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b20414b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +# hxcpp + +[![Build Status](https://dev.azure.com/HaxeFoundation/GitHubPublic/_apis/build/status/HaxeFoundation.hxcpp?branchName=master)](https://dev.azure.com/HaxeFoundation/GitHubPublic/_build/latest?definitionId=3&branchName=master) + +hxcpp is the runtime support for the c++ backend of the [haxe](http://haxe.org/) compiler. This contains the headers, libraries and support code required to generate a fully compiled executable from haxe code. + + +# building the tools + +``` +REPO=$(pwd) +cd ${REPO}/tools/run +haxe compile.hxml +cd ${REPO}/tools/hxcpp +haxe compile.hxml +cd $REPO +``` + +# cppia + +You first need to build the cppia host. + +``` +REPO=$(pwd) +cd ${REPO}/project +haxe compile-cppia.hxml +cd $REPO +``` + +Then you can do `haxelib run hxcpp file.cppia`. diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/azure-pipelines.yml b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/azure-pipelines.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e1755ebd --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/azure-pipelines.yml @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +variables: + - group: variables-haxe + - name: AZURE_PIPELINES_REPO_URL + value: $(Build.Repository.Uri) + - name: AZURE_PIPELINES_BRANCH + value: $(Build.SourceBranchName) + - name: HXCPP_COMPILE_CACHE + value: $(Agent.TempDirectory)/hxcache + +stages: + - stage: StageTest + jobs: + - template: tools/azure-pipelines/build.yml + parameters: + name: Linux64 + vmImage: ubuntu-20.04 + platform: linux64 + arch: 64 + - template: tools/azure-pipelines/build.yml + parameters: + name: Linux32 + vmImage: ubuntu-20.04 + platform: linux64 + arch: 32 + - template: tools/azure-pipelines/build.yml + parameters: + name: Mac + vmImage: macOS-10.15 + platform: mac + arch: 64 + - template: tools/azure-pipelines/build.yml + parameters: + name: Windows64 + vmImage: windows-2019 + platform: windows + arch: 64 + - template: tools/azure-pipelines/build.yml + parameters: + name: Windows32 + vmImage: windows-2019 + platform: windows + arch: 32 diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/build-tool/BuildCommon.xml b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/build-tool/BuildCommon.xml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6e7f95c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/build-tool/BuildCommon.xml @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + + + + + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/CompileCache.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/CompileCache.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..7b7a0ced --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/CompileCache.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +The Hxcpp Cache +--------------- +The hxcpp compile cache is used to share object files between projects. This can alleviate the need to ship static libraries with external projects, since developers who use the library can compile the library just once, and then reuse it between projects. + +The cache uses a hashing mechanism to tell if the contents of a file or its dependencies has changed, and combines this with the compiler version and flags to make specific object files for each change and each compiler congiguration. This also allows some common haxe runtime and haxe generated files to share their object files between projects, even if in different directories. + +Additional benefits include keeping some files outside the source tree, and being able to remove these temp files easily. + +### Setup +A directory needs to be set aside to enable the cache. If possible, this should be on fast storage, such as a SSD. This is most easily done with an entry in the .hxcpp_config.xml file: +```xml + + +``` +Keeping the path short can help in some border-line cases with some compilers where command-line length can become an issue. + +The cache size defaults to 1 Gig. For many cases, this is big enough. However, on large projects, with several architectures and lots of debug information, this default can lead to "cache churn" where some files are evicted from the cache, even though they are likely to be used again. Increasing the number of mega-bytes allocated to the cache can help here. + +### Using The Cache +To use the cashe with your own libraries, the files group should have 'cache' entry to tell hxcpp that you have considered dependency issues when designing the group. + + ```xml + + ``` + + - project = name of project used to manage and group object files in the cache + - asLibrary = link the objs into a .lib file. + +When linking a file group 'asLibrary', the object files are compiled and then the library tool is used to make a library from these object files. This library is then added to the linker. This has a few implications: + - Object files that to not resolve any symbols directly are not added to the final executable + + Can make final exe size smaller + + If the object file only contains a handler that is self-registering via static constructor, + then the constructor may not get called, leading to bugs. + - Can help on some systems where the linker command-line length is an issue. + + +### Management +When compiling normally, hxcpp will check the cache size and evict the least used files to maintain the specified cache size. +Object files in the cache are grouped into "projects" to make management easier, and the hxcpp build tool can be used to explicitly manage the object files. +``` + haxelib run hxcpp cache [command] [project] + Perform command on cache, either on specific project or all. commands: + clear -- remove all files from cache + days #days -- remove files older than "days" + resize #megabytes -- Only keep #megabytes MB + list -- list cache usage + details -- list cache usage, per file +``` +Start with +``` +haxelib run hxcpp cache list +``` +To get an idea of cache usage. + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/ThreadsAndStacks.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/ThreadsAndStacks.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..55eeb00a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/ThreadsAndStacks.md @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +Threads And Stacks +------------------- + + +### Conservative, co-operation +Hxcpp uses conservative stop-the-world GC, where the threads need to co-operate. + - Threads must not change GC pointers in the collection phase + - The thread stacks/registers must be scanned for GC pointers + - Threads must not block without letting the GC system know not to wait for them, otherwise GC blocks until end of block + + call hx::GCEnterBlocking() / gc_enter_blocking() / (cpp.vm.Gc.enterGCFreeZone() from Haxe) before potentially blocking system call (fs, network, etc) + + call hx::GCExitBlocking() / gc_exit_blocking() / (cpp.vm.Gc.exitGCFreeZone() from Haxe) before making more GC calls + + Might need to pre-allocate buffers + + Don't forget the exit blocking on error condition + +### Foreign Threads +When you create a thread from haxe, it starts attached. Before a non-haxe created thread can interact with hxcpp, some care must be taken, since GC allocations are done using a GC context per thread, and all threads must respect the stopped world. + - Foreign threads must be attached-detached + - SetTopOfStack(int * inTop,bool inPush) + - *inTop* = pointer to top of stack to attach, or '0' to remove stack + - *inPush* = usually true. recursive attachment/detachment + - Must not change things when the world is stopped + - Must define their stack range for scanning + - If you are attached, you may need to enter/exit gc free zone + - Must release context when done, if no more calls are going to be made + - Make sure local variables are covered in stack + - compiler may reorder, so be careful + - Read documentation because some things, eg audio callbacks, happen on other threads + - You can use other techniques, eg + - create a haxe thread, which blocks waiting for signal + - foreign thread generates request and signals haxe thread + - haxe thread performs job and generates data then signals foreign thread + - foreign picks up data and carries on + + + + +### Top of Stack + + - To understand how to handle threads, you need a mental picture of the c++ stack + - The stack usually goes "down". That is, if the first stack location is 10000, the next one will be 9999 etc. + - Historical, but consistent. Except for emscripten which goes up - but still use same terminology/picture, just change the less-thans to greater-thans in code. + +Say the system starts each program stack at 10000, the stack might look like this, with local variables and arguments pushed on the stack: + +``` + 10000 + ----------------------------------------------- + 9996 startup temp variable + 9992 startup temp variable + -- main function -- + 9988 main return address - order and details of this are ABI specific + 9984 char ** argv + 9980 int argc +``` + +Hxcpp then runs it main code, which starts with the macro HX_TOP_OF_STACK, which expands to something like: +``` + int t0 = 99; + hx::SetTopOfStack(&t0,false); + ... + __boot_all(); + __hxcpp_main(); + + -- main function -- + 9988 main return address order and details of this are ABI specific + 9984 char ** argv + 9980 int argc + 9976 int t0 + -- hx::SetTopOfStack -- + + records '9976' as top of stack for this thread +``` + +Later, many generated functions deep, `__hxcpp_main` generates an allocation call which +triggers a collection + +``` + ... + 8100 Array bullets + -- alloc Enemy -- + ... + -- Call collect -- + + 8050 int bottomOfStackTemp + MarkConservative(&bottomOfStackTemp, 9976) -> scans stack from 8050 -> 9976 + MarkConservative(Capture registers) + +``` + +Enter/exit use similar technique, where the registers are captured and the bottomOfStack is 'locked-in' when the "enter gc free zone" call is made. +``` + 8100 Array bullets + -- EnterGCFreeZone -- + 8088 int bottomOfStackTemp + thread->setBottomOfStack(&bottomOfStackTemp) + thread->captureRegisters() + return + * any changes here will not affect GC +``` + +Now, when another thread does a collection, the gc-free thread can be scanned from 8088 to 9976, regardless of any stuff happening lower dowsn the stack. + + +### Not Called From Main + +Top of stack can be tricky to get right when a gui framework does not really have a "main". + + +``` + 10000 + ----------------------------------------------- + 9996 startup temp variable + 9992 startup temp variable + -- main function -- + setupWindows(onReadyCallback)...... + ... + 8000 + -- onReadyCallback -- + 7976 int t0 + SetTopOfStack(&t0,false) -> 7966 + __hxcpp_main(); + setOnFrameCallack(haxeOnFrame) + return; +``` + +Later, the haxeOnFrame callback is trigger, but not "below" `__hxcpp_main` + +``` + 9800 -- haxeOnFrame --- + // Top of stack will be below bottom of stack. + +``` + +Solutions: + - Make sure you get in at top of main + + may scan too much? + - Ratchet up top-of-stack in callbacks, inForce = false + + gc_set_top_of_stack(void * inTopOfStack,bool inForce); + - Detach main thread after hxcpp_main and reattach each callback + + android solution because render callbacks happen on different threads + + gc_set_top_of_stack(&base,true); // attach + + gc_set_top_of_stack(0,true); // detach + + + +### Debugging. + - in debug mode, hxcpp will check for calls from unattached threads + - hxcpp can log conservative ranges. With a native debugger you can check the address of + your local variables and ensure they are included. + - hxcpp will scan native objects on the stack, but will not follow non-haxe pointers to other objects, so additional GC roots may be required. + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Compiler.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Compiler.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..f44de899 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Compiler.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +Compiler +-------- +Compilers are run over each of the changed files in each of the filegroups in a target to create object files, which are then linked into the target. Modification dates or hashes are used to tell if files need recompiling, of if the object file can be reused. + + + +- *flag* - Add single arg to command-line. + ```xml + + ``` + + value = text for flag added to command line + + tag = optional filter to restrict flag to files with matching tag. See [Tags.md](Tags.md). + +- *cflag/cppflag/objcflag/mmflag* - Add flag when compiling specific file types. + ```xml + + + + + ``` + + cflag = only added to .c files + + cppflag = only added to .cpp files + + objcflag = only added to .objc files + + mmflag = only added to .mm objc++ files + +- *pchflag* - Add flag when compiling precompiled header .h files. + ```xml + + ``` + + pchflag = Usually `["-x", "c++-header"]` for apple to specify the "identity" of the header + + +- *pch* - Set the precompiled header style - "gcc" or "msvc". + ```xml + + ``` + +- *objdir* - set name of directory used to store object files. Should be unique for given set of compiler flags to avoid linking against wrong architecture. + ```xml + + ``` + + value = usually built programmatically, like `obj/msvc${MSVC_VER}-rt${OBJEXT}${OBJCACHE}${XPOBJ}` + +- *output* - Flag used to specifying compiler output name. + ```xml + + ``` + + value = flag value. Note that it should contain a space character + if the actual name should be a separate argument, like "-o ", or "-o"/"-out:" if it does not. + +- *exe* = Override the executable command specified in the compiler attribute. + ```xml + + ``` + + name = command. Usually you would use 'path' to add the directory, then this is just the filename part. + +- *ext* - Specify the object file extension + ```xml + + ``` + + name = extension, including ".". Usually ".o" or ".obj". + +- *getversion* - The command-line used to create text describing the version of the compiler. + This is used for working out if the compiler has changed, and therefore the objs need recompiling. + ```xml + + ``` + + value = command to run. It defaults to `compiler --version` which is usual for gcc based compilers. + Setting it empty will disable caching. + +- *section* - Group entries - usually sharing common condition + ```xml +
+ ``` + +- *include* - include compiler options from another file. Most compilers should include `` to add defines used by hxcpp. + ```xml + + ``` + + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Defines.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Defines.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..cddbbeff --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Defines.md @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +Defines +------- + +There are a number of standard defines you can use to control the hxcpp build. Some of these are used by the haxe compiler, and affect then generated code. Others apply to the build tool and affect how the code is compiled. + +Defines affecting how the code is generated. These need to be in the command line when calling haxe. + +| Define | Meaning | +|-------------------------|--------------------| +| *HXCPP_DEBUGGER* | Add extra macros required by debugger. Usually added automatically be debugger haxelib | +| *HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL* | Enable experimental generational garbage collector | +| *annotate_source* | Add additional annotations to source code - useful for developing hxcpp | +| *dll_export* | Export hxcpp runtime symbols | +| *file_extension* | Set the extension (without the dot) of generated files. eg "-D file_extension=mm" for objc++ code | +| *force_native_property* | Make dynamic access of fields call property getters/setters where appropriate | +| *include_prefix* | Place all generated include files in a sub-directory, eg "-D include_prefix=hxinc". Useful for avoiding name clashes | +| *no-compilation* | Generate the code, but do not compile it | +| *no-debug* | Do not generate debug macros in code | +| *nocppiaast* | Use legacy cppia generation instead of new more recent changes | +| *objc* | Generate objective-c++ classes | +| *scriptable* | Enable extra runtime information required for scripting | + + + +Defines affecting how the code is compiled. These can be on the command line when calling haxe, or added via the hxcpp build environment. + +| Define | Meaning | +|-------------------------|--------------------| +| *HXCPP_GC_MOVING* | Allow garbage collector to move memory to reduce fragmentation | +| *HXCPP_GC_SUMMARY* | Print small profiling summary at end of program | +| *HXCPP_GC_DYNAMIC_SIZE* | Monitor GC times and expand memory working space if required | +| *HXCPP_GC_BIG_BLOCKS* | Allow working memory greater than 1 Gig | +| *HXCPP_GC_DEBUG_LEVEL* | Number 1-4 indicating additional debugging in GC | +| *HXCPP_DEBUG_LINK* | Add symbols to final binary, even in release mode. | +| *HXCPP_STACK_TRACE* | Have valid function-level stack traces, even in release mode. | +| *HXCPP_STACK_LINE* | Include line information in stack traces, even in release mode. | +| *HXCPP_CHECK_POINTER* | Add null-pointer checks,even in release mode. | +| *HXCPP_PROFILER* | Add profiler support | +| *HXCPP_TELEMETRY* | Add telemetry support | +| *HXCPP_CPP11* | Use c++11 features and link libraries | +| *exe_link* | Generate executable file (rather than dynamic library on android) | +| *static_link* | Generate static library | +| *dll_link* | Generate dynamic library | + +Other defines: + +| Define | Meaning | +|-------------------------|--------------------| +| *HXCPP_VERBOSE* | Print extra output from build tool. | +| *HXCPP_TIMES* | Show some basic profiling information | +| *HXCPP_NEKO_BUILDTOOL* | Force use of hxcpp.n, rather than compiled BuildTool.exe +| *HXCPP_NO_COLOR* | Do not add colour-codes to tool output | +| *HXCPP_KEEP_TEMP* | Does not delete the files created for file 'embedName' option | + + +Defines affecting target architecture. + +| Define | Meaning | +|-------------------------|--------------------| +| *HXCPP_M32* | Force 32-bit compile for current desktop | +| *HXCPP_M64* | Force 64-bit compile for current desktop | +| *HXCPP_ARMV6* | Compile arm-based devices for armv6 | +| *HXCPP_ARM64* | Compile arm-based devices for 64 bits | +| *HXCPP_ARMV7* | Compile arm-based devices for armv7 | +| *HXCPP_ARMV7S* | Compile arm-based devices for armv7s | +| *HXCPP_LINUX_ARMV7* | Run on a linux ARMv7 device | +| *HXCPP_LINUX_ARM64* | Run on a linux ARM64 device | +| *winrt* | Compile for windowsRt/windows UWP | +| *android* | Compile for android | +| *PLATFORM* | Specify the android platform for NDK compilation | +| *ANDROID_NDK_ROOT* | Specify the location of the android NDK toolchain | +| *ANDROID_NDK_DIR* | Specify the search location for finding the android NDK toolchain | +| *HXCPP_X86* | Compile android for x86 architecture | +| *iphoneos* | Compile for iphone iOS | +| *iphonesim* | Compile for iphone simulator | +| *appletvos* | Compile for apple tvOS | +| *appletvsim* | Compile for apple tvOS simulator | +| *watchos* | Compile for apple watchOS | +| *watchsimulator* | Compile for apple watchOS simulator | +| *webos* | Compile for webOS | +| *tizen* | Compile for Tizen | +| *blackberry* | Compile for Blackberry | +| *emscripten* | Compile for Emscripten | +| *cygwin* | Compile for windows using cygwin | +| *linux* | (Cross) Compile for linux | +| *rpi* | (Cross) Compile for raspberry pi | +| *mingw* | Compile for windows using mingw | +| *HXCPP_MINGW* | Compile for windows using mingw | +| *NO_AUTO_MSVC* | Do not detect msvc location, use the one already in the executable path | +| *HXCPP_WINXP_COMPAT* | Remain compatible with Windows XP. Disables condition variables. No effect on ARM. | diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Files.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Files.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..f3f7383c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Files.md @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +Files +------ +The files node defines a group of files that all share the same attributes, including relative directory, default compiler flags and dependencies. The node can be used to define a set of header files on which other files can depend, or a set of source files to be compiled and included in a target. + +- *depend* - Declare that all files in the group depend on another file or another file group. + ```xml + + + ``` + + name = If the named file changes then then all the files in the group need recompiling. + + files = If any of the files in the named group changes then then all the files in the group need recompiling. + +- *options* - Name of file containing compiler flags. When the cache is not used, Options.txt helps detect when the options have changed, and therefore whether files need recompiling. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *config* - Name of file to generate that contains the #defines that were active when code was compiled. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *tag* - Add a default compiler flags tag to all files in group. See [Tags.md](Tags.md). + ```xml + + ``` + +- *addTwice* - When compiled to a library, add the library twice to the link line - once at the beginning and once at then end to satisfy linux selective linking. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *cache* - Use compiler cache for files in group. See [compile cache](../CompileCache.md) for more details. + ```xml + + ``` + + project = name of project used to manage and group object files in the cache + + asLibrary = link the objs into a .lib file, which can skip unneeded objs, but + will also skip things that rely on static initializers to register handlers, so be careful. + +- *include* - Include an external file list + ```xml + + ``` + +- *section* - Groups block of elements - usually ones that all respect the same if/unless condition. + ```xml +
+ ``` + + +- *compilerflag* - Add a compilerflag when compiling files in group. + ```xml + + + ``` + + name, value = add 2 flags when compiling + + value = add 1 flag when compiling + +- *nvcc* - This group is compiled with nvcc. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *objprefix* - An id prepended to generated obj name to allow alphabetical grouping of similar objs. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *precompiledheader* - Use a precompiledheader of given name when compiling group + ```xml + + ``` + + name = the include used when precompiling these files (without the .h) + + directory = the location of this file + + eg, for `#include ` + + name = "lib/Header" + + directory = "${haxelib:somelib}/include" + +- *file* - Add file to group, with optional attributes + ```xml + + + + + ``` + + name = name of file - may be absolute or relative to files.dir + + tags = optional override of group tags. See [Tags.md](Tags.md). + + filterout = allows files to be skipped at compile-time if the named define exists. + This is useful when the define is set sometime after the file list is parsed. + + depend name = filename of additional dependency + + embed = causes the file to be embedded as an extern c++ 'const char *' string constant of the specified name + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/HaxeTarget.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/HaxeTarget.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..17bb4207 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/HaxeTarget.md @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +The Haxe Target +--------------- + +When compiling from haxe, via hxcpp, a "Build.xml" file is generated in the output directory. The file lists the generated files and dependencies and ultimately includes the "toolchain/haxe-target.xml" file, which describes how to combine these files. + +### Include Order +There are a few complications when setting the order in which things are configured, since a particular build might want to: + - set the compiler + - override some compiler settings + - make decisions based on the compiler or settings + - set or use standard file prefixes/suffixes + +### Example Sequence +You can see which files are included by setting the HXCPP_VERBOSE define when compiling. One example is for a hypothetical user 'Hugh' on a windows platform: + +``` +Using makefile: Build.xml +No specified toolchain + - Parsing include: C:/Users/Hugh/dev/hxcpp/toolchain/setup.xml + - Parsing include: C:\Users\Hugh\.hxcpp_config.xml (section "vars") +Using Windows compiler: MSVC + - Parsing include: C:/Users/Hugh/dev/hxcpp/toolchain/finish-setup.xml + - Parsing makefile: C:\Users\Hugh\test\proj\cpp\Build.xml + - Parsing include: C:/Users/Hugh/dev/hxcpp/build-tool/BuildCommon.xml + - Parsing include: C:/Users/Hugh/dev/hxcpp/toolchain/haxe-target.xml + - Parsing include: C:/Users/Hugh/dev/hxcpp/toolchain/msvc-toolchain.xml + - Parsing compiler: C:/Users/Hugh/dev/hxcpp/toolchain/common-defines.xml + - Parsing include: C:\Users\Hugh\.hxcpp_config.xml (section "exes") +``` + +- setup.xml is read because no custom toolchain is specified, and this just include hxcpp_config +- the 'vars' section of hxcpp_config is read - mainly to setup SDK locations +- the hxcpp build tool then uses internal logic based on host and defines to work out which compiler/toolchain to use +- finish-setup then sets a bunch of standard defines for file-extensions and linking flags based on + the type of toolchain being used. +- The provided buildfile (Build.xml) is then processed. It can use the standard defines from finish-setup. +- Build.xml imports the standard haxe-target buildfile, which adds standard runtime files +- The toolchain file is then parsed - making use of any settings from the main Build.xml and finish-setup. + - This file includes the "common-defines.xml" from the compiler to inject standard haxe compiler flags +- hxcpp_config "exe" is parsed. Historically to add libraries or build-paths to targets. + + +### Standard Environment +finish-setup.xml is where the conventions are set. These variables include: + - haxelink = dll|static_link|exe + - LIBPREFIX = lib|"" + - LIBEXTRA = + + .iphonesim-64 + + .iphonesim + + .iphoneos + + .iphoneos-v7 + + .iphoneos-v7s + + .iphoneos-64 + + .appletvsim-64 + + .appletvsim + + .watchos + + .watchsimulator + + -x86 + + -v7 + + -64 + - HX_LINK_SUFFIX = LIBEXTRA | -19 (msvc 19) + - LIBEXT = .a|.lib + - DBG = ""|"-debug" + - OBJEXT = "-list-of-config-ids" depending on available options + +These variables are used by haxe-target - you can use them too. Haxe then builds the "haxe" target, which uses some code like: +```xml + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +``` + +Here you can see the various file groups, which are enabled or not depending on the compiler mode, and some standard libraries that are needed for Linux. + +### Experimenting With Hxcpp Generated Code/Build.xml +If you are using external cpp code, or using meta-data to inject xml into the build process, and you are getting a compile or link error, then it can be useful to run the hxcpp build tool without re-running haxe. This lets you hand-edit the build file or generated c++ code until you get things to work. Once you have solved the issues using this technique, then you can move the changes back into the injected/external code. + +First, compile haxe with '-v' flag. This gives quite a bit of debug, but will include a line like this: +``` +haxelib run hxcpp Build.xml haxe -Dhaxe3="1" -Dhaxe_ver="4.000" -Dhxcpp_api_level="332" -Dsource-header="Generated by Haxe 4.0.0" -I"" -I"C:/Users/Hugh/dev/haxe/std/cpp/_std/" -I"C:/Users/Hugh/dev/haxe/std/" +``` + +To use this, first change directories to your output directory. This will be the one you specified with the "-cpp" haxe compiler option. Then, cut and paste this command into a shell, cmd or batch file. + + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Linker.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Linker.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..5c17a781 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Linker.md @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +Linker +------ +Generally one linker is run per target to build a static library, dynamic library or exe. The 'id' attribute of the linker specifies whch type of linking is performed. + + +- *exe* - Overwrite the exe command for this linker. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *flag* - Add a single link flag. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *ext* - Default extension for generated files - if not overridden by target. + ```xml + + ``` + + value = extension, including "." + +- *outflag* - Flag for specifying linker output name. + ```xml + + ``` + + value = linker flag. Note that it should contain a space character + if the actual name should be a separate argument, like "-o ", or "-o"/"-out:" if it does not. + +- *section* - Group items - usually sharing common condition + ```xml +
+ ``` + +- *libdir* - A temp directory name to build into. This will capture the extra files the compiler + generates, and then the desired file will be copied to the correct location. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *lib* - Add a library to the link line. + ```xml + + ``` + + name = the complete name is specified + + base = the name without compiler-specific extension (.a/.lib) is specified + + hxbase = the name without extension and architecture (-v7/.iphoinesim) is specified + +- *prefix* - Prefix for generated files. + ```xml + + ``` + + value = prefix. This will usually be "lib" or nothing. + +- *ranlib* - Whether ranlib needs to be run, and what command to use. Usually only for unix-style static libraries + ```xml + + ``` + +- *libpathflag* - Flag used for adding library paths to command line. It will be combined with *lib* entries. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *recreate* - Whether to delete the target file before re-running link command. + The archive "ar" command likes to add obj files to existing archives, so deleting first can help. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *expandAr* - Whether to extract the individual obj files from an archive and add these, rather than + add the archive as a single library. Can solve some link-order and static-initialization issues, + but may make final exe bigger. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *fromfile* - If the linker supports taking a list of objs in a file, then this is flag for specifying the file. + ```xml + + ``` + + value = flag for specifying file. + If the filename should be a separate argument, then the flag should end with a space. + Usually `@` or `-filelist `. Use empty to disable. + + needsQuotes = is whether to quote the obj names in the file + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/README.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/README.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..ba0dffd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +Build.xml +---------- + +The hxcpp build.xml build system is designed to make compiling, cross-compiling and linking easy on a large variety of operating systems and devices. It was originally designed to build the haxe-generated c++ code but has evolved to replace the need for configuration tools in many open source libraries. + +### Running +The source code for the tool lives in "tools/hxcpp" in this repo. When compiled, it can be run with the haxe 'haxelib' library tool. This is usually done automatically by the haxe compiler after the cpp code has been generated. It can be done manually like: +``` +haxelib run hxcpp build.xml key=value .... [target] +``` + +### Configuration +The hxcpp build tool is configured using key-value pairs, or just using keys, known internally as 'defines'. These can be set in several ways: + - From system environment variables + - From the command-line, with key=value + - From haxe. Keys defined in haxe with '-D key[=value]' are passed to the build too, where they can influence the build. Certain defines need to be set on the haxe command line so that they can influence the generated code. + - From the the .hxcpp_config.xml file in the users home(profile) directory. This is a good place to set values the apply to the whole machine, like the location of SDKs etc. + - The defines can be manipulated logically from within the build files themselves. + +See [Defines.md](Defines.md) for a list of standard defines. + + +### Format +The compiler specification and target lists all use the same format. + - uses xml parser + - mostly declarative list of files and flags + - order is important + + overriding values is a valid technique + + "commands" are run as they are parsed (eg, 'echo') + - conditions via "if" and "unless" node attributes + - substitution via '${VAR}' syntax + - need to define 'default' target + +### Conditions/Substitution +Most of the xml nodes support 'if' and 'unless' attributes. These will enable or disable the whole node according the existence or non-existence of a define. These can be combined with a space for "and" or two pipes for "or". + +Substitution is supported via the dollars-brace syntax, and does simple text substitution. In addition, there are a few dynamic variables that can be used: + - "${VAR}" - normal replacement + - "${removeQuotes:VAR}" - strips surrounding quotes from VAR, it any + - "${dospath:VAR}" - converts VAR to backwards-slash path + - "${dir:PathWithFilename}" - just the directory part of filename + - "${this_dir}" - the location of the containing build.xml file + + +### Example +The following code is saved in [example.xml](example.xml) in this directory +```xml + + + + + + +``` + +and some example uses: + +``` + unsetenv SILENT + haxelib run hxcpp example.xml + haxelib run hxcpp example.xml WHO=world default + setenv SILENT 1 + haxelib run hxcpp example.xml + haxelib run hxcpp example.xml WHO=world +``` + +### Details +The build.xml file contains configuration, targets, compilers, linkers and files. The details can be found in this directory. + - [Top Level](TopLevel.md) + - [Files](Files.md) + - [Targets](Targets.md) + - [Compiler](Compiler.md) + - [Linker](Linker.md) + - [Stripper](Stripper.md) + +When building from haxe, the "haxe" target is built. You can see the details in [HaxeTarget](HaxeTarget.md). + +You can extend the generated Build.xml from haxe code using [Xml injection](XmlInjection.md). + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Stripper.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Stripper.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..43657ee9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Stripper.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +Stripper +-------- + +A stripper is used to remove debug information in release builds on gcc-like systems. It may contain entries: + +- *exe* - Override stripper command + ```xml + + ``` + +- *flag* - Add flag to stripper command + ```xml + + ``` + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Tags.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Tags.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..21c26a2b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Tags.md @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +Tags +---- + +Tags are identifiers that link compiler flags with specific files. Usually, they are defined in a files group with the 'tags' attribute as a comma separated list, and with the 'tag' attribute on a compiler 'flag' node. Files are then compiled with all the flags that have matching tags. + +By restricting tags to certain files, only a sub-set of files needs to be recompiled when conditions change, and files without the relevant tags can reuse their object files. This can save a lot of time, since some flags only apply to a few files. + +Files can override the group tags by specifying their own 'tags' attribute. Groups can add tags with the 'tag' node. + +Some tags have standard meanings when compiling haxe code: + - *haxe* - The haxe tag adds all the required compiler flags to get haxe-generated code to compile correctly, and should be added to files that depend directly or indirectly on hxcpp.h. + - *static* - This will add the STATIC_LINK define when appropriate, which is used for generating cffi glue. It should be added to cffi code that might generate static libraries. + - *gc* - These flags only affect the garbage-collection files + - *hxstring* - These flags only affect String.cpp + - *optimization tags* - each file is assumed to have exactly 1 optimization tags. If none is explicitly specified, then the default is used depending on whether it is a debug or release build. They are: + + optim-std = alias for 'debug' or 'release' depending on build + + debug + + release + + optim-none + + optim-size + + Setting one of these tags is useful for compiling your library in release mode, even if haxe has -debug. Some very big files are slow to compile in release mode, so using a less optimized mode can be faster. + + +The tags attribute can be added to a haxe-generated file using the `@:fileXml` meta, eg: +```haxe +@:fileXml("tags='haxe,optim-none'") +class MyClass { ... +``` + +Here, the class is compiled with the normal haxe flags, but has the optimizations disabled, which can lead to much faster compiler times in some circumstances. diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Targets.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Targets.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..92112a33 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/Targets.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +Targets +------- + +Targets are used to produce binaries, or to group other targets. When compiling exes or dynamic libraries, they provide the additional link libraries. + +By default, hxcpp will try to compile the 'default' target, so it is easiest to define this one - perhaps by simply adding a dependence on your other targets(s). + +The target is defined with a 'toolid' attribute; exe, static_link or dll. This defines which linker is run, but many of the target entries will be the same even if the linker is changed. + +Targets can contain the following nodes: + +- *subTargetName* - Build another target before building this one. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *merge* - Combine fields from another target. This is useful if you want a target to function as static library or dll when compiled in its own, but also allow it to be used as a list of object files if another target wants to link in the object files directly. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *files* - Add a named group of compiled files to target. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *section* - Group items - usually sharing common condition + ```xml +
+ ``` + +- *lib* - Add a library to the link line. + ```xml + + ``` + + name = the complete name is specified + + base = the name without compiler-specific extension (.a/.lib) is specified + + hxbase = the name without extension and architecture (-v7/.iphoinesim) is specified + +- *flag* - Add a single link flag. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *vflag* - Add a pair of link flags. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *depend* - Target depends on given filename. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *dir* - Add a directory to the targets directory list. These directories will get removed then the target is cleaned. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *outdir* - Directory for build results - including "copyFile" targets + ```xml + + ``` + +- *ext* - Extension for generated files. + ```xml + + ``` + + ext = extension - should contain "." + +- *builddir* - The directory from which the targets build commands are run, and therefore the + relative base for some filenames, and destination for some compiler generated temps. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *libpath* Add library search path to build command + ```xml + + ``` + + name = directory. The particular linker will add the required flags + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/TopLevel.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/TopLevel.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..fe357ce2 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/TopLevel.md @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +Structure of the top-level +--------------------------- +The top-level nodes live inside an "xml" node, and can be: + +- *set* - Set a "define", define being a general variable. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *setenv* - Sets an hxcpp define and an environment variable for child processes. + ```xml + + ``` +- *unset* - Unset a define. if="name" will no longer be true + ```xml + + ``` + +- *setup* - Used internally to call custom setup code to find SDKs etc. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *echo* - Print value to console. Good for debugging. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *error* - Print value to console and force error. Good for checking prerequisites. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *pleaseUpdateHxcppTool* - Used to tell people updating git version that they need to recompile the build tool. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *path* - Add an directory to the exe search path. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *mkdir* - Create a directory. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *section* - Groups block of elements - usually ones that all respect the same if/unless condition. + ```xml +
+ ``` + +- *copy* - Copy file when node is parsed. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *import*/*include* - Read xml from another file. 'import' resets the relative base to the new file, include does not. + ```xml + + + ``` + + noerror - setting the optional noerror allows the file to be missing + + section - setting the optional section will only read the named section from the xml file. Used by hxcpp_config.xml. + +- *pragma* - Only include build file once, even with multiple include statements. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *nvccflag* - Add flag to all nvcc compiles. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *nvcclinkflag* - Add flag when linking with nvcc code. + ```xml + + ``` + +- *files* - Define a file group, and set default tags. + ```xml + + ... + + ``` + + dir = directory to which the filenames in the group are relative + + tags = comma separated list of flags tags + +- *target* - Define a target, and set its toolid(link mode) and output name. + ```xml + + ... + + ``` + +- *copyFile* - Copy a file after given toolId is run into target output directory + ```xml + + ``` + +- *magiclib* - Internal for replacing dlls with object files + ```xml + + ``` + +- *compiler* - Define a compiler. + ```xml + + ... + + ``` + + Use optional 'replace' to overwrite, otherwise append + + It is assumed only 1 compiler is active + + exe can be overridden in the body of the definition + +- *stripper* - Define a stripper, to remove debug information for release from gcc executables + ```xml + + ``` + + Use optional 'replace' to overwrite, otherwise append + +- *linker* - Define a linker. + ```xml + + ``` + + Use optional 'replace' to overwrite, otherwise append + + id could be 'static_link', 'dll' or 'exe'. Usually all 3 linkers are defined. + + exe can be overridden in the body of the definition + +- *prelinker* - Define a prelinker. + ```xml + + ... + + ``` + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/XmlInjection.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/XmlInjection.md new file mode 100755 index 00000000..dd060219 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/XmlInjection.md @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +Xml Injection +------------- + +When using external code in hxcpp, it is often useful to add libraries, include paths or compiler flags to the build process. This can be done with the `@:buildXml` class meta-data. eg, + +```haxe +@:buildXml(" + + + +") +@:keep +class StaticNme +{ + ... +``` + +So, by referencing a given class (you just 'import' the class, no need to use it because it has the @:keep meta-data), the xml fragment is also included. + +Here, the xml fragment is copied verbatim into the generated Build.xml immediately after the standard file lists. This example adds a library to the haxe target, but you could also add flags to files nodes, or files to another files node or target. Another possibility is to add an include command to pull in a whole external xml file. This can help avoid some syntax awkwardness needed when quoting strings in meta-data, and allows a normal xml editor to be used. + +It is also possible to replace the `__main__` file group to skip the standard initialization code and use a custom bootstrap procedure. + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/example.xml b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/example.xml new file mode 100755 index 00000000..6502fd6b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/docs/build_xml/example.xml @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + + + + + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/haxelib.json b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/haxelib.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..919b22c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/haxelib.json @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{ + "name": "hxcpp", + "url": "https://github.com/HaxeFoundation/hxcpp/", + "license": "BSD", + "tags": ["haxe", "hxcpp", "cpp"], + "description": "Hxcpp is the runtime support for the C++ backend of the Haxe compiler. This contains the headers, libraries and support code required to generate a fully compiled executable from Haxe code.", + "version": "4.3.0", + "releasenote": "See Changes.md", + "contributors": ["gamehaxe", "HaxeFoundation"], + "binaryversion": 48, + "dependencies": { + + } +} diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/haxelib.xml b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/haxelib.xml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d02bdba4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/haxelib.xml @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + + + Hxcpp is the runtime support for the c++ backend of the haxe compiler. This release constains the headers, libraries and support code required to generate a fully compiled executable from haxe code. +See Changes.txt + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/Builder.hx b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/Builder.hx new file mode 100644 index 00000000..df518239 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/Builder.hx @@ -0,0 +1,343 @@ +package hxcpp; + +import haxe.io.Path; +import sys.FileSystem; + +class Builder +{ + public var debug:Bool; + public var verbose:Bool; + + public function new(inArgs:Array) + { + debug = false; + verbose = false; + var targets = new Map>(); + var buildArgs = new Array(); + + try + { + var clean = false; + var defaultTarget = true; + for(arg in inArgs) + { + if (arg=="-debug") + { + debug = true; + continue; + } + else if (arg=="-v" || arg=="-verbose") + { + verbose = true; + Sys.putEnv("HXCPP_VERBOSE", "1"); + continue; + } + if (arg=="clean") + { + clean = true; + continue; + } + + + var parts = arg.split("-"); + var linkStatic = allowStatic(); + var linkNdll = allowNdll(); + var explicitNdll = false; + if (parts[0]=="static") + { + linkNdll = false; + parts.shift(); + } + else if (parts[0]=="ndll") + { + linkStatic = false; + explicitNdll = true; + parts.shift(); + } + + var target = parts.shift(); + if (target=="default") + target = getDefault(); + + switch(target) + { + case "ios", "android", "blackberry", "tizen", "emscripten", "webos", "windows", "msvc", "linux", "mac", "mingw", "tvos": + defaultTarget = false; + if (linkStatic) + { + var stat = "static-" + target; + targets.set(stat, parts); + + if (target=="ios" && wantLegacyIosBuild()) + { + var stat = "static-" + "ioslegacy"; + targets.set(stat, parts); + } + } + if (linkNdll && target!="ios" && target!="emscripten" && target!="tvos" /*&& (target!="mingw" || explicitNdll)*/ ) + targets.set(target, parts); + + default: + if (arg.substr(0,2)=="-D") + buildArgs.push(arg); + else + throw "Unknown arg '" + arg + "'"; + } + } + + if (clean) + { + if (!cleanAll(buildArgs)) + return; + + if (defaultTarget) // Just clean + return; + } + + if (defaultTarget) + { + var target = getDefault(); + if (target!="mingw") + targets.set(target,[]); + targets.set("static-" +target,[]); + onEmptyTarget(); + Sys.println("\nUsing default = " + target); + } + + for(target in targets.keys()) + { + var archs = targets.get(target); + var validArchs = new Map>(); + var isStatic = false; + if (target.substr(0,7)=="static-") + { + isStatic = true; + target = target.substr(7); + } + var staticFlags = isStatic ? ["-Dstatic_link"] : []; + if (target=="ios" || target=="tvos") + staticFlags = ["-DHXCPP_CPP11"]; + + switch(target) + { + case "linux": + if (wantLinux32()) + validArchs.set("m32", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_M32"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("m64", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_M64"].concat(staticFlags) ); + + case "mac": + if (wantMac32()) + validArchs.set("m32", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_M32"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("m64", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_M64"].concat(staticFlags) ); + + case "windows": + validArchs.set("m32", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_M32"].concat(staticFlags) ); + if (wantWindows64()) + validArchs.set("m64", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_M64"].concat(staticFlags) ); + if (wantWindowsArm64()) + validArchs.set("arm64", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_ARM64"].concat(staticFlags) ); + + case "msvc": + if (isStatic) + { + validArchs.set("2013m32", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_M32", "HXCPP_MSVC_VER=120"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("2015m32", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_M32", "HXCPP_MSVC_VER=140"].concat(staticFlags) ); + if (wantWindows64()) + { + validArchs.set("2013m64", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_M64", "HXCPP_MSVC_VER=120"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("2015m64", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_M64", "HXCPP_MSVC_VER=140"].concat(staticFlags) ); + } + } + else + { + validArchs.set("m32", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_M32"] ); + if (wantWindows64()) + validArchs.set("m64", ["-D"+target, "-DHXCPP_M64"] ); + } + + case "mingw": + validArchs.set("m32", ["-Dwindows", "-DHXCPP_MINGW", "-DHXCPP_M32"].concat(staticFlags) ); + + case "ios", "ioslegacy": + validArchs.set("armv6", ["-Diphoneos"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("armv7", ["-Diphoneos", "-DHXCPP_ARMV7"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("armv7s", ["-Diphoneos", "-DHXCPP_ARMV7S"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("arm64", ["-Diphoneos", "-DHXCPP_ARM64", "-DHXCPP_M64"].concat(staticFlags) ); + //validArchs.push("armv64"); + validArchs.set("x86", ["-Diphonesim"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("x86_64", ["-Diphonesim", "-DHXCPP_M64"].concat(staticFlags) ); + + case "android": + + if( archs.length == 0 ) + throw("You must specify the archs you want for android"); + + validArchs.set("armv5", ["-Dandroid"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("armv7", ["-Dandroid", "-DHXCPP_ARMV7"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("arm64", ["-Dandroid", "-DHXCPP_ARM64"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("x86", ["-Dandroid", "-DHXCPP_X86"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("x86_64", ["-Dandroid", "-DHXCPP_X86_64"].concat(staticFlags) ); + + case "blackberry": + validArchs.set("armv7", ["-Dblackberry"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("x86", ["-Dblackberry", "-Dsimulator"].concat(staticFlags) ); + + case "tizen": + validArchs.set("armv7", ["-Dtizen"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("x86", ["-Dtizen", "-Dsimulator"].concat(staticFlags) ); + + case "emscripten": + validArchs.set("x86", ["-Demscripten"].concat(staticFlags) ); + + case "webos": + validArchs.set("armv7", ["-Dwebos"].concat(staticFlags) ); + + case "tvos": + validArchs.set("arm64", ["-Dappletvos", "-DHXCPP_ARM64", "-DHXCPP_M64", "-DENABLE_BITCODE"].concat(staticFlags) ); + // NOTE: removed as there's no 32bit support for the AppleTV simulator + //validArchs.set("x86", ["-Dappletvsim", "-DENABLE_BITCODE"].concat(staticFlags) ); + validArchs.set("x86_64", ["-Dappletvsim", "-DHXCPP_M64", "-DENABLE_BITCODE"].concat(staticFlags) ); + + } + + + var valid = new Array(); + for(key in validArchs.keys()) + valid.push(key); + var buildArchs = archs.length==0 ? valid : archs; + for(arch in buildArchs) + { + if (validArchs.exists(arch)) + { + var flags = validArchs.get(arch); + if (debug) + flags.push("-Ddebug"); + + flags = flags.concat(buildArgs); + + runBuild(target, isStatic, arch, flags); + } + } + } + } + catch( e:Dynamic ) + { + if (e!="") + Sys.println(e); + showUsage(false); + } + } + + public function allowNdll() { return true; } + public function allowStatic() { return true; } + public function wantLegacyIosBuild() { return false; } + public function wantWindows64() { return false; } + public function wantMac32() { return false; } + public function wantLinux32() { return false; } + public function wantWindowsArm64() { return false; } + + public function runBuild(target:String, isStatic:Bool, arch:String, buildFlags:Array) + { + var args = ["run", "hxcpp", getBuildFile() ].concat(buildFlags); + + Sys.println('\nBuild $target, link=' + (isStatic?"lib":"ndll")+' arch=$arch'); + Sys.println("haxelib " + args.join(" ")); + if (Sys.command("haxelib",args)!=0) + { + Sys.println("#### Error building " + arch); + Sys.exit(-1); + } + } + + public function getBuildFile() + { + return "Build.xml"; + } + + public function getCleanDir() + { + return "obj"; + } + + public function cleanAll(inBuildFlags:Array) : Bool + { + var args = ["run", "hxcpp", getBuildFile(), "clean", "-DHXCPP_CLEAN_ONLY"].concat(inBuildFlags); + + Sys.println("haxelib " + args.join(" ")); + if (Sys.command("haxelib",args)!=0) + { + Sys.println("#### Error cleaning"); + Sys.exit(-1); + } + return true; + } + + + + public function onEmptyTarget() : Void + { + showUsage(true); + } + + static public function deleteRecurse(inDir:String) : Void + { + if (FileSystem.exists(inDir)) + { + var contents = FileSystem.readDirectory(inDir); + for(item in contents) + { + if (item!="." && item!="..") + { + var name = inDir + "/" + item; + if (FileSystem.isDirectory(name)) + deleteRecurse(name); + else + FileSystem.deleteFile(name); + } + } + FileSystem.deleteDirectory(inDir); + } + } + + + public function showUsage(inShowSpecifyMessage:Bool) : Void + { + var link = allowStatic() && allowNdll() ? "[link-]" : ""; + Sys.println("Usage : neko build.n [clean] " + link + + "target[-arch][-arch] ...] [-debug] [-verbose] [-D...]"); + Sys.println(" target : ios, android, windows, linux, mac, mingw, tvos"); + Sys.println(" default (=current system)"); + if (link!="") + { + Sys.println(" link : ndll- or static-"); + Sys.println(" (none specified = both link types, mingw static only"); + } + Sys.println(" arch : -armv5 -armv6 -armv7 -arm64 -x86 -x86_64 -m32 -m64"); + Sys.println(" (none specified = all valid architectures"); + Sys.println(" -D... : defines passed to hxcpp build system"); + if (link!="") + Sys.println(" eg: neko build.n clean ndll-mac-m32-m64 = rebuild both mac ndlls"); + if (inShowSpecifyMessage) + Sys.println(" Specify target or 'default' to remove this message"); + } + + public function getDefault() : String + { + var sys = Sys.systemName(); + if (new EReg("window", "i").match(sys)) + return "windows"; + else if (new EReg("linux", "i").match(sys)) + return "linux"; + else if (new EReg("mac", "i").match(sys)) + return "mac"; + else + throw "Unknown host system: " + sys; + return ""; + } + + public static function main() + { + new Builder( Sys.args() ); + } +} + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/NekoInit.hx b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/NekoInit.hx new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5366231b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/NekoInit.hx @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +package hxcpp; + +class NekoInit +{ + public static function nekoInit(inModuleName:String) : Bool + { + var init = neko.Lib.load(inModuleName, "neko_init", 5); + + if (init != null) + { + init( function(s) return new String(s), + function(len:Int) { var r = []; if (len > 0) r[len - 1] = null; return r; }, + null, + true, + false); + return true; + + } + return false; + } +} diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticMysql.hx b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticMysql.hx new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b1e7eef8 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticMysql.hx @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +package hxcpp; + +#if (hxcpp_api_level>=330) + +class StaticMysql { } + +#else + +@:cppFileCode( 'extern "C" int mysql_register_prims();') +@:buildXml(" + + + + +") +@:keep class StaticMysql +{ + static function __init__() + { + untyped __cpp__("mysql_register_prims();"); + } +} + +#end diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticRegexp.hx b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticRegexp.hx new file mode 100644 index 00000000..770add3b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticRegexp.hx @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +package hxcpp; + +#if (hxcpp_api_level>=330) + +class StaticRegexp { } + +#else + +@:cppFileCode( 'extern "C" int regexp_register_prims();') +@:buildXml(" + + + +") +@:keep class StaticRegexp +{ + static function __init__() + { + untyped __cpp__("regexp_register_prims();"); + } +} + +#end diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticSqlite.hx b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticSqlite.hx new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b0756539 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticSqlite.hx @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +package hxcpp; + +#if (hxcpp_api_level>=330) + +class StaticSqlite { } + +#else + +@:cppFileCode( 'extern "C" int sqlite_register_prims();') +@:buildXml(" + + + + +") +@:keep class StaticSqlite +{ + static function __init__() + { + untyped __cpp__("sqlite_register_prims();"); + } +} + +#end diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticStd.hx b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticStd.hx new file mode 100644 index 00000000..15184cd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticStd.hx @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +package hxcpp; + +#if (hxcpp_api_level>=330) + +class StaticStd { } + +#else + +@:cppFileCode( 'extern "C" int std_register_prims();') +@:buildXml(" + + + + +") +@:keep class StaticStd +{ + static function __init__() + { + untyped __cpp__("std_register_prims();"); + } +} + + +#end diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticZlib.hx b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticZlib.hx new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b44b1a13 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/hxcpp/StaticZlib.hx @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +package hxcpp; + +#if (hxcpp_api_level>=330) + +class StaticZlib { } + +#else + +@:cppFileCode( 'extern "C" int zlib_register_prims();') +#if HXCPP_LINK_NO_ZLIB +@:buildXml(" + +") +#else +@:buildXml(" + + + +") +#end +@:keep class StaticZlib +{ + static function __init__() + { + untyped __cpp__("zlib_register_prims();"); + } +} + +#end diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/Array.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/Array.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2d80766c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/Array.h @@ -0,0 +1,1292 @@ +#ifndef HX_ARRAY_H +#define HX_ARRAY_H +#include + +// --- hx::ReturnNull ------------------------------------------------------ +// +// Provides an "Null" of given type. For types that can't actually be null, Dynamic is used. + +namespace hx +{ + +enum ArrayStore +{ + arrayNull = 0, + arrayEmpty, + arrayFixed, + arrayBool, + arrayInt, + arrayFloat, + arrayString, + arrayObject, + arrayInt64 +}; + +enum ArrayConvertId +{ + aciAlwaysConvert = -4, + aciVirtualArray = -3, + aciStringArray = -2, + aciObjectArray = -1, + aciNotArray = 0, + aciPodBase = 1, +}; + +template +struct ReturnNull { typedef T type; }; +template<> struct ReturnNull { typedef Dynamic type; }; +template<> struct ReturnNull { typedef Dynamic type; }; +template<> struct ReturnNull { typedef Dynamic type; }; +template<> struct ReturnNull { typedef Dynamic type; }; +template<> struct ReturnNull { typedef Dynamic type; }; +template<> struct ReturnNull { typedef Dynamic type; }; +template<> struct ReturnNull { typedef Dynamic type; }; +template<> struct ReturnNull { typedef Dynamic type; }; +template<> struct ReturnNull { typedef Dynamic type; }; +template<> struct ReturnNull { typedef Dynamic type; }; +template<> struct ReturnNull< ::cpp::Int64> { typedef Dynamic type; }; + +template +struct ArrayTraits { enum { StoreType = arrayObject }; }; +template<> struct ArrayTraits { enum { StoreType = arrayInt }; }; +template<> struct ArrayTraits { enum { StoreType = arrayFloat}; }; +template<> struct ArrayTraits { enum { StoreType = arrayFloat}; }; +template<> struct ArrayTraits { enum { StoreType = arrayObject }; }; +template<> struct ArrayTraits { enum { StoreType = arrayString }; }; +template<> struct ArrayTraits< ::cpp::Int64> { enum { StoreType = arrayInt64 }; }; + +} + + + +namespace hx +{ + + + +// --- ArrayIterator ------------------------------------------- +// +// An object that conforms to the standard iterator interface for arrays +template +class ArrayIterator : public cpp::FastIterator_obj +{ +public: + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdArrayIterator }; + + ArrayIterator(Array inArray) : mArray(inArray), mIdx(0) { } + + // Fast versions ... + bool hasNext() { return mIdx < mArray->length; } + + inline TO toTo(const Dynamic &inD) { return inD.StaticCast(); } + + template + inline TO toTo(T inT) { return inT; } + + TO next() { return toTo(mArray->__get(mIdx++)); } + + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mArray,"mArray"); } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER_NAME(mArray,"mArray"); } + #endif + + int mIdx; + Array mArray; +}; + +// --- ArrayKeyValueIterator ------------------------------------------- +template +class ArrayKeyValueIterator : public cpp::FastIterator_obj +{ +public: + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdArrayIterator }; + + ArrayKeyValueIterator(Array inArray) : mArray(inArray), mIdx(0) { } + + bool hasNext() { return mIdx < mArray->length; } + + inline TO toTo(const Dynamic &inD) { return inD.StaticCast(); } + + template + inline TO toTo(T inT) { return inT; } + + + Dynamic next(); + + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mArray,"mArray"); } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER_NAME(mArray,"mArray"); } + #endif + + int mIdx; + Array mArray; +}; + +} + +namespace hx +{ + +// Also used by cpp::VirtualArray +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES ArrayCommon : public hx::Object +{ + protected: + int mArrayConvertId; + public: + // Plain old data element size - or 0 if not plain-old-data + int getArrayConvertId() const { return mArrayConvertId; } + + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>330) + virtual hx::Object *__GetRealObject() { return this; } + #endif +}; + +// --- hx::ArrayBase ---------------------------------------------------- +// +// Base class that treats array contents as a slab of bytes. +// The derived "Array_obj" adds strong typing to the "[]" operator + +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES ArrayBase : public ArrayCommon +{ +public: + ArrayBase(int inSize,int inReserve,int inElementSize,bool inAtomic); + + // Defined later so we can use "Array" + static Array __new(int inSize=0,int inReserve=0); + + + static void __boot(); + + typedef hx::Object super; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdArrayBase }; + + // Used by cpp.ArrayBase + inline int getElementSize() const { return GetElementSize(); } + inline int getByteCount() const { return GetElementSize()*length; } + inline char * getBase() const { return mBase; } + + + hx::Val __SetField(const String &inString,const hx::Val &inValue ,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp) { return null(); } + + static hx::Class __mClass; + static hx::Class &__SGetClass() { return __mClass; } + hx::Class __GetClass() const { return __mClass; } + String toString(); + String __ToString() const; + + + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>330) + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const; + #endif + + + void setData(void *inData, int inElements) + { + mBase = (char *)inData; + length = inElements; + mAlloc = inElements; + HX_OBJ_WB_PESSIMISTIC_GET(this); + } + + void setUnmanagedData(void *inData, int inElements) + { + mBase = (char *)inData; + length = inElements; + mAlloc = -1; + } + + + int __GetType() const { return vtArray; } + + inline size_t size() const { return length; } + inline int __length() const { return (int)length; } + + virtual String ItemString(int inI) = 0; + + const char * __CStr() const { return mBase; } + inline const char *GetBase() const { return mBase; } + inline char *GetBase() { return mBase; } + + virtual int GetElementSize() const = 0; + + inline void resize(int inSize) + { + if (inSizelength) + { + EnsureSize(inSize); + length = inSize; + } + } + inline void __SetSize(int inLen) { resize(inLen); } + + void __SetSizeExact(int inLen=0); + + Dynamic __unsafe_get(const Dynamic &i); + Dynamic __unsafe_set(const Dynamic &i, const Dynamic &val); + + void safeSort(Dynamic sorter, bool isString); + + inline void __unsafeStringReference(String inString) + { + mBase = (char *)inString.raw_ptr(); + length = inString.length / GetElementSize(); + mAlloc = length; + HX_OBJ_WB_PESSIMISTIC_GET(this); + } + + + virtual hx::ArrayStore getStoreType() const = 0; + + + // Dynamic interface + hx::Val __Field(const String &inString ,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL < 330) + virtual Dynamic __concat(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __copy() = 0; + virtual Dynamic __insert(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __iterator() = 0; + virtual Dynamic __keyValueIterator() = 0; + virtual Dynamic __join(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __pop() = 0; + virtual Dynamic __push(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __remove(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __removeAt(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __indexOf(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __lastIndexOf(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __reverse() = 0; + virtual Dynamic __shift() = 0; + virtual Dynamic __slice(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __splice(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) =0; + virtual Dynamic __sort(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __toString() = 0; + virtual Dynamic __unshift(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __map(const Dynamic &func) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __filter(const Dynamic &func) = 0; + inline Dynamic ____SetSize(const Dynamic &len) { resize(len); return this; } + inline Dynamic ____SetSizeExact(const Dynamic &len) { __SetSizeExact(len); return this; } + inline Dynamic ____unsafe_set(const Dynamic &i, const Dynamic &val) { return __SetItem(i,val); } + inline Dynamic ____unsafe_get(const Dynamic &i) { return __GetItem(i); } + virtual Dynamic __blit(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1,const Dynamic &a2,const Dynamic &a3) = 0; + inline Dynamic __zero(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) { zero(a0,a1); return null(); } + virtual Dynamic __memcmp(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual void __qsort(Dynamic inCompare) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __resize(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + + #else + inline void ____SetSize(int len) { resize(len); } + inline void ____SetSizeExact(int len) { __SetSizeExact(len); } + inline Dynamic ____unsafe_set(const Dynamic &i, const Dynamic &val) { return __SetItem(i,val); } + inline Dynamic ____unsafe_get(const Dynamic &i) { return __GetItem(i); } + + virtual hx::ArrayBase *__concat(const cpp::VirtualArray &a0) = 0; + virtual hx::ArrayBase *__copy() = 0; + virtual void __insert(int inIndex,const Dynamic &a1) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __iterator() = 0; + virtual Dynamic __keyValueIterator() = 0; + virtual ::String __join(::String a0) = 0; + virtual Dynamic __pop() = 0; + virtual int __push(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual bool __contains(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual bool __remove(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual bool __removeAt(int inIndex) = 0; + virtual int __indexOf(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) = 0; + virtual int __lastIndexOf(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) = 0; + virtual void __reverse() = 0; + virtual Dynamic __shift() = 0; + virtual hx::ArrayBase *__slice(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) = 0; + virtual hx::ArrayBase *__splice(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) = 0; + virtual void __sort(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual ::String __toString() = 0; + virtual void __unshift(const Dynamic &a0) = 0; + virtual cpp::VirtualArray_obj *__map(const Dynamic &func) = 0; + virtual hx::ArrayBase *__filter(const Dynamic &func) = 0; + virtual void __blit(int inDestElement,const cpp::VirtualArray &inSourceArray,int inSourceElement,int inElementCount) = 0; + virtual int __memcmp(const cpp::VirtualArray &a0) = 0; + inline void __zero(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) { zero(a0,a1); } + virtual void __qsort(Dynamic inCompare) = 0; + virtual void __resize(int inLen) = 0; + + virtual void set(int inIdx, const cpp::Variant &inValue) = 0; + virtual void setUnsafe(int inIdx, const cpp::Variant &inValue) = 0; + #endif + + Dynamic concat_dyn(); + Dynamic copy_dyn(); + Dynamic insert_dyn(); + Dynamic iterator_dyn(); + Dynamic keyValueIterator_dyn(); + Dynamic join_dyn(); + Dynamic pop_dyn(); + Dynamic push_dyn(); + Dynamic contains_dyn(); + Dynamic remove_dyn(); + Dynamic removeAt_dyn(); + Dynamic indexOf_dyn(); + Dynamic lastIndexOf_dyn(); + Dynamic reverse_dyn(); + Dynamic shift_dyn(); + Dynamic slice_dyn(); + Dynamic splice_dyn(); + Dynamic sort_dyn(); + Dynamic toString_dyn(); + Dynamic unshift_dyn(); + Dynamic map_dyn(); + Dynamic filter_dyn(); + Dynamic __SetSize_dyn(); + Dynamic __SetSizeExact_dyn(); + Dynamic __unsafe_get_dyn(); + Dynamic __unsafe_set_dyn(); + Dynamic blit_dyn(); + Dynamic zero_dyn(); + Dynamic memcmp_dyn(); + Dynamic resize_dyn(); + + void Realloc(int inLen) const; + + inline void EnsureSize(int inLen) const + { + if (inLen>length) + { + if (inLen>mAlloc) + Realloc(inLen); + length = inLen; + } + } + + void RemoveElement(int inIndex); + + + void Insert(int inPos); + + void Splice(hx::ArrayBase *outResult,int inPos,int inLen); + + void Slice(hx::ArrayBase *outResult,int inPos,int inEnd); + + void Concat(hx::ArrayBase *outResult,const char *inEnd, int inLen); + + + void reserve(int inN) const; + + inline int capacity() const { return mAlloc; } + + // Set numeric values to 0, pointers to null, bools to false + void zero(Dynamic inFirst, Dynamic inCount); + + int Memcmp(ArrayBase *inArray); + + // Copy section of other array. + void Blit(int inDestElement, ArrayBase *inSourceArray, int inSourceElement, int inElementCount); + + static String joinArray(hx::ArrayBase *inBase, String inSeparator); + static String joinArray(Array_obj *inArray, String inSeparator); + + virtual bool AllocAtomic() const { return false; } + + inline bool IsByteArray() const { return getStoreType()==arrayBool; } + + + inline Dynamic __get(int inIndex) const { return __GetItem(inIndex); } + + // Plain old data element size - or 0 if not plain-old-data + int getArrayConvertId() const { return mArrayConvertId; } + + mutable int length; + + static inline int baseOffset() { return (int)offsetof(ArrayBase,mBase); } + static inline int allocOffset() { return (int)offsetof(ArrayBase,mAlloc); } + static inline int lengthOffset() { return (int)offsetof(ArrayBase,length); } + +protected: + mutable int mAlloc; + mutable char *mBase; +}; + +} // end namespace hx for ArrayBase + +namespace cpp +{ + typedef hx::ArrayBase ArrayBase_obj; + + // Use by cpp.ArrayBase extern + typedef hx::ObjectPtr ArrayBase; +} + + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=330) +#include "cpp/VirtualArray.h" +#endif + + + + +// --- Array_obj ------------------------------------------------------------------ +// +// The Array_obj specialises the ArrayBase, adding typing where required + + +namespace hx +{ +// This is to determine is we need to include our slab of bytes in garbage collection +template +inline bool TypeContainsPointers(T *) { return true; } +template<> inline bool TypeContainsPointers(bool *) { return false; } +template<> inline bool TypeContainsPointers(int *) { return false; } +template<> inline bool TypeContainsPointers(double *) { return false; } +template<> inline bool TypeContainsPointers(float *) { return false; } +template<> inline bool TypeContainsPointers(short *) { return false; } +template<> inline bool TypeContainsPointers(unsigned char *) { return false; } +template<> inline bool TypeContainsPointers(::cpp::Int64 *) { return false; } + +template inline bool ContainsPointers() +{ + return TypeContainsPointers( (TYPE *)0 ); +} + +struct TNonGcStringSet; + +//template inline const void *PointerOf(hx::ObjectPtr &o) { return o.mPtr; } +//inline const void *PointerOf(String &s) { return s.raw_ptr(); } +inline const void *PointerOf(hx::TNonGcStringSet &set) { return 0; } +//inline const void *PointerOf(...) { return 0; } + + + +// For returning "null" when out of bounds ... +template +inline TYPE *NewNull() { Dynamic d; return (TYPE *)hx::NewGCBytes(&d,sizeof(d)); } + +template<> inline int *NewNull() { int i=0; return (int *)hx::NewGCPrivate(&i,sizeof(i)); } +template<> inline bool *NewNull() { bool b=0; return (bool *)hx::NewGCPrivate(&b,sizeof(b)); } +template<> inline double *NewNull() { double d=0.0; return (double *)hx::NewGCPrivate(&d,sizeof(d)); } +template<> inline float *NewNull() { float d=0.0f; return (float *)hx::NewGCPrivate(&d,sizeof(d)); } +template<> inline unsigned char *NewNull() { unsigned char u=0; return (unsigned char *)hx::NewGCPrivate(&u,sizeof(u)); } +template<> inline ::cpp::Int64 *NewNull< ::cpp::Int64>() { ::cpp::Int64 i=0; return (::cpp::Int64 *)hx::NewGCPrivate(&i,sizeof(i)); } + + +bool DynamicEq(const Dynamic &a, const Dynamic &b); + +} + +template struct ArrayClassId { enum { id=hx::clsIdArrayObject }; }; +template<> struct ArrayClassId { enum { id=hx::clsIdArrayByte }; }; +template<> struct ArrayClassId { enum { id=hx::clsIdArrayByte }; }; +template<> struct ArrayClassId { enum { id=hx::clsIdArrayShort }; }; +template<> struct ArrayClassId { enum { id=hx::clsIdArrayShort }; }; +template<> struct ArrayClassId { enum { id=hx::clsIdArrayInt }; }; +template<> struct ArrayClassId { enum { id=hx::clsIdArrayInt }; }; +template<> struct ArrayClassId { enum { id=hx::clsIdArrayFloat32 }; }; +template<> struct ArrayClassId { enum { id=hx::clsIdArrayFloat64 }; }; +template<> struct ArrayClassId { enum { id=hx::clsIdArrayString }; }; +template<> struct ArrayClassId< ::cpp::Int64> { enum { id=hx::clsIdArrayInt64 }; }; + +// sort... +#include + +namespace hx +{ +template +inline bool arrayElemEq(const T &a, const T &b) { return a==b; } + +template<> +inline bool arrayElemEq(const Dynamic &a, const Dynamic &b) { + return hx::DynamicEq(a,b); +} +} + + +template +class Array_obj : public hx::ArrayBase +{ + typedef ELEM_ Elem; + typedef hx::ObjectPtr< Array_obj > ObjPtr; + typedef typename hx::ReturnNull::type NullType; + +public: + enum { _hx_ClassId = ArrayClassId::id }; + + + Array_obj(int inSize,int inReserve) : + hx::ArrayBase(inSize,inReserve,sizeof(ELEM_),!hx::ContainsPointers()) { } + + + // Defined later so we can use "Array" + static Array __new(int inSize=0,int inReserve=0); + static Array __newConstWrapper(ELEM_ *inData,int inSize); + static Array fromData(const ELEM_ *inData,int inCount); + + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>331) + bool _hx_isInstanceOf(int inClassId) + { + return inClassId==1 || inClassId==(int)hx::clsIdArrayBase || inClassId==(int)_hx_ClassId; + } +#endif + + virtual bool AllocAtomic() const { return !hx::ContainsPointers(); } + + virtual Dynamic __GetItem(int inIndex) const { return __get(inIndex); } + virtual Dynamic __SetItem(int inIndex,Dynamic inValue) + { + ELEM_ &elem = Item(inIndex); + elem = inValue; + if (hx::ContainsPointers()) { HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this,hx::PointerOf(elem)); } + return inValue; + } + + inline ELEM_ *Pointer() { return (ELEM_ *)mBase; } + + inline ELEM_ &Item(int inIndex) + { + if (inIndex>=(int)length) EnsureSize(inIndex+1); + else if (inIndex<0) { return * hx::NewNull(); } + return * (ELEM_ *)(mBase + inIndex*sizeof(ELEM_)); + } + inline ELEM_ __get(int inIndex) const + { + if ((unsigned int)inIndex>=(unsigned int)length ) return null(); + return * (ELEM_ *)(mBase + inIndex*sizeof(ELEM_)); + } + + // Does not check for size valid - use with care + inline ELEM_ &__unsafe_get(int inIndex) { return * (ELEM_ *)(mBase + inIndex*sizeof(ELEM_)); } + + + inline ELEM_ & __unsafe_set(int inIndex, ELEM_ inValue) + { + ELEM_ &elem = *(ELEM_*)(mBase + inIndex*sizeof(ELEM_)); + elem = inValue; + if (hx::ContainsPointers()) { HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(elem)); } + return elem; + } + + + inline int memcmp(Array inOther) + { + return ArrayBase::Memcmp(inOther.GetPtr()); + } + + + inline void memcpy(int inStart, const ELEM_ *inData, int inElements) + { + EnsureSize(inStart+inElements); + int s = GetElementSize(); + ::memcpy(mBase + s*inStart, inData, s*inElements); + if (hx::ContainsPointers()) + { + HX_OBJ_WB_PESSIMISTIC_GET(this); + } + } + + + inline void blit(int inDestElement, Array inSourceArray, + int inSourceElement, int inElementCount) + { + ArrayBase::Blit(inDestElement, inSourceArray.GetPtr(), inSourceElement, inElementCount); + } + + + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) + { + if (mAlloc>0) hx::MarkAlloc((void *)mBase, __inCtx ); + if (length && hx::ContainsPointers()) + { + ELEM_ *ptr = (ELEM_ *)mBase; + HX_MARK_MEMBER_ARRAY(ptr,length); + } + } + + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) + { + if (mAlloc>0) __inCtx->visitAlloc((void **)&mBase); + if (hx::ContainsPointers()) + { + ELEM_ *ptr = (ELEM_ *)mBase; + for(int i=0;i __SetSizeExact(int inLen); + + int GetElementSize() const { return sizeof(ELEM_); } + + String ItemString(int inI) + { + String result(__get(inI)); + if (result==null()) return HX_CSTRING("null"); + return result; + } + + Array_obj *Add(const ELEM_ &inItem) { push(inItem); return this; } + + Array init(int inIndex, ELEM_ inValue) + { + * (ELEM_ *)(mBase + inIndex*sizeof(ELEM_)) = inValue; + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + if (hx::ContainsPointers()) + { HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(inValue)); } + #endif + return this; + } + + + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + inline int pushCtx(hx::StackContext *_hx_ctx, ELEM_ inVal ) + { + int l = length; + EnsureSize((int)l+1); + * (ELEM_ *)(mBase + l*sizeof(ELEM_)) = inVal; + if (hx::ContainsPointers()) { HX_ARRAY_WB(this,inIdx, hx::PointerOf(inVal) ); } + return length; + } + #endif + + + // Haxe API + inline int push( ELEM_ inVal ) + { + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + if (hx::ContainsPointers()) + return pushCtx(HX_CTX_GET,inVal); + #endif + int l = length; + EnsureSize((int)l+1); + * (ELEM_ *)(mBase + l*sizeof(ELEM_)) = inVal; + return length; + } + inline NullType pop( ) + { + if (!length) return null(); + ELEM_ result = __get((int)length-1); + resize((int)length-1); + return result; + } + + + + int Find(ELEM_ inValue) + { + ELEM_ *e = (ELEM_ *)mBase; + for(int i=0;i=length || idx<0) return false; + RemoveElement(idx); + return true; + } + + + int indexOf(ELEM_ inValue, Dynamic fromIndex = null()) + { + int len = length; + int i = fromIndex==null() ? 0 : fromIndex->__ToInt(); + ELEM_ *e = (ELEM_ *)mBase; + if (i < 0) + { + i += len; + if (i < 0) i = 0; + } + while(i__ToInt(); + ELEM_ *e = (ELEM_ *)mBase; + if (i >= len) + i = len - 1; + else if (i < 0) + i += len; + while(i>=0) + { + if (hx::arrayElemEq(e[i],inValue)) + return i; + i--; + } + return -1; + } + + NullType shift() + { + if (length==0) return null(); + ELEM_ result = __get(0); + RemoveElement(0); + return result; + } + + String join(String inSeparator) { return ArrayBase::joinArray(this, inSeparator); } + + Array concat( Array inTail ); + Array copy( ); + Array slice(int inPos, Dynamic end = null()); + Array splice(int inPos, int len); + inline void removeRange(int inPos, int len) + { + hx::ArrayBase::Splice(0,inPos,len); + } + + #if HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=330 + cpp::VirtualArray map(Dynamic inFunc); + #else + Dynamic map(Dynamic inFunc); + #endif + Array filter(Dynamic inFunc); + + void insert(int inPos, ELEM_ inValue) + { + if (inPos<0) + { + inPos+=length; + if (inPos<0) inPos = 0; + } + else if (inPos>length) + inPos = length; + hx::ArrayBase::Insert(inPos); + Item(inPos) = inValue; + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + if (hx::ContainsPointers()) + { HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this,hx::PointerOf(inValue)); } + #endif + } + + void unshift(ELEM_ inValue) + { + insert(0,inValue); + } + + void reverse() + { + int half = length/2; + ELEM_ *e = (ELEM_ *)mBase; + for(int i=0;i__ToInt() < 0; + } + + Dynamic mFunc; + }; + + inline void qsort(Dynamic inSorter) + { + ELEM_ *e = (ELEM_ *)mBase; + std::sort(e, e+length, Sorter(inSorter) ); + } + + void sort(Dynamic inSorter) + { + if ( (int)hx::ArrayTraits::StoreType==(int)hx::arrayObject || + (int)hx::ArrayTraits::StoreType==(int)hx::arrayString) + { + // Keep references from being hidden inside sorters buffers + safeSort(inSorter, (int)hx::ArrayTraits::StoreType==(int)hx::arrayString); + } + else + { + ELEM_ *e = (ELEM_ *)mBase; + std::stable_sort(e, e+length, Sorter(inSorter) ); + } + } + + Dynamic iterator() { return new hx::ArrayIterator(this); } + Dynamic keyValueIterator() { return new hx::ArrayKeyValueIterator(this); } + + template + Dynamic iteratorFast() { return new hx::ArrayIterator(this); } + + template + Dynamic keyValueIteratorFast() { return new hx::ArrayKeyValueIterator(this); } + + virtual hx::ArrayStore getStoreType() const + { + return (hx::ArrayStore) hx::ArrayTraits::StoreType; + } + + inline ELEM_ &setCtx(hx::StackContext *_hx_ctx, int inIdx, ELEM_ inValue) + { + ELEM_ &elem = Item(inIdx); + HX_ARRAY_WB(this,inIdx, hx::PointerOf(inValue) ); + return elem = inValue; + } + + + // Dynamic interface + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL < 330) + virtual Dynamic __concat(const Dynamic &a0) { return concat(a0); } + virtual Dynamic __copy() { return copy(); } + virtual Dynamic __insert(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) { insert(a0,a1); return null(); } + virtual Dynamic __iterator() { return iterator(); } + virtual Dynamic __keyValueIterator() { return keyValueIterator(); } + virtual Dynamic __join(const Dynamic &a0) { return join(a0); } + virtual Dynamic __pop() { return pop(); } + virtual Dynamic __push(const Dynamic &a0) { return push(a0);} + virtual Dynamic __remove(const Dynamic &a0) { return remove(a0); } + virtual Dynamic __removeAt(const Dynamic &a0) { return removeAt(a0); } + virtual Dynamic __indexOf(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) { return indexOf(a0, a1); } + virtual Dynamic __lastIndexOf(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) { return lastIndexOf(a0, a1); } + virtual Dynamic __reverse() { reverse(); return null(); } + virtual Dynamic __shift() { return shift(); } + virtual Dynamic __slice(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) { return slice(a0,a1); } + virtual Dynamic __splice(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) { return splice(a0,a1); } + virtual Dynamic __sort(const Dynamic &a0) { sort(a0); return null(); } + virtual Dynamic __toString() { return toString(); } + virtual Dynamic __unshift(const Dynamic &a0) { unshift(a0); return null(); } + virtual Dynamic __map(const Dynamic &func) { return map(func); } + virtual Dynamic __filter(const Dynamic &func) { return filter(func); } + virtual Dynamic __blit(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1,const Dynamic &a2,const Dynamic &a3) { blit(a0,a1,a2,a3); return null(); } + virtual Dynamic __memcmp(const Dynamic &a0) { return memcmp(a0); } + virtual Dynamic __resize(const Dynamic &a0) { resize(a0); return null(); } + virtual void __qsort(Dynamic inCompare) { this->qsort(inCompare); }; + #else //(HXCPP_API_LEVEL < 330) + + virtual hx::ArrayBase *__concat(const cpp::VirtualArray &a0) { return concat(a0).mPtr; } + virtual hx::ArrayBase *__copy() { return copy().mPtr; } + virtual void __insert(int inIndex,const Dynamic &a1) { insert(inIndex,a1);} + virtual Dynamic __iterator() { return iterator(); } + virtual Dynamic __keyValueIterator() { return keyValueIterator(); } + virtual ::String __join(::String a0) { return join(a0); } + virtual Dynamic __pop() { return pop(); } + virtual int __push(const Dynamic &a0) { return push(a0);} + virtual bool __contains(const Dynamic &a0) { return contains(a0); } + virtual bool __remove(const Dynamic &a0) { return remove(a0); } + virtual bool __removeAt(int inIndex) { return removeAt(inIndex); } + virtual int __indexOf(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) { return indexOf(a0, a1); } + virtual int __lastIndexOf(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) { return lastIndexOf(a0, a1); } + virtual void __reverse() { reverse(); } + virtual Dynamic __shift() { return shift(); } + virtual hx::ArrayBase *__slice(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) { return slice(a0,a1).mPtr; } + virtual hx::ArrayBase *__splice(const Dynamic &a0,const Dynamic &a1) { return splice(a0,a1).mPtr; } + virtual void __sort(const Dynamic &a0) { sort(a0); } + virtual ::String __toString() { return toString(); } + virtual void __unshift(const Dynamic &a0) { unshift(a0); } + virtual cpp::VirtualArray_obj *__map(const Dynamic &func) { return map(func).mPtr; } + virtual void __resize(int inLen) { resize(inLen); } + + virtual hx::ArrayBase *__filter(const Dynamic &func) { return filter(func).mPtr; } + virtual void __blit(int inDestElement,const cpp::VirtualArray &inSourceArray,int inSourceElement,int inElementCount) + { + blit(inDestElement,inSourceArray,inSourceElement,inElementCount); + } + virtual int __memcmp(const cpp::VirtualArray &a0) { return memcmp(a0); } + virtual void __qsort(Dynamic inCompare) { this->qsort(inCompare); }; + + virtual void set(int inIndex, const cpp::Variant &inValue) { + ELEM_ &elem = Item(inIndex); + elem = ELEM_(inValue); + if (hx::ContainsPointers()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(elem)); + } + } + virtual void setUnsafe(int inIndex, const cpp::Variant &inValue) { + ELEM_ &elem = *(ELEM_ *)(mBase + inIndex*sizeof(ELEM_)); + elem = ELEM_(inValue); + if (hx::ContainsPointers()) { HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this,hx::PointerOf(elem)); } + } + + + #endif +}; + + +// --- Array --------------------------------------------------------------- +// +// The array class adds object syntax to the Array_obj pointer + +template +class Array : public hx::ObjectPtr< Array_obj > +{ + typedef hx::ObjectPtr< Array_obj > super; + typedef Array_obj OBJ_; + +public: + typedef ELEM_ Elem; + typedef Array_obj *Ptr; + using super::mPtr; + using super::GetPtr; + + Array() { } + Array(int inSize,int inReserve) : super( OBJ_::__new(inSize,inReserve) ) { } + Array(const null &inNull) : super(0) { } + Array(Ptr inPtr) : super(inPtr) { } + + #ifdef HXCPP_CHECK_POINTER + inline OBJ_ *CheckGetPtr() const + { + if (!mPtr) hx::NullReference("Array", true); + // The handler might have fixed up the null value + if (!mPtr) hx::NullReference("Array", false); + return mPtr; + } + #else + inline OBJ_ *CheckGetPtr() const { return mPtr; } + #endif + + // Construct from our type ... + Array ( const hx::ObjectPtr< OBJ_ > &inArray ) + : hx::ObjectPtr< OBJ_ >(inArray) { } + + Array(const Array &inArray) : super(inArray.GetPtr()) { } + + // Build dynamic array from foreign array + template + Array( const Array &inRHS ) : super(0) + { + Array_obj *ptr = inRHS.GetPtr(); + if (ptr) + { + OBJ_ *arr = dynamic_cast(ptr); + if (!arr) + { + // Non-identical type (syntactically, should be creating from Array) + // Copy elements one-by-one + // Not quite right, but is the best we can do... + int n = ptr->__length(); + *this = Array_obj::__new(n); + for(int i=0;i__unsafe_set(i,ptr->__GetItem(i)); + } + else + mPtr = arr; + } + } + + #ifdef HX_VARRAY_DEFINED + // From VirtualArray + Array( const cpp::VirtualArray &inVArray) { fromVArray(inVArray.mPtr); } + + void fromVArray(cpp::VirtualArray_obj *inVArray) + { + if (!inVArray || inVArray->store==hx::arrayNull) + { + mPtr = 0; + return; + } + inVArray->fixType(); + // Switch on type? + setDynamic(inVArray->base,true); + } + + Array &operator=( const cpp::VirtualArray &inRHS ) + { + fromVArray(inRHS.mPtr); + return *this; + } + + #endif + + inline void setDynamic( const Dynamic &inRHS, bool inIgnoreVirtualArray=false ) + { + hx::Object *ptr = inRHS.GetPtr(); + if (ptr) + { + OBJ_ *arr = dynamic_cast(ptr); + if (!arr && ptr->__GetClass().mPtr == super::__SGetClass().mPtr ) + { + #ifdef HX_VARRAY_DEFINED + cpp::VirtualArray_obj *varray = inIgnoreVirtualArray ? 0 : + dynamic_cast(ptr); + if (varray) + fromVArray(varray); + else + #endif + { + // Non-identical type. + // Copy elements one-by-one + // Not quite right, but is the best we can do... + int n = ptr->__length(); + *this = Array_obj::__new(n); + for(int i=0;i__unsafe_set(i,ptr->__GetItem(i)); + } + } + else + mPtr = arr; + } + } + + Array( const Dynamic &inRHS ) : super(0) { setDynamic(inRHS); } + Array( const cpp::ArrayBase &inRHS ) : super(0) { setDynamic(inRHS); } + inline Array(const ::cpp::Variant &inVariant) : super(0) + { + setDynamic(inVariant.asObject()); + } + + // operator= exact match... + Array &operator=( Array inRHS ) + { + mPtr = inRHS.GetPtr(); + return *this; + } + + // Foreign array + template + Array &operator=( const Array &inRHS ) + { + *this = Array(inRHS); + return *this; + } + + Array &operator=( const Dynamic &inRHS ) + { + setDynamic(inRHS); + return *this; + } + + Array &operator=( const cpp::ArrayBase &inRHS ) + { + setDynamic(inRHS); + return *this; + } + + + Array &operator=( const cpp::Variant &inRHS ) + { + if (inRHS.type!=cpp::Variant::typeObject) + setDynamic( null() ); + else + setDynamic(inRHS.valObject); + return *this; + } + + + Array &operator=( const null &inNull ) + { + mPtr = 0; + return *this; + } + + + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) + inline bool operator==(const cpp::VirtualArray &varray) const { return varray==*this; } + inline bool operator!=(const cpp::VirtualArray &varray) const { return varray!=*this; } + #endif + + + inline ELEM_ &operator[](int inIdx) { return CheckGetPtr()->Item(inIdx); } + inline ELEM_ operator[](int inIdx) const { return CheckGetPtr()->__get(inIdx); } + //inline ELEM_ __get(int inIdx) const { return CheckGetPtr()->__get(inIdx); } + inline int __length() const { return CheckGetPtr()->__length(); } + inline Array &Add(const ELEM_ &inElem) { CheckGetPtr()->Add(inElem); return *this; } + inline Array & operator<<(const ELEM_ &inElem) { CheckGetPtr()->Add(inElem); return *this; } +}; + + +// Now that the "Array" object is defined, we can implement this function .... + +template +Array Array_obj::__new(int inSize,int inReserve) + { return Array(new Array_obj(inSize,inReserve)); } + + +template +Array Array_obj::__newConstWrapper(ELEM_ *inData,int inSize) +{ + Array_obj temp(0,0); + Array_obj *result = (Array_obj *)hx::InternalCreateConstBuffer(&temp,sizeof(temp)); + result->setUnmanagedData(inData, inSize); + return result; +} + + +template +Array Array_obj::fromData(const ELEM_ *inData,int inCount) +{ + Array result = new Array_obj(inCount,inCount); + if (inCount) + result->memcpy(0, inData, inCount); + return result; +} + + + +template<> +inline bool Dynamic::IsClass >() + { return mPtr && mPtr->__GetClass()== hx::ArrayBase::__mClass; } + + +template +Array Array_obj::concat( Array inTail ) +{ + Array_obj *result = new Array_obj(inTail->__length()+(int)length,0); + hx::ArrayBase::Concat(result,inTail->GetBase(),inTail->__length()); + return result; +} + +template +Array Array_obj::copy( ) +{ + Array_obj *result = new Array_obj((int)length,0); + ::memcpy(result->GetBase(),GetBase(),length*sizeof(ELEM_)); + return result; +} + +// Copies the range of the array starting at pos up to, but not including, end. +// Both pos and end can be negative to count from the end: -1 is the last item in the array. +template +Array Array_obj::slice(int inPos, Dynamic end) +{ + int e = end==null() ? length : end->__ToInt(); + Array_obj *result = new Array_obj(0,0); + hx::ArrayBase::Slice(result,inPos,(int)e); + return result; +} + +template +Array Array_obj::splice(int inPos, int len) +{ + Array_obj * result = new Array_obj(0,0); + hx::ArrayBase::Splice(result,inPos,len); + return result; +} + + +template +Array Array_obj::filter(Dynamic inFunc) +{ + Array_obj *result = new Array_obj(0,0); + for(int i=0;ipush(__unsafe_get(i)); + return result; +} + +template +Array Array_obj::__SetSizeExact(int inLen) +{ + ArrayBase::__SetSizeExact(inLen); + return this; +} + +// Static externs +template +inline ARRAY _hx_array_set_size_exact(ARRAY inArray, int inLen) +{ + return inArray->__SetSizeExact(inLen); +} + +template +inline int _hx_array_memcmp(ARRAY1 inArray1, ARRAY2 inArray2) +{ + return inArray1->memcmp(inArray2); +} + +template +inline typename ARRAY::Elem _hx_array_unsafe_set(ARRAY inArray, int inIndex, VALUE inValue) +{ + return inArray->__unsafe_set(inIndex, inValue); +} + + +template +inline typename ARRAY::Elem _hx_array_unsafe_get(ARRAY inArray, int inIndex) +{ + return inArray->__unsafe_get(inIndex); +} + + + +// Include again, for functions that required Array definition +#ifdef HX_VARRAY_DEFINED +#include "cpp/VirtualArray.h" +#endif + + +#if HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330 +template +cpp::VirtualArray Array_obj::map(Dynamic inFunc) +{ + cpp::VirtualArray result = cpp::VirtualArray_obj::__new(length,0); + for(int i=0;i__unsafe_set(i,inFunc(__unsafe_get(i))); + return result; +} + +#else +template +Dynamic Array_obj::map(Dynamic inFunc) +{ + Array_obj *result = new Array_obj(length,0); + for(int i=0;i__unsafe_set(i,inFunc(__unsafe_get(i))); + return result; +} +#endif + + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/Dynamic.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/Dynamic.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..241b07c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/Dynamic.h @@ -0,0 +1,498 @@ +#ifndef HX_DYNAMIC_H +#define HX_DYNAMIC_H + +// --- Dynamic --------------------------------------------------------------- +// +// The Dynamic class views all classes through the hx::Object interface, and +// provides generic access to its pointer. +// It uses dynamic_cast to provide strongly-typed access to the real class. + +namespace hx { class Interface; } + + + +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic : public hx::ObjectPtr +{ + typedef hx::ObjectPtr super; + +public: + + Dynamic() {}; + Dynamic(int inVal); + Dynamic(short inVal); + Dynamic(unsigned int inVal); + Dynamic(unsigned short inVal); + Dynamic(unsigned char inVal); + Dynamic(signed char inVal); + Dynamic(const cpp::CppInt32__ &inVal); + Dynamic(bool inVal); + Dynamic(double inVal); + Dynamic(float inVal); + Dynamic(cpp::Int64 inVal); + Dynamic(cpp::UInt64 inVal); + Dynamic(hx::Object *inObj) : super(inObj) { } + Dynamic(const String &inString); + Dynamic(const null &inNull) : super(0) { } + Dynamic(const Dynamic &inRHS) : super(inRHS.mPtr) { } + explicit Dynamic(const HX_CHAR *inStr); + Dynamic(const cpp::Variant &inRHS) : super(inRHS.asDynamic()) { } + template + Dynamic(const hx::Native &inInterface):super(inInterface.ptr ? inInterface->__GetRealObject() : (hx::Object *)0 ) { } + #if !defined(__GNUC__) || (defined(__WORDSIZE) && (__WORDSIZE != 64)) + Dynamic(long inVal); + Dynamic(unsigned long inVal); + #endif +#ifdef __OBJC__ +#ifdef HXCPP_OBJC + Dynamic(const id inObjc); +#endif +#endif + + template + explicit Dynamic(const cpp::Struct &inRHS) { *this = inRHS; } + template + explicit Dynamic(const cpp::Pointer &inRHS) { *this = inRHS; } + + + void Set(bool inVal); + void Set(int inVal); + void Set(double inVal); + void Set(float inVal); + + + template RESULT StaticCast() const; + + inline operator double () const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToDouble() : 0.0; } + inline operator float () const { return mPtr ? (float)mPtr->__ToDouble() : 0.0f; } + inline operator int () const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToInt() : 0; } + inline operator unsigned int () const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToInt() : 0; } + inline operator short () const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToInt() : 0; } + inline operator unsigned short () const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToInt() : 0; } + inline operator unsigned char () const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToInt() : 0; } + inline operator char () const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToInt() : 0; } + inline operator signed char () const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToInt() : 0; } + inline operator bool() const { return mPtr && mPtr->__ToInt(); } + inline operator cpp::Int64() const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToInt64() : 0; } + inline operator cpp::UInt64() const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToInt64() : 0; } + + // Conversion to generic pointer requires you to tag the class with a typedef + template + inline operator typename hx::Native () const { + return hx::Native(dynamic_cast(mPtr)); + } + + + //inline operator cpp::Variant() const { return cpp::Variant(mPtr); } +#ifdef __OBJC__ +#ifdef HXCPP_OBJC + #ifdef OBJC_ARC + inline operator id() const { return mPtr ? (__bridge id)mPtr->__GetHandle() : 0; } + #else + inline operator id() const { return mPtr ? (id)mPtr->__GetHandle() : 0; } + #endif +#endif +#endif + inline bool operator !() const { return !mPtr || !mPtr->__ToInt(); } + + hx::IndexRef operator[](int inIndex); + inline Dynamic __get(int inIndex) const { return mPtr->__GetItem(inIndex); } + + template + Dynamic(const hx::ObjectPtr &inObjectPtr) : + hx::ObjectPtr(inObjectPtr.mPtr) { } + + Dynamic Default(const Dynamic &inDef) { return mPtr ? *this : inDef; } + + template + RETURN_ Cast() const { return RETURN_(*this); } + + template + bool IsClass() { return CLASS_(mPtr,false).mPtr; } + + static void __boot(); + + inline bool IsNumeric() const + { + if (!mPtr) return false; + int t = mPtr->__GetType(); + return t==vtInt || t==vtFloat; + } + + inline bool IsBool() const + { + if (!mPtr) return false; + int t = mPtr->__GetType(); + return t==vtBool; + } + + + int Compare(const Dynamic &inRHS) const + { + if (mPtr==0) return inRHS.mPtr==0 ? 0 : -1; + if (inRHS.mPtr==0) return -1; + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=331) + return mPtr->__Compare(inRHS.mPtr); + #else + return mPtr->__Compare(inRHS.mPtr->__GetRealObject()); + #endif + } + + bool operator==(const null &inRHS) const { return mPtr==0; } + bool operator!=(const null &inRHS) const { return mPtr!=0; } + + bool operator == (const Dynamic &inRHS) const + { + // Comparing pointers fails in the case on Nan==Nan + //if (mPtr==inRHS.mPtr) return true; + if (!mPtr && !inRHS.mPtr) return true; + if (!mPtr || !inRHS.mPtr) return false; + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=331) + return mPtr->__Compare(inRHS.mPtr)==0; + #else + return mPtr->__Compare(inRHS.mPtr->__GetRealObject())==0; + #endif + } + + bool operator != (const Dynamic &inRHS) const + { + // Comparing pointers fails in the case on Nan==Nan + //if (mPtr==inRHS.mPtr) return true; + if (!mPtr && !inRHS.mPtr) return false; + if (!mPtr || !inRHS.mPtr) return true; + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=331) + return mPtr->__Compare(inRHS.mPtr)!=0; + #else + return mPtr->__Compare(inRHS.mPtr->__GetRealObject())!=0; + #endif + } + + + bool operator == (const cpp::Variant &inRHS) const { return (*this) == Dynamic(inRHS); } + bool operator != (const cpp::Variant &inRHS) const { return (*this) != Dynamic(inRHS); } + + + #define DYNAMIC_COMPARE_OP( op ) \ + bool operator op (const String &inRHS) const { return mPtr && ((String)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + bool operator op (double inRHS) const { return IsNumeric() && ((double)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + bool operator op (cpp::Int64 inRHS) const { return IsNumeric() && ((cpp::Int64)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + bool operator op (cpp::UInt64 inRHS) const { return IsNumeric() && ((cpp::Int64)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + bool operator op (float inRHS) const { return IsNumeric() && ((double)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + bool operator op (int inRHS) const { return IsNumeric() && ((double)(*this) op (double)inRHS); } \ + bool operator op (unsigned int inRHS) const { return IsNumeric() && ((double)(*this) op (double)inRHS); } \ + bool operator op (short inRHS) const { return IsNumeric() && ((double)(*this) op (double)inRHS); } \ + bool operator op (unsigned short inRHS) const { return IsNumeric() && ((double)(*this) op (double)inRHS); } \ + bool operator op (signed char inRHS) const { return IsNumeric() && ((double)(*this) op (double)inRHS); } \ + bool operator op (unsigned char inRHS) const { return IsNumeric() && ((double)(*this) op (double)inRHS); } \ + bool operator op (bool inRHS) const { return IsBool() && ((double)(*this) op (double)inRHS); } \ + + bool operator != (const String &inRHS) const { return !mPtr || ((String)(*this) != inRHS); } + bool operator != (double inRHS) const { return !IsNumeric() || ((double)(*this) != inRHS); } + bool operator != (cpp::Int64 inRHS) const { return !IsNumeric() || ((cpp::Int64)(*this) != inRHS); } + bool operator != (cpp::UInt64 inRHS) const { return !IsNumeric() || ((cpp::Int64)(*this) != inRHS); } + bool operator != (float inRHS) const { return !IsNumeric() || ((double)(*this) != inRHS); } + bool operator != (int inRHS) const { return !IsNumeric() || ((double)(*this) != (double)inRHS); } + bool operator != (unsigned int inRHS) const { return !IsNumeric() || ((double)(*this) != (double)inRHS); } + bool operator != (short inRHS) const { return !IsNumeric() || ((double)(*this) != (double)inRHS); } + bool operator != (unsigned short inRHS) const { return !IsNumeric() || ((double)(*this) != (double)inRHS); } + bool operator != (signed char inRHS) const { return !IsNumeric() || ((double)(*this) != (double)inRHS); } + bool operator != (unsigned char inRHS) const { return !IsNumeric() || ((double)(*this) != (double)inRHS); } + bool operator != (bool inRHS) const { return !IsBool() || ((double)(*this) != (double)inRHS); } + + + + #define DYNAMIC_COMPARE_OP_ALL( op ) \ + bool operator op (const Dynamic &inRHS) const { return mPtr && (Compare(inRHS) op 0); } \ + bool operator op (const cpp::Variant &inRHS) const { return *this op Dynamic(inRHS); } \ + DYNAMIC_COMPARE_OP(op) + + + DYNAMIC_COMPARE_OP( == ) + DYNAMIC_COMPARE_OP_ALL( < ) + DYNAMIC_COMPARE_OP_ALL( <= ) + DYNAMIC_COMPARE_OP_ALL( >= ) + DYNAMIC_COMPARE_OP_ALL( > ) + + template + bool operator==(const hx::ObjectPtr &inRHS) const + { + if (mPtr==inRHS.mPtr) return true; + if (!mPtr || !inRHS.mPtr) return false; + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=331) + return mPtr == inRHS.mPtr; + #else + return mPtr->__GetRealObject() == inRHS.mPtr->__GetRealObject(); + #endif + } + + template + bool operator!=(const hx::ObjectPtr &inRHS) const + { + if (mPtr==inRHS.mPtr) return false; + if (!mPtr || !inRHS.mPtr) return true; + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=331) + return mPtr != inRHS.mPtr; + #else + return mPtr->__GetRealObject() != inRHS.mPtr->__GetRealObject(); + #endif + } + + + // Operator + is different, since it must consider strings too... + Dynamic operator+(const Dynamic &inRHS) const; + inline String operator+(const String &s) const; + + Dynamic operator+(const cpp::UInt64 &i) const; + Dynamic operator+(const cpp::Int64 &i) const; + Dynamic operator+(const int &i) const; + Dynamic operator+(const unsigned int &i) const; + Dynamic operator+(const short &i) const; + Dynamic operator+(const unsigned short &i) const; + Dynamic operator+(const signed char &i) const; + Dynamic operator+(const unsigned char &i) const; + Dynamic operator+(const double &d) const; + Dynamic operator+(const float &d) const; + Dynamic operator+(const cpp::Variant &d) const; + + double operator%(const Dynamic &inRHS) const; + double operator-() const { return mPtr ? - mPtr->__ToDouble() : 0.0; } + double operator++() { double val = mPtr->__ToDouble() + 1; *this = val; return val; } + double operator++(int) {double val = mPtr->__ToDouble(); *this = val+1; return val; } + double operator--() { double val = mPtr->__ToDouble() - 1; *this = val; return val; } + double operator--(int) {double val = mPtr->__ToDouble(); *this = val-1; return val; } + + + double operator / (const cpp::Variant &inRHS) const { return (double)(*this) / (double)inRHS; } \ + double operator / (const Dynamic &inRHS) const { return (double)(*this) / (double)inRHS; } \ + double operator / (const double &inRHS) const { return (double)(*this) / (double)inRHS; } \ + double operator / (const float &inRHS) const { return (double)(*this) / (double)inRHS; } \ + double operator / (const int &inRHS) const { return (double)(*this) / (double)inRHS; } + + #define DYNAMIC_ARITH( op ) \ + Dynamic operator op (const cpp::Variant &inRHS) const \ + { return mPtr->__GetType()==vtInt && inRHS.isInt() ? \ + Dynamic((int)(*this) op (int)inRHS) : \ + Dynamic( (double)(*this) op (double)inRHS); } \ + Dynamic operator op (const Dynamic &inRHS) const \ + { return mPtr->__GetType()==vtInt && inRHS.mPtr->__GetType()==vtInt ? \ + Dynamic((int)(*this) op (int)inRHS) : \ + Dynamic( (double)(*this) op (double)inRHS); } \ + double operator op (const double &inRHS) const { return (double)(*this) op (double)inRHS; } \ + double operator op (const float &inRHS) const { return (double)(*this) op (double)inRHS; } \ + Dynamic operator op (const int &inRHS) const \ + { return mPtr->__GetType()==vtInt ? Dynamic((int)(*this) op inRHS) : Dynamic((double)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + Dynamic operator op (const unsigned int &inRHS) const \ + { return mPtr->__GetType()==vtInt ? Dynamic((int)(*this) op inRHS) : Dynamic((double)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + Dynamic operator op (const short &inRHS) const \ + { return mPtr->__GetType()==vtInt ? Dynamic((int)(*this) op inRHS) : Dynamic((double)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + Dynamic operator op (const unsigned short &inRHS) const \ + { return mPtr->__GetType()==vtInt ? Dynamic((int)(*this) op inRHS) : Dynamic((double)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + Dynamic operator op (const signed char &inRHS) const \ + { return mPtr->__GetType()==vtInt ? Dynamic((int)(*this) op inRHS) : Dynamic((double)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + Dynamic operator op (const unsigned char &inRHS) const \ + { return mPtr->__GetType()==vtInt ? Dynamic((int)(*this) op inRHS) : Dynamic((double)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + Dynamic operator op (const cpp::Int64 &inRHS) const \ + { return Dynamic((double)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + Dynamic operator op (const cpp::UInt64 &inRHS) const \ + { return Dynamic((double)(*this) op inRHS); } \ + + DYNAMIC_ARITH( - ) + DYNAMIC_ARITH( * ) + + static void ThrowBadFunctionError(); + inline void CheckFPtr() { if (!mPtr) ThrowBadFunctionError(); } + + inline ::Dynamic operator()() { CheckFPtr(); return mPtr->__run(); } + inline ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0) { CheckFPtr(); return mPtr->__run(inArg0); } + inline ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1) { CheckFPtr(); return mPtr->__run(inArg0,inArg1); } + inline ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2) { CheckFPtr(); return mPtr->__run(inArg0,inArg1,inArg2); } + inline ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3) { CheckFPtr(); return mPtr->__run(inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3); } + inline ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4) { CheckFPtr(); return mPtr->__run(inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4); } + + HX_DECLARE_DYNAMIC_FUNCTIONS; + + + typedef const Dynamic &D; +}; + + + +namespace hx +{ + +inline hx::Object *DynamicPtr(Dynamic inVal) { return inVal.mPtr; } + +typedef Dynamic (*MemberFunction0)(hx::Object *inObj); +typedef Dynamic (*MemberFunction1)(hx::Object *inObj,const Dynamic &inArg0); +typedef Dynamic (*MemberFunction2)(hx::Object *inObj,const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1); +typedef Dynamic (*MemberFunction3)(hx::Object *inObj,const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2); +typedef Dynamic (*MemberFunction4)(hx::Object *inObj,const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3); +typedef Dynamic (*MemberFunction5)(hx::Object *inObj,const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4); +typedef Dynamic (*MemberFunctionVar)(hx::Object *inObj,const Array &inArgs); + +typedef Dynamic (*StaticFunction0)(); +typedef Dynamic (*StaticFunction1)(const Dynamic &inArg0); +typedef Dynamic (*StaticFunction2)(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1); +typedef Dynamic (*StaticFunction3)(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2); +typedef Dynamic (*StaticFunction4)(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3); +typedef Dynamic (*StaticFunction5)(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4); +typedef Dynamic (*StaticFunction6)(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5); +typedef Dynamic (*StaticFunctionVar)(const Array &inArgs); + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction0(const char *,hx::Object *, MemberFunction0); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction1(const char *,hx::Object *, MemberFunction1); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction2(const char *,hx::Object *, MemberFunction2); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction3(const char *,hx::Object *, MemberFunction3); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction4(const char *,hx::Object *, MemberFunction4); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction5(const char *,hx::Object *, MemberFunction5); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunctionVar(const char *,hx::Object *, MemberFunctionVar,int inN); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction0(const char *,StaticFunction0); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction1(const char *,StaticFunction1); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction2(const char *,StaticFunction2); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction3(const char *,StaticFunction3); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction4(const char *,StaticFunction4); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction5(const char *,StaticFunction5); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction6(const char *,StaticFunction6); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunctionVar(const char *,StaticFunctionVar,int inN); + + +} + + + + + + + +template<> +inline int Dynamic::Cast() const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToInt() : 0; } +template<> +inline bool Dynamic::Cast() const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToInt() : 0; } +template<> +inline double Dynamic::Cast() const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToDouble() : 0; } +template<> +inline float Dynamic::Cast() const { return mPtr ? mPtr->__ToDouble() : 0; } +template<> +inline String Dynamic::Cast() const { return mPtr ? mPtr->toString() : String(null()); } + + + +// +// Gets the class definition that relates to a specific type. +// Most classes have their own class data, by the standard types (non-classes) +// use the template traits to get the class + +namespace hx +{ +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES hx::Class &GetIntClass(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES hx::Class &GetFloatClass(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES hx::Class &GetBoolClass(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES hx::Class &GetVoidClass(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES hx::Class &GetStringClass(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES hx::Class &GetInt64Class(); +} + +template<> +inline bool Dynamic::IsClass() { return mPtr && mPtr->__GetClass()==hx::GetIntClass(); } +template<> +inline bool Dynamic::IsClass() { return mPtr && + ( mPtr->__GetClass()==hx::GetIntClass() || mPtr->__GetClass()==hx::GetFloatClass()) ; } +template<> +inline bool Dynamic::IsClass() { return mPtr && mPtr->__GetClass()==hx::GetFloatClass(); } +template<> +inline bool Dynamic::IsClass() { return mPtr && mPtr->__GetClass()==hx::GetBoolClass(); } +template<> +inline bool Dynamic::IsClass() { return !mPtr; } +template<> +inline bool Dynamic::IsClass() { return mPtr && mPtr->__GetClass()==hx::GetStringClass(); } +template<> +inline bool Dynamic::IsClass() { return true; } +template<> +inline bool Dynamic::IsClass< ::cpp::Int64>() { return mPtr && mPtr->__GetClass()==hx::GetInt64Class(); } + +inline String Dynamic::operator+(const String &s) const { return Cast() + s; } + +#define HX_DYNAMIC_OP_ISEQ(T) \ +inline bool operator == (const T &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inRHS==inLHS; } \ +inline bool operator != (const T &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inRHS!=inLHS; } + +HX_DYNAMIC_OP_ISEQ(String) +HX_DYNAMIC_OP_ISEQ(double) +HX_DYNAMIC_OP_ISEQ(float) +HX_DYNAMIC_OP_ISEQ(int) +HX_DYNAMIC_OP_ISEQ(bool) + +inline bool operator < (bool inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return false; } +inline bool operator <= (bool inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return false; } +inline bool operator >= (bool inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return false; } +inline bool operator > (bool inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return false; } + +#if defined(HX_WINRT) && defined(__cplusplus_winrt) +// Try to avoid the compiler using injected Box::operator int and Dynamic(null) when doing == +template +bool operator==(Platform::Box ^inPtr, nullptr_t) +{ + void* ptr = (void*) reinterpret_cast(inPtr); + return ptr==nullptr; +} +#endif + + + +#define COMPARE_DYNAMIC_OP( op ) \ + inline bool operator op (double inLHS,const ::Dynamic &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.IsNumeric() && (inLHS op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (float inLHS,const ::Dynamic &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.IsNumeric() && ((double)inLHS op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (int inLHS,const ::Dynamic &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.IsNumeric() && (inLHS op (double)inRHS); } + +COMPARE_DYNAMIC_OP( < ) +COMPARE_DYNAMIC_OP( <= ) +COMPARE_DYNAMIC_OP( >= ) +COMPARE_DYNAMIC_OP( > ) + + +#define ARITH_DYNAMIC( op ) \ + inline double operator op (const cpp::Int64 &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inLHS op (cpp::Int64)inRHS;} \ + inline double operator op (const cpp::UInt64 &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inLHS op (cpp::UInt64)inRHS;} \ + inline double operator op (const double &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS;} \ + inline double operator op (const float &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS;} \ + inline double operator op (const int &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + inline double operator op (const unsigned int &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + inline double operator op (const short &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + inline double operator op (const unsigned short &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + inline double operator op (const signed char &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + inline double operator op (const unsigned char &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + +ARITH_DYNAMIC( - ) +ARITH_DYNAMIC( + ) +ARITH_DYNAMIC( / ) +ARITH_DYNAMIC( * ) + +double operator%(const int &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS); +double operator%(const double &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS); +double operator%(const float &inLHS,const Dynamic &inRHS); + +template String::String(const cpp::Struct &inRHS) { *this = (String)inRHS; } +template String::String(const hx::ObjectPtr &inRHS) { *this = Dynamic(inRHS); } + + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/Enum.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/Enum.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9aa4e0e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/Enum.h @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +#ifndef HX_ENUM_H +#define HX_ENUM_H + + + +// Enum (ie enum object class def) is the same as Class. +typedef hx::Class Enum; + + +namespace hx +{ + +// --- hx::EnumBase_obj ---------------------------------------------------------- +// +// Base class for Enums. +// Specializations of this class don't actually add more data, just extra constructors +// and type information. + +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES EnumBase_obj : public hx::Object +{ + typedef hx::Object super; + typedef EnumBase_obj OBJ_; + + + protected: + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) + String _hx_tag; + int mFixedFields; + #ifdef HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE + struct CppiaClassInfo *classInfo; + #endif + #else + String tag; + DynamicArray mArgs; + #endif + public: + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdEnum }; + + int index; + + public: + inline void *operator new( size_t inSize, int inExtra=0) + { + return hx::Object::operator new(inSize+inExtra, true, 0); + } + inline void operator delete(void *, int inExtra ) { } + inline void operator delete(void *, size_t inSize ) { } + inline void operator delete(void *, size_t inSize, int inExtra ) { } + + + HX_DO_ENUM_RTTI_INTERNAL; + static hx::ObjectPtr &__SGetClass(); + + + String toString(); + + EnumBase_obj() : index(-1) { } + EnumBase_obj(const null &inNull) : index(-1) { } + int __GetType() const { return vtEnum; } + static Dynamic __CreateEmpty(); + static Dynamic __Create(DynamicArray inArgs); + static void __boot(); + + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx); + #endif + + static hx::ObjectPtr Resolve(String inName); + inline static bool __GetStatic(const ::String &inName, Dynamic &outValue, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp) { return false; } + + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) + inline cpp::Variant *_hx_getFixed() { return (cpp::Variant *)(this + 1); } + inline const cpp::Variant *_hx_getFixed() const { return (cpp::Variant *)(this + 1); } + inline ::Dynamic __Param(int inID) { return _hx_getFixed()[inID]; } + template + inline EnumBase_obj *_hx_init(int inIndex,const T &inValue) + { + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + cpp::Variant &v = _hx_getFixed()[inIndex]; + v = inValue; + if (v.type<=cpp::Variant::typeString) + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, v.valObject); + #else + _hx_getFixed()[inIndex] = inValue; + #endif + return this; + } + inline void _hx_setIdentity(const String &inTag, int inIndex,int inFixedFields) + { + _hx_tag = inTag; + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, _hx_tag.__s); + index = inIndex; + mFixedFields = inFixedFields; + } + DynamicArray _hx_getParameters(); + + inline ::Dynamic _hx_getObject(int inId) { return _hx_getFixed()[inId].asDynamic(); } + inline int _hx_getInt(int inId) { return _hx_getFixed()[inId]; } + inline ::cpp::Int64 _hx_getInt64(int inId) { return _hx_getFixed()[inId].asInt64(); } + inline Float _hx_getFloat(int inId) { return _hx_getFixed()[inId]; } + inline bool _hx_getBool(int inId) { return _hx_getFixed()[inId]; } + inline ::String _hx_getString(int inId) { return _hx_getFixed()[inId].asString(); } + inline ::Dynamic _hx_getParamI(int inId) { return _hx_getFixed()[inId]; } + inline int _hx_getParamCount() { return mFixedFields; } + // Alias for _hx_getParamI + Dynamic __GetItem(int inIndex) const; + + // For legacy + inline String __Tag() const { return _hx_tag; } + + + String _hx_getTag() const { return _hx_tag; } + int _hx_getIndex() const { return index; } + #else + Dynamic __Param(int inID) { return mArgs[inID]; } + DynamicArray __EnumParams() { return mArgs; } + String __Tag() const { return tag; } + int __Index() const { return index; } + + void __Set( const String &inName,int inIndex,DynamicArray inArgs) + { + tag = inName; + index = inIndex; + mArgs = inArgs; + } + #endif + + + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const; + + virtual String GetEnumName( ) const { return HX_CSTRING("Enum"); } +}; + + +typedef hx::ObjectPtr EnumBase; + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool __hxcpp_enum_eq( ::hx::EnumBase a, ::hx::EnumBase b); + +// --- CreateEnum ------------------------------------------------------------- +// +// Template function to return a strongly-typed version fo the Enum. +// Most of the common stuff is in "Set". + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) +template +ENUM *CreateEnum(const String &inName,int inIndex, int inFields) +{ + ENUM *result = new (inFields*sizeof(cpp::Variant)) ENUM; + result->_hx_setIdentity(inName,inIndex,inFields); + return result; +} + +template +ENUM *CreateConstEnum(const String &inName,int inIndex) +{ + ENUM vtable; + ENUM *result = (ENUM *)hx::InternalCreateConstBuffer(&vtable,sizeof(ENUM)); + result->_hx_setIdentity(inName,inIndex,0); + return result; +} + + +#else +template +hx::ObjectPtr CreateEnum(const String &inName,int inIndex, DynamicArray inArgs=DynamicArray()) +{ + ENUM *result = new ENUM; + result->__Set(inName,inIndex,inArgs); + return result; +} +#endif + +} // end namespace hx + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) +inline int _hx_getEnumValueIndex(hx::EnumBase inEnum) +{ + return inEnum->_hx_getIndex(); +} +#endif + +inline void __hxcpp_enum_force(hx::EnumBase inEnum,String inForceName, int inIndex) +{ + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) + inEnum->_hx_setIdentity(inForceName, inIndex,0); + #else + hx::DynamicArray empty; + inEnum->__Set(inForceName, inIndex, empty); + #endif +} + + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/CppInt32__.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/CppInt32__.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bd856c0b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/CppInt32__.h @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +#ifndef INCLUDED_haxe_CppInt32__ +#define INCLUDED_haxe_CppInt32__ + +#include + +namespace cpp +{ + +#define HX_I32_DEF_FUNC1(Name) \ + static inline Dynamic __##Name(const Dynamic &a) { return Name(a); } \ + static inline Dynamic Name##_dyn() { return hx::CreateStaticFunction1(#Name,&CppInt32__::__##Name); } + +#define HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(Name) \ + static inline Dynamic __##Name(const Dynamic &a, const Dynamic &b) { return Name(a,b); } \ + static inline Dynamic Name##_dyn() { return hx::CreateStaticFunction2(#Name,&CppInt32__::__##Name); } + +class CppInt32__ +{ +public: + CppInt32__(int inX=0) : mValue(inX) { } + CppInt32__(const null &inNull) : mValue(0) { } + CppInt32__(const Dynamic &inD); + operator int() const { return mValue; } + template + inline CppInt32__ &operator=(T inValue) { mValue = inValue; return *this; } + + static inline CppInt32__ make(int a,int b) { return CppInt32__( (a<<16) | b ); } + static inline CppInt32__ ofInt(int a) { return CppInt32__( a ); } + static inline int toInt(CppInt32__ a) { __hxcpp_check_overflow(a); return a.mValue; } + static inline int toNativeInt(CppInt32__ a) { return a.mValue; } + static inline CppInt32__ add(CppInt32__ a,CppInt32__ b) { return CppInt32__( a.mValue + b.mValue ); } + static inline CppInt32__ sub(CppInt32__ a,CppInt32__ b) { return CppInt32__( a.mValue - b.mValue ); } + static inline CppInt32__ mul(CppInt32__ a,CppInt32__ b) { return CppInt32__( a.mValue * b.mValue ); } + static inline CppInt32__ div(CppInt32__ a,CppInt32__ b) { return CppInt32__( a.mValue / b.mValue ); } + static inline CppInt32__ mod(CppInt32__ a,CppInt32__ b) { return CppInt32__( a.mValue % b.mValue ); } + static inline CppInt32__ shl(CppInt32__ a,int b) { return CppInt32__( a.mValue << (b&31) ); } + static inline CppInt32__ shr(CppInt32__ a,int b) { return CppInt32__( a.mValue >> (b&31) ); } + static inline CppInt32__ ushr(CppInt32__ a,int b) { return CppInt32__( ((unsigned int)a.mValue) >> (b&31) ); } + static inline CppInt32__ _and(CppInt32__ a,CppInt32__ b) { return CppInt32__( a.mValue & b.mValue ); } + static inline CppInt32__ _or(CppInt32__ a,CppInt32__ b) { return CppInt32__( a.mValue | b.mValue ); } + static inline CppInt32__ _xor(CppInt32__ a,CppInt32__ b) { return CppInt32__( a.mValue ^ b.mValue ); } + static inline CppInt32__ neg(CppInt32__ a) { return CppInt32__( -a.mValue ); } + static inline CppInt32__ complement(CppInt32__ a) { return CppInt32__( ~a.mValue ); } + static inline int compare(CppInt32__ a,CppInt32__ b) { return ( a.mValue - b.mValue ); } + static inline bool isNeg(CppInt32__ a) { return a.mValue < 0; } + static inline bool isZero(CppInt32__ a) { return a.mValue == 0; } + static inline int ucompare(CppInt32__ a,CppInt32__ b) { unsigned int am = a.mValue, bm = b.mValue; return (am == bm) ? 0 : ((am > bm) ? 1 : -1); } + + + inline bool operator==(const CppInt32__ &inRHS) const { return mValue == inRHS.mValue; } + + inline int operator-(CppInt32__ b) { return mValue - b.mValue; } + inline int operator+(CppInt32__ b) { return mValue + b.mValue; } + inline int operator*(CppInt32__ b) { return mValue * b.mValue; } + inline int operator/(CppInt32__ b) { return mValue / b.mValue; } + inline int operator%(CppInt32__ b) { return mValue % b.mValue; } + + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(make) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC1(ofInt) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC1(toInt) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC1(toNativeInt) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(add) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(sub) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(mul) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(div) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(mod) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(shl) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(shr) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(ushr) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(_and) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(_or) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(_xor) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC1(neg) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC1(complement) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(compare) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC2(ucompare) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC1(isNeg) + HX_I32_DEF_FUNC1(isZero) + + int mValue; +}; + +typedef CppInt32__ CppInt32___obj; +} + + + + + +#endif + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/FastIterator.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/FastIterator.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..37bcf661 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/FastIterator.h @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +#ifndef INCLUDED_cpp_FastIterator +#define INCLUDED_cpp_FastIterator + +namespace cpp +{ + +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES IteratorBase : public hx::Object +{ +public: + hx::Val __Field(const String &inString ,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + virtual bool hasNext() = 0; + virtual Dynamic _dynamicNext() = 0; + + Dynamic hasNext_dyn( ); + Dynamic next_dyn( ); + Dynamic _dynamicNext_dyn( ); +}; + + +template +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES FastIterator_obj : public IteratorBase +{ +public: + virtual bool hasNext() = 0; + virtual T next() = 0; + + virtual Dynamic _dynamicNext() { return next(); } +}; + + + +template +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES DynamicIterator : public FastIterator_obj +{ +public: + Dynamic mNext; + Dynamic mHasNext; + + DynamicIterator(Dynamic inValue) + { + mNext = inValue->__Field(HX_CSTRING("next"), HX_PROP_ALWAYS); + mHasNext = inValue->__Field(HX_CSTRING("hasNext"), HX_PROP_ALWAYS); + } + + bool hasNext() { return mHasNext(); } + T next() { return mNext(); } + + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mNext,"mNext"); + HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mHasNext,"mHasNext"); + } + + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_VISIT_MEMBER_NAME(mNext,"mNext"); + HX_VISIT_MEMBER_NAME(mHasNext,"mHasNext"); + } + #endif + +}; + + +template +FastIterator_obj *CreateFastIterator(Dynamic inValue) +{ + FastIterator_obj *result = dynamic_cast< FastIterator_obj *>(inValue.GetPtr()); + if (result) return result; + return new DynamicIterator(inValue); +} + +template +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES StringIterator : public cpp::FastIterator_obj +{ +public: + String value; + int pos; + + StringIterator(const String &inValue) : value(inValue), pos(0) { } + + bool hasNext() { return pos::__Mark(__inCtx); + HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(value,"value"); + } + + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) + { + cpp::FastIterator_obj::__Visit(__inCtx); + HX_VISIT_MEMBER_NAME(value,"value"); + } + #endif +}; + +} + + + + + + + + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/Int64.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/Int64.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e8b60db9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/Int64.h @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +#ifndef CPP_INT64_INCLUDED +#define CPP_INT64_INCLUDED + +namespace cpp +{ + +class Int64Handler +{ + public: + static inline const char *getName() { return "cpp.Int64"; } + static inline String toString( const void *inValue ) { return String( *(Int64 *)inValue ); } + static inline void handler(DynamicHandlerOp op, void *ioValue,int inSize, void *outResult) + { + if (op==dhoToString) + *(String *)outResult = toString(ioValue); + else if (op==dhoGetClassName) + *(const char **)outResult = getName(); + else if (op==dhoFromDynamic) + { + StructHandlerDynamicParams *params = (StructHandlerDynamicParams *)outResult; + cpp::Int64 &value = *(cpp::Int64 *)ioValue; + params->outProcessed = true; + if (!params->inData) + value = 0; + else + value = params->inData->__ToInt64(); + } + else if (op==dhoToDynamic) + { + Dynamic value = *(cpp::Int64 *)ioValue; + *(hx::Object **)outResult = value.mPtr; + } + else if (op==dhoIs) + { + StructHandlerDynamicParams *params = (StructHandlerDynamicParams *)outResult; + hx::Object *obj = params->inData; + int type = obj->__GetType(); + params->outProcessed = type==vtInt || type==vtInt64; + } + else + return DefaultStructHandler::handler(op,ioValue,inSize, outResult); + } +}; + +typedef Struct Int64Struct; + + +} + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 420) + +inline cpp::Int64 _hx_int64_make(int a, int b) { return (((cpp::Int64)(unsigned int)a)<<32) | (unsigned int)b; } +inline bool _hx_int64_is_neg(cpp::Int64 a) { return a<0; } +inline bool _hx_int64_is_zero(cpp::Int64 a) { return a==0; } +inline bool _hx_int64_eq(cpp::Int64 a, cpp::Int64 b) { return a==b; } +inline bool _hx_int64_neq(cpp::Int64 a, cpp::Int64 b) { return a!=b; } +inline int _hx_int64_compare(cpp::Int64 a, cpp::Int64 b) +{ + return a==b ? 0 : a>(b&63); } +inline cpp::Int64 _hx_int64_ushr(cpp::Int64 a, int b) { return ((cpp::UInt64)a)>>(b&63); } +inline int _hx_int64_high(cpp::Int64 a) { return (int)( a >> 32 ); } +inline int _hx_int64_low(cpp::Int64 a) { return (int)( a & 0xffffffff ); } + +#else + +inline cpp::Int64Struct _hx_int64_make(int a, int b) { return (((cpp::Int64)(unsigned int)a)<<32) | (unsigned int)b; } +inline bool _hx_int64_is_neg(cpp::Int64 a) { return a<0; } +inline bool _hx_int64_is_zero(cpp::Int64 a) { return a==0; } +inline bool _hx_int64_eq(cpp::Int64 a, cpp::Int64 b) { return a==b; } +inline bool _hx_int64_neq(cpp::Int64 a, cpp::Int64 b) { return a!=b; } +inline int _hx_int64_compare(cpp::Int64 a, cpp::Int64 b) +{ + return a==b ? 0 : a>(b&63); } +inline cpp::Int64Struct _hx_int64_ushr(cpp::Int64 a, int b) { return ((cpp::UInt64)a)>>(b&63); } +inline int _hx_int64_high(cpp::Int64Struct a) { return (int)( a.get() >>32 ); } +inline int _hx_int64_low(cpp::Int64Struct a) { return (int)( a.get() & 0xffffffff ); } + +#endif + + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/Pointer.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/Pointer.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b242a13c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/Pointer.h @@ -0,0 +1,562 @@ +#ifndef CPP_POINTER_H +#define CPP_POINTER_H + +namespace cpp +{ + +struct AutoCast +{ + void *value; + + explicit inline AutoCast(void *inValue) : value(inValue) { } +}; + + +struct RawAutoCast +{ + void *value; + + explicit inline RawAutoCast(void *inValue) : value(inValue) { } + + template + operator T*() const { return (T*)value; } +}; + + +Dynamic CreateDynamicPointer(void *inValue); + +enum DynamicHandlerOp +{ + dhoGetClassName, + dhoToString, + dhoFromDynamic, + dhoToDynamic, + dhoIs, +}; +typedef void (*DynamicHandlerFunc)(DynamicHandlerOp op, void *ioValue, int inSize, void *outResult); +Dynamic CreateDynamicStruct(const void *inValue, int inSize, DynamicHandlerFunc inFunc); + +template class Reference; + + + +struct StructHandlerDynamicParams +{ + StructHandlerDynamicParams(hx::Object *data,const char *inName) : + outProcessed(false), inName(inName), inData(data) { } + bool outProcessed; + hx::Object *inData; + const char *inName; +}; + + +class DefaultStructHandler +{ + public: + static inline const char *getName() { return "unknown"; } + static inline String toString( const void *inValue ) { return HX_CSTRING("Struct"); } + static inline void handler(DynamicHandlerOp op, void *ioValue, int inSize, void *outResult) + { + if (op==dhoToString) + *(String *)outResult = toString(ioValue); + else if (op==dhoGetClassName) + *(const char **)outResult = getName(); + else if (op==dhoToDynamic) + { + // Handle outsize.. + *(hx::Object **)outResult = 0; + } + else if (op==dhoFromDynamic) + { + StructHandlerDynamicParams *params = (StructHandlerDynamicParams *)outResult; + hx::Object *ptr= params->inData; + void *data = (void *)ptr->__GetHandle(); + int len = ptr->__length(); + if (data && len>=inSize && ptr->__CStr()==params->inName) + { + memcpy(ioValue,data,inSize); + params->outProcessed = true; + } + } + else if (op==dhoIs) + { + StructHandlerDynamicParams *params = (StructHandlerDynamicParams *)outResult; + hx::Object *ptr= params->inData; + void *data = (void *)ptr->__GetHandle(); + int len = ptr->__length(); + params->outProcessed = data && len>=inSize && ptr->__CStr()==params->inName; + } + } +}; + + +class EnumHandler +{ + public: + static inline const char *getName() { return "enum"; } + static inline String toString( const void *inValue ) { + int val = inValue ? *(int *)inValue : 0; + return HX_CSTRING("enum(") + String(val) + HX_CSTRING(")"); + } + + static inline void handler(DynamicHandlerOp op, void *ioValue, int inSize, void *outResult) + { + if (op==dhoToString) + *(String *)outResult = toString(ioValue); + else if (op==dhoGetClassName) + *(const char **)outResult = getName(); + else if (op==dhoFromDynamic) + { + StructHandlerDynamicParams *params = (StructHandlerDynamicParams *)outResult; + if (params->inData->__GetType()==vtInt) + { + *(int *)ioValue = params->inData->__ToInt(); + params->outProcessed = true; + } + else + DefaultStructHandler::handler(op,ioValue, inSize, outResult); + } + else + DefaultStructHandler::handler(op,ioValue, inSize, outResult); + } +}; + + + +template +class Struct +{ +public: + T value; + // This allows 'StaticCast' to be used from arrays + typedef Dynamic Ptr; + + inline Struct( ) { } + inline Struct( const T &inRHS ) : value(inRHS) { } + inline Struct( const null &) { value = T(); } + inline Struct( const Reference &); + inline Struct( const Dynamic &inRHS) { fromDynamic(inRHS.mPtr); } + + inline Struct &operator=( const T &inRHS ) { value = inRHS; return *this; } + inline Struct &operator=( const null & ) { value = T(); return *this; } + inline Struct &operator=( const Dynamic &inRHS ) { return *this = Struct(inRHS); } + + operator Dynamic() const + { + hx::Object *result = 0; + HANDLER::handler(dhoToDynamic, (void *)&value, sizeof(T), &result ); + if (result) + return result; + return CreateDynamicStruct( &value, sizeof(T), HANDLER::handler); + } + operator String() const { return HANDLER::toString(&value); } + + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) + inline Struct( const hx::Val &inRHS) { fromDynamic(inRHS.asObject()); } + operator hx::Val() const { return operator Dynamic(); } + #endif + + bool operator==(const Struct &inRHS) const { return value==inRHS.value; } + bool operator==(const null &inRHS) const { return false; } + bool operator!=(const null &inRHS) const { return true; } + + // Haxe uses -> notation + inline T *operator->() { return &value; } + + T &get() { return value; } + + static inline bool is( const Dynamic &inRHS) + { + hx::Object *ptr = inRHS.mPtr; + if (!ptr) + return false; + StructHandlerDynamicParams convert(ptr, ptr->__CStr()); + HANDLER::handler(dhoIs, 0, sizeof(T), &convert ); + return convert.outProcessed; + } + + + inline void fromDynamic( hx::Object *ptr) + { + if (!ptr) + { + value = T(); + return; + } + StructHandlerDynamicParams convert(ptr, ptr->__CStr()); + HANDLER::handler(dhoFromDynamic, &value, sizeof(T), &convert ); + if (!convert.outProcessed) + { + hx::NullReference("DynamicData", true); + return; + } + } + + inline operator T& () { return value; } +}; + + + + +template +class Pointer +{ +public: + typedef T elementType; + + T *ptr; + + inline Pointer( ) : ptr(0) { } + inline Pointer( const Pointer &inRHS ) : ptr(inRHS.ptr) { } + inline Pointer( const Dynamic &inRHS) { ptr = inRHS==null()?0: (T*)inRHS->__GetHandle(); } + inline Pointer( const null &inRHS ) : ptr(0) { } + inline Pointer( const cpp::Variant &inVariant ) { + hx::Object *obj = inVariant.asObject(); + ptr = obj ? (T*)inVariant.valObject->__GetHandle() : 0; + } + + template + inline Pointer( const O *inValue ) : ptr( (T*) inValue) { } + //inline Pointer( T *inValue ) : ptr(inValue) { } + inline Pointer( AutoCast inValue ) : ptr( (T*)inValue.value) { } + + template + inline Pointer( const Struct &structVal ) : ptr( &structVal.value ) { } + + template + inline void setRaw(const O *inValue ) { ptr = (T*) inValue; } + + + inline Pointer operator=( const Pointer &inRHS ) { return ptr = inRHS.ptr; } + inline Dynamic operator=( Dynamic &inValue ) + { + ptr = inValue==null() ? 0 : (T*) inValue->__GetHandle(); + return inValue; + } + inline Dynamic operator=( null &inValue ) { ptr=0; return inValue; } + + template + inline Pointer operator=( const Pointer &inValue ) { ptr = (T*) inValue.ptr; return *this; } + + template + inline Pointer operator=( const O *inValue ) { ptr = (T*) inValue; return *this; } + + template + inline Pointer operator=( const Struct &structVal ) { ptr = &structVal.value; return *this; } + + + + inline AutoCast reinterpret() { return AutoCast(ptr); } + inline RawAutoCast rawCast() { return RawAutoCast(ptr); } + + inline bool operator==( const null &inValue ) const { return ptr==0; } + inline bool operator!=( const null &inValue ) const { return ptr!=0; } + + // Allow '->' syntax + inline Pointer *operator->() { return this; } + inline Pointer inc() { return ++ptr; } + inline Pointer dec() { return --ptr; } + inline Pointer add(int inInt) { return ptr+inInt; } + inline Pointer sub(int inInt) { return ptr-inInt; } + inline Pointer incBy(int inDiff) { ptr+=inDiff; return ptr; } + inline Pointer decBy(int inDiff) { ptr-=inDiff; return ptr; } + inline T &postIncRef() { return *ptr++; } + inline T &postIncVal() { return *ptr++; } + + inline T &at(int inIndex) { return ptr[inIndex]; } + inline void setAt(int inIndex, const T &test) { ptr[inIndex] = test; } + + inline T &__get(int inIndex) { return ptr[inIndex]; } + inline T &__set(int inIndex, const T &inValue) { T *p = ptr+inIndex; *p = inValue; return *p; } + + inline T &get_value() { return *ptr; } + inline T &get_ref() { return *ptr; } + inline T &set_ref(const T &inValue) { return *ptr = inValue; } + + operator Dynamic () const { return CreateDynamicPointer((void *)ptr); } + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) + operator cpp::Variant () const { return CreateDynamicPointer((void *)ptr); } + #endif + + operator T * () { return ptr; } + T * get_raw() { return ptr; } + const T * get_constRaw() { return ptr; } + + inline void destroy() { delete ptr; } + inline void destroyArray() { delete [] ptr; } + + inline bool lt(Pointer inOther) { return ptr < inOther.ptr; } + inline bool gt(Pointer inOther) { return ptr > inOther.ptr; } + inline bool leq(Pointer inOther) { return ptr <= inOther.ptr; } + inline bool geq(Pointer inOther) { return ptr >= inOther.ptr; } + +}; + + + + + +template<> +class Pointer +{ +public: + enum { elementSize = 0 }; + + void *ptr; + + inline Pointer( ) : ptr(0) { } + inline Pointer( const Pointer &inRHS ) : ptr(inRHS.ptr) { } + inline Pointer( const Dynamic &inRHS) { ptr = inRHS==null()?0: (void*)inRHS->__GetHandle(); } + inline Pointer( const null &inRHS ) : ptr(0) { } + + template + inline Pointer( const O *inValue ) : ptr( (void*) inValue) { } + //inline Pointer( T *inValue ) : ptr(inValue) { } + inline Pointer( AutoCast inValue ) : ptr( (void*)inValue.value) { } + + inline Pointer operator=( const Pointer &inRHS ) { return ptr = inRHS.ptr; } + inline Dynamic operator=( Dynamic &inValue ) + { + ptr = inValue==null() ? 0 : (void*) inValue->__GetHandle(); + return inValue; + } + inline Dynamic operator=( null &inValue ) { ptr=0; return inValue; } + inline AutoCast reinterpret() { return AutoCast(ptr); } + inline RawAutoCast rawCast() { return RawAutoCast(ptr); } + + inline bool operator==( const null &inValue ) const { return ptr==0; } + inline bool operator!=( const null &inValue ) const { return ptr!=0; } + + // Allow '->' syntax + inline Pointer *operator->() { return this; } + inline Pointer inc() { return ptr; } + inline Pointer dec() { return ptr; } + inline Pointer add(int inInt) { return ptr; } + inline Pointer sub(int inInt) { return ptr; } + inline Pointer incBy(int inDiff) { return ptr; } + inline Pointer decBy(int inDiff) { return ptr; } + inline void postIncRef() { } + inline void postIncVal() { } + + inline void at(int inIndex) { } + + inline void __get(int inIndex) { } + + template + inline void __set(int inIndex, O inValue) { } + + inline void get_value() { } + inline void get_ref() { } + template inline void set_ref(O val) { } + + operator Dynamic () const { return CreateDynamicPointer(ptr); } + //operator hx::Val () const { return CreateDynamicPointer((void *)ptr); } + operator void * () { return ptr; } + void * get_raw() { return ptr; } + const void * get_constRaw() { return ptr; } + + inline void destroy() { } + inline void destroyArray() { } + + inline bool lt(Pointer inOther) { return ptr < inOther.ptr; } + inline bool gt(Pointer inOther) { return ptr > inOther.ptr; } + inline bool leq(Pointer inOther) { return ptr <= inOther.ptr; } + inline bool geq(Pointer inOther) { return ptr >= inOther.ptr; } + +}; + + + + +template +inline bool operator == (const null &, Pointer inPtr) { return inPtr.ptr==0; } +template +inline bool operator != (const null &, Pointer inPtr) { return inPtr.ptr!=0; } + + + +template +class Reference : public Pointer +{ +public: + using Pointer::ptr; + + + inline Reference( const T &inRHS ) : Pointer(&inRHS) { } + inline Reference( T &inRHS ) : Pointer(&inRHS) { } + + inline Reference( ) : Pointer((T*)0) { } + inline Reference( const Reference &inRHS ) : Pointer(inRHS.ptr) { } + inline Reference( const Dynamic &inRHS) { ptr = inRHS==null()?0: (T*)inRHS->__GetHandle(); } + inline Reference( const null &inRHS ) : Pointer((T*)0) { } + inline Reference( const T *inValue ) : Pointer( (T*) inValue) { } + //inline Reference( T *inValue ) : Pointer(inValue) { } + inline Reference( AutoCast inValue ) : Pointer( (T*)inValue.value) { } + + template + inline Reference( const Reference &inOther ) + { + // Allow reinterpret or not? + ptr = (T*)inOther.ptr; + } + + template + inline Reference( const Struct &structVal ) : Pointer( &structVal.value ) { } + + inline Reference operator=( const Reference &inRHS ) { return ptr = inRHS.ptr; } + + + inline T *operator->() const { return ptr; } + + inline operator T &() { return *ptr; } + +}; + +template +Struct::Struct( const Reference &ref ) : value(*ref.ptr) { }; + + + +template +class Function +{ +public: + T *call; + + inline Function( ) { } + inline Function( const Function &inRHS ) : call(inRHS.call) { } + inline Function( const Dynamic &inRHS) { call = inRHS==null()?0: (T*)inRHS->__GetHandle(); } + inline Function( const null &inRHS ) { call = 0; } + inline Function( T *inValue ) : call((T*)(inValue)) { } + //inline Function( T *inValue ) : call(inValue) { } + inline Function( AutoCast inValue ) : call( (T*)inValue.value) { } + inline Function( const hx::AnyCast &inValue ) : call( (T*)inValue.mPtr) { } + + template + inline static Function __new(FROM from) + { + return Function(from); + } + + inline Function operator=( const Function &inRHS ) { return call = inRHS.call; } + inline Dynamic operator=( Dynamic &inValue ) + { + call = inValue==null() ? 0 : (T*) inValue->__GetHandle(); + return inValue; + } + inline Dynamic operator=( null &inValue ) { call=0; return inValue; } + inline bool operator==( const null &inValue ) const { return call==0; } + inline bool operator!=( const null &inValue ) const { return call!=0; } + + + operator Dynamic () const { return CreateDynamicPointer((void *)call); } + //operator hx::Val () const { return CreateDynamicPointer((void *)call); } + operator T * () { return call; } + operator void * () { return (void *)call; } + + inline T &get_call() { return *call; } + + inline bool lt(Function inOther) { return call < inOther.call; } + inline bool gt(Function inOther) { return call > inOther.call; } + inline bool leq(Function inOther) { return call <= inOther.call; } + inline bool geq(Function inOther) { return call >= inOther.call; } + +}; + + +template +inline bool operator == (const null &, Function inPtr) { return inPtr.call==0; } +template +inline bool operator != (const null &, Function inPtr) { return inPtr.call!=0; } + + + +class Function_obj +{ +public: + + inline static AutoCast getProcAddress(String inLib, String inPrim) + { + return AutoCast(__hxcpp_get_proc_address(inLib, inPrim,false)); + } + + + template + inline static AutoCast fromStaticFunction(T *inFunction) + { + return AutoCast(inFunction); + } +}; + + +class Pointer_obj +{ +public: + template + inline static AutoCast arrayElem(::Array array, int inIndex) { return AutoCast(&array[inIndex]); } + inline static AutoCast arrayElem(Dynamic inVal, int inIndex) + { + if (inVal==null() || !inVal->__IsArray()) + return AutoCast(0); + hx::ArrayBase *base = (hx::ArrayBase *)inVal.GetPtr(); + return AutoCast(base->GetBase() + inIndex*base->GetElementSize()); + } + + template + inline static AutoCast ofArray(::Array array) { return AutoCast(&array[0]); } + inline static AutoCast ofArray(Dynamic inVal) + { + if (inVal==null() || !inVal->__IsArray()) + return AutoCast(0); + hx::ArrayBase *base = (hx::ArrayBase *)inVal.GetPtr(); + return AutoCast(base->GetBase()); + } + + + + template + inline static Pointer addressOf(T &value) { return Pointer(&value); } + + template + inline static Pointer endOf(hx::ObjectPtr value) { return (void *)(value.mPtr+1); } + + template + inline static Pointer fromPointer(T *value) { return Pointer(value); } + template + inline static Pointer fromPointer(const T *value) { return Pointer(value); } + + template + inline static Pointer fromRaw(T *value) { return Pointer(value); } + template + inline static Pointer fromRaw(const T *value) { return Pointer(value); } + inline static Pointer fromRaw(const AutoCast &inAutoCast) { return Pointer(inAutoCast.value); } + inline static Pointer fromRaw(const RawAutoCast &inAutoCast) { return Pointer(inAutoCast.value); } + + + inline static AutoCast fromHandle(Dynamic inValue, String inKind) + { + if (inValue==null() || (inKind!=null() && inKind!=__hxcpp_get_kind(inValue))) + return AutoCast(0); + return AutoCast(inValue->__GetHandle()); + } +}; + + +class Reference_obj +{ +public: + +}; + + + +} // end namespace cpp + +namespace hx +{ +template +T *StarOf(T &x) { return &x; } +} + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/Variant.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/Variant.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ed0b8f12 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/Variant.h @@ -0,0 +1,676 @@ +#ifndef CPP_VARIANT_TWICE_H + + +namespace cpp +{ +#ifndef CPP_VARIANT_ONCE_H +#define CPP_VARIANT_ONCE_H + + template + inline bool isIntType(const T &inRHS) { return false; } + template<> inline bool isIntType(const int &inRHS) { return true; } + template<> inline bool isIntType(const Dynamic &inRHS); + template<> inline bool isIntType(const cpp::Variant &inRHS); + + template + inline bool isStringType(const T &inRHS) { return false; } + template<> inline bool isStringType(const String &inRHS) { return true; } + template<> inline bool isStringType(const Dynamic &inRHS); + template<> inline bool isStringType(const cpp::Variant &inRHS); + + struct Variant + { + enum Type + { + typeObject = 0, + typeString, + typeDouble, + typeInt, + typeInt64, + typeBool, + }; + + union + { + // Although this is typed as 'char', it might be char16_t in the case of smart strings + const char *valStringPtr; + hx::Object *valObject; + double valDouble; + cpp::Int64 valInt64; + int valInt; + bool valBool; + }; + Type type; + unsigned int valStringLen; + + + + inline bool isNull() const { + return (type==typeObject && !valObject) || (type==typeString && !valStringPtr); } + inline bool isNumeric() const; + inline bool isBool() const; + inline int asInt() const; + inline bool isInt() const; + inline cpp::Int64 asInt64() const; + inline bool isInt64() const; + inline bool isString() const; + inline double asDouble() const; + inline hx::Object *asObject() const { return type==typeObject ? valObject : 0; } + inline hx::Object *asDynamic() const{ return type==typeObject ? valObject : toDynamic(); } + inline hx::Object *toDynamic() const; // later + inline String asString() const; + inline String getString() const; + + inline Variant() : valInt64(0), type(typeObject) { } + //inline Variant() { copyBuf.b[0] = copyBuf.b[1] = 0; } + inline Variant(const null &) : type(typeObject), valObject(0) { } + inline Variant(bool inValue) : type(typeBool), valBool(inValue) { } + inline Variant(double inValue) : type(typeDouble), valDouble(inValue) { } + inline Variant(const ::String &inValue); // later + + inline Variant(cpp::Int64 inValue) : type(typeInt64), valInt64(inValue) { } + inline Variant(cpp::UInt64 inValue) : type(typeInt64), valInt64(inValue) { } + inline Variant(int inValue) : type(typeInt), valInt(inValue) { } + inline Variant(cpp::UInt32 inValue) : type(typeInt), valInt(inValue) { } + inline Variant(cpp::Int16 inValue) : type(typeInt), valInt(inValue) { } + inline Variant(cpp::UInt16 inValue) : type(typeInt), valInt(inValue) { } + inline Variant(cpp::Int8 inValue) : type(typeInt), valInt(inValue) { } + inline Variant(cpp::UInt8 inValue) : type(typeInt), valInt(inValue) { } + #if defined(__OBJC__) && defined(HXCPP_OBJC) + inline Variant(const id inObjc); + inline operator id() const; + #endif + + + template + Variant(const hx::ObjectPtr &inObjectPtr); + + inline Variant(const Dynamic &inRHS); // later + inline Variant(hx::Object *inValue) : type(typeObject), valObject(inValue) { } + + template + explicit inline Variant(const cpp::Struct &inVal); + template + explicit inline Variant(const cpp::Pointer &inRHS) ; + template + explicit inline Variant(const cpp::Function &inRHS) ; + template + explicit inline Variant(const hx::Native &inRHS) ; + + //inline operator Dynamic() const; // later + //inline operator String() const; + inline operator double() const { return asDouble(); } + inline operator int() const { return asInt(); } + inline operator bool() const { return asInt(); } + inline operator float () const { return asDouble(); } + inline operator unsigned int () const { return asInt(); } + inline operator short () const { return asInt(); } + inline operator unsigned short () const { return asInt(); } + inline operator unsigned char () const { return asInt(); } + inline operator char () const { return asInt(); } + inline operator signed char () const { return asInt(); } + inline operator cpp::Int64 () const { return asInt64(); } + inline operator cpp::UInt64 () const { return asInt64(); } + inline bool operator !() const { return !asInt(); } + + inline int Compare(hx::Object *inRHS) const; + inline int Compare(const Dynamic &inRHS) const; + inline int Compare(const cpp::Variant &inRHS) const; + + inline double set(const double &inValue) { type=typeDouble; return valDouble=inValue; } + inline double set(const float &inValue) { type=typeDouble; return valDouble=inValue; } + + inline void mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); // later + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + inline void visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx); // later + #endif + + + //inline Variant &operator=(const Variant &inRhs) { copyBuf = inRhs.copyBuf; return *this; } + + template + bool operator==(const T &inRHS) const; + + template + bool operator==(const hx::ObjectPtr &inRHS) const + { return Compare(inRHS.mPtr)==0; } + + + template + bool operator!=(const hx::ObjectPtr &inRHS) const + { return Compare(inRHS.mPtr)!=0; } + + + + inline bool operator==(const null &inRHS) const { return isNull(); } + inline bool operator==(const String &inRHS) const; + + inline bool operator!=(const null &inRHS) const { return !isNull(); } + inline bool operator!=(const Variant &inRHS) const { return !operator==(inRHS); } + inline bool operator!=(const String &inRHS) const; + + + template + RETURN_ Cast() const { return RETURN_(*this); } + + void CheckFPtr(); + HX_DECLARE_VARIANT_FUNCTIONS + + + // Operator + is different, since it must consider strings too... + inline String operator+(const String &s) const; + template + inline cpp::Variant operator + (const T &inRHS) const; + + inline double operator%(const Dynamic &inRHS) const; + inline double operator-() const { return -asDouble(); } + inline double operator++() { return set(asDouble()+1); } + inline double operator++(int) {double val = asDouble(); set(val+1); return val; } + inline double operator--() { return set(asDouble()-1); } + inline double operator--(int) {double val = asDouble(); set(val-1); return val; } + + template + inline double operator / (const T &inRHS) const { return asDouble() / (double)inRHS; } \ + + template + inline cpp::Variant operator - (const T &inRHS) const + { + if (::cpp::isIntType(inRHS) && isInt() ) + return asInt() - (int)inRHS; + return asDouble() - (double)inRHS; + } + + template + inline cpp::Variant operator * (const T &inRHS) const + { + if (::cpp::isIntType(inRHS) && isInt()) + return asInt() * (int)inRHS; + return asDouble() * (double)inRHS; + } + + inline bool operator < (const String &inRHS) const; + inline bool operator <= (const String &inRHS) const; + inline bool operator > (const String &inRHS) const; + inline bool operator >= (const String &inRHS) const; + + + + #define HX_VARIANT_COMPARE_OP( op ) \ + inline bool operator op (double inRHS) const { return isNumeric() && (asDouble() op inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (cpp::Int64 inRHS) const { return isNumeric() && (asInt64() op inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (cpp::UInt64 inRHS) const { return isNumeric() && ((cpp::UInt64)(asInt64()) op inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (float inRHS) const { return isNumeric() && (asDouble() op inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (int inRHS) const { return isNumeric() && (asDouble() op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (unsigned int inRHS) const { return isNumeric() && (asDouble() op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (short inRHS) const { return isNumeric() && (asDouble() op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (unsigned short inRHS) const { return isNumeric() && (asDouble() op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (signed char inRHS) const { return isNumeric() && (asDouble() op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (unsigned char inRHS) const { return isNumeric() && (asDouble() op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (bool inRHS) const { return isBool() && (asDouble() op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (const Dynamic &inRHS) const { return Compare(inRHS) op 0; } \ + + #define HX_VARIANT_COMPARE_OP_ALL( op ) \ + inline bool operator op (const null &inRHS) const { return false; } \ + inline bool operator op (const cpp::Variant &inRHS) const { return Compare(inRHS) op 0; } \ + HX_VARIANT_COMPARE_OP(op) + + HX_VARIANT_COMPARE_OP( == ) + HX_VARIANT_COMPARE_OP( != ) + HX_VARIANT_COMPARE_OP_ALL( < ) + HX_VARIANT_COMPARE_OP_ALL( <= ) + HX_VARIANT_COMPARE_OP_ALL( >= ) + HX_VARIANT_COMPARE_OP_ALL( > ) + + + }; + +#else // Second time ... + #define CPP_VARIANT_TWICE_H + + bool Variant::isInt() const + { + return type==typeInt || (type==typeObject && valObject && valObject->__GetType()==vtInt); + } + bool Variant::isInt64() const + { + return type==typeInt64 || (type==typeObject && valObject && valObject->__GetType()==vtInt64); + } + bool Variant::isString() const + { + return type==typeString || (type==typeObject && valObject && valObject->__GetType()==vtString); + } + + + #if defined(__OBJC__) && defined(HXCPP_OBJC) + // Variant type neither adds nor releases references counts while holding the value as an id on the stack + // The Dynamic created here owns the id, and we refer to the Dynamic and use his reference count to keep the id alive + inline Variant::Variant(const id inObjc) { type=typeObject; valObject = Dynamic(inObjc).mPtr; } + #ifdef OBJC_ARC + inline Variant::operator id () const { return type==typeObject && valObject ? (__bridge id)valObject->__GetHandle() : 0; } + #else + inline Variant::operator id () const { return type==typeObject && valObject ? (id)valObject->__GetHandle() : 0; } + #endif + #endif + + + + template<> inline bool isIntType(const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inRHS->__GetType()==vtInt; } + template<> inline bool isIntType(const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inRHS.isInt(); } + template<> inline bool isStringType(const Dynamic &inRHS) { return inRHS.mPtr && inRHS->__GetType()==vtString; } + template<> inline bool isStringType(const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inRHS.isString(); } + + template + Variant::Variant(const cpp::Struct &inVal) : + type(typeObject), valObject(Dynamic(inVal).mPtr) { } + + template + Variant::Variant(const cpp::Pointer &inRHS) : type(typeObject), valObject( Dynamic(inRHS).mPtr ) { } + template + Variant::Variant(const cpp::Function &inRHS) : type(typeObject), valObject( Dynamic(inRHS).mPtr ) { } + template + Variant::Variant(const hx::Native &inRHS) : type(typeObject), valObject( CreateDynamicPointer(inRHS.ptr).mPtr ) { } + + +#define HX_ARITH_VARIANT( op ) \ + inline double operator op (const double &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS;} \ + inline double operator op (const float &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS;} \ + inline double operator op (const int &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + inline double operator op (const unsigned int &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + inline double operator op (const signed char &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + inline double operator op (const unsigned char &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + inline double operator op (const signed short &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + inline double operator op (const unsigned short &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + inline double operator op (const cpp::Int64 &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + inline double operator op (const cpp::UInt64 &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inLHS op (double)inRHS; } \ + + HX_ARITH_VARIANT( - ) + HX_ARITH_VARIANT( + ) + HX_ARITH_VARIANT( / ) + HX_ARITH_VARIANT( * ) + + inline bool Variant::operator==(const String &inString) const + { + if (isNull()) return inString==null(); + return type==typeString && asString()==inString; + } + inline bool Variant::operator!=(const String &inString) const + { + if (isNull()) return inString!=null(); + return type!=typeString || asString()!=inString; + } + inline bool Variant::operator < (const String &inRHS) const { return asString() < inRHS; } + inline bool Variant::operator <= (const String &inRHS) const { return asString() < inRHS; } + inline bool Variant::operator > (const String &inRHS) const { return asString() > inRHS; } + inline bool Variant::operator >= (const String &inRHS) const { return asString() >= inRHS; } + + + + + + Variant::Variant(const ::String &inValue) : + type(typeString), valStringPtr(inValue.raw_ptr()), valStringLen(inValue.length) { } + + Variant::Variant(const Dynamic &inRHS) : type(typeObject), valObject(inRHS.mPtr) { } + + template + Variant::Variant(const hx::ObjectPtr &inObjectPtr) : + type(typeObject), valObject(inObjectPtr.mPtr) { } + + inline void Variant::CheckFPtr() + { + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + } + + HX_IMPLEMENT_INLINE_VARIANT_FUNCTIONS + + + int Variant::asInt() const + { + if (type==typeInt) + return valInt; + + switch(type) + { + case typeDouble: return valDouble; + case typeInt64: return (int)valInt64; + case typeBool: return valBool; + case typeObject: return valObject ? valObject->__ToInt() : 0; + default: ; + } + return 0; + } + + + + cpp::Int64 Variant::asInt64() const + { + if (type==typeInt64) + return valInt64; + + switch(type) + { + case typeDouble: return valDouble; + case typeInt: return valInt; + case typeBool: return valBool; + case typeObject: return valObject ? valObject->__ToInt64() : 0; + default: ; + } + return 0; + } + + double Variant::asDouble() const + { + if (type==typeDouble) + return valDouble; + else if (type==typeInt) + return valInt; + else if (type==typeBool) + return valBool ? 1.0 : 0.0; + else if (type==typeInt64) + return valInt64; + else if (type==typeObject) + return valObject ? valObject->__ToDouble() : 0.0; + return 0.0; + } + + + inline hx::Object *Variant::toDynamic() const + { + switch(type) + { + case typeInt: return Dynamic(valInt).mPtr; + case typeDouble: return Dynamic(valDouble).mPtr; + case typeBool: return Dynamic(valBool).mPtr; + case typeString: return Dynamic(String(valStringPtr, valStringLen)).mPtr; + case typeInt64: return Dynamic(valInt64).mPtr; + case typeObject: return valObject; + default: ; + } + return 0; + } + + + /* + Variant::operator Dynamic() const + { + switch(type) + { + case typeInt: return valInt; + case typeDouble: return valDouble; + case typeBool: return valBool; + case typeString: return String(valStringPtr, valStringLen); + case typeObject: return valObject; + default: ; + } + return null(); + } + */ + + + bool Variant::isNumeric() const + { + if (type==typeInt || type==typeDouble || type==typeInt64) + return true; + if (type!=typeObject || valObject==0) + return false; + + int t = valObject->__GetType(); + return t==vtInt || t==vtFloat; + } + + bool Variant::isBool() const + { + if (type==typeBool) + return true; + if (type!=typeObject || valObject==0) + return false; + + return valObject->__GetType() == vtBool; + } + + + String Variant::getString() const { return String(valStringPtr, valStringLen); } + String Variant::asString() const + { + switch(type) + { + case typeInt: return String(valInt); + case typeDouble: return String(valDouble); + case typeBool: return String(valBool); + case typeString: return String(valStringPtr, valStringLen); + case typeInt64: return String(valInt64); + case typeObject: return valObject ? valObject->toString() : String(); + default: ; + } + return String(); + } + //Variant::operator String() const { return asString(); } + + + void Variant::mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) + { + if (type==typeString) + { + HX_MARK_STRING(valStringPtr); + } + else if (type==typeObject) + { + HX_MARK_OBJECT(valObject); + } + } + + template + bool Variant::operator==(const T &inRHS) const + { + switch(type) + { + case typeInt: return valInt==(double)inRHS; + case typeDouble:return valDouble==(double)inRHS; + case typeBool: return valBool==(bool)inRHS; + case typeInt64: return valInt64==(cpp::Int64)inRHS; + case typeString: return getString()==String(inRHS); + case typeObject: + if (!valObject) + return inRHS == null(); + return valObject->__Compare( Dynamic(inRHS).mPtr )==0; + } + return false; + } + + + int Variant::Compare(hx::Object *inPtr) const + { + if (!inPtr) + return isNull() ? 0 : 1; + + switch(type) + { + case typeInt: + { + double diff = valInt - inPtr->__ToDouble(); + return diff<0 ? -1 : diff==0 ? 0 : 1; + } + case typeDouble: + { + double diff = valDouble - inPtr->__ToDouble(); + return diff<0 ? -1 : diff==0 ? 0 : 1; + } + case typeInt64: + { + cpp::Int64 diff = valInt64 - inPtr->__ToInt64(); + return diff<0 ? -1 : diff==0 ? 0 : 1; + } + case typeBool: + if (!inPtr) return 1; + return valBool==(bool)(inPtr->__ToInt()) ? 1 : 0; + case typeString: + if (!inPtr) return valStringPtr ? 1 : 0; + if (inPtr->__GetType()!=vtString) + return 1; + return String(valStringPtr, valStringLen)==inPtr->toString() ? 1 : 0; + case typeObject: + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=331) + return valObject->__Compare( inPtr ); + #else + return valObject->__Compare( inPtr->__GetRealObject() ); + #endif + default: ; + + } + return 0; + } + int Variant::Compare(const Dynamic &inD) const { return Compare(inD.mPtr); } + int Variant::Compare(const cpp::Variant &inVar) const + { + if (inVar.type==typeObject) + return Compare(inVar.valObject); + + switch(type) + { + case typeInt: + { + double diff = valInt - inVar.asDouble(); + return diff<0 ? -1 : diff==0 ? 0 : 1; + } + case typeDouble: + { + double diff = valDouble - inVar.asDouble(); + return diff<0 ? -1 : diff==0 ? 0 : 1; + } + case typeInt64: + { + cpp::Int64 diff = valInt64 - inVar.asInt64(); + return diff<0 ? -1 : diff==0 ? 0 : 1; + } + case typeBool: + return valBool==(bool)(inVar.asInt()) ? 1 : 0; + case typeString: + if (inVar.type!=typeString) + return 1; + return String(valStringPtr, valStringLen)==inVar.asString(); + case typeObject: + if (!valObject) + return 1; + return - inVar.Compare(*this); + } + + return 0; + } + + String cpp::Variant::operator+(const String &s) const + { + return asString() + s; + } + template + cpp::Variant Variant::operator + (const T &inRHS) const + { + if (isString() || ::cpp::isStringType(inRHS)) + return asString() + String(inRHS); + return asDouble() + (double)inRHS; + } + + + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void Variant::visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) + { + if (type==typeString) + { + HX_VISIT_STRING(valStringPtr); + } + else if (type==typeObject) + { + HX_VISIT_OBJECT(valObject); + } + } + #endif // HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + + + + + +#define HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(T) \ +inline bool operator == (const T &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inRHS==inLHS; } \ +inline bool operator != (const T &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inRHS!=inLHS; } + + +#define HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(T) \ +inline bool operator == (const T &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inRHS==inLHS; } \ +inline bool operator != (const T &inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return inRHS!=inLHS; } + +HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(String) +HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(double) +HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(float) +HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(cpp::Int64) +HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(cpp::UInt64) +HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(int) +HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(unsigned int) +HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(short) +HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(unsigned short) +HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(signed char) +HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(unsigned char) +HX_VARIANT_OP_ISEQ(bool) + +inline bool operator < (bool inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return false; } +inline bool operator <= (bool inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return false; } +inline bool operator >= (bool inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return false; } +inline bool operator > (bool inLHS,const cpp::Variant &inRHS) { return false; } + + +#define HX_COMPARE_VARIANT_OP( op ) \ + inline bool operator op (double inLHS,const ::cpp::Variant &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.isNumeric() && (inLHS op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (float inLHS,const ::cpp::Variant &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.isNumeric() && ((double)inLHS op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (cpp::Int64 inLHS,const ::cpp::Variant &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.isNumeric() && (inLHS op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (cpp::UInt64 inLHS,const ::cpp::Variant &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.isNumeric() && (inLHS op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (int inLHS,const ::cpp::Variant &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.isNumeric() && (inLHS op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (unsigned int inLHS,const ::cpp::Variant &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.isNumeric() && (inLHS op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (short inLHS,const ::cpp::Variant &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.isNumeric() && (inLHS op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (unsigned short inLHS,const ::cpp::Variant &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.isNumeric() && (inLHS op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (signed char inLHS,const ::cpp::Variant &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.isNumeric() && (inLHS op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (unsigned char inLHS,const ::cpp::Variant &inRHS) \ + { return inRHS.isNumeric() && (inLHS op (double)inRHS); } \ + inline bool operator op (const null &,const ::cpp::Variant &inRHS) \ + { return false; } \ + +HX_COMPARE_VARIANT_OP( < ) +HX_COMPARE_VARIANT_OP( <= ) +HX_COMPARE_VARIANT_OP( >= ) +HX_COMPARE_VARIANT_OP( > ) + + + + + + +} // close cpp +namespace hx { + template + bool ObjectPtr::operator==(const cpp::Variant &inRHS) const { + return inRHS.Compare(mPtr)==0; + } + template + bool ObjectPtr::operator!=(const cpp::Variant &inRHS) const { + return inRHS.Compare(mPtr)!=0; + } + +} // close hx +namespace cpp { + +#endif // not twice + + + +} // end namespace cpp + + + + +#endif // CPP_VARIANT_TWICE_H diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/VirtualArray.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/VirtualArray.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..80c27afc --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp/VirtualArray.h @@ -0,0 +1,727 @@ +namespace cpp +{ + +// This file is included twice - either side of the Array definition +#ifndef HX_VARRAY_DEFINED +#define HX_VARRAY_DEFINED + + +class VirtualArray : public hx::ObjectPtr +{ + typedef hx::ObjectPtr super; +public: + typedef Dynamic Elem; + + inline VirtualArray() : super(0) { } + inline VirtualArray(VirtualArray_obj *inObj) : super(inObj) { } + inline VirtualArray(const null &inNull) : super(0) { } + inline VirtualArray(const VirtualArray &inOther) : super( inOther.mPtr ) { } + + // Build from foreign array + template inline VirtualArray( const Array &inRHS ); + + + inline VirtualArray( const Dynamic &inRHS ) : super(0) { setDynamic(inRHS); } + inline VirtualArray( const cpp::ArrayBase &inRHS ) : super(0) { setDynamic(inRHS); } + inline VirtualArray(const ::cpp::Variant &inVariant) { setDynamic(inVariant.asObject()); } + + + + + inline VirtualArray &operator=(const null &inNull) { mPtr = 0; return *this; } + inline VirtualArray &operator=(Ptr inRHS) { mPtr = inRHS; return *this; } + inline VirtualArray &operator=(const VirtualArray &inRHS) { mPtr = inRHS.mPtr; return *this; } + + inline void setDynamic( const Dynamic &inRHS ); + + template + inline VirtualArray Add(const T &inVal); + + + inline bool operator==(const Dynamic &value) const { return value==*this; } + template inline bool operator==( const Array &inRHS ); + + inline bool operator!=(Dynamic value) const { return value!=*this; } + template inline bool operator!=( const Array &inRHS ) { return inRHS!=*this; } + +}; + + + + + + +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES VirtualArray_obj : public hx::ArrayCommon +{ + typedef hx::ArrayStore ArrayStore; + typedef hx::ArrayBase ArrayBase; + +public: + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdVirtualArray }; + + typedef hx::Object super; + ArrayStore store; + ArrayBase *base; + + VirtualArray_obj(ArrayBase *inBase=0, bool inFixed=false) : base(inBase) + { + mArrayConvertId = hx::aciVirtualArray; + store = inFixed && inBase ? hx::arrayFixed : base ? base->getStoreType() : hx::arrayEmpty; + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + if (base) + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this,base); + #endif + } + + VirtualArray_obj(ArrayStore inStore) + { + mArrayConvertId = hx::aciVirtualArray; + store = inStore; + } + + hx::Object *__GetRealObject() { return base?(hx::Object *)base:(hx::Object *)this; } + + inline static VirtualArray __new(int inSize=0,int inReserve=0) + { + VirtualArray result = new VirtualArray_obj(hx::arrayEmpty); + if (inSize>0) + result->__SetSizeExact(inSize); + if (inReserve>0) + result->reserve(inReserve); + return result; + } + + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>330) + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const; + #endif + + + inline int get_length() const + { + return base ? base->length : 0; + } + + inline void checkBase() const + { + #ifdef HXCPP_CHECK_POINTER + if (store==hx::arrayNull) + { + hx::NullReference("Array", true); + // The handler might have fixed up the null value + if (store==hx::arrayNull) hx::NullReference("Array", false); + } + #endif + } + + void EnsureStorage(const Dynamic &inValue) + { + if (!inValue.mPtr) + { + EnsureNullStorage(); + } + else switch(inValue->__GetType()) + { + case vtBool: EnsureBoolStorage(); break; + case vtInt: EnsureIntStorage(); break; + case vtFloat: EnsureFloatStorage(); break; + case vtString: EnsureStringStorage(); break; + case vtInt64: EnsureInt64Storage(); break; + default: EnsureObjectStorage(); + } + } + + + void EnsureStorage(const cpp::Variant &inValue) + { + switch(inValue.type) + { + case Variant::typeObject: + if (!inValue.valObject) + EnsureNullStorage(); + else + EnsureObjectStorage(); + break; + case Variant::typeString: EnsureStringStorage(); break; + case Variant::typeDouble: EnsureFloatStorage(); break; + case Variant::typeInt: EnsureIntStorage(); break; + case Variant::typeBool: EnsureBoolStorage(); break; + case Variant::typeInt64: EnsureInt64Storage(); break; + } + } + + + void MakeIntArray(); + void MakeInt64Array(); + void MakeObjectArray(); + void MakeFloatArray(); + void MakeBoolArray(); + void MakeStringArray(); + + void EnsureStorage(const VirtualArray &inValue) { EnsureObjectStorage(); } + void EnsureStorage(const unsigned char &inValue) { EnsureIntStorage(); } + void EnsureStorage(const bool &inValue) { EnsureBoolStorage(); } + void EnsureStorage(const String &inValue) { EnsureStringStorage(); } + void EnsureStorage(const double &inValue) { EnsureFloatStorage(); } + void EnsureStorage(const float &inValue) { EnsureFloatStorage(); } + void EnsureStorage(const int &inValue) { EnsureIntStorage(); } + void EnsureStorage(const cpp::Int64 &inValue) { EnsureInt64Storage(); } + void EnsureStorage(const cpp::UInt64 &inValue) { EnsureInt64Storage(); } + void EnsureStorage(const null &inValue) { EnsureNullStorage(); } + template + void EnsureStorage(const T &inValue) { EnsureObjectStorage(); } + + inline void EnsureBoolStorage() + { + switch(store) + { + case hx::arrayNull: + case hx::arrayObject: + case hx::arrayFixed: + case hx::arrayBool: + return; + case hx::arrayEmpty: + MakeBoolArray(); + break; + case hx::arrayInt: + case hx::arrayInt64: + case hx::arrayFloat: + case hx::arrayString: + MakeObjectArray(); + break; + } + } + inline void EnsureStringStorage() + { + switch(store) + { + case hx::arrayNull: + case hx::arrayObject: + case hx::arrayFixed: + case hx::arrayString: + return; + case hx::arrayEmpty: + MakeStringArray(); + break; + case hx::arrayInt: + case hx::arrayInt64: + case hx::arrayFloat: + case hx::arrayBool: + MakeObjectArray(); + break; + } + } + inline void EnsureFloatStorage() + { + switch(store) + { + case hx::arrayNull: + case hx::arrayFloat: + case hx::arrayObject: + case hx::arrayFixed: + return; + case hx::arrayInt: + case hx::arrayInt64: + case hx::arrayEmpty: + MakeFloatArray(); + break; + case hx::arrayBool: + case hx::arrayString: + MakeObjectArray(); + break; + } + } + + inline void EnsureIntStorage() + { + switch(store) + { + case hx::arrayNull: + case hx::arrayInt: + case hx::arrayInt64: + case hx::arrayFloat: + case hx::arrayObject: + case hx::arrayFixed: + return; + case hx::arrayEmpty: + MakeIntArray(); + break; + case hx::arrayBool: + case hx::arrayString: + MakeObjectArray(); + break; + } + } + + inline void EnsureInt64Storage() + { + switch(store) + { + case hx::arrayNull: + case hx::arrayInt64: + case hx::arrayFloat: + case hx::arrayObject: + case hx::arrayFixed: + return; + case hx::arrayInt: + case hx::arrayEmpty: + MakeInt64Array(); + break; + case hx::arrayBool: + case hx::arrayString: + MakeObjectArray(); + break; + } + } + + inline void EnsureObjectStorage() + { + switch(store) + { + case hx::arrayNull: + case hx::arrayObject: + case hx::arrayFixed: + return; + case hx::arrayEmpty: + case hx::arrayInt: + case hx::arrayInt64: + case hx::arrayFloat: + case hx::arrayBool: + case hx::arrayString: + MakeObjectArray(); + break; + } + } + inline void EnsureNullStorage() + { + switch(store) + { + case hx::arrayNull: + case hx::arrayObject: + case hx::arrayFixed: + case hx::arrayString: + return; + case hx::arrayEmpty: + case hx::arrayInt: + case hx::arrayInt64: + case hx::arrayFloat: + case hx::arrayBool: + MakeObjectArray(); + break; + } + } + + template void fixType(); + template F castArray(); + + void EnsureBase(); + void CreateEmptyArray(int inLen); + + void EnsureArrayStorage(ArrayStore inValue); + void EnsureArrayStorage(VirtualArray inValue); + + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_MARK_OBJECT(base); + } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) + { + if (base) + __inCtx->visitObject( (hx::Object **)&base); + } + #endif + + + // Used by cpp.ArrayBase + inline int getElementSize() const { return base ? base->GetElementSize() : 0; } + inline int getByteCount() const { return base ? base->getByteCount() : 0; } + inline char * getBase() const { return base ? base->GetBase() : 0; } + hx::Val __SetField(const String &inString,const hx::Val &inValue ,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp) { return null(); } + + static hx::Class &__SGetClass() { return hx::ArrayBase::__mClass; } + hx::Class __GetClass() const; + String toString(); + String __ToString() const { return const_cast(this)->toString(); } + + void setData(void *inData, int inElements) { EnsureBase(); base->setData(inData, inElements); } + void setUnmanagedData(void *inData, int inElements) { EnsureBase(); base->setUnmanagedData(inData, inElements); } + + int __GetType() const { return vtArray; } + + inline size_t size() const { checkBase(); return store==hx::arrayEmpty ? 0 : base->length; } + inline int __length() const { checkBase(); return store==hx::arrayEmpty ? 0 : (int)base->length; } + + String ItemString(int inI) { checkBase(); return store==hx::arrayEmpty ? null() : base->ItemString(inI); } + + const char * __CStr() const { return store==hx::arrayEmpty ? "[]" : store==hx::arrayNull ? "null" : base->__CStr(); } + inline const char *GetBase() const { return base ? base->GetBase() : 0; } + inline char *GetBase() { return base ? base->GetBase() : 0; } + + int GetElementSize() const { checkBase(); return store==hx::arrayEmpty ? 0 : base->GetElementSize(); } + + inline void reserve(int inSize) const + { + if (base) + base->reserve(inSize); + } + + inline int capacity() + { + if (base) + return base->capacity(); + return 0; + } + + void resize(int inLen) + { + if (!base) + CreateEmptyArray(inLen); + else + base->resize(inLen); + } + void __SetSize(int inLen) { resize(inLen); } + + VirtualArray __SetSizeExact(int inLen=0) + { + if (!base && inLen) + CreateEmptyArray(inLen); + else if (base) + base->__SetSizeExact(inLen); + return this; + } + + void safeSort(Dynamic sorter, bool isString) { checkBase(); if (store!=hx::arrayEmpty) base->safeSort(sorter,isString); } + + inline void __unsafeStringReference(String inString) { if (base) base->__unsafeStringReference(inString); } + + + Dynamic __GetItem(int inIndex) const; + Dynamic __SetItem(int inIndex,Dynamic inValue); + hx::Val __Field(const String &inString, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + + template + inline const T &set(int inIdx, const T &inVal) + { + if (store!=hx::arrayFixed) + { + if (inIdx>(store==hx::arrayEmpty ? 0 : (int)base->length) ) + EnsureObjectStorage(); + else + EnsureStorage(inVal); + } + base->set(inIdx, inVal); + return inVal; + } + + + template + inline int push(const T &inVal) + { + if (store!=hx::arrayFixed) EnsureStorage(inVal); + return base->__push(Dynamic(inVal)); + } + + + template + inline VirtualArray_obj *Add(const T &inVal) + { + if (store!=hx::arrayFixed) EnsureStorage(inVal); + base->__push(Dynamic(inVal)); + return this; + } + + inline Dynamic pop() { checkBase(); return store==hx::arrayEmpty ? null() : base->__pop(); } + + inline bool contains(Dynamic inValue) + { + checkBase(); + if (store==hx::arrayEmpty) + return false; + EnsureStorage(inValue); + return base->__contains(inValue); + } + + inline bool remove(Dynamic inValue) + { + checkBase(); + if (store==hx::arrayEmpty) + return false; + EnsureStorage(inValue); + return base->__remove(inValue); + } + + inline bool removeAt(int inIndex) { checkBase(); return (store!=hx::arrayEmpty) && base->__removeAt(inIndex); } + + int indexOf(Dynamic inValue, Dynamic fromIndex = null()) + { + checkBase(); + if (store==hx::arrayEmpty) + return -1; + EnsureStorage(inValue); + return (int)base->__indexOf(inValue,fromIndex); + } + int lastIndexOf(Dynamic inValue, Dynamic fromIndex = null()) + { + checkBase(); + if (store==hx::arrayEmpty) + return -1; + EnsureStorage(inValue); + return (int)base->__lastIndexOf(inValue,fromIndex); + } + + Dynamic shift() { checkBase(); return store==hx::arrayEmpty ? null() : base->__shift(); } + + VirtualArray concat( VirtualArray inTail ) + { + inTail->checkBase(); + EnsureArrayStorage(inTail); + if (inTail->__length()<1) + return copy(); + return new VirtualArray_obj( base->__concat(inTail), store==hx::arrayFixed ); + } + VirtualArray copy( ) + { + checkBase(); + if (store==hx::arrayEmpty) + return new VirtualArray_obj(hx::arrayEmpty); + + return new VirtualArray_obj(base->__copy(), store==hx::arrayFixed); + } + VirtualArray slice(int inPos, Dynamic end = null()) + { + checkBase(); + if (store==hx::arrayEmpty) + return new VirtualArray_obj(hx::arrayEmpty); + return new VirtualArray_obj(base->__slice(inPos,end), store==hx::arrayFixed); + } + VirtualArray splice(int inPos, int len); + VirtualArray map(Dynamic inFunc); + VirtualArray filter(Dynamic inFunc); + + template + inline VirtualArray init(int inIndex, const T &inVal) + { + if (store!=hx::arrayFixed) EnsureStorage(inVal); + __SetItem(inIndex,inVal); + return this; + } + + inline Dynamic __unsafe_set(int inIndex, const Dynamic &val) { return __SetItem(inIndex,val); } + inline Dynamic __unsafe_get(int inIndex) { return __GetItem(inIndex); } + + + template + inline void insert(int inPos, const T &inValue) + { + if (store!=hx::arrayFixed) + { + if (inPos>(store==hx::arrayEmpty ? 0 : (int)base->length) ) + EnsureObjectStorage(); + else + EnsureStorage(inValue); + } + + base->__insert(inPos,inValue); + } + + template + inline void unshift(const T& inValue) + { + if (store!=hx::arrayFixed) EnsureStorage(inValue); + base->__unshift(inValue); + } + + inline void reverse() { checkBase(); if (store!=hx::arrayEmpty) base->__reverse(); } + + inline void qsort(Dynamic inSorter) { checkBase(); if (base) base->__qsort(inSorter); } + + inline void sort(Dynamic inSorter) { checkBase(); if (base) base->__sort(inSorter); } + + Dynamic iterator() { checkBase(); return !base ? getEmptyIterator() : base->__iterator(); } + static Dynamic getEmptyIterator(); + + Dynamic keyValueIterator() { checkBase(); return !base ? getEmptyIterator() : base->__keyValueIterator(); } + + bool IsByteArray() const { checkBase(); return store!=hx::arrayEmpty && base->IsByteArray(); } + + void zero(Dynamic inFirst, Dynamic inCount) { checkBase(); if (store!=hx::arrayEmpty) base->zero(inFirst,inCount); } + + inline int memcmp(VirtualArray inOther) + { + checkBase(); + if (store==hx::arrayEmpty) + return inOther->__length() == 0; + return base->__memcmp(inOther); + } + inline void blit(int inDestElement, cpp::VirtualArray inSourceArray, int inSourceElement, int inElementCount) + { + inSourceArray->checkBase(); + EnsureArrayStorage(inSourceArray); + if (base) + base->__blit(inDestElement, inSourceArray, inSourceElement, inElementCount); + } + + String join(String inSeparator) { checkBase(); if (!base) return HX_CSTRING(""); return base->__join(inSeparator); } + + + Dynamic __get(int inIndex) const { checkBase(); if (store==hx::arrayEmpty) return null(); return base->__GetItem(inIndex); } + + Dynamic concat_dyn(); + Dynamic copy_dyn(); + Dynamic insert_dyn(); + Dynamic iterator_dyn(); + Dynamic keyValueIterator_dyn(); + Dynamic join_dyn(); + Dynamic pop_dyn(); + Dynamic push_dyn(); + Dynamic contains_dyn(); + Dynamic remove_dyn(); + Dynamic removeAt_dyn(); + Dynamic indexOf_dyn(); + Dynamic lastIndexOf_dyn(); + Dynamic reverse_dyn(); + Dynamic shift_dyn(); + Dynamic slice_dyn(); + Dynamic splice_dyn(); + Dynamic sort_dyn(); + Dynamic toString_dyn(); + Dynamic unshift_dyn(); + Dynamic map_dyn(); + Dynamic filter_dyn(); + Dynamic __SetSize_dyn(); + Dynamic __SetSizeExact_dyn(); + Dynamic __unsafe_get_dyn(); + Dynamic __unsafe_set_dyn(); + Dynamic blit_dyn(); + Dynamic zero_dyn(); + Dynamic memcmp_dyn(); + Dynamic resize_dyn(); +}; + + +//typedef hx::ObjectPtr< VirtualArray_obj > VirtualArray; + + + +#else // !HX_VARRAY_DEFINED + + +// Build dynamic array from foreign array +template +VirtualArray::VirtualArray( const Array &inRHS ) + : super( !inRHS.mPtr ? 0 : new VirtualArray_obj( inRHS.mPtr, true) ) +{ +} + + +template +inline VirtualArray VirtualArray::Add(const T &inVal) +{ + mPtr->push(inVal); + return *this; +} + + +inline void VirtualArray::setDynamic( const Dynamic &inRHS ) +{ + hx::Object *ptr = inRHS.GetPtr(); + if (ptr) + { + if (ptr->__GetClass().mPtr == super::__SGetClass().mPtr ) + { + cpp::VirtualArray_obj *varray = dynamic_cast(ptr); + if (varray) + mPtr = varray; + else + mPtr = new VirtualArray_obj(dynamic_cast(ptr), true); + } + } +} + + + +template +void VirtualArray_obj::fixType() +{ + if (store==hx::arrayFixed) + return; + + store = hx::arrayFixed; + if (base && base->length>0) + { + Array fixedArray = Dynamic(base); + base = fixedArray.mPtr; + } + else + { + base = new Array_obj(0,0); + } + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + if (base) + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this,base); + #endif +} + +template +ARRAY VirtualArray_obj::castArray() +{ + if (store==hx::arrayFixed) + return Dynamic(base); + + store = hx::arrayFixed; + if (base && base->length>0) + { + ARRAY fixedArray = Dynamic(base); + base = fixedArray.mPtr; + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + if (base) + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this,base); + #endif + return fixedArray; + } + else + { + ARRAY fixedArray(0,0); + base = fixedArray.mPtr; + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + if (base) + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this,base); + #endif + return fixedArray; + } +} + +template +inline bool VirtualArray::operator==( const Array &inRHS ) +{ + if (!mPtr) + return inRHS.mPtr; + return mPtr->castArray< Array >() == inRHS; +} + +} // end namespace cpp + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_reslove_virtual_array(cpp::VirtualArray inArray); + + + +namespace hx +{ +// For type inference when marking +template<> inline void MarkMember(cpp::VirtualArray &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) + { HX_MARK_OBJECT(outT.mPtr); } + +#ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS +template<> inline void VisitMember(cpp::VirtualArray &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) +{ + HX_VISIT_OBJECT(outT.mPtr); +} +#endif + +} // end namespace hx + +namespace cpp +{ +#endif // HX_VARRAY_DEFINED +} + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp_bytearray.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp_bytearray.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..76b7f45e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/cpp_bytearray.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#pragma once + +#include +#include + +struct bytearray { + uint8_t *data; + int refCount; + + bytearray() { + data = NULL; + refCount = 0; + } + + void alloc(int length) { + data = new uint8_t[length]; + } + + void addRef() { + ++refCount; + } + + void subRef() { + --refCount; + if (refCount == 0) { + delete[] data; + data = NULL; + } + } + + float get(int index) { + return data[index]; + } + + float set(int index, float value) { + return data[index] = value; + } +}; diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Anon.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Anon.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af0caedb --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Anon.h @@ -0,0 +1,755 @@ +#ifndef HX_ANON_H +#define HX_ANON_H + + +namespace hx +{ + +typedef Dynamic FieldMap; + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic FieldMapCreate(); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +bool FieldMapGet(Dynamic *inMap, const ::String &inName, ::Dynamic &outValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +bool FieldMapHas(Dynamic *inMap, const ::String &inName); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +bool FieldMapGet(Dynamic *inMap, int inID, ::Dynamic &outValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +#ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL +void FieldMapSet(hx::Object *inThis,Dynamic *inMap, const ::String &inName, const ::Dynamic &inValue); +#else +void FieldMapSet(Dynamic *inMap, const ::String &inName, const ::Dynamic &inValue); +#endif +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +void FieldMapAppendFields(Dynamic *inMap,::Array< ::String> &outFields); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +void FieldMapMark(Dynamic *inMap,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); +#ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +void FieldMapVisit(Dynamic **inMap,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx); +#endif + +} // end namespace hx + + + + +namespace hx +{ + +// --- hx::Anon_obj ---------------------------------------------- +// +// The hx::Anon_obj contains an arbitrary string map of fields. + +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Anon_obj : public hx::Object +{ + typedef hx::Anon_obj OBJ_; + typedef hx::ObjectPtr Anon; + typedef hx::Object super; + + inline void *operator new( size_t inSize, int inExtra ) + { + return hx::Object::operator new(inSize+inExtra, true, 0); + } + + struct VariantKey + { + int hash; + String key; + cpp::Variant value; + }; + + Dynamic mFields; + int mFixedFields; + +public: + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdDynamic }; + + inline void *operator new( size_t inSize ) + { + return hx::Object::operator new(inSize, true, 0); + } + inline void operator delete(void *, size_t inSize ) { } + inline void operator delete(void *, size_t inSize, int inExtra ) { } + + inline Anon_obj *setFixed(int index, const String &inName, const ::cpp::Variant &inValue) + { + VariantKey *fixed = getFixed() + index; + fixed->hash = inName.hash(); + fixed->key = inName; + fixed->value = inValue; + if (inValue.type == ::cpp::Variant::typeObject) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, inValue.valObject); + } + else if (inValue.type == ::cpp::Variant::typeString) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, inValue.valStringPtr); + } + return this; + } + inline VariantKey *getFixed() + { + return (VariantKey *)(this + 1); + } + inline int findFixed(const ::String &inKey,bool inSkip5 = false); + + + + + Anon_obj(int inFixedFields = 0); + + static Anon Create(int inElements) + { + return Anon(new (inElements*sizeof(VariantKey) ) hx::Anon_obj(inElements) ); + } + + static Anon Create() { return Anon(new (0) hx::Anon_obj); } + static Anon Create(const Dynamic &inSrc) { return Anon(new (0) hx::Anon_obj); } + + static Dynamic __CreateEmpty() { return Anon(new (0) hx::Anon_obj); } + static Dynamic __Create(DynamicArray inArgs); + static void __boot(); + + void operator delete( void *, int) { } + + + hx::Val __Field(const String &inString ,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + bool __HasField(const String &inString); + hx::Val __SetField(const String &inString,const hx::Val &inValue ,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + virtual void __GetFields(Array &outFields); + Dynamic *__GetFieldMap() { return &mFields; } + + virtual int __GetType() const { return vtObject; } + + hx::Anon_obj *Add(const String &inName,const Dynamic &inValue,bool inSetThisPointer=true); + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx); + #endif + + String __ToString() const; + String toString(); + + static hx::ObjectPtr __mClass; \ + static hx::ObjectPtr &__SGetClass() { return __mClass; } + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL<331) + bool __Is(hx::Object *inObj) const { return dynamic_cast(inObj)!=0; } + #endif + hx::ObjectPtr __GetClass() const { return __mClass; } + + bool __Remove(String inKey); +}; + + +typedef hx::ObjectPtr Anon; + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Anon SourceInfo(String inFile, int inLine, String inClass, String inMethod); + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String StringFromAnonFields(hx::Object *inPtr); + + +template +class AnonStruct1_obj : public hx::Object +{ +public: + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdDynamic }; + + String name0; _hx_T0 t0; + + inline static hx::Object *Create(const String &inName0, _hx_T0 inT0) + { + AnonStruct1_obj *result = new AnonStruct1_obj; + result->name0 = inName0; result->t0 = inT0; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT0)); + } + return result; + } + hx::Val __Field(const String &inField, hx::PropertyAccess) + { + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name0)) return t0; + return null(); + } + hx::Val __SetField(const String &inField,const hx::Val &inValue, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp) + { + if (inField.__s==name0.__s || HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name0)) { + t0 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T0 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t0)); + } + return inValue; + } + hx::Throw(HX_CSTRING("Missing field ") + inField); + return inValue; + } + + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t0); + } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t0); + } + #endif + + void __GetFields(Array &outFields) + { + outFields->push(name0); + } + + String toString() { return StringFromAnonFields(this); } +}; + + + +template +class AnonStruct2_obj : public hx::Object +{ +public: + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdDynamic }; + + String name0; _hx_T0 t0; + String name1; _hx_T1 t1; + + inline static hx::Object *Create(const String &inName0, _hx_T0 inT0, + const String &inName1, _hx_T1 inT1) + { + AnonStruct2_obj *result = new AnonStruct2_obj; + result->name0 = inName0; result->t0 = inT0; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT0)); + } + result->name1 = inName1; result->t1 = inT1; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T1>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT1)); + } + return result; + } + hx::Val __Field(const String &inField, hx::PropertyAccess) + { + if (inField.__s==name0.__s) return t0; + if (inField.__s==name1.__s) return t1; + + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + if (!inField.isAsciiEncodedQ()) + return null(); + #endif + + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name0)) return t0; + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name1)) return t1; + return null(); + } + hx::Val __SetField(const String &inField,const hx::Val &inValue, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp) + { + if (inField.__s==name0.__s) { + t0 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T0 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t0)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (inField.__s==name1.__s) { + t1 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T1 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T1>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t1)); + } + return inValue; + } + + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name0)) { + t0 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T0 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t0)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name1)) { + t1 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T1 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T1>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t1)); + } + return inValue; + } + hx::Throw(HX_CSTRING("Missing field ") + inField); + return inValue; + } + + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t0); + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t1); + } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t0); + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t1); + } + #endif + + void __GetFields(Array &outFields) + { + outFields->push(name0); + outFields->push(name1); + } + + String toString() { return StringFromAnonFields(this); } + +}; + + + +template +class AnonStruct3_obj : public hx::Object +{ +public: + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdDynamic }; + + String name0; _hx_T0 t0; + String name1; _hx_T1 t1; + String name2; _hx_T2 t2; + + inline static hx::Object *Create(const String &inName0, _hx_T0 inT0, + const String &inName1, _hx_T1 inT1, + const String &inName2, _hx_T2 inT2) + { + AnonStruct3_obj *result = new AnonStruct3_obj; + result->name0 = inName0; result->t0 = inT0; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT0)); + } + result->name1 = inName1; result->t1 = inT1; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T1>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT1)); + } + result->name2 = inName2; result->t2 = inT2; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T2>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT2)); + } + return result; + } + hx::Val __Field(const String &inField, hx::PropertyAccess) + { + if (inField.__s==name0.__s) return t0; + if (inField.__s==name1.__s) return t1; + if (inField.__s==name2.__s) return t2; + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + if (!inField.isAsciiEncodedQ()) + return null(); + #endif + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name0)) return t0; + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name1)) return t1; + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name2)) return t2; + return null(); + } + hx::Val __SetField(const String &inField,const hx::Val &inValue, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp) + { + if (inField.__s==name0.__s) { + t0 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T0 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t0)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (inField.__s==name1.__s) { + t1 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T1 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T1>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t1)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (inField.__s==name2.__s) { + t2 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T2 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T2>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t2)); + } + return inValue; + } + + + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name0)) { + t0 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T0 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t0)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name1)) { + t1 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T1 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T1>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t1)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name2)) { + t2 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T2 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T2>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t2)); + } + return inValue; + } + hx::Throw(HX_CSTRING("Missing field ") + inField); + return inValue; + } + + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t0); + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t1); + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t2); + } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t0); + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t1); + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t2); + } + #endif + + void __GetFields(Array &outFields) + { + outFields->push(name0); + outFields->push(name1); + outFields->push(name2); + } + + String toString() { return StringFromAnonFields(this); } +}; + + +template +class AnonStruct4_obj : public hx::Object +{ +public: + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdDynamic }; + + String name0; _hx_T0 t0; + String name1; _hx_T1 t1; + String name2; _hx_T2 t2; + String name3; _hx_T3 t3; + + inline static hx::Object *Create(const String &inName0, _hx_T0 inT0, + const String &inName1, _hx_T1 inT1, + const String &inName2, _hx_T2 inT2, + const String &inName3, _hx_T3 inT3 + ) + { + AnonStruct4_obj *result = new AnonStruct4_obj; + result->name0 = inName0; result->t0 = inT0; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT0)); + } + result->name1 = inName1; result->t1 = inT1; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T1>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT1)); + } + result->name2 = inName2; result->t2 = inT2; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T2>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT2)); + } + result->name3 = inName3; result->t3 = inT3; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T3>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT3)); + } + return result; + } + hx::Val __Field(const String &inField, hx::PropertyAccess) + { + if (inField.__s==name0.__s) return t0; + if (inField.__s==name1.__s) return t1; + if (inField.__s==name2.__s) return t2; + if (inField.__s==name3.__s) return t3; + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + if (!inField.isAsciiEncodedQ()) + return null(); + #endif + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name0)) return t0; + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name1)) return t1; + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name2)) return t2; + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name3)) return t3; + return null(); + } + hx::Val __SetField(const String &inField,const hx::Val &inValue, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp) + { + if (inField.__s==name0.__s) { + t0 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T0 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t0)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (inField.__s==name1.__s) { + t1 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T1 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T1>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t1)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (inField.__s==name2.__s) { + t2 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T2 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T2>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t2)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (inField.__s==name3.__s) { + t3 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T3 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T3>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t3)); + } + return inValue; + } + + + + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name0)) { + t0 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T0 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t0)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name1)) { + t1 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T1 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T1>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t1)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name2)) { + t2 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T2 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T2>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t2)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name3)) { + t3 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T3 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T3>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t3)); + } + return inValue; + } + hx::Throw(HX_CSTRING("Missing field ") + inField); + return inValue; + } + + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t0); + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t1); + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t2); + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t3); + } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t0); + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t1); + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t2); + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t3); + } + #endif + + void __GetFields(Array &outFields) + { + outFields->push(name0); + outFields->push(name1); + outFields->push(name2); + outFields->push(name3); + } + + String toString() { return StringFromAnonFields(this); } +}; + + + + +template +class AnonStruct5_obj : public hx::Object +{ +public: + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdDynamic }; + + String name0; _hx_T0 t0; + String name1; _hx_T1 t1; + String name2; _hx_T2 t2; + String name3; _hx_T3 t3; + String name4; _hx_T4 t4; + + inline static hx::Object *Create(const String &inName0, _hx_T0 inT0, + const String &inName1, _hx_T1 inT1, + const String &inName2, _hx_T2 inT2, + const String &inName3, _hx_T3 inT3, + const String &inName4, _hx_T4 inT4 + ) + { + AnonStruct5_obj *result = new AnonStruct5_obj; + result->name0 = inName0; result->t0 = inT0; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT0)); + } + result->name1 = inName1; result->t1 = inT1; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T1>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT1)); + } + result->name2 = inName2; result->t2 = inT2; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T2>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT2)); + } + result->name3 = inName3; result->t3 = inT3; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T3>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT3)); + } + result->name4 = inName4; result->t4 = inT4; + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T4>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(result, hx::PointerOf(inT4)); + } + return result; + } + hx::Val __Field(const String &inField, hx::PropertyAccess) + { + if (inField.__s==name0.__s) return t0; + if (inField.__s==name1.__s) return t1; + if (inField.__s==name2.__s) return t2; + if (inField.__s==name3.__s) return t3; + if (inField.__s==name4.__s) return t4; + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + if (!inField.isAsciiEncodedQ()) + return null(); + #endif + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name0)) return t0; + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name1)) return t1; + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name2)) return t2; + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name3)) return t3; + if (HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(inField,name4)) return t4; + return null(); + } + hx::Val __SetField(const String &inField,const hx::Val &inValue, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp) + { + if (inField.__s==name0.__s) { + t0 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T0 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t0)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (inField.__s==name1.__s) { + t1 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T1 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T1>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t1)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (inField.__s==name2.__s) { + t2 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T2 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T2>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t2)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (inField.__s==name3.__s) { + t3 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T3 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T3>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t3)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (inField.__s==name4.__s) { + t4 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T4 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T4>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t4)); + } + return inValue; + } + + + + + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name0)) { + t0 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T0 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T0>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t0)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name1)) { + t1 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T1 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T1>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t1)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name2)) { + t2 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T2 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T2>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t2)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name3)) { + t3 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T3 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T3>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t3)); + } + return inValue; + } + if (HX_QSTR_EQ(inField,name4)) { + t4 = inValue.Cast< _hx_T4 >(); + if (hx::ContainsPointers<_hx_T4>()) { + HX_OBJ_WB_GET(this, hx::PointerOf(t4)); + } + return inValue; + } + hx::Throw(HX_CSTRING("Missing field ") + inField); + return inValue; + } + + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t0); + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t1); + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t2); + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t3); + HX_MARK_MEMBER(t4); + } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) + { + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t0); + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t1); + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t2); + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t3); + HX_VISIT_MEMBER(t4); + } + #endif + + void __GetFields(Array &outFields) + { + outFields->push(name0); + outFields->push(name1); + outFields->push(name2); + outFields->push(name3); + outFields->push(name4); + } + + String toString() { return StringFromAnonFields(this); } +}; + + + + + + +} // end namespace hx + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +bool __hxcpp_anon_remove(Dynamic inObj,::String inKey); + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Boot.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Boot.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..22cafdee --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Boot.h @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +#ifndef HX_BOOT_H +#define HX_BOOT_H + +// Properly construct all the classes defined in the haxe code +void __boot_all(); + +namespace hx +{ + +// Initializer the hxcpp runtime system +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void Boot(); + +} + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/CFFI.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/CFFI.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..872e1972 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/CFFI.h @@ -0,0 +1,469 @@ +#ifndef HX_CFFI_H +#define HX_CFFI_H + +// 410 - adds gc_try_unblocking +#define HX_CFFI_API_VERSION 410 + +#ifdef HXCPP_JS_PRIME +#include +using namespace emscripten; + +typedef struct emscripten::val value; +typedef struct _vkind *vkind; +typedef struct _buffer *buffer; +#define HAVE_NEKO_TYPES 1 +#endif + +#include "OS.h" +#include +#include +#include +#if defined(BLACKBERRY) +using namespace std; +#endif +// --- Register functions (primitives) ---- + +#ifdef STATIC_LINK + +#define DEFINE_PRIM_MULT(func) \ +int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func)); \ + +#define DEFINE_PRIM(func,nargs) \ +int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__" #nargs,(void *)(&func)); \ + + +#define DEFINE_PRIM_MULT_NATIVE(func,ext) \ +int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func)) + \ + hx_register_prim(#func "__" #ext,(void *)(&func##_##ext)) ; + +#define DEFINE_PRIM_NATIVE(func,nargs,ext) \ +int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__" #nargs,(void *)(&func)) + \ + hx_register_prim(#func "__" #ext,(void *)(&func##_##ext)) ; + + +#define DEFINE_LIB_PRIM_MULT(lib,func) \ +int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(lib "_" #func "__MULT",(void *)(&func)); \ + +#define DEFINE_LIB_PRIM(lib,func,nargs) \ +int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(lib "_" #func "__" #nargs,(void *)(&func)); \ + + +#elif defined(HXCPP_JS_PRIME) + +//#define DEFINE_PRIM_MULT(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +//TODO +#define DEFINE_PRIM_MULT(func) + +#define DEFINE_PRIM(func,nargs) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } + + +#else + + +#define DEFINE_PRIM_MULT(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIM(func,nargs) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__##nargs() { return (void*)(&func); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIM_MULT_NATIVE(func,ext) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__##ext() { return (void*)(&func##_##ext); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIM_NATIVE(func,nargs,ext) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__##nargs() { return (void*)(&func); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__##ext() { return (void*)(&func##_##ext); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_LIB_PRIM_MULT(lib,func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_LIB_PRIM(lib,func,nargs) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__##nargs() { return (void*)(&func); } \ +} + + + +#endif // !STATIC_LINK + + + + + +#define DEFFUNC_0(ret,name) DEFFUNC(name,ret, (), ()) +#define DEFFUNC_1(ret,name,t1) DEFFUNC(name,ret, (t1 a1), (a1)) +#define DEFFUNC_2(ret,name,t1,t2) DEFFUNC(name,ret, (t1 a1, t2 a2), (a1,a2)) +#define DEFFUNC_3(ret,name,t1,t2,t3) DEFFUNC(name,ret, (t1 a1, t2 a2, t3 a3), (a1,a2,a3)) +#define DEFFUNC_4(ret,name,t1,t2,t3,t4) DEFFUNC(name,ret, (t1 a1, t2 a2, t3 a3, t4 a4), (a1,a2,a3,a4)) +#define DEFFUNC_5(ret,name,t1,t2,t3,t4,t5) DEFFUNC(name,ret, (t1 a1, t2 a2, t3 a3, t4 a4,t5 a5), (a1,a2,a3,a4,a5)) + + +enum hxValueType +{ + valtUnknown = -1, + valtInt = 0xff, + valtNull = 0, + valtFloat = 1, + valtBool = 2, + valtString = 3, + valtObject = 4, + valtArray = 5, + valtFunction = 6, + valtEnum, + valtClass, + valtRoot = 0xff, + valtAbstractBase = 0x100, +}; + +namespace hx +{ +enum StringEncoding +{ + StringAscii, + StringUtf8, + StringUtf16 +}; +} + +// val_fun_nargs may return a special value +enum { faNotFunction = -2, faVarArgs=-1, faArgs0=0 /* ... */ }; + +typedef int field; + + + +#ifdef IMPLEMENT_API +#include "CFFILoader.h" +#endif + + +#if !defined(HAVE_NEKO_TYPES) +#ifdef HXCPP_NATIVE_CFFI_VALUE +namespace hx { class Object; } +typedef hx::Object _value; +#else +struct _value; +#endif +typedef _value *value; +typedef struct _vkind *vkind; +typedef struct _buffer *buffer; +#endif + +typedef buffer cffiByteBuffer; + +typedef struct _gcroot *gcroot; + +typedef void (*hxFinalizer)(value v); +typedef void (*hxPtrFinalizer)(void *v); + +typedef void (__hx_field_iter)(value v,field f,void *); + +#define hx_failure(msg) hx_fail(msg,__FILE__,__LINE__) + +#ifndef IGNORE_CFFI_API_H + + +#ifndef IMPLEMENT_API + +#if defined(STATIC_LINK) || defined(HXCPP_JS_PRIME) + +#define DEFFUNC(name,ret,def_args,call_args) \ +extern "C" ret name def_args; + + +#else + +#define DEFFUNC(name,ret,def_args,call_args) \ +typedef ret (*FUNC_##name) def_args; \ +extern FUNC_##name name; + +#endif + +#endif + + +#include "CFFIAPI.h" + + +#ifdef WANT_DYNALLOC_ALLOC_BYTES +void *DynAlloc::allocBytes(size_t n) +{ + return hx_alloc((int)n); +} +#endif + + + +#define DEFINE_KIND(name) extern "C" { vkind name = 0; } + +#ifdef STATIC_LINK +# define DEFINE_ENTRY_POINT(name) +#else +# define DEFINE_ENTRY_POINT(name) extern "C" { void name(); EXPORT void *__neko_entry_point() { return (void *)&name; } } +#endif + +#ifdef HEADER_IMPORTS +# define H_EXTERN IMPORT +#else +# define H_EXTERN EXPORT +#endif + +#define DECLARE_PRIM(func,nargs) extern "C" { H_EXTERN void *func##__##nargs(); } +#define DECLARE_KIND(name) extern "C" { H_EXTERN extern vkind name; } + + + +// --- Helpers ---------------------------------------------------------------- + +// Check type... +inline bool val_is_null(value inVal) { return val_type(inVal)==valtNull; } +inline bool val_is_int(value inVal) { return val_type(inVal)==valtInt; } +inline bool val_is_bool(value inVal) { return val_type(inVal)==valtBool; } +inline bool val_is_float(value inVal) { return val_type(inVal)==valtFloat; } +inline bool val_is_string(value inVal) { return val_type(inVal)==valtString; } +inline bool val_is_function(value inVal) { return val_type(inVal)==valtFunction; } +inline bool val_is_array(value inVal) { return val_type(inVal)==valtArray; } +inline bool val_is_abstract(value inVal) { return val_type(inVal)>=valtAbstractBase; } +inline bool val_is_kind(value inVal,vkind inKind) { return val_to_kind(inVal,inKind)!=0; } + +inline bool val_is_number(value inVal) +{ + int t = val_type(inVal); + return t==valtInt || t==valtFloat; +} +inline bool val_is_object(value inVal) +{ + int t = val_type(inVal); + return t==valtObject || t==valtEnum ||t==valtClass; +} + +class AutoGCBlocking +{ +public: + inline AutoGCBlocking(bool inSoftUnlock=false) : + mSoftUnlock(inSoftUnlock), mLocked( gc_try_blocking() ) { } + inline ~AutoGCBlocking() { Close(); } + inline void Close() + { + if (mLocked) + { + if (mSoftUnlock) + gc_try_unblocking(); + else + gc_exit_blocking(); + } + mLocked = false; + } + + bool mLocked; + bool mSoftUnlock; +}; + +class AutoGCUnblocking +{ +public: + AutoGCUnblocking() : mUnlocked( gc_try_unblocking() ) { } + ~AutoGCUnblocking() { Close(); } + void Close() { if (mUnlocked) gc_enter_blocking(); mUnlocked = false; } + + bool mUnlocked; +}; + + +class AutoGCRoot +{ +public: + AutoGCRoot(value inValue) + { + mRoot = 0; + mPtr = alloc_root(); + if (mPtr) + *mPtr = inValue; + else + mRoot = create_root(inValue); + } + + ~AutoGCRoot() + { + if (mPtr) + free_root(mPtr); + else if (mRoot) + destroy_root(mRoot); + } + value get()const { return mPtr ? *mPtr : query_root(mRoot); } + void set(value inValue) + { + if (mPtr) + *mPtr = inValue; + else + { + if (mRoot) destroy_root(mRoot); + mRoot = create_root(inValue); + } + } + +private: + value *mPtr; + gcroot mRoot; + AutoGCRoot(const AutoGCRoot &); + void operator=(const AutoGCRoot &); +}; + +struct CffiBytes +{ + CffiBytes( unsigned char *inData=0, int inLength=0) : data(inData), length(inLength) {} + + unsigned char *data; + int length; +}; + +inline CffiBytes getByteData(value inValue) +{ + static field bField = 0; + static field lengthField = 0; + if (bField==0) + { + bField = val_id("b"); + lengthField = val_id("length"); + } + + if (val_is_object(inValue)) + { + value b = val_field(inValue, bField); + value len = val_field(inValue, lengthField); + if (val_is_string(b) && val_is_int(len)) + return CffiBytes( (unsigned char *)val_string(b), val_int(len) ); + if (val_is_buffer(b) && val_is_int(len)) + return CffiBytes( (unsigned char *)buffer_data(val_to_buffer(b)), val_int(len) ); + } + else if (val_is_buffer(inValue)) + { + value len = val_field(inValue, lengthField); + if (val_is_int(len)) + { + buffer b = val_to_buffer(inValue); + return CffiBytes( (unsigned char *)buffer_data(b), val_int(len) ); + } + } + return CffiBytes(); +} + +inline bool resizeByteData(value inValue, int inNewLen) +{ + if (!val_is_object(inValue)) + return false; + + static field bField = 0; + static field lengthField = 0; + if (bField==0) + { + bField = val_id("b"); + lengthField = val_id("length"); + } + value len = val_field(inValue, lengthField); + if (!val_is_int(len)) + return false; + int oldLen = val_int(len); + value b = val_field(inValue, bField); + if (val_is_string(b)) + { + if (inNewLen>oldLen) + { + value newString = alloc_raw_string(inNewLen); + memcpy( (char *)val_string(newString), val_string(b), inNewLen); + alloc_field(inValue, bField, newString ); + } + alloc_field(inValue, lengthField, alloc_int(inNewLen) ); + } + else if (val_is_buffer(b)) + { + cffiByteBuffer buf = val_to_buffer(b); + buffer_set_size(buf,inNewLen); + alloc_field(inValue, lengthField, alloc_int(inNewLen) ); + } + else + return false; + + return true; +} + + +#define val_null alloc_null() + +#define bfailure(x) val_throw(buffer_to_string(x)) + +#define copy_string(str,len) alloc_string_len(str,len) + + +// The "Check" macros throw an error if assumtion is false +#define val_check_kind(v,t) if( !val_is_kind(v,t) ) hx_failure("invalid kind"); +#define val_check_function(f,n) if( !val_is_function(f) || (val_fun_nargs(f) != (n) && val_fun_nargs(f) != faVarArgs) ) hx_failure("Bad function"); +#define val_check(v,t) if( !val_is_##t(v) ) hx_failure("type not " #t); + +// The "Get" function will return or force an error +inline bool val_get_bool(value inVal) { val_check(inVal,bool); return val_bool(inVal); } +inline int val_get_int(value inVal) { val_check(inVal,int); return val_int(inVal); } +inline double val_get_double(value inVal) { val_check(inVal,number); return val_number(inVal); } +inline const char *val_get_string(value inVal) { val_check(inVal,string); return val_string(inVal); } +inline void *val_get_handle(value inVal,vkind inKind) + { val_check_kind(inVal,inKind); return val_to_kind(inVal,inKind); } + + +inline value alloc_string(const char *inStr) +{ + const char *end = inStr; + while(*end) end++; + return alloc_string_len(inStr,(int)(end-inStr)); +} + +inline value alloc_wstring(const wchar_t *inStr) +{ + const wchar_t *end = inStr; + while(*end) end++; + return alloc_wstring_len(inStr,(int)(end-inStr)); +} + +inline void hxcpp_unscramble(const unsigned char *bytes, int len, const char *key, unsigned char *dest) +{ + int keyLen = 0; + while(key[keyLen]) + keyLen++; + int state = 0; + //state = ((state + key[i]) ^ ch) & 0xff); + for(int i=0;i IdMap; +static IdMap sIdMap; +static std::vector sIdKeys; + +int val_id(const char *inName) +{ + IdMap::iterator id = sIdMap.find(inName); + if (id==sIdMap.end()) + { + int result = sIdMap.size(); + sIdMap[inName] = result; + sIdKeys.push_back(value(inName)); + return result; + } + return id->second; +} + + +double val_field_numeric(value inObject, int inFieldId) +{ + return inObject[sIdKeys[inFieldId]].as(); +} + +int val_int(value inValue) { return inValue.as(); } +bool val_bool(value inValue) { return inValue.as(); } +double val_number(value inValue) { return inValue.as(); } +double val_float(value inValue) { return inValue.as(); } + +value alloc_null() { return emscripten::val::null(); } +value alloc_int(int inValue) { return value(inValue); } +value alloc_best_int(int inValue) { return value(inValue); } +value alloc_int32(int inValue) { return value(inValue); } +value alloc_bool(bool inValue) { return value(inValue); } +value alloc_float(double inValue) { return value(inValue); } + +value val_field(value inObject, int inIndex) { return inObject[sIdKeys[inIndex]]; } +void alloc_field(value inObject, int inIndex, value inValue) { inObject.set(sIdKeys[inIndex],inValue); } + + + +/* +DEFFUNC_1(void,val_throw,value) +DEFFUNC_0(void,hx_error) +DEFFUNC_3(void,hx_fail,const char *,const char *,int) + +// Determine value type +DEFFUNC_1(int,val_type,value) +DEFFUNC_1(vkind,val_kind,value) +DEFFUNC_2(void *,val_to_kind,value,vkind) +// don't check the 'kind' ... +DEFFUNC_1(void *,val_data,value) +DEFFUNC_1(int,val_fun_nargs,value) + + + +// Create value type + +DEFFUNC_0(value,alloc_empty_object) +DEFFUNC_2(value,alloc_abstract,vkind,void *) +// Allocates conservative-collected memory +DEFFUNC_3(value,create_abstract,vkind,int,hxFinalizer) +DEFFUNC_1(void,free_abstract,value) + +// String access +DEFFUNC_1(int,val_strlen,value) +DEFFUNC_1(const wchar_t *,val_wstring,value) +DEFFUNC_1(const char *,val_string,value) +DEFFUNC_1(wchar_t *,val_dup_wstring,value) +DEFFUNC_1(char *,val_dup_string,value) +DEFFUNC_2(char *,alloc_string_data,const char *,int) +DEFFUNC_2(value,alloc_string_len,const char *,int) +DEFFUNC_2(value,alloc_wstring_len,const wchar_t *,int) + +// Array access - generic +DEFFUNC_1(value,alloc_array,int) +DEFFUNC_1(int,val_array_size,value) +DEFFUNC_2(void,val_array_set_size,value,int) +DEFFUNC_2(value,val_array_i,value,int) +DEFFUNC_3(void,val_array_set_i,value,int,value) +DEFFUNC_2(void,val_array_push,value,value) + + +// Array access - fast if possible - may return null +// Resizing the array may invalidate the pointer +DEFFUNC_1(bool *,val_array_bool,value) +DEFFUNC_1(int *,val_array_int,value) +DEFFUNC_1(double *,val_array_double,value) +DEFFUNC_1(float *,val_array_float,value) +DEFFUNC_1(value *,val_array_value,value) + +// String Buffer +// A 'buffer' is a tool for joining strings together. +// The C++ implementation is haxe.io.BytesData +// The neko implementation is something else again, and can't be passes as a value, only copied to a string + +// Create a buffer from string of an empty buffer of a given length +DEFFUNC_1(buffer,alloc_buffer,const char *) +DEFFUNC_1(buffer,alloc_buffer_len,int) + +// Append a string representation of a value to the buffer +DEFFUNC_2(void,val_buffer,buffer,value) + +// Append a c-string to a buffer +DEFFUNC_2(void,buffer_append,buffer,const char *) + +// Append given number of bytes of a c-string to the buffer +DEFFUNC_3(void,buffer_append_sub,buffer,const char *,int) + +// Append given character to string +DEFFUNC_2(void,buffer_append_char,buffer,int) + +// Convert buffer back into string value +DEFFUNC_1(value,buffer_to_string,buffer) + + + +// These routines are for direct access to the c++ BytesData structure +// Use getByteData and resizeByteData for more generic access to haxe.io.Bytes + +// This will never return true on a neko host. +DEFFUNC_1(bool,val_is_buffer,value) + +// These functions are only valid if val_is_buffer returns true +// Currently, cffiByteBuffer is the same struct as buffer, but the usage is quite different +DEFFUNC_1(cffiByteBuffer,val_to_buffer,value) + +// Number of byes in the array +DEFFUNC_1(int,buffer_size,cffiByteBuffer) + +// Pointer to the byte data - will become invalid if the array is resized +DEFFUNC_1(char *,buffer_data,cffiByteBuffer) + +// Convert c++ ByteBuffer back to 'value' - no copy involved +DEFFUNC_1(value,buffer_val,cffiByteBuffer) + +// Resize the array - will invalidate the data +DEFFUNC_2(void,buffer_set_size,cffiByteBuffer,int) + +// This is used by resizeByteData for manipulating bytes directly on neko +DEFFUNC_1(value,alloc_raw_string,int) + +// Call Function +DEFFUNC_1(value,val_call0,value) +DEFFUNC_2(value,val_call1,value,value) +DEFFUNC_3(value,val_call2,value,value,value) +DEFFUNC_4(value,val_call3,value,value,value,value) +DEFFUNC_3(value,val_callN,value,value *,int) + +// Call the function - catch and print any exceptions +DEFFUNC_1(value,val_call0_traceexcept,value) + +// Call object field +DEFFUNC_2(value,val_ocall0,value,int) +DEFFUNC_3(value,val_ocall1,value,int,value) +DEFFUNC_4(value,val_ocall2,value,int,value,value) +DEFFUNC_4(value,val_ocallN,value,int,value *,int) + +// Objects access +DEFFUNC_1(int,val_id,const char *) +DEFFUNC_3(void,alloc_field,value,int,value) +DEFFUNC_2(value,val_field,value,int) +DEFFUNC_2(double,val_field_numeric,value,int) + +DEFFUNC_1(value,val_field_name,field) +DEFFUNC_3(void,val_iter_fields,value,__hx_field_iter,void *) +DEFFUNC_3(void,val_iter_field_vals,value,__hx_field_iter,void *) + +// Abstract types +DEFFUNC_0(vkind,alloc_kind) +DEFFUNC_2(void,kind_share,vkind *,const char *) + +// Garbage Collection +DEFFUNC_1(void *,hx_alloc,int) +DEFFUNC_2(void, val_gc,value,hxFinalizer) +DEFFUNC_2(void, val_gc_ptr,void *,hxPtrFinalizer) +DEFFUNC_0(value *, alloc_root) +DEFFUNC_1(void, free_root,value *) +DEFFUNC_2(void, gc_change_managed_memory,int,const char *) + +// Only available on cpp target... +DEFFUNC_1(void, val_gc_add_root,value *) +DEFFUNC_1(void, val_gc_remove_root,value *) +// Only available on js target - use AutoGCRoot to assist +DEFFUNC_1(gcroot, create_root,value) +DEFFUNC_1(value, query_root,gcroot) +DEFFUNC_1(void, destroy_root,gcroot) + +DEFFUNC_0(void, gc_enter_blocking) +DEFFUNC_0(void, gc_exit_blocking) +DEFFUNC_0(void, gc_safe_point) +DEFFUNC_2(void, gc_set_top_of_stack,int *,bool) + +// Used for finding functions in static libraries +DEFFUNC_2(int, hx_register_prim, const char *, void*) +*/ + + +} diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/CFFILoader.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/CFFILoader.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ed95f1f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/CFFILoader.h @@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ +#ifndef HX_CFFI_LOADER_H +#define HX_CFFI_LOADER_H + +/* + This file will only be incuded in one cpp file in the ndll library - + the one with IMPLEMENT_API #defined. + + The other files will refer to the val_ functions via the "extern" in CFFI.h + + For dynamic linking, a macro (DEFFUNC) implements the "val_..." functions as function pointers, + and the cpp code calls these function pointers directly. + The pointers starts off as function pointers to bootstrap code, so when they are first called + the bootstrap uses the "ResolveProc" to find the correct version of the function for the particular + platform, and replaces the function pointer with this value. Subsequent calls then go directly + to the correct fucntion. + + The ResolveProc can come from: + Explicitly setting - the proc is set when a dll is loaded into the hxcpp exe + Via 'GetProcAddress' on the exe - if symbols are needed and the proc has not been set + Internal implementation (CFFINekoLoader) - when linking agaist a neko process. + - Old code used to find this in NekoApi.dll, but the glue code is now built into each ndll directly. + + For static linking, the functions are resolved at link time. + + For HXCPP_JS_PRIME, these functions are implemented in CFFIJsPrime +*/ + +#ifdef ANDROID +#include +#endif + +#ifdef NEKO_WINDOWS +#include +#include +// Stoopid windows ... +#ifdef RegisterClass +#undef RegisterClass +#endif +#ifdef abs +#undef abs +#endif + +#else // NOT NEKO_WINDOWS + +#ifdef NEKO_LINUX +#define EXT "dso" +#define NEKO_EXT "so" +//#define __USE_GNU 1 + +#elif defined(HX_MACOS) +#include +#define EXT "dylib" +#define NEKO_EXT "dylib" + +#else +#if defined(EMSCRIPTEN) +#define EXT "ll" +#else +#define EXT "so" +#endif + +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include + + +#endif +#if defined(BLACKBERRY) +using namespace std; +#endif +typedef void *(*ResolveProc)(const char *inName); +static ResolveProc sResolveProc = 0; + +extern "C" { +EXPORT void hx_set_loader(ResolveProc inProc) +{ + #ifdef ANDROID + __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_INFO, "haxe plugin", "Got Load Proc %p", inProc ); + #endif + sResolveProc = inProc; +} +} + + + +#ifdef HXCPP_JS_PRIME // { js prime + +#define DEFFUNC(name,ret,def_args,call_args) \ +extern "C" ret name def_args; + +#include "CFFIJsPrime.h" + +#elif defined(STATIC_LINK) // js prime } { not js prime, static link + +#define DEFFUNC(name,ret,def_args,call_args) \ +extern "C" ret name def_args; + +#else // static link } { Dynamic link + + #ifdef NEKO_COMPATIBLE + + #include "CFFINekoLoader.h" + + #endif // NEKO_COMPATIBLE + + + // This code will get run when the library is compiled against a newer version of hxcpp, + // and the application code uses an older version. + bool default_val_is_buffer(void *inBuffer) + { + typedef void *(ValToBufferFunc)(void *); + static ValToBufferFunc *valToBuffer = 0; + if (!valToBuffer) + valToBuffer = (ValToBufferFunc *)sResolveProc("val_to_buffer"); + + if (valToBuffer) + return valToBuffer(inBuffer)!=0; + + return false; + } + + // Neko, old cpp and js_prime are all utf8 based - and go through here + #ifdef HXCPP_PRIME + struct DynAlloc : public hx::IStringAlloc + { + #define WANT_DYNALLOC_ALLOC_BYTES + void *allocBytes(size_t n); + }; + + + HxString default_string_wchar(const wchar_t *src,int len) + { + hx::strbuf buf; + const char *str = cffi::to_utf8(src,len,&buf); + return HxString(str,len); + } + HxString default_string_utf8(const char *str,int len) + { + return HxString(str,len); + } + HxString default_string_utf16(const char16_t *src,int len) + { + hx::strbuf buf; + const char *str = cffi::to_utf8(src,len,&buf); + return HxString(str,len); + } + + const char *default_to_utf8(const HxString &str,hx::IStringAlloc *alloc) + { + return str.c_str(); + } + const wchar_t *default_to_wchar(const HxString &str,hx::IStringAlloc *alloc) + { + DynAlloc d; + if (!alloc) + alloc = &d; + return cffi::from_utf8(str.c_str(),str.size(),alloc); + } + const char16_t *default_to_utf16(const HxString &str,hx::IStringAlloc *alloc) + { + DynAlloc d; + if (!alloc) + alloc = &d; + return cffi::from_utf8(str.c_str(),str.size(),alloc); + } + #endif + + + hx::StringEncoding default_get_encoding(void *inPtr) { return hx::StringUtf8; } + + void * default_alloc_empty_string(int) { return 0; } + + // Do nothing on earlier versions of hxcpp that do not know what to do + void default_gc_change_managed_memory(int,const char *) { } + + void *ResolveDefault(const char *inName) + { + void *result = sResolveProc(inName); + if (result) + return result; + if (!strcmp(inName,"val_is_buffer")) + return (void *)default_val_is_buffer; + if (!strcmp(inName,"alloc_empty_string")) + return (void *)default_alloc_empty_string; + if (!strcmp(inName,"gc_change_managed_memory")) + return (void *)default_gc_change_managed_memory; + if (!strcmp(inName,"hxs_encoding")) + return (void *)default_get_encoding; + #ifdef HXCPP_PRIME + if (!strcmp(inName,"alloc_hxs_wchar")) + return (void *)default_string_wchar; + if (!strcmp(inName,"alloc_hxs_utf16")) + return (void *)default_string_utf16; + if (!strcmp(inName,"alloc_hxs_utf8")) + return (void *)default_string_utf8; + if (!strcmp(inName,"hxs_utf8")) + return (void *)default_to_utf8; + if (!strcmp(inName,"hxs_utf16")) + return (void *)default_to_utf16; + if (!strcmp(inName,"hxs_wchar")) + return (void *)default_to_wchar; + #endif + + return 0; + } + + #ifdef NEKO_WINDOWS // { + + void *LoadFunc(const char *inName) + { + #ifndef HX_WINRT + static const char *modules[] = { 0, "hxcpp", "hxcpp-debug" }; + for(int i=0; i<3 && sResolveProc==0; i++) + { + HMODULE handle = GetModuleHandleA(modules[i]); + if (handle) + { + sResolveProc = (ResolveProc)GetProcAddress(handle,"hx_cffi"); + if (sResolveProc==0) + FreeLibrary(handle); + } + } + #endif + + #ifdef NEKO_COMPATIBLE + if (sResolveProc==0) + { + sResolveProc = InitDynamicNekoLoader(); + } + #endif + + if (sResolveProc==0) + { + fprintf(stderr,"Could not link plugin to process (hxCFFILoader.h %d)\n",__LINE__); + exit(1); + } + return ResolveDefault(inName); + } + + #else // windows } { not windows + + + void *LoadFunc(const char *inName) + { + #ifndef ANDROID // { + if (sResolveProc==0) + { + sResolveProc = (ResolveProc)dlsym(RTLD_DEFAULT,"hx_cffi"); + } + + #ifdef NEKO_COMPATIBLE + if (sResolveProc==0) + { + sResolveProc = InitDynamicNekoLoader(); + } + #endif + #endif // !Android } + + if (sResolveProc==0) + { + #ifdef ANDROID + __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_ERROR, "CFFILoader.h", "Could not API %s", inName); + return 0; + #else + #ifdef NEKO_COMPATIBLE + fprintf(stderr,"Could not link plugin to process (CFFILoader.h %d) - with neko\n",__LINE__); + #else + fprintf(stderr,"Could not link plugin to process (CFFILoader.h %d)\n",__LINE__); + #endif + exit(1); + #endif + } + return ResolveDefault(inName); + } + + #undef EXT + + #endif // not windows } + + + + #ifndef ANDROID // not android { + + #define DEFFUNC(name,ret,def_args,call_args) \ + typedef ret (*FUNC_##name)def_args; \ + extern FUNC_##name name; \ + ret IMPL_##name def_args \ + { \ + name = (FUNC_##name)LoadFunc(#name); \ + if (!name) \ + { \ + fprintf(stderr,"Could not find function:" #name " \n"); \ + exit(1); \ + } \ + return name call_args; \ + }\ + FUNC_##name name = IMPL_##name; + + #ifdef NEKO_COMPATIBLE + DEFINE_PRIM(neko_init,5) + #endif + + #else // not android } { android + + + #define DEFFUNC(name,ret,def_args,call_args) \ + typedef ret (*FUNC_##name)def_args; \ + extern FUNC_##name name; \ + ret IMPL_##name def_args \ + { \ + name = (FUNC_##name)LoadFunc(#name); \ + if (!name) \ + { \ + __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_ERROR,"CFFILoader", "Could not find function:" #name "\n"); \ + } \ + return name call_args; \ + }\ + FUNC_##name name = IMPL_##name; + + + #endif // android } + +#endif // dynamic link } + +#endif + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/CFFINekoLoader.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/CFFINekoLoader.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9fbb3b7b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/CFFINekoLoader.h @@ -0,0 +1,723 @@ +#ifndef HX_CFFI_NEKO_LOADER_H +#define HX_CFFI_NEKO_LOADER_H + +//-------- NEKO Interface ----------------------------------------------------- +namespace +{ + +#include + + +void *sNekoDllHandle = 0; + +void *LoadNekoFunc(const char *inName) +{ + #ifdef HX_WINRT + return 0; + #else + static bool tried = false; + if (tried && !sNekoDllHandle) + return 0; + tried = true; + + if (!sNekoDllHandle) + { + #ifdef HX_WINDOWS + sNekoDllHandle = GetModuleHandleA("neko.dll"); + #else + sNekoDllHandle = dlopen("libneko." NEKO_EXT, RTLD_NOW); + // The debian package creates libneko.so.0 without libneko.so... + // The fedora/openSUSE rpm packages create libneko.so.1... + if (!sNekoDllHandle) + sNekoDllHandle = dlopen("libneko." NEKO_EXT ".0", RTLD_NOW); + if (!sNekoDllHandle) + sNekoDllHandle = dlopen("libneko." NEKO_EXT ".1", RTLD_NOW); + if (!sNekoDllHandle) + sNekoDllHandle = dlopen("libneko." NEKO_EXT ".2", RTLD_NOW); + #endif + + if (!sNekoDllHandle) + { + fprintf(stderr,"Could not link to neko.\n"); + return 0; + } + } + + + #ifdef HX_WINDOWS + void *result = (void *)GetProcAddress((HMODULE)sNekoDllHandle,inName); + #else + void *result = dlsym(sNekoDllHandle,inName); + #endif + + //printf(" %s = %p\n", inName, result ); + return result; + #endif // !HX_WINRT +} + + +static int __a_id = 0; +static int __s_id = 0; +static int b_id = 0; +static int length_id = 0; +static int push_id = 0; + +neko_value *gNeko2HaxeString = 0; +neko_value *gNekoNewArray = 0; +neko_value gNekoNull = 0; +neko_value gNekoTrue = 0; +neko_value gNekoFalse = 0; + + +namespace +{ +void CheckInitDynamicNekoLoader() +{ + if (!gNekoNull) + { + printf("Haxe code is missing a call to cpp.Prime.nekoInit().\n"); + } +} +} + + +/* + + +*/ + +void *DynamicNekoLoader(const char *inName); + +typedef neko_value (*alloc_object_func)(neko_value); +typedef neko_value (*alloc_string_func)(const char *); +typedef neko_value (*alloc_abstract_func)(neko_vkind,void *); +typedef neko_value (*val_call1_func)(neko_value,neko_value); +typedef neko_value (*val_field_func)(neko_value,int); +typedef neko_value (*alloc_float_func)(double); +typedef void (*alloc_field_func)(neko_value,int,neko_value); +typedef neko_value *(*alloc_root_func)(int); +typedef char *(*alloc_private_func)(int); +typedef neko_value (*copy_string_func)(const char *,int); +typedef int (*val_id_func)(const char *); +typedef neko_buffer (*alloc_buffer_func)(const char *); +typedef neko_value (*val_buffer_func)(neko_buffer); +typedef void (*buffer_append_sub_func)(neko_buffer,const char *,int); +typedef void (*fail_func)(neko_value,const char *,int); +typedef neko_value (*alloc_array_func)(unsigned int); +typedef void (*val_gc_func)(neko_value,void *); +typedef void (*val_ocall1_func)(neko_value,int,neko_value); +typedef neko_value (*alloc_empty_string_func)(int); + +static alloc_object_func dyn_alloc_object = 0; +static alloc_string_func dyn_alloc_string = 0; +static alloc_abstract_func dyn_alloc_abstract = 0; +static val_call1_func dyn_val_call1 = 0; +static val_field_func dyn_val_field = 0; +static alloc_field_func dyn_alloc_field = 0; +static alloc_float_func dyn_alloc_float = 0; +static alloc_root_func dyn_alloc_root = 0; +static alloc_private_func dyn_alloc_private = 0; +static alloc_private_func dyn_alloc = 0; +static copy_string_func dyn_copy_string = 0; +static val_id_func dyn_val_id = 0; +static alloc_buffer_func dyn_alloc_buffer = 0; +static val_buffer_func dyn_val_buffer = 0; +static fail_func dyn_fail = 0; +static buffer_append_sub_func dyn_buffer_append_sub = 0; +static alloc_array_func dyn_alloc_array = 0; +static val_gc_func dyn_val_gc = 0; +static val_ocall1_func dyn_val_ocall1 = 0; +static alloc_empty_string_func dyn_alloc_empty_string = 0; + + +neko_value api_alloc_string(const char *inString) +{ + CheckInitDynamicNekoLoader(); + neko_value neko_string = dyn_alloc_string(inString); + if (gNeko2HaxeString) + return dyn_val_call1(*gNeko2HaxeString,neko_string); + return neko_string; +} + + +char *api_alloc_string_data(const char *inString,int inLength) +{ + CheckInitDynamicNekoLoader(); + char *result = (char *)dyn_alloc_private(inLength+1); + memcpy(result,inString,inLength); + result[inLength]='\0'; + return result; +} + + +neko_value api_alloc_raw_string(int inLength) +{ + CheckInitDynamicNekoLoader(); + return dyn_alloc_empty_string(inLength); +} + + +#define NEKO_NOT_IMPLEMENTED(func) dyn_fail(api_alloc_string("NOT Implemented:" func),__FILE__,__LINE__) + +void * api_empty() { return 0; } + +bool api_val_bool(neko_value arg1) { return arg1==gNekoTrue; } +int api_val_int(neko_value arg1) { return neko_val_int(arg1); } +double api_val_float(neko_value arg1) { return *(double *)( ((char *)arg1) + 4 ); } +double api_val_number(neko_value arg1) { return neko_val_is_int(arg1) ? neko_val_int(arg1) : api_val_float(arg1); } + + +neko_value api_alloc_bool(bool arg1) { CheckInitDynamicNekoLoader(); return arg1 ? gNekoTrue : gNekoFalse; } +neko_value api_alloc_int(int arg1) { return neko_alloc_int(arg1); } +neko_value api_alloc_empty_object() +{ + return dyn_alloc_object(gNekoNull); +} + +neko_value api_buffer_to_string(neko_buffer arg1) +{ + neko_value neko_string = dyn_val_buffer(arg1); + if (gNeko2HaxeString) + return dyn_val_call1(*gNeko2HaxeString,neko_string); + return neko_string; +} + + +const char * api_val_string(neko_value arg1) +{ + if (neko_val_is_string(arg1)) + return neko_val_string(arg1); + + if (neko_val_is_object(arg1)) + { + neko_value s = dyn_val_field(arg1,__s_id); + if (neko_val_is_string(s)) + return neko_val_string(s); + } + + return 0; +} + +void api_alloc_field_numeric(neko_value arg1,int arg2, double arg3) +{ + dyn_alloc_field(arg1, arg2, dyn_alloc_float(arg3) ); +} + +double api_val_field_numeric(neko_value arg1,int arg2) +{ + neko_value field = dyn_val_field(arg1, arg2); + if (neko_val_is_number(field)) + return api_val_number(field); + if (field==gNekoTrue) + return 1; + return 0; +} + + + + +int api_val_strlen(neko_value arg1) +{ + if (neko_val_is_string(arg1)) + return neko_val_strlen(arg1); + + if (neko_val_is_object(arg1)) + { + neko_value l = dyn_val_field(arg1,length_id); + if (neko_val_is_int(l)) + return api_val_int(l); + } + return 0; +} +void api_buffer_set_size(neko_buffer inBuffer,int inLen) { + NEKO_NOT_IMPLEMENTED("api_buffer_set_size"); +} + + +void api_buffer_append_char(neko_buffer inBuffer,int inChar) +{ + NEKO_NOT_IMPLEMENTED("api_buffer_append_char"); +} + + + +// Byte arrays - use strings +neko_buffer api_val_to_buffer(neko_value arg1) +{ + return (neko_buffer)api_val_string(arg1); +} +bool api_val_is_buffer(neko_value arg1) { return neko_val_is_string(arg1); } +int api_buffer_size(neko_buffer inBuffer) { return neko_val_strlen((neko_value)inBuffer); } +char * api_buffer_data(neko_buffer inBuffer) { return (char *)api_val_string((neko_value)inBuffer); } + +char * api_val_dup_string(neko_value inVal) +{ + int len = api_val_strlen(inVal); + const char *ptr = api_val_string(inVal); + char *result = dyn_alloc_private(len+1); + memcpy(result,ptr,len); + result[len] = '\0'; + return result; +} + +neko_value api_alloc_string_len(const char *inStr,int inLen) +{ + if (gNeko2HaxeString) + { + if (!inStr) + return dyn_val_call1(*gNeko2HaxeString,api_alloc_raw_string(inLen)); + return dyn_val_call1(*gNeko2HaxeString,dyn_copy_string(inStr,inLen)); + } + if (!inStr) + inStr = dyn_alloc_private(inLen); + return dyn_copy_string(inStr,inLen); +} + +neko_buffer api_alloc_buffer_len(int inLen) +{ + neko_value str=api_alloc_string_len(0,inLen+1); + char *s=(char *)api_val_string(str); + memset(s,0,inLen+1); + return (neko_buffer)str; +} + + + +neko_value api_alloc_wstring_len(const wchar_t *inStr,int inLen) +{ + int len = 0; + const wchar_t *chars = inStr; + for(int i=0;i> 6); + *data++ = 0x80 | (c & 63); + } + else if( c <= 0xFFFF ) + { + *data++ = 0xE0 | (c >> 12); + *data++ = 0x80 | ((c >> 6) & 63); + *data++ = 0x80 | (c & 63); + } + else + { + *data++ = 0xF0 | (c >> 18); + *data++ = 0x80 | ((c >> 12) & 63); + *data++ = 0x80 | ((c >> 6) & 63); + *data++ = 0x80 | (c & 63); + } + } + //result[len] = 0; + + return api_alloc_string_len(result,len); +} + + + +const wchar_t *api_val_wstring(neko_value arg1) +{ + int len = api_val_strlen(arg1); + + unsigned char *b = (unsigned char *)api_val_string(arg1); + wchar_t *result = (wchar_t *)dyn_alloc_private((len+1)*sizeof(wchar_t)); + int l = 0; + + for(int i=0;i + + +#define HXCPP_PRIME + + +namespace cffi +{ +template +inline const char *to_utf8(const T *inStr,int &ioLen,hx::IStringAlloc *inAlloc) +{ + int len = 0; + int n = ioLen; + if (n==0) + while(inStr[n]) + n++; + for(int i=0;i=0xd800) + { + i++; + int peek = iallocBytes(len+1); + unsigned char *data = (unsigned char *)result; + for(int i=0;i=0xd800) + { + int peek = i+1> 6); + *data++ = 0x80 | (c & 63); + } + else if( c <= 0xFFFF ) + { + *data++ = 0xE0 | (c >> 12); + *data++ = 0x80 | ((c >> 6) & 63); + *data++ = 0x80 | (c & 63); + } + else + { + *data++ = 0xF0 | (c >> 18); + *data++ = 0x80 | ((c >> 12) & 63); + *data++ = 0x80 | ((c >> 6) & 63); + *data++ = 0x80 | (c & 63); + } + } + result[len] = 0; + ioLen = len; + return result; +} + +static inline int decode_advance_utf8(const unsigned char * &ioPtr,const unsigned char *end) +{ + int c = *ioPtr++; + if( c < 0x80 ) + { + return c; + } + else if( c < 0xE0 ) + { + return ((c & 0x3F) << 6) | (ioPtr < end ? (*ioPtr++) & 0x7F : 0); + } + else if( c < 0xF0 ) + { + int c2 = ioPtr +inline const T *from_utf8(const char *inStr,int len,hx::IStringAlloc *inAlloc) +{ + int n = len; + if (n<0) + while(inStr[n]) + n++; + + const unsigned char *str = (const unsigned char *)inStr; + const unsigned char *end = str + n; + int count = 0; + while(str=0x10000) + count++; + } + T *result = (T*)inAlloc->allocBytes( sizeof(T)*(count+1) ); + T *dest = result; + str = (const unsigned char *)inStr; + while(str=0x10000) + { + int over = (ch-0x10000); + *dest++ = (over>>10) + 0xd800; + *dest++ = (over&0x3ff) + 0xdc00; + } + else + *dest++ = ch; + } + *dest++ = 0; + + return result; +} + +} + +#ifdef HXCPP_JS_PRIME +#include +typedef std::string HxString; + +#else + +#ifdef _MSC_VER +#pragma warning( disable : 4190 ) +#endif + +struct HxString +{ + inline HxString(const HxString &inRHS) + { + length = inRHS.length; + __s = inRHS.__s; + } + inline HxString() : length(0), __s(0) { } + inline HxString(const char *inS,int inLen=-1, bool inAllocGcString=true); + inline int size() const { return length; } + inline const char *c_str() const { return __s; } + + + int length; + const char *__s; +}; + +#include "CFFI.h" +#endif + +#ifndef HXCPP_JS_PRIME +HxString::HxString(const char *inS,int inLen, bool inAllocGcString) : length(inLen), __s(inS) +{ + if (!inS) + length = 0; + else + { + if (length<0) + for(length=0; __s[length]; length++) + { + } + if (inAllocGcString) + __s = alloc_string_data(__s, length); + } +} +#endif + + + +namespace cffi +{ + +inline value alloc_pointer(void *inPtr) { return alloc_abstract((vkind)(0x100 + 2),inPtr); } + + +template struct SigType { enum { Char='?' }; }; +template<> struct SigType { enum { Char='b' }; }; +template<> struct SigType { enum { Char='i' }; }; +template<> struct SigType { enum { Char='f' }; }; +template<> struct SigType { enum { Char='d' }; }; +template<> struct SigType { enum { Char='o' }; }; +template<> struct SigType { enum { Char='v' }; }; +template<> struct SigType { enum { Char='c' }; }; +template<> struct SigType { enum { Char='s' }; }; + +template +bool CheckSig0( RET (func)(), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + 0 == inSig[1]; +} + + +template +bool CheckSig1( RET (func)(A0), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + 0 == inSig[2]; +} + + +template +bool CheckSig2( RET (func)(A0,A1), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + 0 == inSig[3]; +} + + +template +bool CheckSig3( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + 0 == inSig[4]; +} + + +template +bool CheckSig4( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2,A3), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + SigType::Char==inSig[4] && + 0 == inSig[5]; +} + + +template +bool CheckSig5( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2,A3,A4), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + SigType::Char==inSig[4] && + SigType::Char==inSig[5] && + 0 == inSig[6]; +} + +template +bool CheckSig6( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2,A3,A4,A5), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + SigType::Char==inSig[4] && + SigType::Char==inSig[5] && + SigType::Char==inSig[6] && + 0 == inSig[7]; +} + + +template +bool CheckSig7( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2,A3,A4,A5,A6), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + SigType::Char==inSig[4] && + SigType::Char==inSig[5] && + SigType::Char==inSig[6] && + SigType::Char==inSig[7] && + 0 == inSig[8]; +} + +template +bool CheckSig8( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2,A3,A4,A5,A6,A7), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + SigType::Char==inSig[4] && + SigType::Char==inSig[5] && + SigType::Char==inSig[6] && + SigType::Char==inSig[7] && + SigType::Char==inSig[8] && + 0 == inSig[9]; +} + + +template +bool CheckSig9( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2,A3,A4,A5,A6,A7,A8), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + SigType::Char==inSig[4] && + SigType::Char==inSig[5] && + SigType::Char==inSig[6] && + SigType::Char==inSig[7] && + SigType::Char==inSig[8] && + SigType::Char==inSig[9] && + 0 == inSig[10]; +} + +template +bool CheckSig10( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2,A3,A4,A5,A6,A7,A8,A9), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + SigType::Char==inSig[4] && + SigType::Char==inSig[5] && + SigType::Char==inSig[6] && + SigType::Char==inSig[7] && + SigType::Char==inSig[8] && + SigType::Char==inSig[9] && + SigType::Char==inSig[10] && + 0 == inSig[11]; +} + +template +bool CheckSig11( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2,A3,A4,A5,A6,A7,A8,A9, A10), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + SigType::Char==inSig[4] && + SigType::Char==inSig[5] && + SigType::Char==inSig[6] && + SigType::Char==inSig[7] && + SigType::Char==inSig[8] && + SigType::Char==inSig[9] && + SigType::Char==inSig[10] && + SigType::Char==inSig[11] && + 0 == inSig[12]; +} + + +template +bool CheckSig12( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2,A3,A4,A5,A6,A7,A8,A9, A10, A11), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + SigType::Char==inSig[4] && + SigType::Char==inSig[5] && + SigType::Char==inSig[6] && + SigType::Char==inSig[7] && + SigType::Char==inSig[8] && + SigType::Char==inSig[9] && + SigType::Char==inSig[10] && + SigType::Char==inSig[11] && + SigType::Char==inSig[12] && + 0 == inSig[13]; +} + +template +bool CheckSig13( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2,A3,A4,A5,A6,A7,A8,A9,A10,A11,A12), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + SigType::Char==inSig[4] && + SigType::Char==inSig[5] && + SigType::Char==inSig[6] && + SigType::Char==inSig[7] && + SigType::Char==inSig[8] && + SigType::Char==inSig[9] && + SigType::Char==inSig[10] && + SigType::Char==inSig[11] && + SigType::Char==inSig[12] && + SigType::Char==inSig[13] && + 0 == inSig[14]; +} + +template +bool CheckSig14( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2,A3,A4,A5,A6,A7,A8,A9,A10,A11,A12,A13), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + SigType::Char==inSig[4] && + SigType::Char==inSig[5] && + SigType::Char==inSig[6] && + SigType::Char==inSig[7] && + SigType::Char==inSig[8] && + SigType::Char==inSig[9] && + SigType::Char==inSig[10] && + SigType::Char==inSig[11] && + SigType::Char==inSig[12] && + SigType::Char==inSig[13] && + SigType::Char==inSig[14] && + 0 == inSig[15]; +} + + +template +bool CheckSig15( RET (func)(A0,A1,A2,A3,A4,A5,A6,A7,A8,A9,A10,A11,A12,A13,A14), const char *inSig) +{ + return SigType::Char==inSig[0] && + SigType::Char==inSig[1] && + SigType::Char==inSig[2] && + SigType::Char==inSig[3] && + SigType::Char==inSig[4] && + SigType::Char==inSig[5] && + SigType::Char==inSig[6] && + SigType::Char==inSig[7] && + SigType::Char==inSig[8] && + SigType::Char==inSig[9] && + SigType::Char==inSig[10] && + SigType::Char==inSig[11] && + SigType::Char==inSig[12] && + SigType::Char==inSig[13] && + SigType::Char==inSig[14] && + SigType::Char==inSig[15] && + 0 == inSig[16]; +} + + +inline value ToValue(int inVal) { return alloc_int(inVal); } +inline value ToValue(long inVal) { return alloc_int32(inVal); } +inline value ToValue(float inVal) { return alloc_float(inVal); } +inline value ToValue(double inVal) { return alloc_float(inVal); } +inline value ToValue(value inVal) { return inVal; } +inline value ToValue(bool inVal) { return alloc_bool(inVal); } +#ifdef HXCPP_JS_PRIME +inline value ToValue(HxString inVal) { return inVal.c_str() ? alloc_string_len(inVal.c_str(),inVal.size()) : alloc_null() ; } +#else +inline value ToValue(HxString inVal) { return inVal.__s ? alloc_string_len(inVal.c_str(),inVal.size()) : alloc_null() ; } +#endif + +struct AutoValue +{ + value mValue; + + inline operator int() { return val_int(mValue); } + inline operator long() { return (long)val_number(mValue); } + inline operator value() { return mValue; } + inline operator double() { return val_number(mValue); } + inline operator float() { return val_number(mValue); } + inline operator bool() { return val_bool(mValue); } + inline operator const char *() { return val_string(mValue); } + inline operator HxString() { return val_is_null(mValue) ? HxString(0,0) : HxString(val_string(mValue), val_strlen(mValue), false); } +}; + + + +} // end namespace cffi + + +#define PRIME_ARG_DECL0 +#define PRIME_ARG_DECL1 cffi::AutoValue a0 +#define PRIME_ARG_DECL2 PRIME_ARG_DECL1, cffi::AutoValue a1 +#define PRIME_ARG_DECL3 PRIME_ARG_DECL2, cffi::AutoValue a2 +#define PRIME_ARG_DECL4 PRIME_ARG_DECL3, cffi::AutoValue a3 +#define PRIME_ARG_DECL5 PRIME_ARG_DECL4, cffi::AutoValue a4 + +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST0 +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST1 a0 +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST2 PRIME_ARG_LIST1, a1 +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST3 PRIME_ARG_LIST2, a2 +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST4 PRIME_ARG_LIST3, a3 +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST5 PRIME_ARG_LIST4, a4 +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST6 arg[0],arg[1],arg[2],arg[3],arg[4],arg[5] +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST7 PRIME_ARG_LIST6 ,arg[6] +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST8 PRIME_ARG_LIST7 ,arg[7] +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST9 PRIME_ARG_LIST8 ,arg[8] +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST10 PRIME_ARG_LIST9 ,arg[9] +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST11 PRIME_ARG_LIST10 ,arg[10] +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST12 PRIME_ARG_LIST11 ,arg[11] +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST13 PRIME_ARG_LIST12 ,arg[12] +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST14 PRIME_ARG_LIST13 ,arg[13] +#define PRIME_ARG_LIST15 PRIME_ARG_LIST14 ,arg[14] + + + +#ifdef HXCPP_JS_PRIME + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME0(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME1(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME2(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME3(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME4(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME5(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME6(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME7(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME8(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME9(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME10(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME11(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME12(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME13(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME14(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME15(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME0v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME1v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME2v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME3v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME4v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME5v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME6v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME7v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME8v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME9v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME10v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME11v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME12v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME13v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME14v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } +#define DEFINE_PRIME15v(func) EMSCRIPTEN_BINDINGS(func) { function(#func, &func); } + + +#elif defined(STATIC_LINK) + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME0(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT value func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig0(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap() { return cffi::ToValue( func() ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__0() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__0",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME0v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT value func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig0(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap() { func(); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__0() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__0",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME1(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig1(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL1) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST1) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__1() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__1",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME1v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig1(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL1) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST1); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__1() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__1",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME2(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig2(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL2) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST2) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__2() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__2",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME2v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig2(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL2) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST2); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__2() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__2",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME3(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig3(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL3) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST3) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__3() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__3",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME3v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig3(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL3) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST3); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__3() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__3",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME4(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig4(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL4) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST4) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__4() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__4",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME4v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig4(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL4) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST4); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__4() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__4",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME5(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig5(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL5) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST5) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__5() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__5",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME5v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig5(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL5) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST5); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__5() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__5",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME6(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig6(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST6) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME6v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig6(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST6); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME7(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig7(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST7) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME7v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig7(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST7); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME8(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig8(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST8) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME8v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig8(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST8); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME9(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig9(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST9) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME9v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig9(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST9); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME10(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig10(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST10) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME10v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig10(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST10); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME11(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig11(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST11) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME11v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig11(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST11); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME12(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig12(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST12) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME12v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig12(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST12); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME13(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig13(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST13) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME13v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig13(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST13); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME14(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig14(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST14) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME14v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig14(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST14); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME15(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig15(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST15) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME15v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig15(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST15); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ + int __reg_##func##__prime = hx_register_prim(#func "__prime",(void *)(&func##__prime)); \ + int __reg_##func = hx_register_prim(#func "__MULT",(void *)(&func##__wrap)); \ +} + + +#else + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME0(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT value func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig0(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap() { return cffi::ToValue( func() ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__0() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME0v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT value func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig0(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap() { func(); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__0() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME1(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig1(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL1) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST1) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__1() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME1v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig1(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL1) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST1); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__1() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME2(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig2(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL2) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST2) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__2() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME2v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig2(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL2) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST2); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__2() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME3(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig3(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL3) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST3) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__3() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME3v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig3(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL3) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST3); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__3() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME4(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig4(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL4) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST4) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__4() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME4v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig4(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL4) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST4); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__4() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME5(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig5(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL5) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST5) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__5() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME5v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig5(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(PRIME_ARG_DECL5) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST5); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__5() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME6(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig6(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST6) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME6v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig6(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST6); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME7(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig7(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST7) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME7v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig7(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST7); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME8(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig8(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST8) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME8v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig8(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST8); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME9(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig9(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST9) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME9v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig9(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST9); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME10(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig10(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST10) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME10v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig10(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST10); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME11(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig11(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST11) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME11v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig11(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST11); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME12(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig12(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST12) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME12v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig12(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST12); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME13(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig13(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST13) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME13v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig13(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST13); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + +#define DEFINE_PRIME14(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig14(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST14) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME14v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig14(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST14); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME15(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig15(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg,int) { return cffi::ToValue( func(PRIME_ARG_LIST15) ); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + +#define DEFINE_PRIME15v(func) extern "C" { \ + EXPORT void *func##__prime(const char *inSig) { \ + if (!cffi::CheckSig15(func,inSig)) return 0; return cffi::alloc_pointer((void*)&func); } \ + value func##__wrap(cffi::AutoValue *arg, int) { func(PRIME_ARG_LIST15); return alloc_null(); } \ + EXPORT void *func##__MULT() { return (void*)(&func##__wrap); } \ +} + + + +#endif + +#endif + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Class.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Class.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f5bdf49c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Class.h @@ -0,0 +1,307 @@ + #ifndef HX_CLASS_H +#define HX_CLASS_H + + +namespace hx +{ +// --- hxClassOf -------------------------------------------------------------- +// +// Gets the class definition that relates to a specific type. +// Most classes have their own class data, but the standard types (non-classes) +// use the template traits to get the class + + +template +inline hx::Class &ClassOf() { typedef typename T::Obj Obj; return Obj::__SGetClass(); } + +template<> +inline hx::Class &ClassOf() { return GetIntClass(); } + +template<> +inline hx::Class &ClassOf() { return GetFloatClass(); } + +template<> +inline hx::Class &ClassOf() { return GetFloatClass(); } + +template<> +inline hx::Class &ClassOf() { return GetBoolClass(); } + +template<> +inline hx::Class &ClassOf() { return GetVoidClass(); } + +template<> +inline hx::Class &ClassOf() { return GetStringClass(); } + +template<> +inline hx::Class &ClassOf< ::cpp::Int64>() { return GetInt64Class(); } + + +template +struct hxBaseType { typedef T type; }; +template +struct hxBaseType< hx::ObjectPtr > { typedef T type; }; + +template inline int ClassSizeOf() { return sizeof( typename hx::hxBaseType::type ); } + +} // end namespace hx + + +// --- Class_obj -------------------------------------------------------------------- +// +// The Class_obj provides the type information required by the Reflect and type APIs. + +namespace hx +{ +typedef Dynamic (*ConstructEmptyFunc)(); +typedef Dynamic (*ConstructArgsFunc)(DynamicArray inArgs); +typedef Dynamic (*ConstructEnumFunc)(String inName,DynamicArray inArgs); +typedef void (*MarkFunc)(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); +typedef bool (*CanCastFunc)(hx::Object *inPtr); +#ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS +typedef void (*VisitFunc)(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx); +#endif +typedef bool (*GetStaticFieldFunc)(const String &inString, Dynamic &outValue, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); +typedef bool (*SetStaticFieldFunc)(const String &inString, Dynamic &ioValue, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); +} + +inline bool operator!=(hx::ConstructEnumFunc inFunc,const null &inNull) { return inFunc!=0; } + +#ifdef HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE +namespace hx +{ +enum FieldStorage +{ + fsUnknown = 0, + fsBool, + fsInt, + fsFloat, + fsString, + fsByte, + fsObject, +}; +struct StorageInfo +{ + FieldStorage type; + int offset; + String name; +}; +struct StaticInfo +{ + FieldStorage type; + void *address; + String name; +}; + +} +#endif + +namespace hx +{ + +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Class_obj : public hx::Object +{ +public: + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdClass }; + + + inline void *operator new( size_t inSize ) + { + return hx::InternalCreateConstBuffer(0,(int)inSize); + } + void operator delete( void *) { } + + + Class_obj() : mSuper(0) { }; + Class_obj(const String &inClassName, String inStatics[], String inMembers[], + hx::ConstructEmptyFunc inConstructEmpty, hx::ConstructArgsFunc inConstructArgs, + hx::Class *inSuperClass, hx::ConstructEnumFunc inConstructEnum, + hx::CanCastFunc inCanCast, hx::MarkFunc inMarkFunc + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + , hx::VisitFunc inVisitFunc + #endif + #ifdef HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE + ,const hx::StorageInfo *inStorageInfo + ,const hx::StaticInfo *inStaticInfo + #endif + ); + + String __ToString() const; + + void MarkStatics(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); + + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void VisitStatics(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx); + #endif + + static ::Array< ::String > dupFunctions(String inStatics[]); + + // the "Class class" + hx::Class __GetClass() const; + static hx::Class & __SGetClass(); + static void __boot(); + + hx::Val __Field(const String &inString ,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + + hx::Val __SetField(const String &inString,const hx::Val &inValue ,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + + bool __HasField(const String &inString); + + virtual Dynamic ConstructEmpty(); + virtual Dynamic ConstructArgs(hx::DynamicArray inArgs); + virtual Dynamic ConstructEnum(String inName,hx::DynamicArray inArgs); + virtual bool VCanCast(hx::Object *inPtr) { return false; } + + int __GetType() const { return vtObject; } + + virtual bool __IsEnum(); + + inline bool CanCast(hx::Object *inPtr) { return mCanCast ? mCanCast(inPtr) : VCanCast(inPtr); } + static bool GetNoStaticField(const String &inString, Dynamic &outValue, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + static bool SetNoStaticField(const String &inString, Dynamic &ioValue, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + + void registerScriptable(bool inOverwrite); + + hx::CanCastFunc mCanCast; + + + + virtual Array GetInstanceFields(); + virtual Array GetClassFields(); + hx::Class GetSuper(); + #ifdef HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE + const hx::StorageInfo* GetMemberStorage(String inName); + const hx::StaticInfo* GetStaticStorage(String inName); + #endif + + static hx::Class Resolve(String inName); + + + hx::Class *mSuper; + String mName; + Dynamic __meta__; + String __rtti__; + + hx::ConstructArgsFunc mConstructArgs; + hx::ConstructEmptyFunc mConstructEmpty; + hx::ConstructEnumFunc mConstructEnum; + hx::GetStaticFieldFunc mGetStaticField; + hx::SetStaticFieldFunc mSetStaticField; + + hx::MarkFunc mMarkFunc; + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + hx::VisitFunc mVisitFunc; + #endif + Array mStatics; + Array mMembers; + + #ifdef HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE + const hx::StorageInfo* mMemberStorageInfo; + const hx::StaticInfo* mStaticStorageInfo; + #endif +}; + +} // end namespace hx + +void __hxcpp_boot_std_classes(); + + +// --- All classes should be registered with this function via the "__boot" method +#ifdef RegisterClass +#undef RegisterClass +#endif + +namespace hx +{ + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +hx::Class _hx_RegisterClass(const String &inClassName, CanCastFunc inCanCast, + String inStatics[], String inMembers[], + ConstructEmptyFunc inConstructEmpty, ConstructArgsFunc inConstructArgs, + hx::Class *inSuperClass, ConstructEnumFunc inConst=0, MarkFunc inMarkFunc=0 + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + , VisitFunc inVisitFunc=0 + #endif + #ifdef HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE + ,const hx::StorageInfo *inStorageInfo=0 + ,const hx::StaticInfo *inStaticInfo=0 + #endif + ); + +// For older versions +inline hx::Class RegisterClass( + const String &inClassName, CanCastFunc inCanCast, + String inStatics[], String inMembers[], + ConstructEmptyFunc inConstructEmpty, ConstructArgsFunc inConstructArgs, + hx::Class *inSuperClass, ConstructEnumFunc inConst=0, MarkFunc inMarkFunc=0 + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + , VisitFunc inVisitFunc=0 + #endif + #ifdef HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE + ,const hx::StorageInfo *inStorageInfo=0 + ,const hx::StaticInfo *inStaticInfo=0 + #endif + ) +{ + return _hx_RegisterClass(inClassName, inCanCast, inStatics, inMembers, + inConstructEmpty, inConstructArgs, inSuperClass, inConst, inMarkFunc + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + , inVisitFunc + #endif + #ifdef HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE + ,inStorageInfo ,inStaticInfo + #endif + ); +} + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +void _hx_RegisterClass(const String &inClassName, hx::Class inClass); + +inline void RegisterClass(const String &inClassName, hx::Class inClass) +{ + _hx_RegisterClass(inClassName, inClass); +} + +template +inline bool TCanCast(hx::Object *inPtr) +{ + return inPtr && ( + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 332) + inPtr->_hx_isInstanceOf(T::_hx_ClassId) + #elif (HXCPP_API_LEVEL==331) + dynamic_cast(inPtr) + #else + dynamic_cast(inPtr->__GetRealObject()) + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL < 330) + || inPtr->__ToInterface(typeid(T)) + #endif + #endif + ); +} + + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) +template +inline bool TIsInterface(hx::Object *inPtr) +{ + return inPtr && inPtr->_hx_getInterface(HASH); +} +#endif + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void RegisterVTableOffset(int inOffset); + +#define HX_REGISTER_VTABLE_OFFSET( CLASS, INTERFACE ) \ +{ \ + CLASS *dummy = (CLASS *)0; \ + INTERFACE *intf = dummy; \ + hx::RegisterVTableOffset( (int)( (size_t)((char *)intf - (char *)dummy)) ); \ +} + + + +} + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Debug.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Debug.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1e0ee228 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Debug.h @@ -0,0 +1,365 @@ +#ifndef HX_DEBUG_H +#define HX_DEBUG_H + +#include + +// Some functions used by AdvancedDebug.cpp +// Returns the thread number of the calling thread +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +int __hxcpp_GetCurrentThreadNumber(); + +namespace hx +{ + +#ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + +template struct StackVariableWrapper +{ + typedef T wrapper; +}; +template<> struct StackVariableWrapper +{ + #ifdef HXCPP_M64 + typedef cpp::Int64 wrapper; + #else + typedef int wrapper; + #endif +}; + + +template struct StackVariableWrapper +{ + typedef cpp::Pointer wrapper; +}; + + + + +class StackVariable +{ +public: + + const char *mHaxeName; + bool mIsArg; + StackVariable *mNext; + + template + StackVariable(StackVariable *&inHead, bool inIsArg, + const char *inHaxeName, T *inCppVar) + : mHaxeName(inHaxeName), mIsArg(inIsArg), mHead(inHead), + mCppVar((void *) inCppVar) + { + mGetOrSetFunction = GetOrSetFunction; + mNext = mHead; + mHead = this; + } + + StackVariable(StackVariable *&inHead, bool inIsArg, + const char *inHaxeName, hx::Object **inCppVar) + : mHaxeName(inHaxeName), mIsArg(inIsArg), mHead(inHead), + mCppVar((void *) inCppVar) + { + mGetOrSetFunction = GetOrSetFunctionHxObject; + mNext = mHead; + mHead = this; + } + + + // For StackThis + template + StackVariable(StackVariable *&inHead, T *inCppVar) + : mHaxeName("this"), mIsArg(true), mHead(inHead), + mCppVar((void *) inCppVar) + { + mNext = mHead; + mHead = this; + } + + ~StackVariable() + { + // Stack variables are always deleted in the reverse order that they + // are created, so a simple pop_front is sufficient; no need to hunt + // for and remove the variable, it's always in the front ... + mHead = mNext; + } + + operator Dynamic() + { + return mGetOrSetFunction(true, mCppVar, 0); + } + + StackVariable &operator =(Dynamic &other) + { + (void) mGetOrSetFunction(false, mCppVar, &other); + + return *this; + } + +protected: + + typedef Dynamic (*GetOrSetFunctionType)(bool, void *, Dynamic *); + + GetOrSetFunctionType mGetOrSetFunction; + +private: + + template + static Dynamic GetOrSetFunction(bool get, void *ptr, Dynamic *dynamic) + { + typedef typename StackVariableWrapper::wrapper Wrap; + + if (get) { + return Wrap(* (T *) ptr); + } + else { + * (T *) ptr = Wrap(*dynamic); + return null(); + } + } + + static Dynamic GetOrSetFunctionHxObject(bool get, void *ptr, Dynamic *dynamic) + { + if (get) { + return * (hx::Object **) ptr; + } + else { + * (hx::Object **)ptr = dynamic->mPtr; + return null(); + } + } + + + StackVariable *&mHead; + + void *mCppVar; + +}; + + +class StackThis : public StackVariable +{ +public: + + template + StackThis(StackVariable *&inHead, T *inThis) + : StackVariable(inHead, inThis) + { + mGetOrSetFunction = GetFunction; + } + + template + StackThis(StackVariable *&inHead, hx::ObjectPtr &inThis) + : StackVariable(inHead, &inThis.mPtr) + { + mGetOrSetFunction = GetObjectPtr; + } + + template + static Dynamic GetObjectPtr(bool get, void *ptr, Dynamic *val) + { + if (get) { + return *(hx::Object **) ptr; + } + else { + return null(); + } + } + + + template + static Dynamic GetFunction(bool get, void *ptr, Dynamic *val) + { + if (get) { + return (T *) ptr; + } + else { + return null(); + } + } +}; + + +class StackCatchable +{ +public: + + StackCatchable *mNext; + + template + StackCatchable(StackFrame &frame, T * /* dummy required by template*/) + : mFrame(frame) +{ + mNext = frame.catchables; + frame.catchables = this; + mTestFunction = TestFunction; + } + + ~StackCatchable() +{ + mFrame.catchables = mNext; + } + + bool Catches(Dynamic e) const + { + return mTestFunction(e); + } + +private: + + template + static bool TestFunction(Dynamic e) + { + return e.IsClass(); + } + + StackFrame &mFrame; + bool (*mTestFunction)(Dynamic e); +}; + + + +#endif // HXCPP_DEBUGGER + +} // end namespace hx + + + +void __hxcpp_dbg_getScriptableFiles( Array< ::String> ioPaths ); +void __hxcpp_dbg_getScriptableFilesFullPath( Array< ::String> ioPaths ); +void __hxcpp_dbg_getScriptableClasses( Array< ::String> ioClasses ); + + + +#ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + + +namespace hx +{ + +// These must match the values present in cpp.vm.Debugger + +enum ThreadEvent +{ + THREAD_CREATED = 1, + THREAD_TERMINATED = 2, + THREAD_STARTED = 3, + THREAD_STOPPED = 4 +}; + +enum StepType +{ + STEP_NONE = 0, // Not present or needed in cpp.vm.Debugger + STEP_INTO = 1, + STEP_OVER = 2, + STEP_OUT = 3 +}; + + +} // end namespace hx + + +// The following functions are called directly, and only, by the haxe standard +// library's cpp.vm.Debugger.hx class +void __hxcpp_dbg_setEventNotificationHandler(Dynamic handler); +void __hxcpp_dbg_enableCurrentThreadDebugging(bool enable); +int __hxcpp_dbg_getCurrentThreadNumber(); +Array< ::String> __hxcpp_dbg_getFiles(); +Array< ::String> __hxcpp_dbg_getFilesFullPath(); +Array< ::String> __hxcpp_dbg_getClasses(); +Array __hxcpp_dbg_getThreadInfos(); +Dynamic __hxcpp_dbg_getThreadInfo(int threadNumber, bool unsafe); +int __hxcpp_dbg_addFileLineBreakpoint(String fileName, int lineNumber); +int __hxcpp_dbg_addClassFunctionBreakpoint(String className, + String functionName); +void __hxcpp_dbg_deleteAllBreakpoints(); +void __hxcpp_dbg_deleteBreakpoint(int number); +void __hxcpp_dbg_breakNow(bool wait); +void __hxcpp_dbg_continueThreads(int threadNumber, int count); +void __hxcpp_dbg_stepThread(int threadNumber, int stepType, int stepCount); +Array __hxcpp_dbg_getStackVariables(int threadNumber, + int stackFrameNumber, + bool unsafe, + Dynamic markThreadNotStopped); +Dynamic __hxcpp_dbg_getStackVariableValue(int threadNumber, + int stackFrameNumber, + String name, + bool unsafe, + Dynamic markNonexistent, + Dynamic markThreadNotStopped); + +Dynamic __hxcpp_dbg_setStackVariableValue(int threadNumber, + int stackFrameNumber, + String name, Dynamic value, + bool unsafe, + Dynamic markNonexistent, + Dynamic markThreadNotStopped); +void __hxcpp_dbg_setNewParameterFunction(Dynamic function); +void __hxcpp_dbg_setNewStackFrameFunction(Dynamic function); +void __hxcpp_dbg_setNewThreadInfoFunction(Dynamic function); +void __hxcpp_dbg_setAddParameterToStackFrameFunction(Dynamic function); +void __hxcpp_dbg_setAddStackFrameToThreadInfoFunction(Dynamic function); + +bool __hxcpp_dbg_fix_critical_error(String inErr); + +// The following functions are called by Thread.cpp to notify of thread +// created and terminated +void __hxcpp_dbg_threadCreatedOrTerminated(int threadNumber, bool created); + +// The following is called by the stack macros, but only if +// HXCPP_DEBUGGER is set +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic __hxcpp_dbg_checkedThrow(Dynamic toThrow); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic __hxcpp_dbg_checkedRethrow(Dynamic toThrow); + +#else // !HXCPP_DEBUGGER + +// If no debugger, provide empty implementations of the debugging functions + +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_setEventNotificationHandler(Dynamic) + { hx::Throw("Debugging is not enabled for this program; try\n" + "rebuilding it with the -D HXCPP_DEBUGGER option"); } +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_enableCurrentThreadDebugging(bool) { } +inline int __hxcpp_dbg_getCurrentThreadNumber() { return -1; } +inline Array< ::String> __hxcpp_dbg_getFiles() + { return Array_obj< String>::__new(); } +inline Array< ::String> __hxcpp_dbg_getFilesFullPath() + { return Array_obj< String>::__new(); } +inline Array< ::String> __hxcpp_dbg_getClasses() + { return Array_obj< String>::__new(); } +inline Array __hxcpp_dbg_getThreadInfos() + { return Array_obj< ::Dynamic>::__new(); } +inline Dynamic __hxcpp_dbg_getThreadInfo(int, bool) { return null(); } +inline int __hxcpp_dbg_addFileLineBreakpoint(String, int) { return -1; } +inline int __hxcpp_dbg_addClassFunctionBreakpoint(String, String) + { return -1; } +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_deleteAllBreakpoints() { } +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_deleteBreakpoint(int) { } +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_breakNow(bool) { } +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_continueThreads(int, int) { } +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_stepThread(int, int, int) { } +inline Array __hxcpp_dbg_getStackVariables(int, int, bool, Dynamic) + { return Array_obj< String>::__new(); } +inline Dynamic __hxcpp_dbg_getStackVariableValue(int, int, String, bool, + Dynamic, Dynamic) + { return null(); } +inline Dynamic __hxcpp_dbg_setStackVariableValue(int, int, String, Dynamic, + bool, Dynamic, Dynamic) + { return null(); } +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_setNewParameterFunction(Dynamic) { } +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_setNewStackFrameFunction(Dynamic) { } +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_setNewThreadInfoFunction(Dynamic) { } +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_setAddParameterToStackFrameFunction(Dynamic) { } +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_setAddStackFrameToThreadInfoFunction(Dynamic) { } + +// The following functions are called by Thread.cpp to notify of thread +// created and terminated +inline void __hxcpp_dbg_threadCreatedOrTerminated(int, bool) { } + +inline Dynamic __hxcpp_dbg_checkedThrow(Dynamic toThrow) { return hx::Throw(toThrow); } +inline Dynamic __hxcpp_dbg_checkedRethrow(Dynamic toThrow) { return hx::Rethrow(toThrow); } + +#endif // HXCPP_DEBUGGER + + +#endif // HX_DEBUG_H diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/DynamicImpl.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/DynamicImpl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5b666d36 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/DynamicImpl.h @@ -0,0 +1,1095 @@ +// ## ## ## ## #### ## ## ## ## ## #### ## +// ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ### ## ## ### ## ## ## +// ## ## ## ###### ###### ###### ## ###### ## ### ## +// ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ### ## ## ### ## ## +// ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## #### ## + +// DO NOT EDIT +// This file is generated from the .tpl file + + + +namespace hx { + +struct CMemberFunction0 : public hx::Object +{ + hx::ObjectPtr mThis; + MemberFunction0 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCMember0 }; + + + CMemberFunction0(const char *inName, hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction0 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mThis = inObj; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CMemberFunction0 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return (mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mThis.GetPtr()==other->mThis.GetPtr())? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 0; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mThis,"CMemberFunction0.this"); } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER(mThis); } + #endif + void *__GetHandle() const { return mThis.GetPtr(); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr()); + + } + Dynamic __run() + { + + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr()); + + } +}; + + + +struct CStaticFunction0 : public hx::Object +{ + StaticFunction0 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCStatic0 }; + + + CStaticFunction0(const char *inName,StaticFunction0 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CStaticFunction0 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mName==other->mName ? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 0; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + return mFunction(); + } + Dynamic __run() + { + return mFunction(); + } +}; + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction0(const char *inName,hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction0 inFunc) + { return new CMemberFunction0(inName,inObj,inFunc); } + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction0(const char *inName,StaticFunction0 inFunc) + { return new CStaticFunction0(inName,inFunc); } + +} + + + + +namespace hx { + +struct CMemberFunction1 : public hx::Object +{ + hx::ObjectPtr mThis; + MemberFunction1 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCMember1 }; + + + CMemberFunction1(const char *inName, hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction1 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mThis = inObj; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CMemberFunction1 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return (mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mThis.GetPtr()==other->mThis.GetPtr())? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 1; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mThis,"CMemberFunction1.this"); } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER(mThis); } + #endif + void *__GetHandle() const { return mThis.GetPtr(); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), inArgs[0]); + + } + Dynamic __run(const Dynamic &inArg0) + { + + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), inArg0); + + } +}; + + + +struct CStaticFunction1 : public hx::Object +{ + StaticFunction1 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCStatic1 }; + + + CStaticFunction1(const char *inName,StaticFunction1 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CStaticFunction1 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mName==other->mName ? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 1; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + return mFunction(inArgs[0]); + } + Dynamic __run(const Dynamic &inArg0) + { + return mFunction(inArg0); + } +}; + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction1(const char *inName,hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction1 inFunc) + { return new CMemberFunction1(inName,inObj,inFunc); } + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction1(const char *inName,StaticFunction1 inFunc) + { return new CStaticFunction1(inName,inFunc); } + +} + + + + +namespace hx { + +struct CMemberFunction2 : public hx::Object +{ + hx::ObjectPtr mThis; + MemberFunction2 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCMember2 }; + + + CMemberFunction2(const char *inName, hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction2 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mThis = inObj; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CMemberFunction2 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return (mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mThis.GetPtr()==other->mThis.GetPtr())? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 2; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mThis,"CMemberFunction2.this"); } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER(mThis); } + #endif + void *__GetHandle() const { return mThis.GetPtr(); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), inArgs[0],inArgs[1]); + + } + Dynamic __run(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1) + { + + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), inArg0,inArg1); + + } +}; + + + +struct CStaticFunction2 : public hx::Object +{ + StaticFunction2 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCStatic2 }; + + + CStaticFunction2(const char *inName,StaticFunction2 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CStaticFunction2 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mName==other->mName ? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 2; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + return mFunction(inArgs[0],inArgs[1]); + } + Dynamic __run(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1) + { + return mFunction(inArg0,inArg1); + } +}; + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction2(const char *inName,hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction2 inFunc) + { return new CMemberFunction2(inName,inObj,inFunc); } + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction2(const char *inName,StaticFunction2 inFunc) + { return new CStaticFunction2(inName,inFunc); } + +} + + + + +namespace hx { + +struct CMemberFunction3 : public hx::Object +{ + hx::ObjectPtr mThis; + MemberFunction3 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCMember3 }; + + + CMemberFunction3(const char *inName, hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction3 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mThis = inObj; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CMemberFunction3 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return (mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mThis.GetPtr()==other->mThis.GetPtr())? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 3; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mThis,"CMemberFunction3.this"); } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER(mThis); } + #endif + void *__GetHandle() const { return mThis.GetPtr(); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2]); + + } + Dynamic __run(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2) + { + + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), inArg0,inArg1,inArg2); + + } +}; + + + +struct CStaticFunction3 : public hx::Object +{ + StaticFunction3 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCStatic3 }; + + + CStaticFunction3(const char *inName,StaticFunction3 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CStaticFunction3 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mName==other->mName ? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 3; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + return mFunction(inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2]); + } + Dynamic __run(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2) + { + return mFunction(inArg0,inArg1,inArg2); + } +}; + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction3(const char *inName,hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction3 inFunc) + { return new CMemberFunction3(inName,inObj,inFunc); } + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction3(const char *inName,StaticFunction3 inFunc) + { return new CStaticFunction3(inName,inFunc); } + +} + + + + +namespace hx { + +struct CMemberFunction4 : public hx::Object +{ + hx::ObjectPtr mThis; + MemberFunction4 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCMember4 }; + + + CMemberFunction4(const char *inName, hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction4 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mThis = inObj; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CMemberFunction4 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return (mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mThis.GetPtr()==other->mThis.GetPtr())? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 4; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mThis,"CMemberFunction4.this"); } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER(mThis); } + #endif + void *__GetHandle() const { return mThis.GetPtr(); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3]); + + } + Dynamic __run(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3) + { + + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3); + + } +}; + + + +struct CStaticFunction4 : public hx::Object +{ + StaticFunction4 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCStatic4 }; + + + CStaticFunction4(const char *inName,StaticFunction4 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CStaticFunction4 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mName==other->mName ? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 4; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + return mFunction(inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3]); + } + Dynamic __run(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3) + { + return mFunction(inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3); + } +}; + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction4(const char *inName,hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction4 inFunc) + { return new CMemberFunction4(inName,inObj,inFunc); } + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction4(const char *inName,StaticFunction4 inFunc) + { return new CStaticFunction4(inName,inFunc); } + +} + + + + +namespace hx { + +struct CMemberFunction5 : public hx::Object +{ + hx::ObjectPtr mThis; + MemberFunction5 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCMember5 }; + + + CMemberFunction5(const char *inName, hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction5 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mThis = inObj; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CMemberFunction5 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return (mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mThis.GetPtr()==other->mThis.GetPtr())? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 5; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mThis,"CMemberFunction5.this"); } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER(mThis); } + #endif + void *__GetHandle() const { return mThis.GetPtr(); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4]); + + } + Dynamic __run(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4) + { + + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4); + + } +}; + + + +struct CStaticFunction5 : public hx::Object +{ + StaticFunction5 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCStatic5 }; + + + CStaticFunction5(const char *inName,StaticFunction5 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CStaticFunction5 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mName==other->mName ? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 5; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + return mFunction(inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4]); + } + Dynamic __run(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4) + { + return mFunction(inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4); + } +}; + +struct CStaticFunction6 : public hx::Object +{ + StaticFunction6 mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCStatic6 }; + + + CStaticFunction6(const char *inName,StaticFunction6 inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CStaticFunction6 *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mName==other->mName ? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return 6; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + return mFunction(inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5]); + } + Dynamic __run(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5) + { + return mFunction(inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5); + } +}; + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction5(const char *inName,hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction5 inFunc) + { return new CMemberFunction5(inName,inObj,inFunc); } + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction5(const char *inName,StaticFunction5 inFunc) + { return new CStaticFunction5(inName,inFunc); } + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction6(const char *inName,StaticFunction6 inFunc) + { return new CStaticFunction6(inName,inFunc); } + +} + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(6)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(6)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(7)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(7)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(8)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(8)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(9)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(9)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(10)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(10)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(11)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(11)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(12)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(12)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(13)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(13)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(14)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(14)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(15)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(15)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(16)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(16)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(17)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(17)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(18)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(18)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(19)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(19)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(20)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(20)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(21)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)->init(20,inArg20)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(21)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)->init(20,inArg20)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(22)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)->init(20,inArg20)->init(21,inArg21)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(22)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)->init(20,inArg20)->init(21,inArg21)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(23)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)->init(20,inArg20)->init(21,inArg21)->init(22,inArg22)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(23)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)->init(20,inArg20)->init(21,inArg21)->init(22,inArg22)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(24)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)->init(20,inArg20)->init(21,inArg21)->init(22,inArg22)->init(23,inArg23)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(24)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)->init(20,inArg20)->init(21,inArg21)->init(22,inArg22)->init(23,inArg23)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23,const Dynamic &inArg24) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(25)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)->init(20,inArg20)->init(21,inArg21)->init(22,inArg22)->init(23,inArg23)->init(24,inArg24)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23,const Dynamic &inArg24) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(25)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)->init(20,inArg20)->init(21,inArg21)->init(22,inArg22)->init(23,inArg23)->init(24,inArg24)); +} +} + + + + +Dynamic Dynamic::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23,const Dynamic &inArg24,const Dynamic &inArg25) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::__new(26)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)->init(20,inArg20)->init(21,inArg21)->init(22,inArg22)->init(23,inArg23)->init(24,inArg24)->init(25,inArg25)); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23,const Dynamic &inArg24,const Dynamic &inArg25) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::__new(26)->init(0,inArg0)->init(1,inArg1)->init(2,inArg2)->init(3,inArg3)->init(4,inArg4)->init(5,inArg5)->init(6,inArg6)->init(7,inArg7)->init(8,inArg8)->init(9,inArg9)->init(10,inArg10)->init(11,inArg11)->init(12,inArg12)->init(13,inArg13)->init(14,inArg14)->init(15,inArg15)->init(16,inArg16)->init(17,inArg17)->init(18,inArg18)->init(19,inArg19)->init(20,inArg20)->init(21,inArg21)->init(22,inArg22)->init(23,inArg23)->init(24,inArg24)->init(25,inArg25)); +} +} + + + + + +namespace hx +{ + + +struct CMemberFunctionVar : public hx::Object +{ + hx::ObjectPtr mThis; + MemberFunctionVar mFunction; + const char *mName; + int N; + + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCMemberVar }; + + + CMemberFunctionVar(const char *inName,hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunctionVar inFunction,int inN) + { + mThis = inObj; + mFunction = inFunction; + mName = inName; + N = inN; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CMemberFunctionVar *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return (mFunction==other->mFunction && mName==other->mName && mThis.GetPtr()==other->mThis.GetPtr())? 0 : -1; + } + + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return N; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mThis,"CMemberFunctionVar.this"); } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER(mThis); } + #endif + void *__GetHandle() const { return mThis.GetPtr(); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), inArgs); + } +}; + + + +struct CStaticFunctionVar : public hx::Object +{ + StaticFunctionVar mFunction; + const char *mName; + int N; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCStaticVar }; + + CStaticFunctionVar(const char *inName,StaticFunctionVar inFunction,int inN) + { + mFunction = inFunction; + mName = inName; + N = inN; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CStaticFunctionVar *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction ? 0 : -1; + } + + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return N; } + ::String __ToString() const { return String(mName); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + return mFunction(inArgs); + } +}; + + +Dynamic CreateMemberFunctionVar(const char *inName, hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunctionVar inFunc,int inN) + { return new CMemberFunctionVar(inName, inObj,inFunc,inN); } + +Dynamic CreateStaticFunctionVar(const char *inName,StaticFunctionVar inFunc,int inN) + { return new CStaticFunctionVar(inName, inFunc,inN); } + +} + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/DynamicImpl.tpl b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/DynamicImpl.tpl new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ae0e380a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/DynamicImpl.tpl @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ + +::foreach PARAMS:: ::if (ARG>=6):: +Dynamic Dynamic::NS::operator()(::DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::) +{ + CheckFPtr(); + return mPtr->__Run(Array_obj::NS::__new(::ARG::)::DYNAMIC_ADDS::); +} + +namespace cpp +{ +::NS::Dynamic Variant::NS::operator()(::DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::) +{ + if (isNull()) Dynamic::ThrowBadFunctionError(); + return valObject->__Run(Array_obj::NS::__new(::ARG::)::DYNAMIC_ADDS::); +} +} + + +::else:: + +namespace hx { + +struct CMemberFunction::ARG:: : public hx::Object +{ + hx::ObjectPtr mThis; + MemberFunction::ARG:: mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::NS::clsIdCMember::ARG:: }; + + + CMemberFunction::ARG::(const char *inName, hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction::ARG:: inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mThis = inObj; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CMemberFunction::ARG:: *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return (mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mThis.GetPtr()==other->mThis.GetPtr())? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return ::ARG::; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mThis,"CMemberFunction::ARG::.this"); } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER(mThis); } + #endif + void *__GetHandle() const { return mThis.GetPtr(); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + ::if (ARG>0):: + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), ::ARR_LIST::); + ::else:: + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr()); + ::end:: + } + Dynamic __run(::DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::) + { + ::if (ARG>0):: + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), ::ARG_LIST::); + ::else:: + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr()); + ::end:: + } +}; + + + +struct CStaticFunction::ARG:: : public hx::Object +{ + StaticFunction::ARG:: mFunction; + const char *mName; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::NS::clsIdCStatic::ARG:: }; + + + CStaticFunction::ARG::(const char *inName,StaticFunction::ARG:: inFunction) + { + mName = inName; + mFunction = inFunction; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CStaticFunction::ARG:: *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction && mName==other->mName ? 0 : -1; + } + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return ::ARG::; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + return mFunction(::ARR_LIST::); + } + Dynamic __run(::DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::) + { + return mFunction(::ARG_LIST::); + } +}; + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateMemberFunction::ARG::(const char *inName,hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunction::ARG:: inFunc) + { return new CMemberFunction::ARG::(inName,inObj,inFunc); } + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +Dynamic CreateStaticFunction::ARG::(const char *inName,StaticFunction::ARG:: inFunc) + { return new CStaticFunction::ARG::(inName,inFunc); } + +} + +::end:: +::end:: + +namespace hx +{ + + +struct CMemberFunctionVar : public hx::Object +{ + hx::ObjectPtr mThis; + MemberFunctionVar mFunction; + const char *mName; + int N; + + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCMemberVar }; + + + CMemberFunctionVar(const char *inName,hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunctionVar inFunction,int inN) + { + mThis = inObj; + mFunction = inFunction; + mName = inName; + N = inN; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CMemberFunctionVar *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return (mFunction==other->mFunction && mName==other->mName && mThis.GetPtr()==other->mThis.GetPtr())? 0 : -1; + } + + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return N; } + ::String __ToString() const{ return String(mName); } + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(mThis,"CMemberFunctionVar.this"); } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER(mThis); } + #endif + void *__GetHandle() const { return mThis.GetPtr(); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + return mFunction(mThis.GetPtr(), inArgs); + } +}; + + + +struct CStaticFunctionVar : public hx::Object +{ + StaticFunctionVar mFunction; + const char *mName; + int N; + + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdCStaticVar }; + + CStaticFunctionVar(const char *inName,StaticFunctionVar inFunction,int inN) + { + mFunction = inFunction; + mName = inName; + N = inN; + } + int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const + { + const CStaticFunctionVar *other = dynamic_cast(inRHS); + if (!other) + return -1; + return mName==other->mName && mFunction==other->mFunction ? 0 : -1; + } + + + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + int __ArgCount() const { return N; } + ::String __ToString() const { return String(mName); } + Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs) + { + return mFunction(inArgs); + } +}; + + +Dynamic CreateMemberFunctionVar(const char *inName, hx::Object *inObj, MemberFunctionVar inFunc,int inN) + { return new CMemberFunctionVar(inName, inObj,inFunc,inN); } + +Dynamic CreateStaticFunctionVar(const char *inName,StaticFunctionVar inFunc,int inN) + { return new CStaticFunctionVar(inName, inFunc,inN); } + +} + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/ErrorCodes.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/ErrorCodes.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fd7ca458 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/ErrorCodes.h @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +#ifndef HX_ERROR_CODES +#define HX_ERROR_CODES + +// --- Exteral constants, used inline +#define HX_INVALID_CAST Dynamic(HX_CSTRING("Invalid Cast")) +#define HX_INVALID_INTERFACE Dynamic(HX_CSTRING("Object does not implement interface")) +#define HX_INDEX_OUT_OF_BOUNDS Dynamic(HX_CSTRING("Index Out of Bounds")) +#define HX_INVALID_CONSTRUCTOR Dynamic(HX_CSTRING("Invalid constructor")) +#define HX_INVALID_ENUM_CONSTRUCTOR(_enum_name, _constructor_name) \ + Dynamic(HX_CSTRING("Invalid enum constructor for ") + \ + HX_CSTRING(_enum_name) + \ + HX_CSTRING(": ") + \ + _constructor_name) +#define HX_INVALID_OBJECT Dynamic(HX_CSTRING("Invalid object")) +#define HX_INVALID_ARG_COUNT Dynamic(HX_CSTRING("Invalid Arg Count")) +#define HX_NULL_FUNCTION_POINTER Dynamic(HX_CSTRING("Null Function Pointer")) +#define HX_INVALID_ENUM_ARG_COUNT(_enum_name, _constructor_name, _count, _expected) \ + Dynamic(HX_CSTRING("Invalid enum arg count for ") + \ + HX_CSTRING(_enum_name) + \ + HX_CSTRING(".") + \ + _constructor_name + \ + HX_CSTRING(": expected ") + \ + ::String(_expected) + \ + HX_CSTRING(", got ") + \ + ::String(_count)) + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/FieldRef.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/FieldRef.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b5185313 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/FieldRef.h @@ -0,0 +1,304 @@ +#ifndef HX_FIELD_REF_H +#define HX_FIELD_REF_H + +namespace hx +{ + +// --- FieldRef ---------------------------------------------------------- +// +// This is used to provide syntaxe for setting fields by name. This is because +// the field can't be returned by reference, because it may not exist as a dynamic. +// +// eg, consider class 'A' with variable 'x': +// class A { int x; } +// +// And you have a Dynamic pointing to it: +// Dynamic d = new A; Then you access x by name: +// d->__Field("x") = 1; +// +// __Field can't return a Dynamic & because x is a int, not Dynamic. So I use this class. +// Note that this may change if I fix the generator to create __SetField("x",1) directly. + + +#define HX_FIELD_REF_MEM_OP(op,ret) \ +inline ret operator op (const FieldRef &inA) \ + { return this->operator Dynamic() op inA.operator Dynamic(); } \ +inline ret operator op (const IndexRef &inA); \ +template inline ret operator op (const T& inA) \ + { return this->operator Dynamic() op inA; } + +#define HX_FIELD_REF_IMPL_MEM_OP(op,ret) \ +inline ret hx::FieldRef::operator op (const IndexRef &inA) \ + { return this->operator Dynamic() op inA.operator Dynamic(); } \ + +class FieldRef +{ +public: + explicit FieldRef(hx::Object *inObj,const String &inName) : mObject(inObj), mName(inName) + { + } + + hx::Val operator=(const hx::Val &inRHS) + { + return mObject->__SetField(mName,inRHS, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC ); + } + #if HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330 + inline operator hx::Val() const { return mObject ? mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC) : null(); } + #endif + inline operator Dynamic() const { return mObject ? Dynamic(mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC)) : null(); } + inline operator double() const { return mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); } + inline operator float() const { return mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); } + inline operator int() const { return mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); } + inline operator cpp::UInt64() const { return mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); } + inline operator cpp::Int64() const { return mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); } + + + // post-increment + inline double operator++(int) + { + double d = mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); + mObject->__SetField(mName,d+1, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); + return d; + } + // pre-increment + inline double operator++() + { + double d = ((double)mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC)) + 1; + mObject->__SetField(mName,d, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); + return d; + } + // post-decrement + inline double operator--(int) + { + double d = mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); + mObject->__SetField(mName,d-1, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); + return d; + } + // pre-decrement + inline double operator--() + { + double d = (double)(mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC)) - 1; + mObject->__SetField(mName,d, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); + return d; + } + bool operator !() { return ! ((int)(mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC))); } + int operator ~() { return ~ ((int)mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC)); } + + inline bool operator==(const null &) const { return !mObject; } + inline bool operator!=(const null &) const { return mObject; } + + double operator -() { return - (double)(mObject->__Field(mName, HX_PROP_DYNAMIC)); } + + bool HasPointer() const { return mObject; } + + + HX_FIELD_REF_MEM_OP(==,bool) + HX_FIELD_REF_MEM_OP(!=,bool) + HX_FIELD_REF_MEM_OP(<,bool) + HX_FIELD_REF_MEM_OP(<=,bool) + HX_FIELD_REF_MEM_OP(>,bool) + HX_FIELD_REF_MEM_OP(>=,bool) + + HX_FIELD_REF_MEM_OP(+,Dynamic) + HX_FIELD_REF_MEM_OP(*,double) + HX_FIELD_REF_MEM_OP(/,double) + HX_FIELD_REF_MEM_OP(-,double) + HX_FIELD_REF_MEM_OP(%,double) + + + + String mName; + hx::Object *mObject; +}; + +// We can define this one now... +template +inline FieldRef ObjectPtr::FieldRef(const String &inString) +{ + return hx::FieldRef(mPtr,inString); +} + +#define HX_FIELD_REF_OP(op,ret) \ +template inline ret operator op (T &inT, const FieldRef &inA) \ + { return inT op ( inA.operator Dynamic()); } + +HX_FIELD_REF_OP(==,bool) +HX_FIELD_REF_OP(!=,bool) +HX_FIELD_REF_OP(<,bool) +HX_FIELD_REF_OP(<=,bool) +HX_FIELD_REF_OP(>,bool) +HX_FIELD_REF_OP(>=,bool) + +HX_FIELD_REF_OP(+,Dynamic) +HX_FIELD_REF_OP(*,double) +HX_FIELD_REF_OP(/,double) +HX_FIELD_REF_OP(-,double) +HX_FIELD_REF_OP(%,double) + + + +// --- IndexRef -------------------------------------------------------------- +// +// Like FieldRef, but for integer array access +// + +#define HX_INDEX_REF_MEM_OP(op,ret) \ +inline ret operator op (const IndexRef &inA) \ + { return this->operator Dynamic() op inA.operator Dynamic(); } \ +inline ret operator op (const FieldRef &inA) \ + { return this->operator Dynamic() op inA.operator Dynamic(); } \ +template inline ret operator op (const T& inA) \ + { return this->operator Dynamic() op inA; } + + +class IndexRef +{ +public: + explicit IndexRef(hx::Object *inObj,int inIndex) : mObject(inObj), mIndex(inIndex) + { + } + + Dynamic operator=(const Dynamic &inRHS) + { + return mObject->__SetItem(mIndex,inRHS); + } + inline operator Dynamic() const { return mObject->__GetItem(mIndex); } + inline operator double() const { return mObject->__GetItem(mIndex); } + inline operator int() const { return mObject->__GetItem(mIndex); } + + // post-increment + inline double operator++(int) + { + double d = mObject->__GetItem(mIndex)->__ToDouble(); + mObject->__SetItem(mIndex,d+1); + return d; + } + // pre-increment + inline double operator++() + { + double d = mObject->__GetItem(mIndex)->__ToDouble() + 1; + mObject->__SetItem(mIndex,d); + return d; + } + // post-decrement + inline double operator--(int) + { + double d = mObject->__GetItem(mIndex)->__ToDouble(); + mObject->__SetItem(mIndex,d-1); + return d; + } + // pre-decrement + inline double operator--() + { + double d = mObject->__GetItem(mIndex)->__ToDouble() - 1; + mObject->__SetItem(mIndex,d); + return d; + } + bool operator !() { return ! mObject->__GetItem(mIndex)->__ToInt(); } + int operator ~() { return ~ mObject->__GetItem(mIndex)->__ToInt(); } + double operator -() { return - mObject->__GetItem(mIndex)->__ToDouble(); } + + inline bool operator==(const null &) const { return !mObject; } + inline bool operator!=(const null &) const { return mObject; } + + HX_INDEX_REF_MEM_OP(==,bool) + HX_INDEX_REF_MEM_OP(!=,bool) + HX_INDEX_REF_MEM_OP(<,bool) + HX_INDEX_REF_MEM_OP(<=,bool) + HX_INDEX_REF_MEM_OP(>,bool) + HX_INDEX_REF_MEM_OP(>=,bool) + + HX_INDEX_REF_MEM_OP(+,Dynamic) + HX_INDEX_REF_MEM_OP(*,double) + HX_INDEX_REF_MEM_OP(/,double) + HX_INDEX_REF_MEM_OP(-,double) + HX_INDEX_REF_MEM_OP(%,double) + + bool HasPointer() const { return mObject; } + + int mIndex; + hx::Object *mObject; +}; + +// We can define this one now... +template +inline IndexRef ObjectPtr::IndexRef(int inIndex) +{ + return hx::IndexRef(mPtr,inIndex); +} + +#define HX_INDEX_REF_OP(op,ret) \ +template inline ret operator op (T &inT, const IndexRef &inA) \ + { return inT op ( inA. operator Dynamic()); } + +HX_INDEX_REF_OP(==,bool) +HX_INDEX_REF_OP(!=,bool) +HX_INDEX_REF_OP(<,bool) +HX_INDEX_REF_OP(<=,bool) +HX_INDEX_REF_OP(>,bool) +HX_INDEX_REF_OP(>=,bool) + +HX_INDEX_REF_OP(+,Dynamic) +HX_INDEX_REF_OP(*,double) +HX_INDEX_REF_OP(/,double) +HX_INDEX_REF_OP(-,double) +HX_INDEX_REF_OP(%,double) + + +// Implement once IndexRef has been defined. +HX_FIELD_REF_IMPL_MEM_OP(==,bool) +HX_FIELD_REF_IMPL_MEM_OP(!=,bool) +HX_FIELD_REF_IMPL_MEM_OP(<,bool) +HX_FIELD_REF_IMPL_MEM_OP(<=,bool) +HX_FIELD_REF_IMPL_MEM_OP(>,bool) +HX_FIELD_REF_IMPL_MEM_OP(>=,bool) + +HX_FIELD_REF_IMPL_MEM_OP(+,Dynamic) +HX_FIELD_REF_IMPL_MEM_OP(*,double) +HX_FIELD_REF_IMPL_MEM_OP(/,double) +HX_FIELD_REF_IMPL_MEM_OP(-,double) +HX_FIELD_REF_IMPL_MEM_OP(%,double) + +// Disambiguate Dynamic operators... + +#define HX_INDEX_REF_OP_DYNAMIC(op,ret) \ +inline ret operator op (const Dynamic &inT, const IndexRef &inA) \ + { return inT op ( inA.operator Dynamic()); } + +HX_INDEX_REF_OP_DYNAMIC(==,bool) +HX_INDEX_REF_OP_DYNAMIC(!=,bool) +HX_INDEX_REF_OP_DYNAMIC(+,Dynamic) +HX_INDEX_REF_OP_DYNAMIC(*,double) + + + +template +class __TArrayImplRef +{ +public: + _OBJ mObject; + int mIndex; + + explicit __TArrayImplRef(_OBJ inObj,int inIndex) : mObject(inObj), mIndex(inIndex) { } + + template + inline operator _DATA() { return mObject->__get(mIndex); } + template + inline void operator=(_DATA inRHS) + { + mObject->__set(mIndex,inRHS); + } +}; + +template +__TArrayImplRef<_OBJ> __ArrayImplRef(_OBJ inObj, int inIndex) +{ + return __TArrayImplRef<_OBJ>(inObj,inIndex); +} + + + +} // end namespace hx + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Functions.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Functions.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a27180e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Functions.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +#ifndef HX_FUNCTIONS_H +#define HX_FUNCTIONS_H +#include + +namespace hx +{ + struct HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES LocalFunc : public hx::Object + { + int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } + inline void DoMarkThis(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { } +#ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + inline void DoVisitThis(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { } +#endif + }; + + struct HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES LocalThisFunc : public LocalFunc + { + Dynamic __this; + void __SetThis(Dynamic inThis) { __this = inThis; } + inline void DoMarkThis(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER(__this); } +#ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + inline void DoVisitThis(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER(__this); } +#endif + }; + +} + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/GC.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/GC.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a8d810ef --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/GC.h @@ -0,0 +1,580 @@ +#ifndef HX_GC_H +#define HX_GC_H + +#include +#include + +// Under the current scheme (as defined by HX_HCSTRING/HX_CSTRING in hxcpp.h) +// each constant string data is prepended with a 4-byte header that says the string +// is constant (ie, not part of GC) and whether there is(not) a pre-computed hash at +// the end of the data. +// When HX_SMART_STRINGS is active, a bit says whether it is char16_t encoded. + +#define HX_GC_CONST_ALLOC_BIT 0x80000000 +#define HX_GC_CONST_ALLOC_MARK_BIT 0x80 + + + + +// Tell compiler the extra functions are supported +#define HXCPP_GC_FUNCTIONS_1 + +// Function called by the haxe code... + +#ifdef HXCPP_TELEMETRY +extern void __hxt_gc_new(hx::StackContext *inStack, void* obj, int inSize, const char *inName); +#endif + + +// Helpers for debugging code +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_reachable(hx::Object *inKeep); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_enable(bool inEnable); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_collect(bool inMajor=true); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_gc_compact(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __hxcpp_gc_trace(hx::Class inClass, bool inPrint); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __hxcpp_gc_used_bytes(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES double __hxcpp_gc_mem_info(int inWhat); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_enter_gc_free_zone(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_exit_gc_free_zone(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_gc_safe_point(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_spam_collects(int inEveryNCalls); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_set_minimum_working_memory(int inBytes); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_set_minimum_free_space(int inBytes); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_set_target_free_space_percentage(int inPercentage); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool __hxcpp_is_const_string(const ::String &inString); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_gc_freeze(Dynamic inObject); + +typedef void (hx::Object::*_hx_member_finalizer)(void); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_add_member_finalizer(hx::Object *inObject, _hx_member_finalizer, bool inPin); + +typedef void (*_hx_alloc_finalizer)(void *inPtr); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_add_alloc_finalizer(void *inAlloc, _hx_alloc_finalizer, bool inPin); + +template +inline void _hx_add_finalizable( hx::ObjectPtr inObj, bool inPin) +{ + _hx_member_finalizer finalizer = (_hx_member_finalizer)&T::finalize; + __hxcpp_add_member_finalizer(inObj.mPtr, finalizer, inPin); +} +template +inline void _hx_add_finalizable( T *inObj, bool inPin) +{ + _hx_member_finalizer finalizer = (_hx_member_finalizer)&T::finalize; + __hxcpp_add_member_finalizer(inObj, finalizer, inPin); +} + + + +template +T _hx_allocate_extended(int inExtra) +{ + typedef typename T::Obj Obj; + Obj *obj = new (inExtra) Obj(); + return obj; +} + +/* +template +inline void _hx_allocate_extended( hx::ObjectPtr inObj, bool inPin) +*/ + + +// Finalizers from haxe code... +void __hxcpp_gc_do_not_kill(Dynamic inObj); + +// This is the correctly typed version - no change of getting function proto wrong +void _hx_set_finalizer(Dynamic inObj, void (*inFunc)(Dynamic) ); + +void __hxcpp_set_finalizer(Dynamic inObj, void *inFunction); +hx::Object *__hxcpp_get_next_zombie(); + +#ifdef HXCPP_TELEMETRY +void __hxcpp_set_hxt_finalizer(void* inObj, void *inFunc); +#endif + +hx::Object *__hxcpp_weak_ref_create(Dynamic inObject); +hx::Object *__hxcpp_weak_ref_get(Dynamic inRef); + + +unsigned int __hxcpp_obj_hash(Dynamic inObj); +int __hxcpp_obj_id(Dynamic inObj); +hx::Object *__hxcpp_id_obj(int); + + + + + + +namespace hx +{ +// Generic allocation routine. +// If inSize is small (<4k) it will be allocated from the immix pool. +// Larger, and it will be allocated from a separate memory pool +// inIsObject specifies whether "__Mark" should be called on the resulting object +void *InternalNew(int inSize,bool inIsObject); + +// Used internall - realloc array data +void *InternalRealloc(int inFromSize, void *inData,int inSize,bool inAllowExpansion=false); + +void InternalReleaseMem(void *inMem); + +unsigned int ObjectSizeSafe(void *inData); + +// Const buffers are allocated outside the GC system, and do not require marking +// String buffers can optionally have a pre-computed hash appended with this method +void *InternalCreateConstBuffer(const void *inData,int inSize,bool inAddStringHash=false); + +// Called after collection by an unspecified thread +typedef void (*finalizer)(hx::Object *v); + +// Used internally by the runtime. +// The constructor will add this object to the internal list of finalizers. +// If the parent object is not marked by the end of the collect, the finalizer will trigger. +struct InternalFinalizer +{ + InternalFinalizer(hx::Object *inObj, finalizer inFinalizer=0); + + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + void Visit(VisitContext *__inCtx); + #endif + void Detach(); + + bool mValid; + finalizer mFinalizer; + hx::Object *mObject; +}; + +// Attach a finalizer to any object allocation. This can be called from haxe code, but be aware that +// you can't make any GC calls from the finalizer. +void GCSetFinalizer( hx::Object *, hx::finalizer f ); + +// If another thread wants to do a collect, it will signal this variable. +// This automatically gets checked when you call "new", but if you are in long-running +// loop with no new call, you might starve another thread if you to not check this. +// 0xffffffff = pause requested +extern int gPauseForCollect; + + +// Minimum total memory - used + buffer for new objects +extern int sgMinimumWorkingMemory; + +// Minimum free memory - not counting used memory +extern int sgMinimumFreeSpace; + +// Also ensure that the free memory is larger than this amount of used memory +extern int sgTargetFreeSpacePercentage; + + +extern HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int gByteMarkID; + +// Call in response to a gPauseForCollect. Normally, this is done for you in "new" +void PauseForCollect(); + + +// Used by WeakHash to work out if it needs to dispose its keys +bool IsWeakRefValid(hx::Object *inPtr); +bool IsWeakRefValid(const HX_CHAR *inPtr); + +// Used by CFFI to scan a block of memory for GC Pointers. May picks up random crap +// that points to real, active objects. +void MarkConservative(int *inBottom, int *inTop,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); + + +// Create/Remove a root. +// All statics are explicitly registered - this saves adding the whole data segment +// to the collection list. +// It takes a pointer-pointer so it can move the contents, and the caller can change the contents +void GCAddRoot(hx::Object **inRoot); +void GCRemoveRoot(hx::Object **inRoot); + + +// This is used internally in hxcpp +// It calls InternalNew, and takes care of null-terminating the result +char *NewString(int inLen); + +// The concept of 'private' is from the old conservative Gc method. +// Now with explicit marking, these functions do the same thing, which is +// to allocate some GC memory and optionally copy the 'inData' into those bytes +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void *NewGCBytes(void *inData,int inSize); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void *NewGCPrivate(void *inData,int inSize); + +// Force a collect from the calling thread +// Only one thread should call this at a time +int InternalCollect(bool inMajor,bool inCompact); + + +// Disable the garbage collector. It will try to increase its internal buffers to honour extra requests. +// If it runs out of memory, it will actually try to do a collect. +void InternalEnableGC(bool inEnable); + +// Record that fact that external memory has been allocated and associated with a haxe object +// eg. BitmapData. This will help the collector know when to collect +void GCChangeManagedMemory(int inDelta, const char *inWhy=0); + +// Haxe threads can center GC free zones, where they can't make GC allocation calls, and should not mess with GC memory. +// This means that they do not need to pause while the GC collections happen, and other threads will not +// wait for them to "check in" before collecting. The standard runtime makes these calls around OS calls, such as "Sleep" +void EnterGCFreeZone(); +void ExitGCFreeZone(); +// retuns true if ExitGCFreeZone should be called +bool TryGCFreeZone(); +// retuns true if ExitGCFreeZone was called +bool TryExitGCFreeZone(); + +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES AutoGCFreeZone +{ +public: + AutoGCFreeZone() : locked(true) { EnterGCFreeZone(); } + ~AutoGCFreeZone() { if (locked) ExitGCFreeZone(); } + + void close() { if (locked) ExitGCFreeZone(); locked = false; } + + bool locked; +}; + + +// Defined in Class.cpp, these function is called from the Gc to start the marking/visiting +void MarkClassStatics(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); +#ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS +void VisitClassStatics(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx); +#endif + + +// Called by haxe/application code to mark allocations. +// "Object" allocs will recursively call __Mark +inline void MarkAlloc(void *inPtr ,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); +inline void MarkObjectAlloc(hx::Object *inPtr ,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); + +// Implemented differently for efficiency +void MarkObjectArray(hx::Object **inPtr, int inLength, hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); +void MarkStringArray(String *inPtr, int inLength, hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); + +// Provide extra debug info to the marking routines +#ifdef HXCPP_DEBUG +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void MarkSetMember(const char *inName ,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void MarkPushClass(const char *inName ,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void MarkPopClass(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); +#endif + + +// Used by runtime if it is being paranoid about pointers. It checks that the pointer is real and alive at last collect. +void GCCheckPointer(void *); +void GCOnNewPointer(void *); + + +// Called internally before and GC operations +void CommonInitAlloc(); + + +// Threading ... +void RegisterNewThread(void *inTopOfStack); +void RegisterCurrentThread(void *inTopOfStack); +void UnregisterCurrentThread(); +void GCPrepareMultiThreaded(); + + + + +} // end namespace hx + + +// Inline code tied to the immix implementation + +namespace hx +{ + +#define HX_USE_INLINE_IMMIX_OPERATOR_NEW + +//#define HX_STACK_CTX ::hx::ImmixAllocator *_hx_stack_ctx = hx::gMultiThreadMode ? hx::tlsImmixAllocator : hx::gMainThreadAlloc; + + +// Each line ast 128 bytes (2^7) +#define IMMIX_LINE_BITS 7 +#define IMMIX_LINE_LEN (1<spaceFirst; + unsigned char *end = buffer + (inSize + 4); + + if ( end > alloc->spaceOversize ) + { + // Fall back to external method + buffer = (unsigned char *)alloc->CallAlloc(inSize, inContainer ? IMMIX_ALLOC_IS_CONTAINER : 0); + } + else + { + alloc->spaceFirst = end; + + if (inContainer) + ((unsigned int *)buffer)[-1] = inSize | IMMIX_ALLOC_IS_CONTAINER; + else + ((unsigned int *)buffer)[-1] = inSize; + } + + #ifdef HXCPP_TELEMETRY + __hxt_gc_new((hx::StackContext *)alloc,buffer, inSize, inName); + #endif + + return buffer; + + #else + #ifndef HXCPP_ALIGN_ALLOC + // Inline the fast-path if we can + // We know the object can hold a pointer (vtable) and that the size is int-aligned + int start = alloc->spaceStart; + int end = start + sizeof(int) + inSize; + + if ( end <= alloc->spaceEnd ) + { + alloc->spaceStart = end; + + unsigned int *buffer = (unsigned int *)(alloc->allocBase + start); + + int startRow = start>>IMMIX_LINE_BITS; + + alloc->allocStartFlags[ startRow ] |= gImmixStartFlag[start&127]; + + if (inContainer) + *buffer++ = (( (end+(IMMIX_LINE_LEN-1))>>IMMIX_LINE_BITS) -startRow) | + (inSize<>IMMIX_LINE_BITS) -startRow) | + (inSize<CallAlloc(inSize, inContainer ? IMMIX_ALLOC_IS_CONTAINER : 0); + + #ifdef HXCPP_TELEMETRY + __hxt_gc_new((hx::StackContext *)alloc,result, inSize, inName); + #endif + + return result; + #endif // HXCPP_GC_NURSERY + } +}; + +typedef ImmixAllocator GcAllocator; +typedef ImmixAllocator Ctx; + + +#ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + #define HX_OBJ_WB_CTX(obj,value,ctx) { \ + unsigned char &mark = ((unsigned char *)(obj))[ HX_ENDIAN_MARK_ID_BYTE]; \ + if (mark == hx::gByteMarkID && value && !((unsigned char *)(value))[ HX_ENDIAN_MARK_ID_BYTE ] ) { \ + mark|=HX_GC_REMEMBERED; \ + ctx->pushReferrer(obj); \ + } } + #define HX_OBJ_WB_PESSIMISTIC_CTX(obj,ctx) { \ + unsigned char &mark = ((unsigned char *)(obj))[ HX_ENDIAN_MARK_ID_BYTE]; \ + if (mark == hx::gByteMarkID) { \ + mark|=HX_GC_REMEMBERED; \ + ctx->pushReferrer(obj); \ + } } + // I'm not sure if this will ever trigger... + #define HX_OBJ_WB_NEW_MARKED_OBJECT(obj) { \ + if (((unsigned char *)(obj))[ HX_ENDIAN_MARK_ID_BYTE]==hx::gByteMarkID) hx::NewMarkedObject(obj); \ + } +#else + #define HX_OBJ_WB_CTX(obj,value,ctx) + #define HX_OBJ_WB_PESSIMISTIC_CTX(obj,ctx) + #define HX_OBJ_WB_NEW_MARKED_OBJECT(obj) +#endif + +#define HX_OBJ_WB(obj,value) HX_OBJ_WB_CTX(obj,value,_hx_ctx) +#define HX_ARRAY_WB(array,index,value) HX_OBJ_WB(array,value) +#define HX_OBJ_WB_PESSIMISTIC(obj) HX_OBJ_WB_PESSIMISTIC_CTX(obj,_hx_ctx) +#define HX_OBJ_WB_GET(obj,value) HX_OBJ_WB_CTX(obj,value,HX_CTX_GET) +#define HX_OBJ_WB_PESSIMISTIC_GET(obj) HX_OBJ_WB_PESSIMISTIC_CTX(obj,HX_CTX_GET) + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES extern unsigned int gPrevMarkIdMask; + +// Called only once it is determined that a new mark is required +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void MarkAllocUnchecked(void *inPtr ,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void MarkObjectAllocUnchecked(hx::Object *inPtr ,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void NewMarkedObject(hx::Object *inPtr); + +inline void MarkAlloc(void *inPtr ,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + #ifdef EMSCRIPTEN + // Unaligned must be constants... + if ( !( ((size_t)inPtr) & 3) ) + #endif + // This will also skip const regions + if ( !(((unsigned int *)inPtr)[-1] & gPrevMarkIdMask) ) + MarkAllocUnchecked(inPtr,__inCtx); +} +inline void MarkObjectAlloc(hx::Object *inPtr ,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + #ifdef EMSCRIPTEN + // Unaligned must be constants... + if ( !( ((size_t)inPtr) & 3) ) + #endif + // This will also skip const regions + if ( !(((unsigned int *)inPtr)[-1] & gPrevMarkIdMask) ) + MarkObjectAllocUnchecked(inPtr,__inCtx); +} + + +} // end namespace hx + + + + +// It was theoretically possible to redefine the MarkContext arg type (or skip it) +// incase the particular GC scheme did not need it. This may take a bit of extra +// work to get going again + +#define HX_MARK_ARG __inCtx +//#define HX_MARK_ADD_ARG ,__inCtx +#define HX_MARK_PARAMS hx::MarkContext *__inCtx +//#define HX_MARK_ADD_PARAMS ,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx + +#ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS +#define HX_VISIT_ARG __inCtx +#define HX_VISIT_PARAMS hx::VisitContext *__inCtx +#else +#define HX_VISIT_ARG +#define HX_VISIT_PARAMS +#endif + + + + + +// These macros add debug to the mark/visit calls if required +// They also perform some inline checking to avoid function calls if possible + + +#ifdef HXCPP_DEBUG + +#define HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(x,name) { hx::MarkSetMember(name, __inCtx); hx::MarkMember(x, __inCtx ); } +#define HX_MARK_BEGIN_CLASS(x) hx::MarkPushClass(#x, __inCtx ); +#define HX_MARK_END_CLASS() hx::MarkPopClass(__inCtx ); +#define HX_MARK_MEMBER(x) { hx::MarkSetMember(0, __inCtx); hx::MarkMember(x, __inCtx ); } +#define HX_MARK_MEMBER_ARRAY(x,len) { hx::MarkSetMember(0, __inCtx); hx::MarkMemberArray(x, len, __inCtx ); } + +#else + +#define HX_MARK_MEMBER_NAME(x,name) hx::MarkMember(x, __inCtx ) +#define HX_MARK_BEGIN_CLASS(x) +#define HX_MARK_END_CLASS() +#define HX_MARK_MEMBER(x) hx::MarkMember(x, __inCtx ) +#define HX_MARK_MEMBER_ARRAY(x,len) hx::MarkMemberArray(x, len, __inCtx ) + +#endif + +#define HX_MARK_OBJECT(ioPtr) if (ioPtr) hx::MarkObjectAlloc(ioPtr, __inCtx ); + + + + +#define HX_MARK_STRING(ioPtr) \ + if (ioPtr) hx::MarkAlloc((void *)ioPtr, __inCtx ); + +#define HX_MARK_ARRAY(ioPtr) { if (ioPtr) hx::MarkAlloc((void *)ioPtr, __inCtx ); } + + + + +#define HX_VISIT_MEMBER_NAME(x,name) hx::VisitMember(x, __inCtx ) +#define HX_VISIT_MEMBER(x) hx::VisitMember(x, __inCtx ) + +#define HX_VISIT_OBJECT(ioPtr) \ + { if (ioPtr && !(((unsigned char *)ioPtr)[HX_GC_CONST_ALLOC_MARK_OFFSET] & HX_GC_CONST_ALLOC_MARK_BIT) ) __inCtx->visitObject( (hx::Object **)&ioPtr); } + +#define HX_VISIT_STRING(ioPtr) \ + if (ioPtr && !(((unsigned char *)ioPtr)[HX_GC_CONST_ALLOC_MARK_OFFSET] & HX_GC_CONST_ALLOC_MARK_BIT) ) __inCtx->visitAlloc((void **)&ioPtr); + +#define HX_VISIT_ARRAY(ioPtr) { if (ioPtr) __inCtx->visitAlloc((void **)&ioPtr); } + + + + + + + +#endif + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/GcTypeInference.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/GcTypeInference.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b1f186ee --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/GcTypeInference.h @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +#ifndef HX_GC_TYPE_INFERENCE_H +#define HX_GC_TYPE_INFERENCE_H + + +// These templates allow you to call MarkMember(x) or VisitMember(x) and the +// compiler will direct the call to the correct function + +namespace hx +{ + + +template inline void MarkMember(T &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { } + +template inline void MarkMember(hx::ObjectPtr &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + HX_MARK_OBJECT(outT.mPtr); +} +template<> inline void MarkMember(Dynamic &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + HX_MARK_OBJECT(outT.mPtr); +} +template inline void MarkMember(Array &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + HX_MARK_OBJECT(outT.mPtr); +} +template<> inline void MarkMember(hx::Object *&outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + HX_MARK_OBJECT(outT); +} +template<> inline void MarkMember(cpp::Variant &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + outT.mark(__inCtx); +} +template inline void MarkMember(hx::Native &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + if (outT.ptr) + { + hx::Object *ptr = outT.ptr->__GetRealObject(); + HX_MARK_OBJECT(ptr); + } +} + +template<> inline void MarkMember(int &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { } +template<> inline void MarkMember(bool &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { } +template<> inline void MarkMember(double &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { } +template<> inline void MarkMember(float &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { } +template<> inline void MarkMember(String &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + HX_MARK_STRING(outT.raw_ptr()); +} +template<> inline void MarkMember(null &outT,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { } + + + + +template inline void MarkMemberArray(T *,int, hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + //*(int *)0=0; +} +template<> inline void MarkMemberArray(String *ioStrings,int inLen,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + hx::MarkStringArray(ioStrings,inLen,__inCtx); +} +template inline void MarkMemberArray(hx::ObjectPtr *inObjects, int inLen, hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + hx::MarkObjectArray( (hx::Object **)inObjects ,inLen,__inCtx); +} +template<> inline void MarkMemberArray(Dynamic *outT,int inLen, hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + hx::MarkObjectArray( (hx::Object **)outT ,inLen,__inCtx); +} +template<> inline void MarkMemberArray(hx::Object **outT,int inLen, hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + hx::MarkObjectArray( outT ,inLen,__inCtx); +} +template inline void MarkMemberArray(Array *outT,int inLen,hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) +{ + hx::MarkObjectArray( (hx::Object **)outT ,inLen,__inCtx); +} + + + +// Locate potential GC pointer inside member +inline const void *PointerOf( ::Dynamic &d) { return d.mPtr; } +inline const void *PointerOf( ::String &s) { return s.raw_ptr(); } +template inline const void *PointerOf( ::Array &a) { return a.mPtr; } +template inline const void *PointerOf( ::hx::ObjectPtr &o) { return o.mPtr; } +template inline const void *PointerOf( ::hx::Native &o) +{ + if (o.ptr) + return o.ptr->__GetRealObject(); + return 0; +} + +inline const void *PointerOf(...) { return 0; } + + +#ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS +template inline void VisitMember(T &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { } + +template inline void VisitMember(hx::ObjectPtr &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) +{ + HX_VISIT_OBJECT(outT.mPtr); +} +template<> inline void VisitMember(Dynamic &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) +{ + HX_VISIT_OBJECT(outT.mPtr); +} +template<> inline void VisitMember(hx::Object *&outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) +{ + HX_VISIT_OBJECT(outT); +} +template inline void VisitMember(Array &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) +{ + HX_VISIT_OBJECT(outT.mPtr); +} +template<> inline void VisitMember(cpp::Variant &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) +{ + outT.visit(__inCtx); +} +template inline void VisitMember(hx::Native &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) +{ + if (outT.ptr) + { + hx::Object *ptr0 = outT.ptr->__GetRealObject(); + if (ptr0) + { + hx::Object *ptr1 = ptr0; + HX_VISIT_OBJECT(ptr1); + size_t delta = ( (char *)ptr1 - (char *)ptr0 ); + if (delta) + outT.ptr = (T)( (char *)outT.ptr + delta ); + } + } +} + + +template<> inline void VisitMember(int &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { } +template<> inline void VisitMember(bool &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { } +template<> inline void VisitMember(double &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { } +template<> inline void VisitMember(float &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { } +template<> inline void VisitMember(String &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) +{ + HX_VISIT_STRING(outT.raw_ref()); +} +template<> inline void VisitMember(null &outT,hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { } +#endif + + + +// Template used to register and initialise the statics in the one call. +// Do nothing... +template inline T &Static(T &t) { return t; } + + +} // end namespace hx + + + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/GenMacro.hx b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/GenMacro.hx new file mode 100644 index 00000000..17e21f0e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/GenMacro.hx @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/* + This file is used to generate Macros.h and DynamicImpl.h. + To change the number of "fast" args, you will also need to change numbers in the tpl files. + Usage: haxe -x GenMacro.hx +*/ + +import haxe.Template; +#if haxe3 +import sys.io.File; +import sys.io.FileOutput; +#else +import neko.io.File; +import neko.io.FileOutput; +#end + +class GenMacro +{ + static var warning = + "// ## ## ## ## #### ## ## ## ## ## #### ##\n" + + "// ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ### ## ## ### ## ## ##\n" + + "// ## ## ## ###### ###### ###### ## ###### ## ### ##\n" + + "// ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ### ## ## ### ## ## \n" + + "// ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## #### ##\n\n" + + "// DO NOT EDIT\n// This file is generated from the .tpl file\n"; + + public function new() + { + var context = { }; + var params = new Array(); + var arr_list = new Array(); + var arg_list = new Array(); + var dynamic_arg_list = new Array(); + var dynamic_in_args = new Array(); + var dynamic_var_args = new Array(); + var dynamic_adds = new Array(); + + for(arg in 0...27) + { + if (arg>0) + { + arr_list.push( "inArgs[" + (arg-1) + "]"); + arg_list.push( "inArg" + (arg-1)); + dynamic_arg_list.push("const Dynamic &inArg" + (arg-1) ); + dynamic_adds.push( "->init(" + (arg-1) + ",inArg" + (arg-1) + ")" ); + } + + params.push( { + ARG : arg, + ARR_LIST : arr_list.join(","), + DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST : dynamic_arg_list.join(","), + ARG_LIST : arg_list.join(","), + DYNAMIC_ADDS : dynamic_adds.join("") + } ); + } + + var locals = new Array(); + var jumboLocals = new Array(); + var marks = new Array(); + var visits = new Array(); + var type_vars = new Array(); + var type_args = new Array(); + var construct_args = new Array(); + var construct_vars = new Array(); + for(arg in 1...62) + { + var vid = arg-1; + if (vid>=0) + { + marks.push( "HX_MARK_MEMBER(v" + vid +");" ); + visits.push( "HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v" + vid +");" ); + type_args.push( "t" + vid +",v" + vid ); + type_vars.push( "t" + vid +" v" + vid ); + construct_args.push( "t" + vid +" __" + vid ); + construct_vars.push( "v" + vid +"(__" + vid + ")" ); + } + + var local = { + ARG : arg, + MARKS : marks.join(" "), + VISITS : visits.join(" "), + TYPE_VARS : type_vars.join(","), + TYPE_ARGS : type_args.join(","), + TYPE_DECL : type_vars.join(";"), + CONSTRUCT_VARS : construct_vars.join(","), + CONSTRUCT_ARGS : construct_args.join(",") + }; + if (arg<20) + locals.push(local); + else + jumboLocals.push(local); + } + + Reflect.setField(context, "PARAMS", params); + Reflect.setField(context, "LOCALS", locals); + Reflect.setField(context, "NS", "::"); + Reflect.setField(context, "hxNS", " ::hx::"); + + var fixed = File.getContent("MacrosFixed.h"); + fixed = fixed.split(" ").join(""); + var fileContents:String = File.getContent("Macros.tpl"); + fileContents = fileContents.split(" ").join(""); + + var template:Template = new Template(fileContents); + var result:String = template.execute(context); + var fileOutput:FileOutput = File.write("Macros.h", true); + fileOutput.writeString(warning); + fileOutput.writeString(fixed); + fileOutput.writeString(result); + fileOutput.close(); + + var fileContents:String = File.getContent("MacrosJumbo.tpl"); + fileContents = fileContents.split(" ").join(""); + var template:Template = new Template(fileContents); + Reflect.setField(context, "LOCALS", jumboLocals); + var result:String = template.execute(context); + var fileOutput:FileOutput = File.write("MacrosJumbo.h", true); + fileOutput.writeString(warning); + fileOutput.writeString(result); + fileOutput.close(); + + + + var fileContents:String = File.getContent("DynamicImpl.tpl"); + fileContents = fileContents.split(" ").join(""); + var template:Template = new Template(fileContents); + var result:String = template.execute(context); + var fileOutput:FileOutput = File.write("DynamicImpl.h", true); + fileOutput.writeString(warning); + fileOutput.writeString(result); + fileOutput.close(); + + } + + public static function main() { new GenMacro(); } +} diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/HeaderVersion.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/HeaderVersion.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..81a24698 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/HeaderVersion.h @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +#ifndef HXCPP_HEADER_VERSION +#define HXCPP_HEADER_VERSION 330 +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/HxcppMain.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/HxcppMain.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ad09f308 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/HxcppMain.h @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +#ifdef HXCPP_DLL_IMPORT + + extern "C" EXPORT_EXTRA void __main__() + { + __boot_all(); + __hxcpp_main(); + } + +#elif defined(HX_ANDROID) && !defined(HXCPP_EXE_LINK) + + // Java Main.... + #include + #include + #include + + extern "C" EXPORT_EXTRA void hxcpp_main() + { + HX_TOP_OF_STACK + try + { + hx::Boot(); + __boot_all(); + __hxcpp_main(); + } + catch (Dynamic e) + { + __hx_dump_stack(); + __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_ERROR, "Exception", "%s", e==null() ? "null" : e->toString().__CStr()); + } + hx::SetTopOfStack((int *)0,true); + } + + extern "C" EXPORT_EXTRA JNIEXPORT void JNICALL Java_org_haxe_HXCPP_main(JNIEnv * env) + { + hxcpp_main(); + } + +#elif defined(HX_WINRT) && defined(__cplusplus_winrt) + + #include + [ Platform::MTAThread ] + int main(Platform::Array^) + { + HX_TOP_OF_STACK + RoInitialize(RO_INIT_MULTITHREADED); + hx::Boot(); + try + { + __boot_all(); + __hxcpp_main(); + } + catch (Dynamic e) + { + __hx_dump_stack(); + return -1; + } + return 0; + } + +#else + + #if defined(HX_WIN_MAIN) && !defined(_WINDOWS_) + #ifndef HINSTANCE + #define HINSTANCE void* + #endif + #ifndef LPSTR + #define LPSTR char* + #endif + extern "C" int __stdcall MessageBoxA(void *,const char *,const char *,int); + #endif + + + #if defined(TIZEN) + extern "C" EXPORT_EXTRA int OspMain (int argc, char* pArgv[]) + { + #elif defined(HX_WIN_MAIN) + int __stdcall WinMain(HINSTANCE hInstance, HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, LPSTR lpCmdLine, int nCmdShow) + { + #else + + extern int _hxcpp_argc; + extern char **_hxcpp_argv; + int main(int argc,char **argv) + { + _hxcpp_argc = argc; + _hxcpp_argv = argv; + #endif + HX_TOP_OF_STACK + hx::Boot(); + try + { + __boot_all(); + __hxcpp_main(); + } + catch (Dynamic e) + { + __hx_dump_stack(); + #ifdef HX_WIN_MAIN + MessageBoxA(0, e==null() ? "null" : e->toString().__CStr(), "Error", 0); + #else + printf("Error : %s\n",e==null() ? "null" : e->toString().__CStr()); + #endif + return -1; + } + return 0; + } + #if 0 + } + } + #endif + +#endif + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/IndexRef.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/IndexRef.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9e9a183c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/IndexRef.h @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +#ifndef HX_INDEX_REF_H +#define HX_INDEX_REF_H + +namespace hx +{ + +} + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Interface.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Interface.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..12078d08 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Interface.h @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +#ifndef HX_INTERFACE_H +#define HX_INTERFACE_H + +namespace hx +{ + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void InvalidInterface(); + +template +inline T interface_cast(void *ptr) +{ + #if defined(HXCPP_GC_CHECK_POINTER) || defined(HXCPP_DEBUG) + if (!ptr) hx::InvalidInterface(); + #endif + return static_cast(ptr); +} + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) +template +inline T interface_check(T inObj,int interfaceId) +{ + Dynamic d(inObj); + if ( !d.mPtr || !d->_hx_getInterface(interfaceId)) + hx::BadCast(); + return inObj; +} +#endif + + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL < 330) +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Interface : public hx::Object +{ +public: + // The following functions make use of : hx::Object *__GetRealObject(); + + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx); + hx::Object *__ToInterface(const hx::type_info &); + int __GetType() const; + void *__GetHandle() const; + hx::FieldRef __FieldRef(const ::String &); + ::String __ToString() const; + int __ToInt() const; + double __ToDouble() const; + const char * __CStr() const; + ::String toString(); + bool __HasField(const ::String &); + hx::Val __Field(const ::String &, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + Dynamic __IField(int); + hx::Val __SetField(const ::String &,const hx::Val &, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + void __SetThis(Dynamic); + void __GetFields(Array< ::String> &); + hx::Class __GetClass() const; + int __Compare(const hx::Object *) const; + + /* No need for enum options - not in interfaces */ + /* No need for array options - not in interfaces */ + /* No need for function options - not in interfaces */ +}; +#endif + +} + + +#endif + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/LessThanEq.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/LessThanEq.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..397ecc33 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/LessThanEq.h @@ -0,0 +1,475 @@ +#ifndef HX_LESS_THAN_EQ_INCLUDED +#define HX_LESS_THAN_EQ_INCLUDED + +namespace hx +{ + +enum { + CompareAsInt, + CompareAsInt64, + CompareAsDouble, + CompareAsString, + CompareAsDynamic, +}; + + +template +struct CompareTraits +{ + enum { type = (int)CompareAsDynamic }; + + inline static int toInt(Dynamic inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static double toDouble(Dynamic inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static cpp::Int64 toInt64(Dynamic inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static String toString(Dynamic inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static hx::Object *toObject(Dynamic inValue) { return inValue.mPtr; } + inline static int getDynamicCompareType(const Dynamic &inValue) + { + if (!inValue.mPtr) + return CompareAsDynamic; + switch(inValue->__GetType()) + { + case vtInt: case vtBool: return CompareAsInt; + case vtInt64: return CompareAsInt64; + case vtFloat: return CompareAsDouble; + case vtString: return CompareAsString; + default: return CompareAsDynamic; + } + } + inline static bool isNull(const Dynamic &inValue) { return !inValue.mPtr; } +}; + + + +template <> +struct CompareTraits +{ + enum { type = (int)CompareAsDynamic }; + + inline static int toInt(const null &inValue) { return 0; } + inline static double toDouble(const null & inValue) { return 0; } + inline static cpp::Int64 toInt64(const null & inValue) { return 0; } + inline static String toString(const null & inValue) { return String(); } + inline static hx::Object *toObject(const null & inValue) { return 0; } + + inline static int getDynamicCompareType(const null &) { return type; } + inline static bool isNull(const null &) { return true; } +}; + + + +template <> +struct CompareTraits +{ + enum { type = (int)CompareAsInt }; + + inline static int toInt(int inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static double toDouble(int inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static cpp::Int64 toInt64(int inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static String toString(int inValue) { return String(); } + inline static hx::Object *toObject(int inValue) { return 0; } + + inline static int getDynamicCompareType(int) { return type; } + inline static bool isNull(int) { return false; } +}; + +template <> +struct CompareTraits +{ + enum { type = (int)CompareAsInt }; + + // Return value is unsigned ... + inline static unsigned int toInt(unsigned int inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static double toDouble(unsigned int inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static cpp::Int64 toInt64(unsigned int inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static String toString(unsigned int inValue) { return String(); } + inline static hx::Object *toObject(unsigned int inValue) { return 0; } + + inline static int getDynamicCompareType(int) { return type; } + inline static bool isNull(int) { return false; } +}; + +template <> struct CompareTraits : public CompareTraits { }; +template <> struct CompareTraits : public CompareTraits { }; +template <> struct CompareTraits : public CompareTraits { }; +template <> struct CompareTraits : public CompareTraits { }; +template <> struct CompareTraits : public CompareTraits { }; +template <> struct CompareTraits : public CompareTraits { }; +#if __cplusplus >= 201103L || defined(KINC_MICROSOFT) +template <> struct CompareTraits : public CompareTraits { }; +#endif + + +template <> +struct CompareTraits +{ + enum { type = (int)CompareAsDouble }; + + inline static int toInt(double inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static double toDouble(double inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static cpp::Int64 toInt64(double inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static String toString(double inValue) { return String(); } + inline static hx::Object *toObject(double inValue) { return 0; } + + inline static int getDynamicCompareType(const double &) { return type; } + inline static bool isNull(const double &) { return false; } +}; +template <> struct CompareTraits : public CompareTraits { }; + + + +template <> +struct CompareTraits +{ + enum { type = (int)CompareAsInt64 }; + + inline static int toInt(cpp::Int64 inValue) { return (int)inValue; } + inline static double toDouble(cpp::Int64 inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static cpp::Int64 toInt64(cpp::Int64 inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static String toString(cpp::Int64 inValue) { return String(); } + inline static hx::Object *toObject(cpp::Int64 inValue) { return 0; } + + inline static int getDynamicCompareType(cpp::Int64) { return type; } + inline static bool isNull(cpp::Int64) { return false; } +}; + +template <> +struct CompareTraits +{ + enum { type = (int)CompareAsInt64 }; + + inline static int toInt(cpp::UInt64 inValue) { return (int)inValue; } + inline static double toDouble(cpp::UInt64 inValue) { return inValue; } + // Return value is unsigned ... + inline static cpp::UInt64 toInt64(cpp::UInt64 inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static String toString(cpp::UInt64 inValue) { return String(); } + inline static hx::Object *toObject(cpp::UInt64 inValue) { return 0; } + + inline static int getDynamicCompareType(cpp::UInt64) { return type; } + inline static bool isNull(cpp::UInt64) { return false; } +}; + + +template <> +struct CompareTraits< String > +{ + enum { type = (int)CompareAsString }; + + inline static int toInt(const String &) { return 0; } + inline static double toDouble(const String &) { return 0; } + inline static cpp::Int64 toInt64(const String &) { return 0; } + inline static String toString(const String &inValue ) { return inValue; } + inline static hx::Object *toObject(const String &inValue) { return Dynamic(inValue).mPtr; } + + inline static int getDynamicCompareType(const String &) { return type; } + inline static bool isNull(const String &inValue) { return !inValue.raw_ptr(); } +}; + + +template <> +struct CompareTraits< cpp::Variant > +{ + enum { type = (int)CompareAsDynamic }; + + // Might ne a + inline static int toInt(const cpp::Variant &inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static double toDouble(const cpp::Variant &inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static cpp::Int64 toInt64(const cpp::Variant &inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static String toString(const cpp::Variant &inValue ) { return inValue; } + inline static hx::Object *toObject(const cpp::Variant &inValue) { + if (inValue.type==cpp::Variant::typeObject) + return inValue.valObject; + return 0; + } + + inline static int getDynamicCompareType(const cpp::Variant &inValue) + { + switch(inValue.type) + { + case cpp::Variant::typeInt: case cpp::Variant::typeBool: return CompareAsInt; + case cpp::Variant::typeInt64: return CompareAsInt64; + case cpp::Variant::typeDouble: return CompareAsDouble; + case cpp::Variant::typeString: return CompareAsString; + + case cpp::Variant::typeObject: + { + if (!inValue.valObject) + return CompareAsDynamic; + switch(inValue.valObject->__GetType()) + { + case vtInt: case vtBool: return CompareAsInt; + case vtInt64: return CompareAsInt64; + case vtFloat: return CompareAsDouble; + case vtString: return CompareAsString; + default: return CompareAsDynamic; + } + } + default: + return CompareAsDynamic; + } + } + inline static bool isNull(const cpp::Variant &inValue) { return inValue.isNull(); } +}; + + + +template +struct CompareTraits< cpp::Pointer > +{ + enum { type = (int)CompareAsDynamic }; + + inline static int toInt(Dynamic inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static double toDouble(Dynamic inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static cpp::Int64 toInt64(Dynamic inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static String toString(Dynamic inValue) { return inValue; } + inline static hx::Object *toObject(Dynamic inValue) { return inValue.mPtr; } + inline static int getDynamicCompareType(const Dynamic &inValue) + { + return CompareAsDynamic; + } + inline static bool isNull(const cpp::Pointer &inValue) { return !inValue.ptr; } +}; + + +template +struct CompareTraits< T * > +{ + enum { type = (int)CompareAsInt64 }; + + inline static int toInt(T * inValue) { return 0; } + inline static double toDouble(T * inValue) { return 0; } + inline static cpp::Int64 toInt64(T * inValue) { return (cpp::Int64)inValue; } + inline static String toString(T * inValue) { return String(); } + inline static hx::Object *toObject(T * inValue) { return 0; } + inline static int getDynamicCompareType(T * inValue) + { + return CompareAsInt64; + } + inline static bool isNull(T *inValue) { return !inValue; } +}; + + +template +hx::Object *GetExistingObject(const T1 &v1) +{ + typedef CompareTraits traits1; + return traits1::toObject(v1); +} + + +template +bool IsNull(const T1 &v1) +{ + typedef CompareTraits traits1; + return traits1::isNull(v1); +} + +template +bool IsNotNull(const T1 &v1) +{ + typedef CompareTraits traits1; + return !traits1::isNull(v1); +} + +template +inline bool TestLessEq(const T1 &v1, const T2 &v2) +{ + typedef CompareTraits traits1; + typedef CompareTraits traits2; + + if (traits1::type==(int)CompareAsInt && traits2::type==(int)CompareAsInt) + { + return LESS ? ( EQ ? traits1::toInt(v1) <= traits2::toInt(v2) : + traits1::toInt(v1) < traits2::toInt(v2) ) : + ( EQ ? traits1::toInt(v1) == traits2::toInt(v2) : + traits1::toInt(v1) != traits2::toInt(v2) ); + } + else if (traits1::type<=(int)CompareAsInt64 && traits2::type<=(int)CompareAsInt64) + { + return LESS ? ( EQ ? traits1::toInt64(v1) <= traits2::toInt64(v2) : + traits1::toInt64(v1) < traits2::toInt64(v2) ) : + ( EQ ? traits1::toInt64(v1) == traits2::toInt64(v2) : + traits1::toInt64(v1) != traits2::toInt64(v2) ); + } + else if (traits1::type<=(int)CompareAsDouble && traits2::type<=(int)CompareAsDouble) + { + return LESS ? ( EQ ? traits1::toDouble(v1) <= traits2::toDouble(v2) : + traits1::toDouble(v1) < traits2::toDouble(v2) ) : + ( EQ ? traits1::toDouble(v1) == traits2::toDouble(v2) : + traits1::toDouble(v1) != traits2::toDouble(v2) ); + } + else if (traits1::type==(int)CompareAsString && traits2::type==(int)CompareAsString) + { + return LESS ? ( EQ ? traits1::toString(v1) <= traits2::toString(v2) : + traits1::toString(v1) < traits2::toString(v2) ) : + ( EQ ? traits1::toString(v1) == traits2::toString(v2) : + traits1::toString(v1) != traits2::toString(v2) ); + } + else if (traits1::type<=(int)CompareAsString && traits2::type<=(int)CompareAsString) + { + // String with a number... + return false; + } + else if (traits1::type==(int)CompareAsString || traits2::type==(int)CompareAsString) + { + // String with a object... + return LESS ? ( EQ ? traits1::toString(v1) <= traits2::toString(v2) : + traits1::toString(v1) < traits2::toString(v2) ) : + ( EQ ? traits1::toString(v1) == traits2::toString(v2) : + traits1::toString(v1) != traits2::toString(v2) ); + } + else if (traits1::type<=(int)CompareAsDouble || traits2::type<=(int)CompareAsDouble) + { + // numeric with a object... + + // null can only be equal to null... + bool n1 = traits1::isNull(v1); + bool n2 = traits2::isNull(v2); + if (n1 || n2) + return EQ ? n1==n2 : !LESS && n1!=n2/* false,false = not equal*/; + + return LESS ? ( EQ ? traits1::toDouble(v1) <= traits2::toDouble(v2) : + traits1::toDouble(v1) < traits2::toDouble(v2) ) : + ( EQ ? traits1::toDouble(v1) == traits2::toDouble(v2) : + traits1::toDouble(v1) != traits2::toDouble(v2) ); + } + else + { + // Dynamic compare. + // This time, one or both types are calculated at run time + + // Check null/not null compare + bool n1 = traits1::isNull(v1); + bool n2 = traits2::isNull(v2); + if (n1 || n2) + return EQ ? n1==n2 : !LESS && n1!=n2 /* false,false = not equal*/; + + int t1 = traits1::getDynamicCompareType(v1); + int t2 = traits2::getDynamicCompareType(v2); + + if (t1==(int)CompareAsInt && t2==(int)CompareAsInt) + { + return LESS ? ( EQ ? traits1::toInt(v1) <= traits2::toInt(v2) : + traits1::toInt(v1) < traits2::toInt(v2) ) : + ( EQ ? traits1::toInt(v1) == traits2::toInt(v2) : + traits1::toInt(v1) != traits2::toInt(v2) ); + } + else if (t1<=(int)CompareAsInt64 && t2<=(int)CompareAsInt64) + { + return LESS ? ( EQ ? traits1::toInt64(v1) <= traits2::toInt64(v2) : + traits1::toInt64(v1) < traits2::toInt64(v2) ) : + ( EQ ? traits1::toInt64(v1) == traits2::toInt64(v2) : + traits1::toInt64(v1) != traits2::toInt64(v2) ); + } + else if (t1<=(int)CompareAsDouble && t2<=(int)CompareAsDouble) + { + return LESS ? ( EQ ? traits1::toDouble(v1) <= traits2::toDouble(v2) : + traits1::toDouble(v1) < traits2::toDouble(v2) ) : + ( EQ ? traits1::toDouble(v1) == traits2::toDouble(v2) : + traits1::toDouble(v1) != traits2::toDouble(v2) ); + } + else if (t1==(int)CompareAsString && t2==(int)CompareAsString) + { + return LESS ? ( EQ ? traits1::toString(v1) <= traits2::toString(v2) : + traits1::toString(v1) < traits2::toString(v2) ) : + ( EQ ? traits1::toString(v1) == traits2::toString(v2) : + traits1::toString(v1) != traits2::toString(v2) ); + } + else if (t1<=(int)CompareAsString && t2<=(int)CompareAsString) + { + // String with a number... + return false; + } + else if (t1==(int)CompareAsString || t2==(int)CompareAsString) + { + // String with a object... + return LESS ? ( EQ ? traits1::toString(v1) <= traits2::toString(v2) : + traits1::toString(v1) < traits2::toString(v2) ) : + ( EQ ? traits1::toString(v1) == traits2::toString(v2) : + traits1::toString(v1) != traits2::toString(v2) ); + } + else if (t1<=(int)CompareAsDouble || t2<=(int)CompareAsDouble) + { + // numeric with a object only works for not-equal + return !LESS && !EQ; + } + else + { + // Object with Object + hx::Object *o1 = traits1::toObject(v1); + hx::Object *o2 = traits2::toObject(v2); + + int diff = o1->__Compare(o2); + return LESS ? ( EQ ? diff <= 0 : + diff < 0 ) : + ( EQ ? diff == 0 : + diff != 0 ); + } + } +} + + +template +bool IsEq(const T1 &v1, const T2 &v2) { return TestLessEq(v1,v2); } + +template +bool IsNotEq(const T1 &v1, const T2 &v2) { return TestLessEq(v1,v2); } + +template +bool IsLess(const T1 &v1, const T2 &v2) { return TestLessEq(v1,v2); } + +template +bool IsLessEq(const T1 &v1, const T2 &v2) { return TestLessEq(v1,v2); } + + +template +bool IsGreater(const T1 &v1, const T2 &v2) { return TestLessEq(v2,v1); } + +template +bool IsGreaterEq(const T1 &v1, const T2 &v2) { return TestLessEq(v2,v1); } + + + +template +bool IsPointerEq(const T1 &v1, const T2 &v2) +{ + return GetExistingObject(v1) == GetExistingObject(v2); +} + +template +bool IsPointerNotEq(const T1 &v1, const T2 &v2) +{ + return GetExistingObject(v1) != GetExistingObject(v2); +} + + +template +bool IsInstanceEq(const T1 &v1, const T2 &v2) +{ + hx::Object *p1 = GetExistingObject(v1); + hx::Object *p2 = GetExistingObject(v2); + if (p1==p2) + return true; + if (!p1 || !p2) + return false; + return !p1->__Compare(p2); +} + +template +bool IsInstanceNotEq(const T1 &v1, const T2 &v2) +{ + hx::Object *p1 = GetExistingObject(v1); + hx::Object *p2 = GetExistingObject(v2); + if (p1==p2) + return false; + if (!p1 || !p2) + return true; + return p1->__Compare(p2); +} + + + +} + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Macros.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Macros.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..612b1804 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Macros.h @@ -0,0 +1,1138 @@ +// ## ## ## ## #### ## ## ## ## ## #### ## +// ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ### ## ## ### ## ## ## +// ## ## ## ###### ###### ###### ## ###### ## ### ## +// ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ### ## ## ### ## ## +// ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## #### ## + +// DO NOT EDIT +// This file is generated from the .tpl file +#ifndef MACROS_FIXED_H +#define MACROS_FIXED_H + +// ---- Forward Declare --------------- + + +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS0(klass) \ + class klass##_obj; \ + typedef ::hx::ObjectPtr klass; +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS1(ns1,klass) namespace ns1 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS0(klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS2(ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns2 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS1(ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS3(ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns3 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS2(ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS4(ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns4 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS3(ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS5(ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns5 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS4(ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS6(ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns6 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS5(ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS7(ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns7 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS6(ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS8(ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns8 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS7(ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS9(ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns9 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS8(ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS10(ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns10 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS9(ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS11(ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns11 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS10(ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS12(ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns12 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS11(ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS13(ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns13 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS12(ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS14(ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns14 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS13(ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS15(ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns15 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS14(ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS16(ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns16 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS15(ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS17(ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns17 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS16(ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS18(ns18,ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns18 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS17(ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS19(ns19,ns18,ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns19 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS18(ns18,ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS20(ns20,ns19,ns18,ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns20 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS19(ns19,ns18,ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } + +// ---- Enum ---------------------- + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) + +#define HX_DEFINE_CREATE_ENUM(enum_obj) \ +static ::Dynamic Create##enum_obj(::String inName,::hx::DynamicArray inArgs) \ +{ \ + int count = enum_obj::__FindArgCount(inName); \ + int args = inArgs.GetPtr() ? inArgs.__length() : 0; \ + if (args!=count) __hxcpp_dbg_checkedThrow(HX_INVALID_ENUM_ARG_COUNT(#enum_obj, inName, count, args)); \ + ::Dynamic result; \ + if (!enum_obj::__GetStatic(inName,result,::hx::paccDynamic)) __hxcpp_dbg_checkedThrow(HX_INVALID_ENUM_CONSTRUCTOR(#enum_obj, inName)); \ + if (args==0) return result; \ + return result->__Run(inArgs); \ +} + + +#else + +#define HX_DEFINE_CREATE_ENUM(enum_obj) \ +static ::Dynamic Create##enum_obj(::String inName,::hx::DynamicArray inArgs) \ +{ \ + int idx = enum_obj::__FindIndex(inName); \ + if (idx<0) __hxcpp_dbg_checkedThrow(HX_INVALID_ENUM_CONSTRUCTOR(#enum_obj, inName)); \ + int count = enum_obj::__FindArgCount(inName); \ + int args = inArgs.GetPtr() ? inArgs.__length() : 0; \ + if (args!=count) __hxcpp_dbg_checkedThrow(HX_INVALID_ENUM_ARG_COUNT(#enum_obj, inName, count, args)); \ + ::Dynamic result =(new enum_obj())->__Field(inName,HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); \ + if (args==0 || !result.mPtr) return result; \ + return result->__Run(inArgs); \ +} + +#endif + + +// ---- Fields ---------------------- + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL<331) + #define HX_DO_RTTI_BASE \ + bool __Is(::hx::Object *inObj) const { return dynamic_cast(inObj)!=0; } +#else + #define HX_DO_RTTI_BASE +#endif + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>331) + #define HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF bool _hx_isInstanceOf(int inClassId) { return inClassId==1 || inClassId==(int)_hx_ClassId; } +#else + #define HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF +#endif + + +#define HX_DO_RTTI_ALL \ + HX_DO_RTTI_BASE \ + static ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj> __mClass; \ + ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj > __GetClass() const { return __mClass; } \ + inline static ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj> &__SGetClass() { return __mClass; } \ + inline operator super *() { return this; } + +#define HX_DO_RTTI \ + HX_DO_RTTI_ALL \ + ::hx::Val __Field(const ::String &inString, ::hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); \ + ::hx::Val __SetField(const ::String &inString,const ::hx::Val &inValue, ::hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); \ + void __GetFields(Array< ::String> &outFields); + +#define HX_DO_INTERFACE_RTTI \ + static ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj> __mClass; \ + static ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj> &__SGetClass() { return __mClass; } \ + static void __register(); + +#define HX_DO_ENUM_RTTI_INTERNAL \ + HX_DO_RTTI_BASE \ + ::hx::Val __Field(const ::String &inString, ::hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); \ + static int __FindIndex(::String inName); \ + static int __FindArgCount(::String inName); + +#define HX_DO_ENUM_RTTI \ + HX_DO_ENUM_RTTI_INTERNAL \ + static ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj> __mClass; \ + ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj > __GetClass() const { return __mClass; } \ + static ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj> &__SGetClass() { return __mClass; } + + +#define HX_DECLARE_IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC ::Dynamic __mDynamicFields; \ + ::Dynamic *__GetFieldMap() { return &__mDynamicFields; } \ + bool __HasField(const String &inString) \ + { return ::hx::FieldMapHas(&__mDynamicFields,inString) || super::__HasField(inString); } + + +#define HX_INIT_IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC + +#define HX_MARK_DYNAMIC HX_MARK_MEMBER(__mDynamicFields) + + +#ifdef HX_VISIT_ALLOCS + +#define HX_VISIT_DYNAMIC HX_VISIT_MEMBER(__mDynamicFields); + +#else + +#define HX_VISIT_DYNAMIC do { } while (0); + +#endif + +#define HX_CHECK_DYNAMIC_GET_FIELD(inName) \ + { ::Dynamic d; if (::hx::FieldMapGet(&__mDynamicFields,inName,d)) return d; } + +#define HX_CHECK_DYNAMIC_GET_INT_FIELD(inID) \ + { ::Dynamic d; if (::hx::FieldMapGet(&__mDynamicFields,inID,d)) return d; } + +#ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL +#define HX_DYNAMIC_SET_FIELD(inName,inValue) ::hx::FieldMapSet(this,&__mDynamicFields,inName,inValue) +#else +#define HX_DYNAMIC_SET_FIELD(inName,inValue) ::hx::FieldMapSet(&__mDynamicFields,inName,inValue) +#endif + +#define HX_APPEND_DYNAMIC_FIELDS(outFields) ::hx::FieldMapAppendFields(&__mDynamicFields,outFields) + + + + + + +// ---- Main --------------- + + +namespace hx { +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void SetTopOfStack(int *inTopOfStack,bool); +} +#define HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + int t0 = 99; \ + ::hx::SetTopOfStack(&t0,false); + + +#ifdef __GNUC__ + #define EXPORT_EXTRA __attribute__ ((visibility("default"))) +#else + #define EXPORT_EXTRA __declspec(dllexport) +#endif + +#ifdef HX_DECLARE_MAIN + +#ifdef HXCPP_DLL_IMPORT + +#define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ + extern "C" { \ + EXPORT_EXTRA void __main__() { \ + __boot_all(); + +#define HX_END_MAIN \ +} \ +} + + +#elif defined(HX_ANDROID) + #ifdef HXCPP_EXE_LINK + #define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ + \ + int main(int argc,char **argv){ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + try{ \ + __boot_all(); + + #define HX_END_MAIN \ + } \ + catch ( ::Dynamic e){ \ + __hx_dump_stack(); \ + printf("Error : %s\n",e->toString().__CStr()); \ + return -1; \ + } \ + return 0; \ + } + + #else + // Java Main.... + #include + #include + #include + + #define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ + extern "C" EXPORT_EXTRA void hxcpp_main() { \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + try { \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + __boot_all(); + + + #define HX_END_MAIN \ + } catch ( ::Dynamic e) { \ + __hx_dump_stack(); \ + __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_ERROR, "Exception", "%s", e->toString().__CStr()); \ + }\ + ::hx::SetTopOfStack((int *)0,true); \ + } \ + \ + extern "C" EXPORT_EXTRA JNIEXPORT void JNICALL Java_org_haxe_HXCPP_main(JNIEnv * env) \ + { hxcpp_main(); } + #endif + +#elif defined(HX_WINRT) + +#include + +#define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ +[ Platform::MTAThread ] \ +int main(Platform::Array^) \ +{ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + RoInitialize(RO_INIT_MULTITHREADED); \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + try{ \ + __boot_all(); + +#define HX_END_MAIN \ + } \ + catch ( ::Dynamic e){ \ + __hx_dump_stack(); \ + return -1; \ + } \ + return 0; \ +} + +#elif defined(HX_WIN_MAIN) + + +#ifdef HAVE_WINDOWS_H + +#define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ +int __stdcall WinMain( HINSTANCE hInstance, HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, LPSTR lpCmdLine, int nCmdShow) \ +{ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + try{ \ + __boot_all(); + +#else + +#define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ +extern "C" int __stdcall MessageBoxA(void *,const char *,const char *,int); \ +\ +int __stdcall WinMain( void * hInstance, void * hPrevInstance, const char *lpCmdLine, int nCmdShow) \ +{ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + try{ \ + __boot_all(); + +#endif + +#define HX_END_MAIN \ + } \ + catch ( ::Dynamic e){ \ + __hx_dump_stack(); \ + MessageBoxA(0, e->toString().__CStr(), "Error", 0); \ + return -1; \ + } \ + return 0; \ +} + + +#elif defined(TIZEN) + + +#define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ +\ +extern "C" EXPORT_EXTRA int OspMain (int argc, char* pArgv[]){ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + try{ \ + __boot_all(); + +#define HX_END_MAIN \ + } \ + catch ( ::Dynamic e){ \ + __hx_dump_stack(); \ + printf("Error : %s\n",e->toString().__CStr()); \ + return -1; \ + } \ + return 0; \ +} + + +#else +// Console Main ... + +#define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ +\ +int main(int argc,char **argv){ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + try{ \ + __boot_all(); + +#define HX_END_MAIN \ + } \ + catch ( ::Dynamic e){ \ + __hx_dump_stack(); \ + printf("Error : %s\n",e->toString().__CStr()); \ + return -1; \ + } \ + return 0; \ +} + +#endif + +#endif // HX_DECLARE_MAIN + +// Run as library +#define HX_BEGIN_LIB_MAIN \ +extern "C" {\ +\ +void __hxcpp_lib_main() \ +{ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + __boot_all(); + +#define HX_END_LIB_MAIN \ +} } + + + +#endif + + +#ifndef HX_MACROS_H +#define HX_MACROS_H + +// --- Functions and their parameters ---- + + +#define HX_ARR_LIST0 +#define HX_ARR_LIST1 inArgs[0] +#define HX_ARR_LIST2 inArgs[0],inArgs[1] +#define HX_ARR_LIST3 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2] +#define HX_ARR_LIST4 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3] +#define HX_ARR_LIST5 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4] +#define HX_ARR_LIST6 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5] +#define HX_ARR_LIST7 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6] +#define HX_ARR_LIST8 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7] +#define HX_ARR_LIST9 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8] +#define HX_ARR_LIST10 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9] +#define HX_ARR_LIST11 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10] +#define HX_ARR_LIST12 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11] +#define HX_ARR_LIST13 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12] +#define HX_ARR_LIST14 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13] +#define HX_ARR_LIST15 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13],inArgs[14] +#define HX_ARR_LIST16 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13],inArgs[14],inArgs[15] +#define HX_ARR_LIST17 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13],inArgs[14],inArgs[15],inArgs[16] +#define HX_ARR_LIST18 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13],inArgs[14],inArgs[15],inArgs[16],inArgs[17] +#define HX_ARR_LIST19 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13],inArgs[14],inArgs[15],inArgs[16],inArgs[17],inArgs[18] +#define HX_ARR_LIST20 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13],inArgs[14],inArgs[15],inArgs[16],inArgs[17],inArgs[18],inArgs[19] +#define HX_ARR_LIST21 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13],inArgs[14],inArgs[15],inArgs[16],inArgs[17],inArgs[18],inArgs[19],inArgs[20] +#define HX_ARR_LIST22 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13],inArgs[14],inArgs[15],inArgs[16],inArgs[17],inArgs[18],inArgs[19],inArgs[20],inArgs[21] +#define HX_ARR_LIST23 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13],inArgs[14],inArgs[15],inArgs[16],inArgs[17],inArgs[18],inArgs[19],inArgs[20],inArgs[21],inArgs[22] +#define HX_ARR_LIST24 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13],inArgs[14],inArgs[15],inArgs[16],inArgs[17],inArgs[18],inArgs[19],inArgs[20],inArgs[21],inArgs[22],inArgs[23] +#define HX_ARR_LIST25 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13],inArgs[14],inArgs[15],inArgs[16],inArgs[17],inArgs[18],inArgs[19],inArgs[20],inArgs[21],inArgs[22],inArgs[23],inArgs[24] +#define HX_ARR_LIST26 inArgs[0],inArgs[1],inArgs[2],inArgs[3],inArgs[4],inArgs[5],inArgs[6],inArgs[7],inArgs[8],inArgs[9],inArgs[10],inArgs[11],inArgs[12],inArgs[13],inArgs[14],inArgs[15],inArgs[16],inArgs[17],inArgs[18],inArgs[19],inArgs[20],inArgs[21],inArgs[22],inArgs[23],inArgs[24],inArgs[25] + + +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST0 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST1 const Dynamic &inArg0 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST2 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST3 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST4 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST5 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST6 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST7 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST8 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST9 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST10 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST11 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST12 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST13 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST14 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST15 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST16 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST17 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST18 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST19 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST20 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST21 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST22 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST23 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST24 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST25 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23,const Dynamic &inArg24 +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST26 const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23,const Dynamic &inArg24,const Dynamic &inArg25 + + +#define HX_ARG_LIST0 +#define HX_ARG_LIST1 inArg0 +#define HX_ARG_LIST2 inArg0,inArg1 +#define HX_ARG_LIST3 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2 +#define HX_ARG_LIST4 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3 +#define HX_ARG_LIST5 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4 +#define HX_ARG_LIST6 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5 +#define HX_ARG_LIST7 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6 +#define HX_ARG_LIST8 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7 +#define HX_ARG_LIST9 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8 +#define HX_ARG_LIST10 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9 +#define HX_ARG_LIST11 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10 +#define HX_ARG_LIST12 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11 +#define HX_ARG_LIST13 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12 +#define HX_ARG_LIST14 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13 +#define HX_ARG_LIST15 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13,inArg14 +#define HX_ARG_LIST16 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13,inArg14,inArg15 +#define HX_ARG_LIST17 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13,inArg14,inArg15,inArg16 +#define HX_ARG_LIST18 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13,inArg14,inArg15,inArg16,inArg17 +#define HX_ARG_LIST19 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13,inArg14,inArg15,inArg16,inArg17,inArg18 +#define HX_ARG_LIST20 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13,inArg14,inArg15,inArg16,inArg17,inArg18,inArg19 +#define HX_ARG_LIST21 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13,inArg14,inArg15,inArg16,inArg17,inArg18,inArg19,inArg20 +#define HX_ARG_LIST22 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13,inArg14,inArg15,inArg16,inArg17,inArg18,inArg19,inArg20,inArg21 +#define HX_ARG_LIST23 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13,inArg14,inArg15,inArg16,inArg17,inArg18,inArg19,inArg20,inArg21,inArg22 +#define HX_ARG_LIST24 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13,inArg14,inArg15,inArg16,inArg17,inArg18,inArg19,inArg20,inArg21,inArg22,inArg23 +#define HX_ARG_LIST25 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13,inArg14,inArg15,inArg16,inArg17,inArg18,inArg19,inArg20,inArg21,inArg22,inArg23,inArg24 +#define HX_ARG_LIST26 inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4,inArg5,inArg6,inArg7,inArg8,inArg9,inArg10,inArg11,inArg12,inArg13,inArg14,inArg15,inArg16,inArg17,inArg18,inArg19,inArg20,inArg21,inArg22,inArg23,inArg24,inArg25 + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC0(class,func,ret) \ +static ::Dynamic __##class##func( ::hx::Object *inObj) \ +{ \ + ret reinterpret_cast(inObj)->func(); return ::Dynamic(); \ +}; \ + ::Dynamic class::func##_dyn() \ +{\ + return ::hx::CreateMemberFunction0(#func,this,__##class##func); \ +} + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,N,func,ret,array_list,dynamic_arg_list,arg_list) \ +static ::Dynamic __##class##func( ::hx::Object *inObj, dynamic_arg_list) \ +{ \ + ret reinterpret_cast(inObj)->func(arg_list); return ::Dynamic(); \ +}; \ + ::Dynamic class::func##_dyn() \ +{\ + return ::hx::CreateMemberFunction##N(#func,this,__##class##func); \ +} + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,N,func,ret,array_list,dynamic_arg_list,arg_list) \ +static ::Dynamic __##class##func( ::hx::Object *inObj, const Array< ::Dynamic> &inArgs) \ +{ \ + ret reinterpret_cast(inObj)->func(array_list); return ::Dynamic(); \ +}; \ + ::Dynamic class::func##_dyn() \ +{\ + return ::hx::CreateMemberFunctionVar(#func,this,__##class##func,N); \ +} + + +#define DELEGATE_0(ret,func) ret func() { return mDelegate->func(); } +#define CDELEGATE_0(ret,func) ret func() const { return mDelegate->func(); } +#define DELEGATE_1(ret,func,arg1) ret func(arg1 _a1) { return mDelegate->func(_a1); } +#define CDELEGATE_1(ret,func,arg1) ret func(arg1 _a1) const { return mDelegate->func(_a1); } +#define DELEGATE_2(ret,func,arg1,arg2) ret func(arg1 _a1,arg2 _a2) { return mDelegate->func(_a1,_a2); } + + + + + +#define HX_DECLARE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(func,dynamic_arg_list) \ + ::Dynamic func##_dyn(dynamic_arg_list); + +#define STATIC_HX_DECLARE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(func,dynamic_arg_list) \ + static ::Dynamic func##_dyn(dynamic_arg_list); + + + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC1(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,1,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST1,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST1,HX_ARG_LIST1) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC2(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,2,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST2,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST2,HX_ARG_LIST2) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC3(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,3,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST3,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST3,HX_ARG_LIST3) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC4(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,4,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST4,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST4,HX_ARG_LIST4) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC5(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,5,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST5,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST5,HX_ARG_LIST5) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC6(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,6,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST6,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST6,HX_ARG_LIST6) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC7(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,7,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST7,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST7,HX_ARG_LIST7) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC8(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,8,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST8,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST8,HX_ARG_LIST8) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC9(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,9,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST9,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST9,HX_ARG_LIST9) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC10(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,10,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST10,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST10,HX_ARG_LIST10) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC11(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,11,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST11,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST11,HX_ARG_LIST11) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC12(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,12,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST12,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST12,HX_ARG_LIST12) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC13(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,13,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST13,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST13,HX_ARG_LIST13) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC14(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,14,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST14,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST14,HX_ARG_LIST14) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC15(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,15,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST15,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST15,HX_ARG_LIST15) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC16(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,16,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST16,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST16,HX_ARG_LIST16) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC17(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,17,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST17,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST17,HX_ARG_LIST17) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC18(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,18,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST18,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST18,HX_ARG_LIST18) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC19(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,19,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST19,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST19,HX_ARG_LIST19) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC20(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,20,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST20,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST20,HX_ARG_LIST20) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC21(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,21,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST21,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST21,HX_ARG_LIST21) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC22(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,22,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST22,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST22,HX_ARG_LIST22) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC23(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,23,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST23,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST23,HX_ARG_LIST23) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC24(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,24,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST24,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST24,HX_ARG_LIST24) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC25(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,25,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST25,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST25,HX_ARG_LIST25) + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC26(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,26,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST26,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST26,HX_ARG_LIST26) + + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC0(class,func,ret) \ +static ::Dynamic __##class##func() \ +{ \ + ret class::func(); return ::Dynamic(); \ +}; \ + ::Dynamic class::func##_dyn() \ +{\ + return ::hx::CreateStaticFunction0(#func,__##class##func); \ +} + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,N,func,ret,array_list,dynamic_arg_list,arg_list) \ +static ::Dynamic __##class##func(dynamic_arg_list) \ +{ \ + ret class::func(arg_list); return ::Dynamic(); \ +}; \ + ::Dynamic class::func##_dyn() \ +{\ + return ::hx::CreateStaticFunction##N(#func,__##class##func); \ +} + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,N,func,ret,array_list,dynamic_arg_list,arg_list) \ +static ::Dynamic __##class##func(const Array< ::Dynamic> &inArgs) \ +{ \ + ret class::func(array_list); return ::Dynamic(); \ +}; \ + ::Dynamic class::func##_dyn() \ +{\ + return ::hx::CreateStaticFunctionVar(#func,__##class##func,N); \ +} + + + + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC1(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,1,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST1,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST1,HX_ARG_LIST1) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC2(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,2,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST2,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST2,HX_ARG_LIST2) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC3(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,3,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST3,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST3,HX_ARG_LIST3) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC4(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,4,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST4,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST4,HX_ARG_LIST4) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC5(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,5,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST5,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST5,HX_ARG_LIST5) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC6(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,6,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST6,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST6,HX_ARG_LIST6) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC7(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,7,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST7,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST7,HX_ARG_LIST7) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC8(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,8,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST8,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST8,HX_ARG_LIST8) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC9(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,9,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST9,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST9,HX_ARG_LIST9) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC10(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,10,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST10,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST10,HX_ARG_LIST10) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC11(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,11,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST11,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST11,HX_ARG_LIST11) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC12(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,12,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST12,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST12,HX_ARG_LIST12) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC13(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,13,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST13,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST13,HX_ARG_LIST13) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC14(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,14,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST14,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST14,HX_ARG_LIST14) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC15(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,15,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST15,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST15,HX_ARG_LIST15) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC16(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,16,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST16,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST16,HX_ARG_LIST16) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC17(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,17,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST17,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST17,HX_ARG_LIST17) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC18(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,18,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST18,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST18,HX_ARG_LIST18) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC19(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,19,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST19,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST19,HX_ARG_LIST19) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC20(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,20,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST20,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST20,HX_ARG_LIST20) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC21(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,21,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST21,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST21,HX_ARG_LIST21) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC22(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,22,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST22,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST22,HX_ARG_LIST22) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC23(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,23,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST23,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST23,HX_ARG_LIST23) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC24(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,24,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST24,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST24,HX_ARG_LIST24) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC25(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,25,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST25,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST25,HX_ARG_LIST25) + + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC26(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,26,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST26,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST26,HX_ARG_LIST26) + + + + +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,array_args,dyn_arg_list,arg_list) \ + ::Dynamic __Run(const Array< ::Dynamic> &inArgs) { ret func( array_args ); return null();} \ + ::Dynamic __run(dyn_arg_list) { ret func( arg_list ); return null();} + + +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL0(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST0,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST0,HX_ARG_LIST0) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL1(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST1,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST1,HX_ARG_LIST1) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL2(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST2,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST2,HX_ARG_LIST2) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL3(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST3,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST3,HX_ARG_LIST3) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL4(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST4,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST4,HX_ARG_LIST4) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL5(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST5,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST5,HX_ARG_LIST5) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL6(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST6,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST6,HX_ARG_LIST6) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL7(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST7,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST7,HX_ARG_LIST7) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL8(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST8,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST8,HX_ARG_LIST8) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL9(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST9,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST9,HX_ARG_LIST9) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL10(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST10,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST10,HX_ARG_LIST10) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL11(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST11,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST11,HX_ARG_LIST11) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL12(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST12,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST12,HX_ARG_LIST12) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL13(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST13,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST13,HX_ARG_LIST13) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL14(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST14,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST14,HX_ARG_LIST14) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL15(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST15,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST15,HX_ARG_LIST15) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL16(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST16,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST16,HX_ARG_LIST16) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL17(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST17,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST17,HX_ARG_LIST17) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL18(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST18,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST18,HX_ARG_LIST18) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL19(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST19,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST19,HX_ARG_LIST19) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL20(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST20,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST20,HX_ARG_LIST20) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL21(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST21,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST21,HX_ARG_LIST21) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL22(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST22,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST22,HX_ARG_LIST22) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL23(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST23,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST23,HX_ARG_LIST23) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL24(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST24,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST24,HX_ARG_LIST24) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL25(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST25,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST25,HX_ARG_LIST25) +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL26(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST26,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST26,HX_ARG_LIST26) + +#define HX_BEGIN_DEFAULT_FUNC(name,t0) \ + namespace { \ + struct name : public ::hx::Object { int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + ::hx::ObjectPtr __this; \ + name( ::hx::ObjectPtr __0 = null()) : __this(__0) {} \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER(__this); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER(__this); } + + +#define HX_END_DEFAULT_FUNC \ +} + +#define HXARGC(x) int __ArgCount() const { return x; } + +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S0(SUPER,name) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); } \ + name() {} + + +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S1(SUPER,name,t0,v0) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); } \ + name(t0 __0) : v0(__0) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S2(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1) : v0(__0),v1(__1) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S3(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S4(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S5(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S6(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S7(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S8(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S9(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S10(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S11(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S12(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S13(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S14(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S15(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S16(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S17(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S18(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S19(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hx::clsIdClosure }; \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18; \ + void __Mark( ::hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); } \ + void __Visit( ::hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18) {} + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=330) + #define HX_LOCAL_RUN _hx_run +#else + #define HX_LOCAL_RUN run +#endif + +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC0(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL0(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; + +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC1(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL1(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC2(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL2(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC3(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL3(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC4(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL4(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC5(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL5(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC6(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL6(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC7(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL7(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC8(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL8(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC9(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL9(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC10(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL10(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC11(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL11(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC12(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL12(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC13(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL13(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC14(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL14(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC15(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL15(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC16(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL16(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC17(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL17(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC18(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL18(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC19(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL19(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; + +// For compatibility until next version of haxe is released +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC0(name) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S0( ::hx::LocalFunc,name) + +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC1(name,t0,v0) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S1( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC2(name,t0,v0,t1,v1) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S2( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC3(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S3( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC4(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S4( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC5(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S5( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC6(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S6( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC7(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S7( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC8(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S8( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC9(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S9( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC10(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S10( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC11(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S11( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC12(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S12( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC13(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S13( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC14(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S14( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC15(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S15( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC16(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S16( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC17(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S17( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC18(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S18( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC19(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S19( ::hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18) + + +#define HX_DECLARE_DYNAMIC_FUNCTIONS \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23,const Dynamic &inArg24); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23,const Dynamic &inArg24,const Dynamic &inArg25); \ + + + +#define HX_DECLARE_VARIANT_FUNCTIONS \ + inline ::Dynamic operator()(); \ + inline ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0); \ + inline ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1); \ + inline ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2); \ + inline ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3); \ + inline ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23,const Dynamic &inArg24); \ + ::Dynamic operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4,const Dynamic &inArg5,const Dynamic &inArg6,const Dynamic &inArg7,const Dynamic &inArg8,const Dynamic &inArg9,const Dynamic &inArg10,const Dynamic &inArg11,const Dynamic &inArg12,const Dynamic &inArg13,const Dynamic &inArg14,const Dynamic &inArg15,const Dynamic &inArg16,const Dynamic &inArg17,const Dynamic &inArg18,const Dynamic &inArg19,const Dynamic &inArg20,const Dynamic &inArg21,const Dynamic &inArg22,const Dynamic &inArg23,const Dynamic &inArg24,const Dynamic &inArg25); \ + + + +#define HX_IMPLEMENT_INLINE_VARIANT_FUNCTIONS \ + ::Dynamic Variant::operator()() { CheckFPtr(); return valObject->__run(); } \ + ::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0) { CheckFPtr(); return valObject->__run(inArg0); } \ + ::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1) { CheckFPtr(); return valObject->__run(inArg0,inArg1); } \ + ::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2) { CheckFPtr(); return valObject->__run(inArg0,inArg1,inArg2); } \ + ::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3) { CheckFPtr(); return valObject->__run(inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3); } \ + ::Dynamic Variant::operator()(const Dynamic &inArg0,const Dynamic &inArg1,const Dynamic &inArg2,const Dynamic &inArg3,const Dynamic &inArg4) { CheckFPtr(); return valObject->__run(inArg0,inArg1,inArg2,inArg3,inArg4); } \ + + + +#endif + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Macros.tpl b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Macros.tpl new file mode 100644 index 00000000..63c3cafc --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Macros.tpl @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +#ifndef HX_MACROS_H +#define HX_MACROS_H + +// --- Functions and their parameters ---- + +::foreach PARAMS:: +#define HX_ARR_LIST::ARG:: ::ARR_LIST::::end:: + +::foreach PARAMS:: +#define HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::ARG:: ::DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::::end:: + +::foreach PARAMS:: +#define HX_ARG_LIST::ARG:: ::ARG_LIST::::end:: + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC0(class,func,ret) \ +static ::NS::Dynamic __##class##func(::hxNS::Object *inObj) \ +{ \ + ret reinterpret_cast(inObj)->func(); return ::NS::Dynamic(); \ +}; \ + ::NS::Dynamic class::func##_dyn() \ +{\ + return ::hxNS::CreateMemberFunction0(#func,this,__##class##func); \ +} + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,N,func,ret,array_list,dynamic_arg_list,arg_list) \ +static ::NS::Dynamic __##class##func(::hxNS::Object *inObj, dynamic_arg_list) \ +{ \ + ret reinterpret_cast(inObj)->func(arg_list); return ::NS::Dynamic(); \ +}; \ + ::NS::Dynamic class::func##_dyn() \ +{\ + return ::hxNS::CreateMemberFunction##N(#func,this,__##class##func); \ +} + + +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,N,func,ret,array_list,dynamic_arg_list,arg_list) \ +static ::NS::Dynamic __##class##func(::hxNS::Object *inObj, const Array< ::NS::Dynamic> &inArgs) \ +{ \ + ret reinterpret_cast(inObj)->func(array_list); return ::NS::Dynamic(); \ +}; \ + ::NS::Dynamic class::func##_dyn() \ +{\ + return ::hxNS::CreateMemberFunctionVar(#func,this,__##class##func,N); \ +} + + +#define DELEGATE_0(ret,func) ret func() { return mDelegate->func(); } +#define CDELEGATE_0(ret,func) ret func() const { return mDelegate->func(); } +#define DELEGATE_1(ret,func,arg1) ret func(arg1 _a1) { return mDelegate->func(_a1); } +#define CDELEGATE_1(ret,func,arg1) ret func(arg1 _a1) const { return mDelegate->func(_a1); } +#define DELEGATE_2(ret,func,arg1,arg2) ret func(arg1 _a1,arg2 _a2) { return mDelegate->func(_a1,_a2); } + + + + + +#define HX_DECLARE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(func,dynamic_arg_list) \ + ::NS::Dynamic func##_dyn(dynamic_arg_list); + +#define STATIC_HX_DECLARE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(func,dynamic_arg_list) \ + static ::NS::Dynamic func##_dyn(dynamic_arg_list); + + +::foreach PARAMS:: +::if (ARG>0)::::if (ARG<6):: +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC::ARG::(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,::ARG::,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST::ARG::,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::ARG::,HX_ARG_LIST::ARG::) +::else:: +#define HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC::ARG::(class,func,ret) \ + HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,::ARG::,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST::ARG::,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::ARG::,HX_ARG_LIST::ARG::) +::end:: +::end::::end:: + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC0(class,func,ret) \ +static ::NS::Dynamic __##class##func() \ +{ \ + ret class::func(); return ::NS::Dynamic(); \ +}; \ + ::NS::Dynamic class::func##_dyn() \ +{\ + return ::hxNS::CreateStaticFunction0(#func,__##class##func); \ +} + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,N,func,ret,array_list,dynamic_arg_list,arg_list) \ +static ::NS::Dynamic __##class##func(dynamic_arg_list) \ +{ \ + ret class::func(arg_list); return ::NS::Dynamic(); \ +}; \ + ::NS::Dynamic class::func##_dyn() \ +{\ + return ::hxNS::CreateStaticFunction##N(#func,__##class##func); \ +} + + +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,N,func,ret,array_list,dynamic_arg_list,arg_list) \ +static ::NS::Dynamic __##class##func(const Array< ::NS::Dynamic> &inArgs) \ +{ \ + ret class::func(array_list); return ::NS::Dynamic(); \ +}; \ + ::NS::Dynamic class::func##_dyn() \ +{\ + return ::hxNS::CreateStaticFunctionVar(#func,__##class##func,N); \ +} + + + +::foreach PARAMS:: +::if (ARG>0)::::if (ARG<6):: +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC::ARG::(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC(class,::ARG::,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST::ARG::,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::ARG::,HX_ARG_LIST::ARG::) +::else:: +#define STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC::ARG::(class,func,ret) \ + STATIC_HX_DEFINE_DYNAMIC_FUNC_EXTRA(class,::ARG::,func,ret,HX_ARR_LIST::ARG::,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::ARG::,HX_ARG_LIST::ARG::) +::end:: +::end::::end:: + + +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,array_args,dyn_arg_list,arg_list) \ + ::NS::Dynamic __Run(const Array< ::NS::Dynamic> &inArgs) { ret func( array_args ); return null();} \ + ::NS::Dynamic __run(dyn_arg_list) { ret func( arg_list ); return null();} + +::foreach PARAMS:: +#define HX_DYNAMIC_CALL::ARG::(ret,func) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL(ret,func,HX_ARR_LIST::ARG::,HX_DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::ARG::,HX_ARG_LIST::ARG::)::end:: + +#define HX_BEGIN_DEFAULT_FUNC(name,t0) \ + namespace { \ + struct name : public ::hxNS::Object { int __GetType() const { return vtFunction; } \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hxNS::clsIdClosure }; \ + ::hxNS::ObjectPtr __this; \ + name(::hxNS::ObjectPtr __0 = null()) : __this(__0) {} \ + void __Mark(::hxNS::MarkContext *__inCtx) { HX_MARK_MEMBER(__this); } \ + void __Visit(::hxNS::VisitContext *__inCtx) { HX_VISIT_MEMBER(__this); } + + +#define HX_END_DEFAULT_FUNC \ +} + +#define HXARGC(x) int __ArgCount() const { return x; } + +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S0(SUPER,name) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hxNS::clsIdClosure }; \ + void __Mark(::hxNS::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); } \ + void __Visit(::hxNS::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); } \ + name() {} + +::foreach LOCALS:: +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S::ARG::(SUPER,name,::TYPE_ARGS::) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = ::hxNS::clsIdClosure }; \ + ::TYPE_DECL::; \ + void __Mark(::hxNS::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); ::MARKS:: } \ + void __Visit(::hxNS::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); ::VISITS:: } \ + name(::CONSTRUCT_ARGS::) : ::CONSTRUCT_VARS:: {}::end:: + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=330) + #define HX_LOCAL_RUN _hx_run +#else + #define HX_LOCAL_RUN run +#endif + +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC0(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL0(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +::foreach LOCALS:: +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC::ARG::(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL::ARG::(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) };::end:: + +// For compatibility until next version of haxe is released +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC0(name) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S0(::hxNS::LocalFunc,name) +::foreach LOCALS:: +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC::ARG::(name,::TYPE_ARGS::) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S::ARG::(::hxNS::LocalFunc,name,::TYPE_ARGS::)::end:: + + +#define HX_DECLARE_DYNAMIC_FUNCTIONS \ +::foreach PARAMS:: ::if (ARG<6)::::else:: ::NS::Dynamic operator()(::DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::); \ +::end:: ::end:: + + +#define HX_DECLARE_VARIANT_FUNCTIONS \ +::foreach PARAMS:: ::if (ARG<6):: inline ::NS::Dynamic operator()(::DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::); \ +::else:: ::NS::Dynamic operator()(::DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::); \ +::end:: ::end:: + + +#define HX_IMPLEMENT_INLINE_VARIANT_FUNCTIONS \ +::foreach PARAMS:: ::if (ARG<6):: ::NS::Dynamic Variant::NS::operator()(::DYNAMIC_ARG_LIST::) { CheckFPtr(); return valObject->__run(::ARG_LIST::); } \ +::end:: ::end:: + + +#endif + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/MacrosFixed.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/MacrosFixed.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1ab0b797 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/MacrosFixed.h @@ -0,0 +1,355 @@ +#ifndef MACROS_FIXED_H +#define MACROS_FIXED_H + +// ---- Forward Declare --------------- + + +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS0(klass) \ + class klass##_obj; \ + typedef ::hx::ObjectPtr klass; +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS1(ns1,klass) namespace ns1 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS0(klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS2(ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns2 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS1(ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS3(ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns3 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS2(ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS4(ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns4 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS3(ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS5(ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns5 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS4(ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS6(ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns6 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS5(ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS7(ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns7 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS6(ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS8(ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns8 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS7(ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS9(ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns9 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS8(ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS10(ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns10 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS9(ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS11(ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns11 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS10(ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS12(ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns12 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS11(ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS13(ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns13 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS12(ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS14(ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns14 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS13(ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS15(ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns15 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS14(ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS16(ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns16 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS15(ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS17(ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns17 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS16(ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS18(ns18,ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns18 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS17(ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS19(ns19,ns18,ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns19 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS18(ns18,ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_CLASS20(ns20,ns19,ns18,ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns20 { HX_DECLARE_CLASS19(ns19,ns18,ns17,ns16,ns15,ns14,ns13,ns12,ns11,ns10,ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } + +// ---- Enum ---------------------- + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) + +#define HX_DEFINE_CREATE_ENUM(enum_obj) \ +static ::Dynamic Create##enum_obj(::String inName,::hx::DynamicArray inArgs) \ +{ \ + int count = enum_obj::__FindArgCount(inName); \ + int args = inArgs.GetPtr() ? inArgs.__length() : 0; \ + if (args!=count) __hxcpp_dbg_checkedThrow(HX_INVALID_ENUM_ARG_COUNT(#enum_obj, inName, count, args)); \ + ::Dynamic result; \ + if (!enum_obj::__GetStatic(inName,result,::hx::paccDynamic)) __hxcpp_dbg_checkedThrow(HX_INVALID_ENUM_CONSTRUCTOR(#enum_obj, inName)); \ + if (args==0) return result; \ + return result->__Run(inArgs); \ +} + + +#else + +#define HX_DEFINE_CREATE_ENUM(enum_obj) \ +static ::Dynamic Create##enum_obj(::String inName,::hx::DynamicArray inArgs) \ +{ \ + int idx = enum_obj::__FindIndex(inName); \ + if (idx<0) __hxcpp_dbg_checkedThrow(HX_INVALID_ENUM_CONSTRUCTOR(#enum_obj, inName)); \ + int count = enum_obj::__FindArgCount(inName); \ + int args = inArgs.GetPtr() ? inArgs.__length() : 0; \ + if (args!=count) __hxcpp_dbg_checkedThrow(HX_INVALID_ENUM_ARG_COUNT(#enum_obj, inName, count, args)); \ + ::Dynamic result =(new enum_obj())->__Field(inName,HX_PROP_DYNAMIC); \ + if (args==0 || !result.mPtr) return result; \ + return result->__Run(inArgs); \ +} + +#endif + + +// ---- Fields ---------------------- + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL<331) + #define HX_DO_RTTI_BASE \ + bool __Is(::hx::Object *inObj) const { return dynamic_cast(inObj)!=0; } +#else + #define HX_DO_RTTI_BASE +#endif + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>331) + #define HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF bool _hx_isInstanceOf(int inClassId) { return inClassId==1 || inClassId==(int)_hx_ClassId; } +#else + #define HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF +#endif + + +#define HX_DO_RTTI_ALL \ + HX_DO_RTTI_BASE \ + static ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj> __mClass; \ + ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj > __GetClass() const { return __mClass; } \ + inline static ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj> &__SGetClass() { return __mClass; } \ + inline operator super *() { return this; } + +#define HX_DO_RTTI \ + HX_DO_RTTI_ALL \ + ::hx::Val __Field(const ::String &inString, ::hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); \ + ::hx::Val __SetField(const ::String &inString,const ::hx::Val &inValue, ::hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); \ + void __GetFields(Array< ::String> &outFields); + +#define HX_DO_INTERFACE_RTTI \ + static ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj> __mClass; \ + static ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj> &__SGetClass() { return __mClass; } \ + static void __register(); + +#define HX_DO_ENUM_RTTI_INTERNAL \ + HX_DO_RTTI_BASE \ + ::hx::Val __Field(const ::String &inString, ::hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); \ + static int __FindIndex(::String inName); \ + static int __FindArgCount(::String inName); + +#define HX_DO_ENUM_RTTI \ + HX_DO_ENUM_RTTI_INTERNAL \ + static ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj> __mClass; \ + ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj > __GetClass() const { return __mClass; } \ + static ::hx::ObjectPtr< ::hx::Class_obj> &__SGetClass() { return __mClass; } + + +#define HX_DECLARE_IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC ::Dynamic __mDynamicFields; \ + ::Dynamic *__GetFieldMap() { return &__mDynamicFields; } \ + bool __HasField(const String &inString) \ + { return ::hx::FieldMapHas(&__mDynamicFields,inString) || super::__HasField(inString); } + + +#define HX_INIT_IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC + +#define HX_MARK_DYNAMIC HX_MARK_MEMBER(__mDynamicFields) + + +#ifdef HX_VISIT_ALLOCS + +#define HX_VISIT_DYNAMIC HX_VISIT_MEMBER(__mDynamicFields); + +#else + +#define HX_VISIT_DYNAMIC do { } while (0); + +#endif + +#define HX_CHECK_DYNAMIC_GET_FIELD(inName) \ + { ::Dynamic d; if (::hx::FieldMapGet(&__mDynamicFields,inName,d)) return d; } + +#define HX_CHECK_DYNAMIC_GET_INT_FIELD(inID) \ + { ::Dynamic d; if (::hx::FieldMapGet(&__mDynamicFields,inID,d)) return d; } + +#ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL +#define HX_DYNAMIC_SET_FIELD(inName,inValue) ::hx::FieldMapSet(this,&__mDynamicFields,inName,inValue) +#else +#define HX_DYNAMIC_SET_FIELD(inName,inValue) ::hx::FieldMapSet(&__mDynamicFields,inName,inValue) +#endif + +#define HX_APPEND_DYNAMIC_FIELDS(outFields) ::hx::FieldMapAppendFields(&__mDynamicFields,outFields) + + + + + + +// ---- Main --------------- + + +namespace hx { +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void SetTopOfStack(int *inTopOfStack,bool); +} +#define HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + int t0 = 99; \ + ::hx::SetTopOfStack(&t0,false); + + +#ifdef __GNUC__ + #define EXPORT_EXTRA __attribute__ ((visibility("default"))) +#else + #define EXPORT_EXTRA __declspec(dllexport) +#endif + +#ifdef HX_DECLARE_MAIN + +#ifdef HXCPP_DLL_IMPORT + +#define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ + extern "C" { \ + EXPORT_EXTRA void __main__() { \ + __boot_all(); + +#define HX_END_MAIN \ +} \ +} + + +#elif defined(HX_ANDROID) + #ifdef HXCPP_EXE_LINK + #define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ + \ + int main(int argc,char **argv){ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + try{ \ + __boot_all(); + + #define HX_END_MAIN \ + } \ + catch ( ::Dynamic e){ \ + __hx_dump_stack(); \ + printf("Error : %s\n",e->toString().__CStr()); \ + return -1; \ + } \ + return 0; \ + } + + #else + // Java Main.... + #include + #include + #include + + #define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ + extern "C" EXPORT_EXTRA void hxcpp_main() { \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + try { \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + __boot_all(); + + + #define HX_END_MAIN \ + } catch ( ::Dynamic e) { \ + __hx_dump_stack(); \ + __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_ERROR, "Exception", "%s", e->toString().__CStr()); \ + }\ + ::hx::SetTopOfStack((int *)0,true); \ + } \ + \ + extern "C" EXPORT_EXTRA JNIEXPORT void JNICALL Java_org_haxe_HXCPP_main(JNIEnv * env) \ + { hxcpp_main(); } + #endif + +#elif defined(HX_WINRT) + +#include + +#define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ +[ Platform::MTAThread ] \ +int main(Platform::Array^) \ +{ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + RoInitialize(RO_INIT_MULTITHREADED); \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + try{ \ + __boot_all(); + +#define HX_END_MAIN \ + } \ + catch ( ::Dynamic e){ \ + __hx_dump_stack(); \ + return -1; \ + } \ + return 0; \ +} + +#elif defined(HX_WIN_MAIN) + + +#ifdef HAVE_WINDOWS_H + +#define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ +int __stdcall WinMain( HINSTANCE hInstance, HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, LPSTR lpCmdLine, int nCmdShow) \ +{ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + try{ \ + __boot_all(); + +#else + +#define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ +extern "C" int __stdcall MessageBoxA(void *,const char *,const char *,int); \ +\ +int __stdcall WinMain( void * hInstance, void * hPrevInstance, const char *lpCmdLine, int nCmdShow) \ +{ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + try{ \ + __boot_all(); + +#endif + +#define HX_END_MAIN \ + } \ + catch ( ::Dynamic e){ \ + __hx_dump_stack(); \ + MessageBoxA(0, e->toString().__CStr(), "Error", 0); \ + return -1; \ + } \ + return 0; \ +} + + +#elif defined(TIZEN) + + +#define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ +\ +extern "C" EXPORT_EXTRA int OspMain (int argc, char* pArgv[]){ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + try{ \ + __boot_all(); + +#define HX_END_MAIN \ + } \ + catch ( ::Dynamic e){ \ + __hx_dump_stack(); \ + printf("Error : %s\n",e->toString().__CStr()); \ + return -1; \ + } \ + return 0; \ +} + + +#else +// Console Main ... + +#define HX_BEGIN_MAIN \ +\ +int main(int argc,char **argv){ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + try{ \ + __boot_all(); + +#define HX_END_MAIN \ + } \ + catch ( ::Dynamic e){ \ + __hx_dump_stack(); \ + printf("Error : %s\n",e->toString().__CStr()); \ + return -1; \ + } \ + return 0; \ +} + +#endif + +#endif // HX_DECLARE_MAIN + +// Run as library +#define HX_BEGIN_LIB_MAIN \ +extern "C" {\ +\ +void __hxcpp_lib_main() \ +{ \ + HX_TOP_OF_STACK \ + ::hx::Boot(); \ + __boot_all(); + +#define HX_END_LIB_MAIN \ +} } + + + +#endif + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/MacrosJumbo.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/MacrosJumbo.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5cb51034 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/MacrosJumbo.h @@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ +// ## ## ## ## #### ## ## ## ## ## #### ## +// ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ### ## ## ### ## ## ## +// ## ## ## ###### ###### ###### ## ###### ## ### ## +// ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ### ## ## ### ## ## +// ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## #### ## + +// DO NOT EDIT +// This file is generated from the .tpl file +#ifndef HX_MACROS_JUMBO_H +#define HX_MACROS_JUMBO_H + + +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S20(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S21(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S22(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S23(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S24(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S25(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S26(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S27(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S28(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S29(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S30(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S31(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S32(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S33(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S34(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S35(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S36(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S37(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S38(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S39(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S40(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S41(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S42(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S43(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S44(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S45(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S46(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S47(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S48(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S49(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S50(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48;t49 v49; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v49); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v49); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48,t49 __49) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48),v49(__49) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S51(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48;t49 v49;t50 v50; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v49); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v50); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v49); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v50); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48,t49 __49,t50 __50) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48),v49(__49),v50(__50) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S52(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48;t49 v49;t50 v50;t51 v51; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v49); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v50); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v51); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v49); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v50); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v51); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48,t49 __49,t50 __50,t51 __51) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48),v49(__49),v50(__50),v51(__51) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S53(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48;t49 v49;t50 v50;t51 v51;t52 v52; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v49); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v50); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v51); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v52); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v49); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v50); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v51); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v52); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48,t49 __49,t50 __50,t51 __51,t52 __52) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48),v49(__49),v50(__50),v51(__51),v52(__52) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S54(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48;t49 v49;t50 v50;t51 v51;t52 v52;t53 v53; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v49); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v50); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v51); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v52); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v53); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v49); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v50); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v51); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v52); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v53); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48,t49 __49,t50 __50,t51 __51,t52 __52,t53 __53) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48),v49(__49),v50(__50),v51(__51),v52(__52),v53(__53) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S55(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48;t49 v49;t50 v50;t51 v51;t52 v52;t53 v53;t54 v54; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v49); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v50); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v51); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v52); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v53); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v54); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v49); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v50); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v51); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v52); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v53); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v54); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48,t49 __49,t50 __50,t51 __51,t52 __52,t53 __53,t54 __54) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48),v49(__49),v50(__50),v51(__51),v52(__52),v53(__53),v54(__54) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S56(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48;t49 v49;t50 v50;t51 v51;t52 v52;t53 v53;t54 v54;t55 v55; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v49); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v50); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v51); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v52); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v53); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v54); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v55); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v49); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v50); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v51); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v52); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v53); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v54); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v55); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48,t49 __49,t50 __50,t51 __51,t52 __52,t53 __53,t54 __54,t55 __55) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48),v49(__49),v50(__50),v51(__51),v52(__52),v53(__53),v54(__54),v55(__55) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S57(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48;t49 v49;t50 v50;t51 v51;t52 v52;t53 v53;t54 v54;t55 v55;t56 v56; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v49); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v50); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v51); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v52); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v53); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v54); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v55); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v56); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v49); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v50); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v51); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v52); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v53); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v54); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v55); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v56); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48,t49 __49,t50 __50,t51 __51,t52 __52,t53 __53,t54 __54,t55 __55,t56 __56) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48),v49(__49),v50(__50),v51(__51),v52(__52),v53(__53),v54(__54),v55(__55),v56(__56) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S58(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56,t57,v57) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48;t49 v49;t50 v50;t51 v51;t52 v52;t53 v53;t54 v54;t55 v55;t56 v56;t57 v57; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v49); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v50); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v51); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v52); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v53); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v54); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v55); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v56); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v57); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v49); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v50); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v51); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v52); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v53); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v54); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v55); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v56); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v57); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48,t49 __49,t50 __50,t51 __51,t52 __52,t53 __53,t54 __54,t55 __55,t56 __56,t57 __57) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48),v49(__49),v50(__50),v51(__51),v52(__52),v53(__53),v54(__54),v55(__55),v56(__56),v57(__57) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S59(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56,t57,v57,t58,v58) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48;t49 v49;t50 v50;t51 v51;t52 v52;t53 v53;t54 v54;t55 v55;t56 v56;t57 v57;t58 v58; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v49); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v50); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v51); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v52); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v53); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v54); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v55); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v56); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v57); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v58); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v49); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v50); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v51); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v52); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v53); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v54); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v55); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v56); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v57); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v58); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48,t49 __49,t50 __50,t51 __51,t52 __52,t53 __53,t54 __54,t55 __55,t56 __56,t57 __57,t58 __58) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48),v49(__49),v50(__50),v51(__51),v52(__52),v53(__53),v54(__54),v55(__55),v56(__56),v57(__57),v58(__58) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S60(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56,t57,v57,t58,v58,t59,v59) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48;t49 v49;t50 v50;t51 v51;t52 v52;t53 v53;t54 v54;t55 v55;t56 v56;t57 v57;t58 v58;t59 v59; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v49); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v50); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v51); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v52); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v53); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v54); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v55); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v56); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v57); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v58); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v59); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v49); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v50); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v51); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v52); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v53); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v54); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v55); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v56); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v57); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v58); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v59); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48,t49 __49,t50 __50,t51 __51,t52 __52,t53 __53,t54 __54,t55 __55,t56 __56,t57 __57,t58 __58,t59 __59) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48),v49(__49),v50(__50),v51(__51),v52(__52),v53(__53),v54(__54),v55(__55),v56(__56),v57(__57),v58(__58),v59(__59) {} +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S61(SUPER,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56,t57,v57,t58,v58,t59,v59,t60,v60) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + t0 v0;t1 v1;t2 v2;t3 v3;t4 v4;t5 v5;t6 v6;t7 v7;t8 v8;t9 v9;t10 v10;t11 v11;t12 v12;t13 v13;t14 v14;t15 v15;t16 v16;t17 v17;t18 v18;t19 v19;t20 v20;t21 v21;t22 v22;t23 v23;t24 v24;t25 v25;t26 v26;t27 v27;t28 v28;t29 v29;t30 v30;t31 v31;t32 v32;t33 v33;t34 v34;t35 v35;t36 v36;t37 v37;t38 v38;t39 v39;t40 v40;t41 v41;t42 v42;t43 v43;t44 v44;t45 v45;t46 v46;t47 v47;t48 v48;t49 v49;t50 v50;t51 v51;t52 v52;t53 v53;t54 v54;t55 v55;t56 v56;t57 v57;t58 v58;t59 v59;t60 v60; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v0); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v1); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v2); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v3); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v4); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v5); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v6); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v7); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v8); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v9); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v10); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v11); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v12); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v13); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v14); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v15); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v16); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v17); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v18); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v19); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v20); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v21); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v22); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v23); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v24); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v25); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v26); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v27); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v28); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v29); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v30); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v31); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v32); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v33); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v34); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v35); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v36); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v37); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v38); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v39); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v40); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v41); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v42); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v43); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v44); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v45); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v46); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v47); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v48); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v49); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v50); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v51); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v52); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v53); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v54); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v55); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v56); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v57); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v58); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v59); HX_MARK_MEMBER(v60); } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v0); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v1); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v2); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v3); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v4); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v5); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v6); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v7); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v8); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v9); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v10); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v11); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v12); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v13); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v14); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v15); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v16); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v17); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v18); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v19); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v20); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v21); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v22); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v23); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v24); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v25); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v26); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v27); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v28); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v29); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v30); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v31); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v32); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v33); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v34); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v35); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v36); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v37); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v38); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v39); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v40); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v41); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v42); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v43); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v44); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v45); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v46); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v47); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v48); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v49); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v50); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v51); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v52); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v53); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v54); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v55); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v56); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v57); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v58); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v59); HX_VISIT_MEMBER(v60); } \ + name(t0 __0,t1 __1,t2 __2,t3 __3,t4 __4,t5 __5,t6 __6,t7 __7,t8 __8,t9 __9,t10 __10,t11 __11,t12 __12,t13 __13,t14 __14,t15 __15,t16 __16,t17 __17,t18 __18,t19 __19,t20 __20,t21 __21,t22 __22,t23 __23,t24 __24,t25 __25,t26 __26,t27 __27,t28 __28,t29 __29,t30 __30,t31 __31,t32 __32,t33 __33,t34 __34,t35 __35,t36 __36,t37 __37,t38 __38,t39 __39,t40 __40,t41 __41,t42 __42,t43 __43,t44 __44,t45 __45,t46 __46,t47 __47,t48 __48,t49 __49,t50 __50,t51 __51,t52 __52,t53 __53,t54 __54,t55 __55,t56 __56,t57 __57,t58 __58,t59 __59,t60 __60) : v0(__0),v1(__1),v2(__2),v3(__3),v4(__4),v5(__5),v6(__6),v7(__7),v8(__8),v9(__9),v10(__10),v11(__11),v12(__12),v13(__13),v14(__14),v15(__15),v16(__16),v17(__17),v18(__18),v19(__19),v20(__20),v21(__21),v22(__22),v23(__23),v24(__24),v25(__25),v26(__26),v27(__27),v28(__28),v29(__29),v30(__30),v31(__31),v32(__32),v33(__33),v34(__34),v35(__35),v36(__36),v37(__37),v38(__38),v39(__39),v40(__40),v41(__41),v42(__42),v43(__43),v44(__44),v45(__45),v46(__46),v47(__47),v48(__48),v49(__49),v50(__50),v51(__51),v52(__52),v53(__53),v54(__54),v55(__55),v56(__56),v57(__57),v58(__58),v59(__59),v60(__60) {} + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=330) + #define HX_LOCAL_RUN _hx_run +#else + #define HX_LOCAL_RUN run +#endif + + +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC20(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL20(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC21(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL21(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC22(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL22(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC23(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL23(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC24(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL24(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC25(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL25(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC26(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL26(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC27(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL27(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC28(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL28(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC29(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL29(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC30(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL30(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC31(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL31(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC32(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL32(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC33(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL33(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC34(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL34(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC35(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL35(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC36(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL36(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC37(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL37(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC38(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL38(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC39(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL39(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC40(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL40(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC41(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL41(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC42(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL42(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC43(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL43(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC44(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL44(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC45(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL45(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC46(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL46(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC47(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL47(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC48(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL48(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC49(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL49(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC50(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL50(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC51(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL51(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC52(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL52(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC53(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL53(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC54(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL54(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC55(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL55(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC56(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL56(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC57(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL57(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC58(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL58(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC59(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL59(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC60(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL60(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC61(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL61(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) }; + +// For compatibility until next version of haxe is released + +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC20(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S20(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC21(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S21(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC22(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S22(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC23(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S23(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC24(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S24(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC25(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S25(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC26(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S26(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC27(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S27(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC28(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S28(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC29(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S29(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC30(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S30(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC31(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S31(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC32(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S32(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC33(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S33(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC34(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S34(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC35(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S35(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC36(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S36(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC37(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S37(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC38(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S38(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC39(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S39(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC40(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S40(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC41(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S41(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC42(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S42(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC43(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S43(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC44(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S44(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC45(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S45(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC46(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S46(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC47(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S47(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC48(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S48(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC49(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S49(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC50(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S50(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC51(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S51(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC52(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S52(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC53(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S53(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC54(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S54(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC55(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S55(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC56(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S56(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC57(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S57(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC58(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56,t57,v57) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S58(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56,t57,v57) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC59(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56,t57,v57,t58,v58) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S59(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56,t57,v57,t58,v58) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC60(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56,t57,v57,t58,v58,t59,v59) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S60(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56,t57,v57,t58,v58,t59,v59) +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC61(name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56,t57,v57,t58,v58,t59,v59,t60,v60) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S61(hx::LocalFunc,name,t0,v0,t1,v1,t2,v2,t3,v3,t4,v4,t5,v5,t6,v6,t7,v7,t8,v8,t9,v9,t10,v10,t11,v11,t12,v12,t13,v13,t14,v14,t15,v15,t16,v16,t17,v17,t18,v18,t19,v19,t20,v20,t21,v21,t22,v22,t23,v23,t24,v24,t25,v25,t26,v26,t27,v27,t28,v28,t29,v29,t30,v30,t31,v31,t32,v32,t33,v33,t34,v34,t35,v35,t36,v36,t37,v37,t38,v38,t39,v39,t40,v40,t41,v41,t42,v42,t43,v43,t44,v44,t45,v45,t46,v46,t47,v47,t48,v48,t49,v49,t50,v50,t51,v51,t52,v52,t53,v53,t54,v54,t55,v55,t56,v56,t57,v57,t58,v58,t59,v59,t60,v60) + + +#endif + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/MacrosJumbo.tpl b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/MacrosJumbo.tpl new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1156c8cd --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/MacrosJumbo.tpl @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +#ifndef HX_MACROS_JUMBO_H +#define HX_MACROS_JUMBO_H + +::foreach LOCALS:: +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S::ARG::(SUPER,name,::TYPE_ARGS::) \ + struct name : public SUPER { \ + ::TYPE_DECL::; \ + void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { DoMarkThis(__inCtx); ::MARKS:: } \ + void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { DoVisitThis(__inCtx); ::VISITS:: } \ + name(::CONSTRUCT_ARGS::) : ::CONSTRUCT_VARS:: {}::end:: + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=330) + #define HX_LOCAL_RUN _hx_run +#else + #define HX_LOCAL_RUN run +#endif + +::foreach LOCALS:: +#define HX_END_LOCAL_FUNC::ARG::(ret) HX_DYNAMIC_CALL::ARG::(ret, HX_LOCAL_RUN ) };::end:: + +// For compatibility until next version of haxe is released +::foreach LOCALS:: +#define HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC::ARG::(name,::TYPE_ARGS::) \ + HX_BEGIN_LOCAL_FUNC_S::ARG::(hx::LocalFunc,name,::TYPE_ARGS::)::end:: + + +#endif + + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Memory.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Memory.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dbb5d3df --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Memory.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +#ifdef HX_MEMORY_H_OVERRIDE +// Users can define their own header to use here, but there is no API +// compatibility gaurantee for future changes. +#include HX_MEMORY_H_OVERRIDE + +// Todo - special version? +inline void HxFreeGCBlock(void *p) { + HxFree(p); +} + +#else + +#ifndef HX_MEMORY_H +#define HX_MEMORY_H + +#include + +inline void *HxAlloc(size_t size) { + return malloc(size); +} + +inline void HxFree(void *p) { + free(p); +} + +void *HxAllocGCBlock(size_t size); +void HxFreeGCBlock(void *p); + + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Native.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Native.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b686f485 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Native.h @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +#ifndef HX_NATIVE_INCLUDED_H +#define HX_NATIVE_INCLUDED_H +/* + * + This file is in the public domain, and can be freely distributed. + +*/ + +#include + +#ifndef HXCPP_H +#define HXCPP_H +typedef double Float; +typedef void Void; + +//typedef int Int; +//typedef bool Bool; + +#ifndef HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +#define HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +#endif + +#endif + + + +#define HX_DECLARE_NATIVE0(klass) \ + class klass; +#define HX_DECLARE_NATIVE1(ns1,klass) namespace ns1 { HX_DECLARE_NATIVE0(klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_NATIVE2(ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns2 { HX_DECLARE_NATIVE1(ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_NATIVE3(ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns3 { HX_DECLARE_NATIVE2(ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_NATIVE4(ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns4 { HX_DECLARE_NATIVE3(ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_NATIVE5(ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns5 { HX_DECLARE_NATIVE4(ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_NATIVE6(ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns6 { HX_DECLARE_NATIVE5(ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_NATIVE7(ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns7 { HX_DECLARE_NATIVE6(ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_NATIVE8(ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns8 { HX_DECLARE_NATIVE7(ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } +#define HX_DECLARE_NATIVE9(ns9,ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) namespace ns9 { HX_DECLARE_NATIVE8(ns8,ns7,ns6,ns5,ns4,ns3,ns2,ns1,klass) } + + + + + +namespace hx +{ + class Object; + + class HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES NativeInterface + { + public: + virtual hx::Object *__GetRealObject() = 0; + void _hx_addRef(); + void _hx_decRef(); + }; + + template + class Native + { + public: + T ptr; + + Native () : ptr(0) { } + Native (T inPtr) : ptr(inPtr) { } + Native (const Native &inNative) : ptr(inNative.ptr) { } + #ifdef CPP_VARIANT_ONCE_H + Native (const cpp::Variant &inVariant) { + hx::Object *obj = inVariant.asObject(); + ptr = obj ? (T)inVariant.valObject->__GetHandle() : 0; + } + #endif + + inline Native &operator=(T inPtr) { ptr=inPtr; return *this; } + inline Native &operator=(const Native &inNative) { ptr=inNative.ptr; return *this; } + #ifdef HX_NULL_H + inline Native &operator=(const ::null &) { ptr=0; return *this; } + #endif + inline T operator->() const { return ptr; } + + inline operator T() const { return ptr; } + + template + inline bool operator==(const Native &inOther) const + { return ptr == inOther.ptr; } + template + inline bool operator!=(const Native &inOther) const + { return ptr != inOther.ptr; } + + }; + + HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES const char *Init(); + HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void PushTopOfStack(void *); + HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void PopTopOfStack(); + HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void GcAddOffsetRoot(void *inRoot, int inOffset); + HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void GcSetOffsetRoot(void *inRoot, int inOffset); + HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void GcRemoveOffsetRoot(void *inRoot); + HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int GcGetThreadAttachedCount(); + + class HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES NativeAttach + { + bool isAttached; + public: + NativeAttach(bool inAttach=true) + { + isAttached = false; + if (inAttach) + attach(); + } + ~NativeAttach() + { + detach(); + } + void attach() + { + if (!isAttached) + { + isAttached = true; + hx::PushTopOfStack(this); + } + } + void detach() + { + if (isAttached) + { + isAttached = false; + hx::PopTopOfStack(); + } + } + }; + + template + class Ref + { + public: + T ptr; + + Ref() : ptr(0) { } + Ref(const T &inT) : ptr(0) { setPtr(inT); } + template + inline Ref(const Native &inNative) : ptr(0) { setPtr(inNative.ptr); } + template + inline Ref(const Ref &inRef) : ptr(0) { setPtr(inRef.ptr); } + + ~Ref() { setPtr(0); } + void setPtr(T inPtr) + { + hx::Object *old = ptr ? ptr->__GetRealObject() : 0; + int oldOffset = old ? (int)(size_t)((char *)inPtr - (char *)old) : 0; + hx::Object *next = inPtr ? inPtr->__GetRealObject() : 0; + int nextOffset = next ? (int)(size_t)((char *)inPtr - (char *)next) : 0; + + ptr = inPtr; + if (next) + { + if (!old) + GcAddOffsetRoot(&ptr, nextOffset); + else if (oldOffset!=nextOffset) + GcSetOffsetRoot(&ptr, nextOffset); + } + else if (old) + GcRemoveOffsetRoot(&ptr); + } + + inline Ref &operator=(const T &inPtr) { setPtr(inPtr); return *this; } + template + inline Ref &operator=(const Native &inNative) { setPtr(inNative.ptr); return *this; } + template + inline Ref &operator=(const Ref &inRef) { setPtr(inRef.ptr); return *this; } + + template + inline bool operator==(const Ref &inOther) const + { return ptr == inOther.ptr; } + template + inline bool operator!=(const Ref &inOther) const + { return ptr != inOther.ptr; } + + T operator->() { return ptr; } + }; + + #define HX_NATIVE_IMPLEMENTATION hx::Object *__GetRealObject() { return this; } + #define HX_EXTERN_NATIVE_IMPLEMENTATION hx::Object *__GetRealObject() { return 0; } +} + +#endif + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/NekoFunc.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/NekoFunc.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..382a5899 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/NekoFunc.h @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +#ifndef HX_NEKO_FUNC_H +#define HX_NEKO_FUNC_H + +#define NEKO_VERSION 180 + +typedef intptr_t int_val; + +typedef enum { + VAL_INT = 0xFF, + VAL_NULL = 0, + VAL_FLOAT = 1, + VAL_BOOL = 2, + VAL_STRING = 3, + VAL_OBJECT = 4, + VAL_ARRAY = 5, + VAL_FUNCTION = 6, + VAL_ABSTRACT = 7, + VAL_PRIMITIVE = 6 | 8, + VAL_JITFUN = 6 | 16, + VAL_32_BITS = 0xFFFFFFFF +} neko_val_type; + +struct _neko_value { + neko_val_type t; +}; + +struct _neko_objtable; +struct _neko_buffer; + +#ifndef HAVE_NEKO_TYPES +typedef struct _neko_vkind *neko_vkind; +typedef struct _neko_value *neko_value; +typedef struct _neko_buffer *neko_buffer; +#endif + +typedef struct _neko_objtable* neko_objtable; +typedef double tfloat; + +typedef void (*finalizer)(neko_value v); + +#pragma pack(4) +typedef struct { + neko_val_type t; + tfloat f; +} vfloat; +#pragma pack() + +typedef struct _vobject { + neko_val_type t; + neko_objtable table; + struct _vobject *proto; +} vobject; + +typedef struct { + neko_val_type t; + int nargs; + void *addr; + neko_value env; + void *module; +} vfunction; + +typedef struct { + neko_val_type t; + char c; +} vstring; + +typedef struct { + neko_val_type t; + neko_value ptr; +} varray; + +typedef struct { + neko_val_type t; + neko_vkind kind; + void *data; +} vabstract; + + + +#define neko_val_tag(v) (*(neko_val_type*)(v)) +#define neko_val_is_null(v) ((v) == val_null) +#define neko_val_is_int(v) ((((int)(int_val)(v)) & 1) != 0) +#define neko_val_is_number(v) (neko_val_is_int(v) || neko_val_tag(v) == VAL_FLOAT) +#define neko_val_is_float(v) (!neko_val_is_int(v) && neko_val_tag(v) == VAL_FLOAT) +#define neko_val_is_string(v) (!neko_val_is_int(v) && (neko_val_tag(v)&7) == VAL_STRING) +#define neko_val_is_function(v) (!neko_val_is_int(v) && (neko_val_tag(v)&7) == VAL_FUNCTION) +#define neko_val_is_object(v) (!neko_val_is_int(v) && neko_val_tag(v) == VAL_OBJECT) +#define neko_val_is_array(v) (!neko_val_is_int(v) && (neko_val_tag(v)&7) == VAL_ARRAY) +#define neko_val_is_abstract(v) (!neko_val_is_int(v) && neko_val_tag(v) == VAL_ABSTRACT) +#define neko_val_is_kind(v,t) (neko_val_is_abstract(v) && neko_val_kind(v) == (t)) +#define neko_val_check_kind(v,t) if( !neko_val_is_kind(v,t) ) neko_error(); +#define neko_val_check_function(f,n) if( !neko_val_is_function(f) || (neko_val_fun_nargs(f) != (n) && neko_val_fun_nargs(f) != VAR_ARGS) ) neko_error(); +#define neko_val_check(v,t) if( !neko_val_is_##t(v) ) neko_error(); +#define neko_val_data(v) ((vabstract*)(v))->data +#define neko_val_kind(v) ((vabstract*)(v))->kind + +#define neko_val_type(v) (neko_val_is_int(v) ? VAL_INT : (neko_val_tag(v)&7)) +#define neko_val_int(v) (((int)(int_val)(v)) >> 1) +#define neko_val_float(v) (CONV_FLOAT ((vfloat*)(v))->f) +#define neko_val_bool(v) ((v) == neko_val_true) +#define neko_val_number(v) (neko_val_is_int(v)?neko_val_int(v):neko_val_float(v)) +#define neko_val_hdata(v) ((vhash*)neko_val_data(v)) +#define neko_val_string(v) (&((vstring*)(v))->c) +#define neko_val_strlen(v) (neko_val_tag(v) >> 3) +#define neko_val_set_length(v,l) neko_val_tag(v) = (neko_val_tag(v)&7) | ((l) << 3) +#define neko_val_set_size neko_val_set_length + +#define neko_val_array_size(v) (neko_val_tag(v) >> 3) +#define neko_val_array_ptr(v) (&((varray*)(v))->ptr) +#define neko_val_fun_nargs(v) ((vfunction*)(v))->nargs +#define neko_alloc_int(v) ((neko_value)(int_val)((((int)(v)) << 1) | 1)) +#define neko_alloc_bool(b) ((b)?neko_val_true:neko_val_false) + +#define neko_max_array_size ((1 << 29) - 1) +#define neko_max_string_size ((1 << 29) - 1) +#define neko_invalid_comparison 0xFE + +#endif // HX_NEKO_FUNC_H diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/OS.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/OS.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5f372db2 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/OS.h @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +#ifndef HX_OS_H +#define HX_OS_H + +// OS FLAGS +#if defined(_WIN32) +# define NEKO_WINDOWS +#endif + +#if defined(__APPLE__) || defined(__MACH__) || defined(macintosh) +# define NEKO_MAC +#endif + +#if defined(linux) || defined(__linux__) +# define NEKO_LINUX +#endif + +#if defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__) +# define NEKO_GNUKBSD +#endif + +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) +# define NEKO_BSD +#endif + +// COMPILER/PROCESSOR FLAGS +#if defined(__GNUC__) +# define NEKO_GCC +#endif + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +# define NEKO_VCC +#endif + +#if defined(__MINGW32__) +# define NEKO_MINGW +#endif + +#if defined(__i386__) || defined(_WIN32) +# define NEKO_X86 +#endif + +#if defined(__ppc__) +# define NEKO_PPC +#endif + +#if !defined(_64BITS) && (defined(__LP64__) || defined(_LP64)) +#define _64BITS +#endif + +#if defined(_64BITS) +# define NEKO_64BITS +#endif + +#if defined(NEKO_LINUX) || defined(NEKO_MAC) || defined(NEKO_BSD) || defined(NEKO_GNUKBSD) +# define NEKO_POSIX +#endif + +#if defined(NEKO_GCC) +# define NEKO_THREADED +# define NEKO_DIRECT_THREADED +#endif + +#include +#ifndef NEKO_VCC +# include +#endif + + + + + +#undef EXPORT +#undef IMPORT +#if defined(NEKO_VCC) || defined(NEKO_MINGW) +# define INLINE __inline +# define EXPORT __declspec( dllexport ) +# define IMPORT __declspec( dllimport ) +#elif defined (HX_LINUX) +# define INLINE inline +# define EXPORT __attribute__ ((visibility("default"))) +# define IMPORT +#else +# define INLINE inline +# define EXPORT __attribute__ ((visibility("default"))) +# define IMPORT +#endif + +#ifdef NEKO_POSIX +# include +# define POSIX_LABEL(name) name: +# define HANDLE_EINTR(label) if( errno == EINTR ) goto label +# define HANDLE_FINTR(f,label) if( ferror(f) && errno == EINTR ) goto label +#else +# define POSIX_LABEL(name) +# define HANDLE_EINTR(label) +# define HANDLE_FINTR(f,label) +#endif + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/ObjcHelpers.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/ObjcHelpers.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..90ef857b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/ObjcHelpers.h @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +#ifndef HX_OBJC_HELPERS_INCLUDED +#define HX_OBJC_HELPERS_INCLUDED + + + +@interface NSHaxeWrapperClass : NSObject { + @public hx::Object *haxeObject; +} +- (id)init:(hx::Object *) inHaxe; +- (void)dealloc; +@end + + +NSDictionary *_hx_obj_to_nsdictionary(Dynamic d); + +id _hx_value_to_objc(Dynamic d); + + +Dynamic _hx_nsdictionary_to_obj(NSDictionary *inDictionary); + +Dynamic _hx_objc_to_dynamic(id inValue); + +Array _hx_objc_to_bytes(id value); + + +namespace hx +{ + + +// 0 args +struct TObjcBlockVoidVoid +{ + typedef void (^t)(); + + static t create(Dynamic func) + { + NSHaxeWrapperClass *wrapper = [[NSHaxeWrapperClass alloc] init:func.mPtr]; + t wrap = ^ { + wrapper->haxeObject->__run(); + }; + return wrap; + } +}; + + +template +struct TObjcBlockRetVoid +{ + typedef Ret (^t)(); + + static t create(Dynamic func) + { + NSHaxeWrapperClass *wrapper = [[NSHaxeWrapperClass alloc] init:func.mPtr]; + t wrap = ^() { + return (Ret) wrapper->haxeObject->__run(); + }; + return wrap; + } +}; + + +// 1 arg +template +struct TObjcBlockVoidArgs1 +{ + typedef void (^t)(Arg0 a); + + static t create(Dynamic func) + { + NSHaxeWrapperClass *wrapper = [[NSHaxeWrapperClass alloc] init:func.mPtr]; + t wrap = ^(Arg0 a0) { + wrapper->haxeObject->__run(a0); + }; + return wrap; + } +}; + +template +struct TObjcBlockRetArgs1 +{ + typedef Ret (^t)(Arg0 a); + inline static t create(Dynamic func) + { + NSHaxeWrapperClass *wrapper = [[NSHaxeWrapperClass alloc] init:func.mPtr]; + t wrap = ^(Arg0 a0) { + return (Ret) wrapper->haxeObject->__run(a0); + } ; + } +}; + + + +// 2 arg +template +struct TObjcBlockVoidArgs2 +{ + typedef void (^t)(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1); + + static t create(Dynamic func) + { + NSHaxeWrapperClass *wrapper = [[NSHaxeWrapperClass alloc] init:func.mPtr]; + t wrap = ^(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1) { + wrapper->haxeObject->__run(a0,a1); + }; + return wrap; + } +}; + +template +struct TObjcBlockRetArgs2 +{ + typedef Ret (^t)(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1); + inline static t create(Dynamic func) + { + NSHaxeWrapperClass *wrapper = [[NSHaxeWrapperClass alloc] init:func.mPtr]; + t wrap = ^(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1) { + return (Ret) wrapper->haxeObject->__run(a0,a1); + } ; + } +}; + + +// 3 arg +template +struct TObjcBlockVoidArgs3 +{ + typedef void (^t)(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1, Arg2 a2); + + static t create(Dynamic func) + { + NSHaxeWrapperClass *wrapper = [[NSHaxeWrapperClass alloc] init:func.mPtr]; + t wrap = ^(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1, Arg2 a2) { + wrapper->haxeObject->__run(a0,a1,a2); + }; + return wrap; + } +}; + +template +struct TObjcBlockRetArgs3 +{ + typedef Ret (^t)(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1, Arg2 a2); + inline static t create(Dynamic func) + { + NSHaxeWrapperClass *wrapper = [[NSHaxeWrapperClass alloc] init:func.mPtr]; + t wrap = ^(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1, Arg2 a2) { + return (Ret) wrapper->haxeObject->__run(a0,a1,a2); + } ; + } +}; + + +// 4 arg +template +struct TObjcBlockVoidArgs4 +{ + typedef void (^t)(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1, Arg2 a2, Arg3 a3); + + static t create(Dynamic func) + { + NSHaxeWrapperClass *wrapper = [[NSHaxeWrapperClass alloc] init:func.mPtr]; + t wrap = ^(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1, Arg2 a2, Arg3 a3) { + wrapper->haxeObject->__run(a0,a1,a2,a3); + }; + return wrap; + } +}; + +template +struct TObjcBlockRetArgs4 +{ + typedef Ret (^t)(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1, Arg2 a2, Arg3 a3); + inline static t create(Dynamic func) + { + NSHaxeWrapperClass *wrapper = [[NSHaxeWrapperClass alloc] init:func.mPtr]; + t wrap = ^(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1, Arg2 a2, Arg3 a3) { + return (Ret) wrapper->haxeObject->__run(a0,a1,a2,a3); + } ; + } +}; + + +// 5 arg +template +struct TObjcBlockVoidArgs5 +{ + typedef void (^t)(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1, Arg2 a2, Arg3 a3, Arg4 a4); + + static t create(Dynamic func) + { + NSHaxeWrapperClass *wrapper = [[NSHaxeWrapperClass alloc] init:func.mPtr]; + t wrap = ^(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1, Arg2 a2, Arg3 a3, Arg4 a4) { + wrapper->haxeObject->__run(a0,a1,a2,a3,a4); + }; + return wrap; + } +}; + +template +struct TObjcBlockRetArgs5 +{ + typedef Ret (^t)(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1, Arg2 a2, Arg3 a3, Arg4 a4); + inline static t create(Dynamic func) + { + NSHaxeWrapperClass *wrapper = [[NSHaxeWrapperClass alloc] init:func.mPtr]; + t wrap = ^(Arg0 a0, Arg1 a1, Arg2 a2, Arg3 a3, Arg4 a4) { + return (Ret) wrapper->haxeObject->__run(a0,a1,a2,a3,a4); + } ; + } +}; + + + + + + + + +} + +#endif + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Object.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Object.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0fe49ffc --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Object.h @@ -0,0 +1,450 @@ +#ifndef HX_OBJECT_H +#define HX_OBJECT_H + +#ifndef HXCPP_H +#error "Please include hxcpp.h, not hx/Object.h" +#endif + +#if defined(KINC_LINUX) && __cplusplus < 201103L +#include +#endif + +// --- Constants ------------------------------------------------------- + +// These values are returned from the "__GetType" function +enum hxObjectType +{ + vtUnknown = -1, + vtInt = 0xff, + vtNull = 0, + vtFloat = 1, + vtBool = 2, + vtString = 3, + vtObject = 4, + vtArray = 5, + vtFunction = 6, + vtEnum, + vtClass, + vtInt64, + vtAbstractBase = 0x100, +}; + + +namespace hx +{ + + + +class FieldRef; +class IndexRef; +typedef Array DynamicArray; +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES null BadCast(); + +#ifdef HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE + +// CPPIA_CALL = fastcall on x86(32), nothing otherwise +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 331) + #if (defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_M_X64) && !defined(__x86_64__) && !defined(_ARM_) ) || \ + defined(HXCPP_X86) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__i386) || \ + (!defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_ARM_) && !defined(__arm__) && !defined(__x86_64__) ) + + #if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(EMSCRIPTEN) + #define CPPIA_CALL __attribute__ ((fastcall)) + #elif defined(_MSC_VER) + #define CPPIA_CALL __fastcall + #endif + #endif +#endif + +#ifndef CPPIA_CALL + #define CPPIA_CALL +#endif + + +typedef void (CPPIA_CALL *StackExecute)(struct StackContext *ctx); +struct ScriptFunction +{ + ScriptFunction(StackExecute inExe=0,const char *inSig=0) + : execute(inExe), signature(inSig) { } + StackExecute execute; + const char *signature; +}; +struct ScriptCallable; + +#endif + +enum NewObjectType +{ + NewObjAlloc, + NewObjContainer, + NewObjConst, +}; + +enum +{ + clsIdDynamic = 1, + clsIdClass, + clsIdInt, + clsIdInt64, + clsIdFloat, + clsIdBool, + clsIdString, + clsIdMath, + clsIdEnum, + clsIdClosure, + clsIdVirtualArray, + clsIdArrayIterator, + clsIdArrayBase, + clsIdArrayByte, + clsIdArrayShort, + clsIdArrayInt, + clsIdArrayBool, + clsIdArrayFloat32, + clsIdArrayFloat64, + clsIdArrayString, + clsIdArrayInt64, + clsIdArrayObject, + clsIdAbstract, + clsIdHash, + clsIdWeakRef, + clsIdExternalPrimitive, + clsIdPointer, + clsIdStruct, + clsIdCMember0, + clsIdCMember1, + clsIdCMember2, + clsIdCMember3, + clsIdCMember4, + clsIdCMember5, + clsIdCMemberVar, + clsIdCStatic0, + clsIdCStatic1, + clsIdCStatic2, + clsIdCStatic3, + clsIdCStatic4, + clsIdCStatic5, + clsIdCStatic6, + clsIdCStaticVar, + clsIdMutex, + clsIdSemaphore, + clsIdCondition, + clsIdLock, + clsIdDeque, + clsIdThreadInfo, + clsIdPcreData, + clsIdFio, + clsIdProcess, + clsIdSocket, + clsIdRandom, + clsIdPollData, + clsIdSqlite, + clsIdMysql, + clsIdMysqlResult, + clsIdSsl, + clsIdSslCert, + clsIdSslConf, + clsIdSslKey, + clsIdZLib, + +}; + + +// --- hx::Object ------------------------------------------------------------ +// +// Base for all hxcpp objects. +// This contains the virtual functions required by the core to provide +// a generic interface to the specific classes. +// +// Hxcpp classes inherit from this. +// +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Object +{ +public: + enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdDynamic }; + + + inline void *operator new( size_t inSize, bool inContainer=true, const char *inName=0 ) + { + #ifdef HX_USE_INLINE_IMMIX_OPERATOR_NEW + ImmixAllocator *alloc = HX_CTX_GET; + + #ifdef HXCPP_DEBUG + if (!alloc) + BadImmixAlloc(); + #endif + + return ImmixAllocator::alloc(alloc, inSize, inContainer, inName); + + #else // Not HX_USE_INLINE_IMMIX_OPERATOR_NEW ... + + void *result = hx::InternalNew(inSize,inContainer); + + #ifdef HXCPP_TELEMETRY + __hxt_gc_new(result, inSize, inName); + #endif + return result; + #endif + } + + inline void *operator new( size_t inSize, hx::NewObjectType inType, const char *inName=0 ) + { + if (inType==NewObjConst) + return InternalCreateConstBuffer(0,(int)inSize); + return operator new(inSize, inType==NewObjContainer, inName); + } + + void operator delete( void *, bool) { } + void operator delete( void *, bool, const char * ) { } + void operator delete( void *, int ) { } + void operator delete( void *, hx::NewObjectType) { } + void operator delete( void *, hx::NewObjectType, const char * ) { } + + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=332) + virtual bool _hx_isInstanceOf(int inClassId); + #endif + + //virtual void *__root(); + virtual void __Mark(hx::MarkContext *__inCtx) { } + #ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS + virtual void __Visit(hx::VisitContext *__inCtx) { } + #endif + + // helpers... + inline bool __IsArray() const { return __GetType()==vtArray; } + + virtual int __GetType() const { return vtClass; } + virtual void *__GetHandle() const { return 0; } + + + virtual hx::FieldRef __FieldRef(const String &inString); + + virtual String __ToString() const; + + virtual int __ToInt() const { return 0; } +#if defined(KINC_LINUX) && __cplusplus < 201103L + virtual double __ToDouble() const { return NAN; } +#else + virtual double __ToDouble() const { return std::numeric_limits::quiet_NaN(); } +#endif + virtual cpp::Int64 __ToInt64() const { return (cpp::Int64)(0); } + virtual const char * __CStr() const; + virtual String toString(); + virtual bool __HasField(const String &inString); + virtual hx::Val __Field(const String &inString, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL <= 330) + virtual bool __Is(hx::Object *inClass) const { return true; } + virtual hx::Object *__GetRealObject() { return this; } + bool __Is(Dynamic inClass ) const; + #endif + + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) + // Non-virtual + Dynamic __IField(int inFieldID); + double __INumField(int inFieldID); + virtual void *_hx_getInterface(int inId); + #else + virtual hx::Object *__ToInterface(const hx::type_info &inInterface) { return 0; } + virtual Dynamic __IField(int inFieldID); + virtual double __INumField(int inFieldID); + + // These have been moved to EnumBase + virtual DynamicArray __EnumParams(); + virtual String __Tag() const; + virtual int __Index() const; + virtual void __SetSize(int inLen) { } + #endif + + virtual hx::Val __SetField(const String &inField,const hx::Val &inValue, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + + virtual void __SetThis(Dynamic inThis); + virtual Dynamic __Run(const Array &inArgs); + virtual Dynamic *__GetFieldMap(); + virtual void __GetFields(Array &outFields); + virtual hx::Class __GetClass() const; + + virtual int __Compare(const hx::Object *inRHS) const; + + virtual int __length() const { return 0; } + virtual Dynamic __GetItem(int inIndex) const; + virtual Dynamic __SetItem(int inIndex,Dynamic inValue); + + + typedef const Dynamic &D; + virtual Dynamic __run(); + virtual Dynamic __run(D a); + virtual Dynamic __run(D a,D b); + virtual Dynamic __run(D a,D b,D c); + virtual Dynamic __run(D a,D b,D c,D d); + virtual Dynamic __run(D a,D b,D c,D d,D e); + + virtual int __ArgCount() const { return -1; } + + #ifdef HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE + virtual void **__GetScriptVTable() { return 0; } + virtual hx::ScriptCallable *__GetScriptCallable() { return 0; } + static hx::ScriptFunction __script_construct; + #endif + + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=331) + inline bool __compare( hx::Object *inRHS ) { return this!=inRHS; } + #else + inline bool __compare( hx::Object *inRHS ) + { return __GetRealObject()!=inRHS->__GetRealObject(); } + #endif + + static hx::Class &__SGetClass(); + static void __boot(); +}; + +// --- hx::ObjectPtr --------------------------------------------------------------- +// +// This class simply provides syntax so that pointers can be written as objects, +// and overloaded operators can be used + +template +class ObjectPtr +{ +protected: + inline bool SetPtr(OBJ_ *inPtr) + { + mPtr = inPtr; + return true; + } + inline bool SetPtr(...) { return false; } + + inline void CastPtr(hx::Object *inPtr,bool inThrowOnInvalid) + { + if (inPtr) + { + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=332) + mPtr = inPtr->_hx_isInstanceOf(OBJ_::_hx_ClassId) ? reinterpret_cast(inPtr) : 0; + #elif (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=331) + mPtr = dynamic_cast(inPtr); + #else + mPtr = dynamic_cast(inPtr->__GetRealObject()); + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL < 330) + if (!mPtr) + mPtr = (Ptr)inPtr->__ToInterface(typeid(Obj)); + #endif + #endif + if (inThrowOnInvalid && !mPtr) + ::hx::BadCast(); + } + else + mPtr = 0; + } + +public: + typedef OBJ_ Obj; + typedef OBJ_ *Ptr; + + inline ObjectPtr() : mPtr(0) { } + inline ObjectPtr(OBJ_ *inObj) : mPtr(inObj) { } + inline ObjectPtr(const null &inNull) : mPtr(0) { } + inline ObjectPtr(const ObjectPtr &inOther) : mPtr( inOther.mPtr ) { } + template + inline ObjectPtr(const hx::Native &inNative) : mPtr( dynamic_cast(inNative.ptr) ) { } + + template + inline ObjectPtr(const ObjectPtr &inObjectPtr) + { + if (!SetPtr(inObjectPtr.mPtr)) + CastPtr(inObjectPtr.mPtr,false); + } + + + inline ObjectPtr(const ::cpp::Variant &inVariant) + { + hx::Object *object = inVariant.asObject(); + if (!SetPtr(object)) + CastPtr(object,false); + } + + template + inline ObjectPtr(const SOURCE_ *inPtr,bool inCheckCast=true) + { + if (!SetPtr(const_cast(inPtr))) + CastPtr(const_cast(inPtr),inCheckCast); + } + + inline ObjectPtr &operator=(const null &inNull) { mPtr = 0; return *this; } + inline ObjectPtr &operator=(Ptr inRHS) { mPtr = inRHS; return *this; } + inline ObjectPtr &operator=(const ObjectPtr &inRHS) { mPtr = inRHS.mPtr; return *this; } + template + inline ObjectPtr &operator=(InterfaceImpl *inRHS) + { + mPtr = inRHS->operator Ptr(); + return *this; + } + + inline OBJ_ *GetPtr() const { return mPtr; } + inline OBJ_ *operator->() + { + #ifdef HXCPP_CHECK_POINTER + if (!mPtr) NullReference("Object", true); + // The handler might have fixed up the null value + if (!mPtr) NullReference("Object", false); + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_CHECK_POINTER + GCCheckPointer(mPtr); + #endif + #endif + return mPtr; + } + inline const OBJ_ *operator->() const + { + #ifdef HXCPP_CHECK_POINTER + if (!mPtr) NullReference("Object", true); + // The handler might have fixed up the null value + if (!mPtr) NullReference("Object", false); + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_CHECK_POINTER + GCCheckPointer(mPtr); + #endif + #endif + return mPtr; + } + + template + inline bool operator==(const T &inTRHS) const + { + ObjectPtr inRHS(inTRHS.mPtr,false); + if (mPtr==inRHS.mPtr) return true; + if (!mPtr || !inRHS.mPtr) return false; + return !mPtr->__compare(inRHS.mPtr); + } + inline bool operator==(const cpp::Variant &inRHS) const; + inline bool operator!=(const cpp::Variant &inRHS) const; + + template + inline bool operator!=(const T &inTRHS) const + { + ObjectPtr inRHS(inTRHS.mPtr,false); + if (mPtr==inRHS.mPtr) return false; + if (!mPtr || !inRHS.mPtr) return true; + return mPtr->__compare(inRHS.mPtr); + } + + template + operator hx::Native () { return hx::Native( mPtr ); } + + inline bool operator==(const null &inRHS) const { return mPtr==0; } + inline bool operator!=(const null &inRHS) const { return mPtr!=0; } + + //inline bool operator==(const Dynamic &inRHS) const { return inRHS==*this; } + //inline bool operator!=(const Dynamic &inRHS) const { return inRHS!=*this; } + + + // This is defined in the "FieldRef" class... + inline class hx::FieldRef FieldRef(const String &inString); + inline class hx::IndexRef IndexRef(int inString); + inline static hx::Class &__SGetClass() { return OBJ_::__SGetClass(); } + + OBJ_ *mPtr; +}; + + +} // end namespace hx + + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Operators.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Operators.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c81c4caf --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Operators.h @@ -0,0 +1,448 @@ +#ifndef HX_OPERATORS_H +#define HX_OPERATORS_H + + + +template bool null::operator == (const hx::ObjectPtr &O) const { return !O.mPtr; } +template inline bool null::operator != (const hx::ObjectPtr &O) const { return O.mPtr; } + +template inline bool null::operator == (const Array &O) const { return !O.mPtr; } +template inline bool null::operator != (const Array &O) const { return O.mPtr; } +inline bool null::operator == (const hx::FieldRef &O) const { return !O.HasPointer(); } +inline bool null::operator != (const hx::FieldRef &O) const { return O.HasPointer(); } +inline bool null::operator == (const hx::IndexRef &O) const { return !O.HasPointer(); } +inline bool null::operator != (const hx::IndexRef &O) const { return O.HasPointer(); } + +inline bool null::operator == (const Dynamic &O) const { return !O.mPtr; } +inline bool null::operator != (const Dynamic &O) const { return O.mPtr; } + +inline bool null::operator == (const String &O) const { return !O.raw_ptr(); } +inline bool null::operator != (const String &O) const { return O.raw_ptr(); } + +namespace hx { +template Null::operator Dynamic() { if (isNull) return Dynamic(); return value; } +} + +HX_COMPARE_NULL_MOST_OPS(String) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_MOST_OPS(Dynamic) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_MOST_OPS(hx::FieldRef) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_MOST_OPS(hx::IndexRef) + +//HX_NULL_DEFINE_COMPARE_MOST_OPS(String) +//HX_NULL_DEFINE_COMPARE_MOST_OPS(Dynamic) +//HX_NULL_DEFINE_COMPARE_MOST_OPS(hx::FieldRef) +//HX_NULL_DEFINE_COMPARE_MOST_OPS(hx::IndexRef) + + +// Operators for mixing various types .... + + +inline String operator+(const cpp::UInt64 &i,const String &s) { return String(i) + s; } +inline String operator+(const cpp::Int64 &i,const String &s) { return String(i) + s; } +inline String operator+(const int &i,const String &s) { return String(i) + s; } +inline String operator+(const unsigned int &i,const String &s) { return String(i) + s; } +inline String operator+(const double &d,const String &s) { return String(d) + s; } +inline String operator+(const float &d,const String &s) { return String(d) + s; } +inline String operator+(const bool &b,const String &s) { return String(b) + s; } +inline String operator+(const unsigned char c,const String &s) { return String(c) + s; } +inline String operator+(const signed char c,const String &s) { return String(c) + s; } +inline String operator+(const unsigned short c,const String &s) { return String(c) + s; } +inline String operator+(const signed short c,const String &s) { return String(c) + s; } +inline String operator+(const null &n,const String &s) { return String(n) + s; } +inline String operator+(const cpp::CppInt32__ &i,const String &s) { return String(i) + s; } + +template + inline String operator+(const hx::ObjectPtr &inLHS,const String &s) + { return (inLHS.mPtr ? const_cast & >(inLHS)->toString() : HX_CSTRING("null") ) + s; } + +/* +template + inline Dynamic operator+(LHS_ inLHS, const hx::FieldRef &inField) + { return inLHS + inField.operator Dynamic(); } + +template + inline Dynamic operator+(LHS_ inLHS,const hx::IndexRef &inIndexRef) + { return inLHS + inIndexRef.operator Dynamic(); } +*/ + +// += -= *= /= %= &= |= ^= <<= >>= >>>= + +namespace hx +{ + +template inline double ToDouble(T inT) { return 0; } +template inline double ToDouble(hx::ObjectPtr inObj) +{ + return inObj.mPtr ? inObj.mPtr->__ToDouble() : 0.0; +} +template<> inline double ToDouble(String inValue) { return __hxcpp_parse_float(inValue); } +template<> inline double ToDouble(double inValue) { return inValue; } +template<> inline double ToDouble(int inValue) { return inValue; } +template<> inline double ToDouble(bool inValue) { return inValue; } +template<> inline double ToDouble(float inValue) { return inValue; } +template<> inline double ToDouble(cpp::UInt64 inValue) { return inValue; } +template<> inline double ToDouble(cpp::Int64 inValue) { return inValue; } +template<> inline double ToDouble(null inValue) { return 0; } + + + +inline int UShr(int inData,int inShift) +{ + return ((unsigned int)inData) >> inShift; +} + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES double DoubleMod(double inLHS,double inRHS); + +template +double Mod(TL inLHS,TR inRHS) { return hx::DoubleMod(inLHS,inRHS); } + +double DivByZero(double d); + +#if !defined(_MSC_VER) || _MSC_VER > 1399 +inline int Mod(int inLHS,int inRHS) +{ + if (!inRHS) + hx::Throw(HX_CSTRING("Mod by 0 Error.")); + return inLHS % inRHS; +} +#endif + + +template +inline L& AddEq(L &inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = inLHS + inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline L& MultEq(L &inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = inLHS * inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline L& DivEq(L &inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (double)inLHS / (double)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline L& SubEq(L &inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = inLHS - inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline L& AndEq(L &inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS & (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline L& OrEq(L &inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS | (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline L& XorEq(L &inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS ^ (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline L& ShlEq(L &inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS << (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline L& ShrEq(L &inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS >> (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline L& UShrEq(L &inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = hx::UShr(inLHS,inRHS); return inLHS; } +template +inline L& ModEq(L &inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = DoubleMod(inLHS,inRHS); return inLHS; } + +#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__SNC__) +template +inline hx::FieldRef AddEq(hx::FieldRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = inLHS + inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::FieldRef MultEq(hx::FieldRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = inLHS * inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::FieldRef DivEq(hx::FieldRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (double)inLHS / (double)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::FieldRef SubEq(hx::FieldRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = inLHS - inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::FieldRef AndEq(hx::FieldRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS & (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::FieldRef OrEq(hx::FieldRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS | (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::FieldRef XorEq(hx::FieldRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS ^ (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::FieldRef ShlEq(hx::FieldRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS << (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::FieldRef ShrEq(hx::FieldRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS >> (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::FieldRef UShrEq(hx::FieldRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = hx::UShr(inLHS,inRHS); return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::FieldRef ModEq(hx::FieldRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = DoubleMod(inLHS,inRHS); return inLHS; } + + +template +inline hx::IndexRef AddEq(hx::IndexRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = inLHS + inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::IndexRef MultEq(hx::IndexRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (double)inLHS * (double)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::IndexRef DivEq(hx::IndexRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (double)inLHS / (double)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::IndexRef SubEq(hx::IndexRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (double)inLHS - (double)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::IndexRef AndEq(hx::IndexRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS & (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::IndexRef OrEq(hx::IndexRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS | (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::IndexRef XorEq(hx::IndexRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS ^ (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::IndexRef ShlEq(hx::IndexRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS << (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::IndexRef ShrEq(hx::IndexRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = (int)inLHS >> (int)inRHS; return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::IndexRef UShrEq(hx::IndexRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = hx::UShr(inLHS,inRHS); return inLHS; } +template +inline hx::IndexRef ModEq(hx::IndexRef inLHS, R inRHS) { inLHS = DoubleMod(inLHS,inRHS); return inLHS; } + + + +#endif // __GNUC__ || __SNC__ + +template +inline hx::__TArrayImplRef AddEq(hx::__TArrayImplRef ref, R inRHS) + { ref.mObject->__set(ref.mIndex, ref.mObject->__get(ref.mIndex) + inRHS); return ref;} + +template +inline hx::__TArrayImplRef MultEq(hx::__TArrayImplRef ref, R inRHS) + { ref.mObject->__set(ref.mIndex, ref.mObject->__get(ref.mIndex) * inRHS); return ref;} + +template +inline hx::__TArrayImplRef DivEq(hx::__TArrayImplRef ref, R inRHS) + { ref.mObject->__set(ref.mIndex, ref.mObject->__get(ref.mIndex) / inRHS); return ref;} + +template +inline hx::__TArrayImplRef SubEq(hx::__TArrayImplRef ref, R inRHS) + { ref.mObject->__set(ref.mIndex, ref.mObject->__get(ref.mIndex) - inRHS); return ref;} + +template +inline hx::__TArrayImplRef AndEq(hx::__TArrayImplRef ref, int inRHS) + { ref.mObject->__set(ref.mIndex, (int)ref.mObject->__get(ref.mIndex) & inRHS); return ref;} + +template +inline hx::__TArrayImplRef OrEq(hx::__TArrayImplRef ref, int inRHS) + { ref.mObject->__set(ref.mIndex, (int)ref.mObject->__get(ref.mIndex) | inRHS); return ref;} + +template +inline hx::__TArrayImplRef XorEq(hx::__TArrayImplRef ref, int inRHS) + { ref.mObject->__set(ref.mIndex, (int)ref.mObject->__get(ref.mIndex) ^ inRHS); return ref;} + +template +inline hx::__TArrayImplRef ShlEq(hx::__TArrayImplRef ref, int inRHS) + { ref.mObject->__set(ref.mIndex, (int)ref.mObject->__get(ref.mIndex) << inRHS); return ref;} + +template +inline hx::__TArrayImplRef ShrEq(hx::__TArrayImplRef ref, int inRHS) + { ref.mObject->__set(ref.mIndex, (int)ref.mObject->__get(ref.mIndex) >> inRHS); return ref;} + +template +inline hx::__TArrayImplRef UShrEq(hx::__TArrayImplRef ref, int inRHS) + { ref.mObject->__set(ref.mIndex, hx::UShr(ref.mObject->__get(ref.mIndex),inRHS)); return ref;} + +template +inline hx::__TArrayImplRef UShrEq(hx::__TArrayImplRef ref, double inRHS) + { ref.mObject->__set(ref.mIndex, DoubleMod(ref.mObject->__get(ref.mIndex),inRHS)); return ref;} + + + + + + + +template inline T TCastObject(hx::Object *inObj) { return hx::BadCast(); } +template<> inline bool TCastObject(hx::Object *inObj) +{ + if (!inObj) return false; + if (inObj->__GetType()!=::vtBool) return hx::BadCast(); + return inObj?inObj->__ToInt():0; +} +template<> inline int TCastObject(hx::Object *inObj) +{ + if (!inObj) return 0; + if (!(inObj->__GetType()==::vtInt || + ((inObj->__GetType()==::vtFloat || inObj->__GetType()==::vtInt64) && inObj->__ToDouble()==inObj->__ToInt()) ) ) return hx::BadCast(); + return inObj->__ToInt(); +} +template<> inline double TCastObject(hx::Object *inObj) +{ + if (!inObj) return 0.0; + if ((inObj->__GetType()!=::vtFloat && inObj->__GetType()!=::vtInt64 && inObj->__GetType()!=::vtInt)) + return hx::BadCast(); + return inObj->__ToDouble(); +} +template<> inline float TCastObject(hx::Object *inObj) +{ + if (!inObj || (inObj->__GetType()!=::vtFloat && inObj->__GetType()!=::vtInt64 && inObj->__GetType()!=::vtInt)) + return hx::BadCast(); + return inObj->__ToDouble(); +} + +template<> inline String TCastObject(hx::Object *inObj) +{ + if (!inObj) return String(); + if (inObj->__GetType()!=::vtString) + return hx::BadCast(); + return inObj->__ToString(); +} + +template<> inline null TCastObject(hx::Object *inObj) { return null(); } + +// Cast to scalar +template struct TCast +{ + template static inline T cast(VAL inVal ) { + T result = TCastObject(Dynamic(inVal).GetPtr()); + //null string from null is ok... + //if (result==null()) hx::BadCast(); + return result; + } + + template + static inline T cast(ObjectPtr inObj ) + { + T result = TCastObject(inObj.GetPtr()); + if (result==null()) hx::BadCast(); + return result; + } + + template + static inline T cast(Array inObj ) { return hx::BadCast(); } + +}; + +// Cast to object +template struct TCast< ObjectPtr > +{ + template static inline ObjectPtr cast(VAL inVal ) { + ObjectPtr result = Dynamic(inVal); + if (result==null() && inVal!=null()) BadCast(); + return result; + } + + template + static inline ObjectPtr cast(ObjectPtr inObj ) + { + ObjectPtr result = ObjectPtr(inObj); + if (result==null() && inObj!=null()) hx::BadCast(); + return result; + } +}; + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) +template< > struct TCast< cpp::VirtualArray > +{ + template static inline cpp::VirtualArray cast(VAL inVal ) { + return cpp::VirtualArray(inVal); + } +}; +#endif + + +// Cast to struct +template struct TCast< cpp::Struct > +{ + static inline cpp::Struct cast( const cpp::Struct &inObj ) { return inObj; } +}; + + +inline Array TCastToArray(Dynamic inVal) +{ + Dynamic result = inVal; + if (result==null() && inVal!=null()) hx::BadCast(); + return inVal; +} + +template struct DynamicConvertType { enum { Convert = aciNotArray }; }; + +// Always convert ... +template<> struct DynamicConvertType< hx::Interface * > { enum { Convert = aciAlwaysConvert }; }; +template<> struct DynamicConvertType< Array_obj * > { enum { Convert = aciObjectArray }; }; +template<> struct DynamicConvertType< Array_obj< ::String> * > { enum { Convert = aciStringArray }; }; +template struct DynamicConvertType< Array_obj * > { enum { Convert = sizeof(T) }; }; +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) +template<> struct DynamicConvertType< cpp::VirtualArray_obj * > { enum { Convert = aciVirtualArray }; }; +#endif + +} + + + +template +inline RESULT Dynamic::StaticCast() const +{ + typedef typename RESULT::Ptr type; + + const int convertId = (int)hx::DynamicConvertType::Convert; + if (convertId!=hx::aciNotArray && mPtr && convertId!=((hx::ArrayCommon *)mPtr)->getArrayConvertId()) + { + // Constructing the result from the Dynamic value will check for a conversion + // using something like dynamic_cast + return *this; + } + else + { + // Simple reinterpret_cast + return (typename RESULT::Ptr)mPtr; + } +} + +namespace hx +{ +inline bool IsInterfacePtr(...) { return false; } +inline bool IsInterfacePtr(const hx::Interface *) { return true; } +} + +template +inline void __hxcpp_unsafe_set(hx::ObjectPtr &outForced, const Dynamic &inD) +{ + if (hx::IsInterfacePtr(outForced.mPtr)) + { + hx::Throw(HX_CSTRING("unsafe set of interfaces not supported yet.")); + outForced.mPtr = (VALUE *)(inD.mPtr); + } + else + { + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 331) + outForced.mPtr = (VALUE *)(inD.mPtr); + #else + outForced.mPtr = (VALUE *)(inD.mPtr ? inD.mPtr->__GetRealObject() : 0); + #endif + } +} + +namespace hx +{ +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES StringValueIterator : public cpp::StringIterator +{ +public: + StringValueIterator(const String &inValue) : StringIterator(inValue) { } + + int next() { return value.cca(pos++); } +}; + +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES StringKeyValueIterator : public cpp::StringIterator +{ +public: + StringKeyValueIterator(const String &inValue) : StringIterator(inValue) { } + + Dynamic next() { + int p = pos; + return + hx::AnonStruct2_obj< int,int >::Create(HX_("key",9f,89,51,00),p, + HX_("value",71,7f,b8,31), value.cca(pos++) ); + } +}; +} + + +Dynamic String::iterator() +{ + return new hx::StringValueIterator(*this); +} + + +Dynamic String::keyValueIterator() +{ + return new hx::StringKeyValueIterator(*this); +} + +namespace hx +{ +template Dynamic hx::ArrayKeyValueIterator::next() +{ + int p = mIdx++; + return + hx::AnonStruct2_obj< int,TO >::Create(HX_("key",9f,89,51,00),p, + HX_("value",71,7f,b8,31), toTo(mArray->__get(p)) ); +} +} + + + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/QuickVec.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/QuickVec.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..24279044 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/QuickVec.h @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +#ifndef HX_QUICKVEC_INCLUDED +#define HX_QUICKVEC_INCLUDED + +#include +#include + +namespace hx +{ + +template +struct QuickVec +{ + int mAlloc; + int mSize; + T *mPtr; + + QuickVec() : mPtr(0), mAlloc(0), mSize(0) { } + ~QuickVec() + { + if (mPtr) + free(mPtr); + } + + inline void push(const T &inT) + { + if (mSize+1>mAlloc) + { + mAlloc = 10 + (mSize*3/2); + mPtr = (T *)realloc(mPtr,sizeof(T)*mAlloc); + } + mPtr[mSize]=inT; + mSize++; + } + void swap(QuickVec &inOther) + { + std::swap(mAlloc, inOther.mAlloc); + std::swap(mSize, inOther.mSize); + std::swap(mPtr, inOther.mPtr); + } + T *setSize(int inSize) + { + if (inSize>mAlloc) + { + mAlloc = inSize; + mPtr = (T *)realloc(mPtr,sizeof(T)*mAlloc); + } + mSize = inSize; + return mPtr; + } + // Can push this many without realloc + bool hasExtraCapacity(int inN) + { + return mSize+inN<=mAlloc; + } + + bool safeReserveExtra(int inN) + { + int want = mSize + inN; + if (want>mAlloc) + { + int wantAlloc = 10 + (mSize*3/2); + if (wantAllocinPos) + memmove(mPtr+inPos, mPtr+inPos+1, (mSize-inPos)*sizeof(T)); + } + void zero() { memset(mPtr,0,mSize*sizeof(T) ); } + + inline bool qerase_val(T inVal) + { + for(int i=0;i=mAlloc) + { + mAlloc = 10 + (mSize*3/2); + mPtr = (T *)realloc(mPtr,sizeof(T)*mAlloc); + } + return mSize++; + } + inline int size() const { return mSize; } + inline T &operator[](int inIndex) { return mPtr[inIndex]; } + inline const T &operator[](int inIndex) const { return mPtr[inIndex]; } + +private: + QuickVec(const QuickVec &); + void operator =(const QuickVec &); +}; + + +template +class QuickDeque +{ + struct Slab + { + T mElems[1024]; + }; + + QuickVec mSpare; + QuickVec mActive; + + int mHeadPos; + int mTailPos; + Slab *mHead; + Slab *mTail; + +public: + + QuickDeque() + { + mHead = mTail = 0; + mHeadPos = 1024; + mTailPos = 1024; + } + ~QuickDeque() + { + for(int i=0;imElems[mHeadPos++] = inObj; + return; + } + if (mHead != mTail) + mActive.push(mHead); + mHead = mSpare.empty() ? new Slab : mSpare.pop(); + mHead->mElems[0] = inObj; + mHeadPos = 1; + } + inline bool some_left() { return mHead!=mTail || mHeadPos!=mTailPos; } + inline T pop() + { + if (mTailPos<1024) + return mTail->mElems[mTailPos++]; + if (mTail) + mSpare.push(mTail); + if (mActive.empty()) + { + mTail = mHead; + } + else + { + mTail = mActive[0]; + mActive.erase(0); + } + mTailPos = 1; + return mTail->mElems[0]; + } + +private: + QuickDeque(const QuickDeque &); + void operator=(const QuickDeque &); +}; + +} // end namespace hx + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Scriptable.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Scriptable.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b5100485 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Scriptable.h @@ -0,0 +1,289 @@ +#ifndef INCLUDED_HX_SCRIPTABLE +#define INCLUDED_HX_SCRIPTABLE + +#include +#ifdef __clang__ +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Winvalid-offsetof" +#endif + + +namespace hx +{ + +extern bool gEnableJit; +inline void EnableJit(bool inEnable) { gEnableJit = inEnable; } + +#define HXCPP_CPPIA_SUPER_ARG(x) , (x) + +struct ScriptNamedFunction : public ScriptFunction +{ + ScriptNamedFunction(const ScriptFunction &s) : ScriptFunction(s), name(0), isStatic(false), superExecute(0) { } + + ScriptNamedFunction(const char *inName=0,StackExecute inExe=0,const char *inSig=0, bool inIsStatic=false, StackExecute superExecute=0) + : ScriptFunction(inExe, inSig), name(inName), isStatic(inIsStatic), superExecute(superExecute) { } + + const char *name; + bool isStatic; + StackExecute superExecute; +}; + + +inline void SetFloatAligned(void *inPtr, const Float &inValue) +{ + #ifdef HXCPP_ALIGN_FLOAT + int *dest = (int *)inPtr; + const int *src = (const int *)&inValue; + dest[1] = src[1]; + #else + *(Float *)inPtr = inValue; + #endif +} + + +inline Float GetFloatAligned(const void *inPtr) +{ + #ifdef HXCPP_ALIGN_FLOAT + Float result; + int *dest = (int *)&result; + const int *src = (const int *)inPtr; + dest[0] = src[0]; + dest[1] = src[1]; + return result; + #else + return *(Float *)inPtr; + #endif +} + + +inline void StackContext::pushFloat(Float f) +{ + SetFloatAligned(pointer, f); + pointer += sizeof(Float); +} +inline void StackContext::pushString(const String &s) +{ + *(String *)pointer = s; + pointer += sizeof(String); +} + +inline void StackContext::pushObject(Dynamic d) +{ + *(hx::Object **)pointer = d.mPtr; + pointer += sizeof(hx::Object *); +} + +inline void StackContext::returnFloat(Float f) +{ + SetFloatAligned(frame, f); +} +inline void StackContext::returnString(const String &s) +{ + *(String *)frame = s; +} +inline void StackContext::returnObject(Dynamic d) +{ + *(hx::Object **)frame = d.mPtr; +} + +inline hx::Object *StackContext::getThis(bool inCheckPtr) +{ + #ifdef HXCPP_CHECK_POINTER + if (inCheckPtr) + { + if (!*(hx::Object **)frame) NullReference("This", false); + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_CHECK_POINTER + GCCheckPointer(*(hx::Object **)frame); + #endif + } + #endif + return *(hx::Object **)frame; +} + + +inline Float StackContext::getFloat(int inPos) +{ + return GetFloatAligned(frame+inPos); +} +inline String StackContext::getString(int inPos) +{ + return *(String *)(frame+inPos); +} +inline Dynamic StackContext::getObject(int inPos) +{ + return *(hx::Object **)(frame+inPos); +} + + +enum SignatureChar +{ + sigVoid = 'v', + sigBool = 'b', + sigInt = 'i', + sigFloat = 'f', + sigString = 's', + sigObject = 'o', +}; + + + +struct AutoStack +{ + CppiaCtx *ctx; + unsigned char *pointer; + unsigned char *frame; + + AutoStack(CppiaCtx *inCtx) : ctx(inCtx) + { + frame = ctx->frame; + pointer = ctx->pointer; + ctx->frame = pointer; + } + AutoStack(CppiaCtx *inCtx,unsigned char *inPointer) : ctx(inCtx) + { + frame = ctx->frame; + pointer = inPointer; + ctx->frame = pointer; + } + + ~AutoStack() + { + ctx->pointer = pointer; + ctx->frame = frame; + } +}; + + + + + +typedef hx::Object * (*ScriptableClassFactory)(void **inVTable,int inDataSize); +typedef hx::Object * (*ScriptableInterfaceFactory)(void **inVTable,::hx::Object *); + +void ScriptableRegisterClass( String inName, int inBaseSize, ScriptNamedFunction *inFunctions, ScriptableClassFactory inFactory, ScriptFunction inConstruct); + + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) +void ScriptableRegisterInterface( String inName, ScriptNamedFunction *inFunctions, void *inInterfacePointers); +void ScriptableRegisterNameSlots(const char *inNames[], int inLength); + +#else +void ScriptableRegisterInterface( String inName, ScriptNamedFunction *inFunctions,const hx::type_info *inType, ScriptableInterfaceFactory inFactory); +#endif + +::String ScriptableToString(void *); +hx::Class ScriptableGetClass(void *); +int ScriptableGetType(void *); +void ScriptableMark(void *, hx::Object *, HX_MARK_PARAMS); +void ScriptableVisit(void *, hx::Object *, HX_VISIT_PARAMS); +bool ScriptableField(hx::Object *, const ::String &,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp,Dynamic &outResult); +bool ScriptableField(hx::Object *, int inName,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp,Float &outResult); +bool ScriptableField(hx::Object *, int inName,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp,Dynamic &outResult); +void ScriptableGetFields(hx::Object *inObject, Array< ::String> &outFields); +bool ScriptableSetField(hx::Object *, const ::String &, Dynamic inValue,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp, Dynamic &outValue); + + +class CppiaLoadedModule_obj : public ::hx::Object +{ +public: + virtual void run() = 0; + virtual void boot() = 0; + virtual ::hx::Class resolveClass( ::String inName) = 0; +}; +typedef ::hx::ObjectPtr CppiaLoadedModule; + + + +} // End namespace hx + +void __scriptable_load_neko(String inName); +void __scriptable_load_cppia(String inCode); +::hx::CppiaLoadedModule __scriptable_cppia_from_string(String inCode); +::hx::CppiaLoadedModule __scriptable_cppia_from_data(Array inBytes); +void __scriptable_load_neko_bytes(Array inBytes); +void __scriptable_load_abc(Array inBytes); + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) + +#define HX_SCRIPTABLE_REGISTER_INTERFACE(name,class) \ + hx::ScriptableRegisterInterface( HX_CSTRING(name), __scriptableFunctions, & class##_scriptable ) + +#else + +#define HX_SCRIPTABLE_REGISTER_INTERFACE(name,class) \ + hx::ScriptableRegisterInterface( HX_CSTRING(name), __scriptableFunctions, &typeid(class), class##__scriptable::__script_create ) + +#endif + +#define HX_SCRIPTABLE_REGISTER_CLASS(name,class) \ + hx::ScriptableRegisterClass( HX_CSTRING(name), (int)offsetof(class##__scriptable,__scriptVTable) + sizeof(void *), __scriptableFunctions, class##__scriptable::__script_create, class##__scriptable::__script_construct ) + + +#ifdef HXCPP_VISIT_ALLOCS +#define SCRIPTABLE_VISIT_FUNCTION \ +void __Visit(HX_VISIT_PARAMS) { super::__Visit(HX_VISIT_ARG); hx::ScriptableVisit(__scriptVTable[-1],this,HX_VISIT_ARG); } +#else +#define SCRIPTABLE_VISIT_FUNCTION +#endif + + +#define HX_DEFINE_SCRIPTABLE(ARG_LIST) \ + inline void *operator new( size_t inSize, int inExtraDataSize ) \ + { \ + return hx::InternalNew(inSize + inExtraDataSize,true); \ + } \ + inline void operator delete(void *,int) {} \ + public: \ + void **__scriptVTable; \ + static hx::Object *__script_create(void **inVTable, int inExtra) { \ + __ME *result = new (inExtra) __ME(); \ + result->__scriptVTable = inVTable; \ + return result; } \ + void ** __GetScriptVTable() { return __scriptVTable; } \ + ::String toString() { if (__scriptVTable[0] ) \ + { hx::CppiaCtx *ctx = hx::CppiaCtx::getCurrent(); hx::AutoStack a(ctx); ctx->pushObject(this); return ctx->runString(__scriptVTable[0]); } \ + else return __superString::toString(); } \ + ::String __ToString() const { return hx::ScriptableToString(__scriptVTable[-1]); } \ + hx::Class __GetClass() const { return hx::ScriptableGetClass(__scriptVTable[-1]); } \ + int __GetType() const { return hx::ScriptableGetType(__scriptVTable[-1]); } \ + void __Mark(HX_MARK_PARAMS) { super::__Mark(HX_MARK_ARG); hx::ScriptableMark(__scriptVTable[-1],this,HX_MARK_ARG); } \ + SCRIPTABLE_VISIT_FUNCTION + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_SCRIPTABLE_INTERFACE \ + void **__scriptVTable; \ + Dynamic mDelegate; \ + hx::Object *__GetRealObject() { return mDelegate.mPtr; } \ + SCRIPTABLE_VISIT_FUNCTION \ + void ** __GetScriptVTable() { return __scriptVTable; } \ + public: \ + static hx::Object *__script_create(void **inVTable,hx::Object *inDelegate) { \ + __ME *result = new __ME(); \ + result->__scriptVTable = inVTable; \ + result->mDelegate = inDelegate; \ + return result; } + + + +#define HX_DEFINE_SCRIPTABLE_DYNAMIC \ + \ + hx::Val __Field(const ::String &inName,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp) \ + { Dynamic result; if (hx::ScriptableField(this,inName,inCallProp,result)) return result; return super::__Field(inName,inCallProp); } \ + Float __INumField(int inFieldID) \ + { Float result; if (hx::ScriptableField(this,inFieldID,hx::paccAlways,result)) return result; return super::__INumField(inFieldID); } \ + Dynamic __IField(int inFieldID) \ + { Dynamic result; if (hx::ScriptableField(this,inFieldID,hx::paccAlways,result)) return result; return super::__IField(inFieldID); } \ + hx::Val __SetField(const ::String &inName,const hx::Val &inValue,hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp) \ + { \ + Dynamic value; \ + if (hx::ScriptableSetField(this, inName, inValue,inCallProp,value)) \ + return value; \ + return super::__SetField(inName,inValue,inCallProp); \ + } \ + void __GetFields(Array< ::String> &outFields) \ + { super::__GetFields(outFields); hx::ScriptableGetFields(this,outFields); } + + + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/StackContext.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/StackContext.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d0bfa949 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/StackContext.h @@ -0,0 +1,752 @@ +#ifndef HX_STACK_CONTEXT_H +#define HX_STACK_CONTEXT_H + +#include "QuickVec.h" + +#ifdef HXCPP_SINGLE_THREADED_APP + #define HX_CTX_GET ::hx::gMainThreadContext +#else + #define HX_CTX_GET ((::hx::StackContext *)::hx::tlsStackContext) +#endif + +// Set: +// HXCPP_STACK_LINE if stack line numbers need to be tracked +// HXCPP_STACK_TRACE if stack frames need to be tracked + +// Keep track of lines - more accurate stack traces for exceptions, also +// needed for the debugger +#if (defined(HXCPP_DEBUG) || defined(HXCPP_DEBUGGER)) && !defined(HXCPP_STACK_LINE) +#define HXCPP_STACK_LINE +#endif + +// Do we need to keep a stack trace - for basic exception handelling, also needed for the debugger +// At a minimum, you can track the functions calls and nothing else +#if (defined(HXCPP_STACK_LINE) || defined(HXCPP_TELEMETRY) || defined(HXCPP_PROFILER) || defined(HXCPP_DEBUG)) && !defined(HXCPP_STACK_TRACE) + #define HXCPP_STACK_TRACE +#endif + +#if defined(HXCPP_STACK_TRACE) && defined(HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE) +#define HXCPP_STACK_SCRIPTABLE +#endif +// HXCPP_DEBUG_HASH == HXCPP_DEBUGGER +// HXCPP_STACK_VARS == HXCPP_DEBUGGER + + +// HX_STACKFRAME(pos) - tracks position according to define. May be optimized away. +// HX_GC_STACKFRAME(pos) - tracks position according to define, but is never optimized away +// HX_JUST_GC_STACKFRAME - never tracks position, never optimized away + +// Setup the _hx_stackframe variable +#ifdef HXCPP_STACK_TRACE + // Setup the 'HX_DEFINE_STACK_FRAME' 'HX_LOCAL_STACK_FRAME' macro. + // This will be empty, just track functions(release), track functions and lines(debug) or track everything (debugger) + #define HX_DECLARE_STACK_FRAME(name) extern ::hx::StackPosition name; + + #ifdef HXCPP_STACK_LINE + + #ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + #define HX_DEFINE_STACK_FRAME(varName, className, functionName, classFunctionHash, fullName,fileName, \ + lineNumber, fileHash ) \ + ::hx::StackPosition varName(className, functionName, fullName, fileName, lineNumber, \ + classFunctionHash, fileHash); + #else + #define HX_DEFINE_STACK_FRAME(varName, className, functionName, classFunctionHash, fullName,fileName, \ + lineNumber, fileHash ) \ + ::hx::StackPosition varName(className, functionName, fullName, fileName, lineNumber); + #endif + #else + + #define HX_DEFINE_STACK_FRAME(varName, className, functionName, classFunctionHash, fullName,fileName, \ + lineNumber, fileHash ) \ + ::hx::StackPosition varName(className, functionName, fullName, fileName); + + #endif + + #define HX_LOCAL_STACK_FRAME(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) static HX_DEFINE_STACK_FRAME(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) + + // Haxe < 330 does not create position pointers, and we must use a local one. + // This code will hst the 'HX_STACK_FRAME' macro + #define HX_STACK_FRAME(className, functionName, classFunctionHash, fullName,fileName, lineNumber, fileHash ) \ + HX_DEFINE_STACK_FRAME(__stackPosition, className, functionName, classFunctionHash, fullName,fileName, lineNumber, fileHash ) \ + ::hx::StackFrame _hx_stackframe(&__stackPosition); + + // Newer code will use the HX_STACKFRAME macro + #define HX_STACKFRAME(pos) ::hx::StackFrame _hx_stackframe(pos); + #define HX_GC_STACKFRAME(pos) ::hx::StackFrame _hx_stackframe(pos); + + // Must record the stack state at the catch + #define HX_STACK_BEGIN_CATCH __hxcpp_stack_begin_catch(); + #define HX_JUST_GC_STACKFRAME ::hx::JustGcStackFrame _hx_stackframe; + #define HX_CTX _hx_stackframe.ctx +#else + // No need to track frame + #define HX_DECLARE_STACK_FRAME(name) + #define HX_STACK_BEGIN_CATCH + #define HX_DEFINE_STACK_FRAME(__stackPosition, className, functionName, classFunctionHash, fullName,fileName, lineNumber, fileHash ) + #define HX_LOCAL_STACK_FRAME(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) + #define HX_STACK_FRAME(className, functionName, classFunctionHash, fullName,fileName, lineNumber, fileHash ) + #define HX_STACKFRAME(pos) + #define HX_JUST_GC_STACKFRAME ::hx::StackContext *_hx_ctx = HX_CTX_GET; + #define HX_GC_STACKFRAME(pos) HX_JUST_GC_STACKFRAME + #define HX_CTX _hx_ctx +#endif + +#define HX_GC_CTX HX_CTX + + +// Setup debugger catchable and variable macros... +#ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + + // Emitted at the beginning of every instance fuction. ptr is "this". + // Only if stack variables are to be tracked + #define HX_STACK_THIS(ptr) ::hx::StackThis __stackthis(_hx_stackframe.variables, ptr); + + // Emitted at the beginning of every function that takes arguments. + // name is the name of the argument. + // For the lifetime of this object, the argument will be in the [arguments] + // list of the stack frame in which the arg was declared + // Only if stack variables are to be tracked + #define HX_STACK_ARG(cpp_var, haxe_name) \ + ::hx::StackVariable __stackargument_##cpp_var(_hx_stackframe.variables, true, haxe_name, &cpp_var); + + // Emitted whenever a Haxe value is pushed on the stack. cpp_var is the local + // cpp variable, haxe_name is the name that was used in haxe for it + // Only if stack variables are to be tracked + #define HX_STACK_VAR(cpp_var, haxe_name) \ + ::hx::StackVariable __stackvariable_##cpp_var(_hx_stackframe.variables, false, haxe_name, &cpp_var); + + #define HX_STACK_CATCHABLE(T, n) \ + hx::StackCatchable __stackcatchable_##n \ + (_hx_stackframe, reinterpret_cast(&_hx_stackframe)); + + // If HXCPP_DEBUGGER is enabled, then a throw is checked to see if it + // can be caught and if not, the debugger is entered. Otherwise, the + // throw proceeds as normal. + #define HX_STACK_DO_THROW(e) __hxcpp_dbg_checkedThrow(e) + #define HX_STACK_DO_RETHROW(e) __hxcpp_dbg_checkedRethrow(e) + + + #define HX_VAR(type,name) type name; HX_STACK_VAR(name, #name) + #define HX_VARI(type,name) type name; HX_STACK_VAR(name, #name) name + #define HX_VAR_NAME(type,name,dbgName) type name; HX_STACK_VAR(name, dbgName) + #define HX_VARI_NAME(type,name,dbgName) type name; HX_STACK_VAR(name, dbgName) name + +#else // Non-debugger versions. Just stub-out. + + #define HX_STACK_THIS(ptr) + #define HX_STACK_ARG(cpp_var, haxe_name) + #define HX_STACK_VAR(cpp_var, haxe_name) + #define HX_STACK_CATCHABLE(T, n) + + #define HX_VAR(type,name) type name + #define HX_VARI(type,name) type name + #define HX_VAR_NAME(type,name,dbgName) type name + #define HX_VARI_NAME(type,name,dbgName) type name + + // Just throw - move to hx::Throw function? + #define HX_STACK_DO_THROW(e) ::hx::Throw(e) + #define HX_STACK_DO_RETHROW(e) ::hx::Rethrow(e) +#endif // HXCPP_STACK_VARS + + + + +// Emitted after every Haxe line. number is the original Haxe line number. +// Only if stack lines are to be tracked +#ifdef HXCPP_STACK_LINE + // If the debugger is enabled, must check for a breakpoint at every line. + #ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + #define HX_STACK_LINE(number) \ + _hx_stackframe.lineNumber = number; \ + /* This is incorrect - a read memory barrier is needed here. */ \ + /* For now, just live with the exceedingly rare cases where */ \ + /* breakpoints are missed */ \ + if (::hx::gShouldCallHandleBreakpoints) { \ + __hxcpp_on_line_changed(_hx_stackframe.ctx); \ + } + #define HX_STACK_LINE_QUICK(number) _hx_stackframe.lineNumber = number; + #else + // Just set it + #define HX_STACK_LINE(number) _hx_stackframe.lineNumber = number; + #define HX_STACK_LINE_QUICK(number) _hx_stackframe.lineNumber = number; + #endif +#else + #define HX_STACK_LINE(number) + #define HX_STACK_LINE_QUICK(number) +#endif + + +// For tidier generated code +#define HXLINE(number) HX_STACK_LINE(number) +#define HXDLIN(number) + + +// To support older versions of the haxe compiler that emit HX_STACK_PUSH +// instead of HX_STACK_FRAME. If the old haxe compiler is used with this +// new debugger implementation, className.functionName breakpoints will +// not work, and stack reporting will be a little weird. If you want to +// use debugging, you really should upgrade to a newer haxe compiler. + +#undef HX_STACK_PUSH +#define HX_STACK_PUSH(fullName, fileName, lineNumber) \ + HX_STACK_FRAME("", fullName, 0, fullName, fileName, lineNumber, 0) + +#if defined(HXCPP_STACK_TRACE) || defined(HXCPP_TELEMETRY) + #define HXCPP_STACK_IDS +#endif + + +namespace hx +{ + + +class StackFrame; +struct StackContext; + +class Profiler; +void profDestroy(Profiler *); +void profAttach(Profiler *, StackContext *); +void profDetach(Profiler *, StackContext *); +void profSample(Profiler *, StackContext *inContext); + + +class Telemetry; +Telemetry *tlmCreate(StackContext *); +void tlmDestroy(Telemetry *); +void tlmAttach(Telemetry *, StackContext *); +void tlmDetach(Telemetry *); +void tlmSampleEnter(Telemetry *, StackFrame *inFrame); +void tlmSampleExit(Telemetry *); + + +class DebuggerContext; +DebuggerContext *dbgCtxCreate(StackContext *); +void dbgCtxDestroy(DebuggerContext *); +void dbgCtxAttach(DebuggerContext *, StackContext *); +void dbgCtxDetach(DebuggerContext *); +void dbgCtxEnable(DebuggerContext *, bool inEnable); + + +struct scriptCallable; +class StackVariable; +class StackCatchable; + +template struct Hash; +struct TWeakStringSet; +typedef Hash WeakStringSet; + +extern const char* EXTERN_CLASS_NAME; + + +#ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER +extern volatile bool gShouldCallHandleBreakpoints; + + +// These must match the values present in cpp.vm.Debugger +enum DebugStatus +{ + DBG_STATUS_INVALID = 0, // Not present or needed in cpp.vm.Debugger + DBG_STATUS_RUNNING = 1, + DBG_STATUS_STOPPED_BREAK_IMMEDIATE = 2, + DBG_STATUS_STOPPED_BREAKPOINT = 3, + DBG_STATUS_STOPPED_UNCAUGHT_EXCEPTION = 4, + DBG_STATUS_STOPPED_CRITICAL_ERROR = 5 +}; + +enum ExecutionTrace +{ + exeTraceOff = 0, + exeTraceFuncs = 1, + exeTraceLines = 2, +}; + +extern ExecutionTrace sExecutionTrace; + +#endif + + + + + +class StackPosition +{ +public: + // These are constant during the lifetime of the stack frame + const char *className; + const char *functionName; + const char *fullName; // this is className.functionName - used for profiler + const char *fileName; + int firstLineNumber; + + #if defined(HXCPP_STACK_SCRIPTABLE) + // Information about the current cppia function + struct ScriptCallable *scriptCallable; + #endif + + // These are only used if HXCPP_DEBUGGER is defined + #ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + int fileHash; + int classFuncHash; + #else + enum { fileHash = 0, classFuncHash=0 }; + #endif + + inline StackPosition() { } + + // The constructor automatically adds the StackFrame to the list of + // stack frames for the current thread + inline StackPosition(const char *inClassName, const char *inFunctionName, + const char *inFullName, const char *inFileName + #ifdef HXCPP_STACK_LINE + , int inLineNumber + #endif + #ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + ,int inClassFunctionHash, int inFileHash + #endif + ) + + : className(inClassName), functionName(inFunctionName) + ,fullName(inFullName), fileName(inFileName) + #ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + ,classFuncHash(inClassFunctionHash) + ,fileHash(inFileHash) + #endif + #ifdef HXCPP_STACK_LINE + ,firstLineNumber(inLineNumber) + #endif + { + #if defined(HXCPP_STACK_SCRIPTABLE) + // Information about the current cppia function + scriptCallable = 0; + #endif + } + +}; + + + + + + +#ifdef HXCPP_STACK_TRACE +struct ExceptionStackFrame +{ + #ifdef HXCPP_STACK_LINE + int line; + #endif + + #if HXCPP_API_LEVEL > 330 + const hx::StackPosition *position; + #else + const char *className; + const char *functionName; + const char *fileName; + #endif + + ExceptionStackFrame(const StackFrame &inFrame); + ::String format(bool inForDisplay); + ::String toDisplay(); + ::String toString(); +}; +#endif + + +#ifdef HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE +enum +{ + bcrBreak = 0x01, + bcrContinue = 0x02, + bcrReturn = 0x04, + + bcrLoop = (bcrBreak | bcrContinue), +}; + + + +#endif + + +struct MarkChunk +{ + enum { SIZE = 62 }; + enum { OBJ_ARRAY_JOB = -1 }; + + inline MarkChunk() : count(0), next(0) { } + + int count; + + union + { + hx::Object *stack[SIZE]; + struct + { + hx::Object **arrayBase; + int arrayElements; + }; + }; + MarkChunk *next; + + inline void push(Object *inObj) + { + stack[count++] = inObj; + } + inline hx::Object *pop() + { + if (count) + return stack[--count]; + return 0; + } + MarkChunk *swapForNew(); +}; + + + +struct StackContext : public hx::ImmixAllocator +{ + #ifdef HXCPP_STACK_IDS + int mThreadId; + #endif + + #ifdef HXCPP_STACK_TRACE + hx::QuickVec mStackFrames; + hx::QuickVec mExceptionStack; + // Updated only when a thrown exception unwinds the stack + bool mIsUnwindingException; + + #ifdef HXCPP_STACK_SCRIPTABLE + // TODO - combine CppaCtx and StackContext + #endif + + #ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + DebuggerContext *mDebugger; + #endif + + #ifdef HXCPP_PROFILER + // Profiling support + Profiler *mProfiler; + #endif + + #endif + + #ifdef HXCPP_TELEMETRY + // Telemetry support + Telemetry *mTelemetry; + #endif + + #ifdef HXCPP_COMBINE_STRINGS + WeakStringSet *stringSet; + #endif + + #ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + MarkChunk *mOldReferrers; + inline void pushReferrer(hx::Object *inObj) + { + // If collector is running on non-generational mode, mOldReferrers will be null + if (mOldReferrers) + { + mOldReferrers->push(inObj); + if (mOldReferrers->count==MarkChunk::SIZE) + mOldReferrers = mOldReferrers->swapForNew(); + } + } + #endif + + #ifdef HXCPP_CATCH_SEGV + #ifdef _MSC_VER + _se_translator_function mOldSignalFunc; + #else + void (*mOldSignalFunc)(int); + #endif + #endif + + StackContext(); + ~StackContext(); + void onThreadAttach(); + void onThreadDetach(); + + + #ifdef HXCPP_STACK_TRACE // { + void tracePosition(); + + // Note that the stack frames are manipulated without holding any locks. + // This is because the manipulation of stack frames can only be done by + // the thread that "owns" that stack frame. The only other contention on + // the call stack is from calls to GetThreadInfo() and GetThreadInfos(), + // and these should only be called when the thread for which the call + // stack is being acquired is stopped in a breakpoint anyway, thus there + // can be no contention on the contents of the CallStack in that case + // either. + + inline void pushFrame(StackFrame *inFrame) + { + #ifdef HXCPP_PROFILER + if (mProfiler) + profSample(mProfiler,this); + #endif + + #ifdef HXCPP_TELEMETRY + if (mTelemetry) + tlmSampleEnter(mTelemetry,inFrame); + #endif + + mIsUnwindingException = false; + mStackFrames.push(inFrame); + + #ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + if (sExecutionTrace!=exeTraceOff) + tracePosition(); + #endif + } + + inline void popFrame(StackFrame *inFrame) + { + #ifdef HXCPP_TELEMETRY + if (mTelemetry) + tlmSampleExit(mTelemetry); + #endif + + if (mIsUnwindingException) + { + // Use default operator= + mExceptionStack.push( *inFrame ); + } + + mStackFrames.pop_back(); + } + + void getCurrentCallStackAsStrings(Array result, bool skipLast); + void getCurrentExceptionStackAsStrings(Array result); + StackFrame *getCurrentStackFrame() { return mStackFrames.back(); } + StackFrame *getStackFrame(int inIndex) { return mStackFrames[inIndex]; } + int getDepth() const { return mStackFrames.size(); } + inline const char *getFullNameAtDepth(int depth) const; + void dumpExceptionStack(); + + // Called when a throw occurs + void setLastException(); + void pushLastException(); + // Called when a catch block begins to be executed. hxcpp wants to track + // the stack back through the catches so that it can be dumped if + // uncaught. If inAll is true, the entire stack is captured immediately. + // If inAll is false, only the last stack frame is captured. + void beginCatch(bool inAll); + + #endif // } HXCPP_STACK_TRACE + + #ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + void enableCurrentThreadDebugging(bool inEnable) + { + dbgCtxEnable(mDebugger,inEnable); + } + #endif + + static inline StackContext *getCurrent() + { + return HX_CTX_GET; + } + + #ifdef HXCPP_STACK_IDS + static void getAllStackIds( QuickVec &outIds ); + static StackContext *getStackForId(int id); + #endif + + + #ifdef HXCPP_SCRIPTABLE + unsigned char *stack; + unsigned char *pointer; + unsigned char *frame; + class Object *exception; + + unsigned int breakContReturn; + int byteMarkId; + + template + void push(T inValue) + { + *(T *)pointer = inValue; + pointer += sizeof(T); + } + unsigned char *stackAlloc(int inSize) + { + unsigned char *p = pointer; + pointer += inSize; + return p; + } + void stackFree(int inSize) + { + pointer -= inSize; + } + + int getFrameSize() const { return pointer-frame; } + + int runInt(void *vtable); + Float runFloat(void *vtable); + String runString(void *vtable); + void runVoid(void *vtable); + Dynamic runObject(void *vtable); + hx::Object *runObjectPtr(void *vtable); + + void push(bool &inValue) { *(int *)pointer = inValue; pointer += sizeof(int); } + inline void pushBool(bool b) { *(int *)pointer = b; pointer += sizeof(int); } + inline void pushInt(int i) { *(int *)pointer = i; pointer += sizeof(int); } + + inline void pushFloat(Float f); + inline void pushString(const String &s); + inline void pushObject(Dynamic d); + inline void returnFloat(Float f); + inline void returnString(const String &s); + inline void returnObject(Dynamic d); + inline hx::Object *getThis(bool inCheckPtr=true); + + inline void returnBool(bool b) { *(int *)frame = b; } + inline void returnInt(int i) { *(int *)frame = i; } + inline bool getBool(int inPos=0) { return *(bool *)(frame+inPos); } + inline int getInt(int inPos=0) { return *(int *)(frame+inPos); } + + inline Float getFloat(int inPos=0); + inline String getString(int inPos=0); + inline Dynamic getObject(int inPos=0); + inline hx::Object *getObjectPtr(int inPos=0) { return *(hx::Object **)(frame+inPos); } + + + void breakFlag() { breakContReturn |= bcrBreak; } + void continueFlag() { breakContReturn |= bcrContinue; } + void returnFlag() { breakContReturn |= bcrReturn; } + + #endif + +}; + + +typedef StackContext CppiaCtx; + + + +class StackFrame +{ +public: + StackContext *ctx; + + #ifdef HXCPP_STACK_TRACE // { + const StackPosition *position; + + #ifdef HXCPP_STACK_LINE + // Current line number, changes during the lifetime of the stack frame. + // Only updated if HXCPP_STACK_LINE is defined. + int lineNumber; + + #ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + // Function arguments and local variables in reverse order of their + // declaration. If a variable name is in here twice, the first version is + // the most recently scoped one and should be used. Only updated if + // HXCPP_DEBUGGER is defined. + StackVariable *variables; + + // The list of types that can be currently caught in the stack frame. + StackCatchable *catchables; + #endif + #endif + + // The constructor automatically adds the StackFrame to the list of + // stack frames for the current thread + inline StackFrame(const StackPosition *inPosition + ) : position(inPosition) + { + #ifdef HXCPP_STACK_LINE + lineNumber = inPosition->firstLineNumber; + #ifdef HXCPP_DEBUGGER + variables = 0; + catchables = 0; + #endif + #endif + + + ctx = HX_CTX_GET; + ctx->pushFrame(this); + } + + + // The destructor automatically removes the StackFrame from the list of + // stack frames for the current thread + ~StackFrame() + { + ctx->popFrame(this); + } + + ::String toString(); + ::String toDisplay(); + #else // } !HXCPP_STACK_TRACE { + + // Release version only has ctx + inline StackFrame() + { + ctx = HX_CTX_GET; + } + + #endif // } + +}; + +#ifdef HXCPP_STACK_TRACE +const char *StackContext::getFullNameAtDepth(int depth) const +{ + return mStackFrames[depth]->position->fullName; +} +#endif + +class JustGcStackFrame +{ +public: + StackContext *ctx; + inline JustGcStackFrame() : ctx(HX_CTX_GET) { } +}; + + + + +} // end namespace hx + + + +// Some functions used by AdvancedDebug.cpp +// Returns the thread number of the calling thread +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +int __hxcpp_GetCurrentThreadNumber(); + +// Called by the main function when an uncaught exception occurs to dump +// the stack leading to the exception +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +void __hx_dump_stack(); + +// The macro HX_STACK_BEGIN_CATCH, which is emitted at the beginning of every +// catch block, calls this in debug mode to let the debugging system know that +// a catch block has been entered +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +void __hxcpp_stack_begin_catch(); + +// Last chance to throw an exception for null-pointer access +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +void __hxcpp_set_critical_error_handler(Dynamic inHandler); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +void __hxcpp_execution_trace(int inLevel); + +// Used by debug breakpoints and execution trace +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +void __hxcpp_set_stack_frame_line(int); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +void __hxcpp_on_line_changed(hx::StackContext *); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +void __hxcpp_set_debugger_info(const char **inAllClasses, const char **inFullPaths); + + +void __hxcpp_dbg_getScriptableVariables(hx::StackFrame *stackFrame, ::Array< ::Dynamic> outNames); +bool __hxcpp_dbg_getScriptableValue(hx::StackFrame *stackFrame, String inName, ::Dynamic &outValue); +bool __hxcpp_dbg_setScriptableValue(hx::StackFrame *StackFrame, String inName, ::Dynamic inValue); + + + + +#endif // HX_STACK_CTX_H diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/StdLibs.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/StdLibs.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e59e9bbf --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/StdLibs.h @@ -0,0 +1,932 @@ +#ifndef HX_STDLIBS_H +#define HX_STDLIBS_H + +// --- Resource ------------------------------------------------------------- + +namespace haxe { + namespace ds { + class HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES StringMap_obj; + } +} + +namespace hx +{ +struct Resource +{ + String mName; + int mDataLength; + unsigned char *mData; + + bool operator<(const Resource &inRHS) const { return mName < inRHS.mName; } +}; + +Resource *GetResources(); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES +void RegisterResources(hx::Resource *inResources); + + +struct AnyCast +{ + template + explicit AnyCast(T* inPtr) : mPtr((void *)inPtr) { } + + template + operator T*() const { return (T*)mPtr; } + + void *mPtr; +}; + +} // end namespace hx + +Array __hxcpp_resource_names(); +String __hxcpp_resource_string(String inName); +Array __hxcpp_resource_bytes(String inName); + + + + +// System access +Array __get_args(); +double __time_stamp(); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_print_string(const String &inV); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_println_string(const String &inV); + +template inline void __hxcpp_println(T inV) +{ + Dynamic d(inV); + __hxcpp_println_string(d); +} +// Specialization that does not need dynamic boxing +template<> inline void __hxcpp_println(String inV) +{ + __hxcpp_println_string(inV); +} + +template inline void __hxcpp_print(T inV) +{ + Dynamic d(inV); + __hxcpp_print_string(d); +} +// Specialization that does not need dynamic boxing +template<> inline void __hxcpp_print(String inV) +{ + __hxcpp_print_string(inV); +} + + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __trace(Dynamic inPtr, Dynamic inData); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_exit(int inExitCode); +void __hxcpp_stdlibs_boot(); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int hxcpp_alloc_kind(); + +// --- Maths --------------------------------------------------------- +double __hxcpp_drand(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __hxcpp_irand(int inMax); + +// --- Casting/Converting --------------------------------------------------------- +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool __instanceof(const Dynamic &inValue, const Dynamic &inType); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __int__(double x); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool __hxcpp_same_closure(Dynamic &inF1,Dynamic &inF2); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic __hxcpp_parse_int(const String &inString); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES double __hxcpp_parse_float(const String &inString); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES double __hxcpp_parse_substr_float(const String &inString, int start, int len); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __hxcpp_parse_substr_int(const String &inString, int start=0, int len=-1); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic __hxcpp_create_var_args(Dynamic &inArrayFunc); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_set_float_format(String inFormat); + +inline int _hx_idiv(int inNum,int inDenom) { return inNum/inDenom; } +inline int _hx_imod(int inNum,int inDenom) { return inNum%inDenom; } +inline int _hx_cast_int(int inX) { return inX; } +inline int _hx_fast_floor(double inX) { + union Cast + { + double d; + long l; + }; + Cast c; + c.d = (inX-0.5) + 6755399441055744.0; + return c.l; +} + + + +// --- CFFI helpers ------------------------------------------------------------------ + +// Used for accessing object fields by integer ID, rather than string ID. +// Used mainly for neko ndll interaction. +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __hxcpp_field_to_id( const char *inField ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES const String &__hxcpp_field_from_id( int f ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __hxcpp_register_prim(const HX_CHAR *inName,void *inFunc); + +// Get function pointer from dll file +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic __loadprim(String inLib, String inPrim,int inArgCount); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void *__hxcpp_get_proc_address(String inLib, String inPrim,bool inNdll, bool inQuietFail=false); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_run_dll(String inLib, String inPrim); +// Can assign to function pointer without error +inline hx::AnyCast __hxcpp_cast_get_proc_address(String inLib, String inPrim,bool inQuietFail=false) +{ + return hx::AnyCast(__hxcpp_get_proc_address(inLib,inPrim,false,inQuietFail)); +} + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __hxcpp_unload_all_libraries(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_push_dll_path(String inPath); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String __hxcpp_get_dll_extension(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String __hxcpp_get_bin_dir(); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String __hxcpp_get_kind(Dynamic inObject); + + +// Loading functions via name (dummy return value) + + + +// --- haxe.io.BytesData ---------------------------------------------------------------- + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_bytes_of_string(Array &outBytes,const String &inString); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_string_of_bytes(Array &inBytes,String &outString,int pos,int len,bool inCopyPointer=false); +// UTF8 processing +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String __hxcpp_char_array_to_utf8_string(Array &inChars,int inFirst=0, int inLen=-1); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array __hxcpp_utf8_string_to_char_array(String &inString); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String __hxcpp_char_bytes_to_utf8_string(String &inBytes); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String __hxcpp_utf8_string_to_char_bytes(String &inUTF8); + + +#ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + #define HX_MAP_THIS this, h + #define HX_MAP_THIS_ this, + #define HX_MAP_THIS_ARG hx::Object *owner, Dynamic &ioHash +#else + #define HX_MAP_THIS h + #define HX_MAP_THIS_ + #define HX_MAP_THIS_ARG Dynamic &ioHash +#endif + +// --- HashRoot --------------------------------------------------------------------- + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __root_hash_size(Dynamic *rtHash); + +// --- IntHash ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES inline hx::Object *__int_hash_create() { return 0; } +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __int_hash_set(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,int inKey,const Dynamic &value); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool __int_hash_exists(Dynamic &hash,int inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool __int_hash_remove(Dynamic &hash,int inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array __int_hash_keys(Dynamic &hash); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic __int_hash_values(Dynamic &hash); +// Typed IntHash access... +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __int_hash_set_int(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,int inKey,int inValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __int_hash_set_string(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,int inKey,::String inValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __int_hash_set_float(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,int inKey,Float inValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __int_hash_set_int64(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,int inKey,cpp::Int64 inValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES ::String __int_hash_to_string(Dynamic &hash); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __int_hash_clear(Dynamic &hash); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic __int_hash_get(Dynamic inHash,int inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __int_hash_get_int(Dynamic inHash,int inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES ::String __int_hash_get_string(Dynamic inHash,int inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Float __int_hash_get_float(Dynamic inHash,int inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES cpp::Int64 __int_hash_get_int64(Dynamic inHash,int inKey); +inline bool __int_hash_get_bool(Dynamic inHash,int inKey) { return __int_hash_get_int(inHash,inKey); } + +// --- Int64Hash ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES inline hx::Object *__int64_hash_create() { return 0; } +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __int64_hash_set(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,cpp::Int64 inKey,const Dynamic &value); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool __int64_hash_exists(Dynamic &hash,cpp::Int64 inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool __int64_hash_remove(Dynamic &hash,cpp::Int64 inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array __int64_hash_keys(Dynamic &hash); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic __int64_hash_values(Dynamic &hash); +// Typed IntHash access... +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __int64_hash_set_int(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,cpp::Int64 inKey,int inValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __int64_hash_set_string(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,cpp::Int64 inKey,::String inValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __int64_hash_set_float(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,cpp::Int64 inKey,Float inValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __int64_hash_set_int64(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,cpp::Int64 inKey,cpp::Int64 inValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES ::String __int64_hash_to_string(Dynamic &hash); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __int64_hash_clear(Dynamic &hash); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic __int64_hash_get(Dynamic inHash,cpp::Int64 inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __int64_hash_get_int(Dynamic inHash,cpp::Int64 inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES ::String __int64_hash_get_string(Dynamic inHash,cpp::Int64 inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Float __int64_hash_get_float(Dynamic inHash,cpp::Int64 inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES cpp::Int64 __int64_hash_get_int64(Dynamic inHash,cpp::Int64 inKey); +inline bool __int64_hash_get_bool(Dynamic inHash,cpp::Int64 inKey) { return __int64_hash_get_int(inHash,inKey); } + +// --- StringHash ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __string_hash_set(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,String inKey,const Dynamic &value,bool inForceDynamic=false); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool __string_hash_exists(Dynamic &hash,String inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool __string_hash_remove(Dynamic &hash,String inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array< ::String> __string_hash_keys(Dynamic &hash); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic __string_hash_values(Dynamic &hash); +// Typed StringHash access... +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __string_hash_set_int(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,String inKey,int inValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __string_hash_set_string(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,String inKey,::String inValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __string_hash_set_float(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,String inKey,Float inValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __string_hash_set_int64(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,String inKey,cpp::Int64 inValue); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES ::String __string_hash_map_substr(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,String inKey,int inStart, int inLength); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES ::String __string_hash_to_string(Dynamic &hash); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES ::String __string_hash_to_string_raw(Dynamic &hash); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __string_hash_clear(Dynamic &hash); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic __string_hash_get(Dynamic inHash,String inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic __string_hash_get2(haxe::ds::StringMap_obj* map,String* inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __string_hash_get_int(Dynamic inHash,String inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES ::String __string_hash_get_string(Dynamic inHash,String inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Float __string_hash_get_float(Dynamic inHash,String inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES cpp::Int64 __string_hash_get_int64(Dynamic inHash,String inKey); +inline bool __string_hash_get_bool(Dynamic inHash,String inKey) { return __string_hash_get_int(inHash,inKey); } + +// --- ObjectHash ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __object_hash_set(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,Dynamic inKey,const Dynamic &value,bool inWeakKey=false); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool __object_hash_exists(Dynamic &hash,Dynamic inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool __object_hash_remove(Dynamic &hash,Dynamic inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array< ::Dynamic> __object_hash_keys(Dynamic &hash); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic __object_hash_values(Dynamic &hash); +// Typed ObjectHash access... +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __object_hash_set_int(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,Dynamic inKey,int inValue,bool inWeakKey=false); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __object_hash_set_string(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,Dynamic inKey,::String inValue,bool inWeakKey=false); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __object_hash_set_float(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,Dynamic inKey,Float inValue,bool inWeakKey=false); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __object_hash_set_int64(HX_MAP_THIS_ARG,Dynamic inKey,cpp::Int64 inValue,bool inWeakKey=false); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES ::String __object_hash_to_string(Dynamic &hash); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __object_hash_clear(Dynamic &hash); + + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic __object_hash_get(Dynamic inHash,Dynamic inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int __object_hash_get_int(Dynamic inHash,Dynamic inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES ::String __object_hash_get_string(Dynamic inHash,Dynamic inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Float __object_hash_get_float(Dynamic inHash,Dynamic inKey); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES cpp::Int64 __object_hash_get_int64(Dynamic inHash,Dynamic inKey); +inline bool __object_hash_get_bool(Dynamic inHash,Dynamic inKey) { return __object_hash_get_int(inHash,inKey); } + +// --- Date -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +// returns Epoch UTC timestamp (in seconds); assumes that input date parts are considered to be in local timezone date/time representation +double __hxcpp_new_date(int inYear,int inMonth,int inDay,int inHour, int inMin, int inSeconds,int inMilliseconds = 0); + +double __hxcpp_utc_date(int inYear,int inMonth,int inDay,int inHour, int inMin, int inSeconds); +int __hxcpp_get_hours(double inSeconds); +int __hxcpp_get_minutes(double inSeconds); +int __hxcpp_get_seconds(double inSeconds); +int __hxcpp_get_year(double inSeconds); +int __hxcpp_get_month(double inSeconds); +int __hxcpp_get_date(double inSeconds); +int __hxcpp_get_day(double inSeconds); +String __hxcpp_to_string(double inSeconds); +double __hxcpp_date_now(); + + +int __hxcpp_get_utc_hours(double inSeconds); /* returns hour part of UTC date/time representation of input time (Epoch, in seconds), 0-23 */ +int __hxcpp_get_utc_minutes(double inSeconds); /* returns minutes part of UTC date/time representation of input time (Epoch, in seconds), 0-59 */ +int __hxcpp_get_utc_seconds(double inSeconds); /* returns seconds part of UTC date/time representation of input time (Epoch, in seconds), 0-59 */ +int __hxcpp_get_utc_year(double inSeconds); /* returns year part of UTC date/time representation of input time (Epoch, in seconds) */ +int __hxcpp_get_utc_month(double inSeconds); /* returns month part of UTC date/time representation of input time (Epoch, in seconds), 0-January...11-December */ +int __hxcpp_get_utc_date(double inSeconds); /* returns day of the month part of UTC date/time representation of input time (Epoch, in seconds), 1-31 */ +int __hxcpp_get_utc_day(double inSeconds); /* returns day of the week part of UTC date/time representation of input time (Epoch, in seconds), 0-Sunday...6-Saturday */ +String __hxcpp_to_utc_string(double inSeconds); /* same as __hxcpp_to_string but in corresponding UTC format */ + +int __hxcpp_is_dst(double inSeconds); /* is input time (Epoch UTC timestamp, in seconds)'s local time in DST ? 1 for true, 0 for false */ +double __hxcpp_timezone_offset(double inSeconds); /* input time (Epoch UTC timestamp, in seconds)'s local time zone offset from UTC, in seconds */ +double __hxcpp_from_utc(int inYear,int inMonth,int inDay,int inHour, int inMin, int inSeconds, int inMilliSeconds); /* returns Epoch timestamp (in seconds); assumes that input date parts are considered to be in UTC date/time representation */ + + + +double __hxcpp_time_stamp(); + +// --- vm/threading -------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Dynamic __hxcpp_thread_create(Dynamic inFunc); +Dynamic __hxcpp_thread_current(); +void __hxcpp_thread_send(Dynamic inThread, Dynamic inMessage); +Dynamic __hxcpp_thread_read_message(bool inBlocked); +bool __hxcpp_is_current_thread(hx::Object *inThread); + +Dynamic __hxcpp_mutex_create(); +void __hxcpp_mutex_acquire(Dynamic); +bool __hxcpp_mutex_try(Dynamic); +void __hxcpp_mutex_release(Dynamic); + +Dynamic __hxcpp_semaphore_create(int); +void __hxcpp_semaphore_acquire(Dynamic); +bool __hxcpp_semaphore_try_acquire(Dynamic, double timeout); +void __hxcpp_semaphore_release(Dynamic); + +Dynamic __hxcpp_condition_create(void); +void __hxcpp_condition_acquire(Dynamic); +bool __hxcpp_condition_try_acquire(Dynamic); +void __hxcpp_condition_release(Dynamic); +void __hxcpp_condition_wait(Dynamic); +bool __hxcpp_condition_timed_wait(Dynamic,double); +void __hxcpp_condition_signal(Dynamic); +void __hxcpp_condition_broadcast(Dynamic); + +Dynamic __hxcpp_lock_create(); +bool __hxcpp_lock_wait(Dynamic inlock,double inTime); +void __hxcpp_lock_release(Dynamic inlock); + +Dynamic __hxcpp_deque_create(); +void __hxcpp_deque_add(Dynamic q,Dynamic inVal); +void __hxcpp_deque_push(Dynamic q,Dynamic inVal); +Dynamic __hxcpp_deque_pop(Dynamic q,bool block); + +Dynamic __hxcpp_tls_get(int inID); +void __hxcpp_tls_set(int inID,Dynamic inVal); + +bool _hx_atomic_exchange_if(::cpp::Pointer inPtr, int test, int newVal ); +int _hx_atomic_inc(::cpp::Pointer inPtr ); +int _hx_atomic_dec(::cpp::Pointer inPtr ); + +// Assumptions made: +// People are not using 8 year old versions of GCC. + +#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) +#define HX_GCC_ATOMICS +#define HX_HAS_ATOMIC 1 +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#define HX_MSVC_ATOMICS +#define HX_HAS_ATOMIC 1 +#include +#else +#define HX_HAS_ATOMIC 0 +#endif + +inline int _hx_atomic_add(volatile int *a, int b) { +#if defined(HX_GCC_ATOMICS) + return __atomic_fetch_add(a, b, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); +#elif defined(HX_MSVC_ATOMICS) + return _InterlockedExchangeAdd((long volatile *)a, b); +#else + int old = *a; + *a += b; + return old; +#endif +} + +inline int _hx_atomic_sub(volatile int *a, int b) { +#if defined(HX_GCC_ATOMICS) + return __atomic_fetch_sub(a, b, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); +#elif defined(HX_MSVC_ATOMICS) + return _InterlockedExchangeAdd((long volatile *)a, -b); +#else + int old = *a; + *a -= b; + return old; +#endif +} + +inline int _hx_atomic_and(volatile int *a, int b) { +#if defined(HX_GCC_ATOMICS) + return __atomic_fetch_and(a, b, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); +#elif defined(HX_MSVC_ATOMICS) + return _InterlockedAnd((long volatile *)a, b); +#else + int old = *a; + *a &= b; + return old; +#endif +} + +inline int _hx_atomic_or(volatile int *a, int b) { +#if defined(HX_GCC_ATOMICS) + return __atomic_fetch_or(a, b, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); +#elif defined(HX_MSVC_ATOMICS) + return _InterlockedOr((long volatile *)a, b); +#else + int old = *a; + *a |= b; + return old; +#endif +} + +inline int _hx_atomic_xor(int *a, int b) { +#if defined(HX_GCC_ATOMICS) + return __atomic_fetch_xor(a, b, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); +#elif defined(HX_MSVC_ATOMICS) + return _InterlockedXor((long volatile *)a, b); +#else + int old = *a; + *a ^= b; + return old; +#endif +} + +inline int _hx_atomic_compare_exchange(volatile int *a, int expected, + int replacement) { +#if defined(HX_GCC_ATOMICS) + int _expected = expected; + __atomic_compare_exchange(a, &_expected, &replacement, false, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + return _expected; +#elif defined(HX_MSVC_ATOMICS) + return _InterlockedCompareExchange((long volatile *)a, replacement, expected); +#else + int old = *a; + if(old == expected) { + *a = replacement; + } + return old; +#endif +} + +inline int _hx_atomic_exchange(volatile int *a, int replacement) { +#if defined(HX_GCC_ATOMICS) + int ret = 0; + __atomic_exchange(a, &replacement, &ret, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + return ret; +#elif defined(HX_MSVC_ATOMICS) + return _InterlockedExchange((long volatile *)a, replacement); +#else + int old = *a; + *a = replacement; + return old; +#endif +} + +inline int _hx_atomic_load(volatile int *a) { +#if defined(HX_GCC_ATOMICS) + int ret = 0; + __atomic_load(a, &ret, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + return ret; +#elif defined(HX_MSVC_ATOMICS) + return _InterlockedXor((long volatile *)a, 0); +#else + return *a; +#endif +} + +inline int _hx_atomic_store(volatile int *a, int value) { +#if defined(HX_GCC_ATOMICS) + __atomic_store(a, &value, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + return value; +#elif defined(HX_MSVC_ATOMICS) + _InterlockedExchange((long volatile *)a, value); + return value; +#else + *a = value; + return value; +#endif +} + +inline void* _hx_atomic_compare_exchange_ptr(volatile void **a, void *expected, void* replacement) { +#if defined(HX_GCC_ATOMICS) + void* _expected = expected; + __atomic_compare_exchange(a, (volatile void **)&_expected, (volatile void**)&replacement, false, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + return _expected; +#elif defined(HX_MSVC_ATOMICS) + return _InterlockedCompareExchangePointer((void *volatile *)a, replacement, expected); +#else + void *old = *a; + *a = replacement; + return old; +#endif +} + +inline void* _hx_atomic_compare_exchange_cast_ptr(void *a, void *expected, void *replacement) { + return _hx_atomic_compare_exchange_ptr((volatile void **)a, expected, replacement); +} + +Array __hxcpp_get_call_stack(bool inSkipLast); +Array __hxcpp_get_exception_stack(); +#define HXCPP_HAS_CLASSLIST +Array __hxcpp_get_class_list(); + +// --- Profile ------------------------------------------------------------------- + +void __hxcpp_start_profiler(::String inDumpFile); +void __hxcpp_stop_profiler(); + + +// --- Memory -------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +inline void __hxcpp_align_set_float32( unsigned char *base, int addr, float v) +{ + #ifdef HXCPP_ALIGN_FLOAT + if (addr & 3) + { + const unsigned char *src = (const unsigned char *)&v; + unsigned char *dest = base + addr; + dest[0] = src[0]; + dest[1] = src[1]; + dest[2] = src[2]; + dest[3] = src[3]; + } + else + #endif + *(float *)(base+addr) = v; +} + + +inline float __hxcpp_align_get_float32( unsigned char *base, int addr) +{ + #ifdef HXCPP_ALIGN_FLOAT + if (addr & 3) + { + float buf; + unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *)&buf; + const unsigned char *src = base + addr; + dest[0] = src[0]; + dest[1] = src[1]; + dest[2] = src[2]; + dest[3] = src[3]; + return buf; + } + #endif + return *(float *)(base+addr); +} + + +inline void __hxcpp_align_set_float64( unsigned char *base, int addr, double v) +{ + #ifdef HXCPP_ALIGN_FLOAT + if (addr & 3) + { + unsigned char *dest = base + addr; + const unsigned char *src = (const unsigned char *)&v; + dest[0] = src[0]; + dest[1] = src[1]; + dest[2] = src[2]; + dest[3] = src[3]; + dest[4] = src[4]; + dest[5] = src[5]; + dest[6] = src[6]; + dest[7] = src[7]; + } + else + #endif + *(double *)(base + addr) = v; +} + + +inline double __hxcpp_align_get_float64( unsigned char *base, int addr) +{ + #ifdef HXCPP_ALIGN_FLOAT + if (addr & 3) + { + double buf; + unsigned char *dest = (unsigned char *)&buf; + const unsigned char *src = base + addr; + dest[0] = src[0]; + dest[1] = src[1]; + dest[2] = src[2]; + dest[3] = src[3]; + dest[4] = src[4]; + dest[5] = src[5]; + dest[6] = src[6]; + dest[7] = src[7]; + return buf; + } + #endif + return *(double *)(base+addr); +} + + + + +// Threadsafe methods - takes buffer +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void __hxcpp_memory_memset(Array &inBuffer ,int pos, int len, int value); + +inline int __hxcpp_memory_get_byte(Array inBuffer ,int addr) { return inBuffer->GetBase()[addr]; } +inline double __hxcpp_memory_get_double(Array inBuffer ,int addr) { + return __hxcpp_align_get_float64((unsigned char *)inBuffer->GetBase(), addr); +} +inline float __hxcpp_memory_get_float(Array inBuffer ,int addr) { + return __hxcpp_align_get_float32((unsigned char *)inBuffer->GetBase(), addr); +} +inline int __hxcpp_memory_get_i16(Array inBuffer ,int addr) { return *(short *)(inBuffer->GetBase()+addr); } +inline int __hxcpp_memory_get_i32(Array inBuffer ,int addr) { return *(int *)(inBuffer->GetBase()+addr); } +inline int __hxcpp_memory_get_ui16(Array inBuffer ,int addr) { return *(unsigned short *)(inBuffer->GetBase()+addr); } +inline int __hxcpp_memory_get_ui32(Array inBuffer ,int addr) { return *(unsigned int *)(inBuffer->GetBase()+addr); } +inline float __hxcpp_memory_get_f32(Array inBuffer ,int addr) { + return __hxcpp_align_get_float32((unsigned char *)inBuffer->GetBase(), addr); +} + +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_byte(Array inBuffer ,int addr,int v) { inBuffer->GetBase()[addr] = v; } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_double(Array inBuffer ,int addr,double v) { + return __hxcpp_align_set_float64((unsigned char *)inBuffer->GetBase(), addr,v); +} +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_float(Array inBuffer ,int addr,float v) { + return __hxcpp_align_set_float32((unsigned char *)inBuffer->GetBase(), addr,v); +} +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_i16(Array inBuffer ,int addr,int v) { *(short *)(inBuffer->GetBase()+addr) = v; } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_i32(Array inBuffer ,int addr,int v) { *(int *)(inBuffer->GetBase()+addr) = v; } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_ui16(Array inBuffer ,int addr,int v) { *(unsigned short *)(inBuffer->GetBase()+addr) = v; } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_ui32(Array inBuffer ,int addr,int v) { *(unsigned int *)(inBuffer->GetBase()+addr) = v; } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_f32(Array inBuffer ,int addr,float v) { + return __hxcpp_align_set_float32((unsigned char *)inBuffer->GetBase(), addr, v); +} + + +// Uses global pointer... +extern unsigned char *__hxcpp_memory; + +inline void __hxcpp_memory_clear( ) { __hxcpp_memory = 0; } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_select( Array inBuffer ) + { __hxcpp_memory= (unsigned char *)inBuffer->GetBase(); } + +inline int __hxcpp_memory_get_byte(int addr) { return __hxcpp_memory[addr]; } +inline double __hxcpp_memory_get_double(int addr) { return __hxcpp_align_get_float64(__hxcpp_memory,addr); } +inline float __hxcpp_memory_get_float(int addr) { return __hxcpp_align_get_float32(__hxcpp_memory,addr); } +inline int __hxcpp_memory_get_i16(int addr) { return *(short *)(__hxcpp_memory+addr); } +inline int __hxcpp_memory_get_i32(int addr) { return *(int *)(__hxcpp_memory+addr); } +inline int __hxcpp_memory_get_ui16(int addr) { return *(unsigned short *)(__hxcpp_memory+addr); } +inline int __hxcpp_memory_get_ui32(int addr) { return *(unsigned int *)(__hxcpp_memory+addr); } +inline float __hxcpp_memory_get_f32(int addr) { return __hxcpp_align_get_float32(__hxcpp_memory,addr); } + +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_byte(int addr,int v) { __hxcpp_memory[addr] = v; } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_double(int addr,double v) { __hxcpp_align_set_float64(__hxcpp_memory,addr,v); } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_float(int addr,float v) { __hxcpp_align_set_float32(__hxcpp_memory,addr,v); } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_i16(int addr,int v) { *(short *)(__hxcpp_memory+addr) = v; } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_i32(int addr,int v) { *(int *)(__hxcpp_memory+addr) = v; } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_ui16(int addr,int v) { *(unsigned short *)(__hxcpp_memory+addr) = v; } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_ui32(int addr,int v) { *(unsigned int *)(__hxcpp_memory+addr) = v; } +inline void __hxcpp_memory_set_f32(int addr,float v) { __hxcpp_align_set_float32(__hxcpp_memory,addr,v); } + +// FPHelper conversion + +inline void __hxcpp_reverse_endian(int &ioData) +{ + ioData = (((ioData>>24) & 0xff ) )| + (((ioData>>16) & 0xff )<<8 )| + (((ioData>>8 ) & 0xff )<<16 )| + (((ioData ) & 0xff )<<24 ); +} + + +inline float __hxcpp_reinterpret_le_int32_as_float32(int inInt) +{ + #ifdef HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + __hxcpp_reverse_endian(inInt); + #endif + return *(float*)(&inInt); +} + + +inline int __hxcpp_reinterpret_float32_as_le_int32(float inFloat) +{ + #ifdef HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + __hxcpp_reverse_endian(*(int *)&inFloat); + #endif + return *(int*)(&inFloat); +} + + +inline double __hxcpp_reinterpret_le_int32s_as_float64(int inLow, int inHigh) +{ + int vals[2] = {inLow, inHigh}; + #ifdef HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + __hxcpp_reverse_endian(vals[0]); + __hxcpp_reverse_endian(vals[1]); + #endif + return *(double*)(vals); +} + + +inline int __hxcpp_reinterpret_float64_as_le_int32_low(double inValue) +{ + int *asInts = (int *)&inValue; + #ifdef HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + __hxcpp_reverse_endian(asInts[0]); + #endif + return asInts[0]; +} + + +inline int __hxcpp_reinterpret_float64_as_le_int32_high(double inValue) +{ + int *asInts = (int *)&inValue; + #ifdef HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + __hxcpp_reverse_endian(asInts[1]); + #endif + return asInts[1]; +} + +#ifdef __OBJC__ +#ifdef HXCPP_OBJC + +inline NSData *_hx_bytes_to_nsdata( ::Array inBytes) +{ + if (!inBytes.mPtr) + return nil; + + return [NSData dataWithBytes: inBytes->getBase() length:inBytes->length ]; + +} + +inline ::Array _hx_nsdata_to_bytes(NSData *inData) +{ + if (inData==nil) + return null(); + + return ::Array_obj::fromData( (const unsigned char *)inData.bytes, inData.length ); +} + +#endif +#endif + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_regexp_new_options(String s, String options); + +// EReg.hx -> src/hx/libs/regexp/RegExp.cpp +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_regexp_new_options(String s, String options); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool _hx_regexp_match(Dynamic handle, String string, int pos, int len); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_regexp_matched(Dynamic handle, int pos); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_regexp_matched_pos(Dynamic handle, int match); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_regexp_matched_num(Dynamic handle); + + +// haxe.zip.(Un)Compress.hx -> src/hx/libs/zlib/ZLib.cpp +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_deflate_init(int level); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_deflate_bound(Dynamic handle,int length); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_deflate_buffer(Dynamic handle, Array src, int srcPos, Array dest, int destPos); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_deflate_end(Dynamic handle); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_inflate_init(Dynamic windowBits); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_inflate_buffer(Dynamic handle, Array src, int srcPos, Array dest, int destPos); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_inflate_end(Dynamic handle); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_zip_set_flush_mode(Dynamic handle, String flushMode); + +// sys.db.Mysql.hx -> src/hx/libs/regexp/RegExp.cpp +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_mysql_connect(Dynamic params); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_mysql_select_db(Dynamic handle,String db); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_mysql_request(Dynamic handle,String req); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_mysql_close(Dynamic handle); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_mysql_escape(Dynamic handle,String str); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_mysql_result_get_length(Dynamic handle); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_mysql_result_get_nfields(Dynamic handle); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_mysql_result_next(Dynamic handle); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_mysql_result_get(Dynamic handle,int i); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_mysql_result_get_int(Dynamic handle,int i); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Float _hx_mysql_result_get_float(Dynamic handle,int i); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array _hx_mysql_result_get_fields_names(Dynamic handle); + +namespace cpp { template class Function; } + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_mysql_set_conversion( + cpp::Function< Dynamic(Dynamic) > inCharsToBytes, + cpp::Function< Dynamic(Float) > inTimeToDate ); + +// sys.db.Sqlite.hx -> src/hx/libs/sqlite/RegExp.cpp + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_sqlite_connect(String filename); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_sqlite_request(Dynamic handle,String req); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_sqlite_close(Dynamic handle); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_sqlite_last_insert_id(Dynamic handle); + +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_sqlite_result_get_length(Dynamic handle); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_sqlite_result_get_nfields(Dynamic handle); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_sqlite_result_next(Dynamic handle); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_sqlite_result_get(Dynamic handle,int i); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_sqlite_result_get_int(Dynamic handle,int i); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Float _hx_sqlite_result_get_float(Dynamic handle,int i); + +// src/hx/libs/std .. +// File +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_std_file_open( String fname, String r ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_file_close( Dynamic handle ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_file_write( Dynamic handle, Array s, int p, int n ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_file_write_char( Dynamic handle, int c ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_file_read( Dynamic handle, Array buf, int p, int n ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_file_read_char( Dynamic handle ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_file_seek( Dynamic handle, int pos, int kind ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_file_tell( Dynamic handle ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool _hx_std_file_eof( Dynamic handle ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_file_flush( Dynamic handle ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_std_file_contents_string( String name ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array _hx_std_file_contents_bytes( String name ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_std_file_stdin(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_std_file_stdout(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_std_file_stderr(); + +// Process +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_std_process_run( String cmd, Array vargs, int inShow= 1 /* SHOW_NORMAL */ ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_process_stdout_read( Dynamic handle, Array buf, int pos, int len ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_process_stderr_read( Dynamic handle, Array buf, int pos, int len ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_process_stdin_write( Dynamic handle, Array buf, int pos, int len ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_process_stdin_close( Dynamic handle ); +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL > 420) +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_std_process_exit( Dynamic handle, bool block ); +#else +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_process_exit( Dynamic handle ); +#endif +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_process_pid( Dynamic handle ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_process_kill( Dynamic handle ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_process_close( Dynamic handle ); + +// Random +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_std_random_new(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_random_set_seed( Dynamic handle, int v ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_random_int( Dynamic handle, int max ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES double _hx_std_random_float( Dynamic handle ); + +// Socket +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_init(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_std_socket_new( bool udp, bool ipv6 = false ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_bind( Dynamic o, int host, int port ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_bind_ipv6( Dynamic o, Array host, int port ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_close( Dynamic handle ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_send_char( Dynamic o, int c ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_socket_send( Dynamic o, Array buf, int p, int l ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_socket_recv( Dynamic o, Array buf, int p, int l ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_socket_recv_char( Dynamic o ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_write( Dynamic o, Array buf ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array _hx_std_socket_read( Dynamic o ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_host_resolve( String host ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array _hx_std_host_resolve_ipv6( String host, bool dummy=true ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_std_host_to_string( int ip ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_std_host_to_string_ipv6( Array ip ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_std_host_reverse( int host ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_std_host_reverse_ipv6( Array host ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_std_host_local(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_connect( Dynamic o, int host, int port ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_connect_ipv6( Dynamic o, Array host, int port ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_listen( Dynamic o, int n ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array _hx_std_socket_select( Array rs, Array ws, Array es, Dynamic timeout ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_fast_select( Array rs, Array ws, Array es, Dynamic timeout ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_std_socket_accept( Dynamic o ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array _hx_std_socket_peer( Dynamic o ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array _hx_std_socket_host( Dynamic o ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_set_timeout( Dynamic o, Dynamic t ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_shutdown( Dynamic o, bool r, bool w ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_set_blocking( Dynamic o, bool b ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_set_fast_send( Dynamic o, bool b ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_set_broadcast( Dynamic o, bool b ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_std_socket_poll_alloc( int nsocks ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array _hx_std_socket_poll_prepare( Dynamic pdata, Array rsocks, Array wsocks ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_socket_poll_events( Dynamic pdata, double timeout ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array _hx_std_socket_poll( Array socks, Dynamic pdata, double timeout ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_socket_send_to( Dynamic o, Array buf, int p, int l, Dynamic inAddr ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_socket_recv_from( Dynamic o, Array buf, int p, int l, Dynamic outAddr); + +// Sys +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_std_get_env( String v ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_put_env( String e, String v ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_sys_sleep( double f ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool _hx_std_set_time_locale( String l ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_std_get_cwd(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool _hx_std_set_cwd( String d ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_std_sys_string(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool _hx_std_sys_is64(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_sys_command( String cmd ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_sys_exit( int code ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool _hx_std_sys_exists( String path ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_file_delete( String path ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_sys_rename( String path, String newname ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic _hx_std_sys_stat( String path ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_std_sys_file_type( String path ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES bool _hx_std_sys_create_dir( String path, int mode ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void _hx_std_sys_remove_dir( String path ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES double _hx_std_sys_time(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES double _hx_std_sys_cpu_time(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array _hx_std_sys_read_dir( String p); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_std_file_full_path( String path ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_std_sys_exe_path(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Array _hx_std_sys_env(); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_sys_getch( bool b ); +HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES int _hx_std_sys_get_pid(); + + +// SSL +void _hx_ssl_init(); +Dynamic _hx_ssl_new( Dynamic hconf ); +void _hx_ssl_close( Dynamic hssl ); +void _hx_ssl_debug_set (int i); +void _hx_ssl_handshake( Dynamic handle ); +void _hx_ssl_set_socket( Dynamic hssl, Dynamic hsocket ); +void _hx_ssl_set_hostname( Dynamic hssl, String hostname ); +Dynamic _hx_ssl_get_peer_certificate( Dynamic hssl ); +bool _hx_ssl_get_verify_result( Dynamic hssl ); +void _hx_ssl_send_char( Dynamic hssl, int v ); +int _hx_ssl_send( Dynamic hssl, Array buf, int p, int l ); +void _hx_ssl_write( Dynamic hssl, Array buf ); +int _hx_ssl_recv_char( Dynamic hssl ); +int _hx_ssl_recv( Dynamic hssl, Array buf, int p, int l ); +Array _hx_ssl_read( Dynamic hssl ); +Dynamic _hx_ssl_conf_new( bool server ); +void _hx_ssl_conf_close( Dynamic hconf ); +void _hx_ssl_conf_set_ca( Dynamic hconf, Dynamic hcert ); +void _hx_ssl_conf_set_verify( Dynamic hconf, int mode ); +void _hx_ssl_conf_set_cert( Dynamic hconf, Dynamic hcert, Dynamic hpkey ); +void _hx_ssl_conf_set_servername_callback( Dynamic hconf, Dynamic obj ); +Dynamic _hx_ssl_cert_load_defaults(); +Dynamic _hx_ssl_cert_load_file( String file ); +Dynamic _hx_ssl_cert_load_path( String path ); +String _hx_ssl_cert_get_subject( Dynamic hcert, String objname ); +String _hx_ssl_cert_get_issuer( Dynamic hcert, String objname ); +Array _hx_ssl_cert_get_altnames( Dynamic hcert ); +Array _hx_ssl_cert_get_notbefore( Dynamic hcert ); +Array _hx_ssl_cert_get_notafter( Dynamic hcert ); +Dynamic _hx_ssl_cert_get_next( Dynamic hcert ); +Dynamic _hx_ssl_cert_add_pem( Dynamic hcert, String data ); +Dynamic _hx_ssl_cert_add_der( Dynamic hcert, Array buf ); +Dynamic _hx_ssl_key_from_der( Array buf, bool pub ); +Dynamic _hx_ssl_key_from_pem( String data, bool pub, String pass ); +Array _hx_ssl_dgst_make( Array buf, String alg ); +Array _hx_ssl_dgst_sign( Array buf, Dynamic hpkey, String alg ); +bool _hx_ssl_dgst_verify( Array buf, Array sign, Dynamic hpkey, String alg ); + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/StdString.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/StdString.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..82c9adc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/StdString.h @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +#ifndef HX_STD_STRING_INCLUDEDED +#define HX_STD_STRING_INCLUDEDED + +#include + +namespace hx +{ + class StdString : public std::string + { + public: + StdString() : std::string() { } + StdString(const char *inPtr) : std::string(inPtr) { } + StdString(const char *inPtr, int inLen) : std::string(inPtr, inLen) { } + StdString(const std::string &inS) : std::string(inS) { } + StdString(const StdString &inS) : std::string(inS) { } + + #if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>1) + StdString(const Dynamic &inS) : std::string(inS.mPtr ? inS.mPtr->toString().utf8_str() : "null") { } + StdString(const String &inS) : std::string(inS.utf8_str()) { } + String toString() const { return String(c_str(),size()).dup(); } + String toString() { return String(c_str(),size()).dup(); } + operator Dynamic() const { return const_cast(this)->toString(); } + #endif + + inline const StdString &toStdString() const { return *this; } + + }; +} + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/StringAlloc.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/StringAlloc.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..29fb7f7d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/StringAlloc.h @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +#ifndef HX_STRING_ALLOC +#define HX_STRING_ALLOC + +#include +#include + +namespace hx +{ + +class IStringAlloc +{ + public: + virtual void *allocBytes(size_t inBytes) = 0; + + protected: + ~IStringAlloc(){}; +}; + +template +class StringAlloc : public IStringAlloc +{ + char buffer[STACK]; + size_t alloced; + char *heap; + + public: + inline StringAlloc() : alloced(0), heap(0) { } + ~StringAlloc() + { + if (heap) + free(heap); + } + void *allocBytes(size_t inBytes) + { + if (inBytes<=STACK) + return buffer; + if (inBytes>alloced) + { + alloced = inBytes; + heap = (char *)realloc(heap, alloced); + } + return heap; + } + private: + StringAlloc(const StringAlloc &); + void operator=(const StringAlloc &); +}; + +typedef StringAlloc<100> strbuf; + +} // end namespace hx + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Telemetry.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Telemetry.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cf865778 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Telemetry.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +#ifndef HX_TELEMETRY_H +#define HX_TELEMETRY_H + +#define HX_TELEMETRY_VERSION 1 + +#include +#include + +struct TelemetryFrame +{ + // microseconds, always valid + int gctime; + int gcoverhead; + + // Valid only if profiler is enabled + std::vector *samples; + std::vector *names; + + // Valid only if allocations (and profiler) are enabled + std::vector *allocation_data; + std::vector *stacks; +}; + +// --- Telemetry ----------------------------------------------------------------- + +int __hxcpp_hxt_start_telemetry(bool profiler, bool allocations); +void __hxcpp_hxt_stash_telemetry(); +TelemetryFrame* __hxcpp_hxt_dump_telemetry(int thread_num); +void __hxcpp_hxt_ignore_allocs(int delta); + +// expose these from GCInternal +int __hxcpp_gc_reserved_bytes(); +int __hxcpp_gc_used_bytes(); + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Thread.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Thread.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1c51d95f --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Thread.h @@ -0,0 +1,458 @@ +#ifdef HX_THREAD_H_OVERRIDE +// Users can define their own header to use here, but there is no API +// compatibility gaurantee for future changes. +#include HX_THREAD_H_OVERRIDE +#else + +#ifndef HX_THREAD_H +#define HX_THREAD_H + +#ifndef HXCPP_HEADER_VERSION +#include "hx/HeaderVersion.h" +#endif + +#if defined(KORE) + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#elif defined(HX_WINRT) + +#include +#include +#include + +#elif defined(_WIN32) + +#ifdef HXCPP_WINXP_COMPAT +#undef _WIN32_WINNT +#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400 +#else +#undef _WIN32_WINNT +#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0600 +#endif + +#include +#include +#else +#include +#include +#include +#include +#define HXCPP_PTHREADS +#endif + +#ifdef RegisterClass +#undef RegisterClass +#endif + +#if defined(KORE) + +struct HxMutex { + HxMutex() { + kinc_mutex_init(&mutex); + } + + ~HxMutex() { + kinc_mutex_destroy(&mutex); + } + + void Lock() { + kinc_mutex_lock(&mutex); + } + + void Unlock() { + kinc_mutex_unlock(&mutex); + } + + bool TryLock() { + return kinc_mutex_try_to_lock(&mutex); + } + + void Clean() { + kinc_mutex_destroy(&mutex); + } +private: + kinc_mutex_t mutex; +}; + +#define THREAD_FUNC_TYPE void +#define THREAD_FUNC_RET return; + +inline bool HxCreateDetachedThread(void (*func)(void *), void *param) +{ + kinc_thread_t thread; + kinc_thread_init(&thread, func, param); + return true; +} + +#elif defined(HX_WINDOWS) + + +struct HxMutex +{ + HxMutex() + { + mValid = true; + #ifdef HX_WINRT + InitializeCriticalSectionEx(&mCritSec,4000,0); + #else + InitializeCriticalSection(&mCritSec); + #endif + } + ~HxMutex() { if (mValid) DeleteCriticalSection(&mCritSec); } + void Lock() { EnterCriticalSection(&mCritSec); } + void Unlock() { LeaveCriticalSection(&mCritSec); } + bool TryLock() { return TryEnterCriticalSection(&mCritSec); } + bool IsValid() { return mValid; } + void Clean() + { + if (mValid) + { + DeleteCriticalSection(&mCritSec); + mValid = false; + } + } + + bool mValid; + CRITICAL_SECTION mCritSec; +}; + + +#define THREAD_FUNC_TYPE DWORD WINAPI +#define THREAD_FUNC_RET return 0; + +inline bool HxCreateDetachedThread(DWORD (WINAPI *func)(void *), void *param) +{ + return (CreateThread(NULL, 0, func, param, 0, 0) != 0); +} + +#else + +struct HxMutex +{ + HxMutex() + { + pthread_mutexattr_t mta; + pthread_mutexattr_init(&mta); + pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mta, PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE); + mValid = pthread_mutex_init(&mMutex,&mta) ==0; + } + ~HxMutex() { if (mValid) pthread_mutex_destroy(&mMutex); } + void Lock() { pthread_mutex_lock(&mMutex); } + void Unlock() { pthread_mutex_unlock(&mMutex); } + bool TryLock() { return !pthread_mutex_trylock(&mMutex); } + bool IsValid() { return mValid; } + void Clean() + { + if (mValid) + pthread_mutex_destroy(&mMutex); + mValid = 0; + } + + bool mValid; + pthread_mutex_t mMutex; +}; + +#define THREAD_FUNC_TYPE void * +#define THREAD_FUNC_RET return 0; + +inline bool HxCreateDetachedThread(void *(*func)(void *), void *param) +{ + pthread_t t; + pthread_attr_t attr; + if (pthread_attr_init(&attr) != 0) + return false; +#ifdef PTHREAD_CREATE_DETACHED + if (pthread_attr_setdetachstate(&attr, PTHREAD_CREATE_DETACHED) != 0) + return false; +#endif + if (pthread_create(&t, &attr, func, param) != 0 ) + return false; + if (pthread_attr_destroy(&attr) != 0) + return false; + return true; +} + +#endif + + + + +template +struct TAutoLock +{ + TAutoLock(LOCKABLE &inMutex) : mMutex(inMutex) { mMutex.Lock(); } + ~TAutoLock() { mMutex.Unlock(); } + void Lock() { mMutex.Lock(); } + void Unlock() { mMutex.Unlock(); } + + LOCKABLE &mMutex; +}; + +typedef TAutoLock AutoLock; + +#if defined(KORE) + +struct HxSemaphore { + HxSemaphore() { + kinc_event_init(&event, true); + } + + ~HxSemaphore() { + kinc_event_destroy(&event); + } + + void Set() { + kinc_event_signal(&event); + } + + void Wait() { + kinc_event_wait(&event); + } + + bool WaitSeconds(double inSeconds) { + return kinc_event_try_to_wait(&event, inSeconds); + } + + void Reset() { + kinc_event_reset(&event); + } + + void Clean() { + kinc_event_destroy(&event); + } +private: + kinc_event_t event; +}; + +struct ThreadPoolSignal { + ThreadPoolSignal() { + kinc_event_init(&event, true); + } + + ~ThreadPoolSignal() { + + } + + void Set() { + kinc_event_signal(&event); + } + + void Wait() { + kinc_event_wait(&event); + } + + bool WaitSeconds(double inSeconds) { + return kinc_event_try_to_wait(&event, inSeconds); + } + + void Reset() { + kinc_event_reset(&event); + } + + void Clean() { + kinc_event_destroy(&event); + } +private: + kinc_event_t event; +}; + +#elif defined(HX_WINDOWS) + +struct HxSemaphore +{ + HxSemaphore() + { + #ifdef HX_WINRT + mSemaphore = CreateEventEx(nullptr,nullptr,0,EVENT_ALL_ACCESS); + #else + mSemaphore = CreateEvent(0,0,0,0); + #endif + } + ~HxSemaphore() { if (mSemaphore) CloseHandle(mSemaphore); } + void Set() { SetEvent(mSemaphore); } + void Wait() + { + #ifdef HX_WINRT + WaitForSingleObjectEx(mSemaphore,INFINITE,false); + #else + WaitForSingleObject(mSemaphore,INFINITE); + #endif + } + // Returns true on success, false on timeout + bool WaitSeconds(double inSeconds) + { + #ifdef HX_WINRT + return WaitForSingleObjectEx(mSemaphore,inSeconds*1000.0,false) != WAIT_TIMEOUT; + #else + return WaitForSingleObject(mSemaphore,inSeconds*1000.0) != WAIT_TIMEOUT; + #endif + } + void Reset() { ResetEvent(mSemaphore); } + void Clean() { if (mSemaphore) CloseHandle(mSemaphore); mSemaphore = 0; } + + HANDLE mSemaphore; +}; + +#else + + +#define HX_THREAD_SEMAPHORE_LOCKABLE + +struct HxSemaphore +{ + HxSemaphore() + { + mSet = false; + mValid = true; + pthread_cond_init(&mCondition,0); + } + ~HxSemaphore() + { + if (mValid) + { + pthread_cond_destroy(&mCondition); + } + } + // For autolock + inline operator HxMutex &() { return mMutex; } + void Set() + { + AutoLock lock(mMutex); + if (!mSet) + { + mSet = true; + pthread_cond_signal( &mCondition ); + } + } + void QSet() + { + mSet = true; + pthread_cond_signal( &mCondition ); + } + void Reset() + { + AutoLock lock(mMutex); + mSet = false; + } + void QReset() { mSet = false; } + void Wait() + { + AutoLock lock(mMutex); + while( !mSet ) + pthread_cond_wait( &mCondition, &mMutex.mMutex ); + mSet = false; + } + // when we already hold the mMutex lock ... + void QWait() + { + while( !mSet ) + pthread_cond_wait( &mCondition, &mMutex.mMutex ); + mSet = false; + } + // Returns true if the wait was success, false on timeout. + bool WaitSeconds(double inSeconds) + { + struct timeval tv; + gettimeofday(&tv, 0); + + int isec = (int)inSeconds; + int usec = (int)((inSeconds-isec)*1000000.0); + timespec spec; + spec.tv_nsec = (tv.tv_usec + usec) * 1000; + if (spec.tv_nsec>1000000000) + { + spec.tv_nsec-=1000000000; + isec++; + } + spec.tv_sec = tv.tv_sec + isec; + + AutoLock lock(mMutex); + + int result = 0; + // Wait for set to be true... + while( !mSet && (result=pthread_cond_timedwait( &mCondition, &mMutex.mMutex, &spec )) != ETIMEDOUT) + { + if (result!=0) + { + // Error - something's gone wrong... + /* + if (result==EINVAL) + printf("ERROR: Condition EINVAL\n"); + else if (result==EPERM) + printf("ERROR: Condition EPERM\n"); + else + printf("ERROR: Condition unknown error\n"); + */ + break; + } + // Condition signalled - but try mSet again ... + } + + bool wasSet = mSet; + mSet = false; + return wasSet; + } + void Clean() + { + mMutex.Clean(); + if (mValid) + { + mValid = false; + pthread_cond_destroy(&mCondition); + } + } + + + HxMutex mMutex; + pthread_cond_t mCondition; + bool mSet; + bool mValid; +}; + + +#endif + + +#if defined(KORE) + +#include + +inline void HxSleep(unsigned int ms) +{ + kinc_thread_sleep(ms); +} + +#elif defined HX_WINRT + +inline void HxSleep(unsigned int ms) +{ + ::Sleep(ms); +} + +#elif defined HX_WINDOWS + +inline void HxSleep(unsigned int ms) +{ + ::Sleep(ms); +} + +#else + +inline void HxSleep(unsigned int ms) +{ + struct timespec t; + struct timespec tmp; + t.tv_sec = 0; + t.tv_nsec = ms * 1000000; + nanosleep(&t, &tmp); +} + +#endif + + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Tls.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Tls.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..c1695b49 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Tls.h @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +#ifdef HX_TLS_H_OVERRIDE +// Users can define their own header to use here, but there is no API +// compatibility gaurantee for future changes. +#include HX_TLS_H_OVERRIDE +#else + +#ifndef HX_TLS_INCLUDED +#define HX_TLS_INCLUDED + +#if defined(HX_WINDOWS) || defined(KINC_CONSOLE) + + #if defined(HX_WINRT) + // Nothing + #elif defined(KINC_CONSOLE) + +#include + +namespace hx { + template struct TLSData { + TLSData() { + kinc_thread_local_init(&tls); + } + + ~TLSData() { + kinc_thread_local_destroy(&tls); + } + + DATA *Get() { + return (DATA*)kinc_thread_local_get(&tls); + } + + void Set(DATA *inData) { + kinc_thread_local_set(&tls, inData); + } + + inline DATA *operator=(DATA *inData) { + kinc_thread_local_set(&tls, inData); + return inData; + } + + inline operator DATA*() { + return (DATA*)kinc_thread_local_get(&tls); + } + private: + kinc_thread_local_t tls; + }; +} + + #else + + #if ! defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__BORLANDC__) + #include + #endif + + extern "C" + { + __declspec(dllimport) + int __stdcall TlsSetValue(unsigned long dwTlsIndex, void *lpTlsValue); + + __declspec(dllimport) + void * __stdcall TlsGetValue(unsigned long dwTlsIndex); + + __declspec(dllimport) + unsigned long __stdcall TlsAlloc(void); + } + + + namespace hx { + + template + struct TLSData + { + static const size_t kMaxInlineSlots = 64; + + TLSData() + { + mSlot = TlsAlloc(); + TlsSetValue(mSlot,0); + #ifdef HXCPP_M64 + mFastOffset = mSlot*sizeof(void *) + 0x1480; + #else + if (FAST || mSlot < kMaxInlineSlots) + mFastOffset = mSlot*sizeof(void *) + 0xE10; + else + mFastOffset = mSlot - kMaxInlineSlots; + #endif + } + inline DATA *operator=(DATA *inData) + { + TlsSetValue(mSlot,inData); + return inData; + } + + inline operator DATA *() + { + #if !defined(HXCPP_M64) && (_MSC_VER >= 1400) + const size_t kTibExtraTlsOffset = 0xF94; + + if (FAST || mSlot < kMaxInlineSlots) + return (DATA *)__readfsdword(mFastOffset); + + DATA **extra = (DATA **)(__readfsdword(kTibExtraTlsOffset)); + return extra[mFastOffset]; + #elif (_MSC_VER >= 1400) & !defined(HXCPP_DEBUG) && !defined(HXCPP_ARM64)// 64 bit version... + if (mSlot < 64) + return (DATA *)__readgsqword(mFastOffset); + else + return (DATA *)TlsGetValue(mSlot); + #else + return (DATA *)TlsGetValue(mSlot); + #endif + } + + int mSlot; + int mFastOffset; + }; + + } // end namespace hx + + + #define DECLARE_TLS_DATA(TYPE,NAME) \ + hx::TLSData NAME; + #define DECLARE_FAST_TLS_DATA(TYPE,NAME) \ + hx::TLSData NAME; + #define EXTERN_TLS_DATA(TYPE,NAME) \ + extern hx::TLSData NAME; + #define EXTERN_FAST_TLS_DATA(TYPE,NAME) \ + extern hx::TLSData NAME; + + + #endif +#else // not HX_WINDOWS + +#include + +namespace hx +{ + +template +struct TLSData +{ + TLSData() + { + pthread_key_create(&mSlot, 0); + } + DATA *Get() + { + return (DATA *)pthread_getspecific(mSlot); + } + void Set(DATA *inData) + { + pthread_setspecific(mSlot,inData); + } + inline DATA *operator=(DATA *inData) + { + pthread_setspecific(mSlot,inData); + return inData; + } + inline operator DATA *() { return (DATA *)pthread_getspecific(mSlot); } + + pthread_key_t mSlot; +}; + +} // end namespace hx + + +#endif + + + +#ifdef HX_WINRT + +#define DECLARE_TLS_DATA(TYPE,NAME) \ + __declspec(thread) TYPE * NAME = nullptr; +#define DECLARE_FAST_TLS_DATA(TYPE,NAME) \ + __declspec(thread) TYPE * NAME = nullptr; +#define EXTERN_TLS_DATA(TYPE,NAME) \ + __declspec(thread) extern TYPE * NAME; +#define EXTERN_FAST_TLS_DATA(TYPE,NAME) \ + __declspec(thread) extern TYPE * NAME; + +#else + +#define DECLARE_TLS_DATA(TYPE,NAME) \ + hx::TLSData NAME; +#define DECLARE_FAST_TLS_DATA(TYPE,NAME) \ + hx::TLSData NAME; +#define EXTERN_TLS_DATA(TYPE,NAME) \ + extern hx::TLSData NAME; +#define EXTERN_FAST_TLS_DATA(TYPE,NAME) \ + extern hx::TLSData NAME; + +#endif + + + + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Undefine.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Undefine.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..55e6ad69 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Undefine.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +#ifndef HX_UNDEFINE_H +#define HX_UNDEFINE_H + + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL < 321) +#undef INT_MIN +#undef INT_MAX +#undef INT8_MIN +#undef INT8_MAX +#undef UINT8_MAX +#undef INT16_MIN +#undef INT16_MAX +#undef UINT16_MAX +#undef INT32_MIN +#undef INT32_MAX +#undef UINT32_MAX +#endif + + +#undef TRUE +#undef FALSE +#undef BOOLEAN +#undef ERROR +#undef NO_ERROR +#undef DELETE +#undef OPTIONS +#undef IN +#undef OUT +#undef ALTERNATE +#undef OPTIONAL +#undef DOUBLE_CLICK +#undef DIFFERENCE +#undef POINT +#undef RECT +#undef OVERFLOW +#undef UNDERFLOW +#undef DOMAIN +#undef TRANSPARENT +#undef CONST +#undef CopyFile +#undef COLOR_HIGHLIGHT +#undef __valid + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Unordered.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Unordered.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ca5d69c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hx/Unordered.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#ifndef HX_UNORDERED_INCLUDED +#define HX_UNORDERED_INCLUDED + +#if (defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER >= 1800)) || ( defined(__GNUC__) && defined(HXCPP_CPP11) ) +#include +#include + +namespace hx +{ + +template +struct UnorderedSet : public std::unordered_set { }; + +template +struct UnorderedMap : public std::unordered_map { }; + +} + + +#else + +#include +#include + +namespace hx +{ + +template +struct UnorderedSet : public std::set { }; + +template +struct UnorderedMap : public std::map { }; + +} + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hxMath.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hxMath.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1e4b1b65 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hxMath.h @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +#ifndef HX_MATH +#define HX_MATH + +#ifndef HXCPP_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include + +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Math_obj : public hx::Object +{ +public: + HX_IS_INSTANCE_OF enum { _hx_ClassId = hx::clsIdMath }; + + typedef hx::Object super; + typedef Math_obj OBJ_; + HX_DO_RTTI; + void __construct(); + static Dynamic __CreateEmpty(); + static void __boot(); + + inline static int floor(double inX) { return __int__(::std::floor(inX)); } + inline static int ceil(double inX) { return __int__(::std::ceil(inX)); } + inline static int round(double inX) { return floor(inX+0.5); } + inline static double ffloor(double inX) { return ::std::floor(inX); } + inline static double fceil(double inX) { return ::std::ceil(inX); } + inline static double fround(double inX) { return ::std::floor(inX+0.5); } + inline static double random() { return __hxcpp_drand(); } + inline static double sqrt(double inX) { return ::std::sqrt(inX); } + inline static double cos(double inX) { return ::std::cos(inX); } + inline static double sin(double inX) { return ::std::sin(inX); } + inline static double tan(double inX) { return ::std::tan(inX); } + inline static double atan2(double inY,double inX) { return ::std::atan2(inY,inX); } + inline static double abs(double inX) { return ::std::fabs(inX); } + inline static double pow(double inA,double inB) { return ::std::pow(inA,inB); } + inline static double log(double inA) { return ::std::log(inA); } + inline static double max(double inA,double inB) { return inA>inB ? inA:inA==inA?inB:inA; } + inline static double min(double inA,double inB) { return inA Math; + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hxString.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hxString.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..831692cd --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hxString.h @@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ +#ifndef HX_STRING_H +#define HX_STRING_H + +#ifndef HXCPP_H +#error "Please include hxcpp.h, not hx/Object.h" +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef __OBJC__ +#import +#endif + +#if __cplusplus < 201103L && !defined(KINC_MICROSOFT) +typedef unsigned short char16_t; +#endif + +// --- String -------------------------------------------------------- +// +// Basic String type for hxcpp. +// It's based on garbage collection of the wchar_t (or char ) *ptr. +// Note: this does not inherit from "hx::Object", so in some ways it acts more +// like a standard "int" type than a mode generic class. + +class HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String +{ + friend class StringOffset; + +public: + // These allocate the function using the garbage-colleced malloc + void *operator new( size_t inSize ); + inline void* operator new( size_t, void* ptr ) { return ptr; } + void operator delete( void * ) { } + + inline String() : length(0), __s(0) { } + + // Uses pointer + inline String(const char *inPtr,int inLen) : __s(inPtr), length(inLen) { } + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + inline String(const char16_t *inPtr,int inLen) : __w(inPtr), length(inLen) { } + #endif + + // Makes copy + inline String(const wchar_t *inPtr) { *this = create(inPtr); } + inline String(const char16_t *inPtr) { *this = create(inPtr); } + inline String(const char *inPtr) { *this = create(inPtr); } + + static String create(const wchar_t *inPtr,int inLen=-1); + static String create(const char16_t *inPtr,int inLen=-1); + static String create(const char *inPtr,int inLen=-1); + + // Uses non-gc memory and wont ever be collected + static ::String createPermanent(const char *inUtf8, int inLen); + const ::String &makePermanent() const; + hx::Object *makePermanentObject() const; + + // Legacy + ::String &dup(); + + + #ifdef __OBJC__ + inline String(NSString *inString) + { + if (inString) + *this = String([inString UTF8String]); + else + { + length = 0; + __s = 0; + } + } + inline operator NSString * () const + { + hx::strbuf buf; + return [[NSString alloc] initWithUTF8String:utf8_str(&buf) ]; + } + #endif + #if defined(HX_WINRT) && defined(__cplusplus_winrt) + inline String(Platform::String^ inString) + { + *this = String(inString->Data()); + } + inline String(Platform::StringReference inString) + { + *this = String(inString.Data()); + } + #endif + + inline String(const ::String &inRHS) : __s(inRHS.__s), length(inRHS.length) { } + String(const int &inRHS); + String(const unsigned int &inRHS); + String(const short &inRHS) { fromInt(inRHS); } + String(const unsigned short &inRHS) { fromInt(inRHS); } + String(const signed char &inRHS) { fromInt(inRHS); } + String(const unsigned char &inRHS) { fromInt(inRHS); } + String(const cpp::CppInt32__ &inRHS); + String(const double &inRHS); + String(const float &inRHS); + String(const cpp::Int64 &inRHS); + String(const cpp::UInt64 &inRHS); + explicit String(const bool &inRHS); + inline String(const null &inRHS) : __s(0), length(0) { } + String(hx::Null< ::String > inRHS) : __s(inRHS.value.__s), length(inRHS.value.length) { } + inline String(const ::cpp::Variant &inRHS) { *this = inRHS.asString(); } + template + inline String( const ::cpp::Pointer &inRHS) { fromPointer(inRHS.ptr); } + template + inline String( const hx::Native &n ) { fromPointer(n.ptr); } + + static String emptyString; + static void __boot(); + + hx::Object *__ToObject() const; + + template + explicit inline String(const cpp::Struct &inRHS); + template + explicit inline String(const hx::ObjectPtr &inRHS); + void fromInt(int inI); + void fromPointer(const void *p); + + + + /* + This causes ambiguous problem with Object==Dynamic (String==Dynamic vs Object==Object) + and syntactically, String(Dynamic) should be enough I think. + Could perhaps make it explicit + + template + inline String(const hx::ObjectPtr &inRHS) + { + if (inRHS.mPtr) + { + ::String s = static_cast(inRHS.mPtr)->toString(); + __s = s.__s; + length = s.length; + } + else { __s = 0; length = 0; } + } + */ + String(const Dynamic &inRHS); + + inline ::String &operator=(const ::String &inRHS) + { length = inRHS.length; __s = inRHS.__s; return *this; } + + ::String Default(const ::String &inDef) { return __s ? *this : inDef; } + + + ::String toString() { return *this; } + + ::String __URLEncode() const; + ::String __URLDecode() const; + + + ::String toUpperCase() const; + ::String toLowerCase() const; + ::String charAt(int inPos) const; + Dynamic charCodeAt(int inPos) const; + int indexOf(const ::String &inValue, Dynamic inStart) const; + int lastIndexOf(const ::String &inValue, Dynamic inStart) const; + Array split(const ::String &inDelimiter) const; + ::String substr(int inPos,Dynamic inLen) const; + ::String substring(int inStartIndex, Dynamic inEndIndex) const; + + inline const char *&raw_ref() { return __s; } + inline const char *raw_ptr() const { return __s; } + const char *utf8_str(hx::IStringAlloc *inBuffer = 0,bool throwInvalid=true, int *byteLength = 0) const; + const char *ascii_substr(hx::IStringAlloc *inBuffer,int start, int length) const; + inline const char *c_str() const { return utf8_str(); } + inline const char *out_str(hx::IStringAlloc *inBuffer = 0) const { return utf8_str(inBuffer,false); } + const wchar_t *wchar_str(hx::IStringAlloc *inBuffer = 0) const; + const char16_t *wc_str(hx::IStringAlloc *inBuffer = 0, int *outCharLength = 0) const; + + const char *__CStr() const { return utf8_str(); }; + const wchar_t *__WCStr() const { return wchar_str(0); } + inline operator const char *() { return utf8_str(); } + + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + inline const char16_t *raw_wptr() const { return __w; } + #endif + inline bool isUTF16Encoded() const { + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + return __w && ((unsigned int *)__w)[-1] & HX_GC_STRING_CHAR16_T; + #else + return false; + #endif + } + + inline bool isAsciiEncoded() const { + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + return !__w || !(((unsigned int *)__w)[-1] & HX_GC_STRING_CHAR16_T); + #else + return true; + #endif + } + + inline bool isAsciiEncodedQ() const { + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + return !(((unsigned int *)__w)[-1] & HX_GC_STRING_CHAR16_T); + #else + return true; + #endif + } + + + + static ::String fromCharCode(int inCode); + + inline bool operator==(const null &inRHS) const { return __s==0; } + inline bool operator!=(const null &inRHS) const { return __s!=0; } + + inline int getChar( int index ) { + if (isUTF16Encoded()) + return __w[index]; + return __s[index]; + } + inline unsigned int hash( ) const + { + if (!__s) return 0; + if ( __s[HX_GC_STRING_HASH_OFFSET] & HX_GC_STRING_HASH_BIT) + { + #ifdef HXCPP_PARANOID + unsigned int result = calcHash(); + + unsigned int have = (((unsigned int *)__s)[-1] & HX_GC_CONST_ALLOC_BIT) ? + ((unsigned int *)__s)[-2] : *((unsigned int *)(__s+length+1) ); + + if ( have != result ) + { + printf("Bad string hash for %s\n", __s ); + printf(" Is %08x\n", result ); + printf(" Baked %08x\n", have ); + printf(" Mark %08x\n", ((unsigned int *)__s)[-1] ); + } + #endif + if (__s[HX_GC_CONST_ALLOC_MARK_OFFSET] & HX_GC_CONST_ALLOC_MARK_BIT) + { + #ifdef EMSCRIPTEN + return ((emscripten_align1_int*)__s)[-2]; + #else + return ((unsigned int *)__s)[-2]; + #endif + } + #ifdef EMSCRIPTEN + return *((emscripten_align1_int *)(__s+length+1) ); + #else + return *((unsigned int *)(__s+length+1) ); + #endif + } + + // Slow path.. + return calcHash(); + } + + unsigned int calcHash() const; + unsigned int calcSubHash(int start, int length) const; + + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + int compare(const ::String &inRHS) const; + #else + inline int compare(const ::String &inRHS) const + { + const char *r = inRHS.__s; + if (__s == r) return inRHS.length-length; + if (__s==0) return -1; + if (r==0) return 1; + + return strcmp(__s,r); + //return memcmp(__s,r,length); + } + #endif + + + ::String &operator+=(const ::String &inRHS); + ::String operator+(const ::String &inRHS) const; + ::String operator+(const int &inRHS) const { return *this + ::String(inRHS); } + ::String operator+(const bool &inRHS) const { return *this + ::String(inRHS); } + ::String operator+(const double &inRHS) const { return *this + ::String(inRHS); } + ::String operator+(const float &inRHS) const { return *this + ::String(inRHS); } + ::String operator+(const null &inRHS) const{ return *this + HX_CSTRING("null"); } + //::String operator+(const char *inRHS) const{ return *this + ::String(inRHS); } + ::String operator+(const cpp::CppInt32__ &inRHS) const{ return *this + ::String(inRHS); } + template + inline ::String operator+(const hx::ObjectPtr &inRHS) const + { return *this + (inRHS.mPtr ? const_cast&>(inRHS)->toString() : HX_CSTRING("null") ); } + ::String operator+(const cpp::Variant &inRHS) const{ return *this + inRHS.asString(); } + + + + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + bool eq(const ::String &inRHS) const; + #else + inline bool eq(const ::String &inRHS) const + { + // Strings are known not to be null... + return length==inRHS.length && !memcmp(__s,inRHS.__s,length); + } + #endif + + inline bool operator==(const ::String &inRHS) const + { + if (!inRHS.__s) + return !__s; + if (!__s) + return false; + return eq(inRHS); + } + inline bool operator!=(const ::String &inRHS) const + { + if (!inRHS.__s) + return __s; + if (!__s) + return true; + return !eq(inRHS); + } + + inline bool operator<(const ::String &inRHS) const { return compare(inRHS)<0; } + inline bool operator<=(const ::String &inRHS) const { return compare(inRHS)<=0; } + inline bool operator>(const ::String &inRHS) const { return compare(inRHS)>0; } + inline bool operator>=(const ::String &inRHS) const { return compare(inRHS)>=0; } + + inline bool operator<(const Dynamic &inRHS) const { return compare(inRHS)<0; } + inline bool operator<=(const Dynamic &inRHS) const { return compare(inRHS)<=0; } + inline bool operator>(const Dynamic &inRHS) const { return compare(inRHS)>0; } + inline bool operator>=(const Dynamic &inRHS) const { return compare(inRHS)>=0; } + + inline int cca(int inPos) const + { + if ((unsigned)inPos>=length) return 0; + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + if (isUTF16Encoded()) + return __w[inPos]; + #endif + return ((unsigned char *)__s)[inPos]; + } + + inline Dynamic iterator(); + inline Dynamic keyValueIterator(); + + static char16_t *allocChar16Ptr(int len); + + + static Dynamic fromCharCode_dyn(); + + + Dynamic charAt_dyn(); + Dynamic charCodeAt_dyn(); + Dynamic indexOf_dyn(); + Dynamic lastIndexOf_dyn(); + Dynamic split_dyn(); + Dynamic substr_dyn(); + Dynamic substring_dyn(); + Dynamic toLowerCase_dyn(); + Dynamic toString_dyn(); + Dynamic toUpperCase_dyn(); + + // This is used by the string-wrapped-as-dynamic class + hx::Val __Field(const ::String &inString, hx::PropertyAccess inCallProp); + + // The actual implementation. + // Note that "__s" is const - if you want to change it, you should create a new string. + // this allows for multiple strings to point to the same data. + int length; + + #ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + // TODO private: + // Use c_str, wc_str, raw_str instead + #endif + + union { + const char *__s; + const char16_t *__w; + }; + +}; + +class StringOffset +{ + public: + enum { Ptr = offsetof(String,__s) }; +}; + + + + + +inline HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES String _hx_string_create(const char *str, int len) +{ + return String::create(str,len); +} + +inline int HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES _hx_string_compare(String inString0, String inString1) +{ + return inString0.compare(inString1); +} + +String HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES _hx_utf8_to_utf16(const unsigned char *ptr, int inUtf8Len, bool addHash); + +int HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES _hx_utf8_char_code_at(String inString, int inIndex); +int HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES _hx_utf8_length(String inString); +bool HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES _hx_utf8_is_valid(String inString); +String HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES _hx_utf8_sub(String inString0, int inStart, int inLen); +int HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES _hx_utf8_decode_advance(char *&ioPtr); + + +#endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hxcpp.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hxcpp.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..4a533625 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/hxcpp.h @@ -0,0 +1,415 @@ +#ifndef HXCPP_H +#define HXCPP_H + +#include + +#ifdef __clang__ +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-variable" +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-value" +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wunreachable-code" +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wshorten-64-to-32" +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Winvalid-offsetof" +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wparentheses-equality" +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wconditional-uninitialized" +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wreorder" +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wself-assign" +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wint-to-void-pointer-cast" +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Woverloaded-virtual" +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wsometimes-uninitialized" +#else +#pragma warning(disable : 4018 4101 4146 4244 4305 4127 4100 4267 4389 4201 4312 4244 4996 4457 4458 4189 4701 4702) +#endif + +// Standard headers .... +#include + +// Windows hack +#define NOMINMAX + +#ifndef HXCPP_API_LEVEL + #define HXCPP_API_LEVEL 0 +#endif + +#include "hx/HeaderVersion.h" + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__BORLANDC__) + #if _MSC_VER >= 1423 + #include + #else + #include + #endif + #if defined(__BORLANDC__) + namespace hx { typedef std::type_info type_info; } + #else + namespace hx { typedef ::type_info type_info; } + #endif +#else + #include + #include + #include + namespace hx { typedef std::type_info type_info; } + #ifndef EMSCRIPTEN + using hx::type_info; + #ifdef __MINGW32__ + #include + #else + typedef int64_t __int64; + #endif + #endif +#endif + +#if defined(EMSCRIPTEN) || defined(IPHONE) || defined(APPLETV) + #include + #include +#endif + +#if defined(EMSCRIPTEN) + #include +#endif + +#ifdef __OBJC__ +#ifdef HXCPP_OBJC + #import +#endif +#endif + + +#include + +#include + +#ifdef HX_LINUX + #include + #include + #include +#endif + +#if defined(EMSCRIPTEN) || defined(_ARM_) || defined(__arm__) || defined(GCW0) + #define HXCPP_ALIGN_FLOAT +#endif + +// Must allign allocs to 8 bytes to match floating point requirement? +// Ints must br read on 4-byte boundary +#if defined(EMSCRIPTEN) || defined(GCW0) + #define HXCPP_ALIGN_ALLOC +#endif + +#if defined(__LP64__) || defined(_LP64) || defined(_WIN64) +#if !defined(HXCPP_M64) +#define HXCPP_M64 +#endif +#endif + + +// Some compilers are over-enthusiastic about what they #define ... +//#ifdef NULL +//#undef NULL +//#endif + +#ifdef assert +#undef assert +#endif + +#define HXCPP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES + +#ifdef _MSC_VER + #if defined(HXCPP_DLL_IMPORT) + #define HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES __declspec(dllimport) + #elif defined (HXCPP_DLL_EXPORT) + #define HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES __declspec(dllexport) + #else + #define HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES + #endif +#else + #if defined(HXCPP_DLL_EXPORT) + #define HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES __attribute__((visibility("default"))) + #else + #define HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES + #endif +#endif + +typedef char HX_CHAR; + + + +#if (defined(HXCPP_DEBUG) || defined(HXCPP_DEBUGGER)) && !defined HXCPP_CHECK_POINTER +#define HXCPP_CHECK_POINTER +#endif + +#ifdef HX_WINRT + +#define WINRT_LOG(fmt, ...) {char buf[1024];sprintf_s(buf,1024,"****LOG: %s(%d): %s \n [" fmt "]\n",__FILE__,__LINE__,__FUNCTION__, __VA_ARGS__);OutputDebugStringA(buf);} +#define WINRT_PRINTF(fmt, ...) {char buf[2048];sprintf_s(buf,2048,fmt,__VA_ARGS__);OutputDebugStringA(buf);} + +#endif + + +#ifdef BIG_ENDIAN +#undef BIG_ENDIAN + + #ifndef HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + #define HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + #endif +#endif + +#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN__ + #ifndef HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + #define HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + #endif +#endif + +#ifdef LITTLE_ENDIAN +#undef LITTLE_ENDIAN + + #ifdef HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + #undef HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + #endif +#endif + +#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ + #ifdef HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + #undef HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + #endif +#endif + + +// HX_HCSTRING is for constant strings with built-in hashes +// HX_GC_CONST_ALLOC_BIT | HX_GC_STRING_HASH +// HX_CSTRING is for constant strings without built-in hashes +// HX_GC_CONST_ALLOC_BIT +// HX_GC_CONST_ALLOC_BIT = 0x80000000 +// HX_GC_STRING_HASH = 0x00100000 +// HX_GC_STRING_CHAR16_T = 0x00200000 + +// For making generated code easier to read +#define HX_HASH_JOIN(A, B) A##B +#define HX_JOIN_PARTS(A, B) HX_HASH_JOIN(A, B) +#define HX_HASH_OF(A) #A +#define HX_HASH_OF_W(A) HX_HASH_JOIN(u,#A) +#define HX_STR_QUOTE(A) HX_HASH_OF(A) +#define HX_STR_QUOTE_W(A) HX_HASH_OF_W(A) +#define HX_HEX_QUOTE(hex) HX_STR_QUOTE(HX_JOIN_PARTS(\x,hex)) +#define HX_HEX_QUOTE_W(hex) HX_STR_QUOTE_W(HX_JOIN_PARTS(\x,hex)) + +#ifdef HXCPP_BIG_ENDIAN + +#define HX_HCSTRING(s,h0,h1,h2,h3) ::String( const_cast((h3 h2 h1 h0 "\x80\x10\x00\x00" s)) + 8 , sizeof(s)/sizeof(char)-1) +#define HX_(s,h0,h1,h2,h3) ::String( const_cast(( HX_HEX_QUOTE(h3) HX_HEX_QUOTE(h2) HX_HEX_QUOTE(h1) HX_HEX_QUOTE(h0) "\x80\x10\x00\x00" s )) + 8 , sizeof(s)/sizeof(char)-1) +#define HX_STRINGI(s,len) ::String( const_cast(("\x80\x00\x00\x00" s)) + 4 ,len) +#define HX_W(s,h0,h1) ::String( const_cast(( HX_HEX_QUOTE_W(h1) HX_HEX_QUOTE_W(h0) u"\x8030\x0000" s )) + 4, sizeof(s)/2-1) + +#else + +#define HX_HCSTRING(s,h0,h1,h2,h3) ::String( const_cast((h0 h1 h2 h3 "\x00\x00\x10\x80" s )) + 8 , sizeof(s)/sizeof(char)-1) +#define HX_(s,h0,h1,h2,h3) ::String( const_cast(( HX_HEX_QUOTE(h0) HX_HEX_QUOTE(h1) HX_HEX_QUOTE(h2) HX_HEX_QUOTE(h3) "\x00\x00\x10\x80" s )) + 8 , sizeof(s)/sizeof(char)-1) +#define HX_STRINGI(s,len) ::String( const_cast(("\x00\x00\x0\x80" s)) + 4 ,len) + +#define HX_W(s,h0,h1) ::String( const_cast(( HX_HEX_QUOTE_W(h0) HX_HEX_QUOTE_W(h1) u"\x0000\x8030" s )) + 4, sizeof(s)/2-1) + +#endif + + +#define HX_STRI(s) HX_STRINGI(s,sizeof(s)/sizeof(char)-1) +#define HX_CSTRING(x) HX_STRI(x) +#define HX_CSTRING2(wide,len,utf8) HX_STRI(utf8) + +#ifdef HX_SMART_STRINGS + #define HX_FIELD_EQ(name,field) (name.isAsciiEncoded() && !::memcmp(name.raw_ptr(), field, sizeof(field)/sizeof(char))) + // No null check is performedd... + #define HX_QSTR_EQ(name,field) (name.length==field.length && field.isAsciiEncodedQ() && !::memcmp(name.raw_ptr(), field.raw_ptr() , field.length) ) + // field is known to be isAsciiEncodedQ + #define HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(name,field) (name.length==field.length && !::memcmp(name.raw_ptr(), field.raw_ptr() , field.length) ) +#else + #define HX_FIELD_EQ(name,field) !::memcmp(name.__s, field, sizeof(field)/sizeof(char)) + // No null check is performed.... + #define HX_QSTR_EQ(name,field) (name.length==field.length && !::memcmp(name.__s, field.__s, field.length)) + #define HX_QSTR_EQ_AE(name,field) (name.length==field.length && !::memcmp(name.__s, field.__s, field.length)) +#endif + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) + + +#pragma warning(disable:4251) +#pragma warning(disable:4800) +#endif + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1201 +#error MSVC 7.1 does not support template specialization and is not supported by HXCPP +#endif + + +// HXCPP includes... + +// Basic mapping from haxe -> c++ +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL<=330) +typedef int Int; +typedef bool Bool; +#endif + +#ifdef HXCPP_FLOAT32 +typedef float Float; +#else +typedef double Float; +#endif + + +// Extended mapping - cpp namespace +namespace cpp +{ + typedef signed char Int8; + typedef unsigned char UInt8; + typedef char Char; + typedef signed short Int16; + typedef unsigned short UInt16; + typedef signed int Int32; + typedef unsigned int UInt32; + #ifdef _WIN32 + typedef __int64 Int64; + typedef unsigned __int64 UInt64; + // TODO - EMSCRIPTEN? + #else + typedef int64_t Int64; + typedef uint64_t UInt64; + #endif + typedef float Float32; + typedef double Float64; + typedef volatile int AtomicInt; +}; +// Extended mapping - old way +namespace haxe { namespace io { typedef unsigned char Unsigned_char__; } } + +// --- Forward decalarations -------------------------------------------- + +class null; +namespace hx { class Object; } +namespace hx { class FieldRef; } +namespace hx { class IndexRef; } +namespace hx { class NativeInterface; } +namespace hx { struct StackContext; } +namespace hx { template class Native; } +namespace hx { template class ObjectPtr; } +namespace cpp { template class Struct; } +namespace cpp { template class Pointer; } +namespace cpp { template class Function; } +template class Array_obj; +template class Array; +namespace hx { + class Class_obj; + typedef hx::ObjectPtr Class; +} +namespace cpp { + struct Variant; + class VirtualArray_obj; + class VirtualArray; + class CppInt32__; +} + + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL < 320) && !defined(__OBJC__) +typedef hx::Class Class; +typedef hx::Class_obj Class_obj; +#endif + +class Dynamic; +class String; + +// Use an external routine to throw to avoid sjlj overhead on iphone. +namespace hx { HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic Throw(Dynamic inDynamic); } +namespace hx { HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES Dynamic Rethrow(Dynamic inDynamic); } +namespace hx { HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void CriticalError(const String &inError, bool inAllowFixup=false); } +namespace hx { HXCPP_EXTERN_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES void NullReference(const char *type, bool allowFixup); } +namespace hx { extern String sNone[]; } +void __hxcpp_check_overflow(int inVal); + +namespace hx +{ +class MarkContext; + + +class VisitContext +{ +public: + virtual void visitObject(hx::Object **ioPtr)=0; + virtual void visitAlloc(void **ioPtr)=0; +}; + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 330) +typedef ::cpp::Variant Val; +#else +typedef ::Dynamic Val; +#endif + +#ifdef HXCPP_GC_GENERATIONAL + #define HXCPP_GC_NURSERY +#endif + + +//#define HXCPP_COMBINE_STRINGS + +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL >= 313) +enum PropertyAccessMode +{ + paccNever = 0, + paccDynamic = 1, + paccAlways = 2, +}; +typedef PropertyAccessMode PropertyAccess; +#define HX_PROP_NEVER hx::paccNever +#define HX_PROP_DYNAMIC hx::paccDynamic +#define HX_PROP_ALWAYS hx::paccAlways +#else +typedef bool PropertyAccess; +#define HX_PROP_NEVER false +#define HX_PROP_DYNAMIC true +#define HX_PROP_ALWAYS true +#endif + +} // end namespace hx + +#define HX_COMMA , + + +// The order of these includes has been chosen to minimize forward declarations. +// You should not include the individual files, just this one. + +// First time ... +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "null.h" +#include +#include "hxString.h" +#include "Dynamic.h" +#include +// This needs to "see" other declarations ... +#include +#include +#include "Array.h" +#include +#include +#include "Enum.h" +#include +#include +#if defined(__OBJC__) && defined(HXCPP_OBJC) + #include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +// second time ... +#include +#include +#include +#include +#if (HXCPP_API_LEVEL>=330) +#include +#else +#include +#endif + +#endif + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/null.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/null.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b3a977c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/include/null.h @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +#ifndef HX_NULL_H +#define HX_NULL_H + + + +// --- null value --------------------------------------------------------- +// +// This is used by external operatator and return statments - Most will +// use operator overloading to convert to the null pointer + + +// Forward declare ... +class String; +class null; +namespace hx { template class ObjectPtr; } + +namespace hx { null NullArithmetic(const char *inText); } + +#define HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(op,type,value) \ + bool operator op (const type &inRHS) const { return value; } + +#define HX_NULL_COMPARE_OPS(type) \ + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(<,type,false) \ + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(<=,type,false) \ + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(>,type,false) \ + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(>=,type,false) \ + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(==,type,false) \ + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(!=,type,true) + +#define HX_NULL_COMPARE_MOST_OPS(type) \ + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(<,type,false) \ + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(<=,type,false) \ + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(>,type,false) \ + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(>=,type,false) + +#define HX_COMPARE_NULL_OP(op,type,value) \ + inline bool operator op (type inLHS, const null &) { return value; } + +#define HX_COMPARE_NULL_OPS(type) \ + HX_COMPARE_NULL_OP(<,type,false) \ + HX_COMPARE_NULL_OP(<=,type,false) \ + HX_COMPARE_NULL_OP(>,type,false) \ + HX_COMPARE_NULL_OP(>=,type,false) \ + HX_COMPARE_NULL_OP(==,type,false) \ + HX_COMPARE_NULL_OP(!=,type,true) + +#define HX_COMPARE_NULL_MOST_OPS(type) \ + HX_COMPARE_NULL_OP(<,type,false) \ + HX_COMPARE_NULL_OP(<=,type,false) \ + HX_COMPARE_NULL_OP(>,type,false) \ + HX_COMPARE_NULL_OP(>=,type,false) + + +#define HX_NULL_ARITHMETIC_OP(op) \ +template inline null operator op (T t) const \ + { return hx::NullArithmetic(#op); } \ +inline null operator op (const null &) const \ + { return hx::NullArithmetic(#op); } + +#define HX_ARITHMETIC_NULL_OP(op) \ +template inline null operator op (const T &, const null &) \ + { return hx::NullArithmetic(#op); } + + +class null +{ + struct AnyArg + { + template + inline AnyArg(const T&) { } + }; + public: + inline null(){ } + + template explicit inline null(const hx::ObjectPtr &){ } + template explicit inline null(const String &){ } + explicit inline null(double){ } + explicit inline null(float){ } + explicit inline null(int){ } + explicit inline null(bool){ } + + template + T StaticCast() { return null(); } + + operator bool () { return false; } + operator int () { return 0; } + operator unsigned int () { return 0; } + operator double () { return 0; } + operator float () { return 0; } + operator char () { return 0; } + operator unsigned char () { return 0; } + operator signed char () { return 0; } + operator short () { return 0; } + operator unsigned short () { return 0; } + operator cpp::UInt64 () { return 0; } + operator cpp::Int64 () { return 0; } + template + inline operator typename hx::Native () const { return 0; } + + + // Any pointer! + //operator char * () { return 0; } + //operator wchar_t * () { return 0; } + template operator T *() { return 0; } + + bool operator == (null inRHS) const { return true; } + bool operator != (null inRHS) const { return false; } + bool operator == (null inRHS) { return true; } + bool operator != (null inRHS) { return false; } + + template inline bool operator == (const hx::ObjectPtr &) const; + template inline bool operator != (const hx::ObjectPtr &) const; + template inline bool operator == (const Array &) const; + template inline bool operator != (const Array &) const; + inline bool operator == (const hx::FieldRef &) const; + inline bool operator != (const hx::FieldRef &) const; + inline bool operator == (const hx::IndexRef &) const; + inline bool operator != (const hx::IndexRef &) const; + inline bool operator == (const Dynamic &) const; + inline bool operator != (const Dynamic &) const; + inline bool operator == (const String &) const; + inline bool operator != (const String &) const; + inline bool operator == (const cpp::Variant &v) const { return v.isNull(); } + inline bool operator != (const cpp::Variant &v) const{ return !v.isNull(); } + + inline null operator - () const { return hx::NullArithmetic("-"); } + inline null operator ! () const { return hx::NullArithmetic("!"); } + + template T operator()(const AnyArg &a0=0, const AnyArg &a1=0, const AnyArg &a2=0, + const AnyArg &a4=0, const AnyArg &a5=0, const AnyArg &a6=0, + const AnyArg &a7=0, const AnyArg &a8=0, const AnyArg &a9=0 ) + { + hx::NullReference("Function Call", false); + T nullDynamic; + return nullDynamic; + } + + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OPS(bool) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OPS(double) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OPS(float) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OPS(int) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OPS(unsigned int) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OPS(short) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OPS(unsigned short) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OPS(signed char) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OPS(unsigned char) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OPS(cpp::Int64) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OPS(cpp::UInt64) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_MOST_OPS(String) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_MOST_OPS(Dynamic) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_MOST_OPS(hx::FieldRef) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_MOST_OPS(hx::IndexRef) + + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(<,null,false) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(<=,null,true) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(>,null,false) + HX_NULL_COMPARE_OP(>=,null,true) + + + HX_NULL_ARITHMETIC_OP(+); + HX_NULL_ARITHMETIC_OP(*); + HX_NULL_ARITHMETIC_OP(-); + HX_NULL_ARITHMETIC_OP(/); + HX_NULL_ARITHMETIC_OP(%); + HX_NULL_ARITHMETIC_OP(&); + HX_NULL_ARITHMETIC_OP(|); + HX_NULL_ARITHMETIC_OP(^); + HX_NULL_ARITHMETIC_OP(>>); + HX_NULL_ARITHMETIC_OP(<<); +}; + +namespace hx +{ + +template +struct Null +{ + inline Null() : isNull(true) { } + inline Null(const Null &inOther) : isNull(inOther.isNull), value(inOther.value) { } + inline Null(const T& inVal) : isNull(false), value(inVal) { } + inline Null(const null &) : isNull(true) { } + inline Null(const Dynamic &inVal) + { + isNull = null() == inVal; + if (!isNull) + value = inVal; + } + inline Null(const cpp::Variant &inVal) + { + isNull = inVal.isNull(); + if (!isNull) + value = inVal; + } + + inline operator Dynamic(); + inline T Default(T inDefault) { return isNull ? inDefault : value; } + + bool isNull; + T value; +}; + +} // end namesapce hx + +typedef null Void; + +HX_COMPARE_NULL_OPS(bool) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_OPS(double) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_OPS(float) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_OPS(int) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_OPS(unsigned int) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_OPS(short) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_OPS(unsigned short) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_OPS(signed char) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_OPS(unsigned char) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_OPS(cpp::UInt64) +HX_COMPARE_NULL_OPS(cpp::Int64) + +HX_ARITHMETIC_NULL_OP(+) +HX_ARITHMETIC_NULL_OP(*) +HX_ARITHMETIC_NULL_OP(-) +HX_ARITHMETIC_NULL_OP(/) +HX_ARITHMETIC_NULL_OP(%) +HX_ARITHMETIC_NULL_OP(&) +HX_ARITHMETIC_NULL_OP(|) +HX_ARITHMETIC_NULL_OP(^) +HX_ARITHMETIC_NULL_OP(>>) +HX_ARITHMETIC_NULL_OP(<<) + +// Other ops in Operator.h + +inline void *_hx_nullptr() { return 0; } + + +#endif + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/java/org/haxe/HXCPP.java b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/java/org/haxe/HXCPP.java new file mode 100644 index 00000000..21dad464 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/java/org/haxe/HXCPP.java @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +package org.haxe; + +// Wrapper for native library + +public class HXCPP { + static boolean mInit = false; + + static public void run(String inClassName) { + System.loadLibrary(inClassName); + + if (!mInit) + { + mInit = true; + main(); + } + } + + public static native void main(); +} + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/Build.xml b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/Build.xml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fbfb33b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/Build.xml @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + +
+
+ + +
diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/compile-cppia-arm64.hxml b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/compile-cppia-arm64.hxml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cf0c8771 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/compile-cppia-arm64.hxml @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +-main cpp.cppia.Host +-D scriptable +-D dll_export= +-dce no +-cpp cppia_bin +-D HXCPP_ARM64 +-D HXCPP_CATCH_SEGV +-D hxcpp_smart_strings +-D destination=../../bin/{BINDIR}/Cppia{EXESUFFIX} diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/compile-cppia.hxml b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/compile-cppia.hxml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..81e74a2c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/compile-cppia.hxml @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +-main cpp.cppia.Host +-D scriptable +-D dll_export= +-dce no +-cpp cppia_bin +-D HXCPP_M64 +-D HXCPP_CATCH_SEGV +-D hxcpp_smart_strings +-D destination=../../bin/{BINDIR}/Cppia{EXESUFFIX} diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/Makefile b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cae88e99 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +MBEDTLS_OLD = mbedtls-2.2.1 +MBEDTLS_NEW = mbedtls-2.9.0 +MBEDTLS_URL = https://tls.mbed.org/download/mbedtls-2.9.0-apache.tgz + +all: purge upgrade + +purge: + rm -rf $(MBEDTLS_OLD) + +upgrade: $(MBEDTLS_NEW) + +$(MBEDTLS_NEW): + curl $(MBEDTLS_URL) | gunzip | tar xf - + rm -rf $(MBEDTLS_NEW)/DartConfiguration.tcl \ + $(MBEDTLS_NEW)/circle.yml \ + $(MBEDTLS_NEW)/configs \ + $(MBEDTLS_NEW)/doxygen \ + $(MBEDTLS_NEW)/programs \ + $(MBEDTLS_NEW)/scripts \ + $(MBEDTLS_NEW)/tests \ + $(MBEDTLS_NEW)/visualc \ + $(MBEDTLS_NEW)/yotta + { echo 'diff --git include/mbedtls/config.h include/mbedtls/config.h'; \ + echo 'index 9585e692..5aa405bc 100644'; \ + echo '--- include/mbedtls/config.h'; \ + echo '+++ include/mbedtls/config.h'; \ + echo '@@ -1480,6 +1480,9 @@'; \ + echo ' * Uncomment this to allow your own alternate threading implementation.'; \ + echo ' */'; \ + echo ' //#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT'; \ + echo '+#ifdef HX_WINDOWS'; \ + echo '+#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT'; \ + echo '+#endif'; \ + echo ' '; \ + echo ' /**'; \ + echo ' * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD'; \ + echo '@@ -1491,6 +1494,9 @@'; \ + echo ' * Uncomment this to enable pthread mutexes.'; \ + echo ' */'; \ + echo ' //#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD'; \ + echo '+#ifndef HX_WINDOWS'; \ + echo '+#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD'; \ + echo '+#endif'; \ + echo ' '; \ + echo ' /**'; \ + echo ' * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES'; \ + echo '@@ -2206,7 +2212,7 @@'; \ + echo ' *'; \ + echo ' * This module provides networking routines.'; \ + echo ' */'; \ + echo '-#define MBEDTLS_NET_C'; \ + echo '+//#define MBEDTLS_NET_C'; \ + echo ' '; \ + echo ' /**'; \ + echo ' * \def MBEDTLS_OID_C'; \ + echo '@@ -2570,7 +2576,7 @@'; \ + echo ' *'; \ + echo ' * Enable this layer to allow use of mutexes within mbed TLS'; \ + echo ' */'; \ + echo '-//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C'; \ + echo '+#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C'; \ + echo ' '; \ + echo ' /**'; \ + echo ' * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_C'; \ + echo 'diff --git include/mbedtls/threading_alt.h include/mbedtls/threading_alt.h'; \ + echo 'new file mode 100644'; \ + echo 'index 00000000..71c2179d'; \ + echo '--- /dev/null'; \ + echo '+++ include/mbedtls/threading_alt.h'; \ + echo '@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@'; \ + echo '+#include '; \ + echo '+'; \ + echo '+typedef struct'; \ + echo '+{'; \ + echo '+ CRITICAL_SECTION cs;'; \ + echo '+ char is_valid;'; \ + echo '+} mbedtls_threading_mutex_t;'; \ + } | patch -p0 -d $(MBEDTLS_NEW) + +clean: + rm -rf $(MBEDTLS_NEW) diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.gitattributes b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ceb59d7d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# Classify all '.function' files as C for syntax highlighting purposes +*.function linguist-language=C diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.gitignore b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a3221cb --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +# Random seed file created by test scripts and sample programs +seedfile + +# CMake build artifacts: +CMakeCache.txt +CMakeFiles +CTestTestfile.cmake +cmake_install.cmake +Testing +# CMake generates *.dir/ folders for in-tree builds (used by MSVC projects), ignore all of those: +*.dir/ +# MSVC files generated by CMake: +/*.sln +/*.vcxproj +/*.filters + +# Test coverage build artifacts: +Coverage +*.gcno +*.gcda +coverage-summary.txt + +# generated by scripts/memory.sh +massif-* + +# Eclipse project files +.cproject +.project +/.settings + +# MSVC build artifacts: +*.exe +*.pdb +*.ilk +*.lib + +# Python build artifacts: +*.pyc + +# CMake generates *.dir/ folders for in-tree builds (used by MSVC projects), ignore all of those: +*.dir/ + +# Microsoft CMake extension for Visual Studio Code generates a build directory by default +/build/ + +# Visual Studio artifacts +/visualc/VS2010/.localhistory/ +/visualc/VS2010/.vs/ +/visualc/VS2010/Debug/ +/visualc/VS2010/Release/ +/visualc/VS2010/*.vcxproj.filters +/visualc/VS2010/*.vcxproj.user + +# Generated documentation: +/apidoc + +# PSA Crypto compliance test repo, cloned by test_psa_compliance.py +/psa-arch-tests + +# Editor navigation files: +/GPATH +/GRTAGS +/GSYMS +/GTAGS +/TAGS +/cscope*.out +/tags diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.globalrc b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.globalrc new file mode 100644 index 00000000..01b2ea5a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.globalrc @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +default:\ + :langmap=c\:.c.h.function:\ + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.mypy.ini b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.mypy.ini new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6b831ddb --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.mypy.ini @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +[mypy] +mypy_path = scripts +namespace_packages = True +warn_unused_configs = True diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.pylintrc b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.pylintrc new file mode 100644 index 00000000..10c93f87 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.pylintrc @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +[MASTER] +init-hook='import sys; sys.path.append("scripts")' + +[BASIC] +# We're ok with short funtion argument names. +# [invalid-name] +argument-rgx=[a-z_][a-z0-9_]*$ + +# Allow filter and map. +# [bad-builtin] +bad-functions=input + +# We prefer docstrings, but we don't require them on all functions. +# Require them only on long functions (for some value of long). +# [missing-docstring] +docstring-min-length=10 + +# No upper limit on method names. Pylint <2.1.0 has an upper limit of 30. +# [invalid-name] +method-rgx=[a-z_][a-z0-9_]{2,}$ + +# Allow module names containing a dash (but no underscore or uppercase letter). +# They are whole programs, not meant to be included by another module. +# [invalid-name] +module-rgx=(([a-z_][a-z0-9_]*)|([A-Z][a-zA-Z0-9]+)|[a-z][-0-9a-z]+)$ + +# Some functions don't need docstrings. +# [missing-docstring] +no-docstring-rgx=(run_)?main$ + +# We're ok with short local or global variable names. +# [invalid-name] +variable-rgx=[a-z_][a-z0-9_]*$ + +[DESIGN] +# Allow more than the default 7 attributes. +# [too-many-instance-attributes] +max-attributes=15 + +[FORMAT] +# Allow longer modules than the default recommended maximum. +# [too-many-lines] +max-module-lines=2000 + +[MESSAGES CONTROL] +# * locally-disabled, locally-enabled: If we disable or enable a message +# locally, it's by design. There's no need to clutter the Pylint output +# with this information. +# * logging-format-interpolation: Pylint warns about things like +# ``log.info('...'.format(...))``. It insists on ``log.info('...', ...)``. +# This is of minor utility (mainly a performance gain when there are +# many messages that use formatting and are below the log level). +# Some versions of Pylint (including 1.8, which is the version on +# Ubuntu 18.04) only recognize old-style format strings using '%', +# and complain about something like ``log.info('{}', foo)`` with +# logging-too-many-args (Pylint supports new-style formatting if +# declared globally with logging_format_style under [LOGGING] but +# this requires Pylint >=2.2). +# * no-else-return: Allow the perfectly reasonable idiom +# if condition1: +# return value1 +# else: +# return value2 +# * unnecessary-pass: If we take the trouble of adding a line with "pass", +# it's because we think the code is clearer that way. +disable=locally-disabled,locally-enabled,logging-format-interpolation,no-else-return,unnecessary-pass + +[REPORTS] +# Don't diplay statistics. Just the facts. +reports=no + +[VARIABLES] +# Allow unused variables if their name starts with an underscore. +# [unused-argument] +dummy-variables-rgx=_.* + +[SIMILARITIES] +# Ignore imports when computing similarities. +ignore-imports=yes diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.travis.yml b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.travis.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cdf74c71 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/.travis.yml @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +language: c +compiler: gcc +sudo: false +cache: ccache + +jobs: + include: + - name: basic checks and reference configurations + addons: + apt: + packages: + - gnutls-bin + - doxygen + - graphviz + - gcc-arm-none-eabi + - libnewlib-arm-none-eabi + - gcc-arm-linux-gnueabi + - libc6-dev-armel-cross + language: python # Needed to get pip for Python 3 + python: 3.5 # version from Ubuntu 16.04 + install: + - scripts/min_requirements.py + script: + - tests/scripts/all.sh -k 'check_*' + - tests/scripts/all.sh -k test_default_out_of_box + - tests/scripts/all.sh -k test_ref_configs + - tests/scripts/all.sh -k build_arm_linux_gnueabi_gcc_arm5vte build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_m0plus + + - name: full configuration + os: linux + dist: focal + addons: + apt: + packages: + - clang-10 + - gnutls-bin + script: + # Do a manual build+test sequence rather than using all.sh, + # because there's no all.sh component that does what we want, + # which is a build with Clang >= 10 and ASan, running all the SSL + # testing. + # - The clang executable in the default PATH is Clang 7 on + # Travis's focal instances, but we want Clang >= 10. + # - Running all the SSL testing requires a specific set of + # OpenSSL and GnuTLS versions and we don't want to bother + # with those on Travis. + # So we explicitly select clang-10 as the compiler, and we + # have ad hoc restrictions on SSL testing based on what is + # passing at the time of writing. We will remove these limitations + # gradually. + - make CC=clang-10 CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O2' LDFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all' + - make test + - programs/test/selftest + - tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py + # Exclude a few test cases that are failing mysteriously. + # https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/6660 + - tests/ssl-opt.sh -e 'Fallback SCSV:\ .*list' + # Modern OpenSSL does not support fixed ECDH, null or ancient ciphers. + - tests/compat.sh -p OpenSSL -e 'NULL\|ECDH-\|DES\|RC4' + - tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh + # GnuTLS supports CAMELLIA but compat.sh doesn't properly enable it. + # Modern GnuTLS does not support DES. + # One NULL cipher suite is strangely missing in pre-1.2 protocol + # versions (it works with (D)TLS1.2, but don't bother). + - tests/compat.sh -p GnuTLS -e 'CAMELLIA\|DES\|TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA256' + - tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh + - tests/context-info.sh + + - name: Windows + os: windows + script: + - scripts/windows_msbuild.bat v141 # Visual Studio 2017 + +after_failure: +- tests/scripts/travis-log-failure.sh + +env: + global: + - SEED=1 + - secure: "JECCru6HASpKZ0OLfHh8f/KXhKkdrCwjquZghd/qbA4ksxsWImjR7KEPERcaPndXEilzhDbKwuFvJiQX2duVgTGoq745YGhLZIjzo1i8tySkceCVd48P8WceYGz+F/bmY7r+m6fFNuxDSoGGSVeA4Lnjvmm8PFUP45YodDV9no4=" + +addons: + apt: + packages: + - gnutls-bin + coverity_scan: + project: + name: "ARMmbed/mbedtls" + notification_email: support-mbedtls@arm.com + build_command_prepend: + build_command: make + branch_pattern: coverity_scan diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/BRANCHES.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/BRANCHES.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d4fa5068 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/BRANCHES.md @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +# Maintained branches + +At any point in time, we have a number of maintained branches consisting of: + +- The [`master`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/master) branch: + this always contains the latest release, including all publicly available + security fixes. +- The [`development`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/development) branch: + this is where new features land, + as well as bug fixes and security fixes. +- One or more long-time support (LTS) branches: + these only get bug fixes and security fixes. + +We use [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/). In particular, we maintain +API compatibility in the `master` branch between major version changes. We +also maintain ABI compatibility within LTS branches; see the next section for +details. + +## Backwards Compatibility for application code + +We maintain API compatibility in released versions of Mbed TLS. If you have +code that's working and secure with Mbed TLS x.y.z and does not rely on +undocumented features, then you should be able to re-compile it without +modification with any later release x.y'.z' with the same major version +number, and your code will still build, be secure, and work. + +Note that this guarantee only applies if you either use the default +compile-time configuration (`mbedtls/config.h`) or the same modified +compile-time configuration. Changing compile-time configuration options can +result in an incompatible API or ABI, although features will generally not +affect unrelated features (for example, enabling or disabling a +cryptographic algorithm does not break code that does not use that +algorithm). + +There are rare exceptions: code that was relying on something that became +insecure in the meantime (for example, crypto that was found to be weak) may +need to be changed. In case security comes in conflict with backwards +compatibility, we will put security first, but always attempt to provide a +compatibility option. + +For the LTS branches, additionally we try very hard to also maintain ABI +compatibility (same definition as API except with re-linking instead of +re-compiling) and to avoid any increase in code size or RAM usage, or in the +minimum version of tools needed to build the code. The only exception, as +before, is in case those goals would conflict with fixing a security issue, we +will put security first but provide a compatibility option. (So far we never +had to break ABI compatibility in an LTS branch, but we occasionally had to +increase code size for a security fix.) + +For contributors, see the [Backwards Compatibility section of +CONTRIBUTING](CONTRIBUTING.md#backwards-compatibility). + +## Backward compatibility for the key store + +We maintain backward compatibility with previous versions of the +PSA Crypto persistent storage since Mbed TLS 2.25.0, provided that the +storage backend (PSA ITS implementation) is configured in a compatible way. +We intend to maintain this backward compatibility throughout a major version +of Mbed TLS (for example, all Mbed TLS 3.y versions will be able to read +keys written under any Mbed TLS 3.x with x <= y). + +Mbed TLS 3.x can also read keys written by Mbed TLS 2.25.0 through 2.28.x +LTS, but future major version upgrades (for example from 2.28.x/3.x to 4.y) +may require the use of an upgrade tool. + +## Current Branches + +The following branches are currently maintained: + +- [master](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/master) +- [`development`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/) +- [`mbedtls-2.28`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.28) + maintained until at least the end of 2024, see + . + +Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch. diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/BUGS.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/BUGS.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..47bde07a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/BUGS.md @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +## Known issues + +Known issues in Mbed TLS are [tracked on GitHub](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues). + +## Reporting a bug + +If you think you've found a bug in Mbed TLS, please follow these steps: + +1. Make sure you're using the latest version of a + [maintained branch](BRANCHES.md): `master`, `development`, + or a long-time support branch. +2. Check [GitHub](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues) to see if + your issue has already been reported. If not, … +3. If the issue is a security risk (for example: buffer overflow, + data leak), please report it confidentially as described in + [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md). If not, … +4. Please [create an issue on on GitHub](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues). + +Please do not use GitHub for support questions. If you want to know +how to do something with Mbed TLS, please see [`SUPPORT.md`](SUPPORT.md) for available documentation and support channels. diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/CMakeLists.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e18f607b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,352 @@ +# +# CMake build system design considerations: +# +# - Include directories: +# + Do not define include directories globally using the include_directories +# command but rather at the target level using the +# target_include_directories command. That way, it is easier to guarantee +# that targets are built using the proper list of include directories. +# + Use the PUBLIC and PRIVATE keywords to specify the scope of include +# directories. That way, a target linking to a library (using the +# target_link_libraries command) inherits from the library PUBLIC include +# directories and not from the PRIVATE ones. +# + Note: there is currently one remaining include_directories command in the +# CMake files. It is related to ZLIB support which is planned to be removed. +# When the support is removed, the associated include_directories command +# will be removed as well as this note. +# - MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX: CMake targets are designed to be alterable by calling +# CMake in order to avoid target name clashes, via the use of +# MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX. The value of this variable is prefixed to the +# mbedtls, mbedx509, mbedcrypto and apidoc targets. +# + +cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 2.8.12) + +# https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/policy/CMP0011.html +# Setting this policy is required in CMake >= 3.18.0, otherwise a warning is generated. The OLD +# policy setting is deprecated, and will be removed in future versions. +cmake_policy(SET CMP0011 NEW) +# https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/policy/CMP0012.html +# Setting the CMP0012 policy to NEW is required for FindPython3 to work with CMake 3.18.2 +# (there is a bug in this particular version), otherwise, setting the CMP0012 policy is required +# for CMake versions >= 3.18.3 otherwise a deprecated warning is generated. The OLD policy setting +# is deprecated and will be removed in future versions. +cmake_policy(SET CMP0012 NEW) + +if(TEST_CPP) + project("mbed TLS" C CXX) +else() + project("mbed TLS" C) +endif() + +# Set the project root directory. +set(MBEDTLS_DIR ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}) + +option(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY "Build mbed TLS with the pkcs11-helper library." OFF) +option(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT "Build mbed TLS with zlib library." OFF) + +option(ENABLE_PROGRAMS "Build mbed TLS programs." ON) + +option(UNSAFE_BUILD "Allow unsafe builds. These builds ARE NOT SECURE." OFF) +option(MBEDTLS_FATAL_WARNINGS "Compiler warnings treated as errors" ON) + +string(REGEX MATCH "Clang" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}") +string(REGEX MATCH "GNU" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}") +string(REGEX MATCH "IAR" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_IAR "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}") +string(REGEX MATCH "MSVC" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}") + +# the test suites currently have compile errors with MSVC +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC) + option(ENABLE_TESTING "Build mbed TLS tests." OFF) +else() + option(ENABLE_TESTING "Build mbed TLS tests." ON) +endif() + +# Warning string - created as a list for compatibility with CMake 2.8 +set(WARNING_BORDER "*******************************************************\n") +set(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L1 "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined!\n") +set(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L2 "**** THIS BUILD HAS NO DEFINED ENTROPY SOURCES\n") +set(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L3 "**** AND IS *NOT* SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE\n") + +set(NULL_ENTROPY_WARNING "${WARNING_BORDER}" + "${NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L1}" + "${NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L2}" + "${NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L3}" + "${WARNING_BORDER}") + +set(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L1 "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY defined!\n") +set(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L2 "**** Using 128-bit keys for CTR_DRBG limits the security of generated\n") +set(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L3 "**** keys and operations that use random values generated to 128-bit security\n") + +set(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARNING "${WARNING_BORDER}" + "${CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L1}" + "${CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L2}" + "${CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L3}" + "${WARNING_BORDER}") + +# Python 3 is only needed here to check for configuration warnings. +if(NOT CMAKE_VERSION VERSION_LESS 3.15.0) + set(Python3_FIND_STRATEGY LOCATION) + find_package(Python3 COMPONENTS Interpreter) + if(Python3_Interpreter_FOUND) + set(MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE ${Python3_EXECUTABLE}) + endif() +else() + find_package(PythonInterp 3) + if(PYTHONINTERP_FOUND) + set(MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE ${PYTHON_EXECUTABLE}) + endif() +endif() +if(MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE) + + # If 128-bit keys are configured for CTR_DRBG, display an appropriate warning + execute_process(COMMAND ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/config.py -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/mbedtls/config.h get MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + RESULT_VARIABLE result) + if(${result} EQUAL 0) + message(WARNING ${CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARNING}) + endif() + + # If NULL Entropy is configured, display an appropriate warning + execute_process(COMMAND ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/scripts/config.py -f ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/mbedtls/config.h get MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY + RESULT_VARIABLE result) + if(${result} EQUAL 0) + message(WARNING ${NULL_ENTROPY_WARNING}) + + if(NOT UNSAFE_BUILD) + message(FATAL_ERROR "\ +\n\ +Warning! You have enabled MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY. \ +This option is not safe for production use and negates all security \ +It is intended for development use only. \ +\n\ +To confirm you want to build with this option, re-run cmake with the \ +option: \n\ + cmake -DUNSAFE_BUILD=ON ") + + return() + endif() + endif() +endif() + +# If this is the root project add longer list of available CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE values +if(CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR STREQUAL CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR) + set(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE ${CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE} + CACHE STRING "Choose the type of build: None Debug Release Coverage ASan ASanDbg MemSan MemSanDbg Check CheckFull" + FORCE) +endif() + +# Create a symbolic link from ${base_name} in the binary directory +# to the corresponding path in the source directory. +function(link_to_source base_name) + # Get OS dependent path to use in `execute_process` + if (CMAKE_HOST_WIN32) + #mklink is an internal command of cmd.exe it can only work with \ + string(REPLACE "/" "\\" link "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${base_name}") + string(REPLACE "/" "\\" target "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/${base_name}") + else() + set(link "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${base_name}") + set(target "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/${base_name}") + endif() + + if (NOT EXISTS ${link}) + if (CMAKE_HOST_UNIX) + set(command ln -s ${target} ${link}) + else() + if (IS_DIRECTORY ${target}) + set(command cmd.exe /c mklink /j ${link} ${target}) + else() + set(command cmd.exe /c mklink /h ${link} ${target}) + endif() + endif() + + execute_process(COMMAND ${command} + RESULT_VARIABLE result + ERROR_VARIABLE output) + + if (NOT ${result} EQUAL 0) + message(FATAL_ERROR "Could not create symbolic link for: ${target} --> ${output}") + endif() + endif() +endfunction(link_to_source) + +string(REGEX MATCH "Clang" CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG "${CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID}") + +include(CheckCCompilerFlag) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU) + # some warnings we want are not available with old GCC versions + # note: starting with CMake 2.8 we could use CMAKE_C_COMPILER_VERSION + execute_process(COMMAND ${CMAKE_C_COMPILER} -dumpversion + OUTPUT_VARIABLE GCC_VERSION) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Wextra -Wwrite-strings") + if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 3.0 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 3.0) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral") + endif() + if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 4.3 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 4.3) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wvla") + endif() + if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 4.5 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 4.5) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wlogical-op") + endif() + if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 4.8 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 4.8) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wshadow") + endif() + if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 5.0) + CHECK_C_COMPILER_FLAG("-Wformat-signedness" C_COMPILER_SUPPORTS_WFORMAT_SIGNEDNESS) + if(C_COMPILER_SUPPORTS_WFORMAT_SIGNEDNESS) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wformat-signedness") + endif() + endif() + if (GCC_VERSION VERSION_GREATER 7.0 OR GCC_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL 7.0) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wformat-overflow=2 -Wformat-truncation") + endif() + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE "-O2") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_DEBUG "-O0 -g3") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_COVERAGE "-O0 -g3 --coverage") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASAN "-fsanitize=address -fno-common -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O3") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASANDBG "-fsanitize=address -fno-common -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O1 -g3 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECK "-Os") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECKFULL "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECK} -Wcast-qual") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Wextra -Wwrite-strings -Wpointer-arith -Wimplicit-fallthrough -Wshadow -Wvla -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE "-O2") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_DEBUG "-O0 -g3") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_COVERAGE "-O0 -g3 --coverage") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASAN "-fsanitize=address -fno-common -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O3") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASANDBG "-fsanitize=address -fno-common -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O1 -g3 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MEMSAN "-fsanitize=memory -O3") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MEMSANDBG "-fsanitize=memory -O1 -g3 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls -fsanitize-memory-track-origins=2") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECK "-Os") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_IAR) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} --warn_about_c_style_casts -Ohz") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_IAR) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC) + # Strictest warnings, UTF-8 source and execution charset + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} /W3 /utf-8") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC) + +if(MBEDTLS_FATAL_WARNINGS) + if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} /WX") + endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC) + + if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG OR CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Werror") + if(UNSAFE_BUILD) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wno-error=cpp") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASAN "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASAN} -Wno-error=cpp") + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASANDBG "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASANDBG} -Wno-error=cpp") + endif(UNSAFE_BUILD) + endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG OR CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU) + + if (CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_IAR) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} --warning_are_errors") + endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_IAR) +endif(MBEDTLS_FATAL_WARNINGS) + +if(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE STREQUAL "Coverage") + if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU OR CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + set(CMAKE_SHARED_LINKER_FLAGS "--coverage") + endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU OR CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) +endif(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE STREQUAL "Coverage") + +if(LIB_INSTALL_DIR) +else() + set(LIB_INSTALL_DIR lib) +endif() + +if(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + find_package(ZLIB) + + if(ZLIB_FOUND) + include_directories(${ZLIB_INCLUDE_DIR}) + endif(ZLIB_FOUND) +endif(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + +add_subdirectory(include) + +add_subdirectory(3rdparty) +list(APPEND libs ${thirdparty_lib}) + +add_subdirectory(library) + +# +# The C files in tests/src directory contain test code shared among test suites +# and programs. This shared test code is compiled and linked to test suites and +# programs objects as a set of compiled objects. The compiled objects are NOT +# built into a library that the test suite and program objects would link +# against as they link against the mbedcrypto, mbedx509 and mbedtls libraries. +# The reason is that such library is expected to have mutual dependencies with +# the aforementioned libraries and that there is as of today no portable way of +# handling such dependencies (only toolchain specific solutions). +# +# Thus the below definition of the `mbedtls_test` CMake library of objects +# target. This library of objects is used by tests and programs CMake files +# to define the test executables. +# +if(ENABLE_TESTING OR ENABLE_PROGRAMS) + file(GLOB MBEDTLS_TEST_FILES ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/tests/src/*.c ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/tests/src/drivers/*.c) + add_library(mbedtls_test OBJECT ${MBEDTLS_TEST_FILES}) + target_include_directories(mbedtls_test + PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/tests/include + PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/include + PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/library) +endif() + +if(ENABLE_PROGRAMS) + add_subdirectory(programs) +endif() + +ADD_CUSTOM_TARGET(${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}apidoc + COMMAND doxygen mbedtls.doxyfile + WORKING_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/doxygen) + +if(ENABLE_TESTING) + enable_testing() + + add_subdirectory(tests) + + # additional convenience targets for Unix only + if(UNIX) + + ADD_CUSTOM_TARGET(covtest + COMMAND make test + COMMAND programs/test/selftest + COMMAND tests/compat.sh + COMMAND tests/ssl-opt.sh + ) + + ADD_CUSTOM_TARGET(lcov + COMMAND rm -rf Coverage + COMMAND lcov --capture --initial --directory library/CMakeFiles/mbedtls.dir -o files.info + COMMAND lcov --capture --directory library/CMakeFiles/mbedtls.dir -o tests.info + COMMAND lcov --add-tracefile files.info --add-tracefile tests.info -o all.info + COMMAND lcov --remove all.info -o final.info '*.h' + COMMAND gendesc tests/Descriptions.txt -o descriptions + COMMAND genhtml --title "mbed TLS" --description-file descriptions --keep-descriptions --legend --no-branch-coverage -o Coverage final.info + COMMAND rm -f files.info tests.info all.info final.info descriptions + ) + + ADD_CUSTOM_TARGET(memcheck + COMMAND sed -i.bak s+/usr/bin/valgrind+`which valgrind`+ DartConfiguration.tcl + COMMAND ctest -O memcheck.log -D ExperimentalMemCheck + COMMAND tail -n1 memcheck.log | grep 'Memory checking results:' > /dev/null + COMMAND rm -f memcheck.log + COMMAND mv DartConfiguration.tcl.bak DartConfiguration.tcl + ) + endif(UNIX) + + # Make scripts needed for testing available in an out-of-source build. + if (NOT ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR} STREQUAL ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}) + link_to_source(scripts) + # Copy (don't link) DartConfiguration.tcl, needed for memcheck, to + # keep things simple with the sed commands in the memcheck target. + configure_file(${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/DartConfiguration.tcl + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/DartConfiguration.tcl COPYONLY) + endif() +endif() diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/CONTRIBUTING.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/CONTRIBUTING.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d19fe57c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +Contributing +============ +We gratefully accept bug reports and contributions from the community. All PRs are reviewed by the project team / community, and may need some modifications to +be accepted. + +Quick Checklist for PR contributors +----------------------------------- +More details on all of these points may be found in the sections below. + +- [Sign-off](#license-and-copyright): all commits must be signed off. +- [Tests](#tests): please ensure the PR includes adequate tests. +- [Changelog](#documentation): if needed, please provide a changelog entry. +- [Backports](#long-term-support-branches): provide a backport if needed (it's fine to wait until the main PR is accepted). + +Coding Standards +---------------- +- We would ask that contributions conform to [our coding standards](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/development/mbedtls-coding-standards/), and that contributions are fully tested before submission, as mentioned in the [Tests](#tests) and [Continuous Integration](#continuous-integration-tests) sections. +- The code should be written in a clean and readable style. +- The code should be written in a portable generic way, that will benefit the whole community, and not only your own needs. +- The code should be secure, and will be reviewed from a security point of view as well. + +Making a Contribution +--------------------- +1. [Check for open issues](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues) or [start a discussion](https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman3/lists/mbed-tls.lists.trustedfirmware.org) around a feature idea or a bug. +1. Fork the [Mbed TLS repository on GitHub](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls) to start making your changes. As a general rule, you should use the ["development" branch](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/development) as a basis. +1. Write a test which shows that the bug was fixed or that the feature works as expected. +1. Send a pull request (PR) and work with us until it gets merged and published. Contributions may need some modifications, so a few rounds of review and fixing may be necessary. We will include your name in the ChangeLog :) +1. For quick merging, the contribution should be short, and concentrated on a single feature or topic. The larger the contribution is, the longer it would take to review it and merge it. + +Backwards Compatibility +----------------------- + +The project aims to minimise the impact on users upgrading to newer versions of the library and it should not be necessary for a user to make any changes to their own code to work with a newer version of the library. Unless the user has made an active decision to use newer features, a newer generation of the library or a change has been necessary due to a security issue or other significant software defect, no modifications to their own code should be necessary. To achieve this, API compatibility is maintained between different versions of Mbed TLS on the main development branch and in LTS (Long Term Support) branches, as described in [BRANCHES.md](BRANCHES.md). + +To minimise such disruption to users, where a change to the interface is required, all changes to the ABI or API, even on the main development branch where new features are added, need to be justifiable by either being a significant enhancement, new feature or bug fix which is best resolved by an interface change. If there is an API change, the contribution, if accepted, will be merged only when there will be a major release. + +Where changes to an existing interface are necessary, functions in the public interface which need to be changed, are marked as 'deprecated'. This is done with the preprocessor symbols `MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING` and `MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED`. Then, a new function with a new name but similar if not identical behaviour to the original function containing the necessary changes should be created alongside the existing deprecated function. + +When a build is made with the deprecation preprocessor symbols defined, a compiler warning will be generated to warn a user that the function will be removed at some point in the future, notifying users that they should change from the older deprecated function to the newer function at their own convenience. + +Therefore, no changes are permitted to the definition of functions in the public interface which will change the API. Instead the interface can only be changed by its extension. As described above, if a function needs to be changed, a new function needs to be created alongside it, with a new name, and whatever change is necessary, such as a new parameter or the addition of a return value. + +Periodically, the library will remove deprecated functions from the library which will be a breaking change in the API, but such changes will be made only in a planned, structured way that gives sufficient notice to users of the library. + +Long Term Support Branches +-------------------------- +Mbed TLS maintains several LTS (Long Term Support) branches, which are maintained continuously for a given period. The LTS branches are provided to allow users of the library to have a maintained, stable version of the library which contains only security fixes and fixes for other defects, without encountering additional features or API extensions which may introduce issues or change the code size or RAM usage, which can be significant considerations on some platforms. To allow users to take advantage of the LTS branches, these branches maintain backwards compatibility for both the public API and ABI. + +When backporting to these branches please observe the following rules: + +1. Any change to the library which changes the API or ABI cannot be backported. +1. All bug fixes that correct a defect that is also present in an LTS branch must be backported to that LTS branch. If a bug fix introduces a change to the API such as a new function, the fix should be reworked to avoid the API change. API changes without very strong justification are unlikely to be accepted. +1. If a contribution is a new feature or enhancement, no backporting is required. Exceptions to this may be additional test cases or quality improvements such as changes to build or test scripts. + +It would be highly appreciated if contributions are backported to LTS branches in addition to the [development branch](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/development) by contributors. + +The list of maintained branches can be found in the [Current Branches section +of BRANCHES.md](BRANCHES.md#current-branches). + +Tests +----- +As mentioned, tests that show the correctness of the feature or bug fix should be added to the pull request, if no such tests exist. + +Mbed TLS includes a comprehensive set of test suites in the `tests/` directory that are dynamically generated to produce the actual test source files (e.g. `test_suite_rsa.c`). These files are generated from a `function file` (e.g. `suites/test_suite_rsa.function`) and a `data file` (e.g. `suites/test_suite_rsa.data`). The function file contains the test functions. The data file contains the test cases, specified as parameters that will be passed to the test function. + +[A Knowledge Base article describing how to add additional tests is available on the Mbed TLS website](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/development/test_suites/). + +A test script `tests/scripts/basic-build-test.sh` is available to show test coverage of the library. New code contributions should provide a similar level of code coverage to that which already exists for the library. + +Sample applications, if needed, should be modified as well. + +Continuous Integration Tests +---------------------------- +Once a PR has been made, the Continuous Integration (CI) tests are triggered and run. You should follow the result of the CI tests, and fix failures. + +It is advised to enable the [githooks scripts](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/development/tests/git-scripts) prior to pushing your changes, for catching some of the issues as early as possible. + +Documentation +------------- +Mbed TLS is well documented, but if you think documentation is needed, speak out! + +1. All interfaces should be documented through Doxygen. New APIs should introduce Doxygen documentation. +1. Complex parts in the code should include comments. +1. If needed, a Readme file is advised. +1. If a [Knowledge Base (KB)](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/) article should be added, write this as a comment in the PR description. +1. A [ChangeLog](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/ChangeLog.d/00README.md) entry should be added for this contribution. + +License and Copyright +--------------------- + +All new files should include the [Apache-2.0](https://spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html) standard license header where possible. For licensing details, please see the [License section of the README](README.md#License). + +The copyright on contributions is retained by the original authors of the code. Where possible for new files, this should be noted in a comment at the top of the file in the form: "Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors". + +When contributing code to us, the committer and all authors are required to make the submission under the terms of the [Developer Certificate of Origin](dco.txt), confirming that the code submitted can (legally) become part of the project, and be subject to the same Apache 2.0 license. This is done by including the standard Git `Signed-off-by:` line in every commit message. If more than one person contributed to the commit, they should also add their own `Signed-off-by:` line. diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/ChangeLog b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3673f5da --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,4676 @@ +Mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date) + += Mbed TLS 2.28.2 branch released 2022-12-14 + +Security + * Fix potential heap buffer overread and overwrite in DTLS if + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID is enabled and + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX > 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX. + * An adversary with access to precise enough information about memory + accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking a secure + enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the victim + performing a single private-key operation if the window size used for the + exponentiation was 3 or smaller. Found and reported by Zili KOU, + Wenjian HE, Sharad Sinha, and Wei ZHANG. See "Cache Side-channel Attacks + and Defenses of the Sliding Window Algorithm in TEEs" - Design, Automation + and Test in Europe 2023. + +Bugfix + * Fix a long-standing build failure when building x86 PIC code with old + gcc (4.x). The code will be slower, but will compile. We do however + recommend upgrading to a more recent compiler instead. Fixes #1910. + * Fix support for little-endian Microblaze when MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM is defined. + Contributed by Kazuyuki Kimura to fix #2020. + * Use double quotes to include private header file psa_crypto_cipher.h. + Fixes 'file not found with include' error + when building with Xcode. + * Fix handling of broken symlinks when loading certificates using + mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(). Instead of returning an error as soon as a + broken link is encountered, skip the broken link and continue parsing + other certificate files. Contributed by Eduardo Silva in #2602. + * Fix a compilation error when using CMake with an IAR toolchain. + Fixes #5964. + * Fix bugs and missing dependencies when building and testing + configurations with only one encryption type enabled in TLS 1.2. + * Provide the missing definition of mbedtls_setbuf() in some configurations + with MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C disabled. Fixes #6118, #6196. + * Fix compilation errors when trying to build with + PSA drivers for AEAD (GCM, CCM, Chacha20-Poly1305). + * Fix memory leak in ssl_parse_certificate_request() caused by + mbedtls_x509_get_name() not freeing allocated objects in case of error. + Change mbedtls_x509_get_name() to clean up allocated objects on error. + * Fix checks on PK in check_config.h for builds with PSA and RSA. This does + not change which builds actually work, only moving a link-time error to + an early check. + * Fix ECDSA verification, where it was not always validating the + public key. This bug meant that it was possible to verify a + signature with an invalid public key, in some cases. Reported by + Guido Vranken using Cryptofuzz in #4420. + * Fix a possible null pointer dereference if a memory allocation fails + in TLS PRF code. Reported by Michael Madsen in #6516. + * Fix a bug in which mbedtls_x509_crt_info() would produce non-printable + bytes when parsing certificates containing a binary RFC 4108 + HardwareModuleName as a Subject Alternative Name extension. Hardware + serial numbers are now rendered in hex format. Fixes #6262. + * Fix bug in error reporting in dh_genprime.c where upon failure, + the error code returned by mbedtls_mpi_write_file() is overwritten + and therefore not printed. + * In the bignum module, operations of the form (-A) - (+A) or (-A) - (-A) + with A > 0 created an unintended representation of the value 0 which was + not processed correctly by some bignum operations. Fix this. This had no + consequence on cryptography code, but might affect applications that call + bignum directly and use negative numbers. + * Fix undefined behavior (typically harmless in practice) of + mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(), mbedtls_mpi_add_abs() and mbedtls_mpi_add_int() + when both operands are 0 and the left operand is represented with 0 limbs. + * Fix undefined behavior (typically harmless in practice) when some bignum + functions receive the most negative value of mbedtls_mpi_sint. Credit + to OSS-Fuzz. Fixes #6597. + * Fix undefined behavior (typically harmless in practice) in PSA ECB + encryption and decryption. + += Mbed TLS 2.28.1 branch released 2022-07-11 + +Default behavior changes + * mbedtls_cipher_set_iv will now fail with ChaCha20 and ChaCha20+Poly1305 + for IV lengths other than 12. The library was silently overwriting this + length with 12, but did not inform the caller about it. Fixes #4301. + +Features + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled, you may list the PSA crypto + feature requirements in the file named by the new macro + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE instead of the default psa/crypto_config.h. + Furthermore you may name an additional file to include after the main + file with the macro MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE. + +Security + * Zeroize dynamically-allocated buffers used by the PSA Crypto key storage + module before freeing them. These buffers contain secret key material, and + could thus potentially leak the key through freed heap. + * Fix a potential heap buffer overread in TLS 1.2 server-side when + MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, an opaque key (created with + mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque()) is provisioned, and a static ECDH ciphersuite + is selected. This may result in an application crash or potentially an + information leak. + * Fix a buffer overread in DTLS ClientHello parsing in servers with + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE enabled. An unauthenticated client + or a man-in-the-middle could cause a DTLS server to read up to 255 bytes + after the end of the SSL input buffer. The buffer overread only happens + when MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN is less than a threshold that depends on + the exact configuration: 258 bytes if using mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(), + and possibly up to 571 bytes with a custom cookie check function. + Reported by the Cybeats PSI Team. + +Bugfix + * Fix a memory leak if mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() is called twice. + * Fix several bugs (warnings, compiler and linker errors, test failures) + in reduced configurations when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled. + * Fix a bug in (D)TLS curve negotiation: when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO was + enabled and an ECDHE-ECDSA or ECDHE-RSA key exchange was used, the + client would fail to check that the curve selected by the server for + ECDHE was indeed one that was offered. As a result, the client would + accept any curve that it supported, even if that curve was not allowed + according to its configuration. Fixes #5291. + * Fix unit tests that used 0 as the file UID. This failed on some + implementations of PSA ITS. Fixes #3838. + * Fix API violation in mbedtls_md_process() test by adding a call to + mbedtls_md_starts(). Fixes #2227. + * Fix compile errors when MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME is not defined. Add tests + to catch bad uses of time.h. + * Fix the library search path when building a shared library with CMake + on Windows. + * Fix bug in the alert sending function mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message() + potentially leading to corrupted alert messages being sent in case + the function needs to be re-called after initially returning + MBEDTLS_SSL_WANT_WRITE. Fixes #1916. + * In configurations with MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID enabled but none of + MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL, MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS or MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C, + DTLS handshakes using CID would crash due to a null pointer dereference. + Fix this. Fixes #3998. + * Fix incorrect documentation of mbedtls_x509_crt_profile. The previous + documentation stated that the `allowed_pks` field applies to signatures + only, but in fact it does apply to the public key type of the end entity + certificate, too. Fixes #1992. + * Fix PSA cipher multipart operations using ARC4. Previously, an IV was + required but discarded. Now, an IV is rejected, as it should be. + * Fix undefined behavior in mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(), where val is + not NULL and val_len is zero. + * psa_raw_key_agreement() now returns PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL when + applicable. Fixes #5735. + * Fix a bug in the x25519 example program where the removal of + MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT caused the program not to run. Fixes #4901 and + #3191. + * Encode X.509 dates before 1/1/2000 as UTCTime rather than + GeneralizedTime. Fixes #5465. + * Fix order value of curve x448. + * Fix string representation of DNs when outputting values containing commas + and other special characters, conforming to RFC 1779. Fixes #769. + * Silence a warning from GCC 12 in the selftest program. Fixes #5974. + * Fix mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi() writing an incorrect encoding of 0. + * Fix resource leaks in mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key() in low + memory conditions. + * Fix server connection identifier setting for outgoing encrypted records + on DTLS 1.2 session resumption. After DTLS 1.2 session resumption with + connection identifier, the Mbed TLS client now properly sends the server + connection identifier in encrypted record headers. Fix #5872. + * Fix a null pointer dereference when performing some operations on zero + represented with 0 limbs (specifically mbedtls_mpi_mod_int() dividing + by 2, and mbedtls_mpi_write_string() in base 2). + * Fix record sizes larger than 16384 being sometimes accepted despite being + non-compliant. This could not lead to a buffer overflow. In particular, + application data size was already checked correctly. + +Changes + * Assume source files are in UTF-8 when using MSVC with CMake. + += mbed TLS 2.28.0 branch released 2021-12-17 + +API changes + * Some fields of mbedtls_ssl_session and mbedtls_ssl_config are in a + different order. This only affects applications that define such + structures directly or serialize them. + +Requirement changes + * Sign-magnitude and one's complement representations for signed integers are + not supported. Two's complement is the only supported representation. + +Removals + * Remove config option MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES, + which allowed SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for certificate + signing. It was intended to facilitate the transition in environments + with SHA-1 certificates. SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and + its use constitutes a security risk. + * Remove the partial support for running unit tests via Greentea on Mbed OS, + which had been unmaintained since 2018. + +Features + * The identifier of the CID TLS extension can be configured by defining + MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID at compile time. + * Warn if errors from certain functions are ignored. This is currently + supported on GCC-like compilers and on MSVC and can be configured through + the macro MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN. The warnings are always enabled + (where supported) for critical functions where ignoring the return + value is almost always a bug. Enable the new configuration option + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING to get warnings for other functions. This + is currently implemented in the AES, DES and md modules, and will be + extended to other modules in the future. + * Add missing PSA macros declared by PSA Crypto API 1.0.0: + PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH, PSA_ALG_NONE, PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH, PSA_KEY_ID_NULL. + * Add new API mbedtls_ct_memcmp for constant time buffer comparison. + * Add PSA API definition for ARIA. + +Security + * Zeroize several intermediate variables used to calculate the expected + value when verifying a MAC or AEAD tag. This hardens the library in + case the value leaks through a memory disclosure vulnerability. For + example, a memory disclosure vulnerability could have allowed a + man-in-the-middle to inject fake ciphertext into a DTLS connection. + * In psa_cipher_generate_iv() and psa_cipher_encrypt(), do not read back + from the output buffer. This fixes a potential policy bypass or decryption + oracle vulnerability if the output buffer is in memory that is shared with + an untrusted application. + * Fix a double-free that happened after mbedtls_ssl_set_session() or + mbedtls_ssl_get_session() failed with MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED + (out of memory). After that, calling mbedtls_ssl_session_free() + and mbedtls_ssl_free() would cause an internal session buffer to + be free()'d twice. + +Bugfix + * Stop using reserved identifiers as local variables. Fixes #4630. + * The GNU makefiles invoke python3 in preference to python except on Windows. + The check was accidentally not performed when cross-compiling for Windows + on Linux. Fix this. Fixes #4774. + * Prevent divide by zero if either of PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE() or + PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE() were called using an asymmetric key type. + * Fix a parameter set but unused in psa_crypto_cipher.c. Fixes #4935. + * Don't use the obsolete header path sys/fcntl.h in unit tests. + These header files cause compilation errors in musl. + Fixes #4969. + * Fix missing constraints on x86_64 and aarch64 assembly code + for bignum multiplication that broke some bignum operations with + (at least) Clang 12. + Fixes #4116, #4786, #4917, #4962. + * Fix mbedtls_cipher_crypt: AES-ECB when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled. + * Failures of alternative implementations of AES or DES single-block + functions enabled with MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT, + MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT or MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT were ignored. + This does not concern the implementation provided with Mbed TLS, + where this function cannot fail, or full-module replacements with + MBEDTLS_AES_ALT or MBEDTLS_DES_ALT. Reported by Armelle Duboc in #1092. + * Some failures of HMAC operations were ignored. These failures could only + happen with an alternative implementation of the underlying hash module. + * Fix the error returned by psa_generate_key() for a public key. Fixes #4551. + * Fix the build of sample programs when neither MBEDTLS_ERROR_C nor + MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY is enabled. + * Fix PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS verification accepting an arbitrary salt length. + This algorithm now accepts only the same salt length for verification + that it produces when signing, as documented. Use the new algorithm + PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT to accept any salt length. Fixes #4946. + * The existing predicate macro name PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN is now reserved + for algorithm values that fully encode the hashing step, as per the PSA + Crypto API specification. This excludes PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW and + PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY. The new predicate macro PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH covers + all algorithms that can be used with psa_{sign,verify}_hash(), including + these two. + * Fix issue in Makefile on Linux with SHARED=1, that caused shared libraries + not to list other shared libraries they need. + * Fix a bug in mbedtls_gcm_starts() when the bit length of the iv + exceeds 2^32. Fixes #4884. + * Fix an uninitialized variable warning in test_suite_ssl.function with GCC + version 11. + * Fix the build when no SHA2 module is included. Fixes #4930. + * Fix the build when only the bignum module is included. Fixes #4929. + * Fix a potential invalid pointer dereference and infinite loop bugs in + pkcs12 functions when the password is empty. Fix the documentation to + better describe the inputs to these functions and their possible values. + Fixes #5136. + * The key usage flags PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE now allows the MAC + operations psa_mac_compute() and psa_mac_sign_setup(). + * The key usage flags PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE now allows the MAC + operations psa_mac_verify() and psa_mac_verify_setup(). + +Changes + * Set config option MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE to be + disabled by default. + * Improve the performance of base64 constant-flow code. The result is still + slower than the original non-constant-flow implementation, but much faster + than the previous constant-flow implementation. Fixes #4814. + * Indicate in the error returned if the nonce length used with + ChaCha20-Poly1305 is invalid, and not just unsupported. + * The mbedcrypto library includes a new source code module constant_time.c, + containing various functions meant to resist timing side channel attacks. + This module does not have a separate configuration option, and functions + from this module will be included in the build as required. Currently + most of the interface of this module is private and may change at any + time. + += mbed TLS 2.27.0 branch released 2021-07-07 + +API changes + * Update AEAD output size macros to bring them in line with the PSA Crypto + API version 1.0 spec. This version of the spec parameterizes them on the + key type used, as well as the key bit-size in the case of + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH. + The old versions of these macros were renamed and deprecated as follows: + - PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH -> PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_1_ARG + - PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG + - PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG + - PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG + - PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE_1_ARG + - PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE -> PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE_1_ARG + * Implement one-shot cipher functions, psa_cipher_encrypt and + psa_cipher_decrypt, according to the PSA Crypto API 1.0.0 + specification. + +Requirement changes + * The library now uses the %zu format specifier with the printf() family of + functions, so requires a toolchain that supports it. This change does not + affect the maintained LTS branches, so when contributing changes please + bear this in mind and do not add them to backported code. + +Features + * Add mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext() function allowing to generate a + signature with a specific salt length. This function allows to validate + test cases provided in the NIST's CAVP test suite. Contributed by Cédric + Meuter in PR #3183. + * Added support for built-in driver keys through the PSA opaque crypto + driver interface. Refer to the documentation of + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS for more information. + * Implement psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message(). + * The new function mbedtls_mpi_random() generates a random value in a + given range uniformly. + * Implement psa_mac_compute() and psa_mac_verify() as defined in the + PSA Cryptograpy API 1.0.0 specification. + * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is now determined automatically from the configured + curves and no longer needs to be configured explicitly to save RAM. + +Security + * Fix a bias in the generation of finite-field Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) + private keys and of blinding values for DHM and elliptic curves (ECP) + computations. Reported by FlorianF89 in #4245. + * Fix a potential side channel vulnerability in ECDSA ephemeral key generation. + An adversary who is capable of very precise timing measurements could + learn partial information about the leading bits of the nonce used for the + signature, allowing the recovery of the private key after observing a + large number of signature operations. This completes a partial fix in + Mbed TLS 2.20.0. + * It was possible to configure MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS to a value that is + too small, leading to buffer overflows in ECC operations. Fail the build + in such a case. + * An adversary with access to precise enough information about memory + accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking a secure + enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the victim + performing a single private-key operation. Found and reported by + Zili KOU, Wenjian HE, Sharad Sinha, and Wei ZHANG. + * An adversary with access to precise enough timing information (typically, a + co-located process) could recover a Curve25519 or Curve448 static ECDH key + after inputting a chosen public key and observing the victim performing the + corresponding private-key operation. Found and reported by Leila Batina, + Lukas Chmielewski, Björn Haase, Niels Samwel and Peter Schwabe. + +Bugfix + * Add printf function attributes to mbedtls_debug_print_msg to ensure we + get printf format specifier warnings. + * Fix premature fopen() call in mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file which may + lead to seed file corruption in the case where the path to the seed file is + equal to MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE. Contributed by Victor + Krasnoshchok in #3616. + * PSA functions other than psa_open_key now return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + rather than PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST for an invalid handle, bringing them + in line with version 1.0.0 of the specification. Fix #4162. + * PSA functions creating a key now return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT rather + than PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE when the identifier specified for the key + to create is not valid, bringing them in line with version 1.0.0 of the + specification. Fix #4271. + * Fix some cases in the bignum module where the library constructed an + unintended representation of the value 0 which was not processed + correctly by some bignum operations. This could happen when + mbedtls_mpi_read_string() was called on "-0", or when + mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi() and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int() was called with one of + the arguments being negative and the other being 0. Fixes #4643. + * Fix a bug in ECDSA that would cause it to fail when the hash is all-bits + zero. Fixes #1792 + * Fix a compilation error when MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT is + defined. Fixes #4217. + * Fix an incorrect error code when parsing a PKCS#8 private key. + * In a TLS client, enforce the Diffie-Hellman minimum parameter size + set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen() precisely. Before, the + minimum size was rounded down to the nearest multiple of 8. + * In library/net_sockets.c, _POSIX_C_SOURCE and _XOPEN_SOURCE are + defined to specific values. If the code is used in a context + where these are already defined, this can result in a compilation + error. Instead, assume that if they are defined, the values will + be adequate to build Mbed TLS. + * The cipher suite TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384 was not available + when SHA-1 was disabled and was offered when SHA-1 was enabled but SHA-384 + was disabled. Fix the dependency. Fixes #4472. + * Do not offer SHA384 cipher suites when SHA-384 is disabled. Fixes #4499. + * With MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C disabled, some functions were getting built + nonetheless, resulting in undefined reference errors when building a + shared library. Reported by Guillermo Garcia M. in #4411. + * Fix test suite code on platforms where int32_t is not int, such as + Arm Cortex-M. Fixes #4530. + * Fix some issues affecting MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT implementations: a misplaced + directive in a header and a missing initialization in the self-test. + * Fix a missing initialization in the Camellia self-test, affecting + MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT implementations. + * Restore the ability to configure PSA via Mbed TLS options to support RSA + key pair operations but exclude RSA key generation. When MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + is not defined PSA will no longer attempt to use mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(). + Fixes #4512. + * Fix a regression introduced in 2.24.0 which broke (D)TLS CBC ciphersuites + (when the encrypt-then-MAC extension is not in use) with some ALT + implementations of the underlying hash (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384), causing + the affected side to wrongly reject valid messages. Fixes #4118. + * Remove outdated check-config.h check that prevented implementing the + timing module on Mbed OS. Fixes #4633. + * Fix PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF and PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS being too permissive + about missing inputs. + * Fix mbedtls_net_poll() and mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() often failing with + MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED on Windows. Fixes #4465. + * Fix a resource leak in a test suite with an alternative AES + implementation. Fixes #4176. + * Fix a crash in mbedtls_mpi_debug_mpi on a bignum having 0 limbs. This + could notably be triggered by setting the TLS debug level to 3 or above + and using a Montgomery curve for the key exchange. Reported by lhuang04 + in #4578. Fixes #4608. + * psa_verify_hash() was relying on implementation-specific behavior of + mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() and was causing failures in some _ALT + implementations. This reliance is now removed. Fixes #3990. + * Disallow inputs of length different from the corresponding hash when + signing or verifying with PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS (The PSA Crypto API mandates + that PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS uses the same hash throughout the algorithm.) + * Fix a null pointer dereference when mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod() was called with + A=0 represented with 0 limbs. Up to and including Mbed TLS 2.26, this bug + could not be triggered by code that constructed A with one of the + mbedtls_mpi_read_xxx functions (including in particular TLS code) since + those always built an mpi object with at least one limb. + Credit to OSS-Fuzz. Fixes #4641. + * Fix mbedtls_mpi_gcd(G,A,B) when the value of B is zero. This had no + effect on Mbed TLS's internal use of mbedtls_mpi_gcd(), but may affect + applications that call mbedtls_mpi_gcd() directly. Fixes #4642. + * The PSA API no longer allows the creation or destruction of keys with a + read-only lifetime. The persistence level PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY + can now only be used as intended, for keys that cannot be modified through + normal use of the API. + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is enabled, crypto_spe.h was not included + in all the right places. Include it from crypto_platform.h, which is + the natural place. Fixes #4649. + * mbedtls_pk_sign() and mbedtls_pk_verify() and their extended and + restartable variants now always honor the specified hash length if + nonzero. Before, for RSA, hash_len was ignored in favor of the length of + the specified hash algorithm. + * Fix which alert is sent in some cases to conform to the + applicable RFC: on an invalid Finished message value, an + invalid max_fragment_length extension, or an + unsupported extension used by the server. + * Correct (change from 12 to 13 bytes) the value of the macro describing the + maximum nonce length returned by psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + +Changes + * Add extra printf compiler warning flags to builds. + * Fix memsan build false positive in x509_crt.c with Clang 11 + * Fix the setting of the read timeout in the DTLS sample programs. + * Remove the AES sample application programs/aes/aescrypt2 which shows + bad cryptographic practice. Fix #1906. + * Alternative implementations of CMAC may now opt to not support 3DES as a + CMAC block cipher, and still pass the CMAC self test. + * Remove configs/config-psa-crypto.h, which was identical to the default + configuration except for having some extra cryptographic mechanisms + enabled and for unintended differences. This configuration was primarily + intended to demonstrate the PSA API, and lost most of its usefulness when + MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C became enabled by default. + * When building the test suites with GNU make, invoke python3 or python, not + python2, which is no longer supported upstream. + * When using session cache based session resumption on the server, + double-check that custom session cache implementations return + sessions which are consistent with the negotiated ciphersuite + and compression method. + * Fix build failure on MinGW toolchain when __USE_MING_ANSI_STDIO is on. + When that flag is on, standard GNU C printf format specifiers + should be used. + * Reduce the default value of MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE. This reduces RAM usage + during ECC operations at a negligible performance cost. + * mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(), mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le() and + mbedtls_mpi_read_string() now construct an mbedtls_mpi object with 0 limbs + when their input has length 0. Note that this is an implementation detail + and can change at any time, so this change should be transparent, but it + may result in mbedtls_mpi_write_binary() or mbedtls_mpi_write_string() + now writing an empty string where it previously wrote one or more + zero digits when operating from values constructed with an mpi_read + function and some mpi operations. + * Implicitly add PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE key usage policy flag when + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH flag is set and PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE flag + when PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH flag is set. This usage flag extension + is also applied when loading a key from storage. + += mbed TLS 2.26.0 branch released 2021-03-08 + +API changes + * Renamed the PSA Crypto API output buffer size macros to bring them in line + with version 1.0.0 of the specification. + * The API glue function mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa() now takes the curve size + in bits rather than bytes, with an additional flag to indicate if the + size may have been rounded up to a whole number of bytes. + * Renamed the PSA Crypto API AEAD tag length macros to bring them in line + with version 1.0.0 of the specification. + +Default behavior changes + * In mbedtls_rsa_context objects, the ver field was formerly documented + as always 0. It is now reserved for internal purposes and may take + different values. + +New deprecations + * PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE, PSA_HASH_SIZE, PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE, + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE and + PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN have been renamed, and the old names + deprecated. + * PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH and PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH + have been renamed, and the old names deprecated. + +Features + * The PSA crypto subsystem can now use HMAC_DRBG instead of CTR_DRBG. + CTR_DRBG is used by default if it is available, but you can override + this choice by setting MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE at compile time. + Fix #3354. + * Automatic fallback to a software implementation of ECP when + MBEDTLS_ECP_xxx_ALT accelerator hooks are in use can now be turned off + through setting the new configuration flag MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK. + * The PSA crypto subsystem can now be configured to use less static RAM by + tweaking the setting for the maximum amount of keys simultaneously in RAM. + MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT sets the maximum number of volatile keys that + can exist simultaneously. It has a sensible default if not overridden. + * Partial implementation of the PSA crypto driver interface: Mbed TLS can + now use an external random generator instead of the library's own + entropy collection and DRBG code. Enable MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + and see the documentation of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() for details. + * Applications using both mbedtls_xxx and psa_xxx functions (for example, + applications using TLS and MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) can now use the PSA + random generator with mbedtls_xxx functions. See the documentation of + mbedtls_psa_get_random() for details. + * In the PSA API, the policy for a MAC or AEAD algorithm can specify a + minimum MAC or tag length thanks to the new wildcards + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC and + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG. + +Security + * Fix a security reduction in CTR_DRBG when the initial seeding obtained a + nonce from entropy. Applications were affected if they called + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(), if they called + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() with a size that was 3/2 times the key + length, or when the entropy module uses SHA-256 and CTR_DRBG uses AES-256. + In such cases, a random nonce was necessary to achieve the advertised + security strength, but the code incorrectly used a constant instead of + entropy from the nonce. + Found by John Stroebel in #3819 and fixed in #3973. + * Fix a buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() when calculating + |A| - |B| where |B| is larger than |A| and has more limbs (so the + function should return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE). Only + applications calling mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() directly are affected: + all calls inside the library were safe since this function is + only called with |A| >= |B|. Reported by Guido Vranken in #4042. + * Fix an errorneous estimation for an internal buffer in + mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(). If MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is set to an odd + value the function might fail to write a private RSA keys of the largest + supported size. + Found by Daniel Otte, reported in #4093 and fixed in #4094. + * Fix a stack buffer overflow with mbedtls_net_poll() and + mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() when given a file descriptor that is + beyond FD_SETSIZE. Reported by FigBug in #4169. + * Guard against strong local side channel attack against base64 tables by + making access aceess to them use constant flow code. + +Bugfix + * Fix use-after-scope error in programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c and ssl_server2.c + * Fix memory leak that occured when calling psa_close_key() on a + wrapped key with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined. + * Fix an incorrect error code if an RSA private operation glitched. + * Fix a memory leak in an error case in psa_generate_derived_key_internal(). + * Fix a resource leak in CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + is enabled, on platforms where initializing a mutex allocates resources. + This was a regression introduced in the previous release. Reported in + #4017, #4045 and #4071. + * Ensure that calling mbedtls_rsa_free() or mbedtls_entropy_free() + twice is safe. This happens for RSA when some Mbed TLS library functions + fail. Such a double-free was not safe when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C was + enabled on platforms where freeing a mutex twice is not safe. + * Fix a resource leak in a bad-arguments case of mbedtls_rsa_gen_key() + when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled on platforms where initializing + a mutex allocates resources. + * Fixes a bug where, if the library was configured to include support for + both the old SE interface and the new PSA driver interface, external keys were + not loaded from storage. This was fixed by #3996. + * This change makes 'mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints' + consistent with RFC 5280 4.2.1.9 which says: "Conforming CAs MUST + include this extension in all CA certificates that contain public keys + used to validate digital signatures on certificates and MUST mark the + extension as critical in such certificates." Previous to this change, + the extension was always marked as non-critical. This was fixed by + #3698. + +Changes + * A new library C file psa_crypto_client.c has been created to contain + the PSA code needed by a PSA crypto client when the PSA crypto + implementation is not included into the library. + * On recent enough versions of FreeBSD and DragonFlyBSD, the entropy module + now uses the getrandom syscall instead of reading from /dev/urandom. + += mbed TLS 2.25.0 branch released 2020-12-11 + +API changes + * The numerical values of the PSA Crypto API macros have been updated to + conform to version 1.0.0 of the specification. + * PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER replaces PSA_ALG_CHACHA20 and PSA_ALG_ARC4. + The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4). + * The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() no longer accept NIST_KW contexts, + as they have no way to check if the output buffer is large enough. + Please use mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() instead. Credit to OSS-Fuzz and + Cryptofuzz. Fixes #3665. + +Requirement changes + * Update the minimum required CMake version to 2.8.12. This silences a + warning on CMake 3.19.0. #3801 + +New deprecations + * PSA_ALG_CHACHA20 and PSA_ALG_ARC4 have been deprecated. + Use PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER instead. + * The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() are deprecated in favour of the new + functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). Please note that with AEAD ciphers, + these new functions always append the tag to the ciphertext, and include + the tag in the ciphertext length. + +Features + * Partial implementation of the new PSA Crypto accelerator APIs. (Symmetric + ciphers, asymmetric signing/verification and key generation, validate_key + entry point, and export_public_key interface.) + * Add support for ECB to the PSA cipher API. + * In PSA, allow using a key declared with a base key agreement algorithm + in combined key agreement and derivation operations, as long as the key + agreement algorithm in use matches the algorithm the key was declared with. + This is currently non-standard behaviour, but expected to make it into a + future revision of the PSA Crypto standard. + * Add MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX CMake variable, which is prefixed to the mbedtls, + mbedcrypto, mbedx509 and apidoc CMake target names. This can be used by + external CMake projects that include this one to avoid CMake target name + clashes. The default value of this variable is "", so default target names + are unchanged. + * Add support for DTLS-SRTP as defined in RFC 5764. Contributed by Johan + Pascal, improved by Ron Eldor. + * In the PSA API, it is no longer necessary to open persistent keys: + operations now accept the key identifier. The type psa_key_handle_t is now + identical to psa_key_id_t instead of being platform-defined. This bridges + the last major gap to compliance with the PSA Cryptography specification + version 1.0.0. Opening persistent keys is still supported for backward + compatibility, but will be deprecated and later removed in future + releases. + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH, PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE, PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH and + PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE macros have been added as defined in version + 1.0.0 of the PSA Crypto API specification. + +Security + * The functions mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and + mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() would write past the minimum documented + size of the output buffer when used with NIST_KW. As a result, code using + those functions as documented with NIST_KW could have a buffer overwrite + of up to 15 bytes, with consequences ranging up to arbitrary code + execution depending on the location of the output buffer. + * Limit the size of calculations performed by mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod to + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE to prevent a potential denial of service when + generating Diffie-Hellman key pairs. Credit to OSS-Fuzz. + * A failure of the random generator was ignored in mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(), + which is how most uses of randomization in asymmetric cryptography + (including key generation, intermediate value randomization and blinding) + are implemented. This could cause failures or the silent use of non-random + values. A random generator can fail if it needs reseeding and cannot not + obtain entropy, or due to an internal failure (which, for Mbed TLS's own + CTR_DRBG or HMAC_DRBG, can only happen due to a misconfiguration). + * Fix a compliance issue whereby we were not checking the tag on the + algorithm parameters (only the size) when comparing the signature in the + description part of the cert to the real signature. This meant that a + NULL algorithm parameters entry would look identical to an array of REAL + (size zero) to the library and thus the certificate would be considered + valid. However, if the parameters do not match in *any* way then the + certificate should be considered invalid, and indeed OpenSSL marks these + certs as invalid when mbedtls did not. + Many thanks to guidovranken who found this issue via differential fuzzing + and reported it in #3629. + * Zeroising of local buffers and variables which are used for calculations + in mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(), mbedtls_internal_sha*_process(), + mbedtls_internal_md*_process() and mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process() + functions to erase sensitive data from memory. Reported by + Johan Malmgren and Johan Uppman Bruce from Sectra. + +Bugfix + * Fix an invalid (but non-zero) return code from mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey() + when the input has trailing garbage. Fixes #2512. + * Fix build failure in configurations where MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is + enabled but ECDSA is disabled. Contributed by jdurkop. Fixes #3294. + * Include the psa_constant_names generated source code in the source tree + instead of generating it at build time. Fixes #3524. + * Fix rsa_prepare_blinding() to retry when the blinding value is not + invertible (mod N), instead of returning MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED. This + addresses a regression but is rare in practice (approx. 1 in 2/sqrt(N)). + Found by Synopsys Coverity, fix contributed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). + Fixes #3647. + * Use socklen_t on Android and other POSIX-compliant system + * Fix the build when the macro _GNU_SOURCE is defined to a non-empty value. + Fix #3432. + * Consistently return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT on invalid cipher input + sizes (instead of PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE in some cases) to make the + psa_cipher_* functions compliant with the PSA Crypto API specification. + * mbedtls_ecp_curve_list() now lists Curve25519 and Curve448 under the names + "x25519" and "x448". These curves support ECDH but not ECDSA. If you need + only the curves that support ECDSA, filter the list with + mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(). + * Fix psa_generate_key() returning an error when asked to generate + an ECC key pair on Curve25519 or secp244k1. + * Fix psa_key_derivation_output_key() to allow the output of a combined key + agreement and subsequent key derivation operation to be used as a key + inside of the PSA Crypto core. + * Fix handling of EOF against 0xff bytes and on platforms with unsigned + chars. Fixes a build failure on platforms where char is unsigned. Fixes + #3794. + * Fix an off-by-one error in the additional data length check for + CCM, which allowed encryption with a non-standard length field. + Fixes #3719. + * Correct the default IV size for mbedtls_cipher_info_t structures using + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB to 0, since ECB mode ciphers don't use IVs. + * Make arc4random_buf available on NetBSD and OpenBSD when _POSIX_C_SOURCE is + defined. Fix contributed in #3571. + * Fix conditions for including string.h in error.c. Fixes #3866. + * psa_set_key_id() now also sets the lifetime to persistent for keys located + in a secure element. + * Attempting to create a volatile key with a non-zero key identifier now + fails. Previously the key identifier was just ignored when creating a + volatile key. + * Attempting to create or register a key with a key identifier in the vendor + range now fails. + * Fix build failures on GCC 11. Fixes #3782. + * Add missing arguments of debug message in mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf. + * Fix a memory leak in mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs() when the result was negative + (an error condition) and the second operand was aliased to the result. + * Fix a case in elliptic curve arithmetic where an out-of-memory condition + could go undetected, resulting in an incorrect result. + * In CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG, don't reset the reseed interval in seed(). + Fixes #2927. + * In PEM writing functions, fill the trailing part of the buffer with null + bytes. This guarantees that the corresponding parsing function can read + the buffer back, which was the case for mbedtls_x509write_{crt,csr}_pem + until this property was inadvertently broken in Mbed TLS 2.19.0. + Fixes #3682. + * Fix a build failure that occurred with the MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT + option on. In this configuration key management methods that are required + for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS were excluded from the build and made it fail. + Fixes #3818. Reported by John Stroebel. + +Changes + * Reduce stack usage significantly during sliding window exponentiation. + Reported in #3591 and fix contributed in #3592 by Daniel Otte. + * The PSA persistent storage format is updated to always store the key bits + attribute. No automatic upgrade path is provided. Previously stored keys + must be erased, or manually upgraded based on the key storage format + specification (docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md). + Fixes #3740. + * Remove the zeroization of a pointer variable in AES rounds. It was valid + but spurious and misleading since it looked like a mistaken attempt to + zeroize the pointed-to buffer. Reported by Antonio de la Piedra, CEA + Leti, France. + += mbed TLS 2.24.0 branch released 2020-09-01 + +API changes + * In the PSA API, rename the types of elliptic curve and Diffie-Hellman + group families to psa_ecc_family_t and psa_dh_family_t, in line with the + PSA Crypto API specification version 1.0.0. + Rename associated macros as well: + PSA_ECC_CURVE_xxx renamed to PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx + PSA_DH_GROUP_xxx renamed to PSA_DH_FAMILY_xxx + PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE renamed to to PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY + PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_GROUP renamed to PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY + +Default behavior changes + * Stop storing persistent information about externally stored keys created + through PSA Crypto with a volatile lifetime. Reported in #3288 and + contributed by Steven Cooreman in #3382. + +Features + * The new function mbedtls_ecp_write_key() exports private ECC keys back to + a byte buffer. It is the inverse of the existing mbedtls_ecp_read_key(). + * Support building on e2k (Elbrus) architecture: correctly enable + -Wformat-signedness, and fix the code that causes signed-one-bit-field + and sign-compare warnings. Contributed by makise-homura (Igor Molchanov) + . + +Security + * Fix a vulnerability in the verification of X.509 certificates when + matching the expected common name (the cn argument of + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify()) with the actual certificate name: when the + subjecAltName extension is present, the expected name was compared to any + name in that extension regardless of its type. This means that an + attacker could for example impersonate a 4-bytes or 16-byte domain by + getting a certificate for the corresponding IPv4 or IPv6 (this would + require the attacker to control that IP address, though). Similar attacks + using other subjectAltName name types might be possible. Found and + reported by kFYatek in #3498. + * When checking X.509 CRLs, a certificate was only considered as revoked if + its revocationDate was in the past according to the local clock if + available. In particular, on builds without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE, + certificates were never considered as revoked. On builds with + MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE, an attacker able to control the local clock (for + example, an untrusted OS attacking a secure enclave) could prevent + revocation of certificates via CRLs. Fixed by no longer checking the + revocationDate field, in accordance with RFC 5280. Reported by + yuemonangong in #3340. Reported independently and fixed by + Raoul Strackx and Jethro Beekman in #3433. + * In (D)TLS record decryption, when using a CBC ciphersuites without the + Encrypt-then-Mac extension, use constant code flow memory access patterns + to extract and check the MAC. This is an improvement to the existing + countermeasure against Lucky 13 attacks. The previous countermeasure was + effective against network-based attackers, but less so against local + attackers. The new countermeasure defends against local attackers, even + if they have access to fine-grained measurements. In particular, this + fixes a local Lucky 13 cache attack found and reported by Tuba Yavuz, + Farhaan Fowze, Ken (Yihan) Bai, Grant Hernandez, and Kevin Butler + (University of Florida) and Dave Tian (Purdue University). + * Fix side channel in RSA private key operations and static (finite-field) + Diffie-Hellman. An adversary with precise enough timing and memory access + information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure + enclave) could bypass an existing counter-measure (base blinding) and + potentially fully recover the private key. + * Fix a 1-byte buffer overread in mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(). + Credit to OSS-Fuzz for detecting the problem and to Philippe Antoine + for pinpointing the problematic code. + * Zeroising of plaintext buffers in mbedtls_ssl_read() to erase unused + application data from memory. Reported in #689 by + Johan Uppman Bruce of Sectra. + +Bugfix + * Library files installed after a CMake build no longer have execute + permission. + * Use local labels in mbedtls_padlock_has_support() to fix an invalid symbol + redefinition if the function is inlined. + Reported in #3451 and fix contributed in #3452 by okhowang. + * Fix the endianness of Curve25519 keys imported/exported through the PSA + APIs. psa_import_key and psa_export_key will now correctly expect/output + Montgomery keys in little-endian as defined by RFC7748. Contributed by + Steven Cooreman in #3425. + * Fix build errors when the only enabled elliptic curves are Montgomery + curves. Raised by signpainter in #941 and by Taiki-San in #1412. This + also fixes missing declarations reported by Steven Cooreman in #1147. + * Fix self-test failure when the only enabled short Weierstrass elliptic + curve is secp192k1. Fixes #2017. + * PSA key import will now correctly import a Curve25519/Curve448 public key + instead of erroring out. Contributed by Steven Cooreman in #3492. + * Use arc4random_buf on NetBSD instead of rand implementation with cyclical + lower bits. Fix contributed in #3540. + * Fix a memory leak in mbedtls_md_setup() when using HMAC under low memory + conditions. Reported and fix suggested by Guido Vranken in #3486. + * Fix bug in redirection of unit test outputs on platforms where stdout is + defined as a macro. First reported in #2311 and fix contributed in #3528. + +Changes + * Only pass -Wformat-signedness to versions of GCC that support it. Reported + in #3478 and fix contributed in #3479 by okhowang. + * Reduce the stack consumption of mbedtls_x509write_csr_der() which + previously could lead to stack overflow on constrained devices. + Contributed by Doru Gucea and Simon Leet in #3464. + * Undefine the ASSERT macro before defining it locally, in case it is defined + in a platform header. Contributed by Abdelatif Guettouche in #3557. + * Update copyright notices to use Linux Foundation guidance. As a result, + the copyright of contributors other than Arm is now acknowledged, and the + years of publishing are no longer tracked in the source files. This also + eliminates the need for the lines declaring the files to be part of + MbedTLS. Fixes #3457. + * Add the command line parameter key_pwd to the ssl_client2 and ssl_server2 + example applications which allows to provide a password for the key file + specified through the existing key_file argument. This allows the use of + these applications with password-protected key files. Analogously but for + ssl_server2 only, add the command line parameter key_pwd2 which allows to + set a password for the key file provided through the existing key_file2 + argument. + += mbed TLS 2.23.0 branch released 2020-07-01 + +Default behavior changes + * In the experimental PSA secure element interface, change the encoding of + key lifetimes to encode a persistence level and the location. Although C + prototypes do not effectively change, code calling + psa_register_se_driver() must be modified to pass the driver's location + instead of the keys' lifetime. If the library is upgraded on an existing + device, keys created with the old lifetime value will not be readable or + removable through Mbed TLS after the upgrade. + +Features + * New functions in the error module return constant strings for + high- and low-level error codes, complementing mbedtls_strerror() + which constructs a string for any error code, including compound + ones, but requires a writable buffer. Contributed by Gaurav Aggarwal + in #3176. + * The new utility programs/ssl/ssl_context_info prints a human-readable + dump of an SSL context saved with mbedtls_ssl_context_save(). + * Add support for midipix, a POSIX layer for Microsoft Windows. + * Add new mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() routine which allows + parsing unsupported certificate extensions via user provided callback. + Contributed by Nicola Di Lieto in #3243 as + a solution to #3241. + * Pass the "certificate policies" extension to the callback supplied to + mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() if it contains unsupported + policies (#3419). + * Added support to entropy_poll for the kern.arandom syscall supported on + some BSD systems. Contributed by Nia Alarie in #3423. + * Add support for Windows 2000 in net_sockets. Contributed by opatomic. #3239 + +Security + * Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could + reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. Noticed by Sangho Lee, + Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim and Hyesoon Kim (Georgia Institute + of Technology); and Marcus Peinado (Microsoft Research). Reported by Raoul + Strackx (Fortanix) in #3394. + * Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and + mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a + private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as + mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL + f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and + memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system + attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key. + Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley. + * Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when + hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT + macros). This would cause the original Lucky 13 attack to be possible in + those configurations, allowing an active network attacker to recover + plaintext after repeated timing measurements under some conditions. + Reported and fix suggested by Luc Perneel in #3246. + +Bugfix + * Fix the Visual Studio Release x64 build configuration for mbedtls itself. + Completes a previous fix in Mbed TLS 2.19 that only fixed the build for + the example programs. Reported in #1430 and fix contributed by irwir. + * Fix undefined behavior in X.509 certificate parsing if the + pathLenConstraint basic constraint value is equal to INT_MAX. + The actual effect with almost every compiler is the intended + behavior, so this is unlikely to be exploitable anywhere. #3192 + * Fix issue with a detected HW accelerated record error not being exposed + due to shadowed variable. Contributed by Sander Visser in #3310. + * Avoid NULL pointer dereferencing if mbedtls_ssl_free() is called with a + NULL pointer argument. Contributed by Sander Visser in #3312. + * Fix potential linker errors on dual world platforms by inlining + mbedtls_gcc_group_to_psa(). This allows the pk.c module to link separately + from psa_crypto.c. Fixes #3300. + * Remove dead code in X.509 certificate parsing. Contributed by irwir in + #2855. + * Include asn1.h in error.c. Fixes #3328 reported by David Hu. + * Fix potential memory leaks in ecp_randomize_jac() and ecp_randomize_mxz() + when PRNG function fails. Contributed by Jonas Lejeune in #3318. + * Remove unused macros from MSVC projects. Reported in #3297 and fix + submitted in #3333 by irwir. + * Add additional bounds checks in ssl_write_client_hello() preventing + output buffer overflow if the configuration declared a buffer that was + too small. + * Set _POSIX_C_SOURCE to at least 200112L in C99 code. Reported in #3420 and + fix submitted in #3421 by Nia Alarie. + * Fix building library/net_sockets.c and the ssl_mail_client program on + NetBSD. Contributed by Nia Alarie in #3422. + * Fix false positive uninitialised variable reported by cpp-check. + Contributed by Sander Visser in #3311. + * Update iv and len context pointers manually when reallocating buffers + using the MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH feature. This caused issues + when receiving a connection with CID, when these fields were shifted + in ssl_parse_record_header(). + +Changes + * Fix warnings about signedness issues in format strings. The build is now + clean of -Wformat-signedness warnings. Contributed by Kenneth Soerensen + in #3153. + * Fix minor performance issue in operations on Curve25519 caused by using a + suboptimal modular reduction in one place. Found and fix contributed by + Aurelien Jarno in #3209. + * Combine identical cases in switch statements in md.c. Contributed + by irwir in #3208. + * Simplify a bounds check in ssl_write_certificate_request(). Contributed + by irwir in #3150. + * Unify the example programs termination to call mbedtls_exit() instead of + using a return command. This has been done to enable customization of the + behavior in bare metal environments. + * Fix mbedtls_x509_dn_gets to escape non-ASCII characters as "?". + Contributed by Koh M. Nakagawa in #3326. + * Use FindPython3 when cmake version >= 3.15.0 + * Abort the ClientHello writing function as soon as some extension doesn't + fit into the record buffer. Previously, such extensions were silently + dropped. As a consequence, the TLS handshake now fails when the output + buffer is not large enough to hold the ClientHello. + * The unit tests now rely on header files in tests/include/test and source + files in tests/src. When building with make or cmake, the files in + tests/src are compiled and the resulting object linked into each test + executable. + * The ECP module, enabled by `MBEDTLS_ECP_C`, now depends on + `MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C` or `MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C` for some side-channel + coutermeasures. If side channels are not a concern, this dependency can + be avoided by enabling the new option `MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG`. + * Align MSVC error flag with GCC and Clang. Contributed by Carlos Gomes + Martinho. #3147 + * Remove superfluous assignment in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(). Reported + in #3182 and fix submitted by irwir. #3217 + * Fix typo in XTS tests. Reported and fix submitted by Kxuan. #3319 + += mbed TLS 2.22.0 branch released 2020-04-14 + +New deprecations + * Deprecate MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL that enables function hooks in the + SSL module for hardware acceleration of individual records. + * Deprecate mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() in favour of + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() and + mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() to be more precise about which max + fragment length is desired. + +Security + * Fix issue in DTLS handling of new associations with the same parameters + (RFC 6347 section 4.2.8): an attacker able to send forged UDP packets to + the server could cause it to drop established associations with + legitimate clients, resulting in a Denial of Service. This could only + happen when MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE was enabled in config.h + (which it is by default). + * Fix side channel in ECC code that allowed an adversary with access to + precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an + untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) to fully recover + an ECDSA private key. Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya, + Billy Brumley and Cesar Pereida Garcia. CVE-2020-10932 + * Fix a potentially remotely exploitable buffer overread in a + DTLS client when parsing the Hello Verify Request message. + +Features + * The new build option MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH automatically + resizes the I/O buffers before and after handshakes, reducing the memory + consumption during application data transfer. + +Bugfix + * Fix compilation failure when both MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS and + MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL are enabled. + * Remove a spurious check in ssl_parse_client_psk_identity that triggered + a warning with some compilers. Fix contributed by irwir in #2856. + * Fix a function name in a debug message. Contributed by Ercan Ozturk in + #3013. + +Changes + * Mbed Crypto is no longer a Git submodule. The crypto part of the library + is back directly in the present repository. + * Split mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() into + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() and + mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() to ensure that a sufficient input + buffer is allocated by the server (if MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + is defined), regardless of what MFL was configured for it. + += mbed TLS 2.21.0 branch released 2020-02-20 + +New deprecations + * Deprecate MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO that enables parsing + SSLv2 ClientHello messages. + * Deprecate MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 that enables support for SSLv3. + * Deprecate for MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C, the wrapper around the pkcs11-helper + library which allows TLS authentication to use keys stored in a + PKCS#11 token such as a smartcard. + +Security + * Fix potential memory overread when performing an ECDSA signature + operation. The overread only happens with cryptographically low + probability (of the order of 2^-n where n is the bitsize of the curve) + unless the RNG is broken, and could result in information disclosure or + denial of service (application crash or extra resource consumption). + Found by Auke Zeilstra and Peter Schwabe, using static analysis. + * To avoid a side channel vulnerability when parsing an RSA private key, + read all the CRT parameters from the DER structure rather than + reconstructing them. Found by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob + Brumley. Reported and fix contributed by Jack Lloyd. + ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#352 + +Features + * The new build option MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 allows building SHA-512 + support without SHA-384. + +API changes + * Change the encoding of key types and curves in the PSA API. The new + values are aligned with the upcoming release of the PSA Crypto API + specification version 1.0.0. The main change which may break some + existing code is that elliptic curve key types no longer encode the + exact curve: a psa_ecc_curve_t or psa_key_type_t value only encodes + a curve family and the key size determines the exact curve (for example, + PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R1 with 256 bits is P256R1). ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#330 + +Bugfix + * Fix an unchecked call to mbedtls_md() in the x509write module. + * Fix build failure with MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT enabled. Reported by + Jack Lloyd in #2859. Fix submitted by jiblime in #2963. + * Fix some false-positive uninitialized variable warnings in X.509. Fix + contributed by apple-ihack-geek in #2663. + * Fix a possible error code mangling in psa_mac_verify_finish() when + a cryptographic accelerator fails. ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#345 + * Fix a bug in mbedtls_pk_parse_key() that would cause it to accept some + RSA keys that would later be rejected by functions expecting private + keys. Found by Catena cyber using oss-fuzz (issue 20467). + * Fix a bug in mbedtls_pk_parse_key() that would cause it to + accept some RSA keys with invalid values by silently fixing those values. + += mbed TLS 2.20.0 branch released 2020-01-15 + +Default behavior changes + * The initial seeding of a CTR_DRBG instance makes a second call to the + entropy function to obtain entropy for a nonce if the entropy size is less + than 3/2 times the key size. In case you want to disable the extra call to + grab entropy, you can call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len() to force the + nonce length to 0. + +Security + * Enforce that mbedtls_entropy_func() gathers a total of + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes or more from strong sources. In the + default configuration, on a platform with a single entropy source, the + entropy module formerly only grabbed 32 bytes, which is good enough for + security if the source is genuinely strong, but less than the expected 64 + bytes (size of the entropy accumulator). + * Zeroize local variables in mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() and + mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() before exiting the function. The value of + these variables can be used to recover the last round key. To follow best + practice and to limit the impact of buffer overread vulnerabilities (like + Heartbleed) we need to zeroize them before exiting the function. + Issue reported by Tuba Yavuz, Farhaan Fowze, Ken (Yihang) Bai, + Grant Hernandez, and Kevin Butler (University of Florida) and + Dave Tian (Purdue University). + * Fix side channel vulnerability in ECDSA. Our bignum implementation is not + constant time/constant trace, so side channel attacks can retrieve the + blinded value, factor it (as it is smaller than RSA keys and not guaranteed + to have only large prime factors), and then, by brute force, recover the + key. Reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley. + * Fix side channel vulnerability in ECDSA key generation. Obtaining precise + timings on the comparison in the key generation enabled the attacker to + learn leading bits of the ephemeral key used during ECDSA signatures and to + recover the private key. Reported by Jeremy Dubeuf. + * Catch failure of AES functions in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(). Uncaught + failures could happen with alternative implementations of AES. Bug + reported and fix proposed by Johan Uppman Bruce and Christoffer Lauri, + Sectra. + +Features + * Key derivation inputs in the PSA API can now either come from a key object + or from a buffer regardless of the step type. + * The CTR_DRBG module can grab a nonce from the entropy source during the + initial seeding. The default nonce length is chosen based on the key size + to achieve the security strength defined by NIST SP 800-90A. You can + change it with mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). + * Add ENUMERATED tag support to the ASN.1 module. Contributed by + msopiha-linaro in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#307. + +API changes + * In the PSA API, forbid zero-length keys. To pass a zero-length input to a + key derivation function, use a buffer instead (this is now always + possible). + * Rename psa_asymmetric_sign() to psa_sign_hash() and + psa_asymmetric_verify() to psa_verify_hash(). + +Bugfix + * Fix an incorrect size in a debugging message. Reported and fix + submitted by irwir. Fixes #2717. + * Fix an unused variable warning when compiling without DTLS. + Reported and fix submitted by irwir. Fixes #2800. + * Remove a useless assignment. Reported and fix submitted by irwir. + Fixes #2801. + * Fix a buffer overflow in the PSA HMAC code when using a long key with an + unsupported algorithm. Fixes ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#254. + * Fix mbedtls_asn1_get_int to support any number of leading zeros. Credit + to OSS-Fuzz for finding a bug in an intermediate version of the fix. + * Fix mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null to correctly parse bitstrings of at + most 2 bytes. + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() and + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len() now work if you call them before + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(). + +Changes + * Remove the technical possibility to define custom mbedtls_md_info + structures, which was exposed only in an internal header. + * psa_close_key(0) and psa_destroy_key(0) now succeed (doing nothing, as + before). + * Variables containing error codes are now initialized to an error code + rather than success, so that coding mistakes or memory corruption tends to + cause functions to return this error code rather than a success. There are + no known instances where this changes the behavior of the library: this is + merely a robustness improvement. ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#323 + * Remove a useless call to mbedtls_ecp_group_free(). Contributed by + Alexander Krizhanovsky in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#210. + * Speed up PBKDF2 by caching the digest calculation. Contributed by Jack + Lloyd and Fortanix Inc in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#277. + * Small performance improvement of mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(). Contributed by + Alexander Krizhanovsky in ARMmbed/mbed-crypto#308. + += mbed TLS 2.19.1 branch released 2019-09-16 + +Features + * Declare include headers as PUBLIC to propagate to CMake project consumers + Contributed by Zachary J. Fields in PR #2949. + * Add nss_keylog to ssl_client2 and ssl_server2, enabling easier analysis of + TLS sessions with tools like Wireshark. + +API Changes + * Make client_random and server_random const in + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t, so that the key exporter is discouraged + from modifying the client/server hello. + +Bugfix + * Fix some false-positive uninitialized variable warnings in crypto. Fix + contributed by apple-ihack-geek in #2663. + += mbed TLS 2.19.0 branch released 2019-09-06 + +Security + * Fix a missing error detection in ECJPAKE. This could have caused a + predictable shared secret if a hardware accelerator failed and the other + side of the key exchange had a similar bug. + * When writing a private EC key, use a constant size for the private + value, as specified in RFC 5915. Previously, the value was written + as an ASN.1 INTEGER, which caused the size of the key to leak + about 1 bit of information on average and could cause the value to be + 1 byte too large for the output buffer. + * The deterministic ECDSA calculation reused the scheme's HMAC-DRBG to + implement blinding. Because of this for the same key and message the same + blinding value was generated. This reduced the effectiveness of the + countermeasure and leaked information about the private key through side + channels. Reported by Jack Lloyd. + +Features + * Add new API functions mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and + mbedtls_ssl_session_load() to allow serializing a session, for example to + store it in non-volatile storage, and later using it for TLS session + resumption. + * Add a new API function mbedtls_ssl_check_record() to allow checking that + an incoming record is valid, authentic and has not been seen before. This + feature can be used alongside Connection ID and SSL context serialisation. + The feature is enabled at compile-time by MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING + option. + * New implementation of X25519 (ECDH using Curve25519) from Project Everest + (https://project-everest.github.io/). It can be enabled at compile time + with MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED. This implementation is formally + verified and significantly faster, but is only supported on x86 platforms + (32-bit and 64-bit) using GCC, Clang or Visual Studio. Contributed by + Christoph Wintersteiger from Microsoft Research. + * Add mbedtls_net_close(), enabling the building of forking servers where + the parent process closes the client socket and continue accepting, and + the child process closes the listening socket and handles the client + socket. Contributed by Robert Larsen in #2803. + +API Changes + * Add DER-encoded test CRTs to library/certs.c, allowing + the example programs ssl_server2 and ssl_client2 to be run + if MBEDTLS_FS_IO and MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C are unset. Fixes #2254. + * The HAVEGE state type now uses uint32_t elements instead of int. + * The functions mbedtls_ecp_curve_list() and mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list() now + list all curves for which at least one of ECDH or ECDSA is supported, not + just curves for which both are supported. Call mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() or + mbedtls_ecdh_can_do() on each result to check whether each algorithm is + supported. + * The new function mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() is similar to + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() but allows passing an external RNG for the + purpose of blinding. + +New deprecations + * Deprecate mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() in favor of a functions that can take an + RNG function as an input. + * Calling mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() with NULL as the f_rng argument + is now deprecated. + +Bugfix + * Fix missing bounds checks in X.509 parsing functions that could + lead to successful parsing of ill-formed X.509 CRTs. Fixes #2437. + * Fix multiple X.509 functions previously returning ASN.1 low-level error + codes to always wrap these codes into X.509 high level error codes before + returning. Fixes #2431. + * Fix to allow building test suites with any warning that detects unused + functions. Fixes #1628. + * Fix typo in net_would_block(). Fixes #528 reported by github-monoculture. + * Remove redundant include file in timing.c. Fixes #2640 reported by irwir. + * Fix build failure when building with mingw on Windows by including + stdarg.h where needed. Fixes #2656. + * Fix Visual Studio Release x64 build configuration by inheriting + PlatformToolset from the project configuration. Fixes #1430 reported by + irwir. + * Enable Suite B with subset of ECP curves. Make sure the code compiles even + if some curves are not defined. Fixes #1591 reported by dbedev. + * Fix misuse of signed arithmetic in the HAVEGE module. #2598 + * Avoid use of statically sized stack buffers for certificate writing. + This previously limited the maximum size of DER encoded certificates + in mbedtls_x509write_crt_der() to 2Kb. Reported by soccerGB in #2631. + * Fix partial zeroing in x509_get_other_name. Found and fixed by ekse, #2716. + * Update test certificates that were about to expire. Reported by + Bernhard M. Wiedemann in #2357. + * Fix the build on ARMv5TE in ARM mode to not use assembly instructions + that are only available in Thumb mode. Fix contributed by Aurelien Jarno + in #2169. + * Fix propagation of restart contexts in restartable EC operations. + This could previously lead to segmentation faults in builds using an + address-sanitizer and enabling but not using MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. + * Fix memory leak in in mpi_miller_rabin(). Contributed by + Jens Wiklander in #2363 + * Improve code clarity in x509_crt module, removing false-positive + uninitialized variable warnings on some recent toolchains (GCC8, etc). + Discovered and fixed by Andy Gross (Linaro), #2392. + * Fix bug in endianness conversion in bignum module. This lead to + functionally incorrect code on bigendian systems which don't have + __BYTE_ORDER__ defined. Reported by Brendan Shanks. Fixes #2622. + +Changes + * Replace multiple uses of MD2 by SHA-256 in X.509 test suite. Fixes #821. + * Make it easier to define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED as assert (which config.h + suggests). #2671 + * Make `make clean` clean all programs always. Fixes #1862. + * Add a Dockerfile and helper scripts (all-in-docker.sh, basic-in-docker.sh, + docker-env.sh) to simplify running test suites on a Linux host. Contributed + by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). + * Add `reproducible` option to `ssl_client2` and `ssl_server2` to enable + test runs without variability. Contributed by Philippe Antoine (Catena + cyber) in #2681. + * Extended .gitignore to ignore Visual Studio artifacts. Fixed by ConfusedSushi. + * Adds fuzz targets, especially for continuous fuzzing with OSS-Fuzz. + Contributed by Philippe Antoine (Catena cyber). + * Remove the crypto part of the library from Mbed TLS. The crypto + code and tests are now only available via Mbed Crypto, which + Mbed TLS references as a Git submodule. + += mbed TLS 2.18.1 branch released 2019-07-12 + +Bugfix + * Fix build failure when building with mingw on Windows by including + stdarg.h where needed. Fixes #2656. + +Changes + * Enable building of Mbed TLS as a CMake subproject. Suggested and fixed by + Ashley Duncan in #2609. + += mbed TLS 2.18.0 branch released 2019-06-11 + +Features + * Add the Any Policy certificate policy oid, as defined in + rfc 5280 section 4.2.1.4. + * It is now possible to use NIST key wrap mode via the mbedtls_cipher API. + Contributed by Jack Lloyd and Fortanix Inc. + * Add the Wi-SUN Field Area Network (FAN) device extended key usage. + * Add the oid certificate policy x509 extension. + * It is now possible to perform RSA PKCS v1.5 signatures with RIPEMD-160 digest. + Contributed by Jack Lloyd and Fortanix Inc. + * Extend the MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS to export the handshake randbytes, + and the used tls-prf. + * Add public API for tls-prf function, according to requested enum. + * Add support for parsing otherName entries in the Subject Alternative Name + X.509 certificate extension, specifically type hardware module name, + as defined in RFC 4108 section 5. + * Add support for parsing certificate policies extension, as defined in + RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.4. Currently, only the "Any Policy" policy is + supported. + * List all SAN types in the subject_alt_names field of the certificate. + Resolves #459. + * Add support for draft-05 of the Connection ID extension, as specified + in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05. + The Connection ID extension allows to keep DTLS connections beyond the + lifetime of the underlying transport by adding a connection identifier + to the DTLS record header. This identifier can be used to associated an + incoming record with the correct connection data even after the peer has + changed its IP or port. The feature is enabled at compile-time by setting + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID (disabled by default), and at run-time + through the new APIs mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid() and mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(). + + +API Changes + * Extend the MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS to export the handshake randbytes, + and the used tls-prf. + * Add public API for tls-prf function, according to requested enum. + +Bugfix + * Fix private key DER output in the key_app_writer example. File contents + were shifted by one byte, creating an invalid ASN.1 tag. Fixed by + Christian Walther in #2239. + * Fix potential memory leak in X.509 self test. Found and fixed by + Junhwan Park, #2106. + * Reduce stack usage of hkdf tests. Fixes #2195. + * Fix 1-byte buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_write_string() when + used with negative inputs. Found by Guido Vranken in #2404. Credit to + OSS-Fuzz. + * Fix bugs in the AEAD test suite which would be exposed by ciphers which + either used both encrypt and decrypt key schedules, or which perform padding. + GCM and CCM were not affected. Fixed by Jack Lloyd. + * Fix incorrect default port number in ssl_mail_client example's usage. + Found and fixed by irwir. #2337 + * Add psa_util.h to test/cpp_dummy_build to fix build_default_make_gcc_and_cxx. + Fixed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). #2579 + * Add missing parentheses around parameters in the definition of the + public macro MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG. This could lead to invalid evaluation + in case operators binding less strongly than subtraction were used + for the parameter. + * Add a check for MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C in ssl_server2, guarding the crl + sni entry parameter. Reported by inestlerode in #560. + * Set the next sequence of the subject_alt_name to NULL when deleting + sequence on failure. Found and fix suggested by Philippe Antoine. + Credit to OSS-Fuzz. + +Changes + * Server's RSA certificate in certs.c was SHA-1 signed. In the default + mbedTLS configuration only SHA-2 signed certificates are accepted. + This certificate is used in the demo server programs, which lead the + client programs to fail at the peer's certificate verification + due to an unacceptable hash signature. The certificate has been + updated to one that is SHA-256 signed. Fix contributed by + Illya Gerasymchuk. + * Return from various debugging routines immediately if the + provided SSL context is unset. + * Remove dead code from bignum.c in the default configuration. + Found by Coverity, reported and fixed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). Fixes #2309. + * Add test for minimal value of MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE to all.sh. + Contributed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin). + * Change wording in the `mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len()`'s documentation to + improve clarity. Fixes #2258. + += mbed TLS 2.17.0 branch released 2019-03-19 + +Features + * Add a new X.509 API call `mbedtls_x509_parse_der_nocopy()` + which allows copy-less parsing of DER encoded X.509 CRTs, + at the cost of additional lifetime constraints on the input + buffer, but at the benefit of reduced RAM consumption. + * Add a new function mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring() to write ASN.1 + named bitstring in DER as required by RFC 5280 Appendix B. + * Add MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES to allow removing 3DES ciphersuites + from the default list (enabled by default). See + https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf. + +API Changes + * Add a new X.509 API call `mbedtls_x509_parse_der_nocopy()`. + See the Features section for more information. + * Allow to opt in to the removal the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() + for the benefit of saving RAM, by disabling the new compile-time + option MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE (enabled by default for + API stability). Disabling this option makes mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() + always return NULL, and removes the peer_cert field from the + mbedtls_ssl_session structure which otherwise stores the peer's + certificate. + +Security + * Make mbedtls_ecdh_get_params return an error if the second key + belongs to a different group from the first. Before, if an application + passed keys that belonged to different group, the first key's data was + interpreted according to the second group, which could lead to either + an error or a meaningless output from mbedtls_ecdh_get_params. In the + latter case, this could expose at most 5 bits of the private key. + +Bugfix + * Fix a compilation issue with mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx not being defined + when MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT is defined. Reported by jwhui. Fixes #2242. + * Run the AD too long test only if MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT is not defined. + Raised as a comment in #1996. + * Reduce the stack consumption of mbedtls_mpi_fill_random() which could + previously lead to a stack overflow on constrained targets. + * Add `MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST` for the mbedtls_self_test functions + in the header files, which missed the precompilation check. #971 + * Fix returning the value 1 when mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey failed. + * Remove a duplicate #include in a sample program. Fixed by Masashi Honma #2326. + * Remove the mbedtls namespacing from the header file, to fix a "file not found" + build error. Fixed by Haijun Gu #2319. + * Fix signed-to-unsigned integer conversion warning + in X.509 module. Fixes #2212. + * Reduce stack usage of `mpi_write_hlp()` by eliminating recursion. + Fixes #2190. + * Fix false failure in all.sh when backup files exist in include/mbedtls + (e.g. config.h.bak). Fixed by Peter Kolbus (Garmin) #2407. + * Ensure that unused bits are zero when writing ASN.1 bitstrings when using + mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(). + * Fix issue when writing the named bitstrings in KeyUsage and NsCertType + extensions in CSRs and CRTs that caused these bitstrings to not be encoded + correctly as trailing zeroes were not accounted for as unused bits in the + leading content octet. Fixes #1610. + +Changes + * Reduce RAM consumption during session renegotiation by not storing + the peer CRT chain and session ticket twice. + * Include configuration file in all header files that use configuration, + instead of relying on other header files that they include. + Inserted as an enhancement for #1371 + * Add support for alternative CSR headers, as used by Microsoft and defined + in RFC 7468. Found by Michael Ernst. Fixes #767. + * Correct many misspellings. Fixed by MisterDA #2371. + * Provide an abstraction of vsnprintf to allow alternative implementations + for platforms that don't provide it. Based on contributions by Joris Aerts + and Nathaniel Wesley Filardo. + * Fix clobber list in MIPS assembly for large integer multiplication. + Previously, this could lead to functionally incorrect assembly being + produced by some optimizing compilers, showing up as failures in + e.g. RSA or ECC signature operations. Reported in #1722, fix suggested + by Aurelien Jarno and submitted by Jeffrey Martin. + * Reduce the complexity of the timing tests. They were assuming more than the + underlying OS actually guarantees. + * Fix configuration queries in ssl-opt.h. #2030 + * Ensure that ssl-opt.h can be run in OS X. #2029 + * Re-enable certain interoperability tests in ssl-opt.sh which had previously + been disabled for lack of a sufficiently recent version of GnuTLS on the CI. + * Ciphersuites based on 3DES now have the lowest priority by default when + they are enabled. + += mbed TLS 2.16.0 branch released 2018-12-21 + +Features + * Add a new config.h option of MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS that enables validation + of parameters in the API. This allows detection of obvious misuses of the + API, such as passing NULL pointers. The API of existing functions hasn't + changed, but requirements on parameters have been made more explicit in + the documentation. See the corresponding API documentation for each + function to see for which parameter values it is defined. This feature is + disabled by default. See its API documentation in config.h for additional + steps you have to take when enabling it. + +API Changes + * The following functions in the random generator modules have been + deprecated and replaced as shown below. The new functions change + the return type from void to int to allow returning error codes when + using MBEDTLS__ALT for the underlying AES or message digest + primitive. Fixes #1798. + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update() -> mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update() -> mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() + * Extend ECDH interface to enable alternative implementations. + * Deprecate error codes of the form MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH for + ARIA, CAMELLIA and Blowfish. These error codes will be replaced by + the more generic per-module error codes MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * Additional parameter validation checks have been added for the following + modules - AES, ARIA, Blowfish, CAMELLIA, CCM, GCM, DHM, ECP, ECDSA, ECDH, + ECJPAKE, SHA, Chacha20 and Poly1305, cipher, pk, RSA, and MPI. + Where modules have had parameter validation added, existing parameter + checks may have changed. Some modules, such as Chacha20 had existing + parameter validation whereas other modules had little. This has now been + changed so that the same level of validation is present in all modules, and + that it is now optional with the MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS flag which by default + is off. That means that checks which were previously present by default + will no longer be. + +New deprecations + * Deprecate mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update + in favor of functions that can return an error code. + +Bugfix + * Fix for Clang, which was reporting a warning for the bignum.c inline + assembly for AMD64 targets creating string literals greater than those + permitted by the ISO C99 standard. Found by Aaron Jones. Fixes #482. + * Fix runtime error in `mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll()` when run + through qemu user emulation. Reported and fix suggested by randombit + in #1212. Fixes #1212. + * Fix an unsafe bounds check when restoring an SSL session from a ticket. + This could lead to a buffer overflow, but only in case ticket authentication + was broken. Reported and fix suggested by Guido Vranken in #659. + * Add explicit integer to enumeration type casts to example program + programs/pkey/gen_key which previously led to compilation failure + on some toolchains. Reported by phoenixmcallister. Fixes #2170. + * Fix double initialization of ECC hardware that made some accelerators + hang. + * Clarify documentation of mbedtls_ssl_set_own_cert() regarding the absence + of check for certificate/key matching. Reported by Attila Molnar, #507. + + = mbed TLS 2.15.1 branch released 2018-11-30 + + Changes + * Update the Mbed Crypto submodule to version 0.1.0b2. + + = mbed TLS 2.15.0 branch released 2018-11-23 + + Features + * Add an experimental build option, USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE, to enable use of + Mbed Crypto as the source of the cryptography implementation. + * Add an experimental configuration option, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, to enable + the PSA Crypto API from Mbed Crypto when additionally used with the + USE_CRYPTO_SUBMODULE build option. + + Changes + * Add unit tests for AES-GCM when called through mbedtls_cipher_auth_xxx() + from the cipher abstraction layer. Fixes #2198. + += mbed TLS 2.14.1 branch released 2018-11-30 + +Security + * Fix timing variations and memory access variations in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 + decryption that could lead to a Bleichenbacher-style padding oracle + attack. In TLS, this affects servers that accept ciphersuites based on + RSA decryption (i.e. ciphersuites whose name contains RSA but not + (EC)DH(E)). Discovered by Eyal Ronen (Weizmann Institute), Robert Gillham + (University of Adelaide), Daniel Genkin (University of Michigan), + Adi Shamir (Weizmann Institute), David Wong (NCC Group), and Yuval Yarom + (University of Adelaide, Data61). The attack is described in more detail + in the paper available here: http://cat.eyalro.net/cat.pdf CVE-2018-19608 + * In mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(), don't leak the exact size of the number + via branching and memory access patterns. An attacker who could submit + a plaintext for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption but only observe the timing + of the decryption and not its result could nonetheless decrypt RSA + plaintexts and forge RSA signatures. Other asymmetric algorithms may + have been similarly vulnerable. Reported by Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham, + Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, David Wong and Yuval Yarom. + * Wipe sensitive buffers on the stack in the CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG + modules. + +API Changes + * The new functions mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() and + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() are similar to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update() + and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update() respectively, but the new functions + report errors whereas the old functions return void. We recommend that + applications use the new functions. + += mbed TLS 2.14.0 branch released 2018-11-19 + +Security + * Fix overly strict DN comparison when looking for CRLs belonging to a + particular CA. This previously led to ignoring CRLs when the CRL's issuer + name and the CA's subject name differed in their string encoding (e.g., + one using PrintableString and the other UTF8String) or in the choice of + upper and lower case. Reported by Henrik Andersson of Bosch GmbH in issue + #1784. + * Fix a flawed bounds check in server PSK hint parsing. In case the + incoming message buffer was placed within the first 64KiB of address + space and a PSK-(EC)DHE ciphersuite was used, this allowed an attacker + to trigger a memory access up to 64KiB beyond the incoming message buffer, + potentially leading to an application crash or information disclosure. + * Fix mbedtls_mpi_is_prime() to use more rounds of probabilistic testing. The + previous settings for the number of rounds made it practical for an + adversary to construct non-primes that would be erroneously accepted as + primes with high probability. This does not have an impact on the + security of TLS, but can matter in other contexts with numbers chosen + potentially by an adversary that should be prime and can be validated. + For example, the number of rounds was enough to securely generate RSA key + pairs or Diffie-Hellman parameters, but was insufficient to validate + Diffie-Hellman parameters properly. + See "Prime and Prejudice" by by Martin R. Albrecht and Jake Massimo and + Kenneth G. Paterson and Juraj Somorovsky. + +Features + * Add support for temporarily suspending expensive ECC computations after + some configurable amount of operations. This is intended to be used in + constrained, single-threaded systems where ECC is time consuming and can + block other operations until they complete. This is disabled by default, + but can be enabled by MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE at compile time and + configured by mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() at runtime. It applies to the new + xxx_restartable functions in ECP, ECDSA, PK and X.509 (CRL not supported + yet), and to existing functions in ECDH and SSL (currently only + implemented client-side, for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphersuites in TLS 1.2, + including client authentication). + * Add support for Arm CPU DSP extensions to accelerate asymmetric key + operations. On CPUs where the extensions are available, they can accelerate + MPI multiplications used in ECC and RSA cryptography. Contributed by + Aurelien Jarno. + * Extend RSASSA-PSS signature to allow a smaller salt size. Previously, PSS + signature always used a salt with the same length as the hash, and returned + an error if this was not possible. Now the salt size may be up to two bytes + shorter. This allows the library to support all hash and signature sizes + that comply with FIPS 186-4, including SHA-512 with a 1024-bit key. + * Add support for 128-bit keys in CTR_DRBG. Note that using keys shorter + than 256 bits limits the security of generated material to 128 bits. + +API Changes + * Add a common error code of `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED` for + a feature that is not supported by underlying alternative + implementations implementing cryptographic primitives. This is useful for + hardware accelerators that don't implement all options or features. + +New deprecations + * All module specific errors following the form + MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE that indicate a feature is not + supported are deprecated and are now replaced by the new equivalent + platform error. + * All module specific generic hardware acceleration errors following the + form MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_HW_ACCEL_FAILED that are deprecated and are replaced + by the equivalent plaform error. + * Deprecate the function mbedtls_mpi_is_prime() in favor of + mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows specifying the number of + Miller-Rabin rounds. + +Bugfix + * Fix wrong order of freeing in programs/ssl/ssl_server2 example + application leading to a memory leak in case both + MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C and MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE are set. + Fixes #2069. + * Fix a bug in the update function for SSL ticket keys which previously + invalidated keys of a lifetime of less than a 1s. Fixes #1968. + * Fix failure in hmac_drbg in the benchmark sample application, when + MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is defined. Found by TrinityTonic, #1095 + * Fix a bug in the record decryption routine ssl_decrypt_buf() + which lead to accepting properly authenticated but improperly + padded records in case of CBC ciphersuites using Encrypt-then-MAC. + * Fix memory leak and freeing without initialization in the example + program programs/x509/cert_write. Fixes #1422. + * Ignore IV in mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() when the cipher mode is + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB. Found by ezdevelop. Fixes #1091. + * Zeroize memory used for buffering or reassembling handshake messages + after use. + * Use `mbedtls_platform_zeroize()` instead of `memset()` for zeroization + of sensitive data in the example programs aescrypt2 and crypt_and_hash. + * Change the default string format used for various X.509 DN attributes to + UTF8String. Previously, the use of the PrintableString format led to + wildcards and non-ASCII characters being unusable in some DN attributes. + Reported by raprepo in #1860 and by kevinpt in #468. Fix contributed by + Thomas-Dee. + * Fix compilation failure for configurations which use compile time + replacements of standard calloc/free functions through the macros + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO. + Reported by ole-de and ddhome2006. Fixes #882, #1642 and #1706. + +Changes + * Removed support for Yotta as a build tool. + * Add tests for session resumption in DTLS. + * Close a test gap in (D)TLS between the client side and the server side: + test the handling of large packets and small packets on the client side + in the same way as on the server side. + * Change the dtls_client and dtls_server samples to work by default over + IPv6 and optionally by a build option over IPv4. + * Change the use of Windows threading to use Microsoft Visual C++ runtime + calls, rather than Win32 API calls directly. This is necessary to avoid + conflict with C runtime usage. Found and fixed by irwir. + * Remember the string format of X.509 DN attributes when replicating + X.509 DNs. Previously, DN attributes were always written in their default + string format (mostly PrintableString), which could lead to CRTs being + created which used PrintableStrings in the issuer field even though the + signing CA used UTF8Strings in its subject field; while X.509 compliant, + such CRTs were rejected in some applications, e.g. some versions of + Firefox, curl and GnuTLS. Reported in #1033 by Moschn. Fix contributed by + Thomas-Dee. + * Improve documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(). + Fixes #517 reported by github-monoculture. + * Add MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR flag to mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime() and + use it to reduce error probability in RSA key generation to levels mandated + by FIPS-186-4. + += mbed TLS 2.13.1 branch released 2018-09-06 + +API Changes + * Extend the platform module with an abstraction mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() + whose implementation should behave as a thread-safe version of gmtime(). + This allows users to configure such an implementation at compile time when + the target system cannot be deduced automatically, by setting the option + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT. At this stage Mbed TLS is only able to + automatically select implementations for Windows and POSIX C libraries. + +Bugfix + * Fix build failures on platforms where only gmtime() is available but + neither gmtime_r() nor gmtime_s() are present. Fixes #1907. + += mbed TLS 2.13.0 branch released 2018-08-31 + +Security + * Fix an issue in the X.509 module which could lead to a buffer overread + during certificate extensions parsing. In case of receiving malformed + input (extensions length field equal to 0), an illegal read of one byte + beyond the input buffer is made. Found and analyzed by Nathan Crandall. + +Features + * Add support for fragmentation of outgoing DTLS handshake messages. This + is controlled by the maximum fragment length as set locally or negotiated + with the peer, as well as by a new per-connection MTU option, set using + mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(). + * Add support for auto-adjustment of MTU to a safe value during the + handshake when flights do not get through (RFC 6347, section 4.1.1.1, + last paragraph). + * Add support for packing multiple records within a single datagram, + enabled by default. + * Add support for buffering out-of-order handshake messages in DTLS. + The maximum amount of RAM used for this can be controlled by the + compile-time constant MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING defined + in mbedtls/config.h. + +API Changes + * Add function mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing() to configure + the use of datagram packing (enabled by default). + +Bugfix + * Fix a potential memory leak in mbedtls_ssl_setup() function. An allocation + failure in the function could lead to other buffers being leaked. + * Fixes an issue with MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C which would not compile if + MBEDTLS_ARC4_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER weren't also defined. #1890 + * Fix a memory leak in ecp_mul_comb() if ecp_precompute_comb() fails. + Fix contributed by Espressif Systems. + * Add ecc extensions only if an ecc based ciphersuite is used. + This improves compliance to RFC 4492, and as a result, solves + interoperability issues with BouncyCastle. Raised by milenamil in #1157. + * Replace printf with mbedtls_printf in the ARIA module. Found by + TrinityTonic in #1908. + * Fix potential use-after-free in mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() + and mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() after a session reset. Fixes #1941. + * Fix a bug that caused SSL/TLS clients to incorrectly abort the handshake + with TLS versions 1.1 and earlier when the server requested authentication + without providing a list of CAs. This was due to an overly strict bounds + check in parsing the CertificateRequest message, + introduced in Mbed TLS 2.12.0. Fixes #1954. + * Fix a miscalculation of the maximum record expansion in + mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() in case of ChachaPoly ciphersuites, + or CBC ciphersuites in (D)TLS versions 1.1 or higher. Fixes #1913, #1914. + * Fix undefined shifts with negative values in certificates parsing + (found by Catena cyber using oss-fuzz) + * Fix memory leak and free without initialization in pk_encrypt + and pk_decrypt example programs. Reported by Brace Stout. Fixes #1128. + * Remove redundant else statement. Raised by irwir. Fixes #1776. + +Changes + * Copy headers preserving timestamps when doing a "make install". + Contributed by xueruini. + * Allow the forward declaration of public structs. Contributed by Dawid + Drozd. Fixes #1215 raised by randombit. + * Improve compatibility with some alternative CCM implementations by using + CCM test vectors from RAM. + * Add support for buffering of out-of-order handshake messages. + * Add warnings to the documentation of the HKDF module to reduce the risk + of misusing the mbedtls_hkdf_extract() and mbedtls_hkdf_expand() + functions. Fixes #1775. Reported by Brian J. Murray. + += mbed TLS 2.12.0 branch released 2018-07-25 + +Security + * Fix a vulnerability in TLS ciphersuites based on CBC and using SHA-384, + in (D)TLS 1.0 to 1.2, that allowed an active network attacker to + partially recover the plaintext of messages under some conditions by + exploiting timing measurements. With DTLS, the attacker could perform + this recovery by sending many messages in the same connection. With TLS + or if mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit() was used, the attack only + worked if the same secret (for example a HTTP Cookie) has been repeatedly + sent over connections manipulated by the attacker. Connections using GCM + or CCM instead of CBC, using hash sizes other than SHA-384, or using + Encrypt-then-Mac (RFC 7366) were not affected. The vulnerability was + caused by a miscalculation (for SHA-384) in a countermeasure to the + original Lucky 13 attack. Found by Kenny Paterson, Eyal Ronen and Adi + Shamir. + * Fix a vulnerability in TLS ciphersuites based on CBC, in (D)TLS 1.0 to + 1.2, that allowed a local attacker, able to execute code on the local + machine as well as manipulate network packets, to partially recover the + plaintext of messages under some conditions by using a cache attack + targeting an internal MD/SHA buffer. With TLS or if + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit() was used, the attack only worked if + the same secret (for example a HTTP Cookie) has been repeatedly sent over + connections manipulated by the attacker. Connections using GCM or CCM + instead of CBC or using Encrypt-then-Mac (RFC 7366) were not affected. + Found by Kenny Paterson, Eyal Ronen and Adi Shamir. + * Add a counter-measure against a vulnerability in TLS ciphersuites based + on CBC, in (D)TLS 1.0 to 1.2, that allowed a local attacker, able to + execute code on the local machine as well as manipulate network packets, + to partially recover the plaintext of messages under some conditions (see + previous entry) by using a cache attack targeting the SSL input record + buffer. Connections using GCM or CCM instead of CBC or using + Encrypt-then-Mac (RFC 7366) were not affected. Found by Kenny Paterson, + Eyal Ronen and Adi Shamir. + +Features + * Add new crypto primitives from RFC 7539: stream cipher Chacha20, one-time + authenticator Poly1305 and AEAD construct Chacha20-Poly1305. Contributed + by Daniel King. + * Add support for CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites from RFC 7905. + * Add platform support for the Haiku OS. (https://www.haiku-os.org). + Contributed by Augustin Cavalier. + * Make the receive and transmit buffers independent sizes, for situations + where the outgoing buffer can be fixed at a smaller size than the incoming + buffer, which can save some RAM. If buffer lengths are kept equal, there + is no functional difference. Contributed by Angus Gratton, and also + independently contributed again by Paul Sokolovsky. + * Add support for key wrapping modes based on AES as defined by + NIST SP 800-38F algorithms KW and KWP and by RFC 3394 and RFC 5649. + +Bugfix + * Fix the key_app_writer example which was writing a leading zero byte which + was creating an invalid ASN.1 tag. Found by Aryeh R. Fixes #1257. + * Fix compilation error on C++, because of a variable named new. + Found and fixed by Hirotaka Niisato in #1783. + * Fix "no symbols" warning issued by ranlib when building on Mac OS X. Fix + contributed by tabascoeye. + * Clarify documentation for mbedtls_ssl_write() to include 0 as a valid + return value. Found by @davidwu2000. #839 + * Fix a memory leak in mbedtls_x509_csr_parse(), found by catenacyber, + Philippe Antoine. Fixes #1623. + * Remove unused headers included in x509.c. Found by Chris Hanson and fixed + by Brendan Shanks. Part of a fix for #992. + * Fix compilation error when MBEDTLS_ARC4_C is disabled and + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER is enabled. Found by TrinityTonic in #1719. + * Added length checks to some TLS parsing functions. Found and fixed by + Philippe Antoine from Catena cyber. #1663. + * Fix the inline assembly for the MPI multiply helper function for i386 and + i386 with SSE2. Found by László Langó. Fixes #1550 + * Fix namespacing in header files. Remove the `mbedtls` namespacing in + the `#include` in the header files. Resolves #857 + * Fix compiler warning of 'use before initialisation' in + mbedtls_pk_parse_key(). Found by Martin Boye Petersen and fixed by Dawid + Drozd. #1098 + * Fix decryption for zero length messages (which contain all padding) when a + CBC based ciphersuite is used together with Encrypt-then-MAC. Previously, + such a message was wrongly reported as an invalid record and therefore lead + to the connection being terminated. Seen most often with OpenSSL using + TLS 1.0. Reported by @kFYatek and by Conor Murphy on the forum. Fix + contributed by Espressif Systems. Fixes #1632 + * Fix ssl_client2 example to send application data with 0-length content + when the request_size argument is set to 0 as stated in the documentation. + Fixes #1833. + * Correct the documentation for `mbedtls_ssl_get_session()`. This API has + deep copy of the session, and the peer certificate is not lost. Fixes #926. + * Fix build using -std=c99. Fixed by Nick Wilson. + +Changes + * Fail when receiving a TLS alert message with an invalid length, or invalid + zero-length messages when using TLS 1.2. Contributed by Espressif Systems. + * Change the default behaviour of mbedtls_hkdf_extract() to return an error + when calling with a NULL salt and non-zero salt_len. Contributed by + Brian J Murray + * Change the shebang line in Perl scripts to look up perl in the PATH. + Contributed by fbrosson. + * Allow overriding the time on Windows via the platform-time abstraction. + Fixed by Nick Wilson. + * Use gmtime_r/gmtime_s for thread-safety. Fixed by Nick Wilson. + += mbed TLS 2.11.0 branch released 2018-06-18 + +Features + * Add additional block mode, OFB (Output Feedback), to the AES module and + cipher abstraction module. + * Implement the HMAC-based extract-and-expand key derivation function + (HKDF) per RFC 5869. Contributed by Thomas Fossati. + * Add support for the CCM* block cipher mode as defined in IEEE Std. 802.15.4. + * Add support for the XTS block cipher mode with AES (AES-XTS). + Contributed by Aorimn in pull request #414. + * In TLS servers, support offloading private key operations to an external + cryptoprocessor. Private key operations can be asynchronous to allow + non-blocking operation of the TLS server stack. + +Bugfix + * Fix the cert_write example to handle certificates signed with elliptic + curves as well as RSA. Fixes #777 found by dbedev. + * Fix for redefinition of _WIN32_WINNT to avoid overriding a definition + used by user applications. Found and fixed by Fabio Alessandrelli. + * Fix compilation warnings with IAR toolchain, on 32 bit platform. + Reported by rahmanih in #683 + * Fix braces in mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(). Found by sbranden, #552. + +Changes + * Changed CMake defaults for IAR to treat all compiler warnings as errors. + * Changed the Clang parameters used in the CMake build files to work for + versions later than 3.6. Versions of Clang earlier than this may no longer + work. Fixes #1072 + += mbed TLS 2.10.0 branch released 2018-06-06 + +Features + * Add support for ARIA cipher (RFC 5794) and associated TLS ciphersuites + (RFC 6209). Disabled by default, see MBEDTLS_ARIA_C in config.h + +API Changes + * Extend the platform module with a util component that contains + functionality shared by multiple Mbed TLS modules. At this stage + platform_util.h (and its associated platform_util.c) only contain + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), which is a critical function from a security + point of view. mbedtls_platform_zeroize() needs to be regularly tested + against compilers to ensure that calls to it are not removed from the + output binary as part of redundant code elimination optimizations. + Therefore, mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is moved to the platform module to + facilitate testing and maintenance. + +Bugfix + * Fix an issue with MicroBlaze support in bn_mul.h which was causing the + build to fail. Found by zv-io. Fixes #1651. + +Changes + * Support TLS testing in out-of-source builds using cmake. Fixes #1193. + * Fix redundant declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites. Raised by + TrinityTonic. #1359. + += mbed TLS 2.9.0 branch released 2018-04-30 + +Security + * Fix an issue in the X.509 module which could lead to a buffer overread + during certificate validation. Additionally, the issue could also lead to + unnecessary callback checks being made or to some validation checks to be + omitted. The overread could be triggered remotely, while the other issues + would require a non DER-compliant certificate to be correctly signed by a + trusted CA, or a trusted CA with a non DER-compliant certificate. Found by + luocm. Fixes #825. + * Fix the buffer length assertion in the ssl_parse_certificate_request() + function which led to an arbitrary overread of the message buffer. The + overreads could be caused by receiving a malformed message at the point + where an optional signature algorithms list is expected when the signature + algorithms section is too short. In builds with debug output, the overread + data is output with the debug data. + * Fix a client-side bug in the validation of the server's ciphersuite choice + which could potentially lead to the client accepting a ciphersuite it didn't + offer or a ciphersuite that cannot be used with the TLS or DTLS version + chosen by the server. This could lead to corruption of internal data + structures for some configurations. + +Features + * Add an option, MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES, to dynamically compute smaller AES + tables during runtime, thereby reducing the RAM/ROM footprint by ~6KiB. + Suggested and contributed by jkivilin in pull request #394. + * Add initial support for Curve448 (RFC 7748). Only mbedtls_ecp_mul() and + ECDH primitive functions (mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(), + mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared()) are supported for now. Contributed by + Nicholas Wilson in pull request #348. + +API Changes + * Extend the public API with the function of mbedtls_net_poll() to allow user + applications to wait for a network context to become ready before reading + or writing. + * Add function mbedtls_ssl_check_pending() to the public API to allow + a check for whether more more data is pending to be processed in the + internal message buffers. + This function is necessary to determine when it is safe to idle on the + underlying transport in case event-driven IO is used. + +Bugfix + * Fix a spurious uninitialized variable warning in cmac.c. Fix independently + contributed by Brian J Murray and David Brown. + * Add missing dependencies in test suites that led to build failures + in configurations that omit certain hashes or public-key algorithms. + Fixes #1040. + * Fix C89 incompatibility in benchmark.c. Contributed by Brendan Shanks. + #1353 + * Add missing dependencies for MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE and + MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES in some test suites. Contributed by + Deomid Ryabkov. Fixes #1299, #1475. + * Fix the Makefile build process for building shared libraries on Mac OS X. + Fixed by mnacamura. + * Fix parsing of PKCS#8 encoded Elliptic Curve keys. Previously Mbed TLS was + unable to parse keys which had only the optional parameters field of the + ECPrivateKey structure. Found by Jethro Beekman, fixed in #1379. + * Return the plaintext data more quickly on unpadded CBC decryption, as + stated in the mbedtls_cipher_update() documentation. Contributed by + Andy Leiserson. + * Fix overriding and ignoring return values when parsing and writing to + a file in pk_sign program. Found by kevlut in #1142. + * Restrict usage of error code MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ to situations + where data needs to be fetched from the underlying transport in order + to make progress. Previously, this error code was also occasionally + returned when unexpected messages were being discarded, ignoring that + further messages could potentially already be pending to be processed + in the internal buffers; these cases led to deadlocks when event-driven + I/O was used. Found and reported by Hubert Mis in #772. + * Fix buffer length assertions in the ssl_parse_certificate_request() + function which leads to a potential one byte overread of the message + buffer. + * Fix invalid buffer sizes passed to zlib during record compression and + decompression. + * Fix the soversion of libmbedcrypto to match the soversion of the + maintained 2.7 branch. The soversion was increased in Mbed TLS + version 2.7.1 to reflect breaking changes in that release, but the + increment was missed in 2.8.0 and later releases outside of the 2.7 branch. + +Changes + * Remove some redundant code in bignum.c. Contributed by Alexey Skalozub. + * Support cmake builds where Mbed TLS is a subproject. Fix contributed + independently by Matthieu Volat and Arne Schwabe. + * Improve testing in configurations that omit certain hashes or + public-key algorithms. Includes contributions by Gert van Dijk. + * Improve negative testing of X.509 parsing. + * Do not define global mutexes around readdir() and gmtime() in + configurations where the feature is disabled. Found and fixed by Gergely + Budai. + * Harden the function mbedtls_ssl_config_free() against misuse, so that it + doesn't leak memory if the user doesn't use mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() and + instead incorrectly manipulates the configuration structure directly. + Found and fix submitted by junyeonLEE in #1220. + * Provide an empty implementation of mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2() when + MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C is not enabled. This allows the use of PBKDF2 + without PBES2. Fixed by Marcos Del Sol Vives. + * Add the order of the base point as N in the mbedtls_ecp_group structure + for Curve25519 (other curves had it already). Contributed by Nicholas + Wilson #481 + * Improve the documentation of mbedtls_net_accept(). Contributed by Ivan + Krylov. + * Improve the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_write(). Suggested by + Paul Sokolovsky in #1356. + * Add an option in the Makefile to support ar utilities where the operation + letter must not be prefixed by '-', such as LLVM. Found and fixed by + Alex Hixon. + * Allow configuring the shared library extension by setting the DLEXT + environment variable when using the project makefiles. + * Optimize unnecessary zeroing in mbedtls_mpi_copy. Based on a contribution + by Alexey Skalozub in #405. + * In the SSL module, when f_send, f_recv or f_recv_timeout report + transmitting more than the required length, return an error. Raised by + Sam O'Connor in #1245. + * Improve robustness of mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys against the use of + HMAC functions with non-HMAC ciphersuites. Independently contributed + by Jiayuan Chen in #1377. Fixes #1437. + * Improve security of RSA key generation by including criteria from + FIPS 186-4. Contributed by Jethro Beekman. #1380 + * Declare functions in header files even when an alternative implementation + of the corresponding module is activated by defining the corresponding + MBEDTLS_XXX_ALT macro. This means that alternative implementations do + not need to copy the declarations, and ensures that they will have the + same API. + * Add platform setup and teardown calls in test suites. + += mbed TLS 2.8.0 branch released 2018-03-16 + +Default behavior changes + * The truncated HMAC extension now conforms to RFC 6066. This means + that when both sides of a TLS connection negotiate the truncated + HMAC extension, Mbed TLS can now interoperate with other + compliant implementations, but this breaks interoperability with + prior versions of Mbed TLS. To restore the old behavior, enable + the (deprecated) option MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT in + config.h. Found by Andreas Walz (ivESK, Offenburg University of + Applied Sciences). + +Security + * Fix implementation of the truncated HMAC extension. The previous + implementation allowed an offline 2^80 brute force attack on the + HMAC key of a single, uninterrupted connection (with no + resumption of the session). + * Verify results of RSA private key operations to defend + against Bellcore glitch attack. + * Fix a buffer overread in ssl_parse_server_key_exchange() that could cause + a crash on invalid input. + * Fix a buffer overread in ssl_parse_server_psk_hint() that could cause a + crash on invalid input. + * Fix CRL parsing to reject CRLs containing unsupported critical + extensions. Found by Falko Strenzke and Evangelos Karatsiolis. + +Features + * Extend PKCS#8 interface by introducing support for the entire SHA + algorithms family when encrypting private keys using PKCS#5 v2.0. + This allows reading encrypted PEM files produced by software that + uses PBKDF2-SHA2, such as OpenSSL 1.1. Submitted by Antonio Quartulli, + OpenVPN Inc. Fixes #1339 + * Add support for public keys encoded in PKCS#1 format. #1122 + +New deprecations + * Deprecate support for record compression (configuration option + MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT). + +Bugfix + * Fix the name of a DHE parameter that was accidentally changed in 2.7.0. + Fixes #1358. + * Fix test_suite_pk to work on 64-bit ILP32 systems. #849 + * Fix mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb, which used to reject all certificates + with flag MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK even when the key type was correct. + In the context of SSL, this resulted in handshake failure. Reported by + daniel in the Mbed TLS forum. #1351 + * Fix Windows x64 builds with the included mbedTLS.sln file. #1347 + * Fix setting version TLSv1 as minimal version, even if TLS 1 + is not enabled. Set MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION + and MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION instead of + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1. #664 + * Fix compilation error on Mingw32 when _TRUNCATE is defined. Use _TRUNCATE + only if __MINGW32__ not defined. Fix suggested by Thomas Glanzmann and + Nick Wilson on issue #355 + * In test_suite_pk, pass valid parameters when testing for hash length + overflow. #1179 + * Fix memory allocation corner cases in memory_buffer_alloc.c module. Found + by Guido Vranken. #639 + * Log correct number of ciphersuites used in Client Hello message. #918 + * Fix X509 CRT parsing that would potentially accept an invalid tag when + parsing the subject alternative names. + * Fix a possible arithmetic overflow in ssl_parse_server_key_exchange() + that could cause a key exchange to fail on valid data. + * Fix a possible arithmetic overflow in ssl_parse_server_psk_hint() that + could cause a key exchange to fail on valid data. + * Don't define mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt under + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED. #1388 + * Fix a 1-byte heap buffer overflow (read-only) during private key parsing. + Found through fuzz testing. + +Changes + * Fix tag lengths and value ranges in the documentation of CCM encryption. + Contributed by Mathieu Briand. + * Fix typo in a comment ctr_drbg.c. Contributed by Paul Sokolovsky. + * Remove support for the library reference configuration for picocoin. + * MD functions deprecated in 2.7.0 are no longer inline, to provide + a migration path for those depending on the library's ABI. + * Clarify the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_setup. + * Use (void) when defining functions with no parameters. Contributed by + Joris Aerts. #678 + += mbed TLS 2.7.0 branch released 2018-02-03 + +Security + * Fix a heap corruption issue in the implementation of the truncated HMAC + extension. When the truncated HMAC extension is enabled and CBC is used, + sending a malicious application packet could be used to selectively corrupt + 6 bytes on the peer's heap, which could potentially lead to crash or remote + code execution. The issue could be triggered remotely from either side in + both TLS and DTLS. CVE-2018-0488 + * Fix a buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the hash was too large + for the key size, which could potentially lead to crash or remote code + execution. Found by Seth Terashima, Qualcomm Product Security Initiative, + Qualcomm Technologies Inc. CVE-2018-0487 + * Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the unmasked data is all + zeros. + * Fix an unsafe bounds check in ssl_parse_client_psk_identity() when adding + 64 KiB to the address of the SSL buffer and causing a wrap around. + * Fix a potential heap buffer overflow in mbedtls_ssl_write(). When the (by + default enabled) maximum fragment length extension is disabled in the + config and the application data buffer passed to mbedtls_ssl_write + is larger than the internal message buffer (16384 bytes by default), the + latter overflows. The exploitability of this issue depends on whether the + application layer can be forced into sending such large packets. The issue + was independently reported by Tim Nordell via e-mail and by Florin Petriuc + and sjorsdewit on GitHub. Fix proposed by Florin Petriuc in #1022. + Fixes #707. + * Add a provision to prevent compiler optimizations breaking the time + constancy of mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp(). + * Ensure that buffers are cleared after use if they contain sensitive data. + Changes were introduced in multiple places in the library. + * Set PEM buffer to zero before freeing it, to avoid decoded private keys + being leaked to memory after release. + * Fix dhm_check_range() failing to detect trivial subgroups and potentially + leaking 1 bit of the private key. Reported by prashantkspatil. + * Make mbedtls_mpi_read_binary() constant-time with respect to the input + data. Previously, trailing zero bytes were detected and omitted for the + sake of saving memory, but potentially leading to slight timing + differences. Reported by Marco Macchetti, Kudelski Group. + * Wipe stack buffer temporarily holding EC private exponent + after keypair generation. + * Fix a potential heap buffer over-read in ALPN extension parsing + (server-side). Could result in application crash, but only if an ALPN + name larger than 16 bytes had been configured on the server. + * Change default choice of DHE parameters from untrustworthy RFC 5114 + to RFC 3526 containing parameters generated in a nothing-up-my-sleeve + manner. + +Features + * Allow comments in test data files. + * The selftest program can execute a subset of the tests based on command + line arguments. + * New unit tests for timing. Improve the self-test to be more robust + when run on a heavily-loaded machine. + * Add alternative implementation support for CCM and CMAC (MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT, + MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT). Submitted by Steven Cooreman, Silicon Labs. + * Add support for alternative implementations of GCM, selected by the + configuration flag MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT. + * Add support for alternative implementations for ECDSA, controlled by new + configuration flags MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT and + MBEDTLS_ECDSDA_GENKEY_AT in config.h. + The following functions from the ECDSA module can be replaced + with alternative implementation: + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(), mbedtls_ecdsa_verify() and mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(). + * Add support for alternative implementation of ECDH, controlled by the + new configuration flags MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT and + MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT in config.h. + The following functions from the ECDH module can be replaced + with an alternative implementation: + mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public() and mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(). + * Add support for alternative implementation of ECJPAKE, controlled by + the new configuration flag MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT. + * Add mechanism to provide alternative implementation of the DHM module. + +API Changes + * Extend RSA interface by multiple functions allowing structure- + independent setup and export of RSA contexts. Most notably, + mbedtls_rsa_import() and mbedtls_rsa_complete() are introduced for setting + up RSA contexts from partial key material and having them completed to the + needs of the implementation automatically. This allows to setup private RSA + contexts from keys consisting of N,D,E only, even if P,Q are needed for the + purpose or CRT and/or blinding. + * The configuration option MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT can be used to define alternative + implementations of the RSA interface declared in rsa.h. + * The following functions in the message digest modules (MD2, MD4, MD5, + SHA1, SHA256, SHA512) have been deprecated and replaced as shown below. + The new functions change the return type from void to int to allow + returning error codes when using MBEDTLS__ALT. + mbedtls__starts() -> mbedtls__starts_ret() + mbedtls__update() -> mbedtls__update_ret() + mbedtls__finish() -> mbedtls__finish_ret() + mbedtls__process() -> mbedtls_internal__process() + +New deprecations + * Deprecate usage of RSA primitives with non-matching key-type + (e.g. signing with a public key). + * Direct manipulation of structure fields of RSA contexts is deprecated. + Users are advised to use the extended RSA API instead. + * Deprecate usage of message digest functions that return void + (mbedtls__starts, mbedtls__update, + mbedtls__finish and mbedtls__process where is + any of MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512) in favor of functions + that can return an error code. + * Deprecate untrustworthy DHE parameters from RFC 5114. Superseded by + parameters from RFC 3526 or the newly added parameters from RFC 7919. + * Deprecate hex string DHE constants MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P etc. + Supserseded by binary encoded constants MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN + etc. + * Deprecate mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param() for setting default DHE parameters + from hex strings. Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin() + accepting DHM parameters in binary form, matching the new constants. + +Bugfix + * Fix ssl_parse_record_header() to silently discard invalid DTLS records + as recommended in RFC 6347 Section 4.1.2.7. + * Fix memory leak in mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() when called multiple times. + Found by projectgus and Jethro Beekman, #836. + * Fix usage help in ssl_server2 example. Found and fixed by Bei Lin. + * Parse signature algorithm extension when renegotiating. Previously, + renegotiated handshakes would only accept signatures using SHA-1 + regardless of the peer's preferences, or fail if SHA-1 was disabled. + * Fix leap year calculation in x509_date_is_valid() to ensure that invalid + dates on leap years with 100 and 400 intervals are handled correctly. Found + by Nicholas Wilson. #694 + * Fix some invalid RSA-PSS signatures with keys of size 8N+1 that were + accepted. Generating these signatures required the private key. + * Fix out-of-memory problem when parsing 4096-bit PKCS8-encrypted RSA keys. + Found independently by Florian in the mbed TLS forum and by Mishamax. + #878, #1019. + * Fix variable used before assignment compilation warnings with IAR + toolchain. Found by gkerrien38. + * Fix unchecked return codes from AES, DES and 3DES functions in + pem_aes_decrypt(), pem_des_decrypt() and pem_des3_decrypt() respectively. + If a call to one of the functions of the cryptographic primitive modules + failed, the error may not be noticed by the function + mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() causing it to return invalid values. Found by + Guido Vranken. #756 + * Include configuration file in md.h, to fix compilation warnings. + Reported by aaronmdjones in #1001 + * Correct extraction of signature-type from PK instance in X.509 CRT and CSR + writing routines that prevented these functions to work with alternative + RSA implementations. Raised by J.B. in the Mbed TLS forum. Fixes #1011. + * Don't print X.509 version tag for v1 CRT's, and omit extensions for + non-v3 CRT's. + * Fix bugs in RSA test suite under MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY. #1023 #1024 + * Fix net_would_block() to avoid modification by errno through fcntl() call. + Found by nkolban. Fixes #845. + * Fix handling of handshake messages in mbedtls_ssl_read() in case + MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is disabled. Found by erja-gp. + * Add a check for invalid private parameters in mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). + Reported by Yolan Romailler. + * Fix word size check in in pk.c to not depend on MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64. + * Fix incorrect unit in benchmark output. #850 + * Add size-checks for record and handshake message content, securing + fragile yet non-exploitable code-paths. + * Fix crash when calling mbedtls_ssl_cache_free() twice. Found by + MilenkoMitrovic, #1104 + * Fix mbedtls_timing_alarm(0) on Unix and MinGW. + * Fix use of uninitialized memory in mbedtls_timing_get_timer() when reset=1. + * Fix possible memory leaks in mbedtls_gcm_self_test(). + * Added missing return code checks in mbedtls_aes_self_test(). + * Fix issues in RSA key generation program programs/x509/rsa_genkey and the + RSA test suite where the failure of CTR DRBG initialization lead to + freeing an RSA context and several MPI's without proper initialization + beforehand. + * Fix error message in programs/pkey/gen_key.c. Found and fixed by Chris Xue. + * Fix programs/pkey/dh_server.c so that it actually works with dh_client.c. + Found and fixed by Martijn de Milliano. + * Fix an issue in the cipher decryption with the mode + MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS that sometimes accepted invalid padding. + Note, this padding mode is not used by the TLS protocol. Found and fixed by + Micha Kraus. + * Fix the entropy.c module to not call mbedtls_sha256_starts() or + mbedtls_sha512_starts() in the mbedtls_entropy_init() function. + * Fix the entropy.c module to ensure that mbedtls_sha256_init() or + mbedtls_sha512_init() is called before operating on the relevant context + structure. Do not assume that zeroizing a context is a correct way to + reset it. Found independently by ccli8 on Github. + * In mbedtls_entropy_free(), properly free the message digest context. + * Fix status handshake status message in programs/ssl/dtls_client.c. Found + and fixed by muddog. + +Changes + * Extend cert_write example program by options to set the certificate version + and the message digest. Further, allow enabling/disabling of authority + identifier, subject identifier and basic constraints extensions. + * Only check for necessary RSA structure fields in `mbedtls_rsa_private`. In + particular, don't require P,Q if neither CRT nor blinding are + used. Reported and fix proposed independently by satur9nine and sliai + on GitHub. + * Only run AES-192 self-test if AES-192 is available. Fixes #963. + * Tighten the RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification code and remove the + undeclared dependency of the RSA module on the ASN.1 module. + * Update all internal usage of deprecated message digest functions to the + new ones with return codes. In particular, this modifies the + mbedtls_md_info_t structure. Propagate errors from these functions + everywhere except some locations in the ssl_tls.c module. + * Improve CTR_DRBG error handling by propagating underlying AES errors. + * Add MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_HW_ACCEL_FAILED error codes for all cryptography + modules where the software implementation can be replaced by a hardware + implementation. + * Add explicit warnings for the use of MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA-1, DES and ARC4 + throughout the library. + += mbed TLS 2.6.0 branch released 2017-08-10 + +Security + * Fix authentication bypass in SSL/TLS: when authmode is set to optional, + mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() would incorrectly return 0 when the peer's + X.509 certificate chain had more than MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + (default: 8) intermediates, even when it was not trusted. This could be + triggered remotely from either side. (With authmode set to 'required' + (the default), the handshake was correctly aborted). + * Reliably wipe sensitive data after use in the AES example applications + programs/aes/aescrypt2 and programs/aes/crypt_and_hash. + Found by Laurent Simon. + +Features + * Add the functions mbedtls_platform_setup() and mbedtls_platform_teardown() + and the context struct mbedtls_platform_context to perform + platform-specific setup and teardown operations. The macro + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT allows the functions to be overridden + by the user in a platform_alt.h file. These new functions are required in + some embedded environments to provide a means of initialising underlying + cryptographic acceleration hardware. + +API Changes + * Reverted API/ABI breaking changes introduced in mbed TLS 2.5.1, to make the + API consistent with mbed TLS 2.5.0. Specifically removed the inline + qualifier from the functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt, mbedtls_aes_encrypt, + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec and mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk. Found + by James Cowgill. #978 + * Certificate verification functions now set flags to -1 in case the full + chain was not verified due to an internal error (including in the verify + callback) or chain length limitations. + * With authmode set to optional, the TLS handshake is now aborted if the + verification of the peer's certificate failed due to an overlong chain or + a fatal error in the verify callback. + +Bugfix + * Add a check if iv_len is zero in GCM, and return an error if it is zero. + Reported by roberto. #716 + * Replace preprocessor condition from #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) + to #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) as the library cannot assume they will + always be implemented by pthread support. #696 + * Fix a resource leak on Windows platforms in mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(), + in the case of an error. Found by redplait. #590 + * Add MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK to check for error value of mbedtls_mpi_fill_random. + Reported and fix suggested by guidovranken. #740 + * Fix conditional preprocessor directives in bignum.h to enable 64-bit + compilation when using ARM Compiler 6. + * Fix a potential integer overflow in the version verification for DER + encoded X.509 CRLs. The overflow could enable maliciously constructed CRLs + to bypass the version verification check. Found by Peng Li/Yueh-Hsun Lin, + KNOX Security, Samsung Research America + * Fix potential integer overflow in the version verification for DER + encoded X.509 CSRs. The overflow could enable maliciously constructed CSRs + to bypass the version verification check. Found by Peng Li/Yueh-Hsun Lin, + KNOX Security, Samsung Research America + * Fix a potential integer overflow in the version verification for DER + encoded X.509 certificates. The overflow could enable maliciously + constructed certificates to bypass the certificate verification check. + * Fix a call to the libc function time() to call the platform abstraction + function mbedtls_time() instead. Found by wairua. #666 + * Avoid shadowing of time and index functions through mbed TLS function + arguments. Found by inestlerode. #557. + +Changes + * Added config.h option MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION, to prevent the use of + 64-bit division. This is useful on embedded platforms where 64-bit division + created a dependency on external libraries. #708 + * Removed mutexes from ECP hardware accelerator code. Now all hardware + accelerator code in the library leaves concurrency handling to the + platform. Reported by Steven Cooreman. #863 + * Define the macro MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in the configuration file + config-no-entropy.h to reduce the RAM footprint. + * Added a test script that can be hooked into git that verifies commits + before they are pushed. + * Improve documentation of PKCS1 decryption functions. + += mbed TLS 2.5.1 released 2017-06-21 + +Security + * Fixed unlimited overread of heap-based buffer in mbedtls_ssl_read(). + The issue could only happen client-side with renegotiation enabled. + Could result in DoS (application crash) or information leak + (if the application layer sent data read from mbedtls_ssl_read() + back to the server or to a third party). Can be triggered remotely. + * Removed SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160 from the default hash algorithms for + certificate verification. SHA-1 can be turned back on with a compile-time + option if needed. + * Fixed offset in FALLBACK_SCSV parsing that caused TLS server to fail to + detect it sometimes. Reported by Hugo Leisink. #810 + * Tighten parsing of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, to avoid a + potential Bleichenbacher/BERserk-style attack. + +Bugfix + * Remove size zero arrays from ECJPAKE test suite. Size zero arrays are not + valid C and they prevented the test from compiling in Visual Studio 2015 + and with GCC using the -Wpedantic compilation option. + * Fix insufficient support for signature-hash-algorithm extension, + resulting in compatibility problems with Chrome. Found by hfloyrd. #823 + * Fix behaviour that hid the original cause of fatal alerts in some cases + when sending the alert failed. The fix makes sure not to hide the error + that triggered the alert. + * Fix SSLv3 renegotiation behaviour and stop processing data received from + peer after sending a fatal alert to refuse a renegotiation attempt. + Previous behaviour was to keep processing data even after the alert has + been sent. + * Accept empty trusted CA chain in authentication mode + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL. Found by Jethro Beekman. #864 + * Fix implementation of mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() to not annihilate + fatal errors in authentication mode MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL and to + reflect bad EC curves within verification result. + * Fix bug that caused the modular inversion function to accept the invalid + modulus 1 and therefore to hang. Found by blaufish. #641. + * Fix incorrect sign computation in modular exponentiation when the base is + a negative MPI. Previously the result was always negative. Found by Guido + Vranken. + * Fix a numerical underflow leading to stack overflow in mpi_read_file() + that was triggered uppon reading an empty line. Found by Guido Vranken. + +Changes + * Send fatal alerts in more cases. The previous behaviour was to skip + sending the fatal alert and just drop the connection. + * Clarify ECDSA documentation and improve the sample code to avoid + misunderstanding and potentially dangerous use of the API. Pointed out + by Jean-Philippe Aumasson. + += mbed TLS 2.5.0 branch released 2017-05-17 + +Security + * Wipe stack buffers in RSA private key operations + (rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(), rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt). Found by Laurent + Simon. + * Add exponent blinding to RSA private operations as a countermeasure + against side-channel attacks like the cache attack described in + https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719v2. + Found and fix proposed by Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, + Clémentine Maurice and Stefan Mangard. + +Features + * Add hardware acceleration support for the Elliptic Curve Point module. + This involved exposing parts of the internal interface to enable + replacing the core functions and adding and alternative, module level + replacement support for enabling the extension of the interface. + * Add a new configuration option to 'mbedtls_ssl_config' to enable + suppressing the CA list in Certificate Request messages. The default + behaviour has not changed, namely every configured CAs name is included. + +API Changes + * The following functions in the AES module have been deprecated and replaced + by the functions shown below. The new functions change the return type from + void to int to allow returning error codes when using MBEDTLS_AES_ALT, + MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT or MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT. + mbedtls_aes_decrypt() -> mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() + mbedtls_aes_encrypt() -> mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() + +Bugfix + * Remove macros from compat-1.3.h that correspond to deleted items from most + recent versions of the library. Found by Kyle Keen. + * Fixed issue in the Threading module that prevented mutexes from + initialising. Found by sznaider. #667 #843 + * Add checks in the PK module for the RSA functions on 64-bit systems. + The PK and RSA modules use different types for passing hash length and + without these checks the type cast could lead to data loss. Found by Guido + Vranken. + += mbed TLS 2.4.2 branch released 2017-03-08 + +Security + * Add checks to prevent signature forgeries for very large messages while + using RSA through the PK module in 64-bit systems. The issue was caused by + some data loss when casting a size_t to an unsigned int value in the + functions rsa_verify_wrap(), rsa_sign_wrap(), rsa_alt_sign_wrap() and + mbedtls_pk_sign(). Found by Jean-Philippe Aumasson. + * Fixed potential livelock during the parsing of a CRL in PEM format in + mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(). A string containing a CRL followed by trailing + characters after the footer could result in the execution of an infinite + loop. The issue can be triggered remotely. Found by Greg Zaverucha, + Microsoft. + * Removed MD5 from the allowed hash algorithms for CertificateRequest and + CertificateVerify messages, to prevent SLOTH attacks against TLS 1.2. + Introduced by interoperability fix for #513. + * Fixed a bug that caused freeing a buffer that was allocated on the stack, + when verifying the validity of a key on secp224k1. This could be + triggered remotely for example with a maliciously constructed certificate + and potentially could lead to remote code execution on some platforms. + Reported independently by rongsaws and Aleksandar Nikolic, Cisco Talos + team. #569 CVE-2017-2784 + +Bugfix + * Fix output certificate verification flags set by x509_crt_verify_top() when + traversing a chain of trusted CA. The issue would cause both flags, + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED and MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, to be + set when the verification conditions are not met regardless of the cause. + Found by Harm Verhagen and inestlerode. #665 #561 + * Fix the redefinition of macro ssl_set_bio to an undefined symbol + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio_timeout in compat-1.3.h, by removing it. + Found by omlib-lin. #673 + * Fix unused variable/function compilation warnings in pem.c, x509_crt.c and + x509_csr.c that are reported when building mbed TLS with a config.h that + does not define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C. Found by omnium21. #562 + * Fix incorrect renegotiation condition in ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate() that + would compare 64 bits of the record counter instead of 48 bits as indicated + in RFC 6347 Section 4.3.1. This could cause the execution of the + renegotiation routines at unexpected times when the protocol is DTLS. Found + by wariua. #687 + * Fixed multiple buffer overreads in mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() when parsing + the input string in PEM format to extract the different components. Found + by Eyal Itkin. + * Fixed potential arithmetic overflow in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed() that could + cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed. Found by Eyal Itkin. + * Fixed potential arithmetic overflows in mbedtls_cipher_update() that could + cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed. Found by Eyal Itkin. + * Fixed potential arithmetic overflow in mbedtls_md2_update() that could + cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed. Found by Eyal Itkin. + * Fixed potential arithmetic overflow in mbedtls_base64_decode() that could + cause buffer bound checks to be bypassed. Found by Eyal Itkin. + * Fixed heap overreads in mbedtls_x509_get_time(). Found by Peng + Li/Yueh-Hsun Lin, KNOX Security, Samsung Research America. + * Fix potential memory leak in mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(). The leak was caused + by missing calls to mbedtls_pem_free() in cases when a + MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT error was encountered. Found and + fix proposed by Guido Vranken. #722 + * Fixed the templates used to generate project and solution files for Visual + Studio 2015 as well as the files themselves, to remove a build warning + generated in Visual Studio 2015. Reported by Steve Valliere. #742 + * Fix a resource leak in ssl_cookie, when using MBEDTLS_THREADING_C. + Raised and fix suggested by Alan Gillingham in the mbed TLS forum. #771 + * Fix 1 byte buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_write_string() when the MPI + number to write in hexadecimal is negative and requires an odd number of + digits. Found and fixed by Guido Vranken. + * Fix unlisted DES configuration dependency in some pkparse test cases. Found + by inestlerode. #555 + += mbed TLS 2.4.1 branch released 2016-12-13 + +Changes + * Update to CMAC test data, taken from - NIST Special Publication 800-38B - + Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for + Authentication – October 2016 + += mbed TLS 2.4.0 branch released 2016-10-17 + +Security + * Removed the MBEDTLS_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV option, because it was not compliant + with RFC-5116 and could lead to session key recovery in very long TLS + sessions. "Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries Practical Forgery Attacks on GCM in + TLS" - H. Bock, A. Zauner, S. Devlin, J. Somorovsky, P. Jovanovic. + https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/475.pdf + * Fixed potential stack corruption in mbedtls_x509write_crt_der() and + mbedtls_x509write_csr_der() when the signature is copied to the buffer + without checking whether there is enough space in the destination. The + issue cannot be triggered remotely. Found by Jethro Beekman. + +Features + * Added support for CMAC for AES and 3DES and AES-CMAC-PRF-128, as defined by + NIST SP 800-38B, RFC-4493 and RFC-4615. + * Added hardware entropy selftest to verify that the hardware entropy source + is functioning correctly. + * Added a script to print build environment info for diagnostic use in test + scripts, which is also now called by all.sh. + * Added the macro MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN that enables the user to + configure the maximum length of a file path that can be buffered when + calling mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(). + * Added a configuration file config-no-entropy.h that configures the subset of + library features that do not require an entropy source. + * Added the macro MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE in config.h. This allows users + to configure the minimum number of bytes for entropy sources using the + mbedtls_hardware_poll() function. + +Bugfix + * Fix for platform time abstraction to avoid dependency issues where a build + may need time but not the standard C library abstraction, and added + configuration consistency checks to check_config.h + * Fix dependency issue in Makefile to allow parallel builds. + * Fix incorrect handling of block lengths in crypt_and_hash.c sample program, + when GCM is used. Found by udf2457. #441 + * Fix for key exchanges based on ECDH-RSA or ECDH-ECDSA which weren't + enabled unless others were also present. Found by David Fernandez. #428 + * Fix for out-of-tree builds using CMake. Found by jwurzer, and fix based on + a contribution from Tobias Tangemann. #541 + * Fixed cert_app.c sample program for debug output and for use when no root + certificates are provided. + * Fix conditional statement that would cause a 1 byte overread in + mbedtls_asn1_get_int(). Found and fixed by Guido Vranken. #599 + * Fixed pthread implementation to avoid unintended double initialisations + and double frees. Found by Niklas Amnebratt. + * Fixed the sample applications gen_key.c, cert_req.c and cert_write.c for + builds where the configuration MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C is not defined. Found + by inestlerode. #559. + * Fix mbedtls_x509_get_sig() to update the ASN1 type in the mbedtls_x509_buf + data structure until after error checks are successful. Found by + subramanyam-c. #622 + * Fix documentation and implementation missmatch for function arguments of + mbedtls_gcm_finish(). Found by cmiatpaar. #602 + * Guarantee that P>Q at RSA key generation. Found by inestlerode. #558 + * Fix potential byte overread when verifying malformed SERVER_HELLO in + ssl_parse_hello_verify_request() for DTLS. Found by Guido Vranken. + * Fix check for validity of date when parsing in mbedtls_x509_get_time(). + Found by subramanyam-c. #626 + * Fix compatibility issue with Internet Explorer client authentication, + where the limited hash choices prevented the client from sending its + certificate. Found by teumas. #513 + * Fix compilation without MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST enabled. + +Changes + * Extended test coverage of special cases, and added new timing test suite. + * Removed self-tests from the basic-built-test.sh script, and added all + missing self-tests to the test suites, to ensure self-tests are only + executed once. + * Added support for 3 and 4 byte lengths to mbedtls_asn1_write_len(). + * Added support for a Yotta specific configuration file - + through the symbol YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_TARGET_CONFIG_FILE. + * Added optimization for code space for X.509/OID based on configured + features. Contributed by Aviv Palivoda. + * Renamed source file library/net.c to library/net_sockets.c to avoid + naming collision in projects which also have files with the common name + net.c. For consistency, the corresponding header file, net.h, is marked as + deprecated, and its contents moved to net_sockets.h. + * Changed the strategy for X.509 certificate parsing and validation, to no + longer disregard certificates with unrecognised fields. + += mbed TLS 2.3.0 branch released 2016-06-28 + +Security + * Fix missing padding length check in mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt + required by PKCS1 v2.2 + * Fix potential integer overflow to buffer overflow in + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt and mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt + (not triggerable remotely in (D)TLS). + * Fix a potential integer underflow to buffer overread in + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt. It is not triggerable remotely in + SSL/TLS. + +Features + * Support for platform abstraction of the standard C library time() + function. + +Bugfix + * Fix bug in mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi() that caused wrong results when the three + arguments where the same (in-place doubling). Found and fixed by Janos + Follath. #309 + * Fix potential build failures related to the 'apidoc' target, introduced + in the previous patch release. Found by Robert Scheck. #390 #391 + * Fix issue in Makefile that prevented building using armar. #386 + * Fix memory leak that occurred only when ECJPAKE was enabled and ECDHE and + ECDSA was disabled in config.h . The leak didn't occur by default. + * Fix an issue that caused valid certificates to be rejected whenever an + expired or not yet valid certificate was parsed before a valid certificate + in the trusted certificate list. + * Fix bug in mbedtls_x509_crt_parse that caused trailing extra data in the + buffer after DER certificates to be included in the raw representation. + * Fix issue that caused a hang when generating RSA keys of odd bitlength + * Fix bug in mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt that made null pointer + dereference possible. + * Fix issue that caused a crash if invalid curves were passed to + mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves. #373 + * Fix issue in ssl_fork_server which was preventing it from functioning. #429 + * Fix memory leaks in test framework + * Fix test in ssl-opt.sh that does not run properly with valgrind + * Fix unchecked calls to mmbedtls_md_setup(). Fix by Brian Murray. #502 + +Changes + * On ARM platforms, when compiling with -O0 with GCC, Clang or armcc5, + don't use the optimized assembly for bignum multiplication. This removes + the need to pass -fomit-frame-pointer to avoid a build error with -O0. + * Disabled SSLv3 in the default configuration. + * Optimized mbedtls_mpi_zeroize() for MPI integer size. (Fix by Alexey + Skalozub). + * Fix non-compliance server extension handling. Extensions for SSLv3 are now + ignored, as required by RFC6101. + += mbed TLS 2.2.1 released 2016-01-05 + +Security + * Fix potential double free when mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data() fails to + allocate memory. Only used for certificate generation, not triggerable + remotely in SSL/TLS. Found by Rafał Przywara. #367 + * Disable MD5 handshake signatures in TLS 1.2 by default to prevent the + SLOTH attack on TLS 1.2 server authentication (other attacks from the + SLOTH paper do not apply to any version of mbed TLS or PolarSSL). + https://www.mitls.org/pages/attacks/SLOTH + +Bugfix + * Fix over-restrictive length limit in GCM. Found by Andreas-N. #362 + * Fix bug in certificate validation that caused valid chains to be rejected + when the first intermediate certificate has pathLenConstraint=0. Found by + Nicholas Wilson. Introduced in mbed TLS 2.2.0. #280 + * Removed potential leak in mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(), found by + JayaraghavendranK. #372 + * Fix suboptimal handling of unexpected records that caused interop issues + with some peers over unreliable links. Avoid dropping an entire DTLS + datagram if a single record in a datagram is unexpected, instead only + drop the record and look at subsequent records (if any are present) in + the same datagram. Found by jeannotlapin. #345 + += mbed TLS 2.2.0 released 2015-11-04 + +Security + * Fix potential double free if mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() is called more than + once and some allocation fails. Cannot be forced remotely. Found by Guido + Vranken, Intelworks. + * Fix potential heap corruption on Windows when + mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path() is passed a path longer than 2GB. Cannot be + triggered remotely. Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. + * Fix potential buffer overflow in some asn1_write_xxx() functions. + Cannot be triggered remotely unless you create X.509 certificates based + on untrusted input or write keys of untrusted origin. Found by Guido + Vranken, Intelworks. + * The X509 max_pathlen constraint was not enforced on intermediate + certificates. Found by Nicholas Wilson, fix and tests provided by + Janos Follath. #280 and #319 + +Features + * Experimental support for EC J-PAKE as defined in Thread 1.0.0. + Disabled by default as the specification might still change. + * Added a key extraction callback to accees the master secret and key + block. (Potential uses include EAP-TLS and Thread.) + +Bugfix + * Self-signed certificates were not excluded from pathlen counting, + resulting in some valid X.509 being incorrectly rejected. Found and fix + provided by Janos Follath. #319 + * Fix build error with configurations where ECDHE-PSK is the only key + exchange. Found and fix provided by Chris Hammond. #270 + * Fix build error with configurations where RSA, RSA-PSK, ECDH-RSA or + ECHD-ECDSA if the only key exchange. Multiple reports. #310 + * Fixed a bug causing some handshakes to fail due to some non-fatal alerts + not being properly ignored. Found by mancha and Kasom Koht-arsa, #308 + * mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(_with_profile)() now also checks the key type and + size/curve against the profile. Before that, there was no way to set a + minimum key size for end-entity certificates with RSA keys. Found by + Matthew Page of Scannex Electronics Ltd. + * Fix failures in MPI on Sparc(64) due to use of bad assembly code. + Found by Kurt Danielson. #292 + * Fix typo in name of the extKeyUsage OID. Found by inestlerode, #314 + * Fix bug in ASN.1 encoding of booleans that caused generated CA + certificates to be rejected by some applications, including OS X + Keychain. Found and fixed by Jonathan Leroy, Inikup. + +Changes + * Improved performance of mbedtls_ecp_muladd() when one of the scalars is 1 + or -1. + += mbed TLS 2.1.2 released 2015-10-06 + +Security + * Added fix for CVE-2015-5291 to prevent heap corruption due to buffer + overflow of the hostname or session ticket. Found by Guido Vranken, + Intelworks. + * Fix potential double-free if mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() is called more than + once in the same handhake and mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() was used. + Found and patch provided by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Cannot be forced + remotely. + * Fix stack buffer overflow in pkcs12 decryption (used by + mbedtls_pk_parse_key(file)() when the password is > 129 bytes. + Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Not triggerable remotely. + * Fix potential buffer overflow in mbedtls_mpi_read_string(). + Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Not exploitable remotely in the context + of TLS, but might be in other uses. On 32 bit machines, requires reading a + string of close to or larger than 1GB to exploit; on 64 bit machines, would + require reading a string of close to or larger than 2^62 bytes. + * Fix potential random memory allocation in mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() + on crafted PEM input data. Found and fix provided by Guido Vranken, + Intelworks. Not triggerable remotely in TLS. Triggerable remotely if you + accept PEM data from an untrusted source. + * Fix possible heap buffer overflow in base64_encoded() when the input + buffer is 512MB or larger on 32-bit platforms. Found by Guido Vranken, + Intelworks. Not trigerrable remotely in TLS. + * Fix potential double-free if mbedtls_conf_psk() is called repeatedly on + the same mbedtls_ssl_config object and memory allocation fails. Found by + Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Cannot be forced remotely. + * Fix potential heap buffer overflow in servers that perform client + authentication against a crafted CA cert. Cannot be triggered remotely + unless you allow third parties to pick trust CAs for client auth. + Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks. + +Bugfix + * Fix compile error in net.c with musl libc. Found and patch provided by + zhasha (#278). + * Fix macroization of 'inline' keyword when building as C++. (#279) + +Changes + * Added checking of hostname length in mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() to ensure + domain names are compliant with RFC 1035. + * Fixed paths for check_config.h in example config files. (Found by bachp) + (#291) + += mbed TLS 2.1.1 released 2015-09-17 + +Security + * Add countermeasure against Lenstra's RSA-CRT attack for PKCS#1 v1.5 + signatures. (Found by Florian Weimer, Red Hat.) + https://securityblog.redhat.com/2015/09/02/factoring-rsa-keys-with-tls-perfect-forward-secrecy/ + * Fix possible client-side NULL pointer dereference (read) when the client + tries to continue the handshake after it failed (a misuse of the API). + (Found and patch provided by Fabian Foerg, Gotham Digital Science using + afl-fuzz.) + +Bugfix + * Fix warning when using a 64bit platform. (found by embedthis) (#275) + * Fix off-by-one error in parsing Supported Point Format extension that + caused some handshakes to fail. + +Changes + * Made X509 profile pointer const in mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile() to allow + use of mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next. (found by NWilson) + * When a client initiates a reconnect from the same port as a live + connection, if cookie verification is available + (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY defined in config.h, and usable cookie + callbacks set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies()), this will be + detected and mbedtls_ssl_read() will return + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT - it is then possible to start a new + handshake with the same context. (See RFC 6347 section 4.2.8.) + += mbed TLS 2.1.0 released 2015-09-04 + +Features + * Added support for yotta as a build system. + * Primary open source license changed to Apache 2.0 license. + +Bugfix + * Fix segfault in the benchmark program when benchmarking DHM. + * Fix build error with CMake and pre-4.5 versions of GCC (found by Hugo + Leisink). + * Fix bug when parsing a ServerHello without extensions (found by David + Sears). + * Fix bug in CMake lists that caused libmbedcrypto.a not to be installed + (found by Benoit Lecocq). + * Fix bug in Makefile that caused libmbedcrypto and libmbedx509 not to be + installed (found by Rawi666). + * Fix compile error with armcc 5 with --gnu option. + * Fix bug in Makefile that caused programs not to be installed correctly + (found by robotanarchy) (#232). + * Fix bug in Makefile that prevented from installing without building the + tests (found by robotanarchy) (#232). + * Fix missing -static-libgcc when building shared libraries for Windows + with make. + * Fix link error when building shared libraries for Windows with make. + * Fix error when loading libmbedtls.so. + * Fix bug in mbedtls_ssl_conf_default() that caused the default preset to + be always used (found by dcb314) (#235) + * Fix bug in mbedtls_rsa_public() and mbedtls_rsa_private() that could + result trying to unlock an unlocked mutex on invalid input (found by + Fredrik Axelsson) (#257) + * Fix -Wshadow warnings (found by hnrkp) (#240) + * Fix memory corruption on client with overlong PSK identity, around + SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN or higher - not triggerrable remotely (found by + Aleksandrs Saveljevs) (#238) + * Fix unused function warning when using MBEDTLS_MDx_ALT or + MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT (found by Henrik) (#239) + * Fix memory corruption in pkey programs (found by yankuncheng) (#210) + +Changes + * The PEM parser now accepts a trailing space at end of lines (#226). + * It is now possible to #include a user-provided configuration file at the + end of the default config.h by defining MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE on the + compiler's command line. + * When verifying a certificate chain, if an intermediate certificate is + trusted, no later cert is checked. (suggested by hannes-landeholm) + (#220). + * Prepend a "thread identifier" to debug messages (issue pointed out by + Hugo Leisink) (#210). + * Add mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len() to query the current maximum fragment + length. + += mbed TLS 2.0.0 released 2015-07-13 + +Features + * Support for DTLS 1.0 and 1.2 (RFC 6347). + * Ability to override core functions from MDx, SHAx, AES and DES modules + with custom implementation (eg hardware accelerated), complementing the + ability to override the whole module. + * New server-side implementation of session tickets that rotate keys to + preserve forward secrecy, and allows sharing across multiple contexts. + * Added a concept of X.509 cerificate verification profile that controls + which algorithms and key sizes (curves for ECDSA) are acceptable. + * Expanded configurability of security parameters in the SSL module with + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(). + * Introduced a concept of presets for SSL security-relevant configuration + parameters. + +API Changes + * The library has been split into libmbedcrypto, libmbedx509, libmbedtls. + You now need to link to all of them if you use TLS for example. + * All public identifiers moved to the mbedtls_* or MBEDTLS_* namespace. + Some names have been further changed to make them more consistent. + Migration helpers scripts/rename.pl and include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h are + provided. Full list of renamings in scripts/data_files/rename-1.3-2.0.txt + * Renamings of fields inside structures, not covered by the previous list: + mbedtls_cipher_info_t.key_length -> key_bitlen + mbedtls_cipher_context_t.key_length -> key_bitlen + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info.size -> bit_size + * Headers are now found in the 'mbedtls' directory (previously 'polarssl'). + * The following _init() functions that could return errors have + been split into an _init() that returns void and another function that + should generally be the first function called on this context after init: + mbedtls_ssl_init() -> mbedtls_ssl_setup() + mbedtls_ccm_init() -> mbedtls_ccm_setkey() + mbedtls_gcm_init() -> mbedtls_gcm_setkey() + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init() -> mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(_buf)() + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init() -> mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() + Note that for mbedtls_ssl_setup(), you need to be done setting up the + ssl_config structure before calling it. + * Most ssl_set_xxx() functions (all except ssl_set_bio(), ssl_set_hostname(), + ssl_set_session() and ssl_set_client_transport_id(), plus + ssl_legacy_renegotiation()) have been renamed to mbedtls_ssl_conf_xxx() + (see rename.pl and compat-1.3.h above) and their first argument's type + changed from ssl_context to ssl_config. + * ssl_set_bio() changed signature (contexts merged, order switched, one + additional callback for read-with-timeout). + * The following functions have been introduced and must be used in callback + implementations (SNI, PSK) instead of their *conf counterparts: + mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert() + mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() + mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() lost its last argument (peer_cn), now set + using mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(). + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache() changed prototype (only one context + pointer, parameters reordered). + * On server, mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb() must now be used in + place of mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets() to enable session tickets. + * The SSL debug callback gained two new arguments (file name, line number). + * Debug modes were removed. + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac() now returns void. + * mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init() now returns void. + * X.509 verification flags are now an uint32_t. Affect the signature of: + mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() + mbedtls_x509_ctr_verify_info() + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() (flags, f_vrfy -> needs to be updated) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() (f_vrfy -> needs to be updated) + * The following functions changed prototype to avoid an in-out length + parameter: + mbedtls_base64_encode() + mbedtls_base64_decode() + mbedtls_mpi_write_string() + mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret() + * In the NET module, all "int" and "int *" arguments for file descriptors + changed type to "mbedtls_net_context *". + * net_accept() gained new arguments for the size of the client_ip buffer. + * In the threading layer, mbedtls_mutex_init() and mbedtls_mutex_free() now + return void. + * ecdsa_write_signature() gained an additional md_alg argument and + ecdsa_write_signature_det() was deprecated. + * pk_sign() no longer accepts md_alg == POLARSSL_MD_NONE with ECDSA. + * Last argument of x509_crt_check_key_usage() and + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage() changed from int to unsigned. + * test_ca_list (from certs.h) is renamed to test_cas_pem and is only + available if POLARSSL_PEM_PARSE_C is defined (it never worked without). + * Test certificates in certs.c are no longer guaranteed to be nul-terminated + strings; use the new *_len variables instead of strlen(). + * Functions mbedtls_x509_xxx_parse(), mbedtls_pk_parse_key(), + mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key() and mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm() now expect the + length parameter to include the terminating null byte for PEM input. + * Signature of mpi_mul_mpi() changed to make the last argument unsigned + * calloc() is now used instead of malloc() everywhere. API of platform + layer and the memory_buffer_alloc module changed accordingly. + (Thanks to Mansour Moufid for helping with the replacement.) + * Change SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTIATION config.h flag to SSL_RENEGOTIATION + (support for renegotiation now needs explicit enabling in config.h). + * Split MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME into MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME and MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + in config.h + * net_connect() and net_bind() have a new 'proto' argument to choose + between TCP and UDP, using the macros NET_PROTO_TCP or NET_PROTO_UDP. + Their 'port' argument type is changed to a string. + * Some constness fixes + +Removals + * Removed mbedtls_ecp_group_read_string(). Only named groups are supported. + * Removed mbedtls_ecp_sub() and mbedtls_ecp_add(), use + mbedtls_ecp_muladd(). + * Removed individual mdX_hmac, shaX_hmac, mdX_file and shaX_file functions + (use generic functions from md.h) + * Removed mbedtls_timing_msleep(). Use mbedtls_net_usleep() or a custom + waiting function. + * Removed test DHM parameters from the test certs module. + * Removed the PBKDF2 module (use PKCS5). + * Removed POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_BC (use mbedtls_strerror()). + * Removed compat-1.2.h (helper for migrating from 1.2 to 1.3). + * Removed openssl.h (very partial OpenSSL compatibility layer). + * Configuration options POLARSSL_HAVE_LONGLONG was removed (now always on). + * Configuration options POLARSSL_HAVE_INT8 and POLARSSL_HAVE_INT16 have + been removed (compiler is required to support 32-bit operations). + * Configuration option POLARSSL_HAVE_IPV6 was removed (always enabled). + * Removed test program o_p_test, the script compat.sh does more. + * Removed test program ssl_test, superseded by ssl-opt.sh. + * Removed helper script active-config.pl + +New deprecations + * md_init_ctx() is deprecated in favour of md_setup(), that adds a third + argument (allowing memory savings if HMAC is not used) + +Semi-API changes (technically public, morally private) + * Renamed a few headers to include _internal in the name. Those headers are + not supposed to be included by users. + * Changed md_info_t into an opaque structure (use md_get_xxx() accessors). + * Changed pk_info_t into an opaque structure. + * Changed cipher_base_t into an opaque structure. + * Removed sig_oid2 and rename sig_oid1 to sig_oid in x509_crt and x509_crl. + * x509_crt.key_usage changed from unsigned char to unsigned int. + * Removed r and s from ecdsa_context + * Removed mode from des_context and des3_context + +Default behavior changes + * The default minimum TLS version is now TLS 1.0. + * RC4 is now blacklisted by default in the SSL/TLS layer, and excluded from the + default ciphersuite list returned by ssl_list_ciphersuites() + * Support for receiving SSLv2 ClientHello is now disabled by default at + compile time. + * The default authmode for SSL/TLS clients is now REQUIRED. + * Support for RSA_ALT contexts in the PK layer is now optional. Since is is + enabled in the default configuration, this is only noticeable if using a + custom config.h + * Default DHM parameters server-side upgraded from 1024 to 2048 bits. + * A minimum RSA key size of 2048 bits is now enforced during ceritificate + chain verification. + * Negotiation of truncated HMAC is now disabled by default on server too. + * The following functions are now case-sensitive: + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string() + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name() + mbedtls_md_info_from_string() + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string() + mbedtls_version_check_feature() + +Requirement changes + * The minimum MSVC version required is now 2010 (better C99 support). + * The NET layer now unconditionnaly relies on getaddrinfo() and select(). + * Compiler is required to support C99 types such as long long and uint32_t. + +API changes from the 1.4 preview branch + * ssl_set_bio_timeout() was removed, split into mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() with + new prototype, and mbedtls_ssl_set_read_timeout(). + * The following functions now return void: + mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport() + mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version() + mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version() + * DTLS no longer hard-depends on TIMING_C, but uses a callback interface + instead, see mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(), with the Timing module providing + an example implementation, see mbedtls_timing_delay_context and + mbedtls_timing_set/get_delay(). + * With UDP sockets, it is no longer necessary to call net_bind() again + after a successful net_accept(). + +Changes + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() are now + thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. + * Reduced ROM fooprint of SHA-256 and added an option to reduce it even + more (at the expense of performance) MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER. + += mbed TLS 1.3 branch + +Security + * With authmode set to SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL, verification of keyUsage and + extendedKeyUsage on the leaf certificate was lost (results not accessible + via ssl_get_verify_results()). + * Add countermeasure against "Lucky 13 strikes back" cache-based attack, + https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2714625 + +Features + * Improve ECC performance by using more efficient doubling formulas + (contributed by Peter Dettman). + * Add x509_crt_verify_info() to display certificate verification results. + * Add support for reading DH parameters with privateValueLength included + (contributed by Daniel Kahn Gillmor). + * Add support for bit strings in X.509 names (request by Fredrik Axelsson). + * Add support for id-at-uniqueIdentifier in X.509 names. + * Add support for overriding snprintf() (except on Windows) and exit() in + the platform layer. + * Add an option to use macros instead of function pointers in the platform + layer (helps get rid of unwanted references). + * Improved Makefiles for Windows targets by fixing library targets and making + cross-compilation easier (thanks to Alon Bar-Lev). + * The benchmark program also prints heap usage for public-key primitives + if POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C and POLARSSL_MEMORY_DEBUG are defined. + * New script ecc-heap.sh helps measuring the impact of ECC parameters on + speed and RAM (heap only for now) usage. + * New script memory.sh helps measuring the ROM and RAM requirements of two + reduced configurations (PSK-CCM and NSA suite B). + * Add config flag POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_WARNING (off by default) to produce + warnings on use of deprecated functions (with GCC and Clang only). + * Add config flag POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_REMOVED (off by default) to produce + errors on use of deprecated functions. + +Bugfix + * Fix compile errors with PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS. + * Fix compile error with PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT (thanks to Rafał Przywara). + * Fix bug in entropy.c when THREADING_C is also enabled that caused + entropy_free() to crash (thanks to Rafał Przywara). + * Fix memory leak when gcm_setkey() and ccm_setkey() are used more than + once on the same context. + * Fix bug in ssl_mail_client when password is longer that username (found + by Bruno Pape). + * Fix undefined behaviour (memcmp( NULL, NULL, 0 );) in X.509 modules + (detected by Clang's 3.6 UBSan). + * mpi_size() and mpi_msb() would segfault when called on an mpi that is + initialized but not set (found by pravic). + * Fix detection of support for getrandom() on Linux (reported by syzzer) by + doing it at runtime (using uname) rather that compile time. + * Fix handling of symlinks by "make install" (found by Gaël PORTAY). + * Fix potential NULL pointer dereference (not trigerrable remotely) when + ssl_write() is called before the handshake is finished (introduced in + 1.3.10) (first reported by Martin Blumenstingl). + * Fix bug in pk_parse_key() that caused some valid private EC keys to be + rejected. + * Fix bug in Via Padlock support (found by Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos). + * Fix thread safety bug in RSA operations (found by Fredrik Axelsson). + * Fix hardclock() (only used in the benchmarking program) with some + versions of mingw64 (found by kxjhlele). + * Fix warnings from mingw64 in timing.c (found by kxjklele). + * Fix potential unintended sign extension in asn1_get_len() on 64-bit + platforms. + * Fix potential memory leak in ssl_set_psk() (found by Mansour Moufid). + * Fix compile error when POLARSSL_SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTATION and + POLARSSL_SSL_SSESSION_TICKETS where both enabled in config.h (introduced + in 1.3.10). + * Add missing extern "C" guard in aesni.h (reported by amir zamani). + * Add missing dependency on SHA-256 in some x509 programs (reported by + Gergely Budai). + * Fix bug related to ssl_set_curves(): the client didn't check that the + curve picked by the server was actually allowed. + +Changes + * Remove bias in mpi_gen_prime (contributed by Pascal Junod). + * Remove potential sources of timing variations (some contributed by Pascal + Junod). + * Options POLARSSL_HAVE_INT8 and POLARSSL_HAVE_INT16 are deprecated. + * Enabling POLARSSL_NET_C without POLARSSL_HAVE_IPV6 is deprecated. + * compat-1.2.h and openssl.h are deprecated. + * Adjusting/overriding CFLAGS and LDFLAGS with the make build system is now + more flexible (warning: OFLAGS is not used any more) (see the README) + (contributed by Alon Bar-Lev). + * ssl_set_own_cert() no longer calls pk_check_pair() since the + performance impact was bad for some users (this was introduced in 1.3.10). + * Move from SHA-1 to SHA-256 in example programs using signatures + (suggested by Thorsten Mühlfelder). + * Remove some unneeded inclusions of header files from the standard library + "minimize" others (eg use stddef.h if only size_t is needed). + * Change #include lines in test files to use double quotes instead of angle + brackets for uniformity with the rest of the code. + * Remove dependency on sscanf() in X.509 parsing modules. + += mbed TLS 1.3.10 released 2015-02-09 +Security + * NULL pointer dereference in the buffer-based allocator when the buffer is + full and polarssl_free() is called (found by Mark Hasemeyer) + (only possible if POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C is enabled, which it is + not by default). + * Fix remotely-triggerable uninitialised pointer dereference caused by + crafted X.509 certificate (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a + client certificate) (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Fix remotely-triggerable memory leak caused by crafted X.509 certificates + (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) + (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Fix potential stack overflow while parsing crafted X.509 certificates + (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) + (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Fix timing difference that could theoretically lead to a + Bleichenbacher-style attack in the RSA and RSA-PSK key exchanges + (reported by Sebastian Schinzel). + +Features + * Add support for FALLBACK_SCSV (draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv). + * Add support for Extended Master Secret (draft-ietf-tls-session-hash). + * Add support for Encrypt-then-MAC (RFC 7366). + * Add function pk_check_pair() to test if public and private keys match. + * Add x509_crl_parse_der(). + * Add compile-time option POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA to limit the + length of an X.509 verification chain. + * Support for renegotiation can now be disabled at compile-time + * Support for 1/n-1 record splitting, a countermeasure against BEAST. + * Certificate selection based on signature hash, preferring SHA-1 over SHA-2 + for pre-1.2 clients when multiple certificates are available. + * Add support for getrandom() syscall on recent Linux kernels with Glibc or + a compatible enough libc (eg uClibc). + * Add ssl_set_arc4_support() to make it easier to disable RC4 at runtime + while using the default ciphersuite list. + * Added new error codes and debug messages about selection of + ciphersuite/certificate. + +Bugfix + * Stack buffer overflow if ctr_drbg_update() is called with too large + add_len (found by Jean-Philippe Aumasson) (not triggerable remotely). + * Possible buffer overflow of length at most POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE + if memory_buffer_alloc_init() was called with buf not aligned and len not + a multiple of POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE (not triggerable remotely). + * User set CFLAGS were ignored by Cmake with gcc (introduced in 1.3.9, found + by Julian Ospald). + * Fix potential undefined behaviour in Camellia. + * Fix potential failure in ECDSA signatures when POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BITS is a + multiple of 8 (found by Gergely Budai). + * Fix unchecked return code in x509_crt_parse_path() on Windows (found by + Peter Vaskovic). + * Fix assembly selection for MIPS64 (thanks to James Cowgill). + * ssl_get_verify_result() now works even if the handshake was aborted due + to a failed verification (found by Fredrik Axelsson). + * Skip writing and parsing signature_algorithm extension if none of the + key exchanges enabled needs certificates. This fixes a possible interop + issue with some servers when a zero-length extension was sent. (Reported + by Peter Dettman.) + * On a 0-length input, base64_encode() did not correctly set output length + (found by Hendrik van den Boogaard). + +Changes + * Use deterministic nonces for AEAD ciphers in TLS by default (possible to + switch back to random with POLARSSL_SSL_AEAD_RANDOM_IV in config.h). + * Blind RSA private operations even when POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT is defined. + * ssl_set_own_cert() now returns an error on key-certificate mismatch. + * Forbid repeated extensions in X.509 certificates. + * debug_print_buf() now prints a text view in addition to hexadecimal. + * A specific error is now returned when there are ciphersuites in common + but none of them is usable due to external factors such as no certificate + with a suitable (extended)KeyUsage or curve or no PSK set. + * It is now possible to disable negotiation of truncated HMAC server-side + at runtime with ssl_set_truncated_hmac(). + * Example programs for SSL client and server now disable SSLv3 by default. + * Example programs for SSL client and server now disable RC4 by default. + * Use platform.h in all test suites and programs. + += PolarSSL 1.3.9 released 2014-10-20 +Security + * Lowest common hash was selected from signature_algorithms extension in + TLS 1.2 (found by Darren Bane) (introduced in 1.3.8). + * Remotely-triggerable memory leak when parsing some X.509 certificates + (server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) + (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Remotely-triggerable memory leak when parsing crafted ClientHello + (not affected if ECC support was compiled out) (found using Codenomicon + Defensics). + +Bugfix + * Support escaping of commas in x509_string_to_names() + * Fix compile error in ssl_pthread_server (found by Julian Ospald). + * Fix net_accept() regarding non-blocking sockets (found by Luca Pesce). + * Don't print uninitialised buffer in ssl_mail_client (found by Marc Abel). + * Fix warnings from Clang's scan-build (contributed by Alfred Klomp). + * Fix compile error in timing.c when POLARSSL_NET_C and POLARSSL_SELFTEST + are defined but not POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME (found by Stephane Di Vito). + * Remove non-existent file from VS projects (found by Peter Vaskovic). + * ssl_read() could return non-application data records on server while + renegotation was pending, and on client when a HelloRequest was received. + * Server-initiated renegotiation would fail with non-blocking I/O if the + write callback returned WANT_WRITE when requesting renegotiation. + * ssl_close_notify() could send more than one message in some circumstances + with non-blocking I/O. + * Fix compiler warnings on iOS (found by Sander Niemeijer). + * x509_crt_parse() did not increase total_failed on PEM error + * Fix compile error with armcc in mpi_is_prime() + * Fix potential bad read in parsing ServerHello (found by Adrien + Vialletelle). + +Changes + * Ciphersuites using SHA-256 or SHA-384 now require TLS 1.x (there is no + standard defining how to use SHA-2 with SSL 3.0). + * Ciphersuites using RSA-PSK key exchange new require TLS 1.x (the spec is + ambiguous on how to encode some packets with SSL 3.0). + * Made buffer size in pk_write_(pub)key_pem() more dynamic, eg smaller if + RSA is disabled, larger if POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE is larger. + * ssl_read() now returns POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ rather than + POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE on harmless alerts. + * POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE now defaults to 1024 in order to allow 8192 bits + RSA keys. + * Accept spaces at end of line or end of buffer in base64_decode(). + * X.509 certificates with more than one AttributeTypeAndValue per + RelativeDistinguishedName are not accepted any more. + += PolarSSL 1.3.8 released 2014-07-11 +Security + * Fix length checking for AEAD ciphersuites (found by Codenomicon). + It was possible to crash the server (and client) using crafted messages + when a GCM suite was chosen. + +Features + * Add CCM module and cipher mode to Cipher Layer + * Support for CCM and CCM_8 ciphersuites + * Support for parsing and verifying RSASSA-PSS signatures in the X.509 + modules (certificates, CRLs and CSRs). + * Blowfish in the cipher layer now supports variable length keys. + * Add example config.h for PSK with CCM, optimized for low RAM usage. + * Optimize for RAM usage in example config.h for NSA Suite B profile. + * Add POLARSSL_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES to allow removing RC4 ciphersuites + from the default list (inactive by default). + * Add server-side enforcement of sent renegotiation requests + (ssl_set_renegotiation_enforced()) + * Add SSL_CIPHERSUITES config.h flag to allow specifying a list of + ciphersuites to use and save some memory if the list is small. + +Changes + * Add LINK_WITH_PTHREAD option in CMake for explicit linking that is + required on some platforms (e.g. OpenBSD) + * Migrate zeroizing of data to polarssl_zeroize() instead of memset() + against unwanted compiler optimizations + * md_list() now returns hashes strongest first + * Selection of hash for signing ServerKeyExchange in TLS 1.2 now picks + strongest offered by client. + * All public contexts have _init() and _free() functions now for simpler + usage pattern + +Bugfix + * Fix in debug_print_msg() + * Enforce alignment in the buffer allocator even if buffer is not aligned + * Remove less-than-zero checks on unsigned numbers + * Stricter check on SSL ClientHello internal sizes compared to actual packet + size (found by TrustInSoft) + * Fix WSAStartup() return value check (found by Peter Vaskovic) + * Other minor issues (found by Peter Vaskovic) + * Fix symlink command for cross compiling with CMake (found by Andre + Heinecke) + * Fix DER output of gen_key app (found by Gergely Budai) + * Very small records were incorrectly rejected when truncated HMAC was in + use with some ciphersuites and versions (RC4 in all versions, CBC with + versions < TLS 1.1). + * Very large records using more than 224 bytes of padding were incorrectly + rejected with CBC-based ciphersuites and TLS >= 1.1 + * Very large records using less padding could cause a buffer overread of up + to 32 bytes with CBC-based ciphersuites and TLS >= 1.1 + * Restore ability to use a v1 cert as a CA if trusted locally. (This had + been removed in 1.3.6.) + * Restore ability to locally trust a self-signed cert that is not a proper + CA for use as an end entity certificate. (This had been removed in + 1.3.6.) + * Fix preprocessor checks for bn_mul PPC asm (found by Barry K. Nathan). + * Use \n\t rather than semicolons for bn_mul asm, since some assemblers + interpret semicolons as comment delimiters (found by Barry K. Nathan). + * Fix off-by-one error in parsing Supported Point Format extension that + caused some handshakes to fail. + * Fix possible miscomputation of the premaster secret with DHE-PSK key + exchange that caused some handshakes to fail with other implementations. + (Failure rate <= 1/255 with common DHM moduli.) + * Disable broken Sparc64 bn_mul assembly (found by Florian Obser). + * Fix base64_decode() to return and check length correctly (in case of + tight buffers) + * Fix mpi_write_string() to write "00" as hex output for empty MPI (found + by Hui Dong) + += PolarSSL 1.3.7 released on 2014-05-02 +Features + * debug_set_log_mode() added to determine raw or full logging + * debug_set_threshold() added to ignore messages over threshold level + * version_check_feature() added to check for compile-time options at + run-time + +Changes + * POLARSSL_CONFIG_OPTIONS has been removed. All values are individually + checked and filled in the relevant module headers + * Debug module only outputs full lines instead of parts + * Better support for the different Attribute Types from IETF PKIX (RFC 5280) + * AES-NI now compiles with "old" assemblers too + * Ciphersuites based on RC4 now have the lowest priority by default + +Bugfix + * Only iterate over actual certificates in ssl_write_certificate_request() + (found by Matthew Page) + * Typos in platform.c and pkcs11.c (found by Daniel Phillips and Steffan + Karger) + * cert_write app should use subject of issuer certificate as issuer of cert + * Fix false reject in padding check in ssl_decrypt_buf() for CBC + ciphersuites, for full SSL frames of data. + * Improve interoperability by not writing extension length in ClientHello / + ServerHello when no extensions are present (found by Matthew Page) + * rsa_check_pubkey() now allows an E up to N + * On OpenBSD, use arc4random_buf() instead of rand() to prevent warnings + * mpi_fill_random() was creating numbers larger than requested on + big-endian platform when size was not an integer number of limbs + * Fix dependencies issues in X.509 test suite. + * Some parts of ssl_tls.c were compiled even when the module was disabled. + * Fix detection of DragonflyBSD in net.c (found by Markus Pfeiffer) + * Fix detection of Clang on some Apple platforms with CMake + (found by Barry K. Nathan) + += PolarSSL 1.3.6 released on 2014-04-11 + +Features + * Support for the ALPN SSL extension + * Add option 'use_dev_random' to gen_key application + * Enable verification of the keyUsage extension for CA and leaf + certificates (POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + * Enable verification of the extendedKeyUsage extension + (POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) + +Changes + * x509_crt_info() now prints information about parsed extensions as well + * pk_verify() now returns a specific error code when the signature is valid + but shorter than the supplied length. + * Use UTC time to check certificate validity. + * Reject certificates with times not in UTC, per RFC 5280. + +Security + * Avoid potential timing leak in ecdsa_sign() by blinding modular division. + (Found by Watson Ladd.) + * The notAfter date of some certificates was no longer checked since 1.3.5. + This affects certificates in the user-supplied chain except the top + certificate. If the user-supplied chain contains only one certificates, + it is not affected (ie, its notAfter date is properly checked). + * Prevent potential NULL pointer dereference in ssl_read_record() (found by + TrustInSoft) + +Bugfix + * The length of various ClientKeyExchange messages was not properly checked. + * Some example server programs were not sending the close_notify alert. + * Potential memory leak in mpi_exp_mod() when error occurs during + calculation of RR. + * Fixed malloc/free default #define in platform.c (found by Gergely Budai). + * Fixed type which made POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 uneffective (found by + Gergely Budai). + * Fix #include path in ecdsa.h which wasn't accepted by some compilers. + (found by Gergely Budai) + * Fix compile errors when POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_BC is undefined (found by + Shuo Chen). + * oid_get_numeric_string() used to truncate the output without returning an + error if the output buffer was just 1 byte too small. + * dhm_parse_dhm() (hence dhm_parse_dhmfile()) did not set dhm->len. + * Calling pk_debug() on an RSA-alt key would segfault. + * pk_get_size() and pk_get_len() were off by a factor 8 for RSA-alt keys. + * Potential buffer overwrite in pem_write_buffer() because of low length + indication (found by Thijs Alkemade) + * EC curves constants, which should be only in ROM since 1.3.3, were also + stored in RAM due to missing 'const's (found by Gergely Budai). + += PolarSSL 1.3.5 released on 2014-03-26 +Features + * HMAC-DRBG as a separate module + * Option to set the Curve preference order (disabled by default) + * Single Platform compatilibity layer (for memory / printf / fprintf) + * Ability to provide alternate timing implementation + * Ability to force the entropy module to use SHA-256 as its basis + (POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) + * Testing script ssl-opt.sh added for testing 'live' ssl option + interoperability against OpenSSL and PolarSSL + * Support for reading EC keys that use SpecifiedECDomain in some cases. + * Entropy module now supports seed writing and reading + +Changes + * Deprecated the Memory layer + * entropy_add_source(), entropy_update_manual() and entropy_gather() + now thread-safe if POLARSSL_THREADING_C defined + * Improvements to the CMake build system, contributed by Julian Ospald. + * Work around a bug of the version of Clang shipped by Apple with Mavericks + that prevented bignum.c from compiling. (Reported by Rafael Baptista.) + * Revamped the compat.sh interoperatibility script to include support for + testing against GnuTLS + * Deprecated ssl_set_own_cert_rsa() and ssl_set_own_cert_rsa_alt() + * Improvements to tests/Makefile, contributed by Oden Eriksson. + +Security + * Forbid change of server certificate during renegotiation to prevent + "triple handshake" attack when authentication mode is 'optional' (the + attack was already impossible when authentication is required). + * Check notBefore timestamp of certificates and CRLs from the future. + * Forbid sequence number wrapping + * Fixed possible buffer overflow with overlong PSK + * Possible remotely-triggered out-of-bounds memory access fixed (found by + TrustInSoft) + +Bugfix + * ecp_gen_keypair() does more tries to prevent failure because of + statistics + * Fixed bug in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 "reversed" operations + * Fixed testing with out-of-source builds using cmake + * Fixed version-major intolerance in server + * Fixed CMake symlinking on out-of-source builds + * Fixed dependency issues in test suite + * Programs rsa_sign_pss and rsa_verify_pss were not using PSS since 1.3.0 + * Bignum's MIPS-32 assembly was used on MIPS-64, causing chaos. (Found by + Alex Wilson.) + * ssl_cache was creating entries when max_entries=0 if TIMING_C was enabled. + * m_sleep() was sleeping twice too long on most Unix platforms. + * Fixed bug with session tickets and non-blocking I/O in the unlikely case + send() would return an EAGAIN error when sending the ticket. + * ssl_cache was leaking memory when reusing a timed out entry containing a + client certificate. + * ssl_srv was leaking memory when client presented a timed out ticket + containing a client certificate + * ssl_init() was leaving a dirty pointer in ssl_context if malloc of + out_ctr failed + * ssl_handshake_init() was leaving dirty pointers in subcontexts if malloc + of one of them failed + * Fix typo in rsa_copy() that impacted PKCS#1 v2 contexts + * x509_get_current_time() uses localtime_r() to prevent thread issues + += PolarSSL 1.3.4 released on 2014-01-27 +Features + * Support for the Koblitz curves: secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1 + * Support for RIPEMD-160 + * Support for AES CFB8 mode + * Support for deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979) + +Bugfix + * Potential memory leak in bignum_selftest() + * Replaced expired test certificate + * ssl_mail_client now terminates lines with CRLF, instead of LF + * net module handles timeouts on blocking sockets better (found by Tilman + Sauerbeck) + * Assembly format fixes in bn_mul.h + +Security + * Missing MPI_CHK calls added around unguarded mpi calls (found by + TrustInSoft) + += PolarSSL 1.3.3 released on 2013-12-31 +Features + * EC key generation support in gen_key app + * Support for adhering to client ciphersuite order preference + (POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) + * Support for Curve25519 + * Support for ECDH-RSA and ECDH-ECDSA key exchanges and ciphersuites + * Support for IPv6 in the NET module + * AES-NI support for AES, AES-GCM and AES key scheduling + * SSL Pthread-based server example added (ssl_pthread_server) + +Changes + * gen_prime() speedup + * Speedup of ECP multiplication operation + * Relaxed some SHA2 ciphersuite's version requirements + * Dropped use of readdir_r() instead of readdir() with threading support + * More constant-time checks in the RSA module + * Split off curves from ecp.c into ecp_curves.c + * Curves are now stored fully in ROM + * Memory usage optimizations in ECP module + * Removed POLARSSL_THREADING_DUMMY + +Bugfix + * Fixed bug in mpi_set_bit() on platforms where t_uint is wider than int + * Fixed X.509 hostname comparison (with non-regular characters) + * SSL now gracefully handles missing RNG + * Missing defines / cases for RSA_PSK key exchange + * crypt_and_hash app checks MAC before final decryption + * Potential memory leak in ssl_ticket_keys_init() + * Memory leak in benchmark application + * Fixed x509_crt_parse_path() bug on Windows platforms + * Added missing MPI_CHK() around some statements in mpi_div_mpi() (found by + TrustInSoft) + * Fixed potential overflow in certificate size verification in + ssl_write_certificate() (found by TrustInSoft) + +Security + * Possible remotely-triggered out-of-bounds memory access fixed (found by + TrustInSoft) + += PolarSSL 1.3.2 released on 2013-11-04 +Features + * PK tests added to test framework + * Added optional optimization for NIST MODP curves (POLARSSL_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + * Support for Camellia-GCM mode and ciphersuites + +Changes + * Padding checks in cipher layer are now constant-time + * Value comparisons in SSL layer are now constant-time + * Support for serialNumber, postalAddress and postalCode in X509 names + * SSL Renegotiation was refactored + +Bugfix + * More stringent checks in cipher layer + * Server does not send out extensions not advertised by client + * Prevent possible alignment warnings on casting from char * to 'aligned *' + * Misc fixes and additions to dependency checks + * Const correctness + * cert_write with selfsign should use issuer_name as subject_name + * Fix ECDSA corner case: missing reduction mod N (found by DualTachyon) + * Defines to handle UEFI environment under MSVC + * Server-side initiated renegotiations send HelloRequest + += PolarSSL 1.3.1 released on 2013-10-15 +Features + * Support for Brainpool curves and TLS ciphersuites (RFC 7027) + * Support for ECDHE-PSK key-exchange and ciphersuites + * Support for RSA-PSK key-exchange and ciphersuites + +Changes + * RSA blinding locks for a smaller amount of time + * TLS compression only allocates working buffer once + * Introduced POLARSSL_HAVE_READDIR_R for systems without it + * config.h is more script-friendly + +Bugfix + * Missing MSVC defines added + * Compile errors with POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT + * Header files with 'polarssl/' + * Const correctness + * Possible naming collision in dhm_context + * Better support for MSVC + * threading_set_alt() name + * Added missing x509write_crt_set_version() + += PolarSSL 1.3.0 released on 2013-10-01 +Features + * Elliptic Curve Cryptography module added + * Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman module added + * Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman support for SSL/TLS + (ECDHE-based ciphersuites) + * Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm support for SSL/TLS + (ECDSA-based ciphersuites) + * Ability to specify allowed ciphersuites based on the protocol version. + * PSK and DHE-PSK based ciphersuites added + * Memory allocation abstraction layer added + * Buffer-based memory allocator added (no malloc() / free() / HEAP usage) + * Threading abstraction layer added (dummy / pthread / alternate) + * Public Key abstraction layer added + * Parsing Elliptic Curve keys + * Parsing Elliptic Curve certificates + * Support for max_fragment_length extension (RFC 6066) + * Support for truncated_hmac extension (RFC 6066) + * Support for zeros-and-length (ANSI X.923) padding, one-and-zeros + (ISO/IEC 7816-4) padding and zero padding in the cipher layer + * Support for session tickets (RFC 5077) + * Certificate Request (CSR) generation with extensions (key_usage, + ns_cert_type) + * X509 Certificate writing with extensions (basic_constraints, + issuer_key_identifier, etc) + * Optional blinding for RSA, DHM and EC + * Support for multiple active certificate / key pairs in SSL servers for + the same host (Not to be confused with SNI!) + +Changes + * Ability to enable / disable SSL v3 / TLS 1.0 / TLS 1.1 / TLS 1.2 + individually + * Introduced separate SSL Ciphersuites module that is based on + Cipher and MD information + * Internals for SSL module adapted to have separate IV pointer that is + dynamically set (Better support for hardware acceleration) + * Moved all OID functionality to a separate module. RSA function + prototypes for the RSA sign and verify functions changed as a result + * Split up the GCM module into a starts/update/finish cycle + * Client and server now filter sent and accepted ciphersuites on minimum + and maximum protocol version + * Ability to disable server_name extension (RFC 6066) + * Renamed error_strerror() to the less conflicting polarssl_strerror() + (Ability to keep old as well with POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_BC) + * SHA2 renamed to SHA256, SHA4 renamed to SHA512 and functions accordingly + * All RSA operations require a random generator for blinding purposes + * X509 core refactored + * x509_crt_verify() now case insensitive for cn (RFC 6125 6.4) + * Also compiles / runs without time-based functions (!POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME) + * Support faulty X509 v1 certificates with extensions + (POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) + +Bugfix + * Fixed parse error in ssl_parse_certificate_request() + * zlib compression/decompression skipped on empty blocks + * Support for AIX header locations in net.c module + * Fixed file descriptor leaks + +Security + * RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks + (found by Cyril Arnaud and Pierre-Alain Fouque) + + += Version 1.2.14 released 2015-05-?? + +Security + * Fix potential invalid memory read in the server, that allows a client to + crash it remotely (found by Caj Larsson). + * Fix potential invalid memory read in certificate parsing, that allows a + client to crash the server remotely if client authentication is enabled + (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Add countermeasure against "Lucky 13 strikes back" cache-based attack, + https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2714625 + +Bugfix + * Fix bug in Via Padlock support (found by Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos). + * Fix hardclock() (only used in the benchmarking program) with some + versions of mingw64 (found by kxjhlele). + * Fix warnings from mingw64 in timing.c (found by kxjklele). + * Fix potential unintended sign extension in asn1_get_len() on 64-bit + platforms (found with Coverity Scan). + += Version 1.2.13 released 2015-02-16 +Note: Although PolarSSL has been renamed to mbed TLS, no changes reflecting + this will be made in the 1.2 branch at this point. + +Security + * Fix remotely-triggerable uninitialised pointer dereference caused by + crafted X.509 certificate (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask + for a client certificate) (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Fix remotely-triggerable memory leak caused by crafted X.509 certificates + (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) + (found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Fix potential stack overflow while parsing crafted X.509 certificates + (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate) + found using Codenomicon Defensics). + * Fix buffer overread of size 1 when parsing crafted X.509 certificates + (TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate). + +Bugfix + * Fix potential undefined behaviour in Camellia. + * Fix memory leaks in PKCS#5 and PKCS#12. + * Stack buffer overflow if ctr_drbg_update() is called with too large + add_len (found by Jean-Philippe Aumasson) (not triggerable remotely). + * Fix bug in MPI/bignum on s390/s390x (reported by Dan Horák) (introduced + in 1.2.12). + * Fix unchecked return code in x509_crt_parse_path() on Windows (found by + Peter Vaskovic). + * Fix assembly selection for MIPS64 (thanks to James Cowgill). + * ssl_get_verify_result() now works even if the handshake was aborted due + to a failed verification (found by Fredrik Axelsson). + * Skip writing and parsing signature_algorithm extension if none of the + key exchanges enabled needs certificates. This fixes a possible interop + issue with some servers when a zero-length extension was sent. (Reported + by Peter Dettman.) + * On a 0-length input, base64_encode() did not correctly set output length + (found by Hendrik van den Boogaard). + +Changes + * Blind RSA private operations even when POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT is defined. + * Forbid repeated extensions in X.509 certificates. + * Add compile-time option POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA to limit the + length of an X.509 verification chain (default = 8). += Version 1.2.12 released 2014-10-24 + +Security + * Remotely-triggerable memory leak when parsing some X.509 certificates + (server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate). + (Found using Codenomicon Defensics.) + +Bugfix + * Fix potential bad read in parsing ServerHello (found by Adrien + Vialletelle). + * ssl_close_notify() could send more than one message in some circumstances + with non-blocking I/O. + * x509_crt_parse() did not increase total_failed on PEM error + * Fix compiler warnings on iOS (found by Sander Niemeijer). + * Don't print uninitialised buffer in ssl_mail_client (found by Marc Abel). + * Fix net_accept() regarding non-blocking sockets (found by Luca Pesce). + * ssl_read() could return non-application data records on server while + renegotation was pending, and on client when a HelloRequest was received. + * Fix warnings from Clang's scan-build (contributed by Alfred Klomp). + +Changes + * X.509 certificates with more than one AttributeTypeAndValue per + RelativeDistinguishedName are not accepted any more. + * ssl_read() now returns POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ rather than + POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE on harmless alerts. + * Accept spaces at end of line or end of buffer in base64_decode(). + += Version 1.2.11 released 2014-07-11 +Features + * Entropy module now supports seed writing and reading + +Changes + * Introduced POLARSSL_HAVE_READDIR_R for systems without it + * Improvements to the CMake build system, contributed by Julian Ospald. + * Work around a bug of the version of Clang shipped by Apple with Mavericks + that prevented bignum.c from compiling. (Reported by Rafael Baptista.) + * Improvements to tests/Makefile, contributed by Oden Eriksson. + * Use UTC time to check certificate validity. + * Reject certificates with times not in UTC, per RFC 5280. + * Migrate zeroizing of data to polarssl_zeroize() instead of memset() + against unwanted compiler optimizations + +Security + * Forbid change of server certificate during renegotiation to prevent + "triple handshake" attack when authentication mode is optional (the + attack was already impossible when authentication is required). + * Check notBefore timestamp of certificates and CRLs from the future. + * Forbid sequence number wrapping + * Prevent potential NULL pointer dereference in ssl_read_record() (found by + TrustInSoft) + * Fix length checking for AEAD ciphersuites (found by Codenomicon). + It was possible to crash the server (and client) using crafted messages + when a GCM suite was chosen. + +Bugfix + * Fixed X.509 hostname comparison (with non-regular characters) + * SSL now gracefully handles missing RNG + * crypt_and_hash app checks MAC before final decryption + * Fixed x509_crt_parse_path() bug on Windows platforms + * Added missing MPI_CHK() around some statements in mpi_div_mpi() (found by + TrustInSoft) + * Fixed potential overflow in certificate size verification in + ssl_write_certificate() (found by TrustInSoft) + * Fix ASM format in bn_mul.h + * Potential memory leak in bignum_selftest() + * Replaced expired test certificate + * ssl_mail_client now terminates lines with CRLF, instead of LF + * Fix bug in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 "reversed" operations + * Fixed testing with out-of-source builds using cmake + * Fixed version-major intolerance in server + * Fixed CMake symlinking on out-of-source builds + * Bignum's MIPS-32 assembly was used on MIPS-64, causing chaos. (Found by + Alex Wilson.) + * ssl_init() was leaving a dirty pointer in ssl_context if malloc of + out_ctr failed + * ssl_handshake_init() was leaving dirty pointers in subcontexts if malloc + of one of them failed + * x509_get_current_time() uses localtime_r() to prevent thread issues + * Some example server programs were not sending the close_notify alert. + * Potential memory leak in mpi_exp_mod() when error occurs during + calculation of RR. + * Improve interoperability by not writing extension length in ClientHello + when no extensions are present (found by Matthew Page) + * rsa_check_pubkey() now allows an E up to N + * On OpenBSD, use arc4random_buf() instead of rand() to prevent warnings + * mpi_fill_random() was creating numbers larger than requested on + big-endian platform when size was not an integer number of limbs + * Fix detection of DragonflyBSD in net.c (found by Markus Pfeiffer) + * Stricter check on SSL ClientHello internal sizes compared to actual packet + size (found by TrustInSoft) + * Fix preprocessor checks for bn_mul PPC asm (found by Barry K. Nathan). + * Use \n\t rather than semicolons for bn_mul asm, since some assemblers + interpret semicolons as comment delimiters (found by Barry K. Nathan). + * Disable broken Sparc64 bn_mul assembly (found by Florian Obser). + * Fix base64_decode() to return and check length correctly (in case of + tight buffers) + += Version 1.2.10 released 2013-10-07 +Changes + * Changed RSA blinding to a slower but thread-safe version + +Bugfix + * Fixed memory leak in RSA as a result of introduction of blinding + * Fixed ssl_pkcs11_decrypt() prototype + * Fixed MSVC project files + += Version 1.2.9 released 2013-10-01 +Changes + * x509_verify() now case insensitive for cn (RFC 6125 6.4) + +Bugfix + * Fixed potential memory leak when failing to resume a session + * Fixed potential file descriptor leaks (found by Remi Gacogne) + * Minor fixes + +Security + * Fixed potential heap buffer overflow on large hostname setting + * Fixed potential negative value misinterpretation in load_file() + * RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks + (found by Cyril Arnaud and Pierre-Alain Fouque) + += Version 1.2.8 released 2013-06-19 +Features + * Parsing of PKCS#8 encrypted private key files + * PKCS#12 PBE and derivation functions + * Centralized module option values in config.h to allow user-defined + settings without editing header files by using POLARSSL_CONFIG_OPTIONS + +Changes + * HAVEGE random generator disabled by default + * Internally split up x509parse_key() into a (PEM) handler function + and specific DER parser functions for the PKCS#1 and unencrypted + PKCS#8 private key formats + * Added mechanism to provide alternative implementations for all + symmetric cipher and hash algorithms (e.g. POLARSSL_AES_ALT in + config.h) + * PKCS#5 module added. Moved PBKDF2 functionality inside and deprecated + old PBKDF2 module + +Bugfix + * Secure renegotiation extension should only be sent in case client + supports secure renegotiation + * Fixed offset for cert_type list in ssl_parse_certificate_request() + * Fixed const correctness issues that have no impact on the ABI + * x509parse_crt() now better handles PEM error situations + * ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly + instead of the x509parse_crt() wrapper that can also parse PEM + certificates + * x509parse_crtpath() is now reentrant and uses more portable stat() + * Fixed bignum.c and bn_mul.h to support Thumb2 and LLVM compiler + * Fixed values for 2-key Triple DES in cipher layer + * ssl_write_certificate_request() can handle empty ca_chain + +Security + * A possible DoS during the SSL Handshake, due to faulty parsing of + PEM-encoded certificates has been fixed (found by Jack Lloyd) + += Version 1.2.7 released 2013-04-13 +Features + * Ability to specify allowed ciphersuites based on the protocol version. + +Changes + * Default Blowfish keysize is now 128-bits + * Test suites made smaller to accommodate Raspberry Pi + +Bugfix + * Fix for MPI assembly for ARM + * GCM adapted to support sizes > 2^29 + += Version 1.2.6 released 2013-03-11 +Bugfix + * Fixed memory leak in ssl_free() and ssl_reset() for active session + * Corrected GCM counter incrementation to use only 32-bits instead of + 128-bits (found by Yawning Angel) + * Fixes for 64-bit compilation with MS Visual Studio + * Fixed net_bind() for specified IP addresses on little endian systems + * Fixed assembly code for ARM (Thumb and regular) for some compilers + +Changes + * Internally split up rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(), rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(), + rsa_pkcs1_sign() and rsa_pkcs1_verify() to separate PKCS#1 v1.5 and + PKCS#1 v2.1 functions + * Added support for custom labels when using rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt() + or rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt() + * Re-added handling for SSLv2 Client Hello when the define + POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is set + * The SSL session cache module (ssl_cache) now also retains peer_cert + information (not the entire chain) + +Security + * Removed further timing differences during SSL message decryption in + ssl_decrypt_buf() + * Removed timing differences due to bad padding from + rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt() and rsa_pkcs1_decrypt() for PKCS#1 v1.5 + operations + += Version 1.2.5 released 2013-02-02 +Changes + * Allow enabling of dummy error_strerror() to support some use-cases + * Debug messages about padding errors during SSL message decryption are + disabled by default and can be enabled with POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + * Sending of security-relevant alert messages that do not break + interoperability can be switched on/off with the flag + POLARSSL_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES + +Security + * Removed timing differences during SSL message decryption in + ssl_decrypt_buf() due to badly formatted padding + += Version 1.2.4 released 2013-01-25 +Changes + * More advanced SSL ciphersuite representation and moved to more dynamic + SSL core + * Added ssl_handshake_step() to allow single stepping the handshake process + +Bugfix + * Memory leak when using RSA_PKCS_V21 operations fixed + * Handle future version properly in ssl_write_certificate_request() + * Correctly handle CertificateRequest message in client for <= TLS 1.1 + without DN list + += Version 1.2.3 released 2012-11-26 +Bugfix + * Server not always sending correct CertificateRequest message + += Version 1.2.2 released 2012-11-24 +Changes + * Added p_hw_data to ssl_context for context specific hardware acceleration + data + * During verify trust-CA is only checked for expiration and CRL presence + +Bugfixes + * Fixed client authentication compatibility + * Fixed dependency on POLARSSL_SHA4_C in SSL modules + += Version 1.2.1 released 2012-11-20 +Changes + * Depth that the certificate verify callback receives is now numbered + bottom-up (Peer cert depth is 0) + +Bugfixes + * Fixes for MSVC6 + * Moved mpi_inv_mod() outside POLARSSL_GENPRIME + * Allow R and A to point to same mpi in mpi_div_mpi (found by Manuel + Pégourié-Gonnard) + * Fixed possible segfault in mpi_shift_r() (found by Manuel + Pégourié-Gonnard) + * Added max length check for rsa_pkcs1_sign with PKCS#1 v2.1 + += Version 1.2.0 released 2012-10-31 +Features + * Added support for NULL cipher (POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) and weak + ciphersuites (POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES). They are disabled by + default! + * Added support for wildcard certificates + * Added support for multi-domain certificates through the X509 Subject + Alternative Name extension + * Added preliminary ASN.1 buffer writing support + * Added preliminary X509 Certificate Request writing support + * Added key_app_writer example application + * Added cert_req example application + * Added base Galois Counter Mode (GCM) for AES + * Added TLS 1.2 support (RFC 5246) + * Added GCM suites to TLS 1.2 (RFC 5288) + * Added commandline error code convertor (util/strerror) + * Added support for Hardware Acceleration hooking in SSL/TLS + * Added OpenSSL / PolarSSL compatibility script (tests/compat.sh) and + example application (programs/ssl/o_p_test) (requires OpenSSL) + * Added X509 CA Path support + * Added Thumb assembly optimizations + * Added DEFLATE compression support as per RFC3749 (requires zlib) + * Added blowfish algorithm (Generic and cipher layer) + * Added PKCS#5 PBKDF2 key derivation function + * Added Secure Renegotiation (RFC 5746) + * Added predefined DHM groups from RFC 5114 + * Added simple SSL session cache implementation + * Added ServerName extension parsing (SNI) at server side + * Added option to add minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version + +Changes + * Removed redundant POLARSSL_DEBUG_MSG define + * AES code only check for Padlock once + * Fixed const-correctness mpi_get_bit() + * Documentation for mpi_lsb() and mpi_msb() + * Moved out_msg to out_hdr + 32 to support hardware acceleration + * Changed certificate verify behaviour to comply with RFC 6125 section 6.3 + to not match CN if subjectAltName extension is present (Closes ticket #56) + * Cipher layer cipher_mode_t POLARSSL_MODE_CFB128 is renamed to + POLARSSL_MODE_CFB, to also handle different block size CFB modes. + * Removed handling for SSLv2 Client Hello (as per RFC 5246 recommendation) + * Revamped session resumption handling + * Generalized external private key implementation handling (like PKCS#11) + in SSL/TLS + * Revamped x509_verify() and the SSL f_vrfy callback implementations + * Moved from unsigned long to fixed width uint32_t types throughout code + * Renamed ciphersuites naming scheme to IANA reserved names + +Bugfix + * Fixed handling error in mpi_cmp_mpi() on longer B values (found by + Hui Dong) + * Fixed potential heap corruption in x509_name allocation + * Fixed single RSA test that failed on Big Endian systems (Closes ticket #54) + * mpi_exp_mod() now correctly handles negative base numbers (Closes ticket + #52) + * Handle encryption with private key and decryption with public key as per + RFC 2313 + * Handle empty certificate subject names + * Prevent reading over buffer boundaries on X509 certificate parsing + * mpi_add_abs() now correctly handles adding short numbers to long numbers + with carry rollover (found by Ruslan Yushchenko) + * Handle existence of OpenSSL Trust Extensions at end of X.509 DER blob + * Fixed MPI assembly for SPARC64 platform + +Security + * Fixed potential memory zeroization on miscrafted RSA key (found by Eloi + Vanderbeken) + += Version 1.1.8 released on 2013-10-01 +Bugfix + * Fixed potential memory leak when failing to resume a session + * Fixed potential file descriptor leaks + +Security + * Potential buffer-overflow for ssl_read_record() (independently found by + both TrustInSoft and Paul Brodeur of Leviathan Security Group) + * Potential negative value misinterpretation in load_file() + * Potential heap buffer overflow on large hostname setting + += Version 1.1.7 released on 2013-06-19 +Changes + * HAVEGE random generator disabled by default + +Bugfix + * x509parse_crt() now better handles PEM error situations + * ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly + instead of the x509parse_crt() wrapper that can also parse PEM + certificates + * Fixed values for 2-key Triple DES in cipher layer + * ssl_write_certificate_request() can handle empty ca_chain + +Security + * A possible DoS during the SSL Handshake, due to faulty parsing of + PEM-encoded certificates has been fixed (found by Jack Lloyd) + += Version 1.1.6 released on 2013-03-11 +Bugfix + * Fixed net_bind() for specified IP addresses on little endian systems + +Changes + * Allow enabling of dummy error_strerror() to support some use-cases + * Debug messages about padding errors during SSL message decryption are + disabled by default and can be enabled with POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + +Security + * Removed timing differences during SSL message decryption in + ssl_decrypt_buf() + * Removed timing differences due to bad padding from + rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt() and rsa_pkcs1_decrypt() for PKCS#1 v1.5 + operations + += Version 1.1.5 released on 2013-01-16 +Bugfix + * Fixed MPI assembly for SPARC64 platform + * Handle existence of OpenSSL Trust Extensions at end of X.509 DER blob + * mpi_add_abs() now correctly handles adding short numbers to long numbers + with carry rollover + * Moved mpi_inv_mod() outside POLARSSL_GENPRIME + * Prevent reading over buffer boundaries on X509 certificate parsing + * mpi_exp_mod() now correctly handles negative base numbers (Closes ticket + #52) + * Fixed possible segfault in mpi_shift_r() (found by Manuel + Pégourié-Gonnard) + * Allow R and A to point to same mpi in mpi_div_mpi (found by Manuel + Pégourié-Gonnard) + * Added max length check for rsa_pkcs1_sign with PKCS#1 v2.1 + * Memory leak when using RSA_PKCS_V21 operations fixed + * Handle encryption with private key and decryption with public key as per + RFC 2313 + * Fixes for MSVC6 + +Security + * Fixed potential memory zeroization on miscrafted RSA key (found by Eloi + Vanderbeken) + += Version 1.1.4 released on 2012-05-31 +Bugfix + * Correctly handle empty SSL/TLS packets (Found by James Yonan) + * Fixed potential heap corruption in x509_name allocation + * Fixed single RSA test that failed on Big Endian systems (Closes ticket #54) + += Version 1.1.3 released on 2012-04-29 +Bugfix + * Fixed random MPI generation to not generate more size than requested. + += Version 1.1.2 released on 2012-04-26 +Bugfix + * Fixed handling error in mpi_cmp_mpi() on longer B values (found by + Hui Dong) + +Security + * Fixed potential memory corruption on miscrafted client messages (found by + Frama-C team at CEA LIST) + * Fixed generation of DHM parameters to correct length (found by Ruslan + Yushchenko) + += Version 1.1.1 released on 2012-01-23 +Bugfix + * Check for failed malloc() in ssl_set_hostname() and x509_get_entries() + (Closes ticket #47, found by Hugo Leisink) + * Fixed issues with Intel compiler on 64-bit systems (Closes ticket #50) + * Fixed multiple compiler warnings for VS6 and armcc + * Fixed bug in CTR_CRBG selftest + += Version 1.1.0 released on 2011-12-22 +Features + * Added ssl_session_reset() to allow better multi-connection pools of + SSL contexts without needing to set all non-connection-specific + data and pointers again. Adapted ssl_server to use this functionality. + * Added ssl_set_max_version() to allow clients to offer a lower maximum + supported version to a server to help buggy server implementations. + (Closes ticket #36) + * Added cipher_get_cipher_mode() and cipher_get_cipher_operation() + introspection functions (Closes ticket #40) + * Added CTR_DRBG based on AES-256-CTR (NIST SP 800-90) random generator + * Added a generic entropy accumulator that provides support for adding + custom entropy sources and added some generic and platform dependent + entropy sources + +Changes + * Documentation for AES and Camellia in modes CTR and CFB128 clarified. + * Fixed rsa_encrypt and rsa_decrypt examples to use public key for + encryption and private key for decryption. (Closes ticket #34) + * Inceased maximum size of ASN1 length reads to 32-bits. + * Added an EXPLICIT tag number parameter to x509_get_ext() + * Added a separate CRL entry extension parsing function + * Separated the ASN.1 parsing code from the X.509 specific parsing code. + So now there is a module that is controlled with POLARSSL_ASN1_PARSE_C. + * Changed the defined key-length of DES ciphers in cipher.h to include the + parity bits, to prevent mistakes in copying data. (Closes ticket #33) + * Loads of minimal changes to better support WINCE as a build target + (Credits go to Marco Lizza) + * Added POLARSSL_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE definition to allow easier time to memory + trade-off + * Introduced POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE and POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS for MPI size + management (Closes ticket #44) + * Changed the used random function pointer to more flexible format. Renamed + havege_rand() to havege_random() to prevent mistakes. Lots of changes as + a consequence in library code and programs + * Moved all examples programs to use the new entropy and CTR_DRBG + * Added permissive certificate parsing to x509parse_crt() and + x509parse_crtfile(). With permissive parsing the parsing does not stop on + encountering a parse-error. Beware that the meaning of return values has + changed! + * All error codes are now negative. Even on mermory failures and IO errors. + +Bugfix + * Fixed faulty HMAC-MD2 implementation. Found by dibac. (Closes + ticket #37) + * Fixed a bug where the CRL parser expected an EXPLICIT ASN.1 tag + before version numbers + * Allowed X509 key usage parsing to accept 4 byte values instead of the + standard 1 byte version sometimes used by Microsoft. (Closes ticket #38) + * Fixed incorrect behaviour in case of RSASSA-PSS with a salt length + smaller than the hash length. (Closes ticket #41) + * If certificate serial is longer than 32 octets, serial number is now + appended with '....' after first 28 octets + * Improved build support for s390x and sparc64 in bignum.h + * Fixed MS Visual C++ name clash with int64 in sha4.h + * Corrected removal of leading "00:" in printing serial numbers in + certificates and CRLs + += Version 1.0.0 released on 2011-07-27 +Features + * Expanded cipher layer with support for CFB128 and CTR mode + * Added rsa_encrypt and rsa_decrypt simple example programs. + +Changes + * The generic cipher and message digest layer now have normal error + codes instead of integers + +Bugfix + * Undid faulty bug fix in ssl_write() when flushing old data (Ticket + #18) + += Version 0.99-pre5 released on 2011-05-26 +Features + * Added additional Cipher Block Modes to symmetric ciphers + (AES CTR, Camellia CTR, XTEA CBC) including the option to + enable and disable individual modes when needed + * Functions requiring File System functions can now be disabled + by undefining POLARSSL_FS_IO + * A error_strerror function() has been added to translate between + error codes and their description. + * Added mpi_get_bit() and mpi_set_bit() individual bit setter/getter + functions. + * Added ssl_mail_client and ssl_fork_server as example programs. + +Changes + * Major argument / variable rewrite. Introduced use of size_t + instead of int for buffer lengths and loop variables for + better unsigned / signed use. Renamed internal bigint types + t_int and t_dbl to t_uint and t_udbl in the process + * mpi_init() and mpi_free() now only accept a single MPI + argument and do not accept variable argument lists anymore. + * The error codes have been remapped and combining error codes + is now done with a PLUS instead of an OR as error codes + used are negative. + * Changed behaviour of net_read(), ssl_fetch_input() and ssl_recv(). + net_recv() now returns 0 on EOF instead of + POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET. ssl_fetch_input() returns + POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF on an EOF from its f_recv() function. + ssl_read() returns 0 if a POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF is received + after the handshake. + * Network functions now return POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ or + POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE instead of the ambiguous + POLARSSL_ERR_NET_TRY_AGAIN + += Version 0.99-pre4 released on 2011-04-01 +Features + * Added support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding and thus support + for the RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations. + * Reading of Public Key files incorporated into default x509 + functionality as well. + * Added mpi_fill_random() for centralized filling of big numbers + with random data (Fixed ticket #10) + +Changes + * Debug print of MPI now removes leading zero octets and + displays actual bit size of the value. + * x509parse_key() (and as a consequence x509parse_keyfile()) + does not zeroize memory in advance anymore. Use rsa_init() + before parsing a key or keyfile! + +Bugfix + * Debug output of MPI's now the same independent of underlying + platform (32-bit / 64-bit) (Fixes ticket #19, found by Mads + Kiilerich and Mihai Militaru) + * Fixed bug in ssl_write() when flushing old data (Fixed ticket + #18, found by Nikolay Epifanov) + * Fixed proper handling of RSASSA-PSS verification with variable + length salt lengths + += Version 0.99-pre3 released on 2011-02-28 +This release replaces version 0.99-pre2 which had possible copyright issues. +Features + * Parsing PEM private keys encrypted with DES and AES + are now supported as well (Fixes ticket #5) + * Added crl_app program to allow easy reading and + printing of X509 CRLs from file + +Changes + * Parsing of PEM files moved to separate module (Fixes + ticket #13). Also possible to remove PEM support for + systems only using DER encoding + +Bugfixes + * Corrected parsing of UTCTime dates before 1990 and + after 1950 + * Support more exotic OID's when parsing certificates + (found by Mads Kiilerich) + * Support more exotic name representations when parsing + certificates (found by Mads Kiilerich) + * Replaced the expired test certificates + * Do not bail out if no client certificate specified. Try + to negotiate anonymous connection (Fixes ticket #12, + found by Boris Krasnovskiy) + +Security fixes + * Fixed a possible Man-in-the-Middle attack on the + Diffie Hellman key exchange (thanks to Larry Highsmith, + Subreption LLC) + += Version 0.99-pre1 released on 2011-01-30 +Features +Note: Most of these features have been donated by Fox-IT + * Added Doxygen source code documentation parts + * Added reading of DHM context from memory and file + * Improved X509 certificate parsing to include extended + certificate fields, including Key Usage + * Improved certificate verification and verification + against the available CRLs + * Detection for DES weak keys and parity bits added + * Improvements to support integration in other + applications: + + Added generic message digest and cipher wrapper + + Improved information about current capabilities, + status, objects and configuration + + Added verification callback on certificate chain + verification to allow external blacklisting + + Additional example programs to show usage + * Added support for PKCS#11 through the use of the + libpkcs11-helper library + +Changes + * x509parse_time_expired() checks time in addition to + the existing date check + * The ciphers member of ssl_context and the cipher member + of ssl_session have been renamed to ciphersuites and + ciphersuite respectively. This clarifies the difference + with the generic cipher layer and is better naming + altogether + += Version 0.14.0 released on 2010-08-16 +Features + * Added support for SSL_EDH_RSA_AES_128_SHA and + SSL_EDH_RSA_CAMELLIA_128_SHA ciphersuites + * Added compile-time and run-time version information + * Expanded ssl_client2 arguments for more flexibility + * Added support for TLS v1.1 + +Changes + * Made Makefile cleaner + * Removed dependency on rand() in rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(). + Now using random fuction provided to function and + changed the prototype of rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(), + rsa_init() and rsa_gen_key(). + * Some SSL defines were renamed in order to avoid + future confusion + +Bug fixes + * Fixed CMake out of source build for tests (found by + kkert) + * rsa_check_private() now supports PKCS1v2 keys as well + * Fixed deadlock in rsa_pkcs1_encrypt() on failing random + generator + += Version 0.13.1 released on 2010-03-24 +Bug fixes + * Fixed Makefile in library that was mistakenly merged + * Added missing const string fixes + += Version 0.13.0 released on 2010-03-21 +Features + * Added option parsing for host and port selection to + ssl_client2 + * Added support for GeneralizedTime in X509 parsing + * Added cert_app program to allow easy reading and + printing of X509 certificates from file or SSL + connection. + +Changes + * Added const correctness for main code base + * X509 signature algorithm determination is now + in a function to allow easy future expansion + * Changed symmetric cipher functions to + identical interface (returning int result values) + * Changed ARC4 to use separate input/output buffer + * Added reset function for HMAC context as speed-up + for specific use-cases + +Bug fixes + * Fixed bug resulting in failure to send the last + certificate in the chain in ssl_write_certificate() and + ssl_write_certificate_request() (found by fatbob) + * Added small fixes for compiler warnings on a Mac + (found by Frank de Brabander) + * Fixed algorithmic bug in mpi_is_prime() (found by + Smbat Tonoyan) + += Version 0.12.1 released on 2009-10-04 +Changes + * Coverage test definitions now support 'depends_on' + tagging system. + * Tests requiring specific hashing algorithms now honor + the defines. + +Bug fixes + * Changed typo in #ifdef in x509parse.c (found + by Eduardo) + += Version 0.12.0 released on 2009-07-28 +Features + * Added CMake makefiles as alternative to regular Makefiles. + * Added preliminary Code Coverage tests for AES, ARC4, + Base64, MPI, SHA-family, MD-family, HMAC-SHA-family, + Camellia, DES, 3-DES, RSA PKCS#1, XTEA, Diffie-Hellman + and X509parse. + +Changes + * Error codes are not (necessarily) negative. Keep + this is mind when checking for errors. + * RSA_RAW renamed to SIG_RSA_RAW for consistency. + * Fixed typo in name of POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. + * Changed interface for AES and Camellia setkey functions + to indicate invalid key lengths. + +Bug fixes + * Fixed include location of endian.h on FreeBSD (found by + Gabriel) + * Fixed include location of endian.h and name clash on + Apples (found by Martin van Hensbergen) + * Fixed HMAC-MD2 by modifying md2_starts(), so that the + required HMAC ipad and opad variables are not cleared. + (found by code coverage tests) + * Prevented use of long long in bignum if + POLARSSL_HAVE_LONGLONG not defined (found by Giles + Bathgate). + * Fixed incorrect handling of negative strings in + mpi_read_string() (found by code coverage tests). + * Fixed segfault on handling empty rsa_context in + rsa_check_pubkey() and rsa_check_privkey() (found by + code coverage tests). + * Fixed incorrect handling of one single negative input + value in mpi_add_abs() (found by code coverage tests). + * Fixed incorrect handling of negative first input + value in mpi_sub_abs() (found by code coverage tests). + * Fixed incorrect handling of negative first input + value in mpi_mod_mpi() and mpi_mod_int(). Resulting + change also affects mpi_write_string() (found by code + coverage tests). + * Corrected is_prime() results for 0, 1 and 2 (found by + code coverage tests). + * Fixed Camellia and XTEA for 64-bit Windows systems. + += Version 0.11.1 released on 2009-05-17 + * Fixed missing functionality for SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA384, + SHA-512 in rsa_pkcs1_sign() + += Version 0.11.0 released on 2009-05-03 + * Fixed a bug in mpi_gcd() so that it also works when both + input numbers are even and added testcases to check + (found by Pierre Habouzit). + * Added support for SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 + one way hash functions with the PKCS#1 v1.5 signing and + verification. + * Fixed minor bug regarding mpi_gcd located within the + POLARSSL_GENPRIME block. + * Fixed minor memory leak in x509parse_crt() and added better + handling of 'full' certificate chains (found by Mathias + Olsson). + * Centralized file opening and reading for x509 files into + load_file() + * Made definition of net_htons() endian-clean for big endian + systems (Found by Gernot). + * Undefining POLARSSL_HAVE_ASM now also handles prevents asm in + padlock and timing code. + * Fixed an off-by-one buffer allocation in ssl_set_hostname() + responsible for crashes and unwanted behaviour. + * Added support for Certificate Revocation List (CRL) parsing. + * Added support for CRL revocation to x509parse_verify() and + SSL/TLS code. + * Fixed compatibility of XTEA and Camellia on a 64-bit system + (found by Felix von Leitner). + += Version 0.10.0 released on 2009-01-12 + * Migrated XySSL to PolarSSL + * Added XTEA symmetric cipher + * Added Camellia symmetric cipher + * Added support for ciphersuites: SSL_RSA_CAMELLIA_128_SHA, + SSL_RSA_CAMELLIA_256_SHA and SSL_EDH_RSA_CAMELLIA_256_SHA + * Fixed dangerous bug that can cause a heap overflow in + rsa_pkcs1_decrypt (found by Christophe Devine) + +================================================================ +XySSL ChangeLog + += Version 0.9 released on 2008-03-16 + + * Added support for ciphersuite: SSL_RSA_AES_128_SHA + * Enabled support for large files by default in aescrypt2.c + * Preliminary openssl wrapper contributed by David Barrett + * Fixed a bug in ssl_write() that caused the same payload to + be sent twice in non-blocking mode when send returns EAGAIN + * Fixed ssl_parse_client_hello(): session id and challenge must + not be swapped in the SSLv2 ClientHello (found by Greg Robson) + * Added user-defined callback debug function (Krystian Kolodziej) + * Before freeing a certificate, properly zero out all cert. data + * Fixed the "mode" parameter so that encryption/decryption are + not swapped on PadLock; also fixed compilation on older versions + of gcc (bug reported by David Barrett) + * Correctly handle the case in padlock_xcryptcbc() when input or + output data is non-aligned by falling back to the software + implementation, as VIA Nehemiah cannot handle non-aligned buffers + * Fixed a memory leak in x509parse_crt() which was reported by Greg + Robson-Garth; some x509write.c fixes by Pascal Vizeli, thanks to + Matthew Page who reported several bugs + * Fixed x509_get_ext() to accept some rare certificates which have + an INTEGER instead of a BOOLEAN for BasicConstraints::cA. + * Added support on the client side for the TLS "hostname" extension + (patch contributed by David Patino) + * Make x509parse_verify() return BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH when an empty + string is passed as the CN (bug reported by spoofy) + * Added an option to enable/disable the BN assembly code + * Updated rsa_check_privkey() to verify that (D*E) = 1 % (P-1)*(Q-1) + * Disabled obsolete hash functions by default (MD2, MD4); updated + selftest and benchmark to not test ciphers that have been disabled + * Updated x509parse_cert_info() to correctly display byte 0 of the + serial number, setup correct server port in the ssl client example + * Fixed a critical denial-of-service with X.509 cert. verification: + peer may cause xyssl to loop indefinitely by sending a certificate + for which the RSA signature check fails (bug reported by Benoit) + * Added test vectors for: AES-CBC, AES-CFB, DES-CBC and 3DES-CBC, + HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 + * Fixed HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512 (thanks to Josh Sinykin) + * Modified ssl_parse_client_key_exchange() to protect against + Daniel Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, as well + as the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack + * Updated rsa_gen_key() so that ctx->N is always nbits in size + * Fixed assembly PPC compilation errors on Mac OS X, thanks to + David Barrett and Dusan Semen + += Version 0.8 released on 2007-10-20 + + * Modified the HMAC functions to handle keys larger + than 64 bytes, thanks to Stephane Desneux and gary ng + * Fixed ssl_read_record() to properly update the handshake + message digests, which fixes IE6/IE7 client authentication + * Cleaned up the XYSSL* #defines, suggested by Azriel Fasten + * Fixed net_recv(), thanks to Lorenz Schori and Egon Kocjan + * Added user-defined callbacks for handling I/O and sessions + * Added lots of debugging output in the SSL/TLS functions + * Added preliminary X.509 cert. writing by Pascal Vizeli + * Added preliminary support for the VIA PadLock routines + * Added AES-CFB mode of operation, contributed by chmike + * Added an SSL/TLS stress testing program (ssl_test.c) + * Updated the RSA PKCS#1 code to allow choosing between + RSA_PUBLIC and RSA_PRIVATE, as suggested by David Barrett + * Updated ssl_read() to skip 0-length records from OpenSSL + * Fixed the make install target to comply with *BSD make + * Fixed a bug in mpi_read_binary() on 64-bit platforms + * mpi_is_prime() speedups, thanks to Kevin McLaughlin + * Fixed a long standing memory leak in mpi_is_prime() + * Replaced realloc with malloc in mpi_grow(), and set + the sign of zero as positive in mpi_init() (reported + by Jonathan M. McCune) + += Version 0.7 released on 2007-07-07 + + * Added support for the MicroBlaze soft-core processor + * Fixed a bug in ssl_tls.c which sometimes prevented SSL + connections from being established with non-blocking I/O + * Fixed a couple bugs in the VS6 and UNIX Makefiles + * Fixed the "PIC register ebx clobbered in asm" bug + * Added HMAC starts/update/finish support functions + * Added the SHA-224, SHA-384 and SHA-512 hash functions + * Fixed the net_set_*block routines, thanks to Andreas + * Added a few demonstration programs: md5sum, sha1sum, + dh_client, dh_server, rsa_genkey, rsa_sign, rsa_verify + * Added new bignum import and export helper functions + * Rewrote README.txt in program/ssl/ca to better explain + how to create a test PKI + += Version 0.6 released on 2007-04-01 + + * Ciphers used in SSL/TLS can now be disabled at compile + time, to reduce the memory footprint on embedded systems + * Added multiply assembly code for the TriCore and modified + havege_struct for this processor, thanks to David Patiño + * Added multiply assembly code for 64-bit PowerPCs, + thanks to Peking University and the OSU Open Source Lab + * Added experimental support of Quantum Cryptography + * Added support for autoconf, contributed by Arnaud Cornet + * Fixed "long long" compilation issues on IA-64 and PPC64 + * Fixed a bug introduced in xyssl-0.5/timing.c: hardclock + was not being correctly defined on ARM and MIPS + += Version 0.5 released on 2007-03-01 + + * Added multiply assembly code for SPARC and Alpha + * Added (beta) support for non-blocking I/O operations + * Implemented session resuming and client authentication + * Fixed some portability issues on WinCE, MINIX 3, Plan9 + (thanks to Benjamin Newman), HP-UX, FreeBSD and Solaris + * Improved the performance of the EDH key exchange + * Fixed a bug that caused valid packets with a payload + size of 16384 bytes to be rejected + += Version 0.4 released on 2007-02-01 + + * Added support for Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange + * Added multiply asm code for SSE2, ARM, PPC, MIPS and M68K + * Various improvement to the modular exponentiation code + * Rewrote the headers to generate the API docs with doxygen + * Fixed a bug in ssl_encrypt_buf (incorrect padding was + generated) and in ssl_parse_client_hello (max. client + version was not properly set), thanks to Didier Rebeix + * Fixed another bug in ssl_parse_client_hello: clients with + cipherlists larger than 96 bytes were incorrectly rejected + * Fixed a couple memory leak in x509_read.c + += Version 0.3 released on 2007-01-01 + + * Added server-side SSLv3 and TLSv1.0 support + * Multiple fixes to enhance the compatibility with g++, + thanks to Xosé Antón Otero Ferreira + * Fixed a bug in the CBC code, thanks to dowst; also, + the bignum code is no longer dependent on long long + * Updated rsa_pkcs1_sign to handle arbitrary large inputs + * Updated timing.c for improved compatibility with i386 + and 486 processors, thanks to Arnaud Cornet + += Version 0.2 released on 2006-12-01 + + * Updated timing.c to support ARM and MIPS arch + * Updated the MPI code to support 8086 on MSVC 1.5 + * Added the copyright notice at the top of havege.h + * Fixed a bug in sha2_hmac, thanks to newsoft/Wenfang Zhang + * Fixed a bug reported by Adrian Rüegsegger in x509_read_key + * Fixed a bug reported by Torsten Lauter in ssl_read_record + * Fixed a bug in rsa_check_privkey that would wrongly cause + valid RSA keys to be dismissed (thanks to oldwolf) + * Fixed a bug in mpi_is_prime that caused some primes to fail + the Miller-Rabin primality test + + I'd also like to thank Younès Hafri for the CRUX linux port, + Khalil Petit who added XySSL into pkgsrc and Arnaud Cornet + who maintains the Debian package :-) + += Version 0.1 released on 2006-11-01 diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/DartConfiguration.tcl b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/DartConfiguration.tcl new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dfa0f071 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/DartConfiguration.tcl @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +Site: localhost +BuildName: mbed TLS-test +CoverageCommand: /usr/bin/gcov +MemoryCheckCommand: /usr/bin/valgrind diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/LICENSE b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/LICENSE new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d6456956 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/LICENSE @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ + + Apache License + Version 2.0, January 2004 + http://www.apache.org/licenses/ + + TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION + + 1. 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MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! ****\n +NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L2=**** THIS BUILD HAS NO DEFINED ENTROPY SOURCES ****\n +NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L3=**** AND IS *NOT* SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE ****\n + +NULL_ENTROPY_WARNING=\n$(WARNING_BORDER)$(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L1)$(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L2)$(NULL_ENTROPY_WARN_L3)$(WARNING_BORDER) + +WARNING_BORDER_LONG =**********************************************************************************\n +CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L1=**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY defined! ****\n +CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L2=**** Using 128-bit keys for CTR_DRBG limits the security of generated ****\n +CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L3=**** keys and operations that use random values generated to 128-bit security ****\n + +CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARNING=\n$(WARNING_BORDER_LONG)$(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L1)$(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L2)$(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARN_L3)$(WARNING_BORDER_LONG) + +# Post build steps +post_build: +ifndef WINDOWS + + # If 128-bit keys are configured for CTR_DRBG, display an appropriate warning + -scripts/config.py get MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY && ([ $$? -eq 0 ]) && \ + echo '$(CTR_DRBG_128_BIT_KEY_WARNING)' + + # If NULL Entropy is configured, display an appropriate warning + -scripts/config.py get MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY && ([ $$? -eq 0 ]) && \ + echo '$(NULL_ENTROPY_WARNING)' +endif + +clean: + $(MAKE) -C library clean + $(MAKE) -C programs clean + $(MAKE) -C tests clean +ifndef WINDOWS + find . \( -name \*.gcno -o -name \*.gcda -o -name \*.info \) -exec rm {} + +endif + +check: lib tests + $(MAKE) -C tests check + +test: check + +ifndef WINDOWS +# note: for coverage testing, build with: +# make CFLAGS='--coverage -g3 -O0' +covtest: + $(MAKE) check + programs/test/selftest + tests/compat.sh + tests/ssl-opt.sh + +lcov: + rm -rf Coverage + lcov --capture --initial --directory library -o files.info + lcov --rc lcov_branch_coverage=1 --capture --directory library -o tests.info + lcov --rc lcov_branch_coverage=1 --add-tracefile files.info --add-tracefile tests.info -o all.info + lcov --rc lcov_branch_coverage=1 --remove all.info -o final.info '*.h' + gendesc tests/Descriptions.txt -o descriptions + genhtml --title "mbed TLS" --description-file descriptions --keep-descriptions --legend --branch-coverage -o Coverage final.info + rm -f files.info tests.info all.info final.info descriptions + +apidoc: + mkdir -p apidoc + cd doxygen && doxygen mbedtls.doxyfile + +apidoc_clean: + rm -rf apidoc +endif + +## Editor navigation files +C_SOURCE_FILES = $(wildcard \ + 3rdparty/*/include/*/*.h 3rdparty/*/include/*/*/*.h 3rdparty/*/include/*/*/*/*.h \ + 3rdparty/*/*.c 3rdparty/*/*/*.c 3rdparty/*/*/*/*.c 3rdparty/*/*/*/*/*.c \ + include/*/*.h \ + library/*.[hc] \ + programs/*/*.[hc] \ + tests/include/*/*.h tests/include/*/*/*.h \ + tests/src/*.c tests/src/*/*.c \ + tests/suites/*.function \ +) +# Exuberant-ctags invocation. Other ctags implementations may require different options. +CTAGS = ctags --langmap=c:+.h.function --line-directives=no -o +tags: $(C_SOURCE_FILES) + $(CTAGS) $@ $(C_SOURCE_FILES) +TAGS: $(C_SOURCE_FILES) + etags --no-line-directive -o $@ $(C_SOURCE_FILES) +global: GPATH GRTAGS GSYMS GTAGS +GPATH GRTAGS GSYMS GTAGS: $(C_SOURCE_FILES) + ls $(C_SOURCE_FILES) | gtags -f - --gtagsconf .globalrc +cscope: cscope.in.out cscope.po.out cscope.out +cscope.in.out cscope.po.out cscope.out: $(C_SOURCE_FILES) + cscope -bq -u -Iinclude -Ilibrary $(patsubst %,-I%,$(wildcard 3rdparty/*/include)) -Itests/include $(C_SOURCE_FILES) +.PHONY: cscope global diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/README.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..833e2cd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,262 @@ +README for Mbed TLS +=================== + +Mbed TLS is a C library that implements cryptographic primitives, X.509 certificate manipulation and the SSL/TLS and DTLS protocols. Its small code footprint makes it suitable for embedded systems. + +Mbed TLS includes a reference implementation of the [PSA Cryptography API](#psa-cryptography-api). This is currently a preview for evaluation purposes only. + +Configuration +------------- + +Mbed TLS should build out of the box on most systems. Some platform specific options are available in the fully documented configuration file `include/mbedtls/config.h`, which is also the place where features can be selected. This file can be edited manually, or in a more programmatic way using the Python 3 script `scripts/config.py` (use `--help` for usage instructions). + +Compiler options can be set using conventional environment variables such as `CC` and `CFLAGS` when using the Make and CMake build system (see below). + +We provide some non-standard configurations focused on specific use cases in the `configs/` directory. You can read more about those in `configs/README.txt` + +Documentation +------------- + +The main Mbed TLS documentation is available via [ReadTheDocs](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/). + +Documentation for the PSA Cryptography API is available [on GitHub](https://arm-software.github.io/psa-api/crypto/). + +To generate a local copy of the library documentation in HTML format, tailored to your compile-time configuration: + +1. Make sure that [Doxygen](http://www.doxygen.nl/) is installed. We use version 1.8.11 but slightly older or more recent versions should work. +1. Run `make apidoc`. +1. Browse `apidoc/index.html` or `apidoc/modules.html`. + +For other sources of documentation, see the [SUPPORT](SUPPORT.md) document. + +Compiling +--------- + +There are currently three active build systems used within Mbed TLS releases: + +- GNU Make +- CMake +- Microsoft Visual Studio (Microsoft Visual Studio 2013 or later) + +The main systems used for development are CMake and GNU Make. Those systems are always complete and up-to-date. The others should reflect all changes present in the CMake and Make build system, although features may not be ported there automatically. + +The Make and CMake build systems create three libraries: libmbedcrypto, libmbedx509, and libmbedtls. Note that libmbedtls depends on libmbedx509 and libmbedcrypto, and libmbedx509 depends on libmbedcrypto. As a result, some linkers will expect flags to be in a specific order, for example the GNU linker wants `-lmbedtls -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto`. + +### Tool versions + +You need the following tools to build the library with the provided makefiles: + +* GNU Make or a build tool that CMake supports. +* A C99 toolchain (compiler, linker, archiver). We actively test with GCC 5.4, Clang 3.8, IAR8 and Visual Studio 2013. More recent versions should work. Slightly older versions may work. +* Python 3 to generate the test code. +* Perl to run the tests. + +### Make + +We require GNU Make. To build the library and the sample programs, GNU Make and a C compiler are sufficient. Some of the more advanced build targets require some Unix/Linux tools. + +We intentionally only use a minimum of functionality in the makefiles in order to keep them as simple and independent of different toolchains as possible, to allow users to more easily move between different platforms. Users who need more features are recommended to use CMake. + +In order to build from the source code using GNU Make, just enter at the command line: + + make + +In order to run the tests, enter: + + make check + +The tests need Python to be built and Perl to be run. If you don't have one of them installed, you can skip building the tests with: + + make no_test + +You'll still be able to run a much smaller set of tests with: + + programs/test/selftest + +In order to build for a Windows platform, you should use `WINDOWS_BUILD=1` if the target is Windows but the build environment is Unix-like (for instance when cross-compiling, or compiling from an MSYS shell), and `WINDOWS=1` if the build environment is a Windows shell (for instance using mingw32-make) (in that case some targets will not be available). + +Setting the variable `SHARED` in your environment will build shared libraries in addition to the static libraries. Setting `DEBUG` gives you a debug build. You can override `CFLAGS` and `LDFLAGS` by setting them in your environment or on the make command line; compiler warning options may be overridden separately using `WARNING_CFLAGS`. Some directory-specific options (for example, `-I` directives) are still preserved. + +Please note that setting `CFLAGS` overrides its default value of `-O2` and setting `WARNING_CFLAGS` overrides its default value (starting with `-Wall -Wextra`), so if you just want to add some warning options to the default ones, you can do so by setting `CFLAGS=-O2 -Werror` for example. Setting `WARNING_CFLAGS` is useful when you want to get rid of its default content (for example because your compiler doesn't accept `-Wall` as an option). Directory-specific options cannot be overridden from the command line. + +Depending on your platform, you might run into some issues. Please check the Makefiles in `library/`, `programs/` and `tests/` for options to manually add or remove for specific platforms. You can also check [the Mbed TLS Knowledge Base](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/) for articles on your platform or issue. + +In case you find that you need to do something else as well, please let us know what, so we can add it to the [Mbed TLS Knowledge Base](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/). + +### CMake + +In order to build the source using CMake in a separate directory (recommended), just enter at the command line: + + mkdir /path/to/build_dir && cd /path/to/build_dir + cmake /path/to/mbedtls_source + cmake --build . + +In order to run the tests, enter: + + ctest + +The test suites need Python to be built and Perl to be executed. If you don't have one of these installed, you'll want to disable the test suites with: + + cmake -DENABLE_TESTING=Off /path/to/mbedtls_source + +If you disabled the test suites, but kept the programs enabled, you can still run a much smaller set of tests with: + + programs/test/selftest + +To configure CMake for building shared libraries, use: + + cmake -DUSE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY=On /path/to/mbedtls_source + +There are many different build modes available within the CMake buildsystem. Most of them are available for gcc and clang, though some are compiler-specific: + +- `Release`. This generates the default code without any unnecessary information in the binary files. +- `Debug`. This generates debug information and disables optimization of the code. +- `Coverage`. This generates code coverage information in addition to debug information. +- `ASan`. This instruments the code with AddressSanitizer to check for memory errors. (This includes LeakSanitizer, with recent version of gcc and clang.) (With recent version of clang, this mode also instruments the code with UndefinedSanitizer to check for undefined behaviour.) +- `ASanDbg`. Same as ASan but slower, with debug information and better stack traces. +- `MemSan`. This instruments the code with MemorySanitizer to check for uninitialised memory reads. Experimental, needs recent clang on Linux/x86\_64. +- `MemSanDbg`. Same as MemSan but slower, with debug information, better stack traces and origin tracking. +- `Check`. This activates the compiler warnings that depend on optimization and treats all warnings as errors. + +Switching build modes in CMake is simple. For debug mode, enter at the command line: + + cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug /path/to/mbedtls_source + +To list other available CMake options, use: + + cmake -LH + +Note that, with CMake, you can't adjust the compiler or its flags after the +initial invocation of cmake. This means that `CC=your_cc make` and `make +CC=your_cc` will *not* work (similarly with `CFLAGS` and other variables). +These variables need to be adjusted when invoking cmake for the first time, +for example: + + CC=your_cc cmake /path/to/mbedtls_source + +If you already invoked cmake and want to change those settings, you need to +remove the build directory and create it again. + +Note that it is possible to build in-place; this will however overwrite the +provided Makefiles (see `scripts/tmp_ignore_makefiles.sh` if you want to +prevent `git status` from showing them as modified). In order to do so, from +the Mbed TLS source directory, use: + + cmake . + make + +If you want to change `CC` or `CFLAGS` afterwards, you will need to remove the +CMake cache. This can be done with the following command using GNU find: + + find . -iname '*cmake*' -not -name CMakeLists.txt -exec rm -rf {} + + +You can now make the desired change: + + CC=your_cc cmake . + make + +Regarding variables, also note that if you set CFLAGS when invoking cmake, +your value of CFLAGS doesn't override the content provided by cmake (depending +on the build mode as seen above), it's merely prepended to it. + +#### Mbed TLS as a subproject + +Mbed TLS supports being built as a CMake subproject. One can +use `add_subdirectory()` from a parent CMake project to include Mbed TLS as a +subproject. + +### Microsoft Visual Studio + +The build files for Microsoft Visual Studio are generated for Visual Studio 2010. + +The solution file `mbedTLS.sln` contains all the basic projects needed to build the library and all the programs. The files in tests are not generated and compiled, as these need Python and perl environments as well. However, the selftest program in `programs/test/` is still available. + +Example programs +---------------- + +We've included example programs for a lot of different features and uses in [`programs/`](programs/README.md). +Please note that the goal of these sample programs is to demonstrate specific features of the library, and the code may need to be adapted to build a real-world application. + +Tests +----- + +Mbed TLS includes an elaborate test suite in `tests/` that initially requires Python to generate the tests files (e.g. `test\_suite\_mpi.c`). These files are generated from a `function file` (e.g. `suites/test\_suite\_mpi.function`) and a `data file` (e.g. `suites/test\_suite\_mpi.data`). The `function file` contains the test functions. The `data file` contains the test cases, specified as parameters that will be passed to the test function. + +For machines with a Unix shell and OpenSSL (and optionally GnuTLS) installed, additional test scripts are available: + +- `tests/ssl-opt.sh` runs integration tests for various TLS options (renegotiation, resumption, etc.) and tests interoperability of these options with other implementations. +- `tests/compat.sh` tests interoperability of every ciphersuite with other implementations. +- `tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl` test builds in various reduced configurations. +- `tests/scripts/depends.py` test builds in configurations with a single curve, key exchange, hash, cipher, or pkalg on. +- `tests/scripts/all.sh` runs a combination of the above tests, plus some more, with various build options (such as ASan, full `config.h`, etc). + +Porting Mbed TLS +---------------- + +Mbed TLS can be ported to many different architectures, OS's and platforms. Before starting a port, you may find the following Knowledge Base articles useful: + +- [Porting Mbed TLS to a new environment or OS](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS/) +- [What external dependencies does Mbed TLS rely on?](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/development/what-external-dependencies-does-mbedtls-rely-on/) +- [How do I configure Mbed TLS](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/compiling-and-building/how-do-i-configure-mbedtls/) + +Mbed TLS is mostly written in portable C99; however, it has a few platform requirements that go beyond the standard, but are met by most modern architectures: + +- Bytes must be 8 bits. +- All-bits-zero must be a valid representation of a null pointer. +- Signed integers must be represented using two's complement. +- `int` and `size_t` must be at least 32 bits wide. +- The types `uint8_t`, `uint16_t`, `uint32_t` and their signed equivalents must be available. + +PSA cryptography API +-------------------- + +### PSA API + +Arm's [Platform Security Architecture (PSA)](https://developer.arm.com/architectures/security-architectures/platform-security-architecture) is a holistic set of threat models, security analyses, hardware and firmware architecture specifications, and an open source firmware reference implementation. PSA provides a recipe, based on industry best practice, that allows security to be consistently designed in, at both a hardware and firmware level. + +The [PSA cryptography API](https://arm-software.github.io/psa-api/crypto/) provides access to a set of cryptographic primitives. It has a dual purpose. First, it can be used in a PSA-compliant platform to build services, such as secure boot, secure storage and secure communication. Second, it can also be used independently of other PSA components on any platform. + +The design goals of the PSA cryptography API include: + +* The API distinguishes caller memory from internal memory, which allows the library to be implemented in an isolated space for additional security. Library calls can be implemented as direct function calls if isolation is not desired, and as remote procedure calls if isolation is desired. +* The structure of internal data is hidden to the application, which allows substituting alternative implementations at build time or run time, for example, in order to take advantage of hardware accelerators. +* All access to the keys happens through key identifiers, which allows support for external cryptoprocessors that is transparent to applications. +* The interface to algorithms is generic, favoring algorithm agility. +* The interface is designed to be easy to use and hard to accidentally misuse. + +Arm welcomes feedback on the design of the API. If you think something could be improved, please open an issue on our Github repository. Alternatively, if you prefer to provide your feedback privately, please email us at [`mbed-crypto@arm.com`](mailto:mbed-crypto@arm.com). All feedback received by email is treated confidentially. + +### PSA implementation in Mbed TLS + +Mbed TLS includes a reference implementation of the PSA Cryptography API. +This implementation is not yet as mature as the rest of the library. Some parts of the code have not been reviewed as thoroughly, and some parts of the PSA implementation are not yet well optimized for code size. + +The X.509 and TLS code can use PSA cryptography for a limited subset of operations. To enable this support, activate the compilation option `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` in `config.h`. + +There are currently a few deviations where the library does not yet implement the latest version of the specification. Please refer to the [compliance issues on Github](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbed-crypto/labels/compliance) for an up-to-date list. + +### Upcoming features + +Future releases of this library will include: + +* A driver programming interface, which makes it possible to use hardware accelerators instead of the default software implementation for chosen algorithms. +* Support for external keys to be stored and manipulated exclusively in a separate cryptoprocessor. +* A configuration mechanism to compile only the algorithms you need for your application. +* A wider set of cryptographic algorithms. + +License +------- + +Unless specifically indicated otherwise in a file, Mbed TLS files are provided under the [Apache-2.0](https://spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html) license. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for the full text of this license. Contributors must accept that their contributions are made under both the Apache-2.0 AND [GPL-2.0-or-later](https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0-or-later.html) licenses. This enables LTS (Long Term Support) branches of the software to be provided under either the Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later licenses. + +Contributing +------------ + +We gratefully accept bug reports and contributions from the community. Please see the [contributing guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md) for details on how to do this. + +Contact +------- + +* To report a security vulnerability in Mbed TLS, please email . For more information, see [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md). +* To report a bug or request a feature in Mbed TLS, please [file an issue on GitHub](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/new/choose). +* Please see [`SUPPORT.md`](SUPPORT.md) for other channels for discussion and support about Mbed TLS. diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/SECURITY.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/SECURITY.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..33bbc2ff --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/SECURITY.md @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +## Reporting Vulnerabilities + +If you think you have found an Mbed TLS security vulnerability, then please +send an email to the security team at +. + +## Security Incident Handling Process + +Our security process is detailed in our +[security +center](https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/security-center/). + +Its primary goal is to ensure fixes are ready to be deployed when the issue +goes public. + +## Maintained branches + +Only the maintained branches, as listed in [`BRANCHES.md`](BRANCHES.md), +get security fixes. +Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch. diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/SUPPORT.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/SUPPORT.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b550e08e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/SUPPORT.md @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +## Documentation + +Here are some useful sources of information about using Mbed TLS: + +- [ReadTheDocs](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/); +- API documentation, see the [Documentation section of the + README](README.md#documentation); +- the `docs` directory in the source tree; +- the [Mbed TLS Knowledge Base](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/); +- the [Mbed TLS mailing-list + archives](https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org/). + +## Asking Questions + +If you can't find your answer in the above sources, please use the [Mbed TLS +mailing list](https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman3/lists/mbed-tls.lists.trustedfirmware.org). diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/dco.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/dco.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8201f992 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/dco.txt @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +Developer Certificate of Origin +Version 1.1 + +Copyright (C) 2004, 2006 The Linux Foundation and its contributors. +1 Letterman Drive +Suite D4700 +San Francisco, CA, 94129 + +Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this +license document, but changing it is not allowed. + + +Developer's Certificate of Origin 1.1 + +By making a contribution to this project, I certify that: + +(a) The contribution was created in whole or in part by me and I + have the right to submit it under the open source license + indicated in the file; or + +(b) The contribution is based upon previous work that, to the best + of my knowledge, is covered under an appropriate open source + license and I have the right under that license to submit that + work with modifications, whether created in whole or in part + by me, under the same open source license (unless I am + permitted to submit under a different license), as indicated + in the file; or + +(c) The contribution was provided directly to me by some other + person who certified (a), (b) or (c) and I have not modified + it. + +(d) I understand and agree that this project and the contribution + are public and that a record of the contribution (including all + personal information I submit with it, including my sign-off) is + maintained indefinitely and may be redistributed consistent with + this project or the open source license(s) involved. diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/.gitignore b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bf67d02e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +Makefile +*.sln +*.vcxproj +mbedtls/check_config diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/CMakeLists.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..62c0f620 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +option(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS "Install mbed TLS headers." ON) + +if(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS) + + file(GLOB headers "mbedtls/*.h") + file(GLOB psa_headers "psa/*.h") + + install(FILES ${headers} + DESTINATION include/mbedtls + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ) + + install(FILES ${psa_headers} + DESTINATION include/psa + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ) + +endif(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS) + +# Make config.h available in an out-of-source build. ssl-opt.sh requires it. +if (ENABLE_TESTING AND NOT ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR} STREQUAL ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}) + link_to_source(mbedtls) + link_to_source(psa) +endif() diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/aes.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/aes.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..401ac39d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/aes.h @@ -0,0 +1,689 @@ +/** + * \file aes.h + * + * \brief This file contains AES definitions and functions. + * + * The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) specifies a FIPS-approved + * cryptographic algorithm that can be used to protect electronic + * data. + * + * The AES algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can + * encrypt and decrypt information. For more information, see + * FIPS Publication 197: Advanced Encryption Standard and + * ISO/IEC 18033-2:2006: Information technology -- Security + * techniques -- Encryption algorithms -- Part 2: Asymmetric + * ciphers. + * + * The AES-XTS block mode is standardized by NIST SP 800-38E + * + * and described in detail by IEEE P1619 + * . + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_AES_H +#define MBEDTLS_AES_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include +#include + +/* padlock.c and aesni.c rely on these values! */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT 1 /**< AES encryption. */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT 0 /**< AES decryption. */ + +/* Error codes in range 0x0020-0x0022 */ +/** Invalid key length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -0x0020 +/** Invalid data input length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0022 + +/* Error codes in range 0x0021-0x0025 */ +/** Invalid input data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0021 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0023 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** AES hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0025 + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The AES context-type definition. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_aes_context +{ + int nr; /*!< The number of rounds. */ + uint32_t *rk; /*!< AES round keys. */ + uint32_t buf[68]; /*!< Unaligned data buffer. This buffer can + hold 32 extra Bytes, which can be used for + one of the following purposes: +
  • Alignment if VIA padlock is + used.
  • +
  • Simplifying key expansion in the 256-bit + case by generating an extra round key. +
*/ +} +mbedtls_aes_context; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +/** + * \brief The AES XTS context-type definition. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_aes_xts_context +{ + mbedtls_aes_context crypt; /*!< The AES context to use for AES block + encryption or decryption. */ + mbedtls_aes_context tweak; /*!< The AES context used for tweak + computation. */ +} mbedtls_aes_xts_context; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ +#include "aes_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified AES context. + * + * It must be the first API called before using + * the context. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_aes_init( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified AES context. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to clear. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + * Otherwise, the context must have been at least initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_aes_free( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified AES XTS context. + * + * It must be the first API called before using + * the context. + * + * \param ctx The AES XTS context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_aes_xts_init( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified AES XTS context. + * + * \param ctx The AES XTS context to clear. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + * Otherwise, the context must have been at least initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_aes_xts_free( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/** + * \brief This function sets the encryption key. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption key. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. + * \param keybits The size of data passed in bits. Valid options are: + *
  • 128 bits
  • + *
  • 192 bits
  • + *
  • 256 bits
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the decryption key. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. + * \param key The decryption key. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. + * \param keybits The size of data passed. Valid options are: + *
  • 128 bits
  • + *
  • 192 bits
  • + *
  • 256 bits
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +/** + * \brief This function prepares an XTS context for encryption and + * sets the encryption key. + * + * \param ctx The AES XTS context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption key. This is comprised of the XTS key1 + * concatenated with the XTS key2. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. + * \param keybits The size of \p key passed in bits. Valid options are: + *
  • 256 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 128-bit key)
  • + *
  • 512 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 256-bit key)
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function prepares an XTS context for decryption and + * sets the decryption key. + * + * \param ctx The AES XTS context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. + * \param key The decryption key. This is comprised of the XTS key1 + * concatenated with the XTS key2. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits. + * \param keybits The size of \p key passed in bits. Valid options are: + *
  • 256 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 128-bit key)
  • + *
  • 512 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 256-bit key)
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES single-block encryption or + * decryption operation. + * + * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode parameter + * (encrypt or decrypt), on the input data buffer defined in + * the \p input parameter. + * + * mbedtls_aes_init(), and either mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() or + * mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec() must be called before the first + * call to this API with the same context. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and at least \c 16 Bytes long. + * \param output The buffer where the output data will be written. + * It must be writeable and at least \c 16 Bytes long. + + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES-CBC encryption or decryption operation + * on full blocks. + * + * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode + * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer defined in + * the \p input parameter. + * + * It can be called as many times as needed, until all the input + * data is processed. mbedtls_aes_init(), and either + * mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() or mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec() must be called + * before the first call to this API with the same context. + * + * \note This function operates on full blocks, that is, the input size + * must be a multiple of the AES block size of \c 16 Bytes. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the same function again on the next + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If you need to retain the contents of the IV, you should + * either save it manually or use the cipher module instead. + * + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be a + * multiple of the block size (\c 16 Bytes). + * \param iv Initialization vector (updated after use). + * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + * on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES-XTS encryption or decryption + * operation for an entire XTS data unit. + * + * AES-XTS encrypts or decrypts blocks based on their location as + * defined by a data unit number. The data unit number must be + * provided by \p data_unit. + * + * NIST SP 800-38E limits the maximum size of a data unit to 2^20 + * AES blocks. If the data unit is larger than this, this function + * returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. + * + * \param ctx The AES XTS context to use for AES XTS operations. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. + * \param length The length of a data unit in Bytes. This can be any + * length between 16 bytes and 2^24 bytes inclusive + * (between 1 and 2^20 block cipher blocks). + * \param data_unit The address of the data unit encoded as an array of 16 + * bytes in little-endian format. For disk encryption, this + * is typically the index of the block device sector that + * contains the data. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data (which is an entire + * data unit). This function reads \p length Bytes from \p + * input. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data (which is an entire + * data unit). This function writes \p length Bytes to \p + * output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if \p length is + * smaller than an AES block in size (16 Bytes) or if \p + * length is larger than 2^20 blocks (16 MiB). + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char data_unit[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES-CFB128 encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode + * parameter (encrypt or decrypt), on the input data buffer + * defined in the \p input parameter. + * + * For CFB, you must set up the context with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(), + * regardless of whether you are performing an encryption or decryption + * operation, that is, regardless of the \p mode parameter. This is + * because CFB mode uses the same key schedule for encryption and + * decryption. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the same function again on the next + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you must either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use). + * It must point to a valid \c size_t. + * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). + * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES-CFB8 encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode + * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer defined + * in the \p input parameter. + * + * Due to the nature of CFB, you must use the same key schedule for + * both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you must + * use the context initialized with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() for + * both #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT and #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the same function again on the next + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param length The length of the input data. + * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). + * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES-OFB (Output Feedback Mode) + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * For OFB, you must set up the context with + * mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(), regardless of whether you are + * performing an encryption or decryption operation. This is + * because OFB mode uses the same key schedule for encryption and + * decryption. + * + * The OFB operation is identical for encryption or decryption, + * therefore no operation mode needs to be specified. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of iv, the Initialisation Vector, is + * updated so that you can call the same function again on the next + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was encrypted + * in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage, by initialising + * iv_off to 0 before the first call, and preserving its value + * between calls. + * + * For non-streaming use, the iv should be initialised on each call + * to a unique value, and iv_off set to 0 on each call. + * + * If you need to retain the contents of the initialisation vector, + * you must either save it manually or use the cipher module + * instead. + * + * \warning For the OFB mode, the initialisation vector must be unique + * every encryption operation. Reuse of an initialisation vector + * will compromise security. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data. + * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use). + * It must point to a valid \c size_t. + * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). + * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/** + * \brief This function performs an AES-CTR encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * Due to the nature of CTR, you must use the same key schedule + * for both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you + * must use the context initialized with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() + * for both #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT and #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT. + * + * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so + * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with + * the same nonce and key. + * + * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: + * + * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over + * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to + * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and + * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p + * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be + * updated by this function. + * + * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**128 + * blocks of data with the same key. + * + * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p + * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a + * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one + * updated by this function internally. + * + * For example, you might reserve the first 12 bytes for the + * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that + * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to + * set the first 12 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce + * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p + * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most + * 2**96 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. + * + * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct + * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. + * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message + * counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, but this + * limits the number of messages that can be securely encrypted: + * for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should not encrypt + * more than 2**32 messages with the same key. + * + * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and + * that an AES block is 16 bytes. + * + * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its + * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be + * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data. + * \param nc_off The offset in the current \p stream_block, for + * resuming within the current cipher stream. The + * offset pointer should be 0 at the start of a stream. + * It must point to a valid \c size_t. + * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. + * It must be a readable-writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param stream_block The saved stream block for resuming. This is + * overwritten by the function. + * It must be a readable-writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[16], + unsigned char stream_block[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +/** + * \brief Internal AES block encryption function. This is only + * exposed to allow overriding it using + * \c MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption. + * \param input The plaintext block. + * \param output The output (ciphertext) block. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief Internal AES block decryption function. This is only + * exposed to allow overriding it using see + * \c MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT. + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for decryption. + * \param input The ciphertext block. + * \param output The output (plaintext) block. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Deprecated internal AES block encryption function + * without return value. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption. + * \param input Plaintext block. + * \param output Output (ciphertext) block. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief Deprecated internal AES block decryption function + * without return value. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() + * + * \param ctx The AES context to use for decryption. + * \param input Ciphertext block. + * \param output Output (plaintext) block. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* aes.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/aesni.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/aesni.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c1d22f59 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/aesni.h @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +/** + * \file aesni.h + * + * \brief AES-NI for hardware AES acceleration on some Intel processors + * + * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call them directly. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_AESNI_H +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES 0x02000000u +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL 0x00000002u + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && \ + ( defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) ) && \ + ! defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Internal function to detect the AES-NI feature in CPUs. + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param what The feature to detect + * (MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES or MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL) + * + * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_has_support( unsigned int what ); + +/** + * \brief Internal AES-NI AES-ECB block encryption and decryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param input 16-byte input block + * \param output 16-byte output block + * + * \return 0 on success (cannot fail) + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief Internal GCM multiplication: c = a * b in GF(2^128) + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param c Result + * \param a First operand + * \param b Second operand + * + * \note Both operands and result are bit strings interpreted as + * elements of GF(2^128) as per the GCM spec. + */ +void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult( unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16] ); + +/** + * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes + * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys. + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param invkey Round keys for the equivalent inverse cipher + * \param fwdkey Original round keys (for encryption) + * \param nr Number of rounds (that is, number of round keys minus one) + */ +void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key( unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, + int nr ); + +/** + * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param rk Destination buffer where the round keys are written + * \param key Encryption key + * \param bits Key size in bits (must be 128, 192 or 256) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc( unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/arc4.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/arc4.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f4b0f9f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/arc4.h @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +/** + * \file arc4.h + * + * \brief The ARCFOUR stream cipher + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ARC4_H +#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** ARC4 hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0019 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief ARC4 context structure + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_arc4_context +{ + int x; /*!< permutation index */ + int y; /*!< permutation index */ + unsigned char m[256]; /*!< permutation table */ +} +mbedtls_arc4_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ +#include "arc4_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize ARC4 context + * + * \param ctx ARC4 context to be initialized + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_arc4_init( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear ARC4 context + * + * \param ctx ARC4 context to be cleared + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_arc4_free( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief ARC4 key schedule + * + * \param ctx ARC4 context to be setup + * \param key the secret key + * \param keylen length of the key, in bytes + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_arc4_setup( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keylen ); + +/** + * \brief ARC4 cipher function + * + * \param ctx ARC4 context + * \param length length of the input data + * \param input buffer holding the input data + * \param output buffer for the output data + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_arc4_crypt( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_arc4_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* arc4.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/aria.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/aria.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d294c47f --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/aria.h @@ -0,0 +1,373 @@ +/** + * \file aria.h + * + * \brief ARIA block cipher + * + * The ARIA algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can encrypt and + * decrypt information. It is defined by the Korean Agency for + * Technology and Standards (KATS) in KS X 1213:2004 (in + * Korean, but see http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/index-e.html in English) + * and also described by the IETF in RFC 5794. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ARIA_H +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT 1 /**< ARIA encryption. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT 0 /**< ARIA decryption. */ + +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE 16 /**< ARIA block size in bytes. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS 16 /**< Maximum number of rounds in ARIA. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_KEYSIZE 32 /**< Maximum size of an ARIA key in bytes. */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( -0x005C ) +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +/** Bad input data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x005C + +/** Invalid data input length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x005E + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x005A + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** ARIA hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0058 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The ARIA context-type definition. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_aria_context +{ + unsigned char nr; /*!< The number of rounds (12, 14 or 16) */ + /*! The ARIA round keys. */ + uint32_t rk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS + 1][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE / 4]; +} +mbedtls_aria_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ +#include "aria_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified ARIA context. + * + * It must be the first API called before using + * the context. + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_aria_init( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified ARIA context. + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized ARIA context. + */ +void mbedtls_aria_free( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the encryption key. + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to which the key should be bound. + * This must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The size of \p key in Bits. Valid options are: + *
  • 128 bits
  • + *
  • 192 bits
  • + *
  • 256 bits
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the decryption key. + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to which the key should be bound. + * This must be initialized. + * \param key The decryption key. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The size of data passed. Valid options are: + *
  • 128 bits
  • + *
  • 192 bits
  • + *
  • 256 bits
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs an ARIA single-block encryption or + * decryption operation. + * + * It performs encryption or decryption (depending on whether + * the key was set for encryption on decryption) on the input + * data buffer defined in the \p input parameter. + * + * mbedtls_aria_init(), and either mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc() or + * mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec() must be called before the first + * call to this API with the same context. + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param input The 16-Byte buffer holding the input data. + * \param output The 16-Byte buffer holding the output data. + + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief This function performs an ARIA-CBC encryption or decryption operation + * on full blocks. + * + * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode + * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer defined in + * the \p input parameter. + * + * It can be called as many times as needed, until all the input + * data is processed. mbedtls_aria_init(), and either + * mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc() or mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec() must be called + * before the first call to this API with the same context. + * + * \note This function operates on aligned blocks, that is, the input size + * must be a multiple of the ARIA block size of 16 Bytes. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the same function again on the next + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If you need to retain the contents of the IV, you should + * either save it manually or use the cipher module instead. + * + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT for encryption, or + * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT for decryption. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be a + * multiple of the block size (16 Bytes). + * \param iv Initialization vector (updated after use). + * This must be a readable buffer of size 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/** + * \brief This function performs an ARIA-CFB128 encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode + * parameter (encrypt or decrypt), on the input data buffer + * defined in the \p input parameter. + * + * For CFB, you must set up the context with mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(), + * regardless of whether you are performing an encryption or decryption + * operation, that is, regardless of the \p mode parameter. This is + * because CFB mode uses the same key schedule for encryption and + * decryption. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the same function again on the next + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you must either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT for encryption, or + * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT for decryption. + * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use). + * This must not be larger than 15. + * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use). + * This must be a readable buffer of size 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/** + * \brief This function performs an ARIA-CTR encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * This function performs the operation defined in the \p mode + * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer + * defined in the \p input parameter. + * + * Due to the nature of CTR, you must use the same key schedule + * for both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you + * must use the context initialized with mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc() + * for both #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT and #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT. + * + * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so + * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with + * the same nonce and key. + * + * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: + * + * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over + * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to + * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and + * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p + * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be + * updated by this function. + * + * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**128 + * blocks of data with the same key. + * + * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p + * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a + * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one + * updated by this function internally. + * + * For example, you might reserve the first 12 bytes for the + * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that + * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to + * set the first 12 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce + * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p + * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most + * 2**96 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. + * + * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct + * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. + * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message + * counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, but this + * limits the number of messages that can be securely encrypted: + * for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should not encrypt + * more than 2**32 messages with the same key. + * + * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and + * that an ARIA block is 16 bytes. + * + * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its + * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be + * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. + * + * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * \param nc_off The offset in Bytes in the current \p stream_block, + * for resuming within the current cipher stream. The + * offset pointer should be \c 0 at the start of a + * stream. This must not be larger than \c 15 Bytes. + * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. This must point to + * a read/write buffer of length \c 16 bytes. + * \param stream_block The saved stream block for resuming. This must + * point to a read/write buffer of length \c 16 bytes. + * This is overwritten by the function. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, or \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* aria.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/asn1.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/asn1.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5117fc7a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/asn1.h @@ -0,0 +1,616 @@ +/** + * \file asn1.h + * + * \brief Generic ASN.1 parsing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_H +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +/** + * \addtogroup asn1_module + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \name ASN1 Error codes + * These error codes are OR'ed to X509 error codes for + * higher error granularity. + * ASN1 is a standard to specify data structures. + * \{ + */ +/** Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA -0x0060 +/** ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG -0x0062 +/** Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH -0x0064 +/** Actual length differs from expected length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH -0x0066 +/** Data is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -0x0068 +/** Memory allocation failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED -0x006A +/** Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL -0x006C + +/** \} name ASN1 Error codes */ + +/** + * \name DER constants + * These constants comply with the DER encoded ASN.1 type tags. + * DER encoding uses hexadecimal representation. + * An example DER sequence is:\n + * - 0x02 -- tag indicating INTEGER + * - 0x01 -- length in octets + * - 0x05 -- value + * Such sequences are typically read into \c ::mbedtls_x509_buf. + * \{ + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN 0x01 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER 0x02 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING 0x03 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 0x04 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL 0x05 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID 0x06 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED 0x0A +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING 0x0C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x10 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET 0x11 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING 0x13 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING 0x14 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING 0x16 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME 0x17 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME 0x18 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING 0x1C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING 0x1E +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE 0x00 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED 0x20 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 0x80 + +/* Slightly smaller way to check if tag is a string tag + * compared to canonical implementation. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG( tag ) \ + ( ( tag ) < 32u && ( \ + ( ( 1u << ( tag ) ) & ( ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) | \ + ( 1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) ) != 0 ) ) + +/* + * Bit masks for each of the components of an ASN.1 tag as specified in + * ITU X.690 (08/2015), section 8.1 "General rules for encoding", + * paragraph 8.1.2.2: + * + * Bit 8 7 6 5 1 + * +-------+-----+------------+ + * | Class | P/C | Tag number | + * +-------+-----+------------+ + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK 0xC0 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_PC_MASK 0x20 +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK 0x1F + +/** \} name DER constants */ + +/** Returns the size of the binary string, without the trailing \\0 */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) - 1) + +/** + * Compares an mbedtls_asn1_buf structure to a reference OID. + * + * Only works for 'defined' oid_str values (MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1), you cannot use a + * 'unsigned char *oid' here! + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(oid_str, oid_buf) \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid_str) != (oid_buf)->len ) || \ + memcmp( (oid_str), (oid_buf)->p, (oid_buf)->len) != 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(oid_str, oid_buf, oid_buf_len) \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid_str) != (oid_buf_len) ) || \ + memcmp( (oid_str), (oid_buf), (oid_buf_len) ) != 0 ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \name Functions to parse ASN.1 data structures + * \{ + */ + +/** + * Type-length-value structure that allows for ASN1 using DER. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_buf +{ + int tag; /**< ASN1 type, e.g. MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING. */ + size_t len; /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */ + unsigned char *p; /**< ASN1 data, e.g. in ASCII. */ +} +mbedtls_asn1_buf; + +/** + * Container for ASN1 bit strings. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_bitstring +{ + size_t len; /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */ + unsigned char unused_bits; /**< Number of unused bits at the end of the string */ + unsigned char *p; /**< Raw ASN1 data for the bit string */ +} +mbedtls_asn1_bitstring; + +/** + * Container for a sequence of ASN.1 items + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence +{ + mbedtls_asn1_buf buf; /**< Buffer containing the given ASN.1 item. */ + struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next; /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ +} +mbedtls_asn1_sequence; + +/** + * Container for a sequence or list of 'named' ASN.1 data items + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data +{ + mbedtls_asn1_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ + mbedtls_asn1_buf val; /**< The named value. */ + struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next; /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ + unsigned char next_merged; /**< Merge next item into the current one? */ +} +mbedtls_asn1_named_data; + +/** + * \brief Get the length of an ASN.1 element. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the length. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the first byte of the length, + * i.e. immediately after the tag. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * after the length, i.e. the first byte of the content. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param len On successful completion, \c *len contains the length + * read from the ASN.1 input. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA if the ASN.1 element + * would end beyond \p end. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparsable. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_len( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len ); + +/** + * \brief Get the tag and length of the element. + * Check for the requested tag. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the tag and length. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * after the length, i.e. the first byte of the content. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param len On successful completion, \c *len contains the length + * read from the ASN.1 input. + * \param tag The expected tag. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the data does not start + * with the requested tag. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA if the ASN.1 element + * would end beyond \p end. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparsable. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len, int tag ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve a boolean ASN.1 tag and its value. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the ASN.1 element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param val On success, the parsed value (\c 0 or \c 1). + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 BOOLEAN. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve an integer ASN.1 tag and its value. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the ASN.1 element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param val On success, the parsed value. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 INTEGER. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does + * not fit in an \c int. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_int( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve an enumerated ASN.1 tag and its value. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the ASN.1 element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param val On success, the parsed value. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 ENUMERATED. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does + * not fit in an \c int. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_enum( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve a bitstring ASN.1 tag and its value. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p is equal to \p end. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param bs On success, ::mbedtls_asn1_bitstring information about + * the parsed value. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input contains + * extra data after a valid BIT STRING. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 BIT STRING. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_bitstring *bs ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve a bitstring ASN.1 tag without unused bits and its + * value. + * Updates the pointer to the beginning of the bit/octet string. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * of the content of the BIT STRING. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param len On success, \c *len is the length of the content in bytes. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if the input starts with + * a valid BIT STRING with a nonzero number of unused bits. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 BIT STRING. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len ); + +/** + * \brief Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF ". + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full sequence tag. + * + * This function allocates memory for the sequence elements. You can free + * the allocated memory with mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(). + * + * \note On error, this function may return a partial list in \p cur. + * You must set `cur->next = NULL` before calling this function! + * Otherwise it is impossible to distinguish a previously non-null + * pointer from a pointer to an object allocated by this function. + * + * \note If the sequence is empty, this function does not modify + * \c *cur. If the sequence is valid and non-empty, this + * function sets `cur->buf.tag` to \p tag. This allows + * callers to distinguish between an empty sequence and + * a one-element sequence. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p is equal to \p end. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param cur A ::mbedtls_asn1_sequence which this function fills. + * When this function returns, \c *cur is the head of a linked + * list. Each node in this list is allocated with + * mbedtls_calloc() apart from \p cur itself, and should + * therefore be freed with mbedtls_free(). + * The list describes the content of the sequence. + * The head of the list (i.e. \c *cur itself) describes the + * first element, `*cur->next` describes the second element, etc. + * For each element, `buf.tag == tag`, `buf.len` is the length + * of the content of the content of the element, and `buf.p` + * points to the first byte of the content (i.e. immediately + * past the length of the element). + * Note that list elements may be allocated even on error. + * \param tag Each element of the sequence must have this tag. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input contains + * extra data after a valid SEQUENCE OF \p tag. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the input starts with + * an ASN.1 SEQUENCE in which an element has a tag that + * is different from \p tag. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur, + int tag ); +/** + * \brief Free a heap-allocated linked list presentation of + * an ASN.1 sequence, including the first element. + * + * There are two common ways to manage the memory used for the representation + * of a parsed ASN.1 sequence: + * - Allocate a head node `mbedtls_asn1_sequence *head` with mbedtls_calloc(). + * Pass this node as the `cur` argument to mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(). + * When you have finished processing the sequence, + * call mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free() on `head`. + * - Allocate a head node `mbedtls_asn1_sequence *head` in any manner, + * for example on the stack. Make sure that `head->next == NULL`. + * Pass `head` as the `cur` argument to mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(). + * When you have finished processing the sequence, + * call mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free() on `head->cur`, + * then free `head` itself in the appropriate manner. + * + * \param seq The address of the first sequence component. This may + * be \c NULL, in which case this functions returns + * immediately. + */ +void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free( mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq ); + +/** + * \brief Traverse an ASN.1 SEQUENCE container and + * call a callback for each entry. + * + * This function checks that the input is a SEQUENCE of elements that + * each have a "must" tag, and calls a callback function on the elements + * that have a "may" tag. + * + * For example, to validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of `tag1` and call + * `cb` on each element, use + * ``` + * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0xff, tag1, 0, 0, cb, ctx); + * ``` + * + * To validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of ANY and call `cb` on + * each element, use + * ``` + * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0, 0, 0, 0, cb, ctx); + * ``` + * + * To validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of CHOICE {NULL, OCTET STRING} + * and call `cb` on each element that is an OCTET STRING, use + * ``` + * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0xfe, 0x04, 0xff, 0x04, cb, ctx); + * ``` + * + * The callback is called on the elements with a "may" tag from left to + * right. If the input is not a valid SEQUENCE of elements with a "must" tag, + * the callback is called on the elements up to the leftmost point where + * the input is invalid. + * + * \warning This function is still experimental and may change + * at any time. + * + * \param p The address of the pointer to the beginning of + * the ASN.1 SEQUENCE header. This is updated to + * point to the end of the ASN.1 SEQUENCE container + * on a successful invocation. + * \param end The end of the ASN.1 SEQUENCE container. + * \param tag_must_mask A mask to be applied to the ASN.1 tags found within + * the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_must_value. + * \param tag_must_val The required value of each ASN.1 tag found in the + * SEQUENCE, after masking with \p tag_must_mask. + * Mismatching tags lead to an error. + * For example, a value of \c 0 for both \p tag_must_mask + * and \p tag_must_val means that every tag is allowed, + * while a value of \c 0xFF for \p tag_must_mask means + * that \p tag_must_val is the only allowed tag. + * \param tag_may_mask A mask to be applied to the ASN.1 tags found within + * the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_may_value. + * \param tag_may_val The desired value of each ASN.1 tag found in the + * SEQUENCE, after masking with \p tag_may_mask. + * Mismatching tags will be silently ignored. + * For example, a value of \c 0 for \p tag_may_mask and + * \p tag_may_val means that any tag will be considered, + * while a value of \c 0xFF for \p tag_may_mask means + * that all tags with value different from \p tag_may_val + * will be ignored. + * \param cb The callback to trigger for each component + * in the ASN.1 SEQUENCE that matches \p tag_may_val. + * The callback function is called with the following + * parameters: + * - \p ctx. + * - The tag of the current element. + * - A pointer to the start of the current element's + * content inside the input. + * - The length of the content of the current element. + * If the callback returns a non-zero value, + * the function stops immediately, + * forwarding the callback's return value. + * \param ctx The context to be passed to the callback \p cb. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful the entire ASN.1 SEQUENCE + * was traversed without parsing or callback errors. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input + * contains extra data after a valid SEQUENCE + * of elements with an accepted tag. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the input starts + * with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE in which an element has a tag + * that is not accepted. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE. + * \return A non-zero error code forwarded from the callback + * \p cb in case the latter returns a non-zero value. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char tag_must_mask, unsigned char tag_must_val, + unsigned char tag_may_mask, unsigned char tag_may_val, + int (*cb)( void *ctx, int tag, + unsigned char* start, size_t len ), + void *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** + * \brief Retrieve an integer ASN.1 tag and its value. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the ASN.1 element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param X On success, the parsed value. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with + * a valid ASN.1 INTEGER. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does + * not fit in an \c int. + * \return An MPI error code if the parsed value is too large. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +/** + * \brief Retrieve an AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 sequence. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full + * AlgorithmIdentifier. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the AlgorithmIdentifier element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param alg The buffer to receive the OID. + * \param params The buffer to receive the parameters. + * This is zeroized if there are no parameters. + * + * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 or MPI error code. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve an AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 sequence with NULL or no + * params. + * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full + * AlgorithmIdentifier. + * + * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element. + * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte + * beyond the AlgorithmIdentifier element. + * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined. + * \param end End of data. + * \param alg The buffer to receive the OID. + * + * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 or MPI error code. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg ); + +/** + * \brief Find a specific named_data entry in a sequence or list based on + * the OID. + * + * \param list The list to seek through + * \param oid The OID to look for + * \param len Size of the OID + * + * \return NULL if not found, or a pointer to the existing entry. + */ +mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Free a mbedtls_asn1_named_data entry + * + * \param entry The named data entry to free. + * This function calls mbedtls_free() on + * `entry->oid.p` and `entry->val.p`. + */ +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *entry ); + +/** + * \brief Free all entries in a mbedtls_asn1_named_data list. + * + * \param head Pointer to the head of the list of named data entries to free. + * This function calls mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data() and + * mbedtls_free() on each list element and + * sets \c *head to \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head ); + +/** \} name Functions to parse ASN.1 data structures */ +/** \} addtogroup asn1_module */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* asn1.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5da7654b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h @@ -0,0 +1,370 @@ +/** + * \file asn1write.h + * + * \brief ASN.1 buffer writing functionality + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(g, f) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( ret = (f) ) < 0 ) \ + return( ret ); \ + else \ + (g) += ret; \ + } while( 0 ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Write a length field in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param len The length value to write. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + size_t len ); +/** + * \brief Write an ASN.1 tag in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param tag The tag to write. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char tag ); + +/** + * \brief Write raw buffer data. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param buf The data buffer to write. + * \param size The length of the data buffer. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** + * \brief Write an arbitrary-precision number (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) + * in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param X The MPI to write. + * It must be non-negative. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_mpi *X ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +/** + * \brief Write a NULL tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL) with zero data + * in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start ); + +/** + * \brief Write an OID tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) and data + * in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param oid The OID to write. + * \param oid_len The length of the OID. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write an AlgorithmIdentifier sequence in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param oid The OID of the algorithm to write. + * \param oid_len The length of the algorithm's OID. + * \param par_len The length of the parameters, which must be already written. + * If 0, NULL parameters are added + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + size_t par_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write a boolean tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) and value + * in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param boolean The boolean value to write, either \c 0 or \c 1. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + int boolean ); + +/** + * \brief Write an int tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) and value + * in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param val The integer value to write. + * It must be non-negative. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ); + +/** + * \brief Write an enum tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED) and value + * in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param val The integer value to write. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ); + +/** + * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using a specific + * string encoding tag. + + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param tag The string encoding tag to write, e.g. + * #MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING. + * \param text The string to write. + * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might + * be strictly larger than the number of characters). + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + int tag, const char *text, + size_t text_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using the PrintableString + * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING). + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param text The string to write. + * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might + * be strictly larger than the number of characters). + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write a UTF8 string in ASN.1 format using the UTF8String + * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING). + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param text The string to write. + * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might + * be strictly larger than the number of characters). + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using the IA5String + * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING). + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param text The string to write. + * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might + * be strictly larger than the number of characters). + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ); + +/** + * \brief Write a bitstring tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and + * value in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param buf The bitstring to write. + * \param bits The total number of bits in the bitstring. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits ); + +/** + * \brief This function writes a named bitstring tag + * (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and value in ASN.1 format. + * + * As stated in RFC 5280 Appendix B, trailing zeroes are + * omitted when encoding named bitstrings in DER. + * + * \note This function works backwards within the data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer which is used for bounds-checking. + * \param buf The bitstring to write. + * \param bits The total number of bits in the bitstring. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t bits ); + +/** + * \brief Write an octet string tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) + * and value in ASN.1 format. + * + * \note This function works backwards in data buffer. + * + * \param p The reference to the current position pointer. + * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking. + * \param buf The buffer holding the data to write. + * \param size The length of the data buffer \p buf. + * + * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); + +/** + * \brief Create or find a specific named_data entry for writing in a + * sequence or list based on the OID. If not already in there, + * a new entry is added to the head of the list. + * Warning: Destructive behaviour for the val data! + * + * \param list The pointer to the location of the head of the list to seek + * through (will be updated in case of a new entry). + * \param oid The OID to look for. + * \param oid_len The size of the OID. + * \param val The associated data to store. If this is \c NULL, + * no data is copied to the new or existing buffer. + * \param val_len The minimum length of the data buffer needed. + * If this is 0, do not allocate a buffer for the associated + * data. + * If the OID was already present, enlarge, shrink or free + * the existing buffer to fit \p val_len. + * + * \return A pointer to the new / existing entry on success. + * \return \c NULL if if there was a memory allocation error. + */ +mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **list, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + const unsigned char *val, + size_t val_len ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/base64.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/base64.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cf4149e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/base64.h @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/** + * \file base64.h + * + * \brief RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_H +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +/** Output buffer too small. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x002A +/** Invalid character in input. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER -0x002C + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Encode a buffer into base64 format + * + * \param dst destination buffer + * \param dlen size of the destination buffer + * \param olen number of bytes written + * \param src source buffer + * \param slen amount of data to be encoded + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * *olen is always updated to reflect the amount + * of data that has (or would have) been written. + * If that length cannot be represented, then no data is + * written to the buffer and *olen is set to the maximum + * length representable as a size_t. + * + * \note Call this function with dlen = 0 to obtain the + * required buffer size in *olen + */ +int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *src, size_t slen ); + +/** + * \brief Decode a base64-formatted buffer + * + * \param dst destination buffer (can be NULL for checking size) + * \param dlen size of the destination buffer + * \param olen number of bytes written + * \param src source buffer + * \param slen amount of data to be decoded + * + * \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER if the input data is + * not correct. *olen is always updated to reflect the amount + * of data that has (or would have) been written. + * + * \note Call this function with *dst = NULL or dlen = 0 to obtain + * the required buffer size in *olen + */ +int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *src, size_t slen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_base64_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* base64.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/bignum.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c61db82c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/bignum.h @@ -0,0 +1,1104 @@ +/** + * \file bignum.h + * + * \brief Multi-precision integer library + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +/** An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x0002 +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0004 +/** There is an invalid character in the digit string. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER -0x0006 +/** The buffer is too small to write to. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0008 +/** The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE -0x000A +/** The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO -0x000C +/** The input arguments are not acceptable. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE -0x000E +/** Memory allocation failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED -0x0010 + +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(f) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( ret = (f) ) != 0 ) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * Maximum size MPIs are allowed to grow to in number of limbs. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS 10000 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE) +/* + * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 6 + * Minimum value: 1. Maximum value: 6. + * + * Result is an array of ( 2 ** MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) MPIs used + * for the sliding window calculation. (So 64 by default) + * + * Reduction in size, reduces speed. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) +/* + * Maximum size of MPIs allowed in bits and bytes for user-MPIs. + * ( Default: 512 bytes => 4096 bits, Maximum tested: 2048 bytes => 16384 bits ) + * + * Note: Calculations can temporarily result in larger MPIs. So the number + * of limbs required (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) is higher. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ( 8 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) /**< Maximum number of bits for usable MPIs. */ + +/* + * When reading from files with mbedtls_mpi_read_file() and writing to files with + * mbedtls_mpi_write_file() the buffer should have space + * for a (short) label, the MPI (in the provided radix), the newline + * characters and the '\0'. + * + * By default we assume at least a 10 char label, a minimum radix of 10 + * (decimal) and a maximum of 4096 bit numbers (1234 decimal chars). + * Autosized at compile time for at least a 10 char label, a minimum radix + * of 10 (decimal) for a number of MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS size. + * + * This used to be statically sized to 1250 for a maximum of 4096 bit + * numbers (1234 decimal chars). + * + * Calculate using the formula: + * MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE = ceil(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS / ln(10) * ln(2)) + + * LabelSize + 6 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 ( 100 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) +#define MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 332 +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ( ((MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 + MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 - 1) / MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100) + 10 + 6 ) + +/* + * Define the base integer type, architecture-wise. + * + * 32 or 64-bit integer types can be forced regardless of the underlying + * architecture by defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 or MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + * respectively and undefining MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM. + * + * Double-width integers (e.g. 128-bit in 64-bit architectures) can be + * disabled by defining MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + #if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_AMD64) + /* Always choose 64-bit when using MSC */ + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #elif defined(__GNUC__) && ( \ + defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ + defined(__ppc64__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || \ + defined(__ia64__) || defined(__alpha__) || \ + ( defined(__sparc__) && defined(__arch64__) ) || \ + defined(__s390x__) || defined(__mips64) || \ + defined(__aarch64__) ) + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ + typedef unsigned int mbedtls_t_udbl __attribute__((mode(TI))); + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ + #elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && defined(__aarch64__) + /* + * __ARMCC_VERSION is defined for both armcc and armclang and + * __aarch64__ is only defined by armclang when compiling 64-bit code + */ + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ + typedef __uint128_t mbedtls_t_udbl; + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ + #elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + /* Force 64-bit integers with unknown compiler */ + typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + /* Default to 32-bit compilation */ + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */ + typedef int32_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; + typedef uint32_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + typedef uint64_t mbedtls_t_udbl; + #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + +/** \typedef mbedtls_mpi_uint + * \brief The type of machine digits in a bignum, called _limbs_. + * + * This is always an unsigned integer type with no padding bits. The size + * is platform-dependent. + */ + +/** \typedef mbedtls_mpi_sint + * \brief The signed type corresponding to #mbedtls_mpi_uint. + * + * This is always a signed integer type with no padding bits. The size + * is platform-dependent. + */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief MPI structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_mpi +{ + /** Sign: -1 if the mpi is negative, 1 otherwise. + * + * The number 0 must be represented with `s = +1`. Although many library + * functions treat all-limbs-zero as equivalent to a valid representation + * of 0 regardless of the sign bit, there are exceptions, so bignum + * functions and external callers must always set \c s to +1 for the + * number zero. + * + * Note that this implies that calloc() or `... = {0}` does not create + * a valid MPI representation. You must call mbedtls_mpi_init(). + */ + int s; + + /** Total number of limbs in \c p. */ + size_t n; + + /** Pointer to limbs. + * + * This may be \c NULL if \c n is 0. + */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; +} +mbedtls_mpi; + +/** + * \brief Initialize an MPI context. + * + * This makes the MPI ready to be set or freed, + * but does not define a value for the MPI. + * + * \param X The MPI context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_init( mbedtls_mpi *X ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees the components of an MPI context. + * + * \param X The MPI context to be cleared. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is + * not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized MPI. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_free( mbedtls_mpi *X ); + +/** + * \brief Enlarge an MPI to the specified number of limbs. + * + * \note This function does nothing if the MPI is + * already large enough. + * + * \param X The MPI to grow. It must be initialized. + * \param nblimbs The target number of limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_grow( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ); + +/** + * \brief This function resizes an MPI downwards, keeping at least the + * specified number of limbs. + * + * If \c X is smaller than \c nblimbs, it is resized up + * instead. + * + * \param X The MPI to shrink. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param nblimbs The minimum number of limbs to keep. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * (this can only happen when resizing up). + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ); + +/** + * \brief Make a copy of an MPI. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param Y The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \note The limb-buffer in the destination MPI is enlarged + * if necessary to hold the value in the source MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ); + +/** + * \brief Swap the contents of two MPIs. + * + * \param X The first MPI. It must be initialized. + * \param Y The second MPI. It must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of MPI which doesn't + * reveal whether the condition was true or not. + * + * \param X The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point + * to an initialized MPI. + * \param Y The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an + * initialized MPI. + * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the + * assignment or not. Must be either 0 or 1: + * * \c 1: Perform the assignment `X = Y`. + * * \c 0: Keep the original value of \p X. + * + * \note This function is equivalent to + * `if( assign ) mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, Y );` + * except that it avoids leaking any information about whether + * the assignment was done or not (the above code may leak + * information through branch prediction and/or memory access + * patterns analysis). + * + * \warning If \p assign is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function + * is indeterminate, and the resulting value in \p X might be + * neither its original value nor the value in \p Y. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char assign ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap which doesn't + * reveal whether the condition was true or not. + * + * \param X The first MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param Y The second MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param swap The condition deciding whether to perform + * the swap or not. Must be either 0 or 1: + * * \c 1: Swap the values of \p X and \p Y. + * * \c 0: Keep the original values of \p X and \p Y. + * + * \note This function is equivalent to + * if( swap ) mbedtls_mpi_swap( X, Y ); + * except that it avoids leaking any information about whether + * the swap was done or not (the above code may leak + * information through branch prediction and/or memory access + * patterns analysis). + * + * \warning If \p swap is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function + * is indeterminate, and both \p X and \p Y might end up with + * values different to either of the original ones. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char swap ); + +/** + * \brief Store integer value in MPI. + * + * \param X The MPI to set. This must be initialized. + * \param z The value to use. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lset( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ); + +/** + * \brief Get a specific bit from an MPI. + * + * \param X The MPI to query. This must be initialized. + * \param pos Zero-based index of the bit to query. + * + * \return \c 0 or \c 1 on success, depending on whether bit \c pos + * of \c X is unset or set. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos ); + +/** + * \brief Modify a specific bit in an MPI. + * + * \note This function will grow the target MPI if necessary to set a + * bit to \c 1 in a not yet existing limb. It will not grow if + * the bit should be set to \c 0. + * + * \param X The MPI to modify. This must be initialized. + * \param pos Zero-based index of the bit to modify. + * \param val The desired value of bit \c pos: \c 0 or \c 1. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val ); + +/** + * \brief Return the number of bits of value \c 0 before the + * least significant bit of value \c 1. + * + * \note This is the same as the zero-based index of + * the least significant bit of value \c 1. + * + * \param X The MPI to query. + * + * \return The number of bits of value \c 0 before the least significant + * bit of value \c 1 in \p X. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb( const mbedtls_mpi *X ); + +/** + * \brief Return the number of bits up to and including the most + * significant bit of value \c 1. + * + * * \note This is same as the one-based index of the most + * significant bit of value \c 1. + * + * \param X The MPI to query. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return The number of bits up to and including the most + * significant bit of value \c 1. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( const mbedtls_mpi *X ); + +/** + * \brief Return the total size of an MPI value in bytes. + * + * \param X The MPI to use. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \note The value returned by this function may be less than + * the number of bytes used to store \p X internally. + * This happens if and only if there are trailing bytes + * of value zero. + * + * \return The least number of bytes capable of storing + * the absolute value of \p X. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_size( const mbedtls_mpi *X ); + +/** + * \brief Import an MPI from an ASCII string. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param radix The numeric base of the input string. + * \param s Null-terminated string buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ); + +/** + * \brief Export an MPI to an ASCII string. + * + * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param radix The numeric base of the output string. + * \param buf The buffer to write the string to. This must be writable + * buffer of length \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The available size in Bytes of \p buf. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of the string + * written, including the final \c NULL byte. This must + * not be \c NULL. + * + * \note You can call this function with `buflen == 0` to obtain the + * minimum required buffer size in `*olen`. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the target buffer \p buf + * is too small to hold the value of \p X in the desired base. + * In this case, `*olen` is nonetheless updated to contain the + * size of \p buf required for a successful call. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, + char *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *olen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief Read an MPI from a line in an opened file. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param radix The numeric base of the string representation used + * in the source line. + * \param fin The input file handle to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * + * \note On success, this function advances the file stream + * to the end of the current line or to EOF. + * + * The function returns \c 0 on an empty line. + * + * Leading whitespaces are ignored, as is a + * '0x' prefix for radix \c 16. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the file read buffer + * is too small. + * \return Another negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ); + +/** + * \brief Export an MPI into an opened file. + * + * \param p A string prefix to emit prior to the MPI data. + * For example, this might be a label, or "0x" when + * printing in base \c 16. This may be \c NULL if no prefix + * is needed. + * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param radix The numeric base to be used in the emitted string. + * \param fout The output file handle. This may be \c NULL, in which case + * the output is written to \c stdout. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_file( const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, + int radix, FILE *fout ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/** + * \brief Import an MPI from unsigned big endian binary data. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of the input buffer \p p in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of the input buffer \p p in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( mbedtls_mpi *X, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian. + * Always fills the whole buffer, which will start with zeros + * if the number is smaller. + * + * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer of length + * \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The size of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p X. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian. + * Always fills the whole buffer, which will end with zeros + * if the number is smaller. + * + * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer of length + * \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The size of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p X. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a left-shift on an MPI: X <<= count + * + * \param X The MPI to shift. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param count The number of bits to shift by. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a right-shift on an MPI: X >>= count + * + * \param X The MPI to shift. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param count The number of bits to shift by. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ); + +/** + * \brief Compare the absolute values of two MPIs. + * + * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 1 if `|X|` is greater than `|Y|`. + * \return \c -1 if `|X|` is lesser than `|Y|`. + * \return \c 0 if `|X|` is equal to `|Y|`. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ); + +/** + * \brief Compare two MPIs. + * + * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 1 if \p X is greater than \p Y. + * \return \c -1 if \p X is lesser than \p Y. + * \return \c 0 if \p X is equal to \p Y. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ); + +/** + * \brief Check if an MPI is less than the other in constant time. + * + * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI + * with the same allocated length as Y. + * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI + * with the same allocated length as X. + * \param ret The result of the comparison: + * \c 1 if \p X is less than \p Y. + * \c 0 if \p X is greater than or equal to \p Y. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the allocated length of + * the two input MPIs is not the same. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned *ret ); + +/** + * \brief Compare an MPI with an integer. + * + * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param z The integer value to compare \p X to. + * + * \return \c 1 if \p X is greater than \p z. + * \return \c -1 if \p X is lesser than \p z. + * \return \c 0 if \p X is equal to \p z. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ); + +/** + * \brief Perform an unsigned addition of MPIs: X = |A| + |B| + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The second summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform an unsigned subtraction of MPIs: X = |A| - |B| + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The subtrahend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p B is greater than \p A. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a signed addition of MPIs: X = A + B + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The second summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a signed subtraction of MPIs: X = A - B + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The subtrahend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a signed addition of an MPI and an integer: X = A + b + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param b The second summand. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a signed subtraction of an MPI and an integer: + * X = A - b + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param b The subtrahend. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a multiplication of two MPIs: X = A * B + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first factor. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The second factor. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a multiplication of an MPI with an unsigned integer: + * X = A * b + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first factor. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param b The second factor. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a division with remainder of two MPIs: + * A = Q * B + R + * + * \param Q The destination MPI for the quotient. + * This may be \c NULL if the value of the + * quotient is not needed. This must not alias A or B. + * \param R The destination MPI for the remainder value. + * This may be \c NULL if the value of the + * remainder is not needed. This must not alias A or B. + * \param A The dividend. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The divisor. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p B equals zero. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a division with remainder of an MPI by an integer: + * A = Q * b + R + * + * \param Q The destination MPI for the quotient. + * This may be \c NULL if the value of the + * quotient is not needed. This must not alias A. + * \param R The destination MPI for the remainder value. + * This may be \c NULL if the value of the + * remainder is not needed. This must not alias A. + * \param A The dividend. This must point to an initialized MPi. + * \param b The divisor. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p b equals zero. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a modular reduction. R = A mod B + * + * \param R The destination MPI for the residue value. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The MPI to compute the residue of. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The base of the modular reduction. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p B equals zero. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p B is negative. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a modular reduction with respect to an integer. + * r = A mod b + * + * \param r The address at which to store the residue. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param A The MPI to compute the residue of. + * This must point to an initialized MPi. + * \param b The integer base of the modular reduction. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p b equals zero. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p b is negative. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * This must not alias E or N. + * \param A The base of the exponentiation. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param E The exponent MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param N The base for the modular reduction. This must point to an + * initialized MPI. + * \param prec_RR A helper MPI depending solely on \p N which can be used to + * speed-up multiple modular exponentiations for the same value + * of \p N. This may be \c NULL. If it is not \c NULL, it must + * point to an initialized MPI. If it hasn't been used after + * the call to mbedtls_mpi_init(), this function will compute + * the helper value and store it in \p prec_RR for reuse on + * subsequent calls to this function. Otherwise, the function + * will assume that \p prec_RR holds the helper value set by a + * previous call to mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(), and reuse it. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \c N is negative or + * even, or if \c E is negative. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failures. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR ); + +/** + * \brief Fill an MPI with a number of random bytes. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param size The number of random bytes to generate. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on failure. + * + * \note The bytes obtained from the RNG are interpreted + * as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can + * be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range. + * + * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and + * \p N exclusive. + * + * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG + * and \p min is \c 1. + * + * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound + * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param min The minimum value to return. + * It must be nonnegative. + * \param N The upper bound of the range, exclusive. + * In other words, this is one plus the maximum value to return. + * \p N must be strictly larger than \p min. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p min or \p N is invalid + * or if they are incompatible. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was + * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number + * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N + * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case + * for all usual cryptographic applications. + * \return Another negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi_sint min, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Compute the greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B) + * + * \param G The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The first operand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param B The second operand. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ); + +/** + * \brief Compute the modular inverse: X = A^-1 mod N + * + * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param A The MPI to calculate the modular inverse of. This must point + * to an initialized MPI. + * \param N The base of the modular inversion. This must point to an + * initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p N is less than + * or equal to one. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p has no modular inverse + * with respect to \p N. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *N ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Perform a Miller-Rabin primality test with error + * probability of 2-80. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows + * specifying the number of Miller-Rabin rounds. + * + * \param X The MPI to check for primality. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a + * context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful, i.e. \p X is probably prime. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p X is not prime. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Miller-Rabin primality test. + * + * \warning If \p X is potentially generated by an adversary, for example + * when validating cryptographic parameters that you didn't + * generate yourself and that are supposed to be prime, then + * \p rounds should be at least the half of the security + * strength of the cryptographic algorithm. On the other hand, + * if \p X is chosen uniformly or non-adversarially (as is the + * case when mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime calls this function), then + * \p rounds can be much lower. + * + * \param X The MPI to check for primality. + * This must point to an initialized MPI. + * \param rounds The number of bases to perform the Miller-Rabin primality + * test for. The probability of returning 0 on a composite is + * at most 2-2*\p rounds. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use + * a context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful, i.e. \p X is probably prime. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p X is not prime. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +/** + * \brief Flags for mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime() + * + * Each of these flags is a constraint on the result X returned by + * mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(). + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH = 0x0001, /**< (X-1)/2 is prime too */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR = 0x0002, /**< lower error rate from 2-80 to 2-128 */ +} mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime_flag_t; + +/** + * \brief Generate a prime number. + * + * \param X The destination MPI to store the generated prime in. + * This must point to an initialized MPi. + * \param nbits The required size of the destination MPI in bits. + * This must be between \c 3 and #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS. + * \param flags A mask of flags of type #mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime_flag_t. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use + * a context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful, in which case \p X holds a + * probably prime number. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if `nbits` is not between + * \c 3 and #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* bignum.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d5f80992 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +/** + * \file blowfish.h + * + * \brief Blowfish block cipher + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS 448 +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS 32 +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS 16 /**< Rounds to use. When increasing this value, make sure to extend the initialisation vectors */ +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE 8 /* Blowfish uses 64 bit blocks */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( -0x0016 ) +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +/** Bad input data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0016 + +/** Invalid data input length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0018 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** Blowfish hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0017 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief Blowfish context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_blowfish_context +{ + uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2]; /*!< Blowfish round keys */ + uint32_t S[4][256]; /*!< key dependent S-boxes */ +} +mbedtls_blowfish_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ +#include "blowfish_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a Blowfish context. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to be initialized. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_blowfish_init( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear a Blowfish context. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to be cleared. + * This may be \c NULL, in which case this function + * returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, it must + * point to an initialized Blowfish context. + */ +void mbedtls_blowfish_free( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a Blowfish key schedule operation. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to perform the key schedule on. + * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer of + * length \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be between + * \c 32 and \c 448 and a multiple of \c 8. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a Blowfish-ECB block encryption/decryption operation. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or + * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. + * \param input The input block. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \c 8 Bytes. + * \param output The output block. This must be a writable buffer + * of size \c 8 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief Perform a Blowfish-CBC buffer encryption/decryption operation. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the function same function again on the following + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or + * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be + * multiple of \c 8. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer + * of length \c 8 Bytes. It is updated by this function. + * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p length Bytes. + * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of length + * \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/** + * \brief Perform a Blowfish CFB buffer encryption/decryption operation. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the function same function again on the following + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or + * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param iv_off The offset in the initialization vector. + * The value pointed to must be smaller than \c 8 Bytes. + * It is updated by this function to support the aforementioned + * streaming usage. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer + * of size \c 8 Bytes. It is updated after use. + * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p length Bytes. + * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of length + * \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/** + * \brief Perform a Blowfish-CTR buffer encryption/decryption operation. + * + * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so + * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with + * the same nonce and key. + * + * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: + * + * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over + * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to + * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and + * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p + * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be + * updated by this function. + * + * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**64 + * blocks of data with the same key. + * + * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p + * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a + * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one + * updated by this function internally. + * + * For example, you might reserve the first 4 bytes for the + * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that + * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to + * set the first 4 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce + * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p + * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most + * 2**32 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. + * + * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct + * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. + * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message + * counter. + * + * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and + * that a Blowfish block is 8 bytes. + * + * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its + * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be + * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. + * + * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param nc_off The offset in the current stream_block (for resuming + * within current cipher stream). The offset pointer + * should be \c 0 at the start of a stream and must be + * smaller than \c 8. It is updated by this function. + * \param nonce_counter The 64-bit nonce and counter. This must point to a + * read/write buffer of length \c 8 Bytes. + * \param stream_block The saved stream-block for resuming. This must point to + * a read/write buffer of length \c 8 Bytes. + * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of + * length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* blowfish.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3ba98652 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h @@ -0,0 +1,1008 @@ +/** + * \file bn_mul.h + * + * \brief Multi-precision integer library + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * Multiply source vector [s] with b, add result + * to destination vector [d] and set carry c. + * + * Currently supports: + * + * . IA-32 (386+) . AMD64 / EM64T + * . IA-32 (SSE2) . Motorola 68000 + * . PowerPC, 32-bit . MicroBlaze + * . PowerPC, 64-bit . TriCore + * . SPARC v8 . ARM v3+ + * . Alpha . MIPS32 + * . C, longlong . C, generic + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H +#define MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + + +/* + * Conversion macros for embedded constants: + * build lists of mbedtls_mpi_uint's from lists of unsigned char's grouped by 8, 4 or 2 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ) \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (a) << 0 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (b) << 8 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (c) << 16 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (d) << 24 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( a, b ) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, 0, 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ), \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( e, f, g, h ) + +#else /* 64-bits */ + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ) \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (a) << 0 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (b) << 8 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (c) << 16 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (d) << 24 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (e) << 32 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (f) << 40 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (g) << 48 ) | \ + ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (h) << 56 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( a, b, c, d ) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, c, d, 0, 0, 0, 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( a, b ) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( a, b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ) + +#endif /* bits in mbedtls_mpi_uint */ + +#ifdef KINC_ANDROID +#undef MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) + +#ifndef asm +#define asm __asm +#endif + +/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 ) + +/* + * GCC < 5.0 treated the x86 ebx (which is used for the GOT) as a + * fixed reserved register when building as PIC, leading to errors + * like: bn_mul.h:46:13: error: PIC register clobbered by 'ebx' in 'asm' + * + * This is fixed by an improved register allocator in GCC 5+. From the + * release notes: + * Register allocation improvements: Reuse of the PIC hard register, + * instead of using a fixed register, was implemented on x86/x86-64 + * targets. This improves generated PIC code performance as more hard + * registers can be used. + */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ < 5 && defined(__PIC__) +#define MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_EBX +#endif + +/* + * Disable use of the i386 assembly code below if option -O0, to disable all + * compiler optimisations, is passed, detected with __OPTIMIZE__ + * This is done as the number of registers used in the assembly code doesn't + * work with the -O0 option. + */ +#if defined(__i386__) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && !defined(MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_EBX) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" \ + "movl %5, %%esi \n\t" \ + "movl %6, %%edi \n\t" \ + "movl %7, %%ecx \n\t" \ + "movl %8, %%ebx \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "lodsl \n\t" \ + "mull %%ebx \n\t" \ + "addl %%ecx, %%eax \n\t" \ + "adcl $0, %%edx \n\t" \ + "addl (%%edi), %%eax \n\t" \ + "adcl $0, %%edx \n\t" \ + "movl %%edx, %%ecx \n\t" \ + "stosl \n\t" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) + +#define MULADDC_HUIT \ + "movd %%ecx, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd %%ebx, %%mm0 \n\t" \ + "movd (%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd (%%esi), %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "movd 4(%%esi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "movd 8(%%esi), %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "movd 12(%%esi), %%mm7 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm7 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm2, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 4(%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm4, %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "movd 8(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm6, %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "movd 12(%%edi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm4, %%mm7 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, (%%edi) \n\t" \ + "movd 16(%%esi), %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 20(%%esi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 24(%%esi), %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 4(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 28(%%esi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 16(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 8(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm7, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 20(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 12(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm2, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 24(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 16(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm4, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 28(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 20(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm6, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 24(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 28(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "addl $32, %%edi \n\t" \ + "addl $32, %%esi \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, %%ecx \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "emms \n\t" \ + "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ + "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ + "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ + "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ + ); + +#else + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ + "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ + "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ + "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ + ); +#endif /* SSE2 */ +#endif /* i386 */ + +#if defined(__amd64__) || defined (__x86_64__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "movq (%%rsi), %%rax\n" \ + "mulq %%rbx\n" \ + "addq $8, %%rsi\n" \ + "addq %%rcx, %%rax\n" \ + "movq %%r8, %%rcx\n" \ + "adcq $0, %%rdx\n" \ + "nop \n" \ + "addq %%rax, (%%rdi)\n" \ + "adcq %%rdx, %%rcx\n" \ + "addq $8, %%rdi\n" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + : "+c" (c), "+D" (d), "+S" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ + : "b" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \ + : "rax", "rdx", "r8" \ + ); + +#endif /* AMD64 */ + +#if defined(__aarch64__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldr x4, [%2], #8 \n\t" \ + "ldr x5, [%1] \n\t" \ + "mul x6, x4, %4 \n\t" \ + "umulh x7, x4, %4 \n\t" \ + "adds x5, x5, x6 \n\t" \ + "adc x7, x7, xzr \n\t" \ + "adds x5, x5, %0 \n\t" \ + "adc %0, x7, xzr \n\t" \ + "str x5, [%1], #8 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + : "+r" (c), "+r" (d), "+r" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ + : "r" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \ + : "x4", "x5", "x6", "x7", "cc" \ + ); + +#endif /* Aarch64 */ + +#if defined(__mc68020__) || defined(__mcpu32__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "movl %3, %%a2 \n\t" \ + "movl %4, %%a3 \n\t" \ + "movl %5, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "movl %6, %%d2 \n\t" \ + "moveq #0, %%d0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "moveq #0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "movl %%d3, %0 \n\t" \ + "movl %%a3, %1 \n\t" \ + "movl %%a2, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "d0", "d1", "d2", "d3", "d4", "a2", "a3" \ + ); + +#define MULADDC_HUIT \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" + +#endif /* MC68000 */ + +#if defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__ppc64__) + +#if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ld r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "ld r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "ld r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "ld r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, -8 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, -8 \n\t" \ + "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldu r7, 8(r3) \n\t" \ + "mulld r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ + "mulhdu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ + "adde r8, r8, r5 \n\t" \ + "ld r7, 8(r4) \n\t" \ + "addze r5, r9 \n\t" \ + "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ + "stdu r8, 8(r4) \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, 8 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, 8 \n\t" \ + "std r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "std r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "std r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ + ); + + +#else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ld %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "ld %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "ld %%r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "ld %%r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r3, %%r3, -8 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r4, %%r4, -8 \n\t" \ + "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldu %%r7, 8(%%r3) \n\t" \ + "mulld %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ + "mulhdu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ + "adde %%r8, %%r8, %%r5 \n\t" \ + "ld %%r7, 8(%%r4) \n\t" \ + "addze %%r5, %%r9 \n\t" \ + "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ + "stdu %%r8, 8(%%r4) \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r4, %%r4, 8 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r3, %%r3, 8 \n\t" \ + "std %%r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "std %%r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "std %%r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ + ); + +#endif /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ + +#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) /* end PPC64/begin PPC32 */ + +#if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "lwz r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "lwz r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "lwz r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "lwz r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, -4 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, -4 \n\t" \ + "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "lwzu r7, 4(r3) \n\t" \ + "mullw r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ + "mulhwu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ + "adde r8, r8, r5 \n\t" \ + "lwz r7, 4(r4) \n\t" \ + "addze r5, r9 \n\t" \ + "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ + "stwu r8, 4(r4) \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, 4 \n\t" \ + "stw r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "stw r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "stw r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ + ); + +#else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "lwz %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "lwz %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "lwz %%r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "lwz %%r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r3, %%r3, -4 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r4, %%r4, -4 \n\t" \ + "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "lwzu %%r7, 4(%%r3) \n\t" \ + "mullw %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ + "mulhwu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ + "adde %%r8, %%r8, %%r5 \n\t" \ + "lwz %%r7, 4(%%r4) \n\t" \ + "addze %%r5, %%r9 \n\t" \ + "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ + "stwu %%r8, 4(%%r4) \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r4, %%r4, 4 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r3, %%r3, 4 \n\t" \ + "stw %%r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "stw %%r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "stw %%r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ + ); + +#endif /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ + +#endif /* PPC32 */ + +/* + * The Sparc(64) assembly is reported to be broken. + * Disable it for now, until we're able to fix it. + */ +#if 0 && defined(__sparc__) +#if defined(__sparc64__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ldx %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ + "ldx %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ + "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ + "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ + "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ + "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ + "umul %%o3, %%o4, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "addcc %%o4, %%o2, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "rd %%y, %%g1 \n\t" \ + "addx %%g1, 0, %%g1 \n\t" \ + "addcc %%o4, %%o5, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "st %%o4, [%%o1] \n\t" \ + "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ + "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" + + #define MULADDC_STOP \ + "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ + "stx %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ + "stx %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "g1", "o0", "o1", "o2", "o3", "o4", \ + "o5" \ + ); + +#else /* __sparc64__ */ + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ld %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ + "ld %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ + "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ + "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ + "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ + "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ + "umul %%o3, %%o4, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "addcc %%o4, %%o2, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "rd %%y, %%g1 \n\t" \ + "addx %%g1, 0, %%g1 \n\t" \ + "addcc %%o4, %%o5, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "st %%o4, [%%o1] \n\t" \ + "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ + "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ + "st %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ + "st %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "g1", "o0", "o1", "o2", "o3", "o4", \ + "o5" \ + ); + +#endif /* __sparc64__ */ +#endif /* __sparc__ */ + +#if defined(__microblaze__) || defined(microblaze) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "lwi r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "lwi r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "lwi r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "lwi r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "andi r7, r6, 0xffff \n\t" \ + "bsrli r6, r6, 16 \n\t" + +#if(__BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) +#define MULADDC_LHUI \ + "lhui r9, r3, 0 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ + "lhui r8, r3, 0 \n\t" +#else +#define MULADDC_LHUI \ + "lhui r8, r3, 0 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ + "lhui r9, r3, 0 \n\t" +#endif + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + MULADDC_LHUI \ + "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ + "mul r10, r9, r6 \n\t" \ + "mul r11, r8, r7 \n\t" \ + "mul r12, r9, r7 \n\t" \ + "mul r13, r8, r6 \n\t" \ + "bsrli r8, r10, 16 \n\t" \ + "bsrli r9, r11, 16 \n\t" \ + "add r13, r13, r8 \n\t" \ + "add r13, r13, r9 \n\t" \ + "bslli r10, r10, 16 \n\t" \ + "bslli r11, r11, 16 \n\t" \ + "add r12, r12, r10 \n\t" \ + "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ + "add r12, r12, r11 \n\t" \ + "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ + "lwi r10, r4, 0 \n\t" \ + "add r12, r12, r10 \n\t" \ + "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ + "add r12, r12, r5 \n\t" \ + "addc r5, r13, r0 \n\t" \ + "swi r12, r4, 0 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "swi r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "swi r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "swi r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", \ + "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13" \ + ); + +#endif /* MicroBlaze */ + +#if defined(__tricore__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ld.a %%a2, %3 \n\t" \ + "ld.a %%a3, %4 \n\t" \ + "ld.w %%d4, %5 \n\t" \ + "ld.w %%d1, %6 \n\t" \ + "xor %%d5, %%d5 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ld.w %%d0, [%%a2+] \n\t" \ + "madd.u %%e2, %%e4, %%d0, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "ld.w %%d0, [%%a3] \n\t" \ + "addx %%d2, %%d2, %%d0 \n\t" \ + "addc %%d3, %%d3, 0 \n\t" \ + "mov %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "st.w [%%a3+], %%d2 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "st.w %0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "st.a %1, %%a3 \n\t" \ + "st.a %2, %%a2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "d0", "d1", "e2", "d4", "a2", "a3" \ + ); + +#endif /* TriCore */ + +/* + * Note, gcc -O0 by default uses r7 for the frame pointer, so it complains about + * our use of r7 below, unless -fomit-frame-pointer is passed. + * + * On the other hand, -fomit-frame-pointer is implied by any -Ox options with + * x !=0, which we can detect using __OPTIMIZE__ (which is also defined by + * clang and armcc5 under the same conditions). + * + * So, only use the optimized assembly below for optimized build, which avoids + * the build error and is pretty reasonable anyway. + */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) +#define MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_R7 +#endif + +#if defined(__arm__) && !defined(MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_R7) + +#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ + "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ + "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ + "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" \ + "lsr r7, r3, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r9, r7 \n\t" \ + "lsl r7, r3, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsr r7, r7, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r8, r7 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldmia r0!, {r6} \n\t" \ + "lsr r7, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsl r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsr r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r4, r8 \n\t" \ + "mul r4, r6 \n\t" \ + "mov r3, r9 \n\t" \ + "mul r6, r3 \n\t" \ + "mov r5, r9 \n\t" \ + "mul r5, r7 \n\t" \ + "mov r3, r8 \n\t" \ + "mul r7, r3 \n\t" \ + "lsr r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ + "lsr r3, r7, #16 \n\t" \ + "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ + "add r4, r4, r2 \n\t" \ + "mov r2, #0 \n\t" \ + "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ + "lsl r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ + "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ + "lsl r3, r7, #16 \n\t" \ + "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ + "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ + "ldr r3, [r1] \n\t" \ + "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ + "adc r2, r5 \n\t" \ + "stmia r1!, {r4} \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ + "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ + "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ + "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9", "cc" \ + ); + +#elif (__ARM_ARCH >= 6) && \ + defined (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP) && (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP == 1) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldr r0, [%0], #4 \n\t" \ + "ldr r1, [%1] \n\t" \ + "umaal r1, %2, %3, r0 \n\t" \ + "str r1, [%1], #4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + : "=r" (s), "=r" (d), "=r" (c) \ + : "r" (b), "0" (s), "1" (d), "2" (c) \ + : "r0", "r1", "memory" \ + ); + +#else + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ + "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ + "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ + "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldr r4, [r0], #4 \n\t" \ + "mov r5, #0 \n\t" \ + "ldr r6, [r1] \n\t" \ + "umlal r2, r5, r3, r4 \n\t" \ + "adds r7, r6, r2 \n\t" \ + "adc r2, r5, #0 \n\t" \ + "str r7, [r1], #4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ + "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ + "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ + "r6", "r7", "cc" \ + ); + +#endif /* Thumb */ + +#endif /* ARMv3 */ + +#if defined(__alpha__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ldq $1, %3 \n\t" \ + "ldq $2, %4 \n\t" \ + "ldq $3, %5 \n\t" \ + "ldq $4, %6 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "ldq $6, 0($1) \n\t" \ + "addq $1, 8, $1 \n\t" \ + "mulq $6, $4, $7 \n\t" \ + "umulh $6, $4, $6 \n\t" \ + "addq $7, $3, $7 \n\t" \ + "cmpult $7, $3, $3 \n\t" \ + "ldq $5, 0($2) \n\t" \ + "addq $7, $5, $7 \n\t" \ + "cmpult $7, $5, $5 \n\t" \ + "stq $7, 0($2) \n\t" \ + "addq $2, 8, $2 \n\t" \ + "addq $6, $3, $3 \n\t" \ + "addq $5, $3, $3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "stq $3, %0 \n\t" \ + "stq $2, %1 \n\t" \ + "stq $1, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "$1", "$2", "$3", "$4", "$5", "$6", "$7" \ + ); +#endif /* Alpha */ + +#if defined(__mips__) && !defined(__mips64) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + asm( \ + "lw $10, %3 \n\t" \ + "lw $11, %4 \n\t" \ + "lw $12, %5 \n\t" \ + "lw $13, %6 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + "lw $14, 0($10) \n\t" \ + "multu $13, $14 \n\t" \ + "addi $10, $10, 4 \n\t" \ + "mflo $14 \n\t" \ + "mfhi $9 \n\t" \ + "addu $14, $12, $14 \n\t" \ + "lw $15, 0($11) \n\t" \ + "sltu $12, $14, $12 \n\t" \ + "addu $15, $14, $15 \n\t" \ + "sltu $14, $15, $14 \n\t" \ + "addu $12, $12, $9 \n\t" \ + "sw $15, 0($11) \n\t" \ + "addu $12, $12, $14 \n\t" \ + "addi $11, $11, 4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + "sw $12, %0 \n\t" \ + "sw $11, %1 \n\t" \ + "sw $10, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "$9", "$10", "$11", "$12", "$13", "$14", "$15", "lo", "hi" \ + ); + +#endif /* MIPS */ +#endif /* GNUC */ + +#if (defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)) || defined(__WATCOMC__) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ + __asm mov esi, s \ + __asm mov edi, d \ + __asm mov ecx, c \ + __asm mov ebx, b + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + __asm lodsd \ + __asm mul ebx \ + __asm add eax, ecx \ + __asm adc edx, 0 \ + __asm add eax, [edi] \ + __asm adc edx, 0 \ + __asm mov ecx, edx \ + __asm stosd + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) + +#define EMIT __asm _emit + +#define MULADDC_HUIT \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC9 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC3 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x1F \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x16 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x66 EMIT 0x04 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xE0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x76 EMIT 0x08 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x0C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF8 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCA \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x5F EMIT 0x04 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xDC \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x08 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xEE \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x67 EMIT 0x0C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xFC \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x0F \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x56 EMIT 0x10 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x66 EMIT 0x14 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xE0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x76 EMIT 0x18 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x04 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x5E EMIT 0x1C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD8 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCD \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x10 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xD5 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x08 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCF \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x14 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xE5 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x0C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCA \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x18 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xF5 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x10 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCC \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x1C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xDD \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x14 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCE \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x18 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x1C \ + EMIT 0x83 EMIT 0xC7 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x83 EMIT 0xC6 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0xC9 + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x77 \ + __asm mov c, ecx \ + __asm mov d, edi \ + __asm mov s, esi \ + +#else + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ + __asm mov c, ecx \ + __asm mov d, edi \ + __asm mov s, esi \ + +#endif /* SSE2 */ +#endif /* MSVC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ + +#if !defined(MULADDC_CORE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) + +#define MULADDC_INIT \ +{ \ + mbedtls_t_udbl r; \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1; + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + r = *(s++) * (mbedtls_t_udbl) b; \ + r0 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) r; \ + r1 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint)( r >> biL ); \ + r0 += c; r1 += (r0 < c); \ + r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ + c = r1; *(d++) = r0; + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ +} + +#else +#define MULADDC_INIT \ +{ \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint s0, s1, b0, b1; \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1, rx, ry; \ + b0 = ( b << biH ) >> biH; \ + b1 = ( b >> biH ); + +#define MULADDC_CORE \ + s0 = ( *s << biH ) >> biH; \ + s1 = ( *s >> biH ); s++; \ + rx = s0 * b1; r0 = s0 * b0; \ + ry = s1 * b0; r1 = s1 * b1; \ + r1 += ( rx >> biH ); \ + r1 += ( ry >> biH ); \ + rx <<= biH; ry <<= biH; \ + r0 += rx; r1 += (r0 < rx); \ + r0 += ry; r1 += (r0 < ry); \ + r0 += c; r1 += (r0 < c); \ + r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ + c = r1; *(d++) = r0; + +#define MULADDC_STOP \ +} + +#endif /* C (generic) */ +#endif /* C (longlong) */ + +#endif /* bn_mul.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/camellia.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/camellia.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d39d932f --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/camellia.h @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +/** + * \file camellia.h + * + * \brief Camellia block cipher + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT 0 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( -0x0024 ) +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +/** Bad input data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0024 + +/** Invalid data input length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0026 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** Camellia hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0027 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief CAMELLIA context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_camellia_context +{ + int nr; /*!< number of rounds */ + uint32_t rk[68]; /*!< CAMELLIA round keys */ +} +mbedtls_camellia_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ +#include "camellia_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a CAMELLIA context. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to be initialized. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_camellia_init( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear a CAMELLIA context. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to be cleared. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function returns immediately. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_camellia_free( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA key schedule operation for encryption. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption key to use. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be either \c 128, + * \c 192 or \c 256. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA key schedule operation for decryption. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param key The decryption key. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \p keybits Bits. + * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be either \c 128, + * \c 192 or \c 256. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-ECB block encryption/decryption operation. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * \param input The input block. This must be a readable buffer + * of size \c 16 Bytes. + * \param output The output block. This must be a writable buffer + * of size \c 16 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption operation. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the function same function again on the following + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * \param length The length in Bytes of the input data \p input. + * This must be a multiple of \c 16 Bytes. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer + * of length \c 16 Bytes. It is updated to allow streaming + * use as explained above. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must point to a + * readable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must point to a + * writable buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/** + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + * operation. + * + * \note Due to the nature of CFB mode, you should use the same + * key for both encryption and decryption. In particular, calls + * to this function should be preceded by a key-schedule via + * mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() regardless of whether \p mode + * is #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the function same function again on the following + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * \param length The length of the input data \p input. Any value is allowed. + * \param iv_off The current offset in the IV. This must be smaller + * than \c 16 Bytes. It is updated after this call to allow + * the aforementioned streaming usage. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer + * of length \c 16 Bytes. It is updated after this call to + * allow the aforementioned streaming usage. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a readable + * buffer of size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The buffer to hold the output data. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/** + * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CTR buffer encryption/decryption operation. + * + * *note Due to the nature of CTR mode, you should use the same + * key for both encryption and decryption. In particular, calls + * to this function should be preceded by a key-schedule via + * mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() regardless of whether \p mode + * is #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT. + * + * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so + * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with + * the same nonce and key. + * + * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: + * + * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over + * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to + * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and + * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p + * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be + * updated by this function. + * + * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**128 + * blocks of data with the same key. + * + * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p + * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a + * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one + * updated by this function internally. + * + * For example, you might reserve the first \c 12 Bytes for the + * per-message nonce, and the last \c 4 Bytes for internal use. + * In that case, before calling this function on a new message you + * need to set the first \c 12 Bytes of \p nonce_counter to your + * chosen nonce value, the last four to \c 0, and \p nc_off to \c 0 + * (which will cause \p stream_block to be ignored). That way, you + * can encrypt at most \c 2**96 messages of up to \c 2**32 blocks + * each with the same key. + * + * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct + * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be + * unique. The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a + * message counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, + * but this limits the number of messages that can be securely + * encrypted: for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should + * not encrypt more than 2**32 messages with the same key. + * + * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and + * that a CAMELLIA block is \c 16 Bytes. + * + * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its + * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be + * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. + * + * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * Any value is allowed. + * \param nc_off The offset in the current \p stream_block (for resuming + * within current cipher stream). The offset pointer to + * should be \c 0 at the start of a stream. It is updated + * at the end of this call. + * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. This must be a read/write + * buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. + * \param stream_block The saved stream-block for resuming. This must be a + * read/write buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The input data stream. This must be a readable buffer of + * size \p length Bytes. + * \param output The output data stream. This must be a writable buffer + * of size \p length Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[16], + unsigned char stream_block[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* camellia.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ccm.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ccm.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ece5a901 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ccm.h @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +/** + * \file ccm.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for the CCM authenticated encryption + * mode for block ciphers. + * + * CCM combines Counter mode encryption with CBC-MAC authentication + * for 128-bit block ciphers. + * + * Input to CCM includes the following elements: + *
  • Payload - data that is both authenticated and encrypted.
  • + *
  • Associated data (Adata) - data that is authenticated but not + * encrypted, For example, a header.
  • + *
  • Nonce - A unique value that is assigned to the payload and the + * associated data.
+ * + * Definition of CCM: + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf + * RFC 3610 "Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)" + * + * Related: + * RFC 5116 "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption" + * + * Definition of CCM*: + * IEEE 802.15.4 - IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks + * Integer representation is fixed most-significant-octet-first order and + * the representation of octets is most-significant-bit-first order. This is + * consistent with RFC 3610. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CCM_H +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +/** Bad input parameters to the function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -0x000D +/** Authenticated decryption failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x000F + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** CCM hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0011 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The CCM context-type definition. The CCM context is passed + * to the APIs called. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context +{ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ +} +mbedtls_ccm_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ +#include "ccm_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified CCM context, + * to make references valid, and prepare the context + * for mbedtls_ccm_setkey() or mbedtls_ccm_free(). + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ccm_init( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the CCM context set in the + * \p ctx parameter and sets the encryption key. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to initialize. This must be an initialized + * context. + * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. + * \param key The encryption key. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param keybits The key size in bits. This must be acceptable by the cipher. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A CCM or cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified CCM context + * and underlying cipher sub-context. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to clear. If this is \c NULL, the function + * has no effect. Otherwise, this must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function encrypts a buffer using CCM. + * + * \note The tag is written to a separate buffer. To concatenate + * the \p tag with the \p output, as done in RFC-3610: + * Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM), use + * \p tag = \p output + \p length, and make sure that the + * output buffer is at least \p length + \p tag_len wide. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be + * initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, + * or 13. The length L of the message length field is + * 15 - \p iv_len. + * \param add The additional data field. If \p add_len is greater than + * zero, \p add must be a readable buffer of at least that + * length. + * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes: + * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A CCM or cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function encrypts a buffer using CCM*. + * + * \note The tag is written to a separate buffer. To concatenate + * the \p tag with the \p output, as done in RFC-3610: + * Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM), use + * \p tag = \p output + \p length, and make sure that the + * output buffer is at least \p length + \p tag_len wide. + * + * \note When using this function in a variable tag length context, + * the tag length has to be encoded into the \p iv passed to + * this function. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be + * initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, + * or 13. The length L of the message length field is + * 15 - \p iv_len. + * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p add_len Bytes. + * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes: + * 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. + * + * \warning Passing \c 0 as \p tag_len means that the message is no + * longer authenticated. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A CCM or cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a CCM authenticated decryption of a + * buffer. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be + * initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, + * or 13. The length L of the message length field is + * 15 - \p iv_len. + * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer + * of at least that \p add_len Bytes.. + * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes: + * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. This indicates that the message is authentic. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on calculation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a CCM* authenticated decryption of a + * buffer. + * + * \note When using this function in a variable tag length context, + * the tag length has to be decoded from \p iv and passed to + * this function as \p tag_len. (\p tag needs to be adjusted + * accordingly.) + * + * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be + * initialized and bound to a key. + * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, + * or 13. The length L of the message length field is + * 15 - \p iv_len. + * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least that \p add_len Bytes. + * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least + * that length. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field in Bytes. + * 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. + * + * \warning Passing \c 0 as \p tag_len means that the message is nos + * longer authenticated. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on calculation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/** + * \brief The CCM checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/certs.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/certs.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c93c741c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/certs.h @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +/** + * \file certs.h + * + * \brief Sample certificates and DHM parameters for testing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CERTS_H +#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* List of all PEM-encoded CA certificates, terminated by NULL; + * PEM encoded if MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C is enabled, DER encoded + * otherwise. */ +extern const char * mbedtls_test_cas[]; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[]; + +/* List of all DER-encoded CA certificates, terminated by NULL */ +extern const unsigned char * mbedtls_test_cas_der[]; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +/* Concatenation of all CA certificates in PEM format if available */ +extern const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[]; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +/* + * CA test certificates + */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[]; + +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der[]; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding + * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256[]; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 + * (SHA-256 if enabled, otherwise SHA-1) */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[]; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA + * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ + +extern const char * mbedtls_test_ca_crt; +extern const char * mbedtls_test_ca_key; +extern const char * mbedtls_test_ca_pwd; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_len; + +/* + * Server test certificates + */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[]; + +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der[]; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding + * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256[]; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 + * (SHA-256 if enabled, otherwise SHA-1) */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[]; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA + * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ + +extern const char * mbedtls_test_srv_crt; +extern const char * mbedtls_test_srv_key; +extern const char * mbedtls_test_srv_pwd; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_len; + +/* + * Client test certificates + */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem[]; + +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der[]; +extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der[]; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem_len; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding + * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ + +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa[]; +extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[]; + +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len; + +/* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA + * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ + +extern const char * mbedtls_test_cli_crt; +extern const char * mbedtls_test_cli_key; +extern const char * mbedtls_test_cli_pwd; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_len; +extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_len; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* certs.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03b48714 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h @@ -0,0 +1,228 @@ +/** + * \file chacha20.h + * + * \brief This file contains ChaCha20 definitions and functions. + * + * ChaCha20 is a stream cipher that can encrypt and decrypt + * information. ChaCha was created by Daniel Bernstein as a variant of + * its Salsa cipher https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf + * ChaCha20 is the variant with 20 rounds, that was also standardized + * in RFC 7539. + * + * \author Daniel King + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/** Invalid input parameter(s). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0051 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be + * used. */ +/** Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0053 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0055 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) + +typedef struct mbedtls_chacha20_context +{ + uint32_t state[16]; /*! The state (before round operations). */ + uint8_t keystream8[64]; /*! Leftover keystream bytes. */ + size_t keystream_bytes_used; /*! Number of keystream bytes already used. */ +} +mbedtls_chacha20_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ +#include "chacha20_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified ChaCha20 context. + * + * It must be the first API called before using + * the context. + * + * It is usually followed by calls to + * \c mbedtls_chacha20_setkey() and + * \c mbedtls_chacha20_starts(), then one or more calls to + * to \c mbedtls_chacha20_update(), and finally to + * \c mbedtls_chacha20_free(). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_chacha20_init( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified + * ChaCha20 context. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized context. + * + */ +void mbedtls_chacha20_free( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the encryption/decryption key. + * + * \note After using this function, you must also call + * \c mbedtls_chacha20_starts() to set a nonce before you + * start encrypting/decrypting data with + * \c mbedtls_chacha_update(). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to which the key should be bound. + * It must be initialized. + * \param key The encryption/decryption key. This must be \c 32 Bytes + * in length. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA if ctx or key is NULL. + */ +int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32] ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the nonce and initial counter value. + * + * \note A ChaCha20 context can be re-used with the same key by + * calling this function to change the nonce. + * + * \warning You must never use the same nonce twice with the same key. + * This would void any confidentiality guarantees for the + * messages encrypted with the same nonce and key. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to which the nonce should be bound. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param nonce The nonce. This must be \c 12 Bytes in size. + * \param counter The initial counter value. This is usually \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA if ctx or nonce is + * NULL. + */ +int mbedtls_chacha20_starts( mbedtls_chacha20_context* ctx, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + uint32_t counter ); + +/** + * \brief This function encrypts or decrypts data. + * + * Since ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, the same operation is + * used for encrypting and decrypting data. + * + * \note The \p input and \p output pointers must either be equal or + * point to non-overlapping buffers. + * + * \note \c mbedtls_chacha20_setkey() and + * \c mbedtls_chacha20_starts() must be called at least once + * to setup the context before this function can be called. + * + * \note This function can be called multiple times in a row in + * order to encrypt of decrypt data piecewise with the same + * key and nonce. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to use for encryption or decryption. + * It must be initialized and bound to a key and nonce. + * \param size The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * This must be able to hold \p size Bytes. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chacha20_update( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, + size_t size, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function encrypts or decrypts data with ChaCha20 and + * the given key and nonce. + * + * Since ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, the same operation is + * used for encrypting and decrypting data. + * + * \warning You must never use the same (key, nonce) pair more than + * once. This would void any confidentiality guarantees for + * the messages encrypted with the same nonce and key. + * + * \note The \p input and \p output pointers must either be equal or + * point to non-overlapping buffers. + * + * \param key The encryption/decryption key. + * This must be \c 32 Bytes in length. + * \param nonce The nonce. This must be \c 12 Bytes in size. + * \param counter The initial counter value. This is usually \c 0. + * \param size The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. + * \param output The buffer holding the output data. + * This must be able to hold \p size Bytes. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( const unsigned char key[32], + const unsigned char nonce[12], + uint32_t counter, + size_t size, + const unsigned char* input, + unsigned char* output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief The ChaCha20 checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chacha20_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ed568bc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +/** + * \file chachapoly.h + * + * \brief This file contains the AEAD-ChaCha20-Poly1305 definitions and + * functions. + * + * ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an algorithm for Authenticated Encryption + * with Associated Data (AEAD) that can be used to encrypt and + * authenticate data. It is based on ChaCha20 and Poly1305 by Daniel + * Bernstein and was standardized in RFC 7539. + * + * \author Daniel King + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/* for shared error codes */ +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" + +/** The requested operation is not permitted in the current state. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE -0x0054 +/** Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED -0x0056 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT, /**< The mode value for performing encryption. */ + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT /**< The mode value for performing decryption. */ +} +mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) + +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" + +typedef struct mbedtls_chachapoly_context +{ + mbedtls_chacha20_context chacha20_ctx; /**< The ChaCha20 context. */ + mbedtls_poly1305_context poly1305_ctx; /**< The Poly1305 context. */ + uint64_t aad_len; /**< The length (bytes) of the Additional Authenticated Data. */ + uint64_t ciphertext_len; /**< The length (bytes) of the ciphertext. */ + int state; /**< The current state of the context. */ + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode; /**< Cipher mode (encrypt or decrypt). */ +} +mbedtls_chachapoly_context; + +#else /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ +#include "chachapoly_alt.h" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. + * + * It must be the first API called before using + * the context. It must be followed by a call to + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey() before any operation can be + * done, and to \c mbedtls_chachapoly_free() once all + * operations with that context have been finished. + * + * In order to encrypt or decrypt full messages at once, for + * each message you should make a single call to + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_crypt_and_tag() or + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(). + * + * In order to encrypt messages piecewise, for each + * message you should make a call to + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(), then 0 or more calls to + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(), then 0 or more calls to + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(), then one call to + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(). + * + * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged! Always + * use \c mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt() when possible! + * + * If however this is not possible because the data is too + * large to fit in memory, you need to: + * + * - call \c mbedtls_chachapoly_starts() and (if needed) + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad() as above, + * - call \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update() multiple times and + * ensure its output (the plaintext) is NOT used in any other + * way than placing it in temporary storage at this point, + * - call \c mbedtls_chachapoly_finish() to compute the + * authentication tag and compared it in constant time to the + * tag received with the ciphertext. + * + * If the tags are not equal, you must immediately discard + * all previous outputs of \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(), + * otherwise you can now safely use the plaintext. + * + * \param ctx The ChachaPoly context to initialize. Must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_chachapoly_init( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified + * ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. + * + * \param ctx The ChachaPoly context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function is a no-op. + */ +void mbedtls_chachapoly_free( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the ChaCha20-Poly1305 + * symmetric encryption key. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to which the key should be + * bound. This must be initialized. + * \param key The \c 256 Bit (\c 32 Bytes) key. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32] ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption or + * decryption operation. + * + * \warning You must never use the same nonce twice with the same key. + * This would void any confidentiality and authenticity + * guarantees for the messages encrypted with the same nonce + * and key. + * + * \note If the context is being used for AAD only (no data to + * encrypt or decrypt) then \p mode can be set to any value. + * + * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the + * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param nonce The nonce/IV to use for the message. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 12 Bytes. + * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT (discouraged, see warning). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds additional data to be authenticated + * into an ongoing ChaCha20-Poly1305 operation. + * + * The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD), also called + * Associated Data (AD) is only authenticated but not + * encrypted nor included in the encrypted output. It is + * usually transmitted separately from the ciphertext or + * computed locally by each party. + * + * \note This function is called before data is encrypted/decrypted. + * I.e. call this function to process the AAD before calling + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(). + * + * You may call this function multiple times to process + * an arbitrary amount of AAD. It is permitted to call + * this function 0 times, if no AAD is used. + * + * This function cannot be called any more if data has + * been processed by \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(), + * or if the context has been finished. + * + * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the + * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. This must be initialized + * and bound to a key. + * \param aad_len The length in Bytes of the AAD. The length has no + * restrictions. + * \param aad Buffer containing the AAD. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * if \p ctx or \p aad are NULL. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE + * if the operations has not been started or has been + * finished, or if the AAD has been finished. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len ); + +/** + * \brief Thus function feeds data to be encrypted or decrypted + * into an on-going ChaCha20-Poly1305 + * operation. + * + * The direction (encryption or decryption) depends on the + * mode that was given when calling + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(). + * + * You may call this function multiple times to process + * an arbitrary amount of data. It is permitted to call + * this function 0 times, if no data is to be encrypted + * or decrypted. + * + * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the + * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param len The length (in bytes) of the data to encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input The buffer containing the data to encrypt or decrypt. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `len == 0`. + * \param output The buffer to where the encrypted or decrypted data is + * written. This must be able to hold \p len bytes. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `len == 0`. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE + * if the operation has not been started or has been + * finished. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_update( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function finished the ChaCha20-Poly1305 operation and + * generates the MAC (authentication tag). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param mac The buffer to where the 128-bit (16 bytes) MAC is written. + * + * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the + * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init(). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE + * if the operation has not been started or has been + * finished. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16] ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a complete ChaCha20-Poly1305 + * authenticated encryption with the previously-set key. + * + * \note Before using this function, you must set the key with + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(). + * + * \warning You must never use the same nonce twice with the same key. + * This would void any confidentiality and authenticity + * guarantees for the messages encrypted with the same nonce + * and key. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use (holds the key). + * This must be initialized. + * \param length The length (in bytes) of the data to encrypt or decrypt. + * \param nonce The 96-bit (12 bytes) nonce/IV to use. + * \param aad The buffer containing the additional authenticated + * data (AAD). This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`. + * \param aad_len The length (in bytes) of the AAD data to process. + * \param input The buffer containing the data to encrypt or decrypt. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The buffer to where the encrypted or decrypted data + * is written. This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * \param tag The buffer to where the computed 128-bit (16 bytes) MAC + * is written. This must not be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + unsigned char tag[16] ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a complete ChaCha20-Poly1305 + * authenticated decryption with the previously-set key. + * + * \note Before using this function, you must set the key with + * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(). + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use (holds the key). + * \param length The length (in Bytes) of the data to decrypt. + * \param nonce The \c 96 Bit (\c 12 bytes) nonce/IV to use. + * \param aad The buffer containing the additional authenticated data (AAD). + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`. + * \param aad_len The length (in bytes) of the AAD data to process. + * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication tag. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. + * \param input The buffer containing the data to decrypt. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The buffer to where the decrypted data is written. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED + * if the data was not authentic. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char tag[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief The ChaCha20-Poly1305 checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_chachapoly_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/check_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7ae1ff94 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,958 @@ +/** + * \file check_config.h + * + * \brief Consistency checks for configuration options + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * It is recommended to include this file from your config.h + * in order to catch dependency issues early. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H + +/* + * We assume CHAR_BIT is 8 in many places. In practice, this is true on our + * target platforms, so not an issue, but let's just be extra sure. + */ +#include +#if CHAR_BIT != 8 +#error "mbed TLS requires a platform with 8-bit chars" +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C is required on Windows" +#endif + +/* Fix the config here. Not convenient to put an #ifdef _WIN32 in config.h as + * it would confuse config.py. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT +#endif +#endif /* _WIN32 */ + +#if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) +#error "The NET module is not available for mbed OS - please use the network functions provided by Mbed OS" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \ + !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__) +#error "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING only works with GCC and Clang" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME does not make sense" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#error "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_DHM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) ) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative or PSA-based ECP implementation" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ + ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but not MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED defined, but MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT not disabled" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) ) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !( \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C requires a DRBG module unless MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined or an alternative implementation is used" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 64) +#error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) ) \ + && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 32) +#error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) +#define MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN) +#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN requires building with MemorySanitizer" +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but entropy sources too" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && ( \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_CCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && ( \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK defined, but no alternative implementation enabled" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_HKDF_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) +#error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#error "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) &&\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO must be defined if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO is" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) &&\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO must be defined if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO is" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) ||\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) &&\ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ + !( ( ( defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) ) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) ) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C defined, but not all prerequisites (missing RNG)" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) && \ + ! ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \ + ! defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is not compatible with actual entropy sources" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is not compatible with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined, but it cannot coexist with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO." +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C in configuration with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and \ + MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C requires MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C to be defined." +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C with MBEDTLS_RSA_C requires MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but none of the PKCS1 versions enabled" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 defined without MBEDTLS_SHA512_C" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) ) +#error "One or more versions of the TLS protocol are enabled " \ + "but no key exchange methods defined with MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_xxxx" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but no protocols are active" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)) +#error "Illegal protocol selection" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)) +#error "Illegal protocol selection" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1))) +#error "Illegal protocol selection" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX > 255 +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > 255 +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) +#error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) +#error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) +#error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C defined, single threading implementation required" +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) && !defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 && MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) ) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32/MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif /* (MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 || MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) && !( defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +/* + * Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this + * workaround since this is included by every single file before the + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_xxx_C) that results in empty translation units. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_iso_c_forbids_empty_translation_units; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/cipher.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d83da88 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/cipher.h @@ -0,0 +1,1102 @@ +/** + * \file cipher.h + * + * \brief This file contains an abstraction interface for use with the cipher + * primitives provided by the library. It provides a common interface to all of + * the available cipher operations. + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM +#endif + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/** The selected feature is not available. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x6080 +/** Bad input parameters. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x6100 +/** Failed to allocate memory. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED -0x6180 +/** Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING -0x6200 +/** Decryption of block requires a full block. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED -0x6280 +/** Authentication failed (for AEAD modes). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED -0x6300 +/** The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT -0x6380 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** Cipher hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x6400 + +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN 0x01 /**< Cipher accepts IVs of variable length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN 0x02 /**< Cipher accepts keys of variable length. */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Supported cipher types. + * + * \warning RC4 and DES are considered weak ciphers and their use + * constitutes a security risk. Arm recommends considering stronger + * ciphers instead. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE = 0, /**< Placeholder to mark the end of cipher ID lists. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL, /**< The identity cipher, treated as a stream cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, /**< The AES cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, /**< The DES cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES, /**< The Triple DES cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, /**< The Camellia cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH, /**< The Blowfish cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4, /**< The RC4 cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, /**< The ChaCha20 cipher. */ +} mbedtls_cipher_id_t; + +/** + * \brief Supported {cipher type, cipher mode} pairs. + * + * \warning RC4 and DES are considered weak ciphers and their use + * constitutes a security risk. Arm recommends considering stronger + * ciphers instead. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE = 0, /**< Placeholder to mark the end of cipher-pair lists. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, /**< The identity stream cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CFB128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CFB128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CFB128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CFB128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CFB128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CFB128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, /**< DES cipher with ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, /**< DES cipher with CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, /**< Blowfish cipher with ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, /**< Blowfish cipher with CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, /**< Blowfish cipher with CFB64 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, /**< Blowfish cipher with CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, /**< RC4 cipher with 128-bit mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and ECB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CBC mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CFB-128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CFB-128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CFB-128 mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CTR mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and GCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, /**< AES 128-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, /**< AES 192-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, /**< AES 256-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, /**< AES 128-bit cipher in XTS block mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, /**< AES 256-bit cipher in XTS block mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, /**< ChaCha20 stream cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, /**< ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit NIST KW mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit NIST KW mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit NIST KW mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit NIST KWP mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit NIST KWP mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit NIST KWP mode. */ +} mbedtls_cipher_type_t; + +/** Supported cipher modes. */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE = 0, /**< None. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, /**< The ECB cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, /**< The CBC cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, /**< The CFB cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, /**< The OFB cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, /**< The CTR cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, /**< The GCM cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, /**< The stream cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, /**< The CCM cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, /**< The XTS cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, /**< The ChaCha-Poly cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, /**< The SP800-38F KW mode */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, /**< The SP800-38F KWP mode */ +} mbedtls_cipher_mode_t; + +/** Supported cipher padding types. */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 = 0, /**< PKCS7 padding (default). */ + MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS, /**< ISO/IEC 7816-4 padding. */ + MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN, /**< ANSI X.923 padding. */ + MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS, /**< Zero padding (not reversible). */ + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE, /**< Never pad (full blocks only). */ +} mbedtls_cipher_padding_t; + +/** Type of operation. */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE = -1, + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT = 0, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT, +} mbedtls_operation_t; + +enum { + /** Undefined key length. */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE = 0, + /** Key length, in bits (including parity), for DES keys. */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES = 64, + /** Key length in bits, including parity, for DES in two-key EDE. */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE = 128, + /** Key length in bits, including parity, for DES in three-key EDE. */ + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 = 192, +}; + +/** Maximum length of any IV, in Bytes. */ +/* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. + * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH defined + * in ssl_internal.h. */ +#define MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 + +/** Maximum block size of any cipher, in Bytes. */ +/* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. + * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined + * in ssl_internal.h. */ +#define MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 + +/** Maximum key length, in Bytes. */ +/* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. + * For now, only check whether XTS is enabled which uses 64 Byte keys, + * and use 32 Bytes as an upper bound for the maximum key length otherwise. + * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined + * in ssl_internal.h, which however deliberately ignores the case of XTS + * since the latter isn't used in SSL/TLS. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +#define MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 64 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/** + * Base cipher information (opaque struct). + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_base_t mbedtls_cipher_base_t; + +/** + * CMAC context (opaque struct). + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t mbedtls_cmac_context_t; + +/** + * Cipher information. Allows calling cipher functions + * in a generic way. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_info_t +{ + /** Full cipher identifier. For example, + * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC. + */ + mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; + + /** The cipher mode. For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. */ + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + + /** The cipher key length, in bits. This is the + * default length for variable sized ciphers. + * Includes parity bits for ciphers like DES. + */ + unsigned int key_bitlen; + + /** Name of the cipher. */ + const char * name; + + /** IV or nonce size, in Bytes. + * For ciphers that accept variable IV sizes, + * this is the recommended size. + */ + unsigned int iv_size; + + /** Bitflag comprised of MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN and + * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN indicating whether the + * cipher supports variable IV or variable key sizes, respectively. + */ + int flags; + + /** The block size, in Bytes. */ + unsigned int block_size; + + /** Struct for base cipher information and functions. */ + const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *base; + +} mbedtls_cipher_info_t; + +/** + * Generic cipher context. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_context_t +{ + /** Information about the associated cipher. */ + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + /** Key length to use. */ + int key_bitlen; + + /** Operation that the key of the context has been + * initialized for. + */ + mbedtls_operation_t operation; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + /** Padding functions to use, if relevant for + * the specific cipher mode. + */ + void (*add_padding)( unsigned char *output, size_t olen, size_t data_len ); + int (*get_padding)( unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, size_t *data_len ); +#endif + + /** Buffer for input that has not been processed yet. */ + unsigned char unprocessed_data[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + + /** Number of Bytes that have not been processed yet. */ + size_t unprocessed_len; + + /** Current IV or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode, data unit (or sector) number + * for XTS-mode. */ + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + + /** IV size in Bytes, for ciphers with variable-length IVs. */ + size_t iv_size; + + /** The cipher-specific context. */ + void *cipher_ctx; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + /** CMAC-specific context. */ + mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /** Indicates whether the cipher operations should be performed + * by Mbed TLS' own crypto library or an external implementation + * of the PSA Crypto API. + * This is unset if the cipher context was established through + * mbedtls_cipher_setup(), and set if it was established through + * mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(). + */ + unsigned char psa_enabled; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +} mbedtls_cipher_context_t; + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the list of ciphers supported + * by the generic cipher module. + * + * For any cipher identifier in the returned list, you can + * obtain the corresponding generic cipher information structure + * via mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(), which can then be used + * to prepare a cipher context via mbedtls_cipher_setup(). + * + * + * \return A statically-allocated array of cipher identifiers + * of type cipher_type_t. The last entry is zero. + */ +const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information + * structure associated with the given cipher name. + * + * \param cipher_name Name of the cipher to search for. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * + * \return The cipher information structure associated with the + * given \p cipher_name. + * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( const char *cipher_name ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information + * structure associated with the given cipher type. + * + * \param cipher_type Type of the cipher to search for. + * + * \return The cipher information structure associated with the + * given \p cipher_type. + * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information + * structure associated with the given cipher ID, + * key size and mode. + * + * \param cipher_id The ID of the cipher to search for. For example, + * #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES. + * \param key_bitlen The length of the key in bits. + * \param mode The cipher mode. For example, #MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. + * + * \return The cipher information structure associated with the + * given \p cipher_id. + * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a \p cipher_context as NONE. + * + * \param ctx The context to be initialized. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_cipher_init( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees and clears the cipher-specific + * context of \p ctx. Freeing \p ctx itself remains the + * responsibility of the caller. + * + * \param ctx The context to be freed. If this is \c NULL, the + * function has no effect, otherwise this must point to an + * initialized context. + */ +void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); + + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a cipher context for + * use with the given cipher primitive. + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. This must be initialized. + * \param cipher_info The cipher to use. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the + * cipher-specific context fails. + * + * \internal Currently, the function also clears the structure. + * In future versions, the caller will be required to call + * mbedtls_cipher_init() on the structure first. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief This function initializes a cipher context for + * PSA-based use with the given cipher primitive. + * + * \note See #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO for information on PSA. + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. May not be \c NULL. + * \param cipher_info The cipher to use. + * \param taglen For AEAD ciphers, the length in bytes of the + * authentication tag to use. Subsequent uses of + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() or + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() must provide + * the same tag length. + * For non-AEAD ciphers, the value must be \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the + * cipher-specific context fails. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + size_t taglen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/** + * \brief This function returns the block size of the given cipher. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The block size of the underlying cipher. + * \return \c 0 if \p ctx has not been initialized. + */ +static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, 0 ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return 0; + + return ctx->cipher_info->block_size; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the mode of operation for + * the cipher. For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The mode of operation. + * \return #MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized. + */ +static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE; + + return ctx->cipher_info->mode; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the size of the IV or nonce + * of the cipher, in Bytes. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The recommended IV size if no IV has been set. + * \return \c 0 for ciphers not using an IV or a nonce. + * \return The actual size if an IV has been set. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, 0 ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return 0; + + if( ctx->iv_size != 0 ) + return (int) ctx->iv_size; + + return (int) ctx->cipher_info->iv_size; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the type of the given cipher. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The type of the cipher. + * \return #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized. + */ +static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( + ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; + + return ctx->cipher_info->type; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the name of the given cipher + * as a string. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The name of the cipher. + * \return NULL if \p ctx has not been not initialized. + */ +static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL, 0 ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return 0; + + return ctx->cipher_info->name; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the key length of the cipher. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The key length of the cipher in bits. + * \return #MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE if ctx \p has not been + * initialized. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( + ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE; + + return (int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the operation of the given cipher. + * + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * + * \return The type of operation: #MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_DECRYPT. + * \return #MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized. + */ +static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( + const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( + ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE; + + return ctx->operation; +} + +/** + * \brief This function sets the key to use with the given context. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a cipher information structure. + * \param key The key to use. This must be a readable buffer of at + * least \p key_bitlen Bits. + * \param key_bitlen The key length to use, in Bits. + * \param operation The operation that the key will be used for: + * #MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_DECRYPT. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_operation_t operation ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) +/** + * \brief This function sets the padding mode, for cipher modes + * that use padding. + * + * The default passing mode is PKCS7 padding. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a cipher information structure. + * \param mode The padding mode. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + * if the selected padding mode is not supported. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the cipher mode + * does not support padding. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + +/** + * \brief This function sets the initialization vector (IV) + * or nonce. + * + * \note Some ciphers do not use IVs nor nonce. For these + * ciphers, this function has no effect. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a cipher information structure. + * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. This + * must be a readable buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV. + * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function resets the cipher state. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +/** + * \brief This function adds additional data for AEAD ciphers. + * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. + * This must be called exactly once, after + * mbedtls_cipher_reset(). + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. + * \param ad The additional data to use. This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +/** + * \brief The generic cipher update function. It encrypts or + * decrypts using the given cipher context. Writes as + * many block-sized blocks of data as possible to output. + * Any data that cannot be written immediately is either + * added to the next block, or flushed when + * mbedtls_cipher_finish() is called. + * Exception: For MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, expects a single block + * in size. For example, 16 Bytes for AES. + * + * \note If the underlying cipher is used in GCM mode, all calls + * to this function, except for the last one before + * mbedtls_cipher_finish(), must have \p ilen as a + * multiple of the block size of the cipher. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be able to + * hold at least `ilen + block_size`. This must not be the + * same buffer as \p input. + * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the + * actual number of Bytes written. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE on an + * unsupported mode for a cipher. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, + size_t *olen ); + +/** + * \brief The generic cipher finalization function. If data still + * needs to be flushed from an incomplete block, the data + * contained in it is padded to the size of + * the last block, and written to the \p output buffer. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key. + * \param output The buffer to write data to. This needs to be a writable + * buffer of at least \p block_size Bytes. + * \param olen The length of the data written to the \p output buffer. + * This may not be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED on decryption + * expecting a full block but not receiving one. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING on invalid padding + * while decrypting. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +/** + * \brief This function writes a tag for AEAD ciphers. + * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. + * This must be called after mbedtls_cipher_finish(). + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized, + * bound to a key, and have just completed a cipher + * operation through mbedtls_cipher_finish() the tag for + * which should be written. + * \param tag The buffer to write the tag to. This must be a writable + * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to write. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks the tag for AEAD ciphers. + * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. + * This must be called after mbedtls_cipher_finish(). + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. + * \param tag The buffer holding the tag. This must be a readable + * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to check. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +/** + * \brief The generic all-in-one encryption/decryption function, + * for all ciphers except AEAD constructs. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. + * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p iv_len + * Bytes. + * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV. + * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size + * IV. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be able to + * hold at least `ilen + block_size`. This must not be the + * same buffer as \p input. + * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the + * actual number of Bytes written. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * + * \note Some ciphers do not use IVs nor nonce. For these + * ciphers, use \p iv = NULL and \p iv_len = 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED on decryption + * expecting a full block but not receiving one. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING on invalid padding + * while decrypting. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +/** + * \brief The generic authenticated encryption (AEAD) function. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + * + * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key + * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the + * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must + * not be \c NULL. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note + * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts. + * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. This + * must match the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher + * used, and in particular must not be \c 0. + * + * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up + * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required + * that \c tag == output + ilen. That is, the tag must be + * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; + +/** + * \brief The generic authenticated decryption (AEAD) function. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). + * + * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key + * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). + * + * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer + * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being + * used, making this interface safer. + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the + * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must + * not be \c NULL. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note + * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts. + * \param tag_len The length of the authentication tag. This must match + * the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used, and in + * particular must not be \c 0. + * + * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up + * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required + * that \c tag == input + len. That is, the tag must be + * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +/** + * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function. + * + * \note For AEAD modes, the tag will be appended to the + * ciphertext, as recommended by RFC 5116. + * (NIST_KW doesn't have a separate tag.) + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key, with an AEAD algorithm or NIST_KW. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and may be \c NULL if \p + * iv_len is \c 0. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. For AEAD ciphers, this must + * satisfy the constraints imposed by the cipher used. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p output_len Bytes, and + * must not be \c NULL. + * \param output_len The length of the \p output buffer in Bytes. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must be at least \p ilen + \p tag_len. + * For NIST_KW, this must be at least \p ilen + 8 + * (rounded up to a multiple of 8 if KWP is used); + * \p ilen + 15 is always a safe value. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must match the constraints imposed by + * the cipher used, and in particular must not be \c 0. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function. + * + * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer + * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being + * used, making this interface safer. + * + * \note For AEAD modes, the tag must be appended to the + * ciphertext, as recommended by RFC 5116. + * (NIST_KW doesn't have a separate tag.) + * + * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and + * bound to a key, with an AEAD algorithm or NIST_KW. + * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes and may be \c NULL if \p + * iv_len is \c 0. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. For AEAD ciphers, this must + * satisfy the constraints imposed by the cipher used. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may + * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be + * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. For AEAD ciphers this + * must be at least \p tag_len. For NIST_KW this must be + * at least \c 8. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a + * writable buffer of at least \p output_len Bytes, and + * may be \c NULL if \p output_len is \c 0. + * \param output_len The length of the \p output buffer in Bytes. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must be at least \p ilen - \p tag_len. + * For NIST_KW, this must be at least \p ilen - 8. + * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes + * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a + * writable object of type \c size_t. + * \param tag_len The actual length of the authentication tag. For AEAD + * ciphers, this must match the constraints imposed by + * the cipher used, and in particular must not be \c 0. + * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2484c01c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/** + * \file cipher_internal.h + * + * \brief Cipher wrappers. + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Base cipher information. The non-mode specific functions and values. + */ +struct mbedtls_cipher_base_t +{ + /** Base Cipher type (e.g. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) */ + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher; + + /** Encrypt using ECB */ + int (*ecb_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /** Encrypt using CBC */ + int (*cbc_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + /** Encrypt using CFB (Full length) */ + int (*cfb_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + /** Encrypt using OFB (Full length) */ + int (*ofb_func)( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + /** Encrypt using CTR */ + int (*ctr_func)( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + /** Encrypt or decrypt using XTS. */ + int (*xts_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, + const unsigned char data_unit[16], + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + /** Encrypt using STREAM */ + int (*stream_func)( void *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ); +#endif + + /** Set key for encryption purposes */ + int (*setkey_enc_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ); + + /** Set key for decryption purposes */ + int (*setkey_dec_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen); + + /** Allocate a new context */ + void * (*ctx_alloc_func)( void ); + + /** Free the given context */ + void (*ctx_free_func)( void *ctx ); + +}; + +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info; +} mbedtls_cipher_definition_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET = 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts which */ + /* use raw key material internally imported */ + /* as a volatile key, and which hence need */ + /* to destroy that key when the context is */ + /* freed. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_NOT_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts */ + /* which use a key provided by the */ + /* user, and which hence will not be */ + /* destroyed when the context is freed. */ +} mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership; + +typedef struct +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_id_t slot; + mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership slot_state; +} mbedtls_cipher_context_psa; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +extern const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[]; + +extern int mbedtls_cipher_supported[]; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/cmac.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/cmac.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8934886a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/cmac.h @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +/** + * \file cmac.h + * + * \brief This file contains CMAC definitions and functions. + * + * The Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) Mode for + * Authentication is defined in RFC-4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CMAC_H +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** CMAC hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x007A + +#define MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 +#define MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE 8 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX 16 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of AES. */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX 8 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of 3DES. */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) + +/** + * The CMAC context structure. + */ +struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t +{ + /** The internal state of the CMAC algorithm. */ + unsigned char state[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + + /** Unprocessed data - either data that was not block aligned and is still + * pending processing, or the final block. */ + unsigned char unprocessed_block[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + + /** The length of data pending processing. */ + size_t unprocessed_len; +}; + +#else /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ +#include "cmac_alt.h" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function starts a new CMAC computation + * by setting the CMAC key, and preparing to authenticate + * the input data. + * It must be called with an initialized cipher context. + * + * Once this function has completed, data can be supplied + * to the CMAC computation by calling + * mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(). + * + * To start a CMAC computation using the same key as a previous + * CMAC computation, use mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(). + * + * \note When the CMAC implementation is supplied by an alternate + * implementation (through #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT), some ciphers + * may not be supported by that implementation, and thus + * return an error. Alternate implementations must support + * AES-128 and AES-256, and may support AES-192 and 3DES. + * + * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation, initialized + * as one of the following types: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + * or MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB. + * \param key The CMAC key. + * \param keybits The length of the CMAC key in bits. + * Must be supported by the cipher. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing CMAC + * computation. + * + * The CMAC computation must have previously been started + * by calling mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts() or + * mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset(). + * + * Call this function as many times as needed to input the + * data to be authenticated. + * Once all of the required data has been input, + * call mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish() to obtain the result + * of the CMAC operation. + * + * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * if parameter verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes an ongoing CMAC operation, and + * writes the result to the output buffer. + * + * It should be followed either by + * mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset(), which starts another CMAC + * operation with the same key, or mbedtls_cipher_free(), + * which clears the cipher context. + * + * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation. + * \param output The output buffer for the CMAC checksum result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * if parameter verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a new CMAC operation with the same + * key as the previous one. + * + * It should be called after finishing the previous CMAC + * operation with mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(). + * After calling this function, + * call mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update() to supply the new + * CMAC operation with data. + * + * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * if parameter verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the full generic CMAC + * on the input buffer with the provided key. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The CMAC result is calculated as + * output = generic CMAC(cmac key, input buffer). + * + * \note When the CMAC implementation is supplied by an alternate + * implementation (through #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT), some ciphers + * may not be supported by that implementation, and thus + * return an error. Alternate implementations must support + * AES-128 and AES-256, and may support AES-192 and 3DES. + * + * \param cipher_info The cipher information. + * \param key The CMAC key. + * \param keylen The length of the CMAC key in bits. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The buffer for the generic CMAC result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * if parameter verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac( const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/** + * \brief This function implements the AES-CMAC-PRF-128 pseudorandom + * function, as defined in + * RFC-4615: The Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based + * Message Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 + * (AES-CMAC-PRF-128) Algorithm for the Internet Key + * Exchange Protocol (IKE). + * + * \param key The key to use. + * \param key_len The key length in Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param in_len The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The buffer holding the generated 16 Bytes of + * pseudorandom output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char output[16] ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) +/** + * \brief The CMAC checkup routine. + * + * \note In case the CMAC routines are provided by an alternative + * implementation (i.e. #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT is defined), the + * checkup routine will succeed even if the implementation does + * not support the less widely used AES-192 or 3DES primitives. + * The self-test requires at least AES-128 and AES-256 to be + * supported by the underlying implementation. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_cmac_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40177512 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h @@ -0,0 +1,2529 @@ +/** + * \file compat-1.3.h + * + * \brief Compatibility definitions for using mbed TLS with client code written + * for the PolarSSL naming conventions. + * + * \deprecated Use the new names directly instead + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "Including compat-1.3.h is deprecated" +#endif + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_COMPAT13_H +#define MBEDTLS_COMPAT13_H + +/* + * config.h options + */ +#if defined MBEDTLS_AESNI_C +#define POLARSSL_AESNI_C MBEDTLS_AESNI_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_ALT +#define POLARSSL_AES_ALT MBEDTLS_AES_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_C +#define POLARSSL_AES_C MBEDTLS_AES_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES +#define POLARSSL_AES_ROM_TABLES MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT +#define POLARSSL_ARC4_ALT MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +#define POLARSSL_ARC4_C MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define POLARSSL_ASN1_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#define POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +#define POLARSSL_BASE64_C MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define POLARSSL_BIGNUM_C MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT +#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_ALT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_C MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT +#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_ALT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_C MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY +#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#define POLARSSL_CCM_C MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CERTS_C +#define POLARSSL_CERTS_C MBEDTLS_CERTS_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_C MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +#define POLARSSL_DEBUG_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED +#define POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_REMOVED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING +#define POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_WARNING MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_DES_ALT +#define POLARSSL_DES_ALT MBEDTLS_DES_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_DES_C +#define POLARSSL_DES_C MBEDTLS_DES_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#define POLARSSL_DHM_C MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +#define POLARSSL_ECDH_C MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_C MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC +#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define POLARSSL_ECP_C MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM +#define POLARSSL_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS +#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM +#define POLARSSL_ECP_NIST_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE +#define POLARSSL_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES +#define POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_C MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 +#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_C +#define POLARSSL_ERROR_C MBEDTLS_ERROR_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY +#define POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_FS_IO +#define POLARSSL_FS_IO MBEDTLS_FS_IO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#define POLARSSL_GCM_C MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +#define POLARSSL_GENPRIME MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C +#define POLARSSL_HAVEGE_C MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_ASM MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_SSE2 MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT +#define POLARSSL_MD2_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_C +#define POLARSSL_MD2_C MBEDTLS_MD2_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_MD2_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT +#define POLARSSL_MD4_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_C +#define POLARSSL_MD4_C MBEDTLS_MD4_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_MD4_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT +#define POLARSSL_MD5_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#define POLARSSL_MD5_C MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_MD5_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define POLARSSL_MD_C MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE +#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE +#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BACKTRACE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C +#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG +#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_DEBUG MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE +#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE +#define POLARSSL_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_NET_C +#define POLARSSL_NET_C MBEDTLS_NET_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES +#define POLARSSL_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY +#define POLARSSL_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define POLARSSL_OID_C MBEDTLS_OID_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C +#define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_C MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +#define POLARSSL_PEM_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C +#define POLARSSL_PEM_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C +#define POLARSSL_PKCS11_C MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +#define POLARSSL_PKCS12_C MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#define POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#define POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +#define POLARSSL_PKCS5_C MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define POLARSSL_PK_C MBEDTLS_PK_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED +#define POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT +#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#define POLARSSL_PK_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_C MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_MEMORY MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FREE MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN +#define POLARSSL_PSK_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES +#define POLARSSL_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT +#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_C MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define POLARSSL_RSA_C MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT +#define POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +#define POLARSSL_SELF_TEST MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT +#define POLARSSL_SHA1_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +#define POLARSSL_SHA1_C MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT +#define POLARSSL_SHA256_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define POLARSSL_SHA256_C MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT +#define POLARSSL_SHA512_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#define POLARSSL_SHA512_C MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT +#define POLARSSL_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES +#define POLARSSL_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN +#define POLARSSL_SSL_ALPN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +#define POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING +#define POLARSSL_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#define POLARSSL_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C +#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT +#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL +#define POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY +#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT +#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY +#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +#define POLARSSL_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +#define POLARSSL_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV +#define POLARSSL_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL +#define POLARSSL_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_DTLS MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 +#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 +#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +#define POLARSSL_SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION +#define POLARSSL_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS +#define POLARSSL_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE +#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO +#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C +#define POLARSSL_SSL_TLS_C MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +#define POLARSSL_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT +#define POLARSSL_THREADING_ALT MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_C +#define POLARSSL_THREADING_C MBEDTLS_THREADING_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD +#define POLARSSL_THREADING_PTHREAD MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT +#define POLARSSL_TIMING_ALT MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_TIMING_C +#define POLARSSL_TIMING_C MBEDTLS_TIMING_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_VERSION_C +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_C MBEDTLS_VERSION_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_FEATURES MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 +#define POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION +#define POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#define POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE +#define POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_CREATE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_CRL_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA +#define POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT +#define POLARSSL_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +#define POLARSSL_X509_USE_C MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT +#define POLARSSL_XTEA_ALT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_XTEA_C +#define POLARSSL_XTEA_C MBEDTLS_XTEA_C +#endif +#if defined MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT +#define POLARSSL_ZLIB_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT +#endif + +/* + * Misc names (macros, types, functions, enum constants...) + */ +#define AES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT +#define AES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT +#define ASN1_BIT_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING +#define ASN1_BMP_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING +#define ASN1_BOOLEAN MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN +#define ASN1_CHK_ADD MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD +#define ASN1_CONSTRUCTED MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED +#define ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC +#define ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME +#define ASN1_IA5_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING +#define ASN1_INTEGER MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER +#define ASN1_NULL MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL +#define ASN1_OCTET_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING +#define ASN1_OID MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID +#define ASN1_PRIMITIVE MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE +#define ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING +#define ASN1_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE +#define ASN1_SET MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET +#define ASN1_T61_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING +#define ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING +#define ASN1_UTC_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME +#define ASN1_UTF8_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING +#define BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH +#define BADCERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED +#define BADCERT_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE +#define BADCERT_MISSING MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING +#define BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED +#define BADCERT_OTHER MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER +#define BADCERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED +#define BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY +#define BADCRL_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED +#define BADCRL_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE +#define BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED +#define BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE +#define BLOWFISH_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT +#define BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT +#define BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS +#define BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS +#define BLOWFISH_ROUNDS MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS +#define CAMELLIA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT +#define CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT +#define COLLECT_SIZE MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE +#define CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE +#define CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN +#define CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS +#define CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE +#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT +#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +#define CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF +#define CTR_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON +#define CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL +#define CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN +#define DEPRECATED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#define DES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT +#define DES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT +#define DES_KEY_SIZE MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE +#define ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE +#define ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER +#define ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE +#define ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES +#define ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK +#define ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE +#define ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM +#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL +#define EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS +#define EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES +#define EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS +#define EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#define EXT_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL +#define EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY +#define EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME +#define EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE +#define EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS +#define EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE +#define EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS +#define EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS +#define EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME +#define EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS +#define EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define GCM_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT +#define GCM_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT +#define KU_CRL_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN +#define KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT +#define KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE +#define KU_KEY_AGREEMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT +#define KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN +#define KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT +#define KU_NON_REPUDIATION MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION +#define LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 +#define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC +#define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS +#define MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE +#define MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE +#define MPI_CHK MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK +#define NET_PROTO_TCP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP +#define NET_PROTO_UDP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT +#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER +#define OID_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 +#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE +#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD +#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG +#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 +#define OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#define OID_AT MBEDTLS_OID_AT +#define OID_AT_CN MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN +#define OID_AT_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY +#define OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER +#define OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER +#define OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME +#define OID_AT_INITIALS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS +#define OID_AT_LOCALITY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY +#define OID_AT_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION +#define OID_AT_ORG_UNIT MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT +#define OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS +#define OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE +#define OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM +#define OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER +#define OID_AT_STATE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE +#define OID_AT_SUR_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME +#define OID_AT_TITLE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE +#define OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER +#define OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS +#define OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM +#define OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES +#define OID_CLIENT_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH +#define OID_CMP MBEDTLS_OID_CMP +#define OID_CODE_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING +#define OID_COUNTRY_US MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US +#define OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS +#define OID_CRL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_NUMBER +#define OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC +#define OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 +#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 +#define OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT +#define OID_ECDSA_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 +#define OID_ECDSA_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 +#define OID_ECDSA_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 +#define OID_ECDSA_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 +#define OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 +#define OID_EC_ALG_ECDH MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH +#define OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED +#define OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 +#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 +#define OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION +#define OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#define OID_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_FRESHEST_CRL +#define OID_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_GOV +#define OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 +#define OID_ID_CE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE +#define OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY +#define OID_ISO_CCITT_DS MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS +#define OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG +#define OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY +#define OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG +#define OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES +#define OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME +#define OID_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE +#define OID_KP MBEDTLS_OID_KP +#define OID_MGF1 MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1 +#define OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS +#define OID_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE +#define OID_NS_BASE_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_BASE_URL +#define OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL +#define OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL +#define OID_NS_CERT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT +#define OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE +#define OID_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE +#define OID_NS_COMMENT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_COMMENT +#define OID_NS_DATA_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE +#define OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL +#define OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL +#define OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME +#define OID_OCSP_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING +#define OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG +#define OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG +#define OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 +#define OID_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION +#define OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 +#define OID_ORG_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM +#define OID_ORG_DOD MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD +#define OID_ORG_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV +#define OID_ORG_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE +#define OID_ORG_OIW MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW +#define OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY +#define OID_ORG_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST +#define OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS +#define OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 +#define OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 +#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 +#define OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 +#define OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 +#define OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 +#define OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA +#define OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 +#define OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 +#define OID_PKCS1_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 +#define OID_PKCS1_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 +#define OID_PKCS1_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 +#define OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 +#define OID_PKCS5_PBES2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2 +#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC +#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC +#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC +#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC +#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC +#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC +#define OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 +#define OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 +#define OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 +#define OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ +#define OID_PKCS9_EMAIL MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL +#define OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX +#define OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS +#define OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS +#define OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD MBEDTLS_OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD +#define OID_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS +#define OID_RSA_COMPANY MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY +#define OID_RSA_SHA_OBS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS +#define OID_SERVER_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH +#define OID_SIZE MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE +#define OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME +#define OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS +#define OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define OID_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST +#define OID_TIME_STAMPING MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING +#define PADLOCK_ACE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE +#define PADLOCK_ALIGN16 MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16 +#define PADLOCK_PHE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE +#define PADLOCK_PMM MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM +#define PADLOCK_RNG MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG +#define PKCS12_DERIVE_IV MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV +#define PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY +#define PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY +#define PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT +#define PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT +#define PKCS5_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT +#define PKCS5_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT +#define POLARSSL_AESNI_AES MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES +#define POLARSSL_AESNI_CLMUL MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL +#define POLARSSL_AESNI_H MBEDTLS_AESNI_H +#define POLARSSL_AES_H MBEDTLS_AES_H +#define POLARSSL_ARC4_H MBEDTLS_ARC4_H +#define POLARSSL_ASN1_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_H +#define POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H +#define POLARSSL_BASE64_H MBEDTLS_BASE64_H +#define POLARSSL_BIGNUM_H MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H +#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_H MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H +#define POLARSSL_BN_MUL_H MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H +#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_H MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H +#define POLARSSL_CCM_H MBEDTLS_CCM_H +#define POLARSSL_CERTS_H MBEDTLS_CERTS_H +#define POLARSSL_CHECK_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H +#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS +#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG +#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ARC4_128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_3DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN +#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H +#define POLARSSL_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H +#define POLARSSL_DEBUG_H MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H +#define POLARSSL_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT +#define POLARSSL_DES_H MBEDTLS_DES_H +#define POLARSSL_DHM_H MBEDTLS_DHM_H +#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G +#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P +#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G +#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P +#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G +#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P +#define POLARSSL_ECDH_H MBEDTLS_ECDH_H +#define POLARSSL_ECDH_OURS MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS +#define POLARSSL_ECDH_THEIRS MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS +#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_H MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_MAX MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_NONE MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 +#define POLARSSL_ECP_H MBEDTLS_ECP_H +#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BYTES MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES +#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN +#define POLARSSL_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED +#define POLARSSL_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE +#define POLARSSL_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT +#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H +#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_POLL_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H +#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR +#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR +#define POLARSSL_ERROR_H MBEDTLS_ERROR_H +#define POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER +#define POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ +#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY +#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO +#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG +#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION +#define POLARSSL_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_GCM_H MBEDTLS_GCM_H +#define POLARSSL_HAVEGE_H MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_INT32 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_UDBL MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_X86 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 +#define POLARSSL_HAVE_X86_64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED +#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES +#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE +#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 +#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE +#define POLARSSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH +#define POLARSSL_MD2_H MBEDTLS_MD2_H +#define POLARSSL_MD4_H MBEDTLS_MD4_H +#define POLARSSL_MD5_H MBEDTLS_MD5_H +#define POLARSSL_MD_H MBEDTLS_MD_H +#define POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE +#define POLARSSL_MD_MD2 MBEDTLS_MD_MD2 +#define POLARSSL_MD_MD4 MBEDTLS_MD_MD4 +#define POLARSSL_MD_MD5 MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 +#define POLARSSL_MD_NONE MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +#define POLARSSL_MD_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 +#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA1 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 +#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA224 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 +#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA256 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA384 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 +#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA512 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#define POLARSSL_MD_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H +#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H +#define POLARSSL_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC +#define POLARSSL_MODE_CCM MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM +#define POLARSSL_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB +#define POLARSSL_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR +#define POLARSSL_MODE_ECB MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB +#define POLARSSL_MODE_GCM MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM +#define POLARSSL_MODE_NONE MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE +#define POLARSSL_MODE_OFB MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB +#define POLARSSL_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM +#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS +#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 +#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_LIMBS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS +#define POLARSSL_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE +#define POLARSSL_NET_H MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H +#define POLARSSL_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG +#define POLARSSL_OID_H MBEDTLS_OID_H +#define POLARSSL_OPERATION_NONE MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE +#define POLARSSL_PADDING_NONE MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE +#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#define POLARSSL_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS +#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_H MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H +#define POLARSSL_PEM_H MBEDTLS_PEM_H +#define POLARSSL_PKCS11_H MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H +#define POLARSSL_PKCS12_H MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H +#define POLARSSL_PKCS5_H MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H +#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP +#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS +#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI +#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE +#define POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA +#define POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY +#define POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY_DH MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH +#define POLARSSL_PK_H MBEDTLS_PK_H +#define POLARSSL_PK_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_NONE +#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA MBEDTLS_PK_RSA +#define POLARSSL_PK_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS +#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT +#define POLARSSL_PK_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H +#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_H MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H +#define POLARSSL_PREMASTER_SIZE MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE +#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_H MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H +#define POLARSSL_RSA_H MBEDTLS_RSA_H +#define POLARSSL_SHA1_H MBEDTLS_SHA1_H +#define POLARSSL_SHA256_H MBEDTLS_SHA256_H +#define POLARSSL_SHA512_H MBEDTLS_SHA512_H +#define POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H +#define POLARSSL_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H +#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H +#define POLARSSL_SSL_H MBEDTLS_SSL_H +#define POLARSSL_THREADING_H MBEDTLS_THREADING_H +#define POLARSSL_THREADING_IMPL MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#define POLARSSL_TIMING_H MBEDTLS_TIMING_H +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_H MBEDTLS_VERSION_H +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_MAJOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_MINOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_PATCH MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING +#define POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING_FULL MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL +#define POLARSSL_X509_CRL_H MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H +#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_H MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H +#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_H MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H +#define POLARSSL_X509_H MBEDTLS_X509_H +#define POLARSSL_XTEA_H MBEDTLS_XTEA_H +#define RSA_CRYPT MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT +#define RSA_PKCS_V15 MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 +#define RSA_PKCS_V21 MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 +#define RSA_PRIVATE MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE +#define RSA_PUBLIC MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC +#define RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY +#define RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN +#define SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL +#define SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT +#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED +#define SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED +#define SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED +#define SSL_ARC4_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED +#define SSL_ARC4_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED +#define SSL_BUFFER_LEN ( ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ) < ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) ) \ + ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN ) : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) ) +#define SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES +#define SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT +#define SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED +#define SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY +#define SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN +#define SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN +#define SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND +#define SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND +#define SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES +#define SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE +#define SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +#define SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED +#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO +#define SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE +#define SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD +#define SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE +#define SSL_COMPRESS_NULL MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL +#define SSL_DEBUG_BUF MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF +#define SSL_DEBUG_CRT MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT +#define SSL_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP +#define SSL_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI +#define SSL_DEBUG_MSG MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG +#define SSL_DEBUG_RET MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET +#define SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME +#define SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX +#define SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN +#define SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO +#define SSL_ETM_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED +#define SSL_ETM_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED +#define SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED +#define SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED +#define SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV +#define SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS +#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER +#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP +#define SSL_HASH_MD5 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 +#define SSL_HASH_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE +#define SSL_HASH_SHA1 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 +#define SSL_HASH_SHA224 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 +#define SSL_HASH_SHA256 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 +#define SSL_HASH_SHA384 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 +#define SSL_HASH_SHA512 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 +#define SSL_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST +#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE +#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST +#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY +#define SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO +#define SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE +#define SSL_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED +#define SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST +#define SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST +#define SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET +#define SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO +#define SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE +#define SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE +#define SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE +#define SSL_IS_CLIENT MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT +#define SSL_IS_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK +#define SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK +#define SSL_IS_SERVER MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER +#define SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE +#define SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_MAC_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD +#define SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 +#define SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 +#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 +#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 +#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 +#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID +#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE +#define SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION +#define SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION +#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 +#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 +#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 +#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 +#define SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION +#define SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION +#define SSL_MSG_ALERT MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT +#define SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA +#define SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +#define SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE +#define SSL_PADDING_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING +#define SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT +#define SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED +#define SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING +#define SSL_RETRANS_SENDING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING +#define SSL_RETRANS_WAITING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING +#define SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION +#define SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE +#define SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC +#define SSL_SERVER_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT +#define SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE +#define SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET +#define SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED +#define SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED +#define SSL_SIG_ANON MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON +#define SSL_SIG_ECDSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA +#define SSL_SIG_RSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA +#define SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM +#define SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM +#define SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN +#define SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED +#define SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED +#define SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN +#define SSL_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE +#define SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL +#define SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_EXT_ALPN MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN +#define TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +#define TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +#define TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +#define TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO +#define TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME +#define TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME +#define TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET +#define TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG +#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES +#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS +#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT +#define TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 +#define TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define X509_CRT_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 +#define X509_CRT_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 +#define X509_CRT_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 +#define X509_FORMAT_DER MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER +#define X509_FORMAT_PEM MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM +#define X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE +#define X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN +#define X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN +#define XTEA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT +#define XTEA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT +#define _asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring +#define _asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf +#define _asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data +#define _asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence +#define _ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context +#define _ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry +#define _ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t +#define _ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context +#define _ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item +#define _ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params +#define _ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert +#define _ssl_premaster_secret mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret +#define _ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session +#define _ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform +#define _x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl +#define _x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry +#define _x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt +#define _x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr +#define _x509_time mbedtls_x509_time +#define _x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert +#define _x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr +#define aes_context mbedtls_aes_context +#define aes_crypt_cbc mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc +#define aes_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128 +#define aes_crypt_cfb8 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8 +#define aes_crypt_ctr mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr +#define aes_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb +#define aes_free mbedtls_aes_free +#define aes_init mbedtls_aes_init +#define aes_self_test mbedtls_aes_self_test +#define aes_setkey_dec mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec +#define aes_setkey_enc mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc +#define aesni_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb +#define aesni_gcm_mult mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult +#define aesni_inverse_key mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key +#define aesni_setkey_enc mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc +#define aesni_supports mbedtls_aesni_has_support +#define alarmed mbedtls_timing_alarmed +#define arc4_context mbedtls_arc4_context +#define arc4_crypt mbedtls_arc4_crypt +#define arc4_free mbedtls_arc4_free +#define arc4_init mbedtls_arc4_init +#define arc4_self_test mbedtls_arc4_self_test +#define arc4_setup mbedtls_arc4_setup +#define asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring +#define asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf +#define asn1_find_named_data mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data +#define asn1_free_named_data mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data +#define asn1_free_named_data_list mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list +#define asn1_get_alg mbedtls_asn1_get_alg +#define asn1_get_alg_null mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null +#define asn1_get_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring +#define asn1_get_bitstring_null mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null +#define asn1_get_bool mbedtls_asn1_get_bool +#define asn1_get_int mbedtls_asn1_get_int +#define asn1_get_len mbedtls_asn1_get_len +#define asn1_get_mpi mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi +#define asn1_get_sequence_of mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of +#define asn1_get_tag mbedtls_asn1_get_tag +#define asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data +#define asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence +#define asn1_store_named_data mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data +#define asn1_write_algorithm_identifier mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier +#define asn1_write_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring +#define asn1_write_bool mbedtls_asn1_write_bool +#define asn1_write_ia5_string mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string +#define asn1_write_int mbedtls_asn1_write_int +#define asn1_write_len mbedtls_asn1_write_len +#define asn1_write_mpi mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi +#define asn1_write_null mbedtls_asn1_write_null +#define asn1_write_octet_string mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string +#define asn1_write_oid mbedtls_asn1_write_oid +#define asn1_write_printable_string mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string +#define asn1_write_raw_buffer mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer +#define asn1_write_tag mbedtls_asn1_write_tag +#define base64_decode mbedtls_base64_decode +#define base64_encode mbedtls_base64_encode +#define base64_self_test mbedtls_base64_self_test +#define blowfish_context mbedtls_blowfish_context +#define blowfish_crypt_cbc mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc +#define blowfish_crypt_cfb64 mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64 +#define blowfish_crypt_ctr mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr +#define blowfish_crypt_ecb mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb +#define blowfish_free mbedtls_blowfish_free +#define blowfish_init mbedtls_blowfish_init +#define blowfish_setkey mbedtls_blowfish_setkey +#define camellia_context mbedtls_camellia_context +#define camellia_crypt_cbc mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc +#define camellia_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128 +#define camellia_crypt_ctr mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr +#define camellia_crypt_ecb mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb +#define camellia_free mbedtls_camellia_free +#define camellia_init mbedtls_camellia_init +#define camellia_self_test mbedtls_camellia_self_test +#define camellia_setkey_dec mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec +#define camellia_setkey_enc mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc +#define ccm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt +#define ccm_context mbedtls_ccm_context +#define ccm_encrypt_and_tag mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag +#define ccm_free mbedtls_ccm_free +#define ccm_init mbedtls_ccm_init +#define ccm_self_test mbedtls_ccm_self_test +#define cipher_auth_decrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt +#define cipher_auth_encrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt +#define cipher_base_t mbedtls_cipher_base_t +#define cipher_check_tag mbedtls_cipher_check_tag +#define cipher_context_t mbedtls_cipher_context_t +#define cipher_crypt mbedtls_cipher_crypt +#define cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definition_t +#define cipher_definitions mbedtls_cipher_definitions +#define cipher_finish mbedtls_cipher_finish +#define cipher_free mbedtls_cipher_free +#define cipher_get_block_size mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size +#define cipher_get_cipher_mode mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode +#define cipher_get_iv_size mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size +#define cipher_get_key_size mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen +#define cipher_get_name mbedtls_cipher_get_name +#define cipher_get_operation mbedtls_cipher_get_operation +#define cipher_get_type mbedtls_cipher_get_type +#define cipher_id_t mbedtls_cipher_id_t +#define cipher_info_from_string mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string +#define cipher_info_from_type mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type +#define cipher_info_from_values mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values +#define cipher_info_t mbedtls_cipher_info_t +#define cipher_init mbedtls_cipher_init +#define cipher_init_ctx mbedtls_cipher_setup +#define cipher_list mbedtls_cipher_list +#define cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_mode_t +#define cipher_padding_t mbedtls_cipher_padding_t +#define cipher_reset mbedtls_cipher_reset +#define cipher_set_iv mbedtls_cipher_set_iv +#define cipher_set_padding_mode mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode +#define cipher_setkey mbedtls_cipher_setkey +#define cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type_t +#define cipher_update mbedtls_cipher_update +#define cipher_update_ad mbedtls_cipher_update_ad +#define cipher_write_tag mbedtls_cipher_write_tag +#define ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context +#define ctr_drbg_free mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free +#define ctr_drbg_init mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init +#define ctr_drbg_random mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random +#define ctr_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add +#define ctr_drbg_reseed mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed +#define ctr_drbg_self_test mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test +#define ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len +#define ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance +#define ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval +#define ctr_drbg_update mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update +#define ctr_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file +#define ctr_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file +#define debug_print_buf mbedtls_debug_print_buf +#define debug_print_crt mbedtls_debug_print_crt +#define debug_print_ecp mbedtls_debug_print_ecp +#define debug_print_mpi mbedtls_debug_print_mpi +#define debug_print_msg mbedtls_debug_print_msg +#define debug_print_ret mbedtls_debug_print_ret +#define debug_set_threshold mbedtls_debug_set_threshold +#define des3_context mbedtls_des3_context +#define des3_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc +#define des3_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb +#define des3_free mbedtls_des3_free +#define des3_init mbedtls_des3_init +#define des3_set2key_dec mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec +#define des3_set2key_enc mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc +#define des3_set3key_dec mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec +#define des3_set3key_enc mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc +#define des_context mbedtls_des_context +#define des_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc +#define des_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb +#define des_free mbedtls_des_free +#define des_init mbedtls_des_init +#define des_key_check_key_parity mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity +#define des_key_check_weak mbedtls_des_key_check_weak +#define des_key_set_parity mbedtls_des_key_set_parity +#define des_self_test mbedtls_des_self_test +#define des_setkey_dec mbedtls_des_setkey_dec +#define des_setkey_enc mbedtls_des_setkey_enc +#define dhm_calc_secret mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret +#define dhm_context mbedtls_dhm_context +#define dhm_free mbedtls_dhm_free +#define dhm_init mbedtls_dhm_init +#define dhm_make_params mbedtls_dhm_make_params +#define dhm_make_public mbedtls_dhm_make_public +#define dhm_parse_dhm mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm +#define dhm_parse_dhmfile mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile +#define dhm_read_params mbedtls_dhm_read_params +#define dhm_read_public mbedtls_dhm_read_public +#define dhm_self_test mbedtls_dhm_self_test +#define ecdh_calc_secret mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret +#define ecdh_compute_shared mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared +#define ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context +#define ecdh_free mbedtls_ecdh_free +#define ecdh_gen_public mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public +#define ecdh_get_params mbedtls_ecdh_get_params +#define ecdh_init mbedtls_ecdh_init +#define ecdh_make_params mbedtls_ecdh_make_params +#define ecdh_make_public mbedtls_ecdh_make_public +#define ecdh_read_params mbedtls_ecdh_read_params +#define ecdh_read_public mbedtls_ecdh_read_public +#define ecdh_side mbedtls_ecdh_side +#define ecdsa_context mbedtls_ecdsa_context +#define ecdsa_free mbedtls_ecdsa_free +#define ecdsa_from_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair +#define ecdsa_genkey mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey +#define ecdsa_info mbedtls_ecdsa_info +#define ecdsa_init mbedtls_ecdsa_init +#define ecdsa_read_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature +#define ecdsa_sign mbedtls_ecdsa_sign +#define ecdsa_sign_det mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det +#define ecdsa_verify mbedtls_ecdsa_verify +#define ecdsa_write_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature +#define ecdsa_write_signature_det mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det +#define eckey_info mbedtls_eckey_info +#define eckeydh_info mbedtls_eckeydh_info +#define ecp_check_privkey mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey +#define ecp_check_pub_priv mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv +#define ecp_check_pubkey mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey +#define ecp_copy mbedtls_ecp_copy +#define ecp_curve_info mbedtls_ecp_curve_info +#define ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id +#define ecp_curve_info_from_name mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name +#define ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id +#define ecp_curve_list mbedtls_ecp_curve_list +#define ecp_gen_key mbedtls_ecp_gen_key +#define ecp_gen_keypair mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair +#define ecp_group mbedtls_ecp_group +#define ecp_group_copy mbedtls_ecp_group_copy +#define ecp_group_free mbedtls_ecp_group_free +#define ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_group_id +#define ecp_group_init mbedtls_ecp_group_init +#define ecp_grp_id_list mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list +#define ecp_is_zero mbedtls_ecp_is_zero +#define ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecp_keypair +#define ecp_keypair_free mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free +#define ecp_keypair_init mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init +#define ecp_mul mbedtls_ecp_mul +#define ecp_point mbedtls_ecp_point +#define ecp_point_free mbedtls_ecp_point_free +#define ecp_point_init mbedtls_ecp_point_init +#define ecp_point_read_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary +#define ecp_point_read_string mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string +#define ecp_point_write_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary +#define ecp_self_test mbedtls_ecp_self_test +#define ecp_set_zero mbedtls_ecp_set_zero +#define ecp_tls_read_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group +#define ecp_tls_read_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point +#define ecp_tls_write_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group +#define ecp_tls_write_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point +#define ecp_use_known_dp mbedtls_ecp_group_load +#define entropy_add_source mbedtls_entropy_add_source +#define entropy_context mbedtls_entropy_context +#define entropy_free mbedtls_entropy_free +#define entropy_func mbedtls_entropy_func +#define entropy_gather mbedtls_entropy_gather +#define entropy_init mbedtls_entropy_init +#define entropy_self_test mbedtls_entropy_self_test +#define entropy_update_manual mbedtls_entropy_update_manual +#define entropy_update_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file +#define entropy_write_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file +#define error_strerror mbedtls_strerror +#define f_source_ptr mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr +#define gcm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt +#define gcm_context mbedtls_gcm_context +#define gcm_crypt_and_tag mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag +#define gcm_finish mbedtls_gcm_finish +#define gcm_free mbedtls_gcm_free +#define gcm_init mbedtls_gcm_init +#define gcm_self_test mbedtls_gcm_self_test +#define gcm_starts mbedtls_gcm_starts +#define gcm_update mbedtls_gcm_update +#define get_timer mbedtls_timing_get_timer +#define hardclock mbedtls_timing_hardclock +#define hardclock_poll mbedtls_hardclock_poll +#define havege_free mbedtls_havege_free +#define havege_init mbedtls_havege_init +#define havege_poll mbedtls_havege_poll +#define havege_random mbedtls_havege_random +#define havege_state mbedtls_havege_state +#define hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context +#define hmac_drbg_free mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free +#define hmac_drbg_init mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init +#define hmac_drbg_random mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random +#define hmac_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add +#define hmac_drbg_reseed mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed +#define hmac_drbg_self_test mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test +#define hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len +#define hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance +#define hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval +#define hmac_drbg_update mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update +#define hmac_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file +#define hmac_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file +#define hr_time mbedtls_timing_hr_time +#define key_exchange_type_t mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t +#define md mbedtls_md +#define md2 mbedtls_md2 +#define md2_context mbedtls_md2_context +#define md2_finish mbedtls_md2_finish +#define md2_free mbedtls_md2_free +#define md2_info mbedtls_md2_info +#define md2_init mbedtls_md2_init +#define md2_process mbedtls_md2_process +#define md2_self_test mbedtls_md2_self_test +#define md2_starts mbedtls_md2_starts +#define md2_update mbedtls_md2_update +#define md4 mbedtls_md4 +#define md4_context mbedtls_md4_context +#define md4_finish mbedtls_md4_finish +#define md4_free mbedtls_md4_free +#define md4_info mbedtls_md4_info +#define md4_init mbedtls_md4_init +#define md4_process mbedtls_md4_process +#define md4_self_test mbedtls_md4_self_test +#define md4_starts mbedtls_md4_starts +#define md4_update mbedtls_md4_update +#define md5 mbedtls_md5 +#define md5_context mbedtls_md5_context +#define md5_finish mbedtls_md5_finish +#define md5_free mbedtls_md5_free +#define md5_info mbedtls_md5_info +#define md5_init mbedtls_md5_init +#define md5_process mbedtls_md5_process +#define md5_self_test mbedtls_md5_self_test +#define md5_starts mbedtls_md5_starts +#define md5_update mbedtls_md5_update +#define md_context_t mbedtls_md_context_t +#define md_file mbedtls_md_file +#define md_finish mbedtls_md_finish +#define md_free mbedtls_md_free +#define md_get_name mbedtls_md_get_name +#define md_get_size mbedtls_md_get_size +#define md_get_type mbedtls_md_get_type +#define md_hmac mbedtls_md_hmac +#define md_hmac_finish mbedtls_md_hmac_finish +#define md_hmac_reset mbedtls_md_hmac_reset +#define md_hmac_starts mbedtls_md_hmac_starts +#define md_hmac_update mbedtls_md_hmac_update +#define md_info_from_string mbedtls_md_info_from_string +#define md_info_from_type mbedtls_md_info_from_type +#define md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t +#define md_init mbedtls_md_init +#define md_init_ctx mbedtls_md_init_ctx +#define md_list mbedtls_md_list +#define md_process mbedtls_md_process +#define md_starts mbedtls_md_starts +#define md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_t +#define md_update mbedtls_md_update +#define memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get +#define memory_buffer_alloc_free mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free +#define memory_buffer_alloc_init mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init +#define memory_buffer_alloc_max_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get +#define memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset +#define memory_buffer_alloc_self_test mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test +#define memory_buffer_alloc_status mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status +#define memory_buffer_alloc_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify +#define memory_buffer_set_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify +#define mpi mbedtls_mpi +#define mpi_add_abs mbedtls_mpi_add_abs +#define mpi_add_int mbedtls_mpi_add_int +#define mpi_add_mpi mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi +#define mpi_cmp_abs mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs +#define mpi_cmp_int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int +#define mpi_cmp_mpi mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi +#define mpi_copy mbedtls_mpi_copy +#define mpi_div_int mbedtls_mpi_div_int +#define mpi_div_mpi mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi +#define mpi_exp_mod mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod +#define mpi_fill_random mbedtls_mpi_fill_random +#define mpi_free mbedtls_mpi_free +#define mpi_gcd mbedtls_mpi_gcd +#define mpi_gen_prime mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime +#define mpi_get_bit mbedtls_mpi_get_bit +#define mpi_grow mbedtls_mpi_grow +#define mpi_init mbedtls_mpi_init +#define mpi_inv_mod mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod +#define mpi_is_prime mbedtls_mpi_is_prime +#define mpi_lsb mbedtls_mpi_lsb +#define mpi_lset mbedtls_mpi_lset +#define mpi_mod_int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int +#define mpi_mod_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi +#define mpi_msb mbedtls_mpi_bitlen +#define mpi_mul_int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int +#define mpi_mul_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi +#define mpi_read_binary mbedtls_mpi_read_binary +#define mpi_read_file mbedtls_mpi_read_file +#define mpi_read_string mbedtls_mpi_read_string +#define mpi_safe_cond_assign mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign +#define mpi_safe_cond_swap mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap +#define mpi_self_test mbedtls_mpi_self_test +#define mpi_set_bit mbedtls_mpi_set_bit +#define mpi_shift_l mbedtls_mpi_shift_l +#define mpi_shift_r mbedtls_mpi_shift_r +#define mpi_shrink mbedtls_mpi_shrink +#define mpi_size mbedtls_mpi_size +#define mpi_sub_abs mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs +#define mpi_sub_int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int +#define mpi_sub_mpi mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi +#define mpi_swap mbedtls_mpi_swap +#define mpi_write_binary mbedtls_mpi_write_binary +#define mpi_write_file mbedtls_mpi_write_file +#define mpi_write_string mbedtls_mpi_write_string +#define net_accept mbedtls_net_accept +#define net_bind mbedtls_net_bind +#define net_close mbedtls_net_free +#define net_connect mbedtls_net_connect +#define net_recv mbedtls_net_recv +#define net_recv_timeout mbedtls_net_recv_timeout +#define net_send mbedtls_net_send +#define net_set_block mbedtls_net_set_block +#define net_set_nonblock mbedtls_net_set_nonblock +#define net_usleep mbedtls_net_usleep +#define oid_descriptor_t mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t +#define oid_get_attr_short_name mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name +#define oid_get_cipher_alg mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg +#define oid_get_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp +#define oid_get_extended_key_usage mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage +#define oid_get_md_alg mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg +#define oid_get_numeric_string mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string +#define oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp +#define oid_get_oid_by_md mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md +#define oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg +#define oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg +#define oid_get_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg +#define oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg +#define oid_get_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg +#define oid_get_sig_alg_desc mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc +#define oid_get_x509_ext_type mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type +#define operation_t mbedtls_operation_t +#define padlock_supports mbedtls_padlock_has_support +#define padlock_xcryptcbc mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc +#define padlock_xcryptecb mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb +#define pem_context mbedtls_pem_context +#define pem_free mbedtls_pem_free +#define pem_init mbedtls_pem_init +#define pem_read_buffer mbedtls_pem_read_buffer +#define pem_write_buffer mbedtls_pem_write_buffer +#define pk_can_do mbedtls_pk_can_do +#define pk_check_pair mbedtls_pk_check_pair +#define pk_context mbedtls_pk_context +#define pk_debug mbedtls_pk_debug +#define pk_debug_item mbedtls_pk_debug_item +#define pk_debug_type mbedtls_pk_debug_type +#define pk_decrypt mbedtls_pk_decrypt +#define pk_ec mbedtls_pk_ec +#define pk_encrypt mbedtls_pk_encrypt +#define pk_free mbedtls_pk_free +#define pk_get_len mbedtls_pk_get_len +#define pk_get_name mbedtls_pk_get_name +#define pk_get_size mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen +#define pk_get_type mbedtls_pk_get_type +#define pk_info_from_type mbedtls_pk_info_from_type +#define pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t +#define pk_init mbedtls_pk_init +#define pk_init_ctx mbedtls_pk_setup +#define pk_init_ctx_rsa_alt mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt +#define pk_load_file mbedtls_pk_load_file +#define pk_parse_key mbedtls_pk_parse_key +#define pk_parse_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile +#define pk_parse_public_key mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key +#define pk_parse_public_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile +#define pk_parse_subpubkey mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey +#define pk_rsa mbedtls_pk_rsa +#define pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func +#define pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func +#define pk_rsa_alt_sign_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func +#define pk_rsassa_pss_options mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options +#define pk_sign mbedtls_pk_sign +#define pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_type_t +#define pk_verify mbedtls_pk_verify +#define pk_verify_ext mbedtls_pk_verify_ext +#define pk_write_key_der mbedtls_pk_write_key_der +#define pk_write_key_pem mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem +#define pk_write_pubkey mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey +#define pk_write_pubkey_der mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der +#define pk_write_pubkey_pem mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem +#define pkcs11_context mbedtls_pkcs11_context +#define pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt +#define pkcs11_priv_key_free mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free +#define pkcs11_priv_key_init mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind +#define pkcs11_sign mbedtls_pkcs11_sign +#define pkcs11_x509_cert_init mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind +#define pkcs12_derivation mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation +#define pkcs12_pbe mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe +#define pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 +#define pkcs5_pbes2 mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2 +#define pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac +#define pkcs5_self_test mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test +#define platform_entropy_poll mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll +#define platform_set_exit mbedtls_platform_set_exit +#define platform_set_fprintf mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf +#define platform_set_printf mbedtls_platform_set_printf +#define platform_set_snprintf mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf +#define polarssl_exit mbedtls_exit +#define polarssl_fprintf mbedtls_fprintf +#define polarssl_free mbedtls_free +#define polarssl_mutex_free mbedtls_mutex_free +#define polarssl_mutex_init mbedtls_mutex_init +#define polarssl_mutex_lock mbedtls_mutex_lock +#define polarssl_mutex_unlock mbedtls_mutex_unlock +#define polarssl_printf mbedtls_printf +#define polarssl_snprintf mbedtls_snprintf +#define polarssl_strerror mbedtls_strerror +#define ripemd160 mbedtls_ripemd160 +#define ripemd160_context mbedtls_ripemd160_context +#define ripemd160_finish mbedtls_ripemd160_finish +#define ripemd160_free mbedtls_ripemd160_free +#define ripemd160_info mbedtls_ripemd160_info +#define ripemd160_init mbedtls_ripemd160_init +#define ripemd160_process mbedtls_ripemd160_process +#define ripemd160_self_test mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test +#define ripemd160_starts mbedtls_ripemd160_starts +#define ripemd160_update mbedtls_ripemd160_update +#define rsa_alt_context mbedtls_rsa_alt_context +#define rsa_alt_info mbedtls_rsa_alt_info +#define rsa_check_privkey mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey +#define rsa_check_pub_priv mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv +#define rsa_check_pubkey mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey +#define rsa_context mbedtls_rsa_context +#define rsa_copy mbedtls_rsa_copy +#define rsa_free mbedtls_rsa_free +#define rsa_gen_key mbedtls_rsa_gen_key +#define rsa_info mbedtls_rsa_info +#define rsa_init mbedtls_rsa_init +#define rsa_pkcs1_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt +#define rsa_pkcs1_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt +#define rsa_pkcs1_sign mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign +#define rsa_pkcs1_verify mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify +#define rsa_private mbedtls_rsa_private +#define rsa_public mbedtls_rsa_public +#define rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt +#define rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt +#define rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt +#define rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt +#define rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign +#define rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify +#define rsa_rsassa_pss_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign +#define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify +#define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext +#define rsa_self_test mbedtls_rsa_self_test +#define rsa_set_padding mbedtls_rsa_set_padding +#define safer_memcmp mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp +#define set_alarm mbedtls_set_alarm +#define sha1 mbedtls_sha1 +#define sha1_context mbedtls_sha1_context +#define sha1_finish mbedtls_sha1_finish +#define sha1_free mbedtls_sha1_free +#define sha1_info mbedtls_sha1_info +#define sha1_init mbedtls_sha1_init +#define sha1_process mbedtls_sha1_process +#define sha1_self_test mbedtls_sha1_self_test +#define sha1_starts mbedtls_sha1_starts +#define sha1_update mbedtls_sha1_update +#define sha224_info mbedtls_sha224_info +#define sha256 mbedtls_sha256 +#define sha256_context mbedtls_sha256_context +#define sha256_finish mbedtls_sha256_finish +#define sha256_free mbedtls_sha256_free +#define sha256_info mbedtls_sha256_info +#define sha256_init mbedtls_sha256_init +#define sha256_process mbedtls_sha256_process +#define sha256_self_test mbedtls_sha256_self_test +#define sha256_starts mbedtls_sha256_starts +#define sha256_update mbedtls_sha256_update +#define sha384_info mbedtls_sha384_info +#define sha512 mbedtls_sha512 +#define sha512_context mbedtls_sha512_context +#define sha512_finish mbedtls_sha512_finish +#define sha512_free mbedtls_sha512_free +#define sha512_info mbedtls_sha512_info +#define sha512_init mbedtls_sha512_init +#define sha512_process mbedtls_sha512_process +#define sha512_self_test mbedtls_sha512_self_test +#define sha512_starts mbedtls_sha512_starts +#define sha512_update mbedtls_sha512_update +#define source_state mbedtls_entropy_source_state +#define ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context +#define ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry +#define ssl_cache_free mbedtls_ssl_cache_free +#define ssl_cache_get mbedtls_ssl_cache_get +#define ssl_cache_init mbedtls_ssl_cache_init +#define ssl_cache_set mbedtls_ssl_cache_set +#define ssl_cache_set_max_entries mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries +#define ssl_cache_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout +#define ssl_check_cert_usage mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage +#define ssl_ciphersuite_from_id mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id +#define ssl_ciphersuite_from_string mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string +#define ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t +#define ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec +#define ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk +#define ssl_close_notify mbedtls_ssl_close_notify +#define ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context +#define ssl_cookie_check mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check +#define ssl_cookie_check_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t +#define ssl_cookie_ctx mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx +#define ssl_cookie_free mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free +#define ssl_cookie_init mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init +#define ssl_cookie_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout +#define ssl_cookie_setup mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup +#define ssl_cookie_write mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write +#define ssl_cookie_write_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t +#define ssl_derive_keys mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys +#define ssl_dtls_replay_check mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check +#define ssl_dtls_replay_update mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update +#define ssl_fetch_input mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input +#define ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item +#define ssl_flush_output mbedtls_ssl_flush_output +#define ssl_free mbedtls_ssl_free +#define ssl_get_alpn_protocol mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol +#define ssl_get_bytes_avail mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail +#define ssl_get_ciphersuite mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite +#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id +#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_name mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name +#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg +#define ssl_get_peer_cert mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert +#define ssl_get_record_expansion mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion +#define ssl_get_session mbedtls_ssl_get_session +#define ssl_get_verify_result mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result +#define ssl_get_version mbedtls_ssl_get_version +#define ssl_handshake mbedtls_ssl_handshake +#define ssl_handshake_client_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step +#define ssl_handshake_free mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free +#define ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params +#define ssl_handshake_server_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step +#define ssl_handshake_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step +#define ssl_handshake_wrapup mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup +#define ssl_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len +#define ssl_hs_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len +#define ssl_hw_record_activate mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate +#define ssl_hw_record_finish mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish +#define ssl_hw_record_init mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init +#define ssl_hw_record_read mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read +#define ssl_hw_record_reset mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset +#define ssl_hw_record_write mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write +#define ssl_init mbedtls_ssl_init +#define ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert +#define ssl_legacy_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation +#define ssl_list_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites +#define ssl_md_alg_from_hash mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash +#define ssl_optimize_checksum mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum +#define ssl_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_own_cert +#define ssl_own_key mbedtls_ssl_own_key +#define ssl_parse_certificate mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate +#define ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec +#define ssl_parse_finished mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished +#define ssl_pk_alg_from_sig mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig +#define ssl_pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt +#define ssl_pkcs11_key_len mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len +#define ssl_pkcs11_sign mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign +#define ssl_psk_derive_premaster mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster +#define ssl_read mbedtls_ssl_read +#define ssl_read_record mbedtls_ssl_read_record +#define ssl_read_version mbedtls_ssl_read_version +#define ssl_recv_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed +#define ssl_renegotiate mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate +#define ssl_resend mbedtls_ssl_resend +#define ssl_reset_checksum mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum +#define ssl_send_alert_message mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message +#define ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure +#define ssl_send_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed +#define ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session +#define ssl_session_free mbedtls_ssl_session_free +#define ssl_session_init mbedtls_ssl_session_init +#define ssl_session_reset mbedtls_ssl_session_reset +#define ssl_set_alpn_protocols mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols +#define ssl_set_arc4_support mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support +#define ssl_set_authmode mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode +#define ssl_set_bio mbedtls_ssl_set_bio +#define ssl_set_ca_chain mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain +#define ssl_set_cbc_record_splitting mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting +#define ssl_set_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites +#define ssl_set_ciphersuites_for_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version +#define ssl_set_client_transport_id mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id +#define ssl_set_curves mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves +#define ssl_set_dbg mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg +#define ssl_set_dh_param mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param +#define ssl_set_dh_param_ctx mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx +#define ssl_set_dtls_anti_replay mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay +#define ssl_set_dtls_badmac_limit mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit +#define ssl_set_dtls_cookies mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies +#define ssl_set_encrypt_then_mac mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac +#define ssl_set_endpoint mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint +#define ssl_set_extended_master_secret mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret +#define ssl_set_fallback mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback +#define ssl_set_handshake_timeout mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout +#define ssl_set_hostname mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname +#define ssl_set_max_frag_len mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len +#define ssl_set_max_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version +#define ssl_set_min_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version +#define ssl_set_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert +#define ssl_set_psk mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk +#define ssl_set_psk_cb mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb +#define ssl_set_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation +#define ssl_set_renegotiation_enforced mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced +#define ssl_set_renegotiation_period mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period +#define ssl_set_rng mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng +#define ssl_set_session mbedtls_ssl_set_session +#define ssl_set_session_cache mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache +#define ssl_set_session_tickets mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets +#define ssl_set_sni mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni +#define ssl_set_transport mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport +#define ssl_set_truncated_hmac mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac +#define ssl_set_verify mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify +#define ssl_sig_from_pk mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk +#define ssl_states mbedtls_ssl_states +#define ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform +#define ssl_transform_free mbedtls_ssl_transform_free +#define ssl_write mbedtls_ssl_write +#define ssl_write_certificate mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate +#define ssl_write_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec +#define ssl_write_finished mbedtls_ssl_write_finished +#define ssl_write_record mbedtls_ssl_write_record +#define ssl_write_version mbedtls_ssl_write_version +#define supported_ciphers mbedtls_cipher_supported +#define t_sint mbedtls_mpi_sint +#define t_udbl mbedtls_t_udbl +#define t_uint mbedtls_mpi_uint +#define test_ca_crt mbedtls_test_ca_crt +#define test_ca_crt_ec mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec +#define test_ca_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa +#define test_ca_key mbedtls_test_ca_key +#define test_ca_key_ec mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec +#define test_ca_key_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa +#define test_ca_list mbedtls_test_cas_pem +#define test_ca_pwd mbedtls_test_ca_pwd +#define test_ca_pwd_ec mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec +#define test_ca_pwd_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa +#define test_cli_crt mbedtls_test_cli_crt +#define test_cli_crt_ec mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec +#define test_cli_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa +#define test_cli_key mbedtls_test_cli_key +#define test_cli_key_ec mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec +#define test_cli_key_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa +#define test_srv_crt mbedtls_test_srv_crt +#define test_srv_crt_ec mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec +#define test_srv_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa +#define test_srv_key mbedtls_test_srv_key +#define test_srv_key_ec mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec +#define test_srv_key_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa +#define threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_mutex_t +#define threading_set_alt mbedtls_threading_set_alt +#define timing_self_test mbedtls_timing_self_test +#define version_check_feature mbedtls_version_check_feature +#define version_get_number mbedtls_version_get_number +#define version_get_string mbedtls_version_get_string +#define version_get_string_full mbedtls_version_get_string_full +#define x509_bitstring mbedtls_x509_bitstring +#define x509_buf mbedtls_x509_buf +#define x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl +#define x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry +#define x509_crl_free mbedtls_x509_crl_free +#define x509_crl_info mbedtls_x509_crl_info +#define x509_crl_init mbedtls_x509_crl_init +#define x509_crl_parse mbedtls_x509_crl_parse +#define x509_crl_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der +#define x509_crl_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file +#define x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt +#define x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage +#define x509_crt_check_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage +#define x509_crt_free mbedtls_x509_crt_free +#define x509_crt_info mbedtls_x509_crt_info +#define x509_crt_init mbedtls_x509_crt_init +#define x509_crt_parse mbedtls_x509_crt_parse +#define x509_crt_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der +#define x509_crt_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file +#define x509_crt_parse_path mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path +#define x509_crt_revoked mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked +#define x509_crt_verify mbedtls_x509_crt_verify +#define x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr +#define x509_csr_free mbedtls_x509_csr_free +#define x509_csr_info mbedtls_x509_csr_info +#define x509_csr_init mbedtls_x509_csr_init +#define x509_csr_parse mbedtls_x509_csr_parse +#define x509_csr_parse_der mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der +#define x509_csr_parse_file mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file +#define x509_dn_gets mbedtls_x509_dn_gets +#define x509_get_alg mbedtls_x509_get_alg +#define x509_get_alg_null mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null +#define x509_get_ext mbedtls_x509_get_ext +#define x509_get_name mbedtls_x509_get_name +#define x509_get_rsassa_pss_params mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params +#define x509_get_serial mbedtls_x509_get_serial +#define x509_get_sig mbedtls_x509_get_sig +#define x509_get_sig_alg mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg +#define x509_get_time mbedtls_x509_get_time +#define x509_key_size_helper mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper +#define x509_name mbedtls_x509_name +#define x509_self_test mbedtls_x509_self_test +#define x509_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence +#define x509_serial_gets mbedtls_x509_serial_gets +#define x509_set_extension mbedtls_x509_set_extension +#define x509_sig_alg_gets mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets +#define x509_string_to_names mbedtls_x509_string_to_names +#define x509_time mbedtls_x509_time +#define x509_time_expired mbedtls_x509_time_is_past +#define x509_time_future mbedtls_x509_time_is_future +#define x509_write_extensions mbedtls_x509_write_extensions +#define x509_write_names mbedtls_x509_write_names +#define x509_write_sig mbedtls_x509_write_sig +#define x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert +#define x509write_crt_der mbedtls_x509write_crt_der +#define x509write_crt_free mbedtls_x509write_crt_free +#define x509write_crt_init mbedtls_x509write_crt_init +#define x509write_crt_pem mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem +#define x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier +#define x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints +#define x509write_crt_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension +#define x509write_crt_set_issuer_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key +#define x509write_crt_set_issuer_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name +#define x509write_crt_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage +#define x509write_crt_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg +#define x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type +#define x509write_crt_set_serial mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial +#define x509write_crt_set_subject_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key +#define x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier +#define x509write_crt_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name +#define x509write_crt_set_validity mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity +#define x509write_crt_set_version mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version +#define x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr +#define x509write_csr_der mbedtls_x509write_csr_der +#define x509write_csr_free mbedtls_x509write_csr_free +#define x509write_csr_init mbedtls_x509write_csr_init +#define x509write_csr_pem mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem +#define x509write_csr_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension +#define x509write_csr_set_key mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key +#define x509write_csr_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage +#define x509write_csr_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg +#define x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type +#define x509write_csr_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name +#define xtea_context mbedtls_xtea_context +#define xtea_crypt_cbc mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc +#define xtea_crypt_ecb mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb +#define xtea_free mbedtls_xtea_free +#define xtea_init mbedtls_xtea_init +#define xtea_self_test mbedtls_xtea_self_test +#define xtea_setup mbedtls_xtea_setup + +#endif /* compat-1.3.h */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/config.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..480b56fd --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/config.h @@ -0,0 +1,4134 @@ +/** + * \file config.h + * + * \brief Configuration options (set of defines) + * + * This set of compile-time options may be used to enable + * or disable features selectively, and reduce the global + * memory footprint. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 +#endif + +/** + * \name SECTION: System support + * + * This section sets system specific settings. + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * The compiler has support for asm(). + * + * Requires support for asm() in compiler. + * + * Used in: + * library/aria.c + * library/timing.c + * include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h + * + * Required by: + * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + * MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + * + * Comment to disable the use of assembly code. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + * + * The platform lacks support for double-width integer division (64-bit + * division on a 32-bit platform, 128-bit division on a 64-bit platform). + * + * Used in: + * include/mbedtls/bignum.h + * library/bignum.c + * + * The bignum code uses double-width division to speed up some operations. + * Double-width division is often implemented in software that needs to + * be linked with the program. The presence of a double-width integer + * type is usually detected automatically through preprocessor macros, + * but the automatic detection cannot know whether the code needs to + * and can be linked with an implementation of division for that type. + * By default division is assumed to be usable if the type is present. + * Uncomment this option to prevent the use of double-width division. + * + * Note that division for the native integer type is always required. + * Furthermore, a 64-bit type is always required even on a 32-bit + * platform, but it need not support multiplication or division. In some + * cases it is also desirable to disable some double-width operations. For + * example, if double-width division is implemented in software, disabling + * it can reduce code size in some embedded targets. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION + * + * The platform lacks support for 32x32 -> 64-bit multiplication. + * + * Used in: + * library/poly1305.c + * + * Some parts of the library may use multiplication of two unsigned 32-bit + * operands with a 64-bit result in order to speed up computations. On some + * platforms, this is not available in hardware and has to be implemented in + * software, usually in a library provided by the toolchain. + * + * Sometimes it is not desirable to have to link to that library. This option + * removes the dependency of that library on platforms that lack a hardware + * 64-bit multiplier by embedding a software implementation in Mbed TLS. + * + * Note that depending on the compiler, this may decrease performance compared + * to using the library function provided by the toolchain. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 + * + * CPU supports SSE2 instruction set. + * + * Uncomment if the CPU supports SSE2 (IA-32 specific). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + * + * System has time.h and time(). + * The time does not need to be correct, only time differences are used, + * by contrast with MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + * + * Defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME allows you to specify MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT, + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME. + * + * Comment if your system does not support time functions. + * + * \note If MBEDTLS_TIMING_C is set - to enable the semi-portable timing + * interface - timing.c will include time.h on suitable platforms + * regardless of the setting of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME, unless + * MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT is used. See timing.c for more information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + * + * System has time.h, time(), and an implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() (see below). + * The time needs to be correct (not necessarily very accurate, but at least + * the date should be correct). This is used to verify the validity period of + * X.509 certificates. + * + * Comment if your system does not have a correct clock. + * + * \note mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() is an abstraction in platform_util.h that + * behaves similarly to the gmtime_r() function from the C standard. Refer to + * the documentation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() for more information. + * + * \note It is possible to configure an implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() at compile-time by using the macro + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + * + * Enable the memory allocation layer. + * + * By default mbed TLS uses the system-provided calloc() and free(). + * This allows different allocators (self-implemented or provided) to be + * provided to the platform abstraction layer. + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY without the + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACROs will provide + * "mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free()" allowing you to set an alternative calloc() and + * free() function pointer at runtime. + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY and specifying + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{CALLOC,FREE}_MACROs will allow you to specify the + * alternate function at compile time. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Enable this layer to allow use of alternative memory allocators. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS + * + * Do not assign standard functions in the platform layer (e.g. calloc() to + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC and printf() to MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) + * + * This makes sure there are no linking errors on platforms that do not support + * these functions. You will HAVE to provide alternatives, either at runtime + * via the platform_set_xxx() functions or at compile time by setting + * the MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_XXX defines, or enabling a + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Uncomment to prevent default assignment of standard functions in the + * platform layer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS support the + * function in the platform abstraction layer. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT, mbed TLS will + * provide a function "mbedtls_platform_set_printf()" that allows you to set an + * alternative printf function pointer. + * + * All these define require MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C to be defined! + * + * \note MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT is required on Windows; + * it will be enabled automatically by check_config.h + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot be defined at the same time as + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO! + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT requires MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of specific base + * platform function + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING + * + * Mark deprecated functions and features so that they generate a warning if + * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the + * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a + * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. + * + * This only works with GCC and Clang. With other compilers, you may want to + * use MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + * + * Uncomment to get warnings on using deprecated functions and features. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + * + * Remove deprecated functions and features so that they generate an error if + * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the + * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a + * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality. + * + * Uncomment to get errors on using deprecated functions and features. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + * + * This configuration option controls whether the library validates more of + * the parameters passed to it. + * + * When this flag is not defined, the library only attempts to validate an + * input parameter if: (1) they may come from the outside world (such as the + * network, the filesystem, etc.) or (2) not validating them could result in + * internal memory errors such as overflowing a buffer controlled by the + * library. On the other hand, it doesn't attempt to validate parameters whose + * values are fully controlled by the application (such as pointers). + * + * When this flag is defined, the library additionally attempts to validate + * parameters that are fully controlled by the application, and should always + * be valid if the application code is fully correct and trusted. + * + * For example, when a function accepts as input a pointer to a buffer that may + * contain untrusted data, and its documentation mentions that this pointer + * must not be NULL: + * - The pointer is checked to be non-NULL only if this option is enabled. + * - The content of the buffer is always validated. + * + * When this flag is defined, if a library function receives a parameter that + * is invalid: + * 1. The function will invoke the macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). + * 2. If MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() did not terminate the program, the function + * will immediately return. If the function returns an Mbed TLS error code, + * the error code in this case is MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * When defining this flag, you also need to arrange a definition for + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). You can do this by any of the following methods: + * - By default, the library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call a + * function mbedtls_param_failed(), but the library does not define this + * function. If you do not make any other arrangements, you must provide + * the function mbedtls_param_failed() in your application. + * See `platform_util.h` for its prototype. + * - If you enable the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT, then the + * library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(\c cond) to be `assert(cond)`. + * You can still supply an alternative definition of + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(), which may call `assert`. + * - If you define a macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() before including `config.h` + * or you uncomment the definition of MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() in `config.h`, + * the library will call the macro that you defined and will not supply + * its own version. Note that if MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() calls `assert`, + * you need to enable #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source + * files include ``. + * + * Uncomment to enable validation of application-controlled parameters. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + * + * Allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`, and make it default to + * `assert`. This macro is only used if #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is defined. + * + * If this macro is not defined, then MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() defaults to + * calling a function mbedtls_param_failed(). See the documentation of + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS for details. + * + * Uncomment to allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + +/** \} name SECTION: System support */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support + * + * This section sets support for features that are or are not needed + * within the modules that are enabled. + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT + * + * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for mbedtls_timing_hardclock(), + * mbedtls_timing_get_timer(), mbedtls_set_alarm(), mbedtls_set/get_delay() + * + * Only works if you have MBEDTLS_TIMING_C enabled. + * + * You will need to provide a header "timing_alt.h" and an implementation at + * compile time. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your + * alternate core implementation of a symmetric crypto, an arithmetic or hash + * module (e.g. platform specific assembly optimized implementations). Keep + * in mind that the function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This replaces the whole module. If you only want to replace one of the + * functions, use one of the MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT flags. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_AES_ALT, mbed TLS will no longer + * provide the "struct mbedtls_aes_context" definition and omit the base + * function declarations and implementations. "aes_alt.h" will be included from + * "aes.h" to include the new function definitions. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * module. + * + * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, ARC4, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their + * use constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend + * avoiding dependencies on them, and considering stronger message + * digests and ciphers instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT + +/* + * When replacing the elliptic curve module, please consider, that it is + * implemented with two .c files: + * - ecp.c + * - ecp_curves.c + * You can replace them very much like all the other MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT + * macros as described above. The only difference is that you have to make sure + * that you provide functionality for both .c files. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT + * + * MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use you + * alternate core implementation of symmetric crypto or hash function. Keep in + * mind that function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This replaces only one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still + * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT flags. + * + * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT, mbed TLS will + * no longer provide the mbedtls_sha1_process() function, but it will still provide + * the other function (using your mbedtls_sha1_process() function) and the definition + * of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible + * with this definition. + * + * \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are + * currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt, + * respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should + * be overridden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt + * must stay untouched. + * + * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then it is recommended to also set + * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES + * tables. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * function. + * + * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use + * constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding + * dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests + * and ciphers instead. + * + * \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are + * enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the + * the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore + * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating + * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative + * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() + * (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is + * desirable). + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT + * + * Expose a part of the internal interface of the Elliptic Curve Point module. + * + * MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use your + * alternative core implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic. Keep in mind + * that function prototypes should remain the same. + * + * This partially replaces one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still + * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT flag. The original implementation + * is still present and it is used for group structures not supported by the + * alternative. + * + * The original implementation can in addition be removed by setting the + * MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK option, in which case any function for which the + * corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT macro is defined will not be + * able to fallback to curves not supported by the alternative implementation. + * + * Any of these options become available by defining MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT + * and implementing the following functions: + * unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( + * const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) + * The mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function should return 1 if the + * replacement functions implement arithmetic for the given group and 0 + * otherwise. + * The functions mbedtls_internal_ecp_init and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free are + * called before and after each point operation and provide an opportunity to + * implement optimized set up and tear down instructions. + * + * Example: In case you set MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT and + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT, mbed TLS will still provide the ecp_double_jac() + * function, but will use your mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac() if the group + * for the operation is supported by your implementation (i.e. your + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable() function returns 1 for this group). If the + * group is not supported by your implementation, then the original mbed TLS + * implementation of ecp_double_jac() is used instead, unless this fallback + * behaviour is disabled by setting MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK (in which case + * ecp_double_jac() will return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE). + * + * The function prototypes and the definition of mbedtls_ecp_group and + * mbedtls_ecp_point will not change based on MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT, so your + * implementation of mbedtls_internal_ecp__function_name__ must be compatible + * with their definitions. + * + * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding + * function. + */ +/* Required for all the functions in this section */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT +/* Turn off software fallback for curves not supported in hardware */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK +/* Support for Weierstrass curves with Jacobi representation */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT +/* Support for curves with Montgomery arithmetic */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY + * + * Enables testing and use of mbed TLS without any configured entropy sources. + * This permits use of the library on platforms before an entropy source has + * been integrated (see for example the MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT or the + * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED switches). + * + * WARNING! This switch MUST be disabled in production builds, and is suitable + * only for development. + * Enabling the switch negates any security provided by the library. + * + * Requires MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT + * + * Uncomment this macro to let mbed TLS use your own implementation of a + * hardware entropy collector. + * + * Your function must be called \c mbedtls_hardware_poll(), have the same + * prototype as declared in entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first argument. + * + * Uncomment to use your own hardware entropy collector. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + * + * Use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. + * + * Uncomment this macro to use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. + * Comment this macro to generate AES tables in RAM at runtime. + * + * Tradeoff: Using precomputed ROM tables reduces RAM usage by ~8kb + * (or ~2kb if \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES is used) and reduces the + * initialization time before the first AES operation can be performed. + * It comes at the cost of additional ~8kb ROM use (resp. ~2kb if \c + * MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES below is used), and potentially degraded + * performance if ROM access is slower than RAM access. + * + * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES + * + * Use less ROM/RAM for AES tables. + * + * Uncommenting this macro omits 75% of the AES tables from + * ROM / RAM (depending on the value of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + * by computing their values on the fly during operations + * (the tables are entry-wise rotations of one another). + * + * Tradeoff: Uncommenting this reduces the RAM / ROM footprint + * by ~6kb but at the cost of more arithmetic operations during + * runtime. Specifically, one has to compare 4 accesses within + * different tables to 4 accesses with additional arithmetic + * operations within the same table. The performance gain/loss + * depends on the system and memory details. + * + * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY + * + * Use less ROM for the Camellia implementation (saves about 768 bytes). + * + * Uncomment this macro to use less memory for Camellia. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING + * + * If this macro is defined, emit a compile-time warning if application code + * calls a function without checking its return value, but the return value + * should generally be checked in portable applications. + * + * This is only supported on platforms where #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN is + * implemented. Otherwise this option has no effect. + * + * Uncomment to get warnings on using fallible functions without checking + * their return value. + * + * \note This feature is a work in progress. + * Warnings will be added to more functions in the future. + * + * \note A few functions are considered critical, and ignoring the return + * value of these functions will trigger a warning even if this + * macro is not defined. To completely disable return value check + * warnings, define #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN with an empty expansion. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC + * + * Enable Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB + * + * Enable Cipher Feedback mode (CFB) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR + * + * Enable Counter Block Cipher mode (CTR) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB + * + * Enable Output Feedback mode (OFB) for symmetric ciphers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS + * + * Enable Xor-encrypt-xor with ciphertext stealing mode (XTS) for AES. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER + * + * Enable NULL cipher. + * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for + * encryption or channels without any security! + * + * Requires MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES as well to enable + * the following ciphersuites: + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable the NULL cipher and ciphersuites + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 + * + * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_XXX: Uncomment or comment macros to add support for + * specific padding modes in the cipher layer with cipher modes that support + * padding (e.g. CBC) + * + * If you disable all padding modes, only full blocks can be used with CBC. + * + * Enable padding modes in the cipher layer. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + * + * Uncomment this macro to use a 128-bit key in the CTR_DRBG module. + * By default, CTR_DRBG uses a 256-bit key. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES + * + * Enable weak ciphersuites in SSL / TLS. + * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for + * channels with virtually no security at all! + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites: + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable weak ciphersuites + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES + * + * Remove RC4 ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. + * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on RC4 from the default list as + * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible to + * enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including them + * explicitly. + * + * Uncomment this macro to remove RC4 ciphersuites by default. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES + * + * Remove 3DES ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. + * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on 3DES from the default list as + * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible + * to enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including + * them explicitly. + * + * A man-in-the-browser attacker can recover authentication tokens sent through + * a TLS connection using a 3DES based cipher suite (see "On the Practical + * (In-)Security of 64-bit Block Ciphers" by Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaëtan + * Leurent, see https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf). If this attack falls + * in your threat model or you are unsure, then you should keep this option + * enabled to remove 3DES based cipher suites. + * + * Comment this macro to keep 3DES in the default ciphersuite list. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED + * + * MBEDTLS_ECP_XXXX_ENABLED: Enables specific curves within the Elliptic Curve + * module. By default all supported curves are enabled. + * + * Comment macros to disable the curve and functions for it + */ +/* Short Weierstrass curves (supporting ECP, ECDH, ECDSA) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +/* Montgomery curves (supporting ECP) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + * + * Enable specific 'modulo p' routines for each NIST prime. + * Depending on the prime and architecture, makes operations 4 to 8 times + * faster on the corresponding curve. + * + * Comment this macro to disable NIST curves optimisation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + * + * When this option is disabled, mbedtls_ecp_mul() will make use of an + * internal RNG when called with a NULL \c f_rng argument, in order to protect + * against some side-channel attacks. + * + * This protection introduces a dependency of the ECP module on one of the + * DRBG modules. For very constrained implementations that don't require this + * protection (for example, because you're only doing signature verification, + * so not manipulating any secret, or because local/physical side-channel + * attacks are outside your threat model), it might be desirable to get rid of + * that dependency. + * + * \warning Enabling this option makes some uses of ECP vulnerable to some + * side-channel attacks. Only enable it if you know that's not a problem for + * your use case. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable some counter-measures in ECP. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + * + * Enable "non-blocking" ECC operations that can return early and be resumed. + * + * This allows various functions to pause by returning + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or, for functions in the SSL module, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) and then be called later again in + * order to further progress and eventually complete their operation. This is + * controlled through mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() which limits the maximum + * number of ECC operations a function may perform before pausing; see + * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() for more information. + * + * This is useful in non-threaded environments if you want to avoid blocking + * for too long on ECC (and, hence, X.509 or SSL/TLS) operations. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable restartable ECC computations. + * + * \note This option only works with the default software implementation of + * elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with + * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT + * and MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT + * + * Use a backward compatible ECDH context. + * + * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context + * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes + * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format, + * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. + + * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller + * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it + * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations. + * The new format is incompatible with applications that access + * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations. + * + * Define this macro if you enable MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE or if you + * want to access ECDH context fields directly. Otherwise you should + * comment out this macro definition. + * + * This option has no effect if #MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is not enabled. + * + * \note This configuration option is experimental. Future versions of the + * library may modify the way the ECDH context layout is configured + * and may modify the layout of the new context type. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC + * + * Enable deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979). + * Standard ECDSA is "fragile" in the sense that lack of entropy when signing + * may result in a compromise of the long-term signing key. This is avoided by + * the deterministic variant. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable deterministic ECDSA. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the DHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED + * + * Enable the RSA-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the RSA-only based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the DHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDHE-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C, + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDH-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECDH-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED + * + * Enable the ECJPAKE based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. + * + * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the + * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification + * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED + * + * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED + * + * Enhance support for reading EC keys using variants of SEC1 not allowed by + * RFC 5915 and RFC 5480. + * + * Currently this means parsing the SpecifiedECDomain choice of EC + * parameters (only known groups are supported, not arbitrary domains, to + * avoid validation issues). + * + * Disable if you only need to support RFC 5915 + 5480 key formats. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY + * + * Enable a dummy error function to make use of mbedtls_strerror() in + * third party libraries easier when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is disabled + * (no effect when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled). + * + * You can safely disable this if MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled, or if you're + * not using mbedtls_strerror() or error_strerror() in your application. + * + * Disable if you run into name conflicts and want to really remove the + * mbedtls_strerror() + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + * + * Enable the prime-number generation code. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_FS_IO + * + * Enable functions that use the filesystem. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + * + * Do not add default entropy sources. These are the platform specific, + * mbedtls_timing_hardclock and HAVEGE based poll functions. + * + * This is useful to have more control over the added entropy sources in an + * application. + * + * Uncomment this macro to prevent loading of default entropy functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY + * + * Do not use built-in platform entropy functions. + * This is useful if your platform does not support + * standards like the /dev/urandom or Windows CryptoAPI. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable the built-in platform entropy functions. + */ +#if defined(KINC_WINDOWSAPP) || defined(KINC_CONSOLE) +#define MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY +#endif + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + * + * Force the entropy accumulator to use a SHA-256 accumulator instead of the + * default SHA-512 based one (if both are available). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * On 32-bit systems SHA-256 can be much faster than SHA-512. Use this option + * if you have performance concerns. + * + * This option is only useful if both MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and + * MBEDTLS_SHA512_C are defined. Otherwise the available hash module is used. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * + * Enable the non-volatile (NV) seed file-based entropy source. + * (Also enables the NV seed read/write functions in the platform layer) + * + * This is crucial (if not required) on systems that do not have a + * cryptographic entropy source (in hardware or kernel) available. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * \note The read/write functions that are used by the entropy source are + * determined in the platform layer, and can be modified at runtime and/or + * compile-time depending on the flags (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_*) used. + * + * \note If you use the default implementation functions that read a seedfile + * with regular fopen(), please make sure you make a seedfile with the + * proper name (defined in MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) and at + * least MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes in size that can be read from + * and written to or you will get an entropy source error! The default + * implementation will only use the first MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + * bytes from the file. + * + * \note The entropy collector will write to the seed file before entropy is + * given to an external source, to update it. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + +/* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + * + * Enable key identifiers that encode a key owner identifier. + * + * The owner of a key is identified by a value of type ::mbedtls_key_owner_id_t + * which is currently hard-coded to be int32_t. + * + * Note that this option is meant for internal use only and may be removed + * without notice. It is incompatible with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + * + * Enable debugging of buffer allocator memory issues. Automatically prints + * (to stderr) all (fatal) messages on memory allocation issues. Enables + * function for 'debug output' of allocated memory. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * + * Uncomment this macro to let the buffer allocator print out error messages. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE + * + * Include backtrace information with each allocated block. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * GLIBC-compatible backtrace() and backtrace_symbols() support + * + * Uncomment this macro to include backtrace information + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT + * + * Support external private RSA keys (eg from a HSM) in the PK layer. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for external private RSA keys. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 + * + * Enable support for PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * This enables support for PKCS#1 v1.5 operations. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + * + * Enable support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * This enables support for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS + * + * Enable support for platform built-in keys. If you enable this feature, + * you must implement the function mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key(). + * See the documentation of that function for more information. + * + * Built-in keys are typically derived from a hardware unique key or + * stored in a secure element. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * + * Enable support for PSA crypto client. + * + * \note This option allows to include the code necessary for a PSA + * crypto client when the PSA crypto implementation is not included in + * the library (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C disabled). The code included is the + * code to set and get PSA key attributes. + * The development of PSA drivers partially relying on the library to + * fulfill the hardware gaps is another possible usage of this option. + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + * + * Enable support for the experimental PSA crypto driver interface. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed + * without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + * + * Make the PSA Crypto module use an external random generator provided + * by a driver, instead of Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules. + * + * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic + * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers + * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function + * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded + * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow + * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source + * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option. + * + * If you enable this option, you must configure the type + * ::mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t in psa/crypto_platform.h + * and define a function called mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() + * with the following prototype: + * ``` + * psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( + * mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context, + * uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + * ); + * ``` + * The \c context value is initialized to 0 before the first call. + * The function must fill the \c output buffer with \p output_size bytes + * of random data and set \c *output_length to \p output_size. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning If you enable this option, code that uses the PSA cryptography + * interface will not use any of the entropy sources set up for + * the entropy module, nor the NV seed that MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * enables. + * + * \note This option is experimental and may be removed without notice. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is built for SPM (Secure + * Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two parts: a + * NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process + * Environment). + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY + * + * Enable support for entropy injection at first boot. This feature is + * required on systems that do not have a built-in entropy source (TRNG). + * This feature is currently not supported on systems that have a built-in + * entropy source. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT + * + * Do not use the Chinese Remainder Theorem + * for the RSA private operation. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable the use of CRT in RSA. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST + * + * Enable the checkup functions (*_self_test). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER + * + * Enable an implementation of SHA-256 that has lower ROM footprint but also + * lower performance. + * + * The default implementation is meant to be a reasonable compromise between + * performance and size. This version optimizes more aggressively for size at + * the expense of performance. Eg on Cortex-M4 it reduces the size of + * mbedtls_sha256_process() from ~2KB to ~0.5KB for a performance hit of about + * 30%. + * + * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA256. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER + * + * Enable an implementation of SHA-512 that has lower ROM footprint but also + * lower performance. + * + * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA512. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 + * + * Disable the SHA-384 option of the SHA-512 module. Use this to save some + * code size on devices that don't use SHA-384. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * + * Uncomment to disable SHA-384 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES + * + * Enable sending of alert messages in case of encountered errors as per RFC. + * If you choose not to send the alert messages, mbed TLS can still communicate + * with other servers, only debugging of failures is harder. + * + * The advantage of not sending alert messages, is that no information is given + * about reasons for failures thus preventing adversaries of gaining intel. + * + * Enable sending of all alert messages + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING + * + * Enable the function mbedtls_ssl_check_record() which can be used to check + * the validity and authenticity of an incoming record, to verify that it has + * not been seen before. These checks are performed without modifying the + * externally visible state of the SSL context. + * + * See mbedtls_ssl_check_record() for more information. + * + * Uncomment to enable support for record checking. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + * + * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID extension + * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) + * which allows to identify DTLS connections across changes + * in the underlying transport. + * + * Setting this option enables the SSL APIs `mbedtls_ssl_set_cid()`, + * `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. + * See the corresponding documentation for more information. + * + * \warning The Connection ID extension is still in draft state. + * We make no stability promises for the availability + * or the shape of the API controlled by this option. + * + * The maximum lengths of outgoing and incoming CIDs can be configured + * through the options + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Uncomment to enable the Connection ID extension. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE + * + * Enable asynchronous external private key operations in SSL. This allows + * you to configure an SSL connection to call an external cryptographic + * module to perform private key operations instead of performing the + * operation inside the library. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION + * + * Enable serialization of the TLS context structures, through use of the + * functions mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load(). + * + * This pair of functions allows one side of a connection to serialize the + * context associated with the connection, then free or re-use that context + * while the serialized state is persisted elsewhere, and finally deserialize + * that state to a live context for resuming read/write operations on the + * connection. From a protocol perspective, the state of the connection is + * unaffected, in particular this is entirely transparent to the peer. + * + * Note: this is distinct from TLS session resumption, which is part of the + * protocol and fully visible by the peer. TLS session resumption enables + * establishing new connections associated to a saved session with shorter, + * lighter handshakes, while context serialization is a local optimization in + * handling a single, potentially long-lived connection. + * + * Enabling these APIs makes some SSL structures larger, as 64 extra bytes are + * saved after the handshake to allow for more efficient serialization, so if + * you don't need this feature you'll save RAM by disabling it. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_GCM_C or MBEDTLS_CCM_C or MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + * + * Comment to disable the context serialization APIs. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + * + * Enable the debug messages in SSL module for all issues. + * Debug messages have been disabled in some places to prevent timing + * attacks due to (unbalanced) debugging function calls. + * + * If you need all error reporting you should enable this during debugging, + * but remove this for production servers that should log as well. + * + * Uncomment this macro to report all debug messages on errors introducing + * a timing side-channel. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC + * + * Enable support for Encrypt-then-MAC, RFC 7366. + * + * This allows peers that both support it to use a more robust protection for + * ciphersuites using CBC, providing deep resistance against timing attacks + * on the padding or underlying cipher. + * + * This only affects CBC ciphersuites, and is useless if none is defined. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for Encrypt-then-MAC + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET + * + * Enable support for RFC 7627: Session Hash and Extended Master Secret + * Extension. + * + * This was introduced as "the proper fix" to the Triple Handshake family of + * attacks, but it is recommended to always use it (even if you disable + * renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the + * original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for Extended Master Secret. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV + * + * Enable support for RFC 7507: Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) + * for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks. + * + * For servers, it is recommended to always enable this, unless you support + * only one version of TLS, or know for sure that none of your clients + * implements a fallback strategy. + * + * For clients, you only need this if you're using a fallback strategy, which + * is not recommended in the first place, unless you absolutely need it to + * interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) servers. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for FALLBACK_SCSV + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + * + * This option controls the availability of the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() + * giving access to the peer's certificate after completion of the handshake. + * + * Unless you need mbedtls_ssl_peer_cert() in your application, it is + * recommended to disable this option for reduced RAM usage. + * + * \note If this option is disabled, mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() is still + * defined, but always returns \c NULL. + * + * \note This option has no influence on the protection against the + * triple handshake attack. Even if it is disabled, Mbed TLS will + * still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation, + * for example by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate. + * + * Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate + * after the handshake. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL + * + * Enable hooking functions in SSL module for hardware acceleration of + * individual records. + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable hooking functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING + * + * Enable 1/n-1 record splitting for CBC mode in SSLv3 and TLS 1.0. + * + * This is a countermeasure to the BEAST attack, which also minimizes the risk + * of interoperability issues compared to sending 0-length records. + * + * Comment this macro to disable 1/n-1 record splitting. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION + * + * Enable support for TLS renegotiation. + * + * The two main uses of renegotiation are (1) refresh keys on long-lived + * connections and (2) client authentication after the initial handshake. + * If you don't need renegotiation, it's probably better to disable it, since + * it has been associated with security issues in the past and is easy to + * misuse/misunderstand. + * + * Comment this to disable support for renegotiation. + * + * \note Even if this option is disabled, both client and server are aware + * of the Renegotiation Indication Extension (RFC 5746) used to + * prevent the SSL renegotiation attack (see RFC 5746 Sect. 1). + * (See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation for the + * configuration of this extension). + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO + * + * Enable support for receiving and parsing SSLv2 Client Hello messages for the + * SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable support for SSLv2 Client Hello messages. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE + * + * Pick the ciphersuite according to the client's preferences rather than ours + * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * + * Uncomment this macro to respect client's ciphersuite order + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension in SSL. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for the max_fragment_length extension + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 + * + * Enable support for SSL 3.0. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL 3.0 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.0. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.0 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.1 (and DTLS 1.0 if DTLS is enabled). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.1 / DTLS 1.0 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Enable support for TLS 1.2 (and DTLS 1.2 if DTLS is enabled). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA1_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * (Depends on ciphersuites) + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.2 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + * + * This macro is used to selectively enable experimental parts + * of the code that contribute to the ongoing development of + * the prototype TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 implementation, and provide + * no other purpose. + * + * \warning TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 aren't yet supported in Mbed TLS, + * and no feature exposed through this macro is part of the + * public API. In particular, features under the control + * of this macro are experimental and don't come with any + * stability guarantees. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable experimental and partial + * functionality specific to TLS 1.3. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Enable support for DTLS (all available versions). + * + * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 to enable DTLS 1.0, + * and/or this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + * or MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for DTLS + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN + * + * Enable support for RFC 7301 Application Layer Protocol Negotiation. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for ALPN. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY + * + * Enable support for the anti-replay mechanism in DTLS. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * \warning Disabling this is often a security risk! + * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay() for details. + * + * Comment this to disable anti-replay in DTLS. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + * + * Enable support for HelloVerifyRequest on DTLS servers. + * + * This feature is highly recommended to prevent DTLS servers being used as + * amplifiers in DoS attacks against other hosts. It should always be enabled + * unless you know for sure amplification cannot be a problem in the + * environment in which your server operates. + * + * \warning Disabling this can be a security risk! (see above) + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Comment this to disable support for HelloVerifyRequest. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP + * + * Enable support for negotiation of DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764) + * through the use_srtp extension. + * + * \note This feature provides the minimum functionality required + * to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP and to allow the derivation of + * the associated SRTP packet protection key material. + * In particular, the SRTP packet protection itself, as well as the + * demultiplexing of RTP and DTLS packets at the datagram layer + * (see Section 5 of RFC 5764), are not handled by this feature. + * Instead, after successful completion of a handshake negotiating + * the use of DTLS-SRTP, the extended key exporter API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb() should be used to implement + * the key exporter described in Section 4.2 of RFC 5764 and RFC 5705 + * (this is implemented in the SSL example programs). + * The resulting key should then be passed to an SRTP stack. + * + * Setting this option enables the runtime API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles() + * through which the supported DTLS-SRTP protection + * profiles can be configured. You must call this API at + * runtime if you wish to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + * + * Uncomment this to enable support for use_srtp extension. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE + * + * Enable server-side support for clients that reconnect from the same port. + * + * Some clients unexpectedly close the connection and try to reconnect using the + * same source port. This needs special support from the server to handle the + * new connection securely, as described in section 4.2.8 of RFC 6347. This + * flag enables that support. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY + * + * Comment this to disable support for clients reusing the source port. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT + * + * Enable support for a limit of records with bad MAC. + * + * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS + * + * Enable support for RFC 5077 session tickets in SSL. + * Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintenance of a + * session store remains the responsibility of the application, though). + * Server-side, you also need to provide callbacks for writing and parsing + * tickets, including authenticated encryption and key management. Example + * callbacks are provided by MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL session tickets + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS + * + * Enable support for exporting key block and master secret. + * This is required for certain users of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for key export + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 server name indication (SNI) in SSL. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for server name indication in SSL + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 truncated HMAC in SSL. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for truncated HMAC in SSL + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT + * + * Fallback to old (pre-2.7), non-conforming implementation of the truncated + * HMAC extension which also truncates the HMAC key. Note that this option is + * only meant for a transitory upgrade period and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + * + * \warning The old implementation is non-compliant and has a security weakness + * (2^80 brute force attack on the HMAC key used for a single, + * uninterrupted connection). This should only be enabled temporarily + * when (1) the use of truncated HMAC is essential in order to save + * bandwidth, and (2) the peer is an Mbed TLS stack that doesn't use + * the fixed implementation yet (pre-2.7). + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Uncomment to fallback to old, non-compliant truncated HMAC implementation. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + * + * When this option is enabled, the SSL buffer will be resized automatically + * based on the negotiated maximum fragment length in each direction. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN + * + * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with + * clang's MemorySanitizer. This causes some existing tests to also test + * this non-functional property of the code under test. + * + * This setting requires compiling with clang -fsanitize=memory. The test + * suites can then be run normally. + * + * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered + * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. + * + * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + * + * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with + * valgrind's memcheck tool. This causes some existing tests to also test + * this non-functional property of the code under test. + * + * This setting requires valgrind headers for building, and is only useful for + * testing if the tests suites are run with valgrind's memcheck. This can be + * done for an individual test suite with 'valgrind ./test_suite_xxx', or when + * using CMake, this can be done for all test suites with 'make memcheck'. + * + * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered + * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. + * + * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS + * + * Enable features for invasive testing such as introspection functions and + * hooks for fault injection. This enables additional unit tests. + * + * Merely enabling this feature should not change the behavior of the product. + * It only adds new code, and new branching points where the default behavior + * is the same as when this feature is disabled. + * However, this feature increases the attack surface: there is an added + * risk of vulnerabilities, and more gadgets that can make exploits easier. + * Therefore this feature must never be enabled in production. + * + * See `docs/architecture/testing/mbed-crypto-invasive-testing.md` for more + * information. + * + * Uncomment to enable invasive tests. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT + * + * Provide your own alternate threading implementation. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Uncomment this to allow your own alternate threading implementation. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD + * + * Enable the pthread wrapper layer for the threading layer. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Uncomment this to enable pthread mutexes. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + * + * Make the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic operations, and + * enable new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto. + * + * \note Development of this option is currently in progress, and parts of Mbed + * TLS's X.509 and TLS modules are not ported to PSA yet. However, these parts + * will still continue to work as usual, so enabling this option should not + * break backwards compatibility. + * + * \note See docs/use-psa-crypto.md for a complete description of what this + * option currently does, and of parts that are not affected by it so far. + * + * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs which are currently + * considered experimental and may change in incompatible ways at any time. + * That is, the APIs enabled by this option are not covered by the usual + * promises of API stability. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * Uncomment this to enable internal use of PSA Crypto and new associated APIs. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + * + * This setting allows support for cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA + * API to be configured separately from support through the mbedtls API. + * + * When this option is disabled, the PSA API exposes the cryptographic + * mechanisms that can be implemented on top of the `mbedtls_xxx` API + * configured with `MBEDTLS_XXX` symbols. + * + * When this option is enabled, the PSA API exposes the cryptographic + * mechanisms requested by the `PSA_WANT_XXX` symbols defined in + * include/psa/crypto_config.h. The corresponding `MBEDTLS_XXX` settings are + * automatically enabled if required (i.e. if no PSA driver provides the + * mechanism). You may still freely enable additional `MBEDTLS_XXX` symbols + * in config.h. + * + * If the symbol #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE is defined, it specifies + * an alternative header to include instead of include/psa/crypto_config.h. + * + * If you enable this option and write your own configuration file, you must + * include mbedtls/config_psa.h in your configuration file. The default + * provided mbedtls/config.h contains the necessary inclusion. + * + * This feature is still experimental and is not ready for production since + * it is not completed. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + * + * Allow run-time checking of compile-time enabled features. Thus allowing users + * to check at run-time if the library is for instance compiled with threading + * support via mbedtls_version_check_feature(). + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + * + * Comment this to disable run-time checking and save ROM space + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 + * + * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate + * and encountering an extension in a v1 or v2 certificate. + * + * Uncomment to prevent an error. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + * + * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate + * and encountering an unknown critical extension. + * + * \warning Depending on your PKI use, enabling this can be a security risk! + * + * Uncomment to prevent an error. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK + * + * If set, this enables the X.509 API `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` + * and the SSL API `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` which allow users to configure + * the set of trusted certificates through a callback instead of a linked + * list. + * + * This is useful for example in environments where a large number of trusted + * certificates is present and storing them in a linked list isn't efficient + * enough, or when the set of trusted certificates changes frequently. + * + * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` and + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` for more information. + * + * Uncomment to enable trusted certificate callbacks. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE + * + * Enable verification of the keyUsage extension (CA and leaf certificates). + * + * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused + * (intermediate) CA and leaf certificates. + * + * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! + * + * Comment to skip keyUsage checking for both CA and leaf certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE + * + * Enable verification of the extendedKeyUsage extension (leaf certificates). + * + * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused certificates. + * + * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! + * + * Comment to skip extendedKeyUsage checking for certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT + * + * Enable parsing and verification of X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRS + * signed with RSASSA-PSS (aka PKCS#1 v2.1). + * + * Comment this macro to disallow using RSASSA-PSS in certificates. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT + * + * If set, the SSL/TLS module uses ZLIB to support compression and + * decompression of packet data. + * + * \warning TLS-level compression MAY REDUCE SECURITY! See for example the + * CRIME attack. Before enabling this option, you should examine with care if + * CRIME or similar exploits may be applicable to your use case. + * + * \note Currently compression can't be used with DTLS. + * + * \deprecated This feature is deprecated and will be removed + * in the next major revision of the library. + * + * Used in: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This feature requires zlib library and headers to be present. + * + * Uncomment to enable use of ZLIB + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT +/** \} name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: mbed TLS modules + * + * This section enables or disables entire modules in mbed TLS + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + * + * Enable AES-NI support on x86-64. + * + * Module: library/aesni.c + * Caller: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * This modules adds support for the AES-NI instructions on x86-64 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * Enable the AES block cipher. + * + * Module: library/aes.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * library/pem.c + * library/ctr_drbg.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + * + * PEM_PARSE uses AES for decrypting encrypted keys. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + * + * Enable the ARCFOUR stream cipher. + * + * Module: library/arc4.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + * + * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger ciphers instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + * + * Enable the generic ASN1 parser. + * + * Module: library/asn1.c + * Caller: library/x509.c + * library/dhm.c + * library/pkcs12.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/pkparse.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C + * + * Enable the generic ASN1 writer. + * + * Module: library/asn1write.c + * Caller: library/ecdsa.c + * library/pkwrite.c + * library/x509_create.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * Enable the Base64 module. + * + * Module: library/base64.c + * Caller: library/pem.c + * + * This module is required for PEM support (required by X.509). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + * + * Enable the multi-precision integer library. + * + * Module: library/bignum.c + * Caller: library/dhm.c + * library/ecp.c + * library/ecdsa.c + * library/rsa.c + * library/rsa_internal.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module is required for RSA, DHM and ECC (ECDH, ECDSA) support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C + * + * Enable the Blowfish block cipher. + * + * Module: library/blowfish.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * + * Enable the Camellia block cipher. + * + * Module: library/camellia.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * + * Enable the ARIA block cipher. + * + * Module: library/aria.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CCM_C + * + * Enable the Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode for 128-bit block cipher. + * + * Module: library/ccm.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * + * This module enables the AES-CCM ciphersuites, if other requisites are + * enabled as well. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CERTS_C + * + * Enable the test certificates. + * + * Module: library/certs.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used for testing (ssl_client/server). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C + * + * Enable the ChaCha20 stream cipher. + * + * Module: library/chacha20.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + * + * Enable the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * Module: library/chachapoly.c + * + * This module requires: MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C, MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + * + * Enable the generic cipher layer. + * + * Module: library/cipher.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * + * Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + * + * Enable the CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) mode for block + * ciphers. + * + * \note When #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT is active, meaning that the underlying + * implementation of the CMAC algorithm is provided by an alternate + * implementation, that alternate implementation may opt to not support + * AES-192 or 3DES as underlying block ciphers for the CMAC operation. + * + * Module: library/cmac.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + * + * Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-based random generator. + * The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default. + * To use AES-128 instead, enable \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY above. + * + * \note To achieve a 256-bit security strength with CTR_DRBG, + * you must use AES-256 *and* use sufficient entropy. + * See ctr_drbg.h for more details. + * + * Module: library/ctr_drbg.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C + * + * Enable the debug functions. + * + * Module: library/debug.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module provides debugging functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DES_C + * + * Enable the DES block cipher. + * + * Module: library/des.c + * Caller: library/pem.c + * library/cipher.c + * + * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are + * enabled as well): + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + * + * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys. + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_DHM_C + * + * Enable the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle module. + * + * Module: library/dhm.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * DHE-RSA, DHE-PSK + * + * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it + * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. + * If possible, it is recommended users should consider + * preferring other methods of key exchange. + * See dhm.h for more details. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman library. + * + * Module: library/ecdh.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECDHE-ECDSA, ECDHE-RSA, DHE-PSK + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve DSA library. + * + * Module: library/ecdsa.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECDHE-ECDSA + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, + * and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED for a + * short Weierstrass curve. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve J-PAKE library. + * + * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the + * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification + * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. + * + * Module: library/ecjpake.c + * Caller: + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * ECJPAKE + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * + * Enable the elliptic curve over GF(p) library. + * + * Module: library/ecp.c + * Caller: library/ecdh.c + * library/ecdsa.c + * library/ecjpake.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + * + * Enable the platform-specific entropy code. + * + * Module: library/entropy.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * This module provides a generic entropy pool + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + * + * Enable error code to error string conversion. + * + * Module: library/error.c + * Caller: + * + * This module enables mbedtls_strerror(). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_GCM_C + * + * Enable the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). + * + * Module: library/gcm.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * + * This module enables the AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-GCM ciphersuites, if other + * requisites are enabled as well. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C + * + * Enable the HAVEGE random generator. + * + * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is not suitable for virtualized + * environments + * + * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is dependent on timing and specific + * processor traits. It is therefore not advised to use HAVEGE as + * your applications primary random generator or primary entropy pool + * input. As a secondary input to your entropy pool, it IS able add + * the (limited) extra entropy it provides. + * + * Module: library/havege.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + * + * Uncomment to enable the HAVEGE random generator. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + * + * Enable the HKDF algorithm (RFC 5869). + * + * Module: library/hkdf.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * This module adds support for the Hashed Message Authentication Code + * (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + * + * Enable the HMAC_DRBG random generator. + * + * Module: library/hmac_drbg.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * Uncomment to enable the HMAC_DRBG random number generator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + * + * Enable the Key Wrapping mode for 128-bit block ciphers, + * as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Only KW and KWP modes + * are supported. At the moment, only AES is approved by NIST. + * + * Module: library/nist_kw.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * Enable the generic message digest layer. + * + * Module: library/md.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_C + * + * Enable the MD2 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md2.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD2-signed X.509 certs. + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD4_C + * + * Enable the MD4 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md4.c + * Caller: + * + * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD4-signed X.509 certs. + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MD5_C + * + * Enable the MD5 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/md5.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/pem.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, and for TLS 1.2 + * depending on the handshake parameters. Further, it is used for checking + * MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 when decrypting PEM-encoded + * encrypted keys. + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on + * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * + * Enable the buffer allocator implementation that makes use of a (stack) + * based buffer to 'allocate' dynamic memory. (replaces calloc() and free() + * calls) + * + * Module: library/memory_buffer_alloc.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY (to use it within mbed TLS) + * + * Enable this module to enable the buffer memory allocator. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NET_C + * + * Enable the TCP and UDP over IPv6/IPv4 networking routines. + * + * \note This module only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, BSD and OS X) + * and Windows. For other platforms, you'll want to disable it, and write your + * own networking callbacks to be passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). + * + * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new + * environment: + * https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS + * + * Module: library/net_sockets.c + * + * This module provides networking routines. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_NET_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_OID_C + * + * Enable the OID database. + * + * Module: library/oid.c + * Caller: library/asn1write.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/pkparse.c + * library/pkwrite.c + * library/rsa.c + * library/x509.c + * library/x509_create.c + * library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + * + * This modules translates between OIDs and internal values. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + * + * Enable VIA Padlock support on x86. + * + * Module: library/padlock.c + * Caller: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + * + * Enable PEM decoding / parsing. + * + * Module: library/pem.c + * Caller: library/dhm.c + * library/pkparse.c + * library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * This modules adds support for decoding / parsing PEM files. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C + * + * Enable PEM encoding / writing. + * + * Module: library/pem.c + * Caller: library/pkwrite.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * + * This modules adds support for encoding / writing PEM files. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key layer. + * + * Module: library/pk.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C or MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key parser. + * + * Module: library/pkparse.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key parse functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + * + * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key writer. + * + * Module: library/pkwrite.c + * Caller: library/x509write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * Uncomment to enable generic public key write functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C + * + * Enable PKCS#5 functions. + * + * Module: library/pkcs5.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * This module adds support for the PKCS#5 functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C + * + * Enable wrapper for PKCS#11 smartcard support via the pkcs11-helper library. + * + * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of Mbed TLS. + * + * Module: library/pkcs11.c + * Caller: library/pk.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * + * This module enables SSL/TLS PKCS #11 smartcard support. + * Requires the presence of the PKCS#11 helper library (libpkcs11-helper) + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C + * + * Enable PKCS#12 PBE functions. + * Adds algorithms for parsing PKCS#8 encrypted private keys + * + * Module: library/pkcs12.c + * Caller: library/pkparse.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + * Can use: MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + * + * This module enables PKCS#12 functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Enable the platform abstraction layer that allows you to re-assign + * functions like calloc(), free(), snprintf(), printf(), fprintf(), exit(). + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C enables to use of MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT + * or MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO directives, allowing the functions mentioned + * above to be specified at runtime or compile time respectively. + * + * \note This abstraction layer must be enabled on Windows (including MSYS2) + * as other module rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation. + * + * Module: library/platform.c + * Caller: Most other .c files + * + * This module enables abstraction of common (libc) functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + * + * Enable the Poly1305 MAC algorithm. + * + * Module: library/poly1305.c + * Caller: library/chachapoly.c + */ +#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * + * Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, + * or MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, + * or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + * + * Enable secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture + * cryptography API. + * + * \warning This feature is not yet suitable for production. It is provided + * for API evaluation and testing purposes only. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_se.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture persistent key storage. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_storage.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, + * either MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C or a native implementation of + * the PSA ITS interface + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + * + * Enable the emulation of the Platform Security Architecture + * Internal Trusted Storage (PSA ITS) over files. + * + * Module: library/psa_its_file.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_FS_IO + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + * + * Enable the RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/ripemd160.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * Enable the RSA public-key cryptosystem. + * + * Module: library/rsa.c + * library/rsa_internal.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/x509.c + * + * This module is used by the following key exchanges: + * RSA, DHE-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, RSA-PSK + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * + * Enable the SHA1 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/sha1.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, for TLS 1.2 + * depending on the handshake parameters, and for SHA1-signed certificates. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes + * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies + * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * Enable the SHA-224 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * Caller: library/entropy.c + * library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-224 and SHA-256. + * This module is required for the SSL/TLS 1.2 PRF function. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + * + * Enable the SHA-384 and SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * Caller: library/entropy.c + * library/md.c + * library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-384 and SHA-512. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + * + * Enable simple SSL cache implementation. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cache.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C + * + * Enable basic implementation of DTLS cookies for hello verification. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cookie.c + * Caller: + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C + * + * Enable an implementation of TLS server-side callbacks for session tickets. + * + * Module: library/ssl_ticket.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C && + * ( MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C ) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C + * + * Enable the SSL/TLS client code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_cli.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS client support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C + * + * Enable the SSL/TLS server code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS server support. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + * + * Enable the generic SSL/TLS code. + * + * Module: library/ssl_tls.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + * and at least one of the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_XXX defines + * + * This module is required for SSL/TLS. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + * + * Enable the threading abstraction layer. + * By default mbed TLS assumes it is used in a non-threaded environment or that + * contexts are not shared between threads. If you do intend to use contexts + * between threads, you will need to enable this layer to prevent race + * conditions. See also our Knowledge Base article about threading: + * https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/development/thread-safety-and-multi-threading + * + * Module: library/threading.c + * + * This allows different threading implementations (self-implemented or + * provided). + * + * You will have to enable either MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT or + * MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD. + * + * Enable this layer to allow use of mutexes within mbed TLS + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + * + * Enable the semi-portable timing interface. + * + * \note The provided implementation only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, + * BSD and OS X) and Windows. On other platforms, you can either disable that + * module and provide your own implementations of the callbacks needed by + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS, or leave it enabled and provide + * your own implementation of the whole module by setting + * \c MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT in the current file. + * + * \note The timing module will include time.h on suitable platforms + * regardless of the setting of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME, unless + * MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT is used. See timing.c for more information. + * + * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new + * environment: + * https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS + * + * Module: library/timing.c + * Caller: library/havege.c + * + * This module is used by the HAVEGE random number generator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + * + * Enable run-time version information. + * + * Module: library/version.c + * + * This module provides run-time version information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * Enable X.509 core for using certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509.c + * Caller: library/x509_crl.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509_csr.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, + * MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * + * This module is required for the X.509 parsing modules. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 certificate parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_crt.c + * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c + * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate parsing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 CRL parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_crl.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 CRL parsing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C + * + * Enable X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing. + * + * Module: library/x509_csr.c + * Caller: library/x509_crt_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C + * + * This module is used for reading X.509 certificate request. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * Enable X.509 core for creating certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509_create.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + * + * This module is the basis for creating X.509 certificates and CSRs. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C + * + * Enable creating X.509 certificates. + * + * Module: library/x509_crt_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate creation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C + * + * Enable creating X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR). + * + * Module: library/x509_csr_write.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C + * + * This module is required for X.509 certificate request writing. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_XTEA_C + * + * Enable the XTEA block cipher. + * + * Module: library/xtea.c + * Caller: + */ +#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C + +/** \} name SECTION: mbed TLS modules */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: General configuration options + * + * This section contains Mbed TLS build settings that are not associated + * with a particular module. + * + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of + * `"mbedtls/config.h"`. + * This header file specifies the compile-time configuration of Mbed TLS. + * Unlike other configuration options, this one must be defined on the + * compiler command line: a definition in `config.h` would have no effect. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE "mbedtls/config.h" + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included after + * `"mbedtls/config.h"` or #MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE. + * This allows you to modify the default configuration, including the ability + * to undefine options that are enabled by default. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE "/dev/null" + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of + * `"psa/crypto_config.h"`. + * This header file specifies which cryptographic mechanisms are available + * through the PSA API when #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled, and + * is not used when #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE "psa/crypto_config.h" + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included after + * `"psa/crypto_config.h"` or #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE. + * This allows you to modify the default configuration, including the ability + * to undefine options that are enabled by default. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE "/dev/null" + +/** \} name SECTION: General configuration options */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module configuration options + * + * This section allows for the setting of module specific sizes and + * configuration options. The default values are already present in the + * relevant header files and should suffice for the regular use cases. + * + * Our advice is to enable options and change their values here + * only if you have a good reason and know the consequences. + * \{ + */ +/* The Doxygen documentation here is used when a user comments out a + * setting and runs doxygen themselves. On the other hand, when we typeset + * the full documentation including disabled settings, the documentation + * in specific modules' header files is used if present. When editing this + * file, make sure that each option is documented in exactly one place, + * plus optionally a same-line Doxygen comment here if there is a Doxygen + * comment in the specific module. */ + +/* MPI / BIGNUM options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 6 /**< Maximum window size used. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */ + +/* CTR_DRBG options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 /**< Amount of entropy used per seed by default (48 with SHA-512, 32 with SHA-256) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ + +/* HMAC_DRBG options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ + +/* ECP options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< Maximum bit size of groups. Normally determined automatically from the configured curves. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< Maximum window size used */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up */ + +/* Entropy options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 20 /**< Maximum number of sources supported */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER 128 /**< Maximum amount requested from entropy sources */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Default minimum number of bytes required for the hardware entropy source mbedtls_hardware_poll() before entropy is released */ + +/* Memory buffer allocator options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE 4 /**< Align on multiples of this value */ + +/* Platform options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR /**< Header to include if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS is defined. Don't define if no header is needed. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC calloc /**< Default allocator to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< Default free to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< Default exit to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< Default printf to use, can be undefined */ +/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< Default snprintf to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE 1 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE "seedfile" /**< Seed file to read/write with default implementation */ + +/* To Use Function Macros MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C must be enabled */ +/* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot both be defined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO calloc /**< Default allocator macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO free /**< Default free macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO exit /**< Default exit macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO time /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO printf /**< Default printf macro to use, can be undefined */ +/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf /**< Default snprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO vsnprintf /**< Default vsnprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ + +/** + * \brief This macro is invoked by the library when an invalid parameter + * is detected that is only checked with #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + * (see the documentation of that option for context). + * + * When you leave this undefined here, the library provides + * a default definition. If the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT + * is defined, the default definition is `assert(cond)`, + * otherwise the default definition calls a function + * mbedtls_param_failed(). This function is declared in + * `platform_util.h` for the benefit of the library, but + * you need to define in your application. + * + * When you define this here, this replaces the default + * definition in platform_util.h (which no longer declares the + * function mbedtls_param_failed()) and it is your responsibility + * to make sure this macro expands to something suitable (in + * particular, that all the necessary declarations are visible + * from within the library - you can ensure that by providing + * them in this file next to the macro definition). + * If you define this macro to call `assert`, also define + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source files + * include ``. + * + * Note that you may define this macro to expand to nothing, in + * which case you don't have to worry about declarations or + * definitions. However, you will then be notified about invalid + * parameters only in non-void functions, and void function will + * just silently return early on invalid parameters, which + * partially negates the benefits of enabling + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS in the first place, so is discouraged. + * + * \param cond The expression that should evaluate to true, but doesn't. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) assert( cond ) + +/** \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN + * + * This macro is used at the beginning of the declaration of a function + * to indicate that its return value should be checked. It should + * instruct the compiler to emit a warning or an error if the function + * is called without checking its return value. + * + * There is a default implementation for popular compilers in platform_util.h. + * You can override the default implementation by defining your own here. + * + * If the implementation here is empty, this will effectively disable the + * checking of functions' return values. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN __attribute__((__warn_unused_result__)) + +/** \def MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN + * + * This macro requires one argument, which should be a C function call. + * If that function call would cause a #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN warning, this + * warning is suppressed. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( result ) ((void) !(result)) + +/* PSA options */ +/** + * Use HMAC_DRBG with the specified hash algorithm for HMAC_DRBG for the + * PSA crypto subsystem. + * + * If this option is unset: + * - If CTR_DRBG is available, the PSA subsystem uses it rather than HMAC_DRBG. + * - Otherwise, the PSA subsystem uses HMAC_DRBG with either + * #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 or #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 based on availability and + * on unspecified heuristics. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + * Restrict the PSA library to supporting a maximum amount of simultaneously + * loaded keys. A loaded key is a key stored by the PSA Crypto core as a + * volatile key, or a persistent key which is loaded temporarily by the + * library as part of a crypto operation in flight. + * + * If this option is unset, the library will fall back to a default value of + * 32 keys. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 + +/* SSL Cache options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /**< 1 day */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /**< Maximum entries in cache */ + +/* SSL options */ + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming and outgoing plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of both the incoming and outgoing TLS I/O buffers + * in such a way that both are capable of holding the specified amount of + * plaintext data, regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * To configure incoming and outgoing I/O buffers separately, use + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, + * which overwrite the value set by this option. + * + * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is + * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to + * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there + * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about + * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless + * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended + * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of both + * incoming and outgoing I/O buffers. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of the incoming TLS I/O buffer in such a way + * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, + * regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * If this option is undefined, it inherits its value from + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. + * + * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is + * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to + * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there + * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about + * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless + * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended + * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer + * independently of the outgoing I/O buffer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * + * The maximum length of CIDs used for incoming DTLS messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX + * + * The maximum length of CIDs used for outgoing DTLS messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY + * + * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding + * when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2. + * + * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the + * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. + * + * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used + * for outgoing records. + * + * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, + * a power of two should be preferred. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY + * + * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding + * in TLS 1.3. + * + * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the + * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. + * + * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used + * for outgoing records. + * + * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, + * a power of two should be preferred. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + * + * Maximum length (in bytes) of outgoing plaintext fragments. + * + * This determines the size of the outgoing TLS I/O buffer in such a way + * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, + * regardless of the protection mechanism used. + * + * If this option undefined, it inherits its value from + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. + * + * It is possible to save RAM by setting a smaller outward buffer, while keeping + * the default inward 16384 byte buffer to conform to the TLS specification. + * + * The minimum required outward buffer size is determined by the handshake + * protocol's usage. Handshaking will fail if the outward buffer is too small. + * The specific size requirement depends on the configured ciphers and any + * certificate data which is sent during the handshake. + * + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer + * independently of the incoming I/O buffer. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 + +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING + * + * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of + * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering. + * + * This should be at least 9/8 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + * to account for a reassembled handshake message of maximum size, + * together with its reassembly bitmap. + * + * A value of 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN (32768 by default) + * should be sufficient for all practical situations as it allows + * to reassembly a large handshake message (such as a certificate) + * while buffering multiple smaller handshake messages. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 + +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 bits) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */ + +/** \def MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID + * + * At the time of writing, the CID extension has not been assigned its + * final value. Set this configuration option to make Mbed TLS use a + * different value. + * + * A future minor revision of Mbed TLS may change the default value of + * this option to match evolving standards and usage. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 + +/** + * Complete list of ciphersuites to use, in order of preference. + * + * \warning No dependency checking is done on that field! This option can only + * be used to restrict the set of available ciphersuites. It is your + * responsibility to make sure the needed modules are active. + * + * Use this to save a few hundred bytes of ROM (default ordering of all + * available ciphersuites) and a few to a few hundred bytes of RAM. + * + * The value below is only an example, not the default. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + +/* X509 options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */ + +/** + * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for TLS 1.2 handshake + * signature and ciphersuite selection. Without this build-time option, SHA-1 + * support must be activated explicitly through mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes. + * The use of SHA-1 in TLS <= 1.1 and in HMAC-SHA-1 is always allowed by + * default. At the time of writing, there is no practical attack on the use + * of SHA-1 in handshake signatures, hence this option is turned on by default + * to preserve compatibility with existing peers, but the general + * warning applies nonetheless: + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes + * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies + * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE + +/** + * Uncomment the macro to let mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). This replaces the default implementation in + * platform_util.c. + * + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is a widely used function across the library to + * zero a block of memory. The implementation is expected to be secure in the + * sense that it has been written to prevent the compiler from removing calls + * to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() as part of redundant code elimination + * optimizations. However, it is difficult to guarantee that calls to + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized by the compiler as older + * versions of the C language standards do not provide a secure implementation + * of memset(). Therefore, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT enables users to + * configure their own implementation of mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), for + * example by using directives specific to their compiler, features from newer + * C standards (e.g using memset_s() in C11) or calling a secure memset() from + * their system (e.g explicit_bzero() in BSD). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT + +/** + * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(). This replaces the default implementation in + * platform_util.c. + * + * gmtime() is not a thread-safe function as defined in the C standard. The + * library will try to use safer implementations of this function, such as + * gmtime_r() when available. However, if Mbed TLS cannot identify the target + * system, the implementation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() will default to + * using the standard gmtime(). In this case, calls from the library to + * gmtime() will be guarded by the global mutex mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex + * if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. We recommend that calls from outside the + * library are also guarded with this mutex to avoid race conditions. However, + * if the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, Mbed TLS will + * unconditionally use the implementation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() + * supplied at compile time. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT + +/** + * Enable the verified implementations of ECDH primitives from Project Everest + * (currently only Curve25519). This feature changes the layout of ECDH + * contexts and therefore is a compatibility break for applications that access + * fields of a mbedtls_ecdh_context structure directly. See also + * MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT in include/mbedtls/ecdh.h. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED + +/** \} name SECTION: Module configuration options */ + +/* Target and application specific configurations + * + * Allow user to override any previous default. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d27fb54b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h @@ -0,0 +1,833 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_psa.h + * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines) + * + * This set of compile-time options takes settings defined in + * include/mbedtls/config.h and include/psa/crypto_config.h and uses + * those definitions to define symbols used in the library code. + * + * Users and integrators should not edit this file, please edit + * include/mbedtls/config.h for MBEDTLS_XXX settings or + * include/psa/crypto_config.h for PSA_WANT_XXX settings. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE +#else +#include "psa/crypto_config.h" +#endif +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* De facto synonyms */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +#endif + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Require built-in implementations based on PSA requirements */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD2) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD4) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C +#define MBEDTLS_PK_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +/* If any of the block modes are requested that don't have an + * associated HW assist, define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE for checking + * in the block cipher key types. */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB)) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC)) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE 1 +#endif + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM)) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C +#endif /*!MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C +#endif /*PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +#endif /*!MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ + +/* If any of the software block ciphers are selected, define + * PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER, which can be used in any of these + * situations. */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC) +#error "CBC-MAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_MAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +/* + * Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4249). + */ +#error "Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +/* + * SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541). + */ +#error "SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Infer PSA requirements from Mbed TLS capabilities */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ + +/* + * Ensure PSA_WANT_* defines are setup properly if MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + * is not defined + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY 1 + +// Only add in DETERMINISTIC support if ECDSA is also enabled +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#endif +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +#endif + +/* Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4249) */ +#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 +#endif + +/* SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541) */ +#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ + +/* These features are always enabled. */ +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c5de57a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H + +#include + + +/** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to the standard memcmp function, but is likely to be + * compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param a Pointer to the first buffer. + * \param b Pointer to the second buffer. + * \param n The number of bytes to compare in the buffer. + * + * \return Zero if the content of the two buffer is the same, + * otherwise non-zero. + */ +int mbedtls_ct_memcmp( const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e68237a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h @@ -0,0 +1,611 @@ +/** + * \file ctr_drbg.h + * + * \brief This file contains definitions and functions for the + * CTR_DRBG pseudorandom generator. + * + * CTR_DRBG is a standardized way of building a PRNG from a block-cipher + * in counter mode operation, as defined in NIST SP 800-90A: + * Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random + * Bit Generators. + * + * The Mbed TLS implementation of CTR_DRBG uses AES-256 (default) or AES-128 + * (if \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled at compile time) + * as the underlying block cipher, with a derivation function. + * + * The security strength as defined in NIST SP 800-90A is + * 128 bits when AES-128 is used (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY enabled) + * and 256 bits otherwise, provided that #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN is + * kept at its default value (and not overridden in config.h) and that the + * DRBG instance is set up with default parameters. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more + * information. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +/** The entropy source failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x0034 +/** The requested random buffer length is too big. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -0x0036 +/** The input (entropy + additional data) is too large. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -0x0038 +/** Read or write error in file. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x003A + +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE 16 /**< The block size used by the cipher. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 16 +/**< The key size in bytes used by the cipher. + * + * Compile-time choice: 16 bytes (128 bits) + * because #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled. + */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 32 +/**< The key size in bytes used by the cipher. + * + * Compile-time choice: 32 bytes (256 bits) + * because \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is disabled. + */ +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 8 ) /**< The key size for the DRBG operation, in bits. */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) /**< The seed length, calculated as (counter + AES key). */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them using the compiler command + * line. + * \{ + */ + +/** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + * + * \brief The amount of entropy used per seed by default, in bytes. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) +/** This is 48 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-512 + * (\c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is disabled). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 + +#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) */ + +/** This is 32 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-256 + * (the SHA512 module is disabled or + * \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is enabled). + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) +/** \warning To achieve a 256-bit security strength, you must pass a nonce + * to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(). + */ +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 32 +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) */ +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 +/**< The interval before reseed is performed by default. */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 +/**< The maximum number of additional input Bytes. */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 +/**< The maximum number of requested Bytes per call. */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 +/**< The maximum size of seed or reseed buffer in bytes. */ +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF 0 +/**< Prediction resistance is disabled. */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON 1 +/**< Prediction resistance is enabled. */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2 +/** The default length of the nonce read from the entropy source. + * + * This is \c 0 because a single read from the entropy source is sufficient + * to include a nonce. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN 0 +#else +/** The default length of the nonce read from the entropy source. + * + * This is half of the default entropy length because a single read from + * the entropy source does not provide enough material to form a nonce. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + 1 ) / 2 +#endif + +/** + * \brief The CTR_DRBG context structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context +{ + unsigned char counter[16]; /*!< The counter (V). */ + int reseed_counter; /*!< The reseed counter. + * This is the number of requests that have + * been made since the last (re)seeding, + * minus one. + * Before the initial seeding, this field + * contains the amount of entropy in bytes + * to use as a nonce for the initial seeding, + * or -1 if no nonce length has been explicitly + * set (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). + */ + int prediction_resistance; /*!< This determines whether prediction + resistance is enabled, that is + whether to systematically reseed before + each random generation. */ + size_t entropy_len; /*!< The amount of entropy grabbed on each + seed or reseed operation, in bytes. */ + int reseed_interval; /*!< The reseed interval. + * This is the maximum number of requests + * that can be made between reseedings. */ + + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; /*!< The AES context. */ + + /* + * Callbacks (Entropy) + */ + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + /*!< The entropy callback function. */ + + void *p_entropy; /*!< The context for the entropy function. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized if and only if f_entropy != NULL. + * This means that the mutex is initialized during the initial seeding + * in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() and freed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). + * + * Note that this invariant may change without notice. Do not rely on it + * and do not access the mutex directly in application code. + */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; +#endif +} +mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context; + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the CTR_DRBG context, + * and prepares it for mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() + * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). + * + * \note The reseed interval is + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL by default. + * You can override it by calling + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval(). + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to initialize. + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function seeds and sets up the CTR_DRBG + * entropy source for future reseeds. + * + * A typical choice for the \p f_entropy and \p p_entropy parameters is + * to use the entropy module: + * - \p f_entropy is mbedtls_entropy_func(); + * - \p p_entropy is an instance of ::mbedtls_entropy_context initialized + * with mbedtls_entropy_init() (which registers the platform's default + * entropy sources). + * + * The entropy length is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN by default. + * You can override it by calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len(). + * + * The entropy nonce length is: + * - \c 0 if the entropy length is at least 3/2 times the entropy length, + * which guarantees that the security strength is the maximum permitted + * by the key size and entropy length according to NIST SP 800-90A §10.2.1; + * - Half the entropy length otherwise. + * You can override it by calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). + * With the default entropy length, the entropy nonce length is + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN. + * + * You can provide a nonce and personalization string in addition to the + * entropy source, to make this instantiation as unique as possible. + * See SP 800-90A §8.6.7 for more details about nonces. + * + * The _seed_material_ value passed to the derivation function in + * the CTR_DRBG Instantiate Process described in NIST SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2 + * is the concatenation of the following strings: + * - A string obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the entropy + * length. + */ +#if MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN == 0 +/** + * - If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len() has been called, a string + * obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the specified length. + */ +#else +/** + * - A string obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the entropy nonce + * length. If the entropy nonce length is \c 0, this function does not + * make a second call to \p f_entropy. + */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * after this function returns successfully, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * - The \p custom string. + * + * \note To achieve the nominal security strength permitted + * by CTR_DRBG, the entropy length must be: + * - at least 16 bytes for a 128-bit strength + * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-128); + * - at least 32 bytes for a 256-bit strength + * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-256). + * + * In addition, if you do not pass a nonce in \p custom, + * the sum of the entropy length + * and the entropy nonce length must be: + * - at least 24 bytes for a 128-bit strength + * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-128); + * - at least 48 bytes for a 256-bit strength + * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-256). + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to seed. + * It must have been initialized with + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). + * After a successful call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(), + * you may not call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() again on + * the same context unless you call + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free() and mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init() + * again first. + * After a failed call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(), + * you must call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). + * \param f_entropy The entropy callback, taking as arguments the + * \p p_entropy context, the buffer to fill, and the + * length of the buffer. + * \p f_entropy is always called with a buffer size + * less than or equal to the entropy length. + * \param p_entropy The entropy context to pass to \p f_entropy. + * \param custom The personalization string. + * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization + * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. + * \param len The length of the personalization string. + * This must be at most + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + * - #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function resets CTR_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to clear. + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function turns prediction resistance on or off. + * The default value is off. + * + * \note If enabled, entropy is gathered at the beginning of + * every call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add() + * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(). + * Only use this if your entropy source has sufficient + * throughput. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param resistance #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON or #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF. + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int resistance ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed on each + * seed or reseed. + * + * The default value is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN. + * + * \note The security strength of CTR_DRBG is bounded by the + * entropy length. Thus: + * - When using AES-256 + * (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is disabled, + * which is the default), + * \p len must be at least 32 (in bytes) + * to achieve a 256-bit strength. + * - When using AES-128 + * (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled) + * \p len must be at least 16 (in bytes) + * to achieve a 128-bit strength. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param len The amount of entropy to grab, in bytes. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + * and at most the maximum length accepted by the + * entropy function that is set in the context. + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed + * as a nonce for the initial seeding. + * + * Call this function before calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() to read + * a nonce from the entropy source during the initial seeding. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param len The amount of entropy to grab for the nonce, in bytes. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + * and at most the maximum length accepted by the + * entropy function that is set in the context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if \p len is + * more than #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if the initial seeding has already taken place. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the reseed interval. + * + * The reseed interval is the number of calls to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() + * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add() after which the entropy function + * is called again. + * + * The default value is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param interval The reseed interval. + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int interval ); + +/** + * \brief This function reseeds the CTR_DRBG context, that is + * extracts data from the entropy source. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param additional Additional data to add to the state. Can be \c NULL. + * \param len The length of the additional data. + * This must be less than + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len + * where \c entropy_len is the entropy length + * configured for the context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param additional The data to update the state with. This must not be + * \c NULL unless \p add_len is \c 0. + * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. This must be at + * most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if + * \p add_len is more than + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. + * \return An error from the underlying AES cipher on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function updates a CTR_DRBG instance with additional + * data and uses it to generate random data. + * + * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded + * or prediction resistance is enabled. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * + * \param p_rng The CTR_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a + * #mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context structure. + * \param output The buffer to fill. + * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. + * \param additional Additional data to update. Can be \c NULL, in which + * case the additional data is empty regardless of + * the value of \p add_len. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data + * if \p additional is not \c NULL. + * This must be less than #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT + * and less than + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len + * where \c entropy_len is the entropy length + * configured for the context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function uses CTR_DRBG to generate random data. + * + * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded + * or prediction resistance is enabled. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * \param p_rng The CTR_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a + * #mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context structure. + * \param output The buffer to fill. + * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ); + + +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() + * in 2.16.0. + * + * \note If \p add_len is greater than + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT, only the first + * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT Bytes are used. + * The remaining Bytes are silently discarded. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param additional The data to update the state with. + * \param add_len Length of \p additional data. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ); +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief This function writes a seed file. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param path The name of the file. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on reseed + * failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); + +/** + * \brief This function reads and updates a seed file. The seed + * is added to this instance. + * + * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. + * \param path The name of the file. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on + * reseed failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if the existing + * seed file is too large. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The CTR_DRBG checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ctr_drbg.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/debug.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/debug.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4fc4662d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/debug.h @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +/** + * \file debug.h + * + * \brief Functions for controlling and providing debug output from the library. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H +#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + +#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_STRIP_PARENS( ... ) __VA_ARGS__ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( level, args ) \ + mbedtls_debug_print_msg( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_STRIP_PARENS args ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( level, text, ret ) \ + mbedtls_debug_print_ret( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, ret ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( level, text, buf, len ) \ + mbedtls_debug_print_buf( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, buf, len ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( level, text, X ) \ + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, X ) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( level, text, X ) \ + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, X ) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( level, text, crt ) \ + mbedtls_debug_print_crt( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, crt ) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( level, ecdh, attr ) \ + mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh( ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, ecdh, attr ) +#endif + +#else /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( level, args ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( level, text, ret ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( level, text, buf, len ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( level, text, X ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( level, text, X ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( level, text, crt ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( level, ecdh, attr ) do { } while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE + * + * Mark a function as having printf attributes, and thus enable checking + * via -wFormat and other flags. This does nothing on builds with compilers + * that do not support the format attribute + * + * Module: library/debug.c + * Caller: + * + * This module provides debugging functions. + */ +#if defined(__has_attribute) +#if __has_attribute(format) +#if defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) \ + __attribute__((__format__ (gnu_printf, string_index, first_to_check))) +#else /* defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 1 */ +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) \ + __attribute__((format(printf, string_index, first_to_check))) +#endif +#else /* __has_attribute(format) */ +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) +#endif /* __has_attribute(format) */ +#else /* defined(__has_attribute) */ +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) +#endif + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + * + * MBEDTLS_PRINTF_xxx: Due to issues with older window compilers + * and MinGW we need to define the printf specifier for size_t + * and long long per platform. + * + * Module: library/debug.c + * Caller: + * + * This module provides debugging functions. + */ +#if (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) + #include + #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET PRIuPTR + #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "I64d" +#else /* (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */ + #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET "zu" + #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "lld" +#endif /* (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Set the threshold error level to handle globally all debug output. + * Debug messages that have a level over the threshold value are + * discarded. + * (Default value: 0 = No debug ) + * + * \param threshold threshold level of messages to filter on. Messages at a + * higher level will be discarded. + * - Debug levels + * - 0 No debug + * - 1 Error + * - 2 State change + * - 3 Informational + * - 4 Verbose + */ +void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( int threshold ); + +/** + * \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used + * through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl + * context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the message has occurred in + * \param line line number the message has occurred at + * \param format format specifier, in printf format + * \param ... variables used by the format specifier + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_msg( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *format, ... ) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6); + +/** + * \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This + * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text the name of the function that returned the error + * \param ret the return code value + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ret( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, int ret ); + +/** + * \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function + * is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the + * variable or buffer name + * \param buf the buffer to be outputted + * \param len length of the buffer + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_buf( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** + * \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always + * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the + * ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the + * variable name + * \param X the MPI variable + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/** + * \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always + * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the + * ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the + * variable name + * \param X the ECP point + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This + * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the certificate being output + * \param crt X.509 certificate structure + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_crt( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z, +} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr; + +/** + * \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug + * output. This function is always used through the + * MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file + * and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param ecdh the ECDH context + * \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr ); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* debug.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/des.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/des.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..325aab53 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/des.h @@ -0,0 +1,370 @@ +/** + * \file des.h + * + * \brief DES block cipher + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_DES_H +#define MBEDTLS_DES_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT 0 + +/** The data input has an invalid length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0032 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** DES hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0033 + +#define MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE 8 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief DES context structure + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_des_context +{ + uint32_t sk[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */ +} +mbedtls_des_context; + +/** + * \brief Triple-DES context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_des3_context +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; /*!< 3DES subkeys */ +} +mbedtls_des3_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ +#include "des_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize DES context + * + * \param ctx DES context to be initialized + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +void mbedtls_des_init( mbedtls_des_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear DES context + * + * \param ctx DES context to be cleared + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +void mbedtls_des_free( mbedtls_des_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Initialize Triple-DES context + * + * \param ctx DES3 context to be initialized + */ +void mbedtls_des3_init( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear Triple-DES context + * + * \param ctx DES3 context to be cleared + */ +void mbedtls_des3_free( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Set key parity on the given key to odd. + * + * DES keys are 56 bits long, but each byte is padded with + * a parity bit to allow verification. + * + * \param key 8-byte secret key + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +void mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); + +/** + * \brief Check that key parity on the given key is odd. + * + * DES keys are 56 bits long, but each byte is padded with + * a parity bit to allow verification. + * + * \param key 8-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 is parity was ok, 1 if parity was not correct. + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); + +/** + * \brief Check that key is not a weak or semi-weak DES key + * + * \param key 8-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 if no weak key was found, 1 if a weak key was identified. + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des_key_check_weak( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); + +/** + * \brief DES key schedule (56-bit, encryption) + * + * \param ctx DES context to be initialized + * \param key 8-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); + +/** + * \brief DES key schedule (56-bit, decryption) + * + * \param ctx DES context to be initialized + * \param key 8-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); + +/** + * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, encryption) + * + * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized + * \param key 16-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2] ); + +/** + * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, decryption) + * + * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized + * \param key 16-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2] ); + +/** + * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, encryption) + * + * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized + * \param key 24-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3] ); + +/** + * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, decryption) + * + * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized + * \param key 24-byte secret key + * + * \return 0 + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3] ); + +/** + * \brief DES-ECB block encryption/decryption + * + * \param ctx DES context + * \param input 64-bit input block + * \param output 64-bit output block + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the function same function again on the following + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * \param ctx DES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT + * \param length length of the input data + * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) + * \param input buffer holding the input data + * \param output buffer holding the output data + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +/** + * \brief 3DES-ECB block encryption/decryption + * + * \param ctx 3DES context + * \param input 64-bit input block + * \param output 64-bit output block + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief 3DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + * + * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can + * call the function same function again on the following + * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was + * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. + * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the + * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher + * module instead. + * + * \param ctx 3DES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT + * \param length length of the input data + * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) + * \param input buffer holding the input data + * \param output buffer holding the output data + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +/** + * \brief Internal function for key expansion. + * (Only exposed to allow overriding it, + * see MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) + * + * \param SK Round keys + * \param key Base key + * + * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers + * instead. + */ +void mbedtls_des_setkey( uint32_t SK[32], + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* des.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/dhm.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/dhm.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c4b15a2c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/dhm.h @@ -0,0 +1,1103 @@ +/** + * \file dhm.h + * + * \brief This file contains Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) key exchange + * definitions and functions. + * + * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) key exchange is defined in + * RFC-2631: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method and + * Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #3: Diffie + * Hellman Key Agreement Standard. + * + * RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for + * Internet Key Exchange (IKE) defines a number of standardized + * Diffie-Hellman groups for IKE. + * + * RFC-5114: Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF + * Standards defines a number of standardized Diffie-Hellman + * groups that can be used. + * + * \warning The security of the DHM key exchange relies on the proper choice + * of prime modulus - optimally, it should be a safe prime. The usage + * of non-safe primes both decreases the difficulty of the underlying + * discrete logarithm problem and can lead to small subgroup attacks + * leaking private exponent bits when invalid public keys are used + * and not detected. This is especially relevant if the same DHM + * parameters are reused for multiple key exchanges as in static DHM, + * while the criticality of small-subgroup attacks is lower for + * ephemeral DHM. + * + * \warning For performance reasons, the code does neither perform primality + * nor safe primality tests, nor the expensive checks for invalid + * subgroups. Moreover, even if these were performed, non-standardized + * primes cannot be trusted because of the possibility of backdoors + * that can't be effectively checked for. + * + * \warning Diffie-Hellman-Merkle is therefore a security risk when not using + * standardized primes generated using a trustworthy ("nothing up + * my sleeve") method, such as the RFC 3526 / 7919 primes. In the TLS + * protocol, DH parameters need to be negotiated, so using the default + * primes systematically is not always an option. If possible, use + * Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), which has better performance, + * and for which the TLS protocol mandates the use of standard + * parameters. + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_DHM_H +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +/* + * DHM Error codes + */ +/** Bad input parameters. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x3080 +/** Reading of the DHM parameters failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED -0x3100 +/** Making of the DHM parameters failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED -0x3180 +/** Reading of the public values failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED -0x3200 +/** Making of the public value failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED -0x3280 +/** Calculation of the DHM secret failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED -0x3300 +/** The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT -0x3380 +/** Allocation of memory failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3400 +/** Read or write of file failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x3480 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** DHM hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3500 + +/** Setting the modulus and generator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED -0x3580 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) + +/** + * \brief The DHM context structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_dhm_context +{ + size_t len; /*!< The size of \p P in Bytes. */ + mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus. */ + mbedtls_mpi G; /*!< The generator. */ + mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< Our secret value. */ + mbedtls_mpi GX; /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi GY; /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi K; /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi RP; /*!< The cached value = \c R^2 mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi pX; /*!< The previous \c X. */ +} +mbedtls_dhm_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ +#include "dhm_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the DHM context. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to initialize. + */ +void mbedtls_dhm_init( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function parses the DHM parameters in a + * TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message + * (DHM modulus, generator, and public key). + * + * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the client + * sets up its DHM context from the server's public + * DHM key material. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param p On input, *p must be the start of the input buffer. + * On output, *p is updated to point to the end of the data + * that has been read. On success, this is the first byte + * past the end of the ServerKeyExchange parameters. + * On error, this is the point at which an error has been + * detected, which is usually not useful except to debug + * failures. + * \param end The end of the input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a DHM key pair and exports its + * public part together with the DHM parameters in the format + * used in a TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message. + * + * \note This function assumes that the DHM parameters \c ctx->P + * and \c ctx->G have already been properly set. For that, use + * mbedtls_dhm_set_group() below in conjunction with + * mbedtls_mpi_read_binary() and mbedtls_mpi_read_string(). + * + * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the server generates + * and exports its DHM key material. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized + * and have the DHM parameters set. It may or may not + * already have imported the peer's public key. + * \param x_size The private key size in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes + * written on success. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param output The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of + * sufficient size to hold the reduced binary presentation of + * the modulus, the generator and the public key, each wrapped + * with a 2-byte length field. It is the responsibility of the + * caller to ensure that enough space is available. Refer to + * mbedtls_mpi_size() to computing the byte-size of an MPI. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. Must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the prime modulus and generator. + * + * \note This function can be used to set \c ctx->P, \c ctx->G + * in preparation for mbedtls_dhm_make_params(). + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to configure. This must be initialized. + * \param P The MPI holding the DHM prime modulus. This must be + * an initialized MPI. + * \param G The MPI holding the DHM generator. This must be an + * initialized MPI. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *G ); + +/** + * \brief This function imports the raw public value of the peer. + * + * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the server imports + * the Client's public DHM key. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized and have + * its DHM parameters set, e.g. via mbedtls_dhm_set_group(). + * It may or may not already have generated its own private key. + * \param input The input buffer containing the \c G^Y value of the peer. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The size of the input buffer \p input in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_read_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function creates a DHM key pair and exports + * the raw public key in big-endian format. + * + * \note The destination buffer is always fully written + * so as to contain a big-endian representation of G^X mod P. + * If it is larger than \c ctx->len, it is padded accordingly + * with zero-bytes at the beginning. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized and + * have the DHM parameters set. It may or may not already + * have imported the peer's public key. + * \param x_size The private key size in Bytes. + * \param output The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of + * size \p olen Bytes. + * \param olen The length of the destination buffer. This must be at least + * equal to `ctx->len` (the size of \c P). + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + unsigned char *output, size_t olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret + * \c (G^Y)^X mod \c P. + * + * \note If \p f_rng is not \c NULL, it is used to blind the input as + * a countermeasure against timing attacks. Blinding is used + * only if our private key \c X is re-used, and not used + * otherwise. We recommend always passing a non-NULL + * \p f_rng argument. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized + * and have its own private key generated and the peer's + * public key imported. + * \param output The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This + * must be a writable buffer of size \p output_size Bytes. + * \param output_size The size of the destination buffer. This must be at + * least the size of \c ctx->len (the size of \c P). + * \param olen On exit, holds the actual number of Bytes written. + * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. This may + * b \c NULL if blinding isn't needed. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng + * doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees and clears the components + * of a DHM context. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to free and clear. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized DHM context. + */ +void mbedtls_dhm_free( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief This function parses DHM parameters in PEM or DER format. + * + * \param dhm The DHM context to import the DHM parameters into. + * This must be initialized. + * \param dhmin The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of + * length \p dhminlen Bytes. + * \param dhminlen The size of the input buffer \p dhmin, including the + * terminating \c NULL Byte for PEM data. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_XXX error + * code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, + size_t dhminlen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief This function loads and parses DHM parameters from a file. + * + * \param dhm The DHM context to load the parameters to. + * This must be initialized. + * \param path The filename to read the DHM parameters from. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The DMH checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +/** + * RFC 3526, RFC 5114 and RFC 7919 standardize a number of + * Diffie-Hellman groups, some of which are included here + * for use within the SSL/TLS module and the user's convenience + * when configuring the Diffie-Hellman parameters by hand + * through \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param. + * + * The following lists the source of the above groups in the standards: + * - RFC 5114 section 2.2: 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup + * - RFC 3526 section 3: 2048-bit MODP Group + * - RFC 3526 section 4: 3072-bit MODP Group + * - RFC 3526 section 5: 4096-bit MODP Group + * - RFC 7919 section A.1: ffdhe2048 + * - RFC 7919 section A.2: ffdhe3072 + * - RFC 7919 section A.3: ffdhe4096 + * - RFC 7919 section A.4: ffdhe6144 + * - RFC 7919 section A.5: ffdhe8192 + * + * The constants with suffix "_p" denote the chosen prime moduli, while + * the constants with suffix "_g" denote the chosen generator + * of the associated prime field. + * + * The constants further suffixed with "_bin" are provided in binary format, + * while all other constants represent null-terminated strings holding the + * hexadecimal presentation of the respective numbers. + * + * The primes from RFC 3526 and RFC 7919 have been generating by the following + * trust-worthy procedure: + * - Fix N in { 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192 } and consider the N-bit number + * the first and last 64 bits are all 1, and the remaining N - 128 bits of + * which are 0x7ff...ff. + * - Add the smallest multiple of the first N - 129 bits of the binary expansion + * of pi (for RFC 5236) or e (for RFC 7919) to this intermediate bit-string + * such that the resulting integer is a safe-prime. + * - The result is the respective RFC 3526 / 7919 prime, and the corresponding + * generator is always chosen to be 2 (which is a square for these prime, + * hence the corresponding subgroup has order (p-1)/2 and avoids leaking a + * bit in the private exponent). + * + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +/** + * \warning The origin of the primes in RFC 5114 is not documented and + * their use therefore constitutes a security risk! + * + * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 5114 are deprecated and are + * likely to be removed in a future version of the library without + * replacement. + */ + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the + * 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined + * in RFC-5114: Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with + * IETF Standards. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ + "AD107E1E9123A9D0D660FAA79559C51FA20D64E5683B9FD1" \ + "B54B1597B61D0A75E6FA141DF95A56DBAF9A3C407BA1DF15" \ + "EB3D688A309C180E1DE6B85A1274A0A66D3F8152AD6AC212" \ + "9037C9EDEFDA4DF8D91E8FEF55B7394B7AD5B7D0B6C12207" \ + "C9F98D11ED34DBF6C6BA0B2C8BBC27BE6A00E0A0B9C49708" \ + "B3BF8A317091883681286130BC8985DB1602E714415D9330" \ + "278273C7DE31EFDC7310F7121FD5A07415987D9ADC0A486D" \ + "CDF93ACC44328387315D75E198C641A480CD86A1B9E587E8" \ + "BE60E69CC928B2B9C52172E413042E9B23F10B0E16E79763" \ + "C9B53DCF4BA80A29E3FB73C16B8E75B97EF363E2FFA31F71" \ + "CF9DE5384E71B81C0AC4DFFE0C10E64F" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP + * Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined in RFC-5114: + * Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF Standards. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ + "AC4032EF4F2D9AE39DF30B5C8FFDAC506CDEBE7B89998CAF" \ + "74866A08CFE4FFE3A6824A4E10B9A6F0DD921F01A70C4AFA" \ + "AB739D7700C29F52C57DB17C620A8652BE5E9001A8D66AD7" \ + "C17669101999024AF4D027275AC1348BB8A762D0521BC98A" \ + "E247150422EA1ED409939D54DA7460CDB5F6C6B250717CBE" \ + "F180EB34118E98D119529A45D6F834566E3025E316A330EF" \ + "BB77A86F0C1AB15B051AE3D428C8F8ACB70A8137150B8EEB" \ + "10E183EDD19963DDD9E263E4770589EF6AA21E7F5F2FF381" \ + "B539CCE3409D13CD566AFBB48D6C019181E1BCFE94B30269" \ + "EDFE72FE9B6AA4BD7B5A0F1C71CFFF4C19C418E1F6EC0179" \ + "81BC087F2A7065B384B890D3191F2BFA" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 2048-bit MODP + * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) + * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). + * + * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 3625 are deprecated and + * superseded by the corresponding macros providing them as + * binary constants. Their hex-encoded constants are likely + * to be removed in a future version of the library. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ + "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ + "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ + "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ + "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ + "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ + "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ + "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ + "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ + "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ + "15728E5A8AACAA68FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP + * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) + * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 3072-bit MODP + * Group, as defined in RFC-3072: More Modular Exponential (MODP) + * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ + "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ + "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ + "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ + "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ + "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ + "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ + "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ + "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ + "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ + "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \ + "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \ + "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \ + "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \ + "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \ + "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A93AD2CAFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 3072-bit MODP + * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) + * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 4096-bit MODP + * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) + * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ + "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ + "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ + "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ + "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ + "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ + "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ + "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ + "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ + "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ + "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \ + "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \ + "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \ + "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \ + "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \ + "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D7" \ + "88719A10BDBA5B2699C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA" \ + "2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6" \ + "287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2233BA186515BE7ED" \ + "1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127D5B05AA9" \ + "93B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934063199" \ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" ) + +/** + * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 4096-bit MODP + * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) + * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( "02" ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* + * Trustworthy DHM parameters in binary form + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, \ + 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, \ + 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, \ + 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, \ + 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, \ + 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, \ + 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, \ + 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, \ + 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, \ + 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, \ + 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, \ + 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, \ + 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, \ + 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, \ + 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, \ + 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, \ + 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, \ + 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, \ + 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, \ + 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, \ + 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, \ + 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, \ + 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, \ + 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, \ + 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, \ + 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, \ + 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, \ + 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, \ + 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, \ + 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, \ + 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, \ + 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, \ + 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, \ + 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, \ + 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, \ + 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, \ + 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, \ + 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, \ + 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, \ + 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, \ + 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, \ + 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, \ + 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, \ + 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, \ + 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, \ + 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, \ + 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, \ + 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, \ + 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, \ + 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, \ + 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, \ + 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, \ + 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, \ + 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, \ + 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, \ + 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, \ + 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, \ + 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, \ + 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, \ + 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33, \ + 0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, \ + 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A, \ + 0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, \ + 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7, \ + 0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, \ + 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D, \ + 0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, \ + 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64, \ + 0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, \ + 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, \ + 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, \ + 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, \ + 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, \ + 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, \ + 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x3A, 0xD2, 0xCA, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, \ + 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, \ + 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, \ + 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, \ + 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, \ + 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, \ + 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, \ + 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, \ + 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, \ + 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, \ + 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, \ + 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, \ + 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, \ + 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, \ + 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, \ + 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, \ + 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, \ + 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, \ + 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, \ + 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, \ + 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, \ + 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, \ + 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, \ + 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, \ + 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, \ + 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, \ + 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, \ + 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, \ + 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, \ + 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, \ + 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33, \ + 0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, \ + 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A, \ + 0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, \ + 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7, \ + 0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, \ + 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D, \ + 0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, \ + 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64, \ + 0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, \ + 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, \ + 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, \ + 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, \ + 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, \ + 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, \ + 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01, \ + 0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7, \ + 0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26, \ + 0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C, \ + 0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA, \ + 0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8, \ + 0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9, \ + 0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6, \ + 0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D, \ + 0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2, \ + 0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED, \ + 0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF, \ + 0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C, \ + 0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9, \ + 0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1, \ + 0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F, \ + 0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x06, 0x31, 0x99, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x97, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \ + 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \ + 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \ + 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \ + 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \ + 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \ + 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \ + 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \ + 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \ + 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \ + 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \ + 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \ + 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \ + 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \ + 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \ + 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \ + 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0x37, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \ + 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \ + 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \ + 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \ + 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \ + 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \ + 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \ + 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \ + 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \ + 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \ + 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \ + 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \ + 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \ + 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \ + 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \ + 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \ + 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, \ + 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, \ + 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, \ + 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, \ + 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, \ + 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, \ + 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, \ + 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, \ + 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, \ + 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, \ + 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, \ + 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, \ + 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, \ + 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, \ + 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, \ + 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, \ + 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x65, 0x5F, 0x6A, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \ + 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \ + 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \ + 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \ + 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \ + 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \ + 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \ + 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \ + 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \ + 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \ + 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \ + 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \ + 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \ + 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \ + 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \ + 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \ + 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, \ + 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, \ + 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, \ + 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, \ + 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, \ + 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, \ + 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, \ + 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, \ + 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, \ + 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, \ + 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, \ + 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, \ + 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, \ + 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, \ + 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, \ + 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, \ + 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0xD9, 0x02, \ + 0x0B, 0xFD, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x45, 0x03, 0x6C, 0x7A, \ + 0x4E, 0x67, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0x38, 0x53, 0x2A, 0x3A, \ + 0x23, 0xBA, 0x44, 0x42, 0xCA, 0xF5, 0x3E, 0xA6, \ + 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x54, 0x32, 0x9B, 0x76, 0x24, 0xC8, \ + 0x91, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0x64, 0xB1, 0xC0, 0xFD, 0x4C, \ + 0xB3, 0x8E, 0x8C, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x1C, 0x3A, \ + 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x57, 0xFC, 0xCF, 0xEC, 0x71, \ + 0x9B, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x46, 0x04, 0x1F, \ + 0x38, 0x81, 0x47, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0xFD, 0xB4, 0x77, \ + 0xA5, 0x24, 0x71, 0xF7, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x69, 0x10, \ + 0xB8, 0x55, 0x32, 0x2E, 0xDB, 0x63, 0x40, 0xD8, \ + 0xA0, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x92, 0x35, 0x05, 0x11, 0xE3, \ + 0x0A, 0xBE, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xF9, 0xE3, 0xA2, 0x6E, \ + 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0x18, 0x30, 0x23, 0xC3, \ + 0x58, 0x7E, 0x38, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xB4, \ + 0x76, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x4B, 0x94, 0xB2, 0xBB, 0xC1, \ + 0x94, 0xC6, 0x65, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x92, \ + 0xEE, 0xAA, 0xC0, 0x23, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x1B, 0xF6, \ + 0xB3, 0xA7, 0x39, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x61, 0x16, 0x82, \ + 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0x58, 0x47, 0xA6, 0x7C, 0xBE, \ + 0xF9, 0xC9, 0x09, 0x1B, 0x46, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x8C, \ + 0xD7, 0x2B, 0x03, 0x74, 0x6A, 0xE7, 0x7F, 0x5E, \ + 0x62, 0x29, 0x2C, 0x31, 0x15, 0x62, 0xA8, 0x46, \ + 0x50, 0x5D, 0xC8, 0x2D, 0xB8, 0x54, 0x33, 0x8A, \ + 0xE4, 0x9F, 0x52, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x5B, 0x91, 0x17, \ + 0x8C, 0xCF, 0x2D, 0xD5, 0xCA, 0xCE, 0xF4, 0x03, \ + 0xEC, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x10, 0xC6, 0x27, 0x2B, 0x04, \ + 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x71, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0x6B, 0x80, 0xD6, \ + 0x3F, 0xDD, 0x4A, 0x8E, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x69, \ + 0x62, 0xA6, 0x95, 0x26, 0xD4, 0x31, 0x61, 0xC1, \ + 0xA4, 0x1D, 0x57, 0x0D, 0x79, 0x38, 0xDA, 0xD4, \ + 0xA4, 0x0E, 0x32, 0x9C, 0xD0, 0xE4, 0x0E, 0x65, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_P_BIN { \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \ + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \ + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \ + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \ + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \ + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \ + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \ + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \ + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \ + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \ + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \ + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \ + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \ + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \ + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \ + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \ + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \ + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \ + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \ + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \ + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \ + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \ + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \ + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \ + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \ + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \ + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \ + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \ + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \ + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \ + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \ + 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \ + 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \ + 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \ + 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \ + 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \ + 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \ + 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \ + 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \ + 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \ + 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \ + 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \ + 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \ + 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \ + 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \ + 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \ + 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, \ + 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, \ + 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, \ + 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, \ + 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, \ + 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, \ + 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, \ + 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, \ + 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, \ + 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, \ + 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, \ + 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, \ + 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, \ + 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, \ + 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, \ + 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, \ + 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0xD9, 0x02, \ + 0x0B, 0xFD, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x45, 0x03, 0x6C, 0x7A, \ + 0x4E, 0x67, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0x38, 0x53, 0x2A, 0x3A, \ + 0x23, 0xBA, 0x44, 0x42, 0xCA, 0xF5, 0x3E, 0xA6, \ + 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x54, 0x32, 0x9B, 0x76, 0x24, 0xC8, \ + 0x91, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0x64, 0xB1, 0xC0, 0xFD, 0x4C, \ + 0xB3, 0x8E, 0x8C, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x1C, 0x3A, \ + 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x57, 0xFC, 0xCF, 0xEC, 0x71, \ + 0x9B, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x46, 0x04, 0x1F, \ + 0x38, 0x81, 0x47, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0xFD, 0xB4, 0x77, \ + 0xA5, 0x24, 0x71, 0xF7, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x69, 0x10, \ + 0xB8, 0x55, 0x32, 0x2E, 0xDB, 0x63, 0x40, 0xD8, \ + 0xA0, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x92, 0x35, 0x05, 0x11, 0xE3, \ + 0x0A, 0xBE, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xF9, 0xE3, 0xA2, 0x6E, \ + 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0x18, 0x30, 0x23, 0xC3, \ + 0x58, 0x7E, 0x38, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xB4, \ + 0x76, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x4B, 0x94, 0xB2, 0xBB, 0xC1, \ + 0x94, 0xC6, 0x65, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x92, \ + 0xEE, 0xAA, 0xC0, 0x23, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x1B, 0xF6, \ + 0xB3, 0xA7, 0x39, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x61, 0x16, 0x82, \ + 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0x58, 0x47, 0xA6, 0x7C, 0xBE, \ + 0xF9, 0xC9, 0x09, 0x1B, 0x46, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x8C, \ + 0xD7, 0x2B, 0x03, 0x74, 0x6A, 0xE7, 0x7F, 0x5E, \ + 0x62, 0x29, 0x2C, 0x31, 0x15, 0x62, 0xA8, 0x46, \ + 0x50, 0x5D, 0xC8, 0x2D, 0xB8, 0x54, 0x33, 0x8A, \ + 0xE4, 0x9F, 0x52, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x5B, 0x91, 0x17, \ + 0x8C, 0xCF, 0x2D, 0xD5, 0xCA, 0xCE, 0xF4, 0x03, \ + 0xEC, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x10, 0xC6, 0x27, 0x2B, 0x04, \ + 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x71, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0x6B, 0x80, 0xD6, \ + 0x3F, 0xDD, 0x4A, 0x8E, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x69, \ + 0x62, 0xA6, 0x95, 0x26, 0xD4, 0x31, 0x61, 0xC1, \ + 0xA4, 0x1D, 0x57, 0x0D, 0x79, 0x38, 0xDA, 0xD4, \ + 0xA4, 0x0E, 0x32, 0x9C, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0x6A, 0xAA, \ + 0x36, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x4C, 0xF6, 0x00, 0xC8, 0x38, \ + 0x1E, 0x42, 0x5A, 0x31, 0xD9, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x64, \ + 0xFD, 0xB2, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x50, 0x9D, 0x43, \ + 0x68, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x69, 0xED, 0xD1, 0xCC, 0x5E, \ + 0x0B, 0x8C, 0xC3, 0xBD, 0xF6, 0x4B, 0x10, 0xEF, \ + 0x86, 0xB6, 0x31, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0x88, 0x29, \ + 0x55, 0x5B, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7C, 0x93, 0x26, 0x65, \ + 0xCB, 0x2C, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0xC0, 0x1B, 0xD7, 0x02, \ + 0x29, 0x38, 0x88, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xE4, \ + 0x54, 0x50, 0x4A, 0xC7, 0x8B, 0x75, 0x82, 0x82, \ + 0x28, 0x46, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0x35, 0xC3, 0x5F, 0x5C, \ + 0x59, 0x16, 0x0C, 0xC0, 0x46, 0xFD, 0x82, 0x51, \ + 0x54, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x8C, 0x9C, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x22, \ + 0xBB, 0x70, 0x99, 0x87, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x0E, 0x74, \ + 0x51, 0xA8, 0xA9, 0x31, 0x09, 0x70, 0x3F, 0xEE, \ + 0x1C, 0x21, 0x7E, 0x6C, 0x38, 0x26, 0xE5, 0x2C, \ + 0x51, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0x42, 0x3C, 0xFC, \ + 0x99, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0x16, 0x50, 0xC1, 0x21, 0x7B, \ + 0x62, 0x48, 0x16, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x9A, 0x95, 0xF9, \ + 0xD5, 0xB8, 0x01, 0x94, 0x88, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0xA0, \ + 0xA1, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x75, 0xA5, 0x77, 0xE2, 0x31, \ + 0x83, 0xF8, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x3F, 0x2F, 0xA4, 0x57, \ + 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x8C, 0xE0, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x4F, 0xE8, \ + 0xB6, 0x85, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x72, 0xB0, 0xA6, 0x6E, \ + 0xDE, 0xD2, 0xFB, 0xAB, 0xFB, 0xE5, 0x8A, 0x30, \ + 0xFA, 0xFA, 0xBE, 0x1C, 0x5D, 0x71, 0xA8, 0x7E, \ + 0x2F, 0x74, 0x1E, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0xFE, 0x86, 0xFE, \ + 0xA6, 0xBB, 0xFD, 0xE5, 0x30, 0x67, 0x7F, 0x0D, \ + 0x97, 0xD1, 0x1D, 0x49, 0xF7, 0xA8, 0x44, 0x3D, \ + 0x08, 0x22, 0xE5, 0x06, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x61, 0x4E, \ + 0x01, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x94, 0x83, 0x8F, 0xF8, 0x8C, \ + 0xD6, 0x8C, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x4C, \ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF } + +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_G_BIN { 0x02 } + +#endif /* dhm.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..05855cdf --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h @@ -0,0 +1,446 @@ +/** + * \file ecdh.h + * + * \brief This file contains ECDH definitions and functions. + * + * The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol is an anonymous + * key agreement protocol allowing two parties to establish a shared + * secret over an insecure channel. Each party must have an + * elliptic-curve public–private key pair. + * + * For more information, see NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 2: Recommendation for + * Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm + * Cryptography. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDH_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) +#undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT +#include "everest/everest.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Defines the source of the imported EC key. + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS, /**< Our key. */ + MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS, /**< The key of the peer. */ +} mbedtls_ecdh_side; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) +/** + * Defines the ECDH implementation used. + * + * Later versions of the library may add new variants, therefore users should + * not make any assumptions about them. + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE = 0, /*!< Implementation not defined. */ + MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0,/*!< The default Mbed TLS implementation */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST /*!< Everest implementation */ +#endif +} mbedtls_ecdh_variant; + +/** + * The context used by the default ECDH implementation. + * + * Later versions might change the structure of this context, therefore users + * should not make any assumptions about the structure of + * mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< The private key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< The public key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Qp; /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ + mbedtls_mpi z; /*!< The shared secret. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx rs; /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ +#endif +} mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed; +#endif + +/** + * + * \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same + * ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type + * should not be shared between multiple threads. + * \brief The ECDH context structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< The private key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< The public key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Qp; /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ + mbedtls_mpi z; /*!< The shared secret. */ + int point_format; /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi _d; /*!< The previous \p d. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + int restart_enabled; /*!< The flag for restartable mode. */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx rs; /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#else + uint8_t point_format; /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages + as defined in RFC 4492. */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;/*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_ecdh_variant var; /*!< The ECDH implementation/structure used. */ + union + { + mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed mbed_ecdh; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest everest_ecdh; +#endif + } ctx; /*!< Implementation-specific context. The + context in use is specified by the \c var + field. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + uint8_t restart_enabled; /*!< The flag for restartable mode. Functions of + an alternative implementation not supporting + restartable mode must return + MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED error + if this flag is set. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ +} +mbedtls_ecdh_context; + +/** + * \brief Check whether a given group can be used for ECDH. + * + * \param gid The ECP group ID to check. + * + * \return \c 1 if the group can be used, \c 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an ECDH keypair on an elliptic + * curve. + * + * This function performs the first of two core computations + * implemented during the ECDH key exchange. The second core + * computation is performed by mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(). + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. This must be initialized and have + * domain parameters loaded, for example through + * mbedtls_ecp_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(). + * \param d The destination MPI (private key). + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The destination point (public key). + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or + * \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function computes the shared secret. + * + * This function performs the second of two core computations + * implemented during the ECDH key exchange. The first core + * computation is performed by mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(). + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to implement + * countermeasures against side-channel attacks. + * For more information, see mbedtls_ecp_mul(). + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. This must be initialized and have + * domain parameters loaded, for example through + * mbedtls_ecp_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(). + * \param z The destination MPI (shared secret). + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The public key from another party. + * This must be initialized. + * \param d Our secret exponent (private key). + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization + * of intermediate results during the ECP computations is + * not needed (discouraged). See the documentation of + * mbedtls_ecp_mul() for more. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a + * context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or + * \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes an ECDH context. + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_init( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets up the ECDH context with the information + * given. + * + * This function should be called after mbedtls_ecdh_init() but + * before mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(). There is no need to call + * this function before mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(). + * + * This is the first function used by a TLS server for ECDHE + * ciphersuites. + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. This must be initialized. + * \param grp_id The group id of the group to set up the context for. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_setup( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees a context. + * + * \param ctx The context to free. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function does nothing. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized ECDH context. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an EC key pair and exports its + * in the format used in a TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake + * message. + * + * This is the second function used by a TLS server for ECDHE + * ciphersuites. (It is called after mbedtls_ecdh_setup().) + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a group, for example via mbedtls_ecdh_setup(). + * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written. + * \param buf The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function parses the ECDHE parameters in a + * TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message. + * + * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the client + * sets up its ECDHE context from the server's public + * ECDHE key material. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDHE context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param buf On input, \c *buf must be the start of the input buffer. + * On output, \c *buf is updated to point to the end of the + * data that has been read. On success, this is the first byte + * past the end of the ServerKeyExchange parameters. + * On error, this is the point at which an error has been + * detected, which is usually not useful except to debug + * failures. + * \param end The end of the input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets up an ECDH context from an EC key. + * + * It is used by clients and servers in place of the + * ServerKeyEchange for static ECDH, and imports ECDH + * parameters from the EC key information of a certificate. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. This must be initialized. + * \param key The EC key to use. This must be initialized. + * \param side Defines the source of the key. Possible values are: + * - #MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS: The key is ours. + * - #MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS: The key is that of the peer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_ecdh_side side ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a public key and exports it + * as a TLS ClientKeyExchange payload. + * + * This is the second function used by a TLS client for ECDH(E) + * ciphersuites. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a group, the latter usually by + * mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(). + * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The size of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function parses and processes the ECDHE payload of a + * TLS ClientKeyExchange message. + * + * This is the third function used by a TLS server for ECDH(E) + * ciphersuites. (It is called after mbedtls_ecdh_setup() and + * mbedtls_ecdh_make_params().) + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized + * and bound to a group, for example via mbedtls_ecdh_setup(). + * \param buf The pointer to the ClientKeyExchange payload. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + +/** + * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret. + * + * This is the last function used by both TLS client + * and servers. + * + * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to implement + * countermeasures against side-channel attacks. + * For more information, see mbedtls_ecp_mul(). + * + * \see ecp.h + + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized + * and have its own private key generated and the peer's + * public key imported. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of + * Bytes written on success. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This + * must be a writable buffer of size \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. This may + * b \c NULL if blinding isn't needed. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng + * doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief This function enables restartable EC computations for this + * context. (Default: disabled.) + * + * \see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() + * + * \note It is not possible to safely disable restartable + * computations once enabled, except by free-ing the context, + * which cancels possible in-progress operations. + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ecdh.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..118f7ced --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h @@ -0,0 +1,624 @@ +/** + * \file ecdsa.h + * + * \brief This file contains ECDSA definitions and functions. + * + * The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in + * Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): + * SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography. + * The use of ECDSA for TLS is defined in RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve + * Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS). + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +/** + * \brief Maximum ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size + * + * \param bits Curve size in bits + * \return Maximum signature size in bytes + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument + * is one. It may evaluate its argument multiple times. + */ +/* + * Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { + * r INTEGER, + * s INTEGER + * } + * + * For each of r and s, the value (V) may include an extra initial "0" bit. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( bits ) \ + ( /*T,L of SEQUENCE*/ ( ( bits ) >= 61 * 8 ? 3 : 2 ) + \ + /*T,L of r,s*/ 2 * ( ( ( bits ) >= 127 * 8 ? 3 : 2 ) + \ + /*V of r,s*/ ( ( bits ) + 8 ) / 8 ) ) + +/** The maximal size of an ECDSA signature in Bytes. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief The ECDSA context structure. + * + * \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same + * ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type + * should not be shared between multiple threads. + */ +typedef mbedtls_ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_context; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_verify() + * + * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx; + +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_sign() + * + * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_sign_det() + * + * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx; +#endif + +/** + * \brief General context for resuming ECDSA operations + */ +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx ecp; /*!< base context for ECP restart and + shared administrative info */ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ver; /*!< ecdsa_verify() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *sig; /*!< ecdsa_sign() sub-context */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *det; /*!< ecdsa_sign_det() sub-context */ +#endif +} mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ +typedef void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/** + * \brief This function checks whether a given group can be used + * for ECDSA. + * + * \param gid The ECP group ID to check. + * + * \return \c 1 if the group can be used, \c 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ); + +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message. + * + * \note The deterministic version implemented in + * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is usually preferred. + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated + * as defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized. + * \param buf The content to be signed. This is usually the hash of + * the original data to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX + * or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message, deterministic version. + * + * For more information, see RFC-6979: Deterministic + * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic + * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \warning Since the output of the internal RNG is always the same for + * the same key and message, this limits the efficiency of + * blinding and leaks information through side channels. For + * secure behavior use mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() instead. + * + * (Optimally the blinding is a random value that is different + * on every execution. In this case the blinding is still + * random from the attackers perspective, but is the same on + * each execution. This means that this blinding does not + * prevent attackers from recovering secrets by combining + * several measurement traces, but may prevent some attacks + * that exploit relationships between secret data.) + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized + * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). + * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, + mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message, deterministic version. + * + * For more information, see RFC-6979: Deterministic + * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic + * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized + * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). + * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data. + * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, + mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +/** + * \brief This function verifies the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message. + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.4, step 3. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param buf The hashed content that was signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param Q The public key to use for verification. This must be + * initialized and setup. + * \param r The first integer of the signature. + * This must be initialized. + * \param s The second integer of the signature. + * This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, + const mbedtls_mpi *s); + +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it + * to a buffer, serialized as defined in RFC-4492: + * Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for + * Transport Layer Security (TLS). + * + * \warning It is not thread-safe to use the same context in + * multiple threads. + * + * \note The deterministic version is used if + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is defined. For more + * information, see RFC-6979: Deterministic Usage + * of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic + * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example + * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). + * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. + * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a + * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the + * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if + * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. + * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of + * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL if + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is unset. Otherwise, + * it is used only for blinding and may be set to \c NULL, but + * doing so is DEPRECATED. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't use a context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or + * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it + * to a buffer, in a restartable way. + * + * \see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() + * + * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() + * but it can return early and restart according to the limit + * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example + * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). + * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. + * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a + * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the + * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if + * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. + * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of + * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL if + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is unset. Otherwise, + * it is unused and may be set to \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't use a context. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable + * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an + * initialized restart context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or + * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function computes an ECDSA signature and writes + * it to a buffer, serialized as defined in RFC-4492: + * Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for + * Transport Layer Security (TLS). + * + * The deterministic version is defined in RFC-6979: + * Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) + * and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). + * + * \warning It is not thread-safe to use the same context in + * multiple threads. + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() in + * Mbed TLS version 2.0 and later. + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example + * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). + * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. + * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a + * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the + * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if + * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. + * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of + * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. + * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or + * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +/** + * \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature. + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.4, step 3. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and public key bound to it. + * \param hash The message hash that was signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p size Bytes. + * \param hlen The size of the hash \p hash. + * \param sig The signature to read and verify. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The size of \p sig in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid + * signature in \p sig, but its length is less than \p siglen. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure for any other reason. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen ); + +/** + * \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature, + * in a restartable way. + * + * \see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature() + * + * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature() + * but it can return early and restart according to the limit + * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized + * and have a group and public key bound to it. + * \param hash The message hash that was signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p size Bytes. + * \param hlen The size of the hash \p hash. + * \param sig The signature to read and verify. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The size of \p sig in Bytes. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable + * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an + * initialized restart context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid + * signature in \p sig, but its length is less than \p siglen. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure for any other reason. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an ECDSA keypair on the given curve. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to store the keypair in. + * This must be initialized. + * \param gid The elliptic curve to use. One of the various + * \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX macros depending on configuration. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets up an ECDSA context from an EC key pair. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to setup. This must be initialized. + * \param key The EC key to use. This must be initialized and hold + * a private-public key pair or a public key. In the former + * case, the ECDSA context may be used for signature creation + * and verification after this call. In the latter case, it + * may be used for signature verification. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes an ECDSA context. + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees an ECDSA context. + * + * \param ctx The ECDSA context to free. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it + * is not \c NULL, it must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Initialize a restart context. + * + * \param ctx The restart context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a restart context. + * + * \param ctx The restart context to free. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it + * is not \c NULL, it must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ecdsa.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3564ff8d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h @@ -0,0 +1,275 @@ +/** + * \file ecjpake.h + * + * \brief Elliptic curve J-PAKE + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H + +/* + * J-PAKE is a password-authenticated key exchange that allows deriving a + * strong shared secret from a (potentially low entropy) pre-shared + * passphrase, with forward secrecy and mutual authentication. + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_Authenticated_Key_Exchange_by_Juggling + * + * This file implements the Elliptic Curve variant of J-PAKE, + * as defined in Chapter 7.4 of the Thread v1.0 Specification, + * available to members of the Thread Group http://threadgroup.org/ + * + * As the J-PAKE algorithm is inherently symmetric, so is our API. + * Each party needs to send its first round message, in any order, to the + * other party, then each sends its second round message, in any order. + * The payloads are serialized in a way suitable for use in TLS, but could + * also be use outside TLS. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Roles in the EC J-PAKE exchange + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT = 0, /**< Client */ + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER, /**< Server */ +} mbedtls_ecjpake_role; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) +/** + * EC J-PAKE context structure. + * + * J-PAKE is a symmetric protocol, except for the identifiers used in + * Zero-Knowledge Proofs, and the serialization of the second message + * (KeyExchange) as defined by the Thread spec. + * + * In order to benefit from this symmetry, we choose a different naming + * convention from the Thread v1.0 spec. Correspondence is indicated in the + * description as a pair C: client name, S: server name + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecjpake_context +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; /**< Hash to use */ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /**< Elliptic curve */ + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; /**< Are we client or server? */ + int point_format; /**< Format for point export */ + + mbedtls_ecp_point Xm1; /**< My public key 1 C: X1, S: X3 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Xm2; /**< My public key 2 C: X2, S: X4 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Xp1; /**< Peer public key 1 C: X3, S: X1 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Xp2; /**< Peer public key 2 C: X4, S: X2 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Xp; /**< Peer public key C: Xs, S: Xc */ + + mbedtls_mpi xm1; /**< My private key 1 C: x1, S: x3 */ + mbedtls_mpi xm2; /**< My private key 2 C: x2, S: x4 */ + + mbedtls_mpi s; /**< Pre-shared secret (passphrase) */ +} mbedtls_ecjpake_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ +#include "ecjpake_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize an ECJPAKE context. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ecjpake_init( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Set up an ECJPAKE context for use. + * + * \note Currently the only values for hash/curve allowed by the + * standard are #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256/#MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to set up. This must be initialized. + * \param role The role of the caller. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT or #MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER. + * \param hash The identifier of the hash function to use, + * for example #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256. + * \param curve The identifier of the elliptic curve to use, + * for example #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1. + * \param secret The pre-shared secret (passphrase). This must be + * a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. It need + * only be valid for the duration of this call. + * \param len The length of the pre-shared secret \p secret. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve, + const unsigned char *secret, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Check if an ECJPAKE context is ready for use. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to check. This must be + * initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 if the context is ready for use. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_check( const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Generate and write the first round message + * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerHello extension, + * excluding extension type and length bytes). + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be + * initialized and set up. + * \param buf The buffer to write the contents to. This must be a + * writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number + * of Bytes written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Read and process the first round message + * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerHello extension, + * excluding extension type and length bytes). + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized + * and set up. + * \param buf The buffer holding the first round message. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length in Bytes of \p buf. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Generate and write the second round message + * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerKeyExchange). + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized, + * set up, and already have performed round one. + * \param buf The buffer to write the round two contents to. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The size of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of Bytes + * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Read and process the second round message + * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerKeyExchange). + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized + * and set up and already have performed round one. + * \param buf The buffer holding the second round message. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length in Bytes of \p buf. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Derive the shared secret + * (TLS: Pre-Master Secret). + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized, + * set up and have performed both round one and two. + * \param buf The buffer to write the derived secret to. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of Bytes + * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This clears an ECJPAKE context and frees any + * embedded data structure. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to free. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECJPAKE context. + */ +void mbedtls_ecjpake_free( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + + +#endif /* ecjpake.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecp.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..64a0bccd --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -0,0 +1,1311 @@ +/** + * \file ecp.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for Elliptic Curves over GF(P) (ECP). + * + * The use of ECP in cryptography and TLS is defined in + * Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): SEC1 + * Elliptic Curve Cryptography and + * RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites + * for Transport Layer Security (TLS). + * + * RFC-2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) defines ECP + * group types. + * + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +/* + * ECP error codes + */ +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x4F80 +/** The buffer is too small to write to. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x4F00 +/** The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supported. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x4E80 +/** The signature is not valid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED -0x4E00 +/** Memory allocation failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED -0x4D80 +/** Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED -0x4D00 +/** Invalid private or public key. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY -0x4C80 +/** The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x4C00 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** The ECP hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4B80 + +/** Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS -0x4B00 + +/* Flags indicating whether to include code that is specific to certain + * types of curves. These flags are for internal library use only. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Domain-parameter identifiers: curve, subgroup, and generator. + * + * \note Only curves over prime fields are supported. + * + * \warning This library does not support validation of arbitrary domain + * parameters. Therefore, only standardized domain parameters from trusted + * sources should be used. See mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + */ +/* Note: when adding a new curve: + * - Add it at the end of this enum, otherwise you'll break the ABI by + * changing the numerical value for existing curves. + * - Increment MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX below if needed. + * - Update the calculation of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN below. + * - Add the corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx_ENABLED macro definition to + * config.h. + * - List the curve as a dependency of MBEDTLS_ECP_C and + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C if supported in check_config.h. + * - Add the curve to the appropriate curve type macro + * MBEDTLS_ECP_yyy_ENABLED above. + * - Add the necessary definitions to ecp_curves.c. + * - Add the curve to the ecp_supported_curves array in ecp.c. + * - Add the curve to applicable profiles in x509_crt.c if applicable. + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE = 0, /*!< Curve not defined. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 192-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 224-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 256-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 384-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 521-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, /*!< Domain parameters for 256-bit Brainpool curve. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, /*!< Domain parameters for 384-bit Brainpool curve. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, /*!< Domain parameters for 512-bit Brainpool curve. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, /*!< Domain parameters for Curve25519. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, /*!< Domain parameters for 192-bit "Koblitz" curve. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, /*!< Domain parameters for 224-bit "Koblitz" curve. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, /*!< Domain parameters for 256-bit "Koblitz" curve. */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, /*!< Domain parameters for Curve448. */ +} mbedtls_ecp_group_id; + +/** + * The number of supported curves, plus one for #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. + * + * \note Montgomery curves are currently excluded. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX 12 + +/* + * Curve types + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x + b */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x^2 + x */ +} mbedtls_ecp_curve_type; + +/** + * Curve information, for use by other modules. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_curve_info +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; /*!< An internal identifier. */ + uint16_t tls_id; /*!< The TLS NamedCurve identifier. */ + uint16_t bit_size; /*!< The curve size in bits. */ + const char *name; /*!< A human-friendly name. */ +} mbedtls_ecp_curve_info; + +/** + * \brief The ECP point structure, in Jacobian coordinates. + * + * \note All functions expect and return points satisfying + * the following condition: Z == 0 or + * Z == 1. Other values of \p Z are + * used only by internal functions. + * The point is zero, or "at infinity", if Z == 0. + * Otherwise, \p X and \p Y are its standard (affine) + * coordinates. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_point +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< The X coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi Y; /*!< The Y coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi Z; /*!< The Z coordinate of the ECP point. */ +} +mbedtls_ecp_point; + +/* Determine the minimum safe value of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 0 +/* Note: the curves must be listed in DECREASING size! */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 521 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 448 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 255 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 225 // n is slightly above 2^224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 192 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 192 +#else +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C enabled, but no curve?" +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) +/* + * default mbed TLS elliptic curve arithmetic implementation + * + * (in case MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT is defined then the developer has to provide an + * alternative implementation for the whole module and it will replace this + * one.) + */ + +/** + * \brief The ECP group structure. + * + * We consider two types of curve equations: + *
  • Short Weierstrass: y^2 = x^3 + A x + B mod P + * (SEC1 + RFC-4492)
  • + *
  • Montgomery: y^2 = x^3 + A x^2 + x mod P (Curve25519, + * Curve448)
+ * In both cases, the generator (\p G) for a prime-order subgroup is fixed. + * + * For Short Weierstrass, this subgroup is the whole curve, and its + * cardinality is denoted by \p N. Our code requires that \p N is an + * odd prime as mbedtls_ecp_mul() requires an odd number, and + * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() requires that it is prime for blinding purposes. + * + * For Montgomery curves, we do not store \p A, but (A + 2) / 4, + * which is the quantity used in the formulas. Additionally, \p nbits is + * not the size of \p N but the required size for private keys. + * + * If \p modp is NULL, reduction modulo \p P is done using a generic algorithm. + * Otherwise, \p modp must point to a function that takes an \p mbedtls_mpi in the + * range of 0..2^(2*pbits)-1, and transforms it in-place to an integer + * which is congruent mod \p P to the given MPI, and is close enough to \p pbits + * in size, so that it may be efficiently brought in the 0..P-1 range by a few + * additions or subtractions. Therefore, it is only an approximative modular + * reduction. It must return 0 on success and non-zero on failure. + * + * \note Alternative implementations must keep the group IDs distinct. If + * two group structures have the same ID, then they must be + * identical. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id id; /*!< An internal group identifier. */ + mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus of the base field. */ + mbedtls_mpi A; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: \p A in the equation. For + Montgomery curves: (A + 2) / 4. */ + mbedtls_mpi B; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: \p B in the equation. + For Montgomery curves: unused. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point G; /*!< The generator of the subgroup used. */ + mbedtls_mpi N; /*!< The order of \p G. */ + size_t pbits; /*!< The number of bits in \p P.*/ + size_t nbits; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: The number of bits in \p P. + For Montgomery curves: the number of bits in the + private keys. */ + unsigned int h; /*!< \internal 1 if the constants are static. */ + int (*modp)(mbedtls_mpi *); /*!< The function for fast pseudo-reduction + mod \p P (see above).*/ + int (*t_pre)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ + int (*t_post)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ + void *t_data; /*!< Unused. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point *T; /*!< Pre-computed points for ecp_mul_comb(). */ + size_t T_size; /*!< The number of pre-computed points. */ +} +mbedtls_ecp_group; + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h, or define them using the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS) + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS < MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is smaller than the largest supported curve" +#endif + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/** + * The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN + +#else +/* MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is not relevant without MBEDTLS_ECP_C, but set it + * to a nonzero value so that code that unconditionally allocates an array + * of a size based on it keeps working if built without ECC support. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 1 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ( ( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7 ) / 8 ) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ( 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1 ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) +/* + * Maximum "window" size used for point multiplication. + * Default: a point where higher memory usage yields diminishing performance + * returns. + * Minimum value: 2. Maximum value: 7. + * + * Result is an array of at most ( 1 << ( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1 ) ) + * points used for point multiplication. This value is directly tied to EC + * peak memory usage, so decreasing it by one should roughly cut memory usage + * by two (if large curves are in use). + * + * Reduction in size may reduce speed, but larger curves are impacted first. + * Sample performances (in ECDHE handshakes/s, with FIXED_POINT_OPTIM = 1): + * w-size: 6 5 4 3 2 + * 521 145 141 135 120 97 + * 384 214 209 198 177 146 + * 256 320 320 303 262 226 + * 224 475 475 453 398 342 + * 192 640 640 633 587 476 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< The maximum window size used. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM) +/* + * Trade memory for speed on fixed-point multiplication. + * + * This speeds up repeated multiplication of the generator (that is, the + * multiplication in ECDSA signatures, and half of the multiplications in + * ECDSA verification and ECDHE) by a factor roughly 3 to 4. + * + * The cost is increasing EC peak memory usage by a factor roughly 2. + * + * Change this value to 0 to reduce peak memory usage. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */ + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ +#include "ecp_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for multiplication + * + * \note Opaque struct + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx; + +/** + * \brief Internal restart context for ecp_muladd() + * + * \note Opaque struct + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx; + +/** + * \brief General context for resuming ECC operations + */ +typedef struct +{ + unsigned ops_done; /*!< current ops count */ + unsigned depth; /*!< call depth (0 = top-level) */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *rsm; /*!< ecp_mul_comb() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ma; /*!< ecp_muladd() sub-context */ +} mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx; + +/* + * Operation counts for restartable functions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK 3 /*!< basic ops count for ecp_check_pubkey() */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL 8 /*!< basic ops count for ecp_double_jac() */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD 11 /*!< basic ops count for see ecp_add_mixed() */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV 120 /*!< empirical equivalent for mpi_mod_inv() */ + +/** + * \brief Internal; for restartable functions in other modules. + * Check and update basic ops budget. + * + * \param grp Group structure + * \param rs_ctx Restart context + * \param ops Number of basic ops to do + * + * \return \c 0 if doing \p ops basic ops is still allowed, + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + unsigned ops ); + +/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ops ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( grp, rs_ctx, \ + (unsigned) (ops) ) ); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ops ) /* no-op; for compatibility */ + +/* We want to declare restartable versions of existing functions anyway */ +typedef void mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/** + * \brief The ECP key-pair structure. + * + * A generic key-pair that may be used for ECDSA and fixed ECDH, for example. + * + * \note Members are deliberately in the same order as in the + * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_keypair +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< Elliptic curve and base point */ + mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< our secret value */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< our public value */ +} +mbedtls_ecp_keypair; + +/* + * Point formats, from RFC 4492's enum ECPointFormat + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED 0 /**< Uncompressed point format. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED 1 /**< Compressed point format. */ + +/* + * Some other constants from RFC 4492 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE 3 /**< The named_curve of ECCurveType. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Set the maximum number of basic operations done in a row. + * + * If more operations are needed to complete a computation, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS will be returned by the + * function performing the computation. It is then the + * caller's responsibility to either call again with the same + * parameters until it returns 0 or an error code; or to free + * the restart context if the operation is to be aborted. + * + * It is strictly required that all input parameters and the + * restart context be the same on successive calls for the + * same operation, but output parameters need not be the + * same; they must not be used until the function finally + * returns 0. + * + * This only applies to functions whose documentation + * mentions they may return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS for functions in the + * SSL module). For functions that accept a "restart context" + * argument, passing NULL disables restart and makes the + * function equivalent to the function with the same name + * with \c _restartable removed. For functions in the ECDH + * module, restart is disabled unless the function accepts + * an "ECDH context" argument and + * mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart() was previously called on + * that context. For function in the SSL module, restart is + * only enabled for specific sides and key exchanges + * (currently only for clients and ECDHE-ECDSA). + * + * \param max_ops Maximum number of basic operations done in a row. + * Default: 0 (unlimited). + * Lower (non-zero) values mean ECC functions will block for + * a lesser maximum amount of time. + * + * \note A "basic operation" is defined as a rough equivalent of a + * multiplication in GF(p) for the NIST P-256 curve. + * As an indication, with default settings, a scalar + * multiplication (full run of \c mbedtls_ecp_mul()) is: + * - about 3300 basic operations for P-256 + * - about 9400 basic operations for P-384 + * + * \note Very low values are not always respected: sometimes + * functions need to block for a minimum number of + * operations, and will do so even if max_ops is set to a + * lower value. That minimum depends on the curve size, and + * can be made lower by decreasing the value of + * \c MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE. As an indication, here is the + * lowest effective value for various curves and values of + * that parameter (w for short): + * w=6 w=5 w=4 w=3 w=2 + * P-256 208 208 160 136 124 + * P-384 682 416 320 272 248 + * P-521 1364 832 640 544 496 + * + * \note This setting is currently ignored by Curve25519. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( unsigned max_ops ); + +/** + * \brief Check if restart is enabled (max_ops != 0) + * + * \return \c 0 if \c max_ops == 0 (restart disabled) + * \return \c 1 otherwise (restart enabled) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled( void ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * Get the type of a curve + */ +mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the information defined in + * mbedtls_ecp_curve_info() for all supported curves. + * + * \note This function returns information about all curves + * supported by the library. Some curves may not be + * supported for all algorithms. Call mbedtls_ecdh_can_do() + * or mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() to check if a curve is + * supported for ECDH or ECDSA. + * + * \return A statically allocated array. The last entry is 0. + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_list( void ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the list of internal group + * identifiers of all supported curves in the order of + * preference. + * + * \note This function returns information about all curves + * supported by the library. Some curves may not be + * supported for all algorithms. Call mbedtls_ecdh_can_do() + * or mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() to check if a curve is + * supported for ECDH or ECDSA. + * + * \return A statically allocated array, + * terminated with MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list( void ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves curve information from an internal + * group identifier. + * + * \param grp_id An \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX value. + * + * \return The associated curve information on success. + * \return NULL on failure. + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves curve information from a TLS + * NamedCurve value. + * + * \param tls_id An \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX value. + * + * \return The associated curve information on success. + * \return NULL on failure. + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( uint16_t tls_id ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves curve information from a + * human-readable name. + * + * \param name The human-readable name. + * + * \return The associated curve information on success. + * \return NULL on failure. + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( const char *name ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a point as zero. + * + * \param pt The point to initialize. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_init( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes an ECP group context + * without loading any domain parameters. + * + * \note After this function is called, domain parameters + * for various ECP groups can be loaded through the + * mbedtls_ecp_group_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group() + * functions. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_init( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a key pair as an invalid one. + * + * \param key The key pair to initialize. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees the components of a point. + * + * \param pt The point to free. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_free( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees the components of an ECP group. + * + * \param grp The group to free. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECP group. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_free( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees the components of a key pair. + * + * \param key The key pair to free. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECP key pair. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Initialize a restart context. + * + * \param ctx The restart context to initialize. This must + * not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a restart context. + * + * \param ctx The restart context to free. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not + * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized restart context. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/** + * \brief This function copies the contents of point \p Q into + * point \p P. + * + * \param P The destination point. This must be initialized. + * \param Q The source point. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code for other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_copy( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); + +/** + * \brief This function copies the contents of group \p src into + * group \p dst. + * + * \param dst The destination group. This must be initialized. + * \param src The source group. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *src ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets a point to the point at infinity. + * + * \param pt The point to set. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks if a point is the point at infinity. + * + * \param pt The point to test. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 1 if the point is zero. + * \return \c 0 if the point is non-zero. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); + +/** + * \brief This function compares two points. + * + * \note This assumes that the points are normalized. Otherwise, + * they may compare as "not equal" even if they are. + * + * \param P The first point to compare. This must be initialized. + * \param Q The second point to compare. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 if the points are equal. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the points are not equal. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); + +/** + * \brief This function imports a non-zero point from two ASCII + * strings. + * + * \param P The destination point. This must be initialized. + * \param radix The numeric base of the input. + * \param x The first affine coordinate, as a null-terminated string. + * \param y The second affine coordinate, as a null-terminated string. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, + const char *x, const char *y ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports a point into unsigned binary data. + * + * \param grp The group to which the point should belong. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param P The point to export. This must be initialized. + * \param format The point format. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED. + * (For groups without these formats, this parameter is + * ignored. But it still has to be either of the above + * values.) + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the output in Bytes. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output buffer + * is too small to hold the point. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the point format + * or the export for the given group is not implemented. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief This function imports a point from unsigned binary data. + * + * \note This function does not check that the point actually + * belongs to the given group, see mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey() + * for that. + * + * \param grp The group to which the point should belong. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param P The destination context to import the point to. + * This must be initialized. + * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the input is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the import for the + * given group is not implemented. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function imports a point from a TLS ECPoint record. + * + * \note On function return, \p *buf is updated to point immediately + * after the ECPoint record. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param pt The destination point. + * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer. + * \param len The length of the buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code on initialization + * failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports a point as a TLS ECPoint record + * defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param pt The point to be exported. This must be initialized. + * \param format The point format to use. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length in Bytes + * of the data written. + * \param buf The target buffer. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the target buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the input is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the target buffer + * is too small to hold the exported point. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets up an ECP group context + * from a standardized set of domain parameters. + * + * \note The index should be a value of the NamedCurve enum, + * as defined in RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve Cryptography + * (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS), + * usually in the form of an \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX macro. + * + * \param grp The group context to setup. This must be initialized. + * \param id The identifier of the domain parameter set to load. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p id doesn't + * correspond to a known group. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets up an ECP group context from a TLS + * ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. + * + * \note The read pointer \p buf is updated to point right after + * the ECParameters record on exit. + * + * \param grp The group context to setup. This must be initialized. + * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer. + * \param len The length of the input buffer \c *buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the group is not + * recognized. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function extracts an elliptic curve group ID from a + * TLS ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. + * + * \note The read pointer \p buf is updated to point right after + * the ECParameters record on exit. + * + * \param grp The address at which to store the group id. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer. + * \param len The length of the input buffer \c *buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the group is not + * recognized. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, + size_t len ); +/** + * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve as a TLS + * ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to be exported. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The buffer to write to. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output + * buffer is too small to hold the exported group. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a scalar multiplication of a point + * by an integer: \p R = \p m * \p P. + * + * It is not thread-safe to use same group in multiple threads. + * + * \note To prevent timing attacks, this function + * executes the exact same sequence of base-field + * operations for any valid \p m. It avoids any if-branch or + * array index depending on the value of \p m. + * + * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to randomize + * intermediate results to prevent potential timing attacks + * targeting these results. We recommend always providing + * a non-NULL \p f_rng. The overhead is negligible. + * Note: unless #MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined, when + * \p f_rng is NULL, an internal RNG (seeded from the value + * of \p m) will be used instead. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized. + * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization + * of intermediate results isn't desired (discouraged). + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p p_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private + * key, or \p P is not a valid public key. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs multiplication of a point by + * an integer: \p R = \p m * \p P in a restartable way. + * + * \see mbedtls_ecp_mul() + * + * \note This function does the same as \c mbedtls_ecp_mul(), but + * it can return early and restart according to the limit set + * with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized. + * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization + * of intermediate results isn't desired (discouraged). + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p p_rng. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private + * key, or \p P is not a valid public key. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two + * points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q + * + * It is not thread-safe to use same group in multiple threads. + * + * \note In contrast to mbedtls_ecp_mul(), this function does not + * guarantee a constant execution flow and timing. + * + * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves. + * It may not be included in builds without any short + * Weierstrass curve. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param m The integer by which to multiply \p P. + * This must be initialized. + * \param P The point to multiply by \p m. This must be initialized. + * \param n The integer by which to multiply \p Q. + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The point to be multiplied by \p n. + * This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m or \p n are not + * valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public + * keys. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p grp does not + * designate a short Weierstrass curve. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two + * points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q in a + * restartable way. + * + * \see \c mbedtls_ecp_muladd() + * + * \note This function works the same as \c mbedtls_ecp_muladd(), + * but it can return early and restart according to the limit + * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves. + * It may not be included in builds without any short + * Weierstrass curve. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param m The integer by which to multiply \p P. + * This must be initialized. + * \param P The point to multiply by \p m. This must be initialized. + * \param n The integer by which to multiply \p Q. + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The point to be multiplied by \p n. + * This must be initialized. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m or \p n are not + * valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public + * keys. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p grp does not + * designate a short Weierstrass curve. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +/** + * \brief This function checks that a point is a valid public key + * on this curve. + * + * It only checks that the point is non-zero, has + * valid coordinates and lies on the curve. It does not verify + * that it is indeed a multiple of \p G. This additional + * check is computationally more expensive, is not required + * by standards, and should not be necessary if the group + * used has a small cofactor. In particular, it is useless for + * the NIST groups which all have a cofactor of 1. + * + * \note This function uses bare components rather than an + * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure, to ease use with other + * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or + * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. + * + * \param grp The ECP group the point should belong to. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param pt The point to check. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 if the point is a valid public key. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if the point is not + * a valid public key for the given curve. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks that an \p mbedtls_mpi is a + * valid private key for this curve. + * + * \note This function uses bare components rather than an + * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other + * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or + * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. + * + * \param grp The ECP group the private key should belong to. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param d The integer to check. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 if the point is a valid private key. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if the point is not a valid + * private key for the given curve. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *d ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a private key. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to generate a private key for. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code + * on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates a keypair with a configurable base + * point. + * + * \note This function uses bare components rather than an + * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other + * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or + * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to generate a key pair for. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param G The base point to use. This must be initialized + * and belong to \p grp. It replaces the default base + * point \c grp->G used by mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(). + * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The destination point (public part). + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code + * on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an ECP keypair. + * + * \note This function uses bare components rather than an + * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other + * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or + * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context. + * + * \param grp The ECP group to generate a key pair for. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). + * This must be initialized. + * \param Q The destination point (public part). + * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code + * on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an ECP key. + * + * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. + * \param key The destination key. This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code + * on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief This function reads an elliptic curve private key. + * + * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. + * \param key The destination key. + * \param buf The buffer containing the binary representation of the + * key. (Big endian integer for Weierstrass curves, byte + * string for Montgomery curves.) + * \param buflen The length of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY error if the key is + * invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for + * the group is not implemented. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_read_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve private key. + * + * \param key The private key. + * \param buf The output buffer for containing the binary representation + * of the key. (Big endian integer for Weierstrass curves, byte + * string for Montgomery curves.) + * \param buflen The total length of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the \p key + representation is larger than the available space in \p buf. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for + * the group is not implemented. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks that the keypair objects + * \p pub and \p prv have the same group and the + * same public point, and that the private key in + * \p prv is consistent with the public key. + * + * \param pub The keypair structure holding the public key. This + * must be initialized. If it contains a private key, that + * part is ignored. + * \param prv The keypair structure holding the full keypair. + * This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, meaning that the keys are valid and match. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keys are invalid or do not match. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX + * error code on calculation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The ECP checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ecp.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6a47a8ff --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,297 @@ +/** + * \file ecp_internal.h + * + * \brief Function declarations for alternative implementation of elliptic curve + * point arithmetic. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * [1] BERNSTEIN, Daniel J. Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records. + * + * + * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis + * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and + * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302. + * + * + * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to + * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology + * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342. + * + * + * [4] Certicom Research. SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters. + * + * + * [5] HANKERSON, Darrel, MENEZES, Alfred J., VANSTONE, Scott. Guide to Elliptic + * Curve Cryptography. + * + * [6] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS 186-4. + * + * + * [7] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer + * Security (TLS), RFC 4492. + * + * + * [8] + * + * [9] COHEN, Henri. A Course in Computational Algebraic Number Theory. + * Springer Science & Business Media, 1 Aug 2000 + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + +/** + * \brief Indicate if the Elliptic Curve Point module extension can + * handle the group. + * + * \param grp The pointer to the elliptic curve group that will be the + * basis of the cryptographic computations. + * + * \return Non-zero if successful. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +/** + * \brief Initialise the Elliptic Curve Point module extension. + * + * If mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable returns true for a + * group, this function has to be able to initialise the + * module for it. + * + * This module can be a driver to a crypto hardware + * accelerator, for which this could be an initialise function. + * + * \param grp The pointer to the group the module needs to be + * initialised for. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +/** + * \brief Frees and deallocates the Elliptic Curve Point module + * extension. + * + * \param grp The pointer to the group the module was initialised for. + */ +void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) +/** + * \brief Randomize jacobian coordinates: + * (X, Y, Z) -> (l^2 X, l^3 Y, l Z) for random l. + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param pt The point on the curve to be randomised, given with Jacobian + * coordinates. + * + * \param f_rng A function pointer to the random number generator. + * + * \param p_rng A pointer to the random number generator state. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) +/** + * \brief Addition: R = P + Q, mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates. + * + * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine), + * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized. + * + * This function is used only as a subrutine of + * ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, + * (3) P == Q. + * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in + * ecp_mul_comb(): + * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base + * point, the factor being less than its order, so none of + * them is zero; + * - Q is an odd multiple of the base point, P an even + * multiple, due to the choice of precomputed points in the + * modified comb method. + * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information. + * + * We accept Q->Z being unset (saving memory in tables) as + * meaning 1. + * + * Cost in field operations if done by [5] 3.22: + * 1A := 8M + 3S + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param R Pointer to a point structure to hold the result. + * + * \param P Pointer to the first summand, given with Jacobian + * coordinates + * + * \param Q Pointer to the second summand, given with affine + * coordinates. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Point doubling R = 2 P, Jacobian coordinates. + * + * Cost: 1D := 3M + 4S (A == 0) + * 4M + 4S (A == -3) + * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise + * when the implementation is based on the "dbl-1998-cmo-2" + * doubling formulas in [8] and standard optimizations are + * applied when curve parameter A is one of { 0, -3 }. + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param R Pointer to a point structure to hold the result. + * + * \param P Pointer to the point that has to be doubled, given with + * Jacobian coordinates. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Normalize jacobian coordinates of an array of (pointers to) + * points. + * + * Using Montgomery's trick to perform only one inversion mod P + * the cost is: + * 1N(t) := 1I + (6t - 3)M + 1S + * (See for example Algorithm 10.3.4. in [9]) + * + * This function is used only as a subrutine of + * ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * Warning: fails (returning an error) if one of the points is + * zero! + * This should never happen, see choice of w in ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param T Array of pointers to the points to normalise. + * + * \param t_len Number of elements in the array. + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * an error if one of the points is zero. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t t_len ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Normalize jacobian coordinates so that Z == 0 || Z == 1. + * + * Cost in field operations if done by [5] 3.2.1: + * 1N := 1I + 3M + 1S + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param pt pointer to the point to be normalised. This is an + * input/output parameter. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Randomize projective x/z coordinates: + * (X, Z) -> (l X, l Z) for random l + * + * \param grp pointer to the group representing the curve + * + * \param P the point on the curve to be randomised given with + * projective coordinates. This is an input/output parameter. + * + * \param f_rng a function pointer to the random number generator + * + * \param p_rng a pointer to the random number generator state + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Normalize Montgomery x/z coordinates: X = X/Z, Z = 1. + * + * \param grp pointer to the group representing the curve + * + * \param P pointer to the point to be normalised. This is an + * input/output parameter. + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *P ); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#endif /* ecp_internal.h */ + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/entropy.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/entropy.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40259ebc --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/entropy.h @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +/** + * \file entropy.h + * + * \brief Entropy accumulator implementation + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) +#include "mbedtls/havege.h" +#endif + +/** Critical entropy source failure. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x003C +/** No more sources can be added. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES -0x003E +/** No sources have been added to poll. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED -0x0040 +/** No strong sources have been added to poll. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE -0x003D +/** Read/write error in file. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x003F + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES) +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 20 /**< Maximum number of sources supported */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER) +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER 128 /**< Maximum amount requested from entropy sources */ +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 64 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-512) */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 32 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-256) */ +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum size of seed we read from seed file */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES + +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG 1 /**< Entropy source is strong */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK 0 /**< Entropy source is weak */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Entropy poll callback pointer + * + * \param data Callback-specific data pointer + * \param output Data to fill + * \param len Maximum size to provide + * \param olen The actual amount of bytes put into the buffer (Can be 0) + * + * \return 0 if no critical failures occurred, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED otherwise + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr)(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, + size_t *olen); + +/** + * \brief Entropy source state + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_source_state +{ + mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source; /**< The entropy source callback */ + void * p_source; /**< The callback data pointer */ + size_t size; /**< Amount received in bytes */ + size_t threshold; /**< Minimum bytes required before release */ + int strong; /**< Is the source strong? */ +} +mbedtls_entropy_source_state; + +/** + * \brief Entropy context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_context +{ + int accumulator_started; /* 0 after init. + * 1 after the first update. + * -1 after free. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + mbedtls_sha512_context accumulator; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR) + mbedtls_sha256_context accumulator; +#endif + int source_count; /* Number of entries used in source. */ + mbedtls_entropy_source_state source[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + mbedtls_havege_state havege_data; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< mutex */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + int initial_entropy_run; +#endif +} +mbedtls_entropy_context; + +/** + * \brief Initialize the context + * + * \param ctx Entropy context to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_entropy_init( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the data in the context + * + * \param ctx Entropy context to free + */ +void mbedtls_entropy_free( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Adds an entropy source to poll + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param ctx Entropy context + * \param f_source Entropy function + * \param p_source Function data + * \param threshold Minimum required from source before entropy is released + * ( with mbedtls_entropy_func() ) (in bytes) + * \param strong MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG or + * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK. + * At least one strong source needs to be added. + * Weaker sources (such as the cycle counter) can be used as + * a complement. + * + * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_add_source( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, + mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source, void *p_source, + size_t threshold, int strong ); + +/** + * \brief Trigger an extra gather poll for the accumulator + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param ctx Entropy context + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_gather( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve entropy from the accumulator + * (Maximum length: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param data Entropy context + * \param output Buffer to fill + * \param len Number of bytes desired, must be at most MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Add data to the accumulator manually + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param ctx Entropy context + * \param data Data to add + * \param len Length of data + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +/** + * \brief Trigger an update of the seed file in NV by using the + * current entropy pool. + * + * \param ctx Entropy context + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief Write a seed file + * + * \param ctx Entropy context + * \param path Name of the file + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path ); + +/** + * \brief Read and update a seed file. Seed is added to this + * instance. No more than MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE bytes are + * read from the seed file. The rest is ignored. + * + * \param ctx Entropy context + * \param path Name of the file + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * This module self-test also calls the entropy self-test, + * mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test(); + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_self_test( int verbose ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * Verifies the integrity of the hardware entropy source + * provided by the function 'mbedtls_hardware_poll()'. + * + * Note this is the only hardware entropy source that is known + * at link time, and other entropy sources configured + * dynamically at runtime by the function + * mbedtls_entropy_add_source() will not be tested. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* entropy.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e1d7491a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/** + * \file entropy_poll.h + * + * \brief Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Default thresholds for built-in sources, in bytes + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM 32 /**< Minimum for platform source */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE 32 /**< Minimum for HAVEGE */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK 4 /**< Minimum for mbedtls_timing_hardclock() */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE) +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Minimum for the hardware source */ +#endif + +/** + * \brief Entropy poll callback that provides 0 entropy. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) + int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) +/** + * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback + */ +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) +/** + * \brief HAVEGE based entropy poll callback + * + * Requires an HAVEGE state as its data pointer. + */ +int mbedtls_havege_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +/** + * \brief mbedtls_timing_hardclock-based entropy poll callback + */ +int mbedtls_hardclock_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) +/** + * \brief Entropy poll callback for a hardware source + * + * \warning This is not provided by mbed TLS! + * See \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT in config.h. + * + * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. + */ +int mbedtls_hardware_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +/** + * \brief Entropy poll callback for a non-volatile seed file + * + * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. + */ +int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* entropy_poll.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/error.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/error.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..50f25385 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/error.h @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +/** + * \file error.h + * + * \brief Error to string translation + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ERROR_H +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/** + * Error code layout. + * + * Currently we try to keep all error codes within the negative space of 16 + * bits signed integers to support all platforms (-0x0001 - -0x7FFF). In + * addition we'd like to give two layers of information on the error if + * possible. + * + * For that purpose the error codes are segmented in the following manner: + * + * 16 bit error code bit-segmentation + * + * 1 bit - Unused (sign bit) + * 3 bits - High level module ID + * 5 bits - Module-dependent error code + * 7 bits - Low level module errors + * + * For historical reasons, low-level error codes are divided in even and odd, + * even codes were assigned first, and -1 is reserved for other errors. + * + * Low-level module errors (0x0002-0x007E, 0x0001-0x007F) + * + * Module Nr Codes assigned + * ERROR 2 0x006E 0x0001 + * MPI 7 0x0002-0x0010 + * GCM 3 0x0012-0x0014 0x0013-0x0013 + * BLOWFISH 3 0x0016-0x0018 0x0017-0x0017 + * THREADING 3 0x001A-0x001E + * AES 5 0x0020-0x0022 0x0021-0x0025 + * CAMELLIA 3 0x0024-0x0026 0x0027-0x0027 + * XTEA 2 0x0028-0x0028 0x0029-0x0029 + * BASE64 2 0x002A-0x002C + * OID 1 0x002E-0x002E 0x000B-0x000B + * PADLOCK 1 0x0030-0x0030 + * DES 2 0x0032-0x0032 0x0033-0x0033 + * CTR_DBRG 4 0x0034-0x003A + * ENTROPY 3 0x003C-0x0040 0x003D-0x003F + * NET 13 0x0042-0x0052 0x0043-0x0049 + * ARIA 4 0x0058-0x005E + * ASN1 7 0x0060-0x006C + * CMAC 1 0x007A-0x007A + * PBKDF2 1 0x007C-0x007C + * HMAC_DRBG 4 0x0003-0x0009 + * CCM 3 0x000D-0x0011 + * ARC4 1 0x0019-0x0019 + * MD2 1 0x002B-0x002B + * MD4 1 0x002D-0x002D + * MD5 1 0x002F-0x002F + * RIPEMD160 1 0x0031-0x0031 + * SHA1 1 0x0035-0x0035 0x0073-0x0073 + * SHA256 1 0x0037-0x0037 0x0074-0x0074 + * SHA512 1 0x0039-0x0039 0x0075-0x0075 + * CHACHA20 3 0x0051-0x0055 + * POLY1305 3 0x0057-0x005B + * CHACHAPOLY 2 0x0054-0x0056 + * PLATFORM 2 0x0070-0x0072 + * + * High-level module nr (3 bits - 0x0...-0x7...) + * Name ID Nr of Errors + * PEM 1 9 + * PKCS#12 1 4 (Started from top) + * X509 2 20 + * PKCS5 2 4 (Started from top) + * DHM 3 11 + * PK 3 15 (Started from top) + * RSA 4 11 + * ECP 4 10 (Started from top) + * MD 5 5 + * HKDF 5 1 (Started from top) + * SSL 5 2 (Started from 0x5F00) + * CIPHER 6 8 (Started from 0x6080) + * SSL 6 24 (Started from top, plus 0x6000) + * SSL 7 32 + * + * Module dependent error code (5 bits 0x.00.-0x.F8.) + */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Generic error */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR -0x0001 +/** This is a bug in the library */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED -0x006E + +/** + * \brief Combines a high-level and low-level error code together. + * + * Wrapper macro for mbedtls_error_add(). See that function for + * more details. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( high, low ) \ + mbedtls_error_add( high, low, __FILE__, __LINE__ ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +/** + * \brief Testing hook called before adding/combining two error codes together. + * Only used when invasive testing is enabled via MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS. + */ +extern void (*mbedtls_test_hook_error_add)( int, int, const char *, int ); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Combines a high-level and low-level error code together. + * + * This function can be called directly however it is usually + * called via the #MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD macro. + * + * While a value of zero is not a negative error code, it is still an + * error code (that denotes success) and can be combined with both a + * negative error code or another value of zero. + * + * \note When invasive testing is enabled via #MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS, also try to + * call \link mbedtls_test_hook_error_add \endlink. + * + * \param high high-level error code. See error.h for more details. + * \param low low-level error code. See error.h for more details. + * \param file file where this error code addition occurred. + * \param line line where this error code addition occurred. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_error_add( int high, int low, + const char *file, int line ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if( *mbedtls_test_hook_error_add != NULL ) + ( *mbedtls_test_hook_error_add )( high, low, file, line ); +#endif + (void)file; + (void)line; + + return( high + low ); +} + +/** + * \brief Translate a mbed TLS error code into a string representation, + * Result is truncated if necessary and always includes a terminating + * null byte. + * + * \param errnum error code + * \param buffer buffer to place representation in + * \param buflen length of the buffer + */ +void mbedtls_strerror( int errnum, char *buffer, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Translate the high-level part of an Mbed TLS error code into a string + * representation. + * + * This function returns a const pointer to an un-modifiable string. The caller + * must not try to modify the string. It is intended to be used mostly for + * logging purposes. + * + * \param error_code error code + * + * \return The string representation of the error code, or \c NULL if the error + * code is unknown. + */ +const char * mbedtls_high_level_strerr( int error_code ); + +/** + * \brief Translate the low-level part of an Mbed TLS error code into a string + * representation. + * + * This function returns a const pointer to an un-modifiable string. The caller + * must not try to modify the string. It is intended to be used mostly for + * logging purposes. + * + * \param error_code error code + * + * \return The string representation of the error code, or \c NULL if the error + * code is unknown. + */ +const char * mbedtls_low_level_strerr( int error_code ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* error.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/gcm.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/gcm.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9723a17b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/gcm.h @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +/** + * \file gcm.h + * + * \brief This file contains GCM definitions and functions. + * + * The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for 128-bit block ciphers is defined + * in D. McGrew, J. Viega, The Galois/Counter Mode of Operation + * (GCM), Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. + * + * For more information on GCM, see NIST SP 800-38D: Recommendation for + * Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC. + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GCM_H +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT 0 + +/** Authenticated decryption failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x0012 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** GCM hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0013 + +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT -0x0014 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + +/** + * \brief The GCM context structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_gcm_context +{ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ + uint64_t HL[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable low. */ + uint64_t HH[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable high. */ + uint64_t len; /*!< The total length of the encrypted data. */ + uint64_t add_len; /*!< The total length of the additional data. */ + unsigned char base_ectr[16]; /*!< The first ECTR for tag. */ + unsigned char y[16]; /*!< The Y working value. */ + unsigned char buf[16]; /*!< The buf working value. */ + int mode; /*!< The operation to perform: + #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or + #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. */ +} +mbedtls_gcm_context; + +#else /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ +#include "gcm_alt.h" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified GCM context, + * to make references valid, and prepares the context + * for mbedtls_gcm_setkey() or mbedtls_gcm_free(). + * + * The function does not bind the GCM context to a particular + * cipher, nor set the key. For this purpose, use + * mbedtls_gcm_setkey(). + * + * \param ctx The GCM context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function associates a GCM context with a + * cipher algorithm and a key. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. + * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer of at + * least \p keybits bits. + * \param keybits The key size in bits. Valid options are: + *
  • 128 bits
  • + *
  • 192 bits
  • + *
  • 256 bits
+ * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs GCM encryption or decryption of a buffer. + * + * \note For encryption, the output buffer can be the same as the + * input buffer. For decryption, the output buffer cannot be + * the same as input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output + * buffer must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. + * + * \warning When this function performs a decryption, it outputs the + * authentication tag and does not verify that the data is + * authentic. You should use this function to perform encryption + * only. For decryption, use mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() instead. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context to use for encryption or decryption. This + * must be initialized. + * \param mode The operation to perform: + * - #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT to perform authenticated encryption. + * The ciphertext is written to \p output and the + * authentication tag is written to \p tag. + * - #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT to perform decryption. + * The plaintext is written to \p output and the + * authentication tag is written to \p tag. + * Note that this mode is not recommended, because it does + * not verify the authenticity of the data. For this reason, + * you should use mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() instead of + * calling this function in decryption mode. + * \param length The length of the input data, which is equal to the length + * of the output data. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the IV. + * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at + * least that size in Bytes. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that + * size in Bytes. + * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least that + * size in Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. + * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable + * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if the encryption or decryption was performed + * successfully. Note that in #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT mode, + * this does not indicate that the data is authentic. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are + * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the encryption + * or decryption failed. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t tag_len, + unsigned char *tag ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a GCM authenticated decryption of a + * buffer. + * + * \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as + * input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer + * must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param length The length of the ciphertext to decrypt, which is also + * the length of the decrypted plaintext. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer + * of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the IV. + * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at + * least that size in Bytes. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data. + * \param tag The buffer holding the tag to verify. This must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to verify. + * \param input The buffer holding the ciphertext. If \p length is greater + * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that + * size. + * \param output The buffer for holding the decrypted plaintext. If \p length + * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at + * least that size. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful and authenticated. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are + * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the decryption + * failed. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *tag, + size_t tag_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a GCM encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the IV. + * \param add The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL + * if \p add_len is \c 0. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0, + * \p add may be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing GCM + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * ` The function expects input to be a multiple of 16 + * Bytes. Only the last call before calling + * mbedtls_gcm_finish() can be less than 16 Bytes. + * + * \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as + * input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer + * must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param length The length of the input data. This must be a multiple of + * 16 except in the last call before mbedtls_gcm_finish(). + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater + * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that + * size in Bytes. + * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is + * greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at + * least that size in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the GCM operation and generates + * the authentication tag. + * + * It wraps up the GCM stream, and generates the + * tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable + * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. This must be at least + * four. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, + size_t tag_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function clears a GCM context and the underlying + * cipher sub-context. + * + * \param ctx The GCM context to clear. If this is \c NULL, the call has + * no effect. Otherwise, this must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The GCM checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + + +#endif /* gcm.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/havege.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/havege.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7d27039e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/havege.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/** + * \file havege.h + * + * \brief HAVEGE: HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H +#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE 1024 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief HAVEGE state structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_havege_state +{ + uint32_t PT1, PT2, offset[2]; + uint32_t pool[MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE]; + uint32_t WALK[8192]; +} +mbedtls_havege_state; + +/** + * \brief HAVEGE initialization + * + * \param hs HAVEGE state to be initialized + */ +void mbedtls_havege_init( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ); + +/** + * \brief Clear HAVEGE state + * + * \param hs HAVEGE state to be cleared + */ +void mbedtls_havege_free( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ); + +/** + * \brief HAVEGE rand function + * + * \param p_rng A HAVEGE state + * \param output Buffer to fill + * \param len Length of buffer + * + * \return 0 + */ +int mbedtls_havege_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t len ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* havege.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..111d960e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/** + * \file hkdf.h + * + * \brief This file contains the HKDF interface. + * + * The HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) is + * specified by RFC 5869. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_HKDF_H +#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +/** + * \name HKDF Error codes + * \{ + */ +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5F80 +/** \} name */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief This is the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function + * (HKDF). + * + * \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the hash + * function output in bytes. + * \param salt An optional salt value (a non-secret random value); + * if the salt is not provided, a string of all zeros of + * md.size length is used as the salt. + * \param salt_len The length in bytes of the optional \p salt. + * \param ikm The input keying material. + * \param ikm_len The length in bytes of \p ikm. + * \param info An optional context and application specific information + * string. This can be a zero-length string. + * \param info_len The length of \p info in bytes. + * \param okm The output keying material of \p okm_len bytes. + * \param okm_len The length of the output keying material in bytes. This + * must be less than or equal to 255 * md.size bytes. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the parameters are invalid. + * \return An MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_* error for errors returned from the underlying + * MD layer. + */ +int mbedtls_hkdf( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *salt, + size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, + const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, + unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len ); + +/** + * \brief Take the input keying material \p ikm and extract from it a + * fixed-length pseudorandom key \p prk. + * + * \warning This function should only be used if the security of it has been + * studied and established in that particular context (eg. TLS 1.3 + * key schedule). For standard HKDF security guarantees use + * \c mbedtls_hkdf instead. + * + * \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the + * hash function output in bytes. + * \param salt An optional salt value (a non-secret random value); + * if the salt is not provided, a string of all zeros + * of md.size length is used as the salt. + * \param salt_len The length in bytes of the optional \p salt. + * \param ikm The input keying material. + * \param ikm_len The length in bytes of \p ikm. + * \param[out] prk A pseudorandom key of at least md.size bytes. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the parameters are invalid. + * \return An MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_* error for errors returned from the underlying + * MD layer. + */ +int mbedtls_hkdf_extract( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, + const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, + unsigned char *prk ); + +/** + * \brief Expand the supplied \p prk into several additional pseudorandom + * keys, which is the output of the HKDF. + * + * \warning This function should only be used if the security of it has been + * studied and established in that particular context (eg. TLS 1.3 + * key schedule). For standard HKDF security guarantees use + * \c mbedtls_hkdf instead. + * + * \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the hash + * function output in bytes. + * \param prk A pseudorandom key of at least md.size bytes. \p prk is + * usually the output from the HKDF extract step. + * \param prk_len The length in bytes of \p prk. + * \param info An optional context and application specific information + * string. This can be a zero-length string. + * \param info_len The length of \p info in bytes. + * \param okm The output keying material of \p okm_len bytes. + * \param okm_len The length of the output keying material in bytes. This + * must be less than or equal to 255 * md.size bytes. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the parameters are invalid. + * \return An MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_* error for errors returned from the underlying + * MD layer. + */ +int mbedtls_hkdf_expand( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *prk, + size_t prk_len, const unsigned char *info, + size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* hkdf.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d372b97 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h @@ -0,0 +1,474 @@ +/** + * \file hmac_drbg.h + * + * \brief The HMAC_DRBG pseudorandom generator. + * + * This module implements the HMAC_DRBG pseudorandom generator described + * in NIST SP 800-90A: Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using + * Deterministic Random Bit Generators. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +/* + * Error codes + */ +/** Too many random requested in single call. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -0x0003 +/** Input too large (Entropy + additional). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -0x0005 +/** Read/write error in file. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x0007 +/** The entropy source failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x0009 + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF 0 /**< No prediction resistance */ +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON 1 /**< Prediction resistance enabled */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * HMAC_DRBG context. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context +{ + /* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitly, + * but is implied by the HMAC context */ + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; /*!< HMAC context (inc. K) */ + unsigned char V[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; /*!< V in the spec */ + int reseed_counter; /*!< reseed counter */ + + /* Administrative state */ + size_t entropy_len; /*!< entropy bytes grabbed on each (re)seed */ + int prediction_resistance; /*!< enable prediction resistance (Automatic + reseed before every random generation) */ + int reseed_interval; /*!< reseed interval */ + + /* Callbacks */ + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< entropy function */ + void *p_entropy; /*!< context for the entropy function */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized if and only if + * md_ctx->md_info != NULL. This means that the mutex is initialized + * during the initial seeding in mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() or + * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf() and freed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(). + * + * Note that this invariant may change without notice. Do not rely on it + * and do not access the mutex directly in application code. + */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; +#endif +} mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context; + +/** + * \brief HMAC_DRBG context initialization. + * + * This function makes the context ready for mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(), + * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf() or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(). + * + * \note The reseed interval is #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL + * by default. Override this value by calling + * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval(). + * + * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief HMAC_DRBG initial seeding. + * + * Set the initial seed and set up the entropy source for future reseeds. + * + * A typical choice for the \p f_entropy and \p p_entropy parameters is + * to use the entropy module: + * - \p f_entropy is mbedtls_entropy_func(); + * - \p p_entropy is an instance of ::mbedtls_entropy_context initialized + * with mbedtls_entropy_init() (which registers the platform's default + * entropy sources). + * + * You can provide a personalization string in addition to the + * entropy source, to make this instantiation as unique as possible. + * + * \note By default, the security strength as defined by NIST is: + * - 128 bits if \p md_info is SHA-1; + * - 192 bits if \p md_info is SHA-224; + * - 256 bits if \p md_info is SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512. + * Note that SHA-256 is just as efficient as SHA-224. + * The security strength can be reduced if a smaller + * entropy length is set with + * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(). + * + * \note The default entropy length is the security strength + * (converted from bits to bytes). You can override + * it by calling mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(). + * + * \note During the initial seeding, this function calls + * the entropy source to obtain a nonce + * whose length is half the entropy length. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * after this function returns successfully, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be seeded. + * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG. + * \param f_entropy The entropy callback, taking as arguments the + * \p p_entropy context, the buffer to fill, and the + * length of the buffer. + * \p f_entropy is always called with a length that is + * less than or equal to the entropy length. + * \param p_entropy The entropy context to pass to \p f_entropy. + * \param custom The personalization string. + * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization + * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. + * \param len The length of the personalization string. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT + * and also at most + * #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \p entropy_len * 3 / 2 + * where \p entropy_len is the entropy length + * described above. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info is + * invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED if there was not enough + * memory to allocate context data. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if the call to \p f_entropy failed. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Initialisation of simplified HMAC_DRBG (never reseeds). + * + * This function is meant for use in algorithms that need a pseudorandom + * input such as deterministic ECDSA. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * after this function returns successfully, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialised. + * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG. + * \param data Concatenation of the initial entropy string and + * the additional data. + * \param data_len Length of \p data in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. or + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info is + * invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED if there was not enough + * memory to allocate context data. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function turns prediction resistance on or off. + * The default value is off. + * + * \note If enabled, entropy is gathered at the beginning of + * every call to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add() + * or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(). + * Only use this if your entropy source has sufficient + * throughput. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param resistance #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON or #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF. + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + int resistance ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed on each + * seed or reseed. + * + * See the documentation of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() for the default value. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param len The amount of entropy to grab, in bytes. + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Set the reseed interval. + * + * The reseed interval is the number of calls to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() + * or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add() after which the entropy function + * is called again. + * + * The default value is #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param interval The reseed interval. + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + int interval ); + +/** + * \brief This function updates the state of the HMAC_DRBG context. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param additional The data to update the state with. + * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data. + * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. + * Unused if \p additional is \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, or an error from the underlying + * hash calculation. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function reseeds the HMAC_DRBG context, that is + * extracts data from the entropy source. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param additional Additional data to add to the state. + * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data + * and \p len should be \c 0. + * \param len The length of the additional data. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT + * and also at most + * #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \p entropy_len + * where \p entropy_len is the entropy length + * (see mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len()). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if a call to the entropy function failed. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief This function updates an HMAC_DRBG instance with additional + * data and uses it to generate random data. + * + * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded + * or prediction resistance is enabled. + * + * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe + * to call this function if another thread might be + * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same + * context or updating or reseeding the same context. + * + * \param p_rng The HMAC_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a + * #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context structure. + * \param output The buffer to fill. + * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. + * \param additional Additional data to update with. + * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data + * and \p add_len should be \c 0. + * \param add_len The length of the additional data. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if a call to the entropy source failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG if + * \p output_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if + * \p add_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function uses HMAC_DRBG to generate random data. + * + * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded + * or prediction resistance is enabled. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/** + * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support, + * it is safe to call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() + * from multiple threads. Other operations, including + * reseeding, are not thread-safe. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +/** + * \param p_rng The HMAC_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a + * #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context structure. + * \param output The buffer to fill. + * \param out_len The length of the buffer in bytes. + * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED + * if a call to the entropy source failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG if + * \p out_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(). + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context to free. + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ); + +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function updates the state of the HMAC_DRBG context. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() + * in 2.16.0. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param additional The data to update the state with. + * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data. + * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. + * Unused if \p additional is \c NULL. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ); +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief This function writes a seed file. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param path The name of the file. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on reseed + * failure. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); + +/** + * \brief This function reads and updates a seed file. The seed + * is added to this instance. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. + * \param path The name of the file. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on + * reseed failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if the existing + * seed file is too large. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief The HMAC_DRBG Checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return \c 1 if the test failed. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* hmac_drbg.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9cea40a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md.h @@ -0,0 +1,493 @@ + /** + * \file md.h + * + * \brief This file contains the generic message-digest wrapper. + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD_H + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +/** The selected feature is not available. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x5080 +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5100 +/** Failed to allocate memory. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED -0x5180 +/** Opening or reading of file failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x5200 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** MD hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x5280 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Supported message digests. + * + * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5 and SHA-1 are considered weak message digests and + * their use constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE=0, /**< None. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, /**< The MD2 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, /**< The MD4 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, /**< The MD5 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, /**< The SHA-1 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, /**< The SHA-224 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, /**< The SHA-256 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, /**< The SHA-384 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, /**< The SHA-512 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, /**< The RIPEMD-160 message digest. */ +} mbedtls_md_type_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 64 /* longest known is SHA512 */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 32 /* longest known is SHA256 or less */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 128 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +#endif + +/** + * Opaque struct defined in md_internal.h. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t; + +/** + * The generic message-digest context. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_md_context_t +{ + /** Information about the associated message digest. */ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + /** The digest-specific context. */ + void *md_ctx; + + /** The HMAC part of the context. */ + void *hmac_ctx; +} mbedtls_md_context_t; + +/** + * \brief This function returns the list of digests supported by the + * generic digest module. + * + * \note The list starts with the strongest available hashes. + * + * \return A statically allocated array of digests. Each element + * in the returned list is an integer belonging to the + * message-digest enumeration #mbedtls_md_type_t. + * The last entry is 0. + */ +const int *mbedtls_md_list( void ); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the message-digest information + * associated with the given digest name. + * + * \param md_name The name of the digest to search for. + * + * \return The message-digest information associated with \p md_name. + * \return NULL if the associated message-digest information is not found. + */ +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string( const char *md_name ); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the message-digest information + * associated with the given digest type. + * + * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. + * + * \return The message-digest information associated with \p md_type. + * \return NULL if the associated message-digest information is not found. + */ +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a message-digest context without + * binding it to a particular message-digest algorithm. + * + * This function should always be called first. It prepares the + * context for mbedtls_md_setup() for binding it to a + * message-digest algorithm. + */ +void mbedtls_md_init( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clears the internal structure of \p ctx and + * frees any embedded internal structure, but does not free + * \p ctx itself. + * + * If you have called mbedtls_md_setup() on \p ctx, you must + * call mbedtls_md_free() when you are no longer using the + * context. + * Calling this function if you have previously + * called mbedtls_md_init() and nothing else is optional. + * You must not call this function if you have not called + * mbedtls_md_init(). + */ +void mbedtls_md_free( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); + +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use, + * and allocates internal structures. + * + * It should be called after mbedtls_md_init() or mbedtls_md_free(). + * Makes it necessary to call mbedtls_md_free() later. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md_setup() in 2.0.0 + * + * \param ctx The context to set up. + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_md_init_ctx( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use, + * and allocates internal structures. + * + * It should be called after mbedtls_md_init() or + * mbedtls_md_free(). Makes it necessary to call + * mbedtls_md_free() later. + * + * \param ctx The context to set up. + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * \param hmac Defines if HMAC is used. 0: HMAC is not used (saves some memory), + * or non-zero: HMAC is used with this context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_setup( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac ); + +/** + * \brief This function clones the state of a message-digest + * context. + * + * \note You must call mbedtls_md_setup() on \c dst before calling + * this function. + * + * \note The two contexts must have the same type, + * for example, both are SHA-256. + * + * \warning This function clones the message-digest state, not the + * HMAC state. + * + * \param dst The destination context. + * \param src The context to be cloned. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_clone( mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, + const mbedtls_md_context_t *src ); + +/** + * \brief This function extracts the message-digest size from the + * message-digest information structure. + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * + * \return The size of the message-digest output in Bytes. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ); + +/** + * \brief This function extracts the message-digest type from the + * message-digest information structure. + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * + * \return The type of the message digest. + */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ); + +/** + * \brief This function extracts the message-digest name from the + * message-digest information structure. + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * + * \return The name of the message digest. + */ +const char *mbedtls_md_get_name( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a message-digest computation. + * + * You must call this function after setting up the context + * with mbedtls_md_setup(), and before passing data with + * mbedtls_md_update(). + * + * \param ctx The generic message-digest context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * message-digest computation. + * + * You must call mbedtls_md_starts() before calling this + * function. You may call this function multiple times. + * Afterwards, call mbedtls_md_finish(). + * + * \param ctx The generic message-digest context. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the digest operation, + * and writes the result to the output buffer. + * + * Call this function after a call to mbedtls_md_starts(), + * followed by any number of calls to mbedtls_md_update(). + * Afterwards, you may either clear the context with + * mbedtls_md_free(), or call mbedtls_md_starts() to reuse + * the context for another digest operation with the same + * algorithm. + * + * \param ctx The generic message-digest context. + * \param output The buffer for the generic message-digest checksum result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the message-digest of a buffer, + * with respect to a configurable message-digest algorithm + * in a single call. + * + * The result is calculated as + * Output = message_digest(input buffer). + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The generic message-digest checksum result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief This function calculates the message-digest checksum + * result of the contents of the provided file. + * + * The result is calculated as + * Output = message_digest(file contents). + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * \param path The input file name. + * \param output The generic message-digest checksum result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR on an I/O error accessing + * the file pointed by \p path. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info was NULL. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_file( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, + unsigned char *output ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/** + * \brief This function sets the HMAC key and prepares to + * authenticate a new message. + * + * Call this function after mbedtls_md_setup(), to use + * the MD context for an HMAC calculation, then call + * mbedtls_md_hmac_update() to provide the input data, and + * mbedtls_md_hmac_finish() to get the HMAC value. + * + * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC + * context. + * \param key The HMAC secret key. + * \param keylen The length of the HMAC key in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + size_t keylen ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing HMAC + * computation. + * + * Call mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() or mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() + * before calling this function. + * You may call this function multiple times to pass the + * input piecewise. + * Afterwards, call mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(). + * + * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC + * context. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_hmac_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the HMAC operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * Call this function after mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and + * mbedtls_md_hmac_update() to get the HMAC value. Afterwards + * you may either call mbedtls_md_free() to clear the context, + * or call mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() to reuse the context with + * the same HMAC key. + * + * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC + * context. + * \param output The generic HMAC checksum result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output); + +/** + * \brief This function prepares to authenticate a new message with + * the same key as the previous HMAC operation. + * + * You may call this function after mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(). + * Afterwards call mbedtls_md_hmac_update() to pass the new + * input. + * + * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC + * context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the full generic HMAC + * on the input buffer with the provided key. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The HMAC result is calculated as + * output = generic HMAC(hmac key, input buffer). + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * \param key The HMAC secret key. + * \param keylen The length of the HMAC secret key in Bytes. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param ilen The length of the input data. + * \param output The generic HMAC result. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification + * failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_hmac( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ); + +/* Internal use */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +int mbedtls_md_process( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md2.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md2.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f3d5cf4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md2.h @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/** + * \file md2.h + * + * \brief MD2 message digest algorithm (hash function) + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message digests + * instead. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD2_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD2_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** MD2 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002B + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief MD2 context structure + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_md2_context +{ + unsigned char cksum[16]; /*!< checksum of the data block */ + unsigned char state[48]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char buffer[16]; /*!< data block being processed */ + size_t left; /*!< amount of data in buffer */ +} +mbedtls_md2_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ +#include "md2_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize MD2 context + * + * \param ctx MD2 context to be initialized + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md2_init( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear MD2 context + * + * \param ctx MD2 context to be cleared + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md2_free( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD2 context + * + * \param dst The destination context + * \param src The context to be cloned + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md2_clone( mbedtls_md2_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md2_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 process buffer + * + * \param ctx MD2 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md2_update_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 final digest + * + * \param ctx MD2 context + * \param output MD2 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \param ctx MD2 context + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_internal_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief MD2 context setup + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_starts( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 process buffer + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_update_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD2 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_update( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 final digest + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD2 context + * \param output MD2 checksum result + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_finish( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief MD2 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md2_process() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD2 context + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Output = MD2( input buffer ) + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD2 checksum result + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md2_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Output = MD2( input buffer ) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD2 checksum result + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + * + * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md2_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_md2.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md4.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md4.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0238c672 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md4.h @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +/** + * \file md4.h + * + * \brief MD4 message digest algorithm (hash function) + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message digests + * instead. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD4_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD4_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** MD4 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002D + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief MD4 context structure + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_md4_context +{ + uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ +} +mbedtls_md4_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ +#include "md4_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize MD4 context + * + * \param ctx MD4 context to be initialized + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md4_init( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear MD4 context + * + * \param ctx MD4 context to be cleared + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md4_free( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD4 context + * + * \param dst The destination context + * \param src The context to be cloned + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md4_clone( mbedtls_md4_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md4_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + */ +int mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 process buffer + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md4_update_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 final digest + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param output MD4 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param data buffer holding one block of data + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_internal_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief MD4 context setup + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_starts( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 process buffer + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_update_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_update( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 final digest + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param output MD4 checksum result + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_finish( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief MD4 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md4_process() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD4 context + * \param data buffer holding one block of data + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD4 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md4_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD4 checksum result + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + * + * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md4_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_md4.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md5.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md5.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..73e4dd2c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md5.h @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +/** + * \file md5.h + * + * \brief MD5 message digest algorithm (hash function) + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a + * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message + * digests instead. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD5_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** MD5 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002F + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief MD5 context structure + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_md5_context +{ + uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ +} +mbedtls_md5_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ +#include "md5_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize MD5 context + * + * \param ctx MD5 context to be initialized + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md5_init( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear MD5 context + * + * \param ctx MD5 context to be cleared + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md5_free( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD5 context + * + * \param dst The destination context + * \param src The context to be cloned + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +void mbedtls_md5_clone( mbedtls_md5_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md5_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 process buffer + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md5_update_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 final digest + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param output MD5 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param data buffer holding one block of data + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_internal_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief MD5 context setup + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_starts( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 process buffer + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_update_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_update( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 final digest + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param output MD5 checksum result + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_finish( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md5_process() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx MD5 context + * \param data buffer holding one block of data + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD5 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md5_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output MD5 checksum result + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + * + * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +int mbedtls_md5_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_md5.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f33cdf60 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/** + * \file md_internal.h + * + * \brief Message digest wrappers. + * + * \warning This in an internal header. Do not include directly. + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Message digest information. + * Allows message digest functions to be called in a generic way. + */ +struct mbedtls_md_info_t +{ + /** Name of the message digest */ + const char * name; + + /** Digest identifier */ + mbedtls_md_type_t type; + + /** Output length of the digest function in bytes */ + unsigned char size; + + /** Block length of the digest function in bytes */ + unsigned char block_size; +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info; +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info; +#endif +extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info; +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3954b36a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +/** + * \file memory_buffer_alloc.h + * + * \brief Buffer-based memory allocator + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE 4 /**< Align on multiples of this value */ +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC (1 << 0) +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE (1 << 1) +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS (MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC | MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Initialize use of stack-based memory allocator. + * The stack-based allocator does memory management inside the + * presented buffer and does not call calloc() and free(). + * It sets the global mbedtls_calloc() and mbedtls_free() pointers + * to its own functions. + * (Provided mbedtls_calloc() and mbedtls_free() are thread-safe if + * MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is defined) + * + * \note This code is not optimized and provides a straight-forward + * implementation of a stack-based memory allocator. + * + * \param buf buffer to use as heap + * \param len size of the buffer + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Free the mutex for thread-safety and clear remaining memory + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( void ); + +/** + * \brief Determine when the allocator should automatically verify the state + * of the entire chain of headers / meta-data. + * (Default: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE) + * + * \param verify One of MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC, + * MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE or MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify( int verify ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) +/** + * \brief Print out the status of the allocated memory (primarily for use + * after a program should have de-allocated all memory) + * Prints out a list of 'still allocated' blocks and their stack + * trace if MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE is defined. + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status( void ); + +/** + * \brief Get the peak heap usage so far + * + * \param max_used Peak number of bytes in use or committed. This + * includes bytes in allocated blocks too small to split + * into smaller blocks but larger than the requested size. + * \param max_blocks Peak number of blocks in use, including free and used + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get( size_t *max_used, size_t *max_blocks ); + +/** + * \brief Reset peak statistics + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset( void ); + +/** + * \brief Get the current heap usage + * + * \param cur_used Current number of bytes in use or committed. This + * includes bytes in allocated blocks too small to split + * into smaller blocks but larger than the requested size. + * \param cur_blocks Current number of blocks in use, including free and used + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get( size_t *cur_used, size_t *cur_blocks ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ + +/** + * \brief Verifies that all headers in the memory buffer are correct + * and contain sane values. Helps debug buffer-overflow errors. + * + * Prints out first failure if MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG is defined. + * Prints out full header information if MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG + * is defined. (Includes stack trace information for each block if + * MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE is defined as well). + * + * \return 0 if verified, 1 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify( void ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed + */ +int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* memory_buffer_alloc.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/net.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/net.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..66921887 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/net.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/** + * \file net.h + * + * \brief Deprecated header file that includes net_sockets.h + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "Deprecated header file: Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ceb7d5f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h @@ -0,0 +1,301 @@ +/** + * \file net_sockets.h + * + * \brief Network sockets abstraction layer to integrate Mbed TLS into a + * BSD-style sockets API. + * + * The network sockets module provides an example integration of the + * Mbed TLS library into a BSD sockets implementation. The module is + * intended to be an example of how Mbed TLS can be integrated into a + * networking stack, as well as to be Mbed TLS's network integration + * for its supported platforms. + * + * The module is intended only to be used with the Mbed TLS library and + * is not intended to be used by third party application software + * directly. + * + * The supported platforms are as follows: + * * Microsoft Windows and Windows CE + * * POSIX/Unix platforms including Linux, OS X + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H +#define MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" + +#include +#include + +/** Failed to open a socket. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED -0x0042 +/** The connection to the given server / port failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED -0x0044 +/** Binding of the socket failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED -0x0046 +/** Could not listen on the socket. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED -0x0048 +/** Could not accept the incoming connection. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED -0x004A +/** Reading information from the socket failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED -0x004C +/** Sending information through the socket failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED -0x004E +/** Connection was reset by peer. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET -0x0050 +/** Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST -0x0052 +/** Buffer is too small to hold the data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0043 +/** The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT -0x0045 +/** Polling the net context failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED -0x0047 +/** Input invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0049 + +#define MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG 10 /**< The backlog that listen() should use. */ + +#define MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP 0 /**< The TCP transport protocol */ +#define MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP 1 /**< The UDP transport protocol */ + +#define MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ 1 /**< Used in \c mbedtls_net_poll to check for pending data */ +#define MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE 2 /**< Used in \c mbedtls_net_poll to check if write possible */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Wrapper type for sockets. + * + * Currently backed by just a file descriptor, but might be more in the future + * (eg two file descriptors for combined IPv4 + IPv6 support, or additional + * structures for hand-made UDP demultiplexing). + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_net_context +{ + int fd; /**< The underlying file descriptor */ +} +mbedtls_net_context; + +/** + * \brief Initialize a context + * Just makes the context ready to be used or freed safely. + * + * \param ctx Context to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_net_init( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Initiate a connection with host:port in the given protocol + * + * \param ctx Socket to use + * \param host Host to connect to + * \param port Port to connect to + * \param proto Protocol: MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP or MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP + * + * \return 0 if successful, or one of: + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED + * + * \note Sets the socket in connected mode even with UDP. + */ +int mbedtls_net_connect( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host, const char *port, int proto ); + +/** + * \brief Create a receiving socket on bind_ip:port in the chosen + * protocol. If bind_ip == NULL, all interfaces are bound. + * + * \param ctx Socket to use + * \param bind_ip IP to bind to, can be NULL + * \param port Port number to use + * \param proto Protocol: MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP or MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP + * + * \return 0 if successful, or one of: + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED + * + * \note Regardless of the protocol, opens the sockets and binds it. + * In addition, make the socket listening if protocol is TCP. + */ +int mbedtls_net_bind( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *port, int proto ); + +/** + * \brief Accept a connection from a remote client + * + * \param bind_ctx Relevant socket + * \param client_ctx Will contain the connected client socket + * \param client_ip Will contain the client IP address, can be NULL + * \param buf_size Size of the client_ip buffer + * \param ip_len Will receive the size of the client IP written, + * can be NULL if client_ip is null + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if buf_size is too small, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if bind_fd was set to + * non-blocking and accept() would block. + */ +int mbedtls_net_accept( mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, + mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, + void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len ); + +/** + * \brief Check and wait for the context to be ready for read/write + * + * \note The current implementation of this function uses + * select() and returns an error if the file descriptor + * is \c FD_SETSIZE or greater. + * + * \param ctx Socket to check + * \param rw Bitflag composed of MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ and + * MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE specifying the events + * to wait for: + * - If MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ is set, the function + * will return as soon as the net context is available + * for reading. + * - If MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE is set, the function + * will return as soon as the net context is available + * for writing. + * \param timeout Maximal amount of time to wait before returning, + * in milliseconds. If \c timeout is zero, the + * function returns immediately. If \c timeout is + * -1u, the function blocks potentially indefinitely. + * + * \return Bitmask composed of MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ/WRITE + * on success or timeout, or a negative return code otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_net_poll( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout ); + +/** + * \brief Set the socket blocking + * + * \param ctx Socket to set + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a non-zero error code + */ +int mbedtls_net_set_block( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Set the socket non-blocking + * + * \param ctx Socket to set + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a non-zero error code + */ +int mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Portable usleep helper + * + * \param usec Amount of microseconds to sleep + * + * \note Real amount of time slept will not be less than + * select()'s timeout granularity (typically, 10ms). + */ +void mbedtls_net_usleep( unsigned long usec ); + +/** + * \brief Read at most 'len' characters. If no error occurs, + * the actual amount read is returned. + * + * \param ctx Socket + * \param buf The buffer to write to + * \param len Maximum length of the buffer + * + * \return the number of bytes received, + * or a non-zero error code; with a non-blocking socket, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ indicates read() would block. + */ +int mbedtls_net_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Write at most 'len' characters. If no error occurs, + * the actual amount read is returned. + * + * \param ctx Socket + * \param buf The buffer to read from + * \param len The length of the buffer + * + * \return the number of bytes sent, + * or a non-zero error code; with a non-blocking socket, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE indicates write() would block. + */ +int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Read at most 'len' characters, blocking for at most + * 'timeout' seconds. If no error occurs, the actual amount + * read is returned. + * + * \note The current implementation of this function uses + * select() and returns an error if the file descriptor + * is \c FD_SETSIZE or greater. + * + * \param ctx Socket + * \param buf The buffer to write to + * \param len Maximum length of the buffer + * \param timeout Maximum number of milliseconds to wait for data + * 0 means no timeout (wait forever) + * + * \return The number of bytes received if successful. + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT if the operation timed out. + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if interrupted by a signal. + * Another negative error code (MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_xxx) + * for other failures. + * + * \note This function will block (until data becomes available or + * timeout is reached) even if the socket is set to + * non-blocking. Handling timeouts with non-blocking reads + * requires a different strategy. + */ +int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, + uint32_t timeout ); + +/** + * \brief Closes down the connection and free associated data + * + * \param ctx The context to close + */ +void mbedtls_net_close( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Gracefully shutdown the connection and free associated data + * + * \param ctx The context to free + */ +void mbedtls_net_free( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* net_sockets.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f3e64a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +/** + * \file nist_kw.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for key wrapping (KW) and key wrapping with + * padding (KWP) as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf + * + * Key wrapping specifies a deterministic authenticated-encryption mode + * of operation, according to NIST SP 800-38F: Recommendation for + * Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping. Its + * purpose is to protect cryptographic keys. + * + * Its equivalent is RFC 3394 for KW, and RFC 5649 for KWP. + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3394 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5649 + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H +#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW = 0, + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP = 1 +} mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The key wrapping context-type definition. The key wrapping context is passed + * to the APIs called. + * + * \note The definition of this type may change in future library versions. + * Don't make any assumptions on this context! + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ +} mbedtls_nist_kw_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_NIST_key wrapping_ALT */ +#include "nist_kw_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified key wrapping context + * to make references valid and prepare the context + * for mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey() or mbedtls_nist_kw_free(). + * + * \param ctx The key wrapping context to initialize. + * + */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_init( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the key wrapping context set in the + * \p ctx parameter and sets the encryption key. + * + * \param ctx The key wrapping context. + * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. Only AES is supported. + * \param key The Key Encryption Key (KEK). + * \param keybits The KEK size in bits. This must be acceptable by the cipher. + * \param is_wrap Specify whether the operation within the context is wrapping or unwrapping + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA for any invalid input. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for 128-bit block ciphers + * which are not supported. + * \return cipher-specific error code on failure of the underlying cipher. + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits, + const int is_wrap ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified key wrapping context + * and underlying cipher sub-context. + * + * \param ctx The key wrapping context to clear. + */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_free( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function encrypts a buffer using key wrapping. + * + * \param ctx The key wrapping context to use for encryption. + * \param mode The key wrapping mode to use (MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW or MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP) + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param in_len The length of the input data in Bytes. + * The input uses units of 8 Bytes called semiblocks. + *
  • For KW mode: a multiple of 8 bytes between 16 and 2^57-8 inclusive.
  • + *
  • For KWP mode: any length between 1 and 2^32-1 inclusive.
+ * \param[out] output The buffer holding the output data. + *
  • For KW mode: Must be at least 8 bytes larger than \p in_len.
  • + *
  • For KWP mode: Must be at least 8 bytes larger rounded up to a multiple of + * 8 bytes for KWP (15 bytes at most).
+ * \param[out] out_len The number of bytes written to the output buffer. \c 0 on failure. + * \param[in] out_size The capacity of the output buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA for invalid input length. + * \return cipher-specific error code on failure of the underlying cipher. + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t* out_len, size_t out_size ); + +/** + * \brief This function decrypts a buffer using key wrapping. + * + * \param ctx The key wrapping context to use for decryption. + * \param mode The key wrapping mode to use (MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW or MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP) + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * \param in_len The length of the input data in Bytes. + * The input uses units of 8 Bytes called semiblocks. + * The input must be a multiple of semiblocks. + *
  • For KW mode: a multiple of 8 bytes between 24 and 2^57 inclusive.
  • + *
  • For KWP mode: a multiple of 8 bytes between 16 and 2^32 inclusive.
+ * \param[out] output The buffer holding the output data. + * The output buffer's minimal length is 8 bytes shorter than \p in_len. + * \param[out] out_len The number of bytes written to the output buffer. \c 0 on failure. + * For KWP mode, the length could be up to 15 bytes shorter than \p in_len, + * depending on how much padding was added to the data. + * \param[in] out_size The capacity of the output buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA for invalid input length. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED for verification failure of the ciphertext. + * \return cipher-specific error code on failure of the underlying cipher. + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t* out_len, size_t out_size); + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/** + * \brief The key wrapping checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/oid.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/oid.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..01862178 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/oid.h @@ -0,0 +1,649 @@ +/** + * \file oid.h + * + * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_OID_H +#define MBEDTLS_OID_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#endif + +/** OID is not found. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND -0x002E +/** output buffer is too small */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL -0x000B + +/* This is for the benefit of X.509, but defined here in order to avoid + * having a "backwards" include of x.509.h here */ +/* + * X.509 extension types (internal, arbitrary values for bitsets) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER (1 << 0) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER (1 << 1) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE (1 << 2) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES (1 << 3) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS (1 << 4) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME (1 << 5) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME (1 << 6) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS (1 << 7) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 8) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 9) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 10) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE (1 << 11) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS (1 << 12) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY (1 << 13) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL (1 << 14) +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE (1 << 16) + +/* + * Top level OID tuples + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES "\x2a" /* {iso(1) member-body(2)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG "\x2b" /* {iso(1) identified-organization(3)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS "\x55" /* {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY "\x60" /* {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)} */ + +/* + * ISO Member bodies OID parts + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US "\x86\x48" /* {us(840)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY "\x86\xf7\x0d" /* {rsadsi(113549)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US \ + MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY /* {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 "\xce\x3d" /* ansi-X9-62(10045) */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US \ + MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 + +/* + * ISO Identified organization OID parts + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD "\x06" /* {dod(6)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW "\x0e" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW "\x03" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG "\x02" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x1a" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM "\x81\x04" /* certicom(132) */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST "\x24" /* teletrust(36) */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST + +/* + * ISO ITU OID parts + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION "\x01" /* {organization(1)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION /* {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)} */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV "\x65" /* {gov(101)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV /* {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)} */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE "\x86\xF8\x42" /* {netscape(113730)} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE /* Netscape OID {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) netscape(113730)} */ + +/* ISO arc for standard certificate and CRL extensions */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS "\x1D" /**< id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29} */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_GOV "\x03\x04" /** { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) */ + +/** + * Private Internet Extensions + * { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + * security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD "\x01" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x05\x05\x07" + +/* + * Arc for standard naming attributes + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS "\x04" /**< id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x03" /**< id-at-commonName AttributeType:= {id-at 3} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x04" /**< id-at-surName AttributeType:= {id-at 4} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x05" /**< id-at-serialNumber AttributeType:= {id-at 5} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x06" /**< id-at-countryName AttributeType:= {id-at 6} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x07" /**< id-at-locality AttributeType:= {id-at 7} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x08" /**< id-at-state AttributeType:= {id-at 8} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x0A" /**< id-at-organizationName AttributeType:= {id-at 10} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x0B" /**< id-at-organizationalUnitName AttributeType:= {id-at 11} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x0C" /**< id-at-title AttributeType:= {id-at 12} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x10" /**< id-at-postalAddress AttributeType:= {id-at 16} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x11" /**< id-at-postalCode AttributeType:= {id-at 17} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2A" /**< id-at-givenName AttributeType:= {id-at 42} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2B" /**< id-at-initials AttributeType:= {id-at 43} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2C" /**< id-at-generationQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 44} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2D" /**< id-at-uniqueIdentifier AttributeType:= {id-at 45} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2E" /**< id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 46} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x41" /**< id-at-pseudonym AttributeType:= {id-at 65} */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x19" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) domainComponent(25)} */ + +/* + * OIDs for standard certificate extensions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x23" /**< id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x0E" /**< id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x0F" /**< id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x20" /**< id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x21" /**< id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x11" /**< id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x12" /**< id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 18 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x09" /**< id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 9 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x13" /**< id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x1E" /**< id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 30 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x24" /**< id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x25" /**< id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x1F" /**< id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x36" /**< id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x2E" /**< id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } */ + +/* + * Certificate policies + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES "\x00" /**< anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } */ + +/* + * Netscape certificate extensions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE "\x01" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x01" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_BASE_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x02" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x03" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x04" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x07" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x08" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x0C" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_COMMENT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x0D" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE "\x02" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE "\x05" + +/* + * OIDs for CRL extensions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x10" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x14" /**< id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 } */ + +/* + * X.509 v3 Extended key usage OIDs + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE "\x00" /**< anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-extKeyUsage 0 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_KP MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX "\x03" /**< id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x01" /**< id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x02" /**< id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x03" /**< id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x04" /**< id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x08" /**< id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x09" /**< id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } */ + +/** + * Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network + * { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + * private(4) enterprise(1) WiSUN(45605) FieldAreaNetwork(1) } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x04\x01\x82\xe4\x25\x01" + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ON MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX "\x08" /**< id-on OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 8 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ON "\x04" /**< id-on-hardwareModuleName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on 4 } */ + +/* + * PKCS definition OIDs + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x01" /**< pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x01" /**< pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x05" /**< pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 5 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x09" /**< pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x0c" /**< pkcs-12 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 12 } */ + +/* + * PKCS#1 OIDs + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x01" /**< rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x02" /**< md2WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 2 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x03" /**< md4WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 3 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x04" /**< md5WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 4 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x05" /**< sha1WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 5 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0e" /**< sha224WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 14 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0b" /**< sha256WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 11 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0c" /**< sha384WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 12 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0d" /**< sha512WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 13 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS "\x2B\x0E\x03\x02\x1D" + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 "\x01" /**< emailAddress AttributeType ::= { pkcs-9 1 } */ + +/* RFC 4055 */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0a" /**< id-RSASSA-PSS ::= { pkcs-1 10 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x08" /**< id-mgf1 ::= { pkcs-1 8 } */ + +/* + * Digest algorithms + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x02" /**< id-mbedtls_md2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x04" /**< id-mbedtls_md4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 4 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x05" /**< id-mbedtls_md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 /**< id-mbedtls_sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x04" /**< id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x01" /**< id-mbedtls_sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x02" /**< id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x03" /**< id-mbedtls_sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST "\x03\x02\x01" /**< id-ripemd160 OBJECT IDENTIFIER :: { iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) hashAlgorithm(2) ripemd160(1) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x07" /**< id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 7 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x08" /**< id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x09" /**< id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x0A" /**< id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 10 } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x0B" /**< id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } */ + +/* + * Encryption algorithms + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x07" /**< desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 7 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x03\x07" /**< des-ede3-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) -- us(840) rsadsi(113549) encryptionAlgorithm(3) 7 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x01" /** aes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 1 } */ + +/* + * Key Wrapping algorithms + */ +/* + * RFC 5649 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES128_KW MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x05" /** id-aes128-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 5 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES128_KWP MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x08" /** id-aes128-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 8 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES192_KW MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x19" /** id-aes192-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 25 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES192_KWP MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x1c" /** id-aes192-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 28 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES256_KW MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x2d" /** id-aes256-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 45 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES256_KWP MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x30" /** id-aes256-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 48 } */ +/* + * PKCS#5 OIDs + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0c" /**< id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 12} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0d" /**< id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 13} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0e" /**< id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 14} */ + +/* + * PKCS#5 PBES1 algorithms + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x01" /**< pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 1} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x04" /**< pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 4} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x03" /**< pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x06" /**< pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0a" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0b" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11} */ + +/* + * PKCS#8 OIDs + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 "\x0e" /**< extensionRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 14} */ + +/* + * PKCS#12 PBE OIDs + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 "\x01" /**< pkcs-12PbeIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12 1} */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x01" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 1} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x02" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 2} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x03" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 3} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x04" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 4} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x05" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 5} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x06" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 6} */ + +/* + * EC key algorithms from RFC 5480 + */ + +/* id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x02\01" + +/* id-ecDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) + * schemes(1) ecdh(12) } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x01\x0c" + +/* + * ECParameters namedCurve identifiers, from RFC 5480, RFC 5639, and SEC2 + */ + +/* secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x03\x01\x01" + +/* secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x21" + +/* secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 7 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x03\x01\x07" + +/* secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x22" + +/* secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x23" + +/* secp192k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 31 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x1f" + +/* secp224k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 32 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x20" + +/* secp256k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 10 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x0a" + +/* RFC 5639 4.1 + * ecStdCurvesAndGeneration OBJECT IDENTIFIER::= {iso(1) + * identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) signature- + * algorithm(3) ecSign(2) 8} + * ellipticCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {ecStdCurvesAndGeneration 1} + * versionOne OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {ellipticCurve 1} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST "\x03\x03\x02\x08\x01\x01" + +/* brainpoolP256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 7} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 "\x07" + +/* brainpoolP384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 11} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 "\x0B" + +/* brainpoolP512r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 13} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 "\x0D" + +/* + * SEC1 C.1 + * + * prime-field OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-fieldType 1 } + * id-fieldType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-X9-62 fieldType(1)} + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x01" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE "\x01" + +/* + * ECDSA signature identifiers, from RFC 5480 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x04" /* signatures(4) */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG "\x03" /* ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) */ + +/* ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG "\x01" + +/* ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) + * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x01" + +/* ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) + * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x02" + +/* ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) + * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x03" + +/* ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) + * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x04" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Base OID descriptor structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t +{ + const char *asn1; /*!< OID ASN.1 representation */ + size_t asn1_len; /*!< length of asn1 */ + const char *name; /*!< official name (e.g. from RFC) */ + const char *description; /*!< human friendly description */ +} mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t; + +/** + * \brief Translate an ASN.1 OID into its numeric representation + * (e.g. "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D" into "1.2.840.113549") + * + * \param buf buffer to put representation in + * \param size size of the buffer + * \param oid OID to translate + * + * \return Length of the string written (excluding final NULL) or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL in case of error + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ); + +/** + * \brief Translate an X.509 extension OID into local values + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param ext_type place to store the extension type + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, int *ext_type ); + +/** + * \brief Translate an X.509 attribute type OID into the short name + * (e.g. the OID for an X520 Common Name into "CN") + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param short_name place to store the string pointer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **short_name ); + +/** + * \brief Translate PublicKeyAlgorithm OID into pk_type + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param pk_alg place to store public key algorithm + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg ); + +/** + * \brief Translate pk_type into PublicKeyAlgorithm OID + * + * \param pk_alg Public key type to look for + * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer + * \param olen length of the OID + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, + const char **oid, size_t *olen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/** + * \brief Translate NamedCurve OID into an EC group identifier + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param grp_id place to store group id + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id ); + +/** + * \brief Translate EC group identifier into NamedCurve OID + * + * \param grp_id EC group identifier + * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer + * \param olen length of the OID + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + const char **oid, size_t *olen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +/** + * \brief Translate SignatureAlgorithm OID into md_type and pk_type + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm + * \param pk_alg place to store public key algorithm + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg ); + +/** + * \brief Translate SignatureAlgorithm OID into description + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param desc place to store string pointer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc ); + +/** + * \brief Translate md_type and pk_type into SignatureAlgorithm OID + * + * \param md_alg message digest algorithm + * \param pk_alg public key algorithm + * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer + * \param olen length of the OID + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const char **oid, size_t *olen ); + +/** + * \brief Translate hash algorithm OID into md_type + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg ); + +/** + * \brief Translate hmac algorithm OID into md_type + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param md_hmac place to store message hmac algorithm + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_hmac ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +/** + * \brief Translate Extended Key Usage OID into description + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param desc place to store string pointer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc ); + +/** + * \brief Translate certificate policies OID into description + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param desc place to store string pointer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc ); + +/** + * \brief Translate md_type into hash algorithm OID + * + * \param md_alg message digest algorithm + * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer + * \param olen length of the OID + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const char **oid, size_t *olen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +/** + * \brief Translate encryption algorithm OID into cipher_type + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param cipher_alg place to store cipher algorithm + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +/** + * \brief Translate PKCS#12 PBE algorithm OID into md_type and + * cipher_type + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm + * \param cipher_alg place to store cipher algorithm + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* oid.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/padlock.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/padlock.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..624d02df --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/padlock.h @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +/** + * \file padlock.h + * + * \brief VIA PadLock ACE for HW encryption/decryption supported by some + * processors + * + * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call them directly. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" + +/** Input data should be aligned. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -0x0030 + +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(address_sanitizer) +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN +#endif +#endif + +/* Some versions of ASan result in errors about not enough registers */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__i386__) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN) + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 +#endif + +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG 0x000C +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE 0x00C0 +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE 0x0C00 +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM 0x3000 + +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(x) (uint32_t *) (16 + ((int32_t) (x) & ~15)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Internal PadLock detection routine + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param feature The feature to detect + * + * \return non-zero if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_has_support( int feature ); + +/** + * \brief Internal PadLock AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param input 16-byte input block + * \param output 16-byte output block + * + * \return 0 if success, 1 if operation failed + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ); + +/** + * \brief Internal PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param length length of the input data + * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) + * \param input buffer holding the input data + * \param output buffer holding the output data + * + * \return 0 if success, 1 if operation failed + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* HAVE_X86 */ + +#endif /* padlock.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pem.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pem.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..daa71c88 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pem.h @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +/** + * \file pem.h + * + * \brief Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) decoding + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PEM_H +#define MBEDTLS_PEM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +/** + * \name PEM Error codes + * These error codes are returned in case of errors reading the + * PEM data. + * \{ + */ +/** No PEM header or footer found. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT -0x1080 +/** PEM string is not as expected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA -0x1100 +/** Failed to allocate memory. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED -0x1180 +/** RSA IV is not in hex-format. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV -0x1200 +/** Unsupported key encryption algorithm. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG -0x1280 +/** Private key password can't be empty. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -0x1300 +/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x1380 +/** Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x1400 +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x1480 +/** \} name PEM Error codes */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief PEM context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pem_context +{ + unsigned char *buf; /*!< buffer for decoded data */ + size_t buflen; /*!< length of the buffer */ + unsigned char *info; /*!< buffer for extra header information */ +} +mbedtls_pem_context; + +/** + * \brief PEM context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + */ +void mbedtls_pem_init( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Read a buffer for PEM information and store the resulting + * data into the specified context buffers. + * + * \param ctx context to use + * \param header header string to seek and expect + * \param footer footer string to seek and expect + * \param data source data to look in (must be nul-terminated) + * \param pwd password for decryption (can be NULL) + * \param pwdlen length of password + * \param use_len destination for total length used (set after header is + * correctly read, so unless you get + * MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT, use_len is + * the length to skip) + * + * \note Attempts to check password correctness by verifying if + * the decrypted text starts with an ASN.1 sequence of + * appropriate length + * + * \return 0 on success, or a specific PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer, + const unsigned char *data, + const unsigned char *pwd, + size_t pwdlen, size_t *use_len ); + +/** + * \brief PEM context memory freeing + * + * \param ctx context to be freed + */ +void mbedtls_pem_free( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Write a buffer of PEM information from a DER encoded + * buffer. + * + * \param header The header string to write. + * \param footer The footer string to write. + * \param der_data The DER data to encode. + * \param der_len The length of the DER data \p der_data in Bytes. + * \param buf The buffer to write to. + * \param buf_len The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total length written + * or required (if \p buf_len is not enough). + * + * \note You may pass \c NULL for \p buf and \c 0 for \p buf_len + * to request the length of the resulting PEM buffer in + * `*olen`. + * + * \note This function may be called with overlapping \p der_data + * and \p buf buffers. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't large + * enough to hold the PEM buffer. In this case, `*olen` holds + * the required minimum size of \p buf. + * \return Another PEM or BASE64 error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( const char *header, const char *footer, + const unsigned char *der_data, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* pem.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pk.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c9a13f48 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pk.h @@ -0,0 +1,918 @@ +/** + * \file pk.h + * + * \brief Public Key abstraction layer + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_H +#define MBEDTLS_PK_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/** Memory allocation failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3F80 +/** Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -0x3F00 +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x3E80 +/** Read/write of file failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x3E00 +/** Unsupported key version */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION -0x3D80 +/** Invalid key tag or value. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT -0x3D00 +/** Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG -0x3C80 +/** Private key password can't be empty. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -0x3C00 +/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x3B80 +/** The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY -0x3B00 +/** The algorithm tag or value is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG -0x3A80 +/** Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE -0x3A00 +/** Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x3980 +/** The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x3900 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** PK hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3880 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Public key types + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_PK_NONE=0, + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, + MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, + MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, + MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, +} mbedtls_pk_type_t; + +/** + * \brief Options for RSASSA-PSS signature verification. + * See \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext() + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options +{ + mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; + int expected_salt_len; + +} mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options; + +/** + * \brief Maximum size of a signature made by mbedtls_pk_sign(). + */ +/* We need to set MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE to the maximum signature + * size among the supported signature types. Do it by starting at 0, + * then incrementally increasing to be large enough for each supported + * signature mechanism. + * + * The resulting value can be 0, for example if MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is enabled + * (which allows the pk module to be included) but neither MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C + * nor MBEDTLS_RSA_C nor any opaque signature mechanism (PSA or RSA_ALT). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE 0 + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) ) && \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +/* For RSA, the signature can be as large as the bignum module allows. + * For RSA_ALT, the signature size is not necessarily tied to what the + * bignum module can do, but in the absence of any specific setting, + * we use that (rsa_alt_sign_wrap in pk_wrap will check). */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && \ + MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +/* For ECDSA, the ecdsa module exports a constant for the maximum + * signature size. */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +/* PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is the maximum size of a signature made + * through the PSA API in the PSA representation. */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#endif + +#if PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + 11 > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +/* The Mbed TLS representation is different for ECDSA signatures: + * PSA uses the raw concatenation of r and s, + * whereas Mbed TLS uses the ASN.1 representation (SEQUENCE of two INTEGERs). + * Add the overhead of ASN.1: up to (1+2) + 2 * (1+2+1) for the + * types, lengths (represented by up to 2 bytes), and potential leading + * zeros of the INTEGERs and the SEQUENCE. */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ( PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + 11 ) +#endif +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) */ + +/** + * \brief Types for interfacing with the debug module + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI, + MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP, +} mbedtls_pk_debug_type; + +/** + * \brief Item to send to the debug module + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pk_debug_item +{ + mbedtls_pk_debug_type type; + const char *name; + void *value; +} mbedtls_pk_debug_item; + +/** Maximum number of item send for debugging, plus 1 */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS 3 + +/** + * \brief Public key information and operations + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t; + +/** + * \brief Public key container + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context +{ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t * pk_info; /**< Public key information */ + void * pk_ctx; /**< Underlying public key context */ +} mbedtls_pk_context; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Context for resuming operations + */ +typedef struct +{ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t * pk_info; /**< Public key information */ + void * rs_ctx; /**< Underlying restart context */ +} mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx; +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ +typedef void mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/** + * \brief Types for RSA-alt abstraction + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func)( void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ); +typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func)( void *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ); +typedef size_t (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func)( void *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +/** + * \brief Return information associated with the given PK type + * + * \param pk_type PK type to search for. + * + * \return The PK info associated with the type or NULL if not found. + */ +const mbedtls_pk_info_t *mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type ); + +/** + * \brief Initialize a #mbedtls_pk_context (as NONE). + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_pk_init( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a #mbedtls_pk_context. + * + * \param ctx The context to clear. It must have been initialized. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + * + * \note For contexts that have been set up with + * mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(), this does not free the underlying + * PSA key and you still need to call psa_destroy_key() + * independently if you want to destroy that key. + */ +void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Initialize a restart context + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_init( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a restart context + * + * \param ctx The context to clear. It must have been initialized. + * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing. + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_free( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a PK context with the information given + * and allocates the type-specific PK subcontext. + * + * \param ctx Context to initialize. It must not have been set + * up yet (type #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE). + * \param info Information to use + * + * \return 0 on success, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA on invalid input, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure. + * + * \note For contexts holding an RSA-alt key, use + * \c mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt() instead. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Initialize a PK context to wrap a PSA key. + * + * \note This function replaces mbedtls_pk_setup() for contexts + * that wrap a (possibly opaque) PSA key instead of + * storing and manipulating the key material directly. + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. It must be empty (type NONE). + * \param key The PSA key to wrap, which must hold an ECC key pair + * (see notes below). + * + * \note The wrapped key must remain valid as long as the + * wrapping PK context is in use, that is at least between + * the point this function is called and the point + * mbedtls_pk_free() is called on this context. The wrapped + * key might then be independently used or destroyed. + * + * \note This function is currently only available for ECC key + * pairs (that is, ECC keys containing private key material). + * Support for other key types may be added later. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA on invalid input + * (context already used, invalid key identifier). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the key is not an + * ECC key pair. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const psa_key_id_t key ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/** + * \brief Initialize an RSA-alt context + * + * \param ctx Context to initialize. It must not have been set + * up yet (type #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE). + * \param key RSA key pointer + * \param decrypt_func Decryption function + * \param sign_func Signing function + * \param key_len_func Function returning key length in bytes + * + * \return 0 on success, or MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the + * context wasn't already initialized as RSA_ALT. + * + * \note This function replaces \c mbedtls_pk_setup() for RSA-alt. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void * key, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +/** + * \brief Get the size in bits of the underlying key + * + * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. + * + * \return Key size in bits, or 0 on error + */ +size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Get the length in bytes of the underlying key + * + * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. + * + * \return Key length in bytes, or 0 on error + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_pk_get_len( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + return( ( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( ctx ) + 7 ) / 8 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Tell if a context can do the operation given by type + * + * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. + * \param type The desired type. + * + * \return 1 if the context can do operations on the given type. + * \return 0 if the context cannot do the operations on the given + * type. This is always the case for a context that has + * been initialized but not set up, or that has been + * cleared with mbedtls_pk_free(). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_can_do( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); + +/** + * \brief Verify signature (including padding if relevant). + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param sig Signature to verify + * \param sig_len Signature length + * + * \return 0 on success (signature is valid), + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid + * signature in sig but its length is less than \p siglen, + * or a specific error code. + * + * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. + * Use \c mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, ... ) + * to verify RSASSA_PSS signatures. + * + * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg + * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. + * + * \note md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, only if hash_len != 0 + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); + +/** + * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_verify() + * + * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_pk_verify(), but can + * return early and restart according to the limit set with + * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC + * operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_verify(). + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param sig Signature to verify + * \param sig_len Signature length + * \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart) + * + * \return See \c mbedtls_pk_verify(), or + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Verify signature, with options. + * (Includes verification of the padding depending on type.) + * + * \param type Signature type (inc. possible padding type) to verify + * \param options Pointer to type-specific options, or NULL + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param sig Signature to verify + * \param sig_len Signature length + * + * \return 0 on success (signature is valid), + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if the PK context can't be + * used for this type of signatures, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid + * signature in sig but its length is less than \p siglen, + * or a specific error code. + * + * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg + * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. + * + * \note md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, only if hash_len != 0 + * + * \note If type is MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, then options must point + * to a mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options structure, + * otherwise it must be NULL. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, + mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); + +/** + * \brief Make signature, including padding if relevant. + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up + * with a private key. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param sig Place to write the signature. + * It must have enough room for the signature. + * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. + * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough + * given the key type. + * \param sig_len On successful return, + * the number of bytes written to \p sig. + * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. + * + * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. + * There is no interface in the PK module to make RSASSA-PSS + * signatures yet. + * + * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg + * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. + * + * \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0. + * For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_sign() + * + * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_pk_sign(), but can + * return early and restart according to the limit set with + * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC + * operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_sign(). + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up + * with a private key. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes for mbedtls_pk_sign()) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes for mbedtls_pk_sign()) + * \param sig Place to write the signature. + * It must have enough room for the signature. + * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. + * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough + * given the key type. + * \param sig_len On successful return, + * the number of bytes written to \p sig. + * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart) + * + * \return See \c mbedtls_pk_sign(). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Decrypt message (including padding if relevant). + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up + * with a private key. + * \param input Input to decrypt + * \param ilen Input size + * \param output Decrypted output + * \param olen Decrypted message length + * \param osize Size of the output buffer + * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. + * + * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_decrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Encrypt message (including padding if relevant). + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * \param input Message to encrypt + * \param ilen Message size + * \param output Encrypted output + * \param olen Encrypted output length + * \param osize Size of the output buffer + * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. + * + * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_encrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Check if a public-private pair of keys matches. + * + * \param pub Context holding a public key. + * \param prv Context holding a private (and public) key. + * + * \return \c 0 on success (keys were checked and match each other). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the keys could not + * be checked - in that case they may or may not match. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a context is invalid. + * \return Another non-zero value if the keys do not match. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv ); + +/** + * \brief Export debug information + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized. + * \param items Place to write debug items + * + * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA + */ +int mbedtls_pk_debug( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ); + +/** + * \brief Access the type name + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized. + * + * \return Type name on success, or "invalid PK" + */ +const char * mbedtls_pk_get_name( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Get the key type + * + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized. + * + * \return Type on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE for a context that has not been set up. + */ +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/** + * Quick access to an RSA context inside a PK context. + * + * \warning This function can only be used when the type of the context, as + * returned by mbedtls_pk_get_type(), is #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA. + * Ensuring that is the caller's responsibility. + * Alternatively, you can check whether this function returns NULL. + * + * \return The internal RSA context held by the PK context, or NULL. + */ +static inline mbedtls_rsa_context *mbedtls_pk_rsa( const mbedtls_pk_context pk ) +{ + switch( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) ) + { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) (pk).pk_ctx ); + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/** + * Quick access to an EC context inside a PK context. + * + * \warning This function can only be used when the type of the context, as + * returned by mbedtls_pk_get_type(), is #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + * #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA. + * Ensuring that is the caller's responsibility. + * Alternatively, you can check whether this function returns NULL. + * + * \return The internal EC context held by the PK context, or NULL. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec( const mbedtls_pk_context pk ) +{ + switch( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &pk ) ) + { + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return( (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).pk_ctx ); + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) +/** \ingroup pk_module */ +/** + * \brief Parse a private key in PEM or DER format + * + * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. + * \param key Input buffer to parse. + * The buffer must contain the input exactly, with no + * extra trailing material. For PEM, the buffer must + * contain a null-terminated string. + * \param keylen Size of \b key in bytes. + * For PEM data, this includes the terminating null byte, + * so \p keylen must be equal to `strlen(key) + 1`. + * \param pwd Optional password for decryption. + * Pass \c NULL if expecting a non-encrypted key. + * Pass a string of \p pwdlen bytes if expecting an encrypted + * key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted. + * The empty password is not supported. + * \param pwdlen Size of the password in bytes. + * Ignored if \p pwd is \c NULL. + * + * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised + * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a + * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do(). + * + * \note The key is also checked for correctness. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ); + +/** \ingroup pk_module */ +/** + * \brief Parse a public key in PEM or DER format + * + * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. + * \param key Input buffer to parse. + * The buffer must contain the input exactly, with no + * extra trailing material. For PEM, the buffer must + * contain a null-terminated string. + * \param keylen Size of \b key in bytes. + * For PEM data, this includes the terminating null byte, + * so \p keylen must be equal to `strlen(key) + 1`. + * + * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised + * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a + * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do(). + * + * \note The key is also checked for correctness. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** \ingroup pk_module */ +/** + * \brief Load and parse a private key + * + * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. + * \param path filename to read the private key from + * \param password Optional password to decrypt the file. + * Pass \c NULL if expecting a non-encrypted key. + * Pass a null-terminated string if expecting an encrypted + * key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted. + * The empty password is not supported. + * + * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised + * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a + * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do(). + * + * \note The key is also checked for correctness. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const char *path, const char *password ); + +/** \ingroup pk_module */ +/** + * \brief Load and parse a public key + * + * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. + * \param path filename to read the public key from + * + * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised + * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If + * you need a specific key type, check the result with + * mbedtls_pk_can_do(). + * + * \note The key is also checked for correctness. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Write a private key to a PKCS#1 or SEC1 DER structure + * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the + * return value to determine where you should start + * using the buffer + * + * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid private key. + * \param buf buffer to write to + * \param size size of the buffer + * + * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific + * error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); + +/** + * \brief Write a public key to a SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER structure + * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the + * return value to determine where you should start + * using the buffer + * + * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid public or private key. + * \param buf buffer to write to + * \param size size of the buffer + * + * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific + * error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Write a public key to a PEM string + * + * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid public or private key. + * \param buf Buffer to write to. The output includes a + * terminating null byte. + * \param size Size of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); + +/** + * \brief Write a private key to a PKCS#1 or SEC1 PEM string + * + * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid private key. + * \param buf Buffer to write to. The output includes a + * terminating null byte. + * \param size Size of the buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ + +/* + * WARNING: Low-level functions. You probably do not want to use these unless + * you are certain you do ;) + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Parse a SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER structure + * + * \param p the position in the ASN.1 data + * \param end end of the buffer + * \param pk The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized + * but not set up. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Write a subjectPublicKey to ASN.1 data + * Note: function works backwards in data buffer + * + * \param p reference to current position pointer + * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking) + * \param key PK context which must contain a valid public or private key. + * + * \return the length written or a negative error code + */ +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *key ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ + +/* + * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you + * know you do. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_pk_load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Turn an EC key into an opaque one. + * + * \warning This is a temporary utility function for tests. It might + * change or be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \note Only ECDSA keys are supported so far. Signing with the + * specified hash is the only allowed use of that key. + * + * \param pk Input: the EC key to import to a PSA key. + * Output: a PK context wrapping that PSA key. + * \param key Output: a PSA key identifier. + * It's the caller's responsibility to call + * psa_destroy_key() on that key identifier after calling + * mbedtls_pk_free() on the PK context. + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm to allow for use with that key. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An Mbed TLS error code otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_id_t *key, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..47f77677 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/** + * \file pk_internal.h + * + * \brief Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +struct mbedtls_pk_info_t +{ + /** Public key type */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t type; + + /** Type name */ + const char *name; + + /** Get key size in bits */ + size_t (*get_bitlen)( const void * ); + + /** Tell if the context implements this type (e.g. ECKEY can do ECDSA) */ + int (*can_do)( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); + + /** Verify signature */ + int (*verify_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); + + /** Make signature */ + int (*sign_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /** Verify signature (restartable) */ + int (*verify_rs_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx ); + + /** Make signature (restartable) */ + int (*sign_rs_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /** Decrypt message */ + int (*decrypt_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + + /** Encrypt message */ + int (*encrypt_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + + /** Check public-private key pair */ + int (*check_pair_func)( const void *pub, const void *prv ); + + /** Allocate a new context */ + void * (*ctx_alloc_func)( void ); + + /** Free the given context */ + void (*ctx_free_func)( void *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /** Allocate the restart context */ + void * (*rs_alloc_func)( void ); + + /** Free the restart context */ + void (*rs_free_func)( void *rs_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /** Interface with the debug module */ + void (*debug_func)( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ); + +}; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/* Container for RSA-alt */ +typedef struct +{ + void *key; + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func; + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func; + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func; +} mbedtls_rsa_alt_context; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info; +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info; +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3530ee16 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs11.h + * + * \brief Wrapper for PKCS#11 library libpkcs11-helper + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" + +#include + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +/** + * Context for PKCS #11 private keys. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs11_context +{ + pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert; + int len; +} mbedtls_pkcs11_context; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif + +/** + * Initialize a mbedtls_pkcs11_context. + * (Just making memory references valid.) + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_pkcs11_init( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx ); + +/** + * Fill in a mbed TLS certificate, based on the given PKCS11 helper certificate. + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * + * \param cert X.509 certificate to fill + * \param pkcs11h_cert PKCS #11 helper certificate + * + * \return 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind( mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert ); + +/** + * Set up a mbedtls_pkcs11_context storing the given certificate. Note that the + * mbedtls_pkcs11_context will take over control of the certificate, freeing it when + * done. + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * + * \param priv_key Private key structure to fill. + * \param pkcs11_cert PKCS #11 helper certificate + * + * \return 0 on success + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind( + mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key, + pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert ); + +/** + * Free the contents of the given private key context. Note that the structure + * itself is not freed. + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * + * \param priv_key Private key structure to cleanup + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free( + mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key ); + +/** + * \brief Do an RSA private key decrypt, then remove the message + * padding + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + * + * \param ctx PKCS #11 context + * \param mode must be MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's signature + * \param input buffer holding the encrypted data + * \param output buffer that will hold the plaintext + * \param olen will contain the plaintext length + * \param output_max_len maximum length of the output buffer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code + * + * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size + * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used) otherwise + * an error is thrown. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, + int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ); + +/** + * \brief Do a private RSA to sign a message digest + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + * + * \param ctx PKCS #11 context + * \param mode must be MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's signature + * \param md_alg a MBEDTLS_MD_XXX (use MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data) + * \param hashlen message digest length (for MBEDTLS_MD_NONE only) + * \param hash buffer holding the message digest + * \param sig buffer that will hold the ciphertext + * + * \return 0 if the signing operation was successful, + * or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code + * + * \note The "sig" buffer must be as large as the size + * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used). + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_sign( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * SSL/TLS wrappers for PKCS#11 functions + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline int mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt( void *ctx, + int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ) +{ + return mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt( (mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx, mode, olen, input, output, + output_max_len ); +} + +/** + * \brief This function signs a message digest using RSA. + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + * + * \param ctx The PKCS #11 context. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This parameter is unused. + * \param p_rng The RNG context. This parameter is unused. + * \param mode The operation to run. This must be set to + * MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's + * signature. + * \param md_alg The message digest algorithm. One of the MBEDTLS_MD_XXX + * must be passed to this function and MBEDTLS_MD_NONE can be + * used for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The message digest length (for MBEDTLS_MD_NONE only). + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest. + * \param sig The buffer that will hold the ciphertext. + * + * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + * + * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size of + * ctx->N. For example, 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is + * used. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline int mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign( void *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig ) +{ + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + return mbedtls_pkcs11_sign( (mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); +} + +/** + * This function gets the length of the private key. + * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future + * version of the library. + * + * \param ctx The PKCS #11 context. + * + * \return The length of the private key. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len( void *ctx ) +{ + return ( (mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx )->len; +} + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d9e85b1d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs12.h + * + * \brief PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" + +#include + +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x1F80 +/** Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x1F00 +/** PBE ASN.1 data not as expected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT -0x1E80 +/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x1E00 + +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY 1 /**< encryption/decryption key */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV 2 /**< initialization vector */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY 3 /**< integrity / MAC key */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT 1 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + +/** + * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption) + * for pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 + * + * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12PbeParams structure + * \param mode either MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT + * \param pwd the password used (may be NULL if no password is used) + * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0) + * \param input the input data + * \param len data length + * \param output the output buffer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t len, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption) + * for cipher-based and mbedtls_md-based PBE's + * + * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12 PbeParams structure + * \param mode either #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT + * \param cipher_type the cipher used + * \param md_type the mbedtls_md used + * \param pwd Latin1-encoded password used. This may only be \c NULL when + * \p pwdlen is 0. No null terminator should be used. + * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0) + * \param input the input data + * \param len data length + * \param output the output buffer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t len, + unsigned char *output ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +/** + * \brief The PKCS#12 derivation function uses a password and a salt + * to produce pseudo-random bits for a particular "purpose". + * + * Depending on the given id, this function can produce an + * encryption/decryption key, an initialization vector or an + * integrity key. + * + * \param data buffer to store the derived data in + * \param datalen length of buffer to fill + * \param pwd The password to use. For compliance with PKCS#12 §B.1, this + * should be a BMPString, i.e. a Unicode string where each + * character is encoded as 2 bytes in big-endian order, with + * no byte order mark and with a null terminator (i.e. the + * last two bytes should be 0x00 0x00). + * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0). + * \param salt Salt buffer to use This may only be \c NULL when + * \p saltlen is 0. + * \param saltlen length of the salt (may be zero) + * \param mbedtls_md mbedtls_md type to use during the derivation + * \param id id that describes the purpose (can be + * #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY, #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV or + * #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY) + * \param iterations number of iterations + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MD, BIGNUM type error. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, + mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md, int id, int iterations ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* pkcs12.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..696930f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs5.h + * + * \brief PKCS#5 functions + * + * \author Mathias Olsson + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#include +#include + +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x2f80 +/** Unexpected ASN.1 data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT -0x2f00 +/** Requested encryption or digest alg not available. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x2e80 +/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x2e00 + +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT 1 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + +/** + * \brief PKCS#5 PBES2 function + * + * \param pbe_params the ASN.1 algorithm parameters + * \param mode either MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT or MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT + * \param pwd password to use when generating key + * \param pwdlen length of password + * \param data data to process + * \param datalen length of data + * \param output output buffer + * + * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *output ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +/** + * \brief PKCS#5 PBKDF2 using HMAC + * + * \param ctx Generic HMAC context + * \param password Password to use when generating key + * \param plen Length of password + * \param salt Salt to use when generating key + * \param slen Length of salt + * \param iteration_count Iteration count + * \param key_length Length of generated key in bytes + * \param output Generated key. Must be at least as big as key_length + * + * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* pkcs5.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/platform.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/platform.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eaf5122b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/platform.h @@ -0,0 +1,428 @@ +/** + * \file platform.h + * + * \brief This file contains the definitions and functions of the + * Mbed TLS platform abstraction layer. + * + * The platform abstraction layer removes the need for the library + * to directly link to standard C library functions or operating + * system services, making the library easier to port and embed. + * Application developers and users of the library can provide their own + * implementations of these functions, or implementations specific to + * their platform, which can be statically linked to the library or + * dynamically configured at runtime. + * + * When all compilation options related to platform abstraction are + * disabled, this header just defines `mbedtls_xxx` function names + * as aliases to the standard `xxx` function. + * + * Most modules in the library and example programs are expected to + * include this header. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif + +/** Hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0070 +/** The requested feature is not supported by the platform */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -0x0072 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +/* The older Microsoft Windows common runtime provides non-conforming + * implementations of some standard library functions, including snprintf + * and vsnprintf. This affects MSVC and MinGW builds. + */ +#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) +#include +#include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf /**< The default \c snprintf function to use. */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< The default \c snprintf function to use. */ +#endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf /**< The default \c vsnprintf function to use. */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF vsnprintf /**< The default \c vsnprintf function to use. */ +#endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< The default \c printf function to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< The default \c fprintf function to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC calloc /**< The default \c calloc function to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< The default \c free function to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< The default \c exit function to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< The default \c time function to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS /**< The default exit value to use. */ +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE /**< The default exit value to use. */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE "seedfile" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR) +#include MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ + + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +/* + * The function pointers for calloc and free. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_free MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO +#define mbedtls_calloc MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO +#else +/* For size_t */ +#include +extern void *mbedtls_calloc( size_t n, size_t size ); +extern void mbedtls_free( void *ptr ); + +/** + * \brief This function dynamically sets the memory-management + * functions used by the library, during runtime. + * + * \param calloc_func The \c calloc function implementation. + * \param free_func The \c free function implementation. + * + * \return \c 0. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( void * (*calloc_func)( size_t, size_t ), + void (*free_func)( void * ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO */ +#else /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */ +#define mbedtls_free free +#define mbedtls_calloc calloc +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACRO */ + +/* + * The function pointers for fprintf + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) +/* We need FILE * */ +#include +extern int (*mbedtls_fprintf)( FILE *stream, const char *format, ... ); + +/** + * \brief This function dynamically configures the fprintf + * function that is called when the + * mbedtls_fprintf() function is invoked by the library. + * + * \param fprintf_func The \c fprintf function implementation. + * + * \return \c 0. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf( int (*fprintf_func)( FILE *stream, const char *, + ... ) ); +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_fprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ + +/* + * The function pointers for printf + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) +extern int (*mbedtls_printf)( const char *format, ... ); + +/** + * \brief This function dynamically configures the snprintf + * function that is called when the mbedtls_snprintf() + * function is invoked by the library. + * + * \param printf_func The \c printf function implementation. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_printf( int (*printf_func)( const char *, ... ) ); +#else /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_printf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ + +/* + * The function pointers for snprintf + * + * The snprintf implementation should conform to C99: + * - it *must* always correctly zero-terminate the buffer + * (except when n == 0, then it must leave the buffer untouched) + * - however it is acceptable to return -1 instead of the required length when + * the destination buffer is too short. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) +/* For Windows (inc. MSYS2), we provide our own fixed implementation */ +int mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ... ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) +extern int (*mbedtls_snprintf)( char * s, size_t n, const char * format, ... ); + +/** + * \brief This function allows configuring a custom + * \c snprintf function pointer. + * + * \param snprintf_func The \c snprintf function implementation. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf( int (*snprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, ... ) ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_snprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_snprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ + +/* + * The function pointers for vsnprintf + * + * The vsnprintf implementation should conform to C99: + * - it *must* always correctly zero-terminate the buffer + * (except when n == 0, then it must leave the buffer untouched) + * - however it is acceptable to return -1 instead of the required length when + * the destination buffer is too short. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) +#include +/* For Older Windows (inc. MSYS2), we provide our own fixed implementation */ +int mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list arg ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) +#include +extern int (*mbedtls_vsnprintf)( char * s, size_t n, const char * format, va_list arg ); + +/** + * \brief Set your own snprintf function pointer + * + * \param vsnprintf_func The \c vsnprintf function implementation + * + * \return \c 0 + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf( int (*vsnprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, va_list arg ) ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_vsnprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ + +/* + * The function pointers for exit + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) +extern void (*mbedtls_exit)( int status ); + +/** + * \brief This function dynamically configures the exit + * function that is called when the mbedtls_exit() + * function is invoked by the library. + * + * \param exit_func The \c exit function implementation. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_exit( void (*exit_func)( int status ) ); +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_exit MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_exit exit +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ + +/* + * The default exit values + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS) +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS +#else +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE) +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE +#else +#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE 1 +#endif + +/* + * The function pointers for reading from and writing a seed file to + * Non-Volatile storage (NV) in a platform-independent way + * + * Only enabled when the NV seed entropy source is enabled + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* Internal standard platform definitions */ +int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ); +int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) +extern int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_read)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ); +extern int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_write)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function allows configuring custom seed file writing and + * reading functions. + * + * \param nv_seed_read_func The seed reading function implementation. + * \param nv_seed_write_func The seed writing function implementation. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( + int (*nv_seed_read_func)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ), + int (*nv_seed_write_func)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) + ); +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_nv_seed_read MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO +#define mbedtls_nv_seed_write MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_nv_seed_read mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read +#define mbedtls_nv_seed_write mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) + +/** + * \brief The platform context structure. + * + * \note This structure may be used to assist platform-specific + * setup or teardown operations. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_platform_context +{ + char dummy; /**< A placeholder member, as empty structs are not portable. */ +} +mbedtls_platform_context; + +#else +#include "platform_alt.h" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function performs any platform-specific initialization + * operations. + * + * \note This function should be called before any other library functions. + * + * Its implementation is platform-specific, and unless + * platform-specific code is provided, it does nothing. + * + * \note The usage and necessity of this function is dependent on the platform. + * + * \param ctx The platform context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_platform_setup( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ); +/** + * \brief This function performs any platform teardown operations. + * + * \note This function should be called after every other Mbed TLS module + * has been correctly freed using the appropriate free function. + * + * Its implementation is platform-specific, and unless + * platform-specific code is provided, it does nothing. + * + * \note The usage and necessity of this function is dependent on the platform. + * + * \param ctx The platform context. + * + */ +void mbedtls_platform_teardown( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* platform.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..94055711 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/** + * \file platform_time.h + * + * \brief mbed TLS Platform time abstraction + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * The time_t datatype + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) +typedef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO mbedtls_time_t; +#else +/* For time_t */ +#include +typedef time_t mbedtls_time_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO */ + +/* + * The function pointers for time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) +extern mbedtls_time_t (*mbedtls_time)( mbedtls_time_t* time ); + +/** + * \brief Set your own time function pointer + * + * \param time_func the time function implementation + * + * \return 0 + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_time( mbedtls_time_t (*time_func)( mbedtls_time_t* time ) ); +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) +#define mbedtls_time MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_time time +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* platform_time.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cd112ab5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +/** + * \file platform_util.h + * + * \brief Common and shared functions used by multiple modules in the Mbed TLS + * library. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#include +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) +/* Allow the user to define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED to something like assert + * (which is what our config.h suggests). */ +#include +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED) +/** An alternative definition of MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED has been set in config.h. + * + * This flag can be used to check whether it is safe to assume that + * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() will expand to a call to mbedtls_param_failed(). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) +#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) assert( cond ) +#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED */ +#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) \ + mbedtls_param_failed( #cond, __FILE__, __LINE__ ) + +/** + * \brief User supplied callback function for parameter validation failure. + * See #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS for context. + * + * This function will be called unless an alternative treatment + * is defined through the #MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED macro. + * + * This function can return, and the operation will be aborted, or + * alternatively, through use of setjmp()/longjmp() can resume + * execution in the application code. + * + * \param failure_condition The assertion that didn't hold. + * \param file The file where the assertion failed. + * \param line The line in the file where the assertion failed. + */ +void mbedtls_param_failed( const char *failure_condition, + const char *file, + int line ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED */ + +/* Internal macro meant to be called only from within the library. */ +#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, ret ) \ + do { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ); \ + return( ret ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* Internal macro meant to be called only from within the library. */ +#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + do { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ); \ + return; \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ + +/* Internal macros meant to be called only from within the library. */ +#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, ret ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) do { } while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ + +/* Internal helper macros for deprecating API constants. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +/* Deliberately don't (yet) export MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED here + * to avoid conflict with other headers which define and use + * it, too. We might want to move all these definitions here at + * some point for uniformity. */ +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef char const * mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t; +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( VAL ) \ + ( (mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t) ( VAL ) ) +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef int mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t; +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( VAL ) \ + ( (mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t) ( VAL ) ) +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#else /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( VAL ) VAL +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( VAL ) VAL +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* Implementation of the check-return facility. + * See the user documentation in config.h. + * + * Do not use this macro directly to annotate function: instead, + * use one of MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL or MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL + * depending on how important it is to check the return value. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN) +#if defined(__GNUC__) +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN __attribute__((__warn_unused_result__)) +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1700 +#include +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN _Check_return_ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN +#endif +#endif + +/** Critical-failure function + * + * This macro appearing at the beginning of the declaration of a function + * indicates that its return value should be checked in all applications. + * Omitting the check is very likely to indicate a bug in the application + * and will result in a compile-time warning if #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN + * is implemented for the compiler in use. + * + * \note The use of this macro is a work in progress. + * This macro may be added to more functions in the future. + * Such an extension is not considered an API break, provided that + * there are near-unavoidable circumstances under which the function + * can fail. For example, signature/MAC/AEAD verification functions, + * and functions that require a random generator, are considered + * return-check-critical. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN + +/** Ordinary-failure function + * + * This macro appearing at the beginning of the declaration of a function + * indicates that its return value should be generally be checked in portable + * applications. Omitting the check will result in a compile-time warning if + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN is implemented for the compiler in use and + * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING is enabled in the compile-time configuration. + * + * You can use #MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN to explicitly ignore the return value + * of a function that is annotated with #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN. + * + * \note The use of this macro is a work in progress. + * This macro will be added to more functions in the future. + * Eventually this should appear before most functions returning + * an error code (as \c int in the \c mbedtls_xxx API or + * as ::psa_status_t in the \c psa_xxx API). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN +#else +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL +#endif + +/** Benign-failure function + * + * This macro appearing at the beginning of the declaration of a function + * indicates that it is rarely useful to check its return value. + * + * This macro has an empty expansion. It exists for documentation purposes: + * a #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_OPTIONAL annotation indicates that the function + * has been analyzed for return-check usefulness, whereas the lack of + * an annotation indicates that the function has not been analyzed and its + * return-check usefulness is unknown. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_OPTIONAL + +/** \def MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN + * + * Call this macro with one argument, a function call, to suppress a warning + * from #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN due to that function call. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN) +/* GCC doesn't silence the warning with just (void)(result). + * (void)!(result) is known to work up at least up to GCC 10, as well + * as with Clang and MSVC. + * + * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-3.4.6/gcc/Non_002dbugs.html + * https://stackoverflow.com/questions/40576003/ignoring-warning-wunused-result + * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66425#c34 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN(result) ( (void) !( result ) ) +#endif + +/** + * \brief Securely zeroize a buffer + * + * The function is meant to wipe the data contained in a buffer so + * that it can no longer be recovered even if the program memory + * is later compromised. Call this function on sensitive data + * stored on the stack before returning from a function, and on + * sensitive data stored on the heap before freeing the heap + * object. + * + * It is extremely difficult to guarantee that calls to + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() are not removed by aggressive + * compiler optimizations in a portable way. For this reason, Mbed + * TLS provides the configuration option + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT, which allows users to configure + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for + * their platform and needs + * + * \param buf Buffer to be zeroized + * \param len Length of the buffer in bytes + * + */ +void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +/** + * \brief Platform-specific implementation of gmtime_r() + * + * The function is a thread-safe abstraction that behaves + * similarly to the gmtime_r() function from Unix/POSIX. + * + * Mbed TLS will try to identify the underlying platform and + * make use of an appropriate underlying implementation (e.g. + * gmtime_r() for POSIX and gmtime_s() for Windows). If this is + * not possible, then gmtime() will be used. In this case, calls + * from the library to gmtime() will be guarded by the mutex + * mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is + * enabled. It is recommended that calls from outside the library + * are also guarded by this mutex. + * + * If MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, then Mbed TLS will + * unconditionally use the alternative implementation for + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() supplied by the user at compile time. + * + * \param tt Pointer to an object containing time (in seconds) since the + * epoch to be converted + * \param tm_buf Pointer to an object where the results will be stored + * + * \return Pointer to an object of type struct tm on success, otherwise + * NULL + */ +struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( const mbedtls_time_t *tt, + struct tm *tm_buf ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a69ede98 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +/** + * \file poly1305.h + * + * \brief This file contains Poly1305 definitions and functions. + * + * Poly1305 is a one-time message authenticator that can be used to + * authenticate messages. Poly1305-AES was created by Daniel + * Bernstein https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf The generic + * Poly1305 algorithm (not tied to AES) was also standardized in RFC + * 7539. + * + * \author Daniel King + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H +#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/** Invalid input parameter(s). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0057 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be + * used. */ +/** Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0059 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x005B + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) + +typedef struct mbedtls_poly1305_context +{ + uint32_t r[4]; /** The value for 'r' (low 128 bits of the key). */ + uint32_t s[4]; /** The value for 's' (high 128 bits of the key). */ + uint32_t acc[5]; /** The accumulator number. */ + uint8_t queue[16]; /** The current partial block of data. */ + size_t queue_len; /** The number of bytes stored in 'queue'. */ +} +mbedtls_poly1305_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ +#include "poly1305_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes the specified Poly1305 context. + * + * It must be the first API called before using + * the context. + * + * It is usually followed by a call to + * \c mbedtls_poly1305_starts(), then one or more calls to + * \c mbedtls_poly1305_update(), then one call to + * \c mbedtls_poly1305_finish(), then finally + * \c mbedtls_poly1305_free(). + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to initialize. This must + * not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_poly1305_init( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function releases and clears the specified + * Poly1305 context. + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, it must + * point to an initialized Poly1305 context. + */ +void mbedtls_poly1305_free( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets the one-time authentication key. + * + * \warning The key must be unique and unpredictable for each + * invocation of Poly1305. + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to which the key should be bound. + * This must be initialized. + * \param key The buffer containing the \c 32 Byte (\c 256 Bit) key. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_poly1305_starts( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32] ); + +/** + * \brief This functions feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * Poly1305 computation. + * + * It is called between \c mbedtls_cipher_poly1305_starts() and + * \c mbedtls_cipher_poly1305_finish(). + * It can be called repeatedly to process a stream of data. + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to use for the Poly1305 operation. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * Any value is accepted. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_poly1305_update( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates the Poly1305 Message + * Authentication Code (MAC). + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to use for the Poly1305 operation. + * This must be initialized and bound to a key. + * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_poly1305_finish( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16] ); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the Poly1305 MAC of the input + * buffer with the provided key. + * + * \warning The key must be unique and unpredictable for each + * invocation of Poly1305. + * + * \param key The buffer containing the \c 32 Byte (\c 256 Bit) key. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * Any value is accepted. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`. + * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. This must be + * a writable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_poly1305_mac( const unsigned char key[32], + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char mac[16] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief The Poly1305 checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_poly1305_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..af7a809e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -0,0 +1,512 @@ +/** + * \file psa_util.h + * + * \brief Utility functions for the use of the PSA Crypto library. + * + * \warning This function is not part of the public API and may + * change at any time. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" + +#include + +/* Translations for symmetric crypto. */ + +static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher ) +{ + switch( cipher ) + { + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB: + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ); + + /* ARIA not yet supported in PSA. */ + /* case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC: + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ); */ + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode, size_t taglen ) +{ + switch( mode ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB: + return( PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, taglen ) ); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen ) ); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: + if( taglen == 0 ) + return( PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ); + else + return( 0 ); + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +static inline psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( + mbedtls_operation_t op ) +{ + switch( op ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT: + return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ); + case MBEDTLS_DECRYPT: + return( PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +/* Translations for hashing. */ + +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_md( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + switch( md_alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( PSA_ALG_MD2 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( PSA_ALG_MD4 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( PSA_ALG_MD5 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: + return( 0 ); + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +/* Translations for ECC. */ + +static inline int mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id( + psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t bits, + char const **oid, size_t *oid_len ) +{ + switch( curve ) + { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case 192: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case 224: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case 256: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case 384: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case 521: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + } + break; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case 192: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case 224: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case 256: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + } + break; + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case 256: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case 384: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case 512: + *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1; + *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 ); + return( 0 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + } + break; + } + (void) oid; + (void) oid_len; + return( -1 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 521 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 521 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 192 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 224 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 256 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 384 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < ( 2 * ( ( 512 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH ( 2 * ( ( 512 + 7 ) / 8 ) + 1 ) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + + +/* Translations for PK layer */ + +static inline int mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( psa_status_t status ) +{ + switch( status ) + { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + return( 0 ); + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + /* All other failures */ + case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE: + case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE: + case PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + default: /* We return the same as for the 'other failures', + * but list them separately nonetheless to indicate + * which failure conditions we have considered. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } +} + +/* Translations for ECC */ + +/* This function transforms an ECC group identifier from + * https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8 + * into a PSA ECC group identifier. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( + uint16_t tls_ecc_grp_reg_id, size_t *bits ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_ecc_grp_reg_id ); + if( curve_info == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( curve_info->grp_id, bits ) ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* This function takes a buffer holding an EC public key + * exported through psa_export_public_key(), and converts + * it into an ECPoint structure to be put into a ClientKeyExchange + * message in an ECDHE exchange. + * + * Both the present and the foreseeable future format of EC public keys + * used by PSA have the ECPoint structure contained in the exported key + * as a subbuffer, and the function merely selects this subbuffer instead + * of making a copy. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint( unsigned char *src, + size_t srclen, + unsigned char **dst, + size_t *dstlen ) +{ + *dst = src; + *dstlen = srclen; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* This function takes a buffer holding an ECPoint structure + * (as contained in a TLS ServerKeyExchange message for ECDHE + * exchanges) and converts it into a format that the PSA key + * agreement API understands. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( unsigned char const *src, + size_t srclen, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dstlen, + size_t *olen ) +{ + if( srclen > dstlen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( dst, src, srclen ); + *olen = srclen; + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* Expose whatever RNG the PSA subsystem uses to applications using the + * mbedtls_xxx API. The declarations and definitions here need to be + * consistent with the implementation in library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h. + * See that file for implementation documentation. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +/* The type of a `f_rng` random generator function that many library functions + * take. + * + * This type name is not part of the Mbed TLS stable API. It may be renamed + * or moved without warning. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_f_rng_t( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_size ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + +/** The random generator function for the PSA subsystem. + * + * This function is suitable as the `f_rng` random generator function + * parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions. Use #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE + * to obtain the \p p_rng parameter. + * + * The implementation of this function depends on the configuration of the + * library. + * + * \note Depending on the configuration, this may be a function or + * a pointer to a function. + * + * \note This function may only be used if the PSA crypto subsystem is active. + * This means that you must call psa_crypto_init() before any call to + * this function, and you must not call this function after calling + * mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + * + * \param p_rng The random generator context. This must be + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE. No other state is + * supported. + * \param output The buffer to fill. It must have room for + * \c output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The number of bytes to write to \p output. + * This function may fail if \p output_size is too + * large. It is guaranteed to accept any output size + * requested by Mbed TLS library functions. The + * maximum request size depends on the library + * configuration. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An `MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_xxx`, + * `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_xxx, + * `MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_xxx` or + * `MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_xxx` on error. + */ +int mbedtls_psa_get_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size ); + +/** The random generator state for the PSA subsystem. + * + * This macro expands to an expression which is suitable as the `p_rng` + * random generator state parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions. + * It must be used in combination with the random generator function + * mbedtls_psa_get_random(). + * + * The implementation of this macro depends on the configuration of the + * library. Do not make any assumption on its nature. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL + +#else /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; +static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; +static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random; +#endif +extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE mbedtls_psa_random_state + +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f890aefa --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +/** + * \file ripemd160.h + * + * \brief RIPE MD-160 message digest + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0031 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ripemd160_context +{ + uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + uint32_t state[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ +} +mbedtls_ripemd160_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ +#include "ripemd160_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize RIPEMD-160 context + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context to be initialized + */ +void mbedtls_ripemd160_init( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear RIPEMD-160 context + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context to be cleared + */ +void mbedtls_ripemd160_free( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clone (the state of) a RIPEMD-160 context + * + * \param dst The destination context + * \param src The context to be cloned + */ +void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, + const mbedtls_ripemd160_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 context setup + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context + * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context + * \param data buffer holding one block of data + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 context setup + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx context to be initialized + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( + mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_update( + mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context + * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( + mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +/** + * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context + * \param data buffer holding one block of data + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_process( + mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param input buffer holding the data + * \param ilen length of the input data + * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_ripemd160.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/rsa.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8559f67b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/rsa.h @@ -0,0 +1,1351 @@ +/** + * \file rsa.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for the RSA public-key cryptosystem. + * + * The RSA public-key cryptosystem is defined in Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v1.5: RSA Encryption + * and Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: + * RSA Cryptography Specifications. + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +/* + * RSA Error codes + */ +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x4080 +/** Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING -0x4100 +/** Something failed during generation of a key. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED -0x4180 +/** Key failed to pass the validity check of the library. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED -0x4200 +/** The public key operation failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED -0x4280 +/** The private key operation failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED -0x4300 +/** The PKCS#1 verification failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED -0x4380 +/** The output buffer for decryption is not large enough. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE -0x4400 +/** The random generator failed to generate non-zeros. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED -0x4480 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION is deprecated and should not be used. + */ +/** The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION -0x4500 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** RSA hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4580 + +/* + * RSA constants + */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC 0 /**< Request private key operation. */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE 1 /**< Request public key operation. */ + +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 0 /**< Use PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 1 /**< Use PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. */ + +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN 1 /**< Identifier for RSA signature operations. */ +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT 2 /**< Identifier for RSA encryption and decryption operations. */ + +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY -1 + +/* + * The above constants may be used even if the RSA module is compile out, + * eg for alternative (PKCS#11) RSA implementations in the PK layers. + */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The RSA context structure. + * + * \note Direct manipulation of the members of this structure + * is deprecated. All manipulation should instead be done through + * the public interface functions. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_rsa_context +{ + int ver; /*!< Reserved for internal purposes. + * Do not set this field in application + * code. Its meaning might change without + * notice. */ + size_t len; /*!< The size of \p N in Bytes. */ + + mbedtls_mpi N; /*!< The public modulus. */ + mbedtls_mpi E; /*!< The public exponent. */ + + mbedtls_mpi D; /*!< The private exponent. */ + mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The first prime factor. */ + mbedtls_mpi Q; /*!< The second prime factor. */ + + mbedtls_mpi DP; /*!< D % (P - 1). */ + mbedtls_mpi DQ; /*!< D % (Q - 1). */ + mbedtls_mpi QP; /*!< 1 / (Q % P). */ + + mbedtls_mpi RN; /*!< cached R^2 mod N. */ + + mbedtls_mpi RP; /*!< cached R^2 mod P. */ + mbedtls_mpi RQ; /*!< cached R^2 mod Q. */ + + mbedtls_mpi Vi; /*!< The cached blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi Vf; /*!< The cached un-blinding value. */ + + int padding; /*!< Selects padding mode: + #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 for 1.5 padding and + #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for OAEP or PSS. */ + int hash_id; /*!< Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type, + as specified in md.h for use in the MGF + mask generating function used in the + EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS encodings. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized iff ver != 0. */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< Thread-safety mutex. */ +#endif +} +mbedtls_rsa_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ +#include "rsa_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes an RSA context. + * + * \note Set padding to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for the RSAES-OAEP + * encryption scheme and the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme. + * + * \note The \p hash_id parameter is ignored when using + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 padding. + * + * \note The choice of padding mode is strictly enforced for private key + * operations, since there might be security concerns in + * mixing padding modes. For public key operations it is + * a default value, which can be overridden by calling specific + * \c rsa_rsaes_xxx or \c rsa_rsassa_xxx functions. + * + * \note The hash selected in \p hash_id is always used for OEAP + * encryption. For PSS signatures, it is always used for + * making signatures, but can be overridden for verifying them. + * If set to #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it is always overridden. + * + * \param ctx The RSA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. + * \param hash_id The hash identifier of ::mbedtls_md_type_t type, if + * \p padding is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. It is unused + * otherwise. + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int padding, + int hash_id ); + +/** + * \brief This function imports a set of core parameters into an + * RSA context. + * + * \note This function can be called multiple times for successive + * imports, if the parameters are not simultaneously present. + * + * Any sequence of calls to this function should be followed + * by a call to mbedtls_rsa_complete(), which checks and + * completes the provided information to a ready-for-use + * public or private RSA key. + * + * \note See mbedtls_rsa_complete() for more information on which + * parameters are necessary to set up a private or public + * RSA key. + * + * \note The imported parameters are copied and need not be preserved + * for the lifetime of the RSA context being set up. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to store the parameters in. + * \param N The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL. + * \param P The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. + * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. + * \param D The private exponent. This may be \c NULL. + * \param E The public exponent. This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E ); + +/** + * \brief This function imports core RSA parameters, in raw big-endian + * binary format, into an RSA context. + * + * \note This function can be called multiple times for successive + * imports, if the parameters are not simultaneously present. + * + * Any sequence of calls to this function should be followed + * by a call to mbedtls_rsa_complete(), which checks and + * completes the provided information to a ready-for-use + * public or private RSA key. + * + * \note See mbedtls_rsa_complete() for more information on which + * parameters are necessary to set up a private or public + * RSA key. + * + * \note The imported parameters are copied and need not be preserved + * for the lifetime of the RSA context being set up. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to store the parameters in. + * \param N The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL. + * \param N_len The Byte length of \p N; it is ignored if \p N == NULL. + * \param P The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. + * \param P_len The Byte length of \p P; it ns ignored if \p P == NULL. + * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. + * \param Q_len The Byte length of \p Q; it is ignored if \p Q == NULL. + * \param D The private exponent. This may be \c NULL. + * \param D_len The Byte length of \p D; it is ignored if \p D == NULL. + * \param E The public exponent. This may be \c NULL. + * \param E_len The Byte length of \p E; it is ignored if \p E == NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len, + unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len, + unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len, + unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len, + unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function completes an RSA context from + * a set of imported core parameters. + * + * To setup an RSA public key, precisely \p N and \p E + * must have been imported. + * + * To setup an RSA private key, sufficient information must + * be present for the other parameters to be derivable. + * + * The default implementation supports the following: + *
  • Derive \p P, \p Q from \p N, \p D, \p E.
  • + *
  • Derive \p N, \p D from \p P, \p Q, \p E.
+ * Alternative implementations need not support these. + * + * If this function runs successfully, it guarantees that + * the RSA context can be used for RSA operations without + * the risk of failure or crash. + * + * \warning This function need not perform consistency checks + * for the imported parameters. In particular, parameters that + * are not needed by the implementation might be silently + * discarded and left unchecked. To check the consistency + * of the key material, see mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(). + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context holding imported parameters. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the attempted derivations + * failed. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports the core parameters of an RSA key. + * + * If this function runs successfully, the non-NULL buffers + * pointed to by \p N, \p P, \p Q, \p D, and \p E are fully + * written, with additional unused space filled leading by + * zero Bytes. + * + * Possible reasons for returning + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:
    + *
  • An alternative RSA implementation is in use, which + * stores the key externally, and either cannot or should + * not export it into RAM.
  • + *
  • A SW or HW implementation might not support a certain + * deduction. For example, \p P, \p Q from \p N, \p D, + * and \p E if the former are not part of the + * implementation.
+ * + * If the function fails due to an unsupported operation, + * the RSA context stays intact and remains usable. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * \param N The MPI to hold the RSA modulus. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param P The MPI to hold the first prime factor of \p N. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param Q The MPI to hold the second prime factor of \p N. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param D The MPI to hold the private exponent. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param E The MPI to hold the public exponent. + * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED if exporting the + * requested parameters cannot be done due to missing + * functionality or because of security policies. + * \return A non-zero return code on any other failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q, + mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports core parameters of an RSA key + * in raw big-endian binary format. + * + * If this function runs successfully, the non-NULL buffers + * pointed to by \p N, \p P, \p Q, \p D, and \p E are fully + * written, with additional unused space filled leading by + * zero Bytes. + * + * Possible reasons for returning + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:
    + *
  • An alternative RSA implementation is in use, which + * stores the key externally, and either cannot or should + * not export it into RAM.
  • + *
  • A SW or HW implementation might not support a certain + * deduction. For example, \p P, \p Q from \p N, \p D, + * and \p E if the former are not part of the + * implementation.
+ * If the function fails due to an unsupported operation, + * the RSA context stays intact and remains usable. + * + * \note The length parameters are ignored if the corresponding + * buffer pointers are NULL. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * \param N The Byte array to store the RSA modulus, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param N_len The size of the buffer for the modulus. + * \param P The Byte array to hold the first prime factor of \p N, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param P_len The size of the buffer for the first prime factor. + * \param Q The Byte array to hold the second prime factor of \p N, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param Q_len The size of the buffer for the second prime factor. + * \param D The Byte array to hold the private exponent, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param D_len The size of the buffer for the private exponent. + * \param E The Byte array to hold the public exponent, + * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported. + * \param E_len The size of the buffer for the public exponent. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED if exporting the + * requested parameters cannot be done due to missing + * functionality or because of security policies. + * \return A non-zero return code on any other failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + unsigned char *N, size_t N_len, + unsigned char *P, size_t P_len, + unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len, + unsigned char *D, size_t D_len, + unsigned char *E, size_t E_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function exports CRT parameters of a private RSA key. + * + * \note Alternative RSA implementations not using CRT-parameters + * internally can implement this function based on + * mbedtls_rsa_deduce_opt(). + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * \param DP The MPI to hold \c D modulo `P-1`, + * or \c NULL if it need not be exported. + * \param DQ The MPI to hold \c D modulo `Q-1`, + * or \c NULL if it need not be exported. + * \param QP The MPI to hold modular inverse of \c Q modulo \c P, + * or \c NULL if it need not be exported. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ); + +/** + * \brief This function sets padding for an already initialized RSA + * context. See mbedtls_rsa_init() for details. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to be configured. + * \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. + * \param hash_id The #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 hash identifier. + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, + int hash_id ); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the length of RSA modulus in Bytes. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * + * \return The length of the RSA modulus in Bytes. + * + */ +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an RSA keypair. + * + * \note mbedtls_rsa_init() must be called before this function, + * to set up the RSA context. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context used to hold the key. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for key generation. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. + * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * \param nbits The size of the public key in bits. + * \param exponent The public exponent to use. For example, \c 65537. + * This must be odd and greater than \c 1. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + unsigned int nbits, int exponent ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks if a context contains at least an RSA + * public key. + * + * If the function runs successfully, it is guaranteed that + * enough information is present to perform an RSA public key + * operation using mbedtls_rsa_public(). + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to check. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks if a context contains an RSA private key + * and perform basic consistency checks. + * + * \note The consistency checks performed by this function not only + * ensure that mbedtls_rsa_private() can be called successfully + * on the given context, but that the various parameters are + * mutually consistent with high probability, in the sense that + * mbedtls_rsa_public() and mbedtls_rsa_private() are inverses. + * + * \warning This function should catch accidental misconfigurations + * like swapping of parameters, but it cannot establish full + * trust in neither the quality nor the consistency of the key + * material that was used to setup the given RSA context: + *
  • Consistency: Imported parameters that are irrelevant + * for the implementation might be silently dropped. If dropped, + * the current function does not have access to them, + * and therefore cannot check them. See mbedtls_rsa_complete(). + * If you want to check the consistency of the entire + * content of a PKCS1-encoded RSA private key, for example, you + * should use mbedtls_rsa_validate_params() before setting + * up the RSA context. + * Additionally, if the implementation performs empirical checks, + * these checks substantiate but do not guarantee consistency.
  • + *
  • Quality: This function is not expected to perform + * extended quality assessments like checking that the prime + * factors are safe. Additionally, it is the responsibility of the + * user to ensure the trustworthiness of the source of his RSA + * parameters, which goes beyond what is effectively checkable + * by the library.
+ * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to check. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function checks a public-private RSA key pair. + * + * It checks each of the contexts, and makes sure they match. + * + * \param pub The initialized RSA context holding the public key. + * \param prv The initialized RSA context holding the private key. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, + const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs an RSA public key operation. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \note This function does not handle message padding. + * + * \note Make sure to set \p input[0] = 0 or ensure that + * input is smaller than \p N. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs an RSA private key operation. + * + * \note Blinding is used if and only if a PRNG is provided. + * + * \note If blinding is used, both the base of exponentiation + * and the exponent are blinded, providing protection + * against some side-channel attacks. + * + * \warning It is deprecated and a security risk to not provide + * a PRNG here and thereby prevent the use of blinding. + * Future versions of the library may enforce the presence + * of a PRNG. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function, used for blinding. It is discouraged + * and deprecated to pass \c NULL here, in which case + * blinding will be omitted. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to pass to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function adds the message padding, then performs an RSA + * operation. + * + * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 encryption + * operation using the \p mode from the context. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG to use. It is mandatory for PKCS#1 v2.1 padding + * encoding, and for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding encoding when used + * with \p mode set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. For PKCS#1 v1.5 + * padding encoding and \p mode set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * it is used for blinding and should be provided in this + * case; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. May be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng doesn't + * need a context argument. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes. + * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable + * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption operation + * (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCRYPT). + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. It is needed for padding generation + * if \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. If \p mode is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (discouraged), it is used for + * blinding and should be provided; see mbedtls_rsa_private(). + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng + * doesn't need a context argument. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes. + * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable + * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 OAEP encryption + * operation (RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT). + * + * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size + * of ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is needed for padding + * generation and must be provided. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len + * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0. + * \param label_len The length of the label in Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the plaintext buffer \p input in Bytes. + * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable + * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * `ilen == 0`. + * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs an RSA operation, then removes the + * message padding. + * + * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 decryption + * operation using the \p mode from the context. + * + * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be + * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N (for example, + * 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used) to be able to hold an + * arbitrary decrypted message. If it is not large enough to + * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, + * the function returns \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes. + * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption + * operation (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-DECRYPT). + * + * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be + * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N, for example, + * 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used, to be able to hold an + * arbitrary decrypted message. If it is not large enough to + * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, + * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes. + * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 OAEP decryption + * operation (RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT). + * + * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be + * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N, for + * example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used, to be able to + * hold an arbitrary decrypted message. If it is not + * large enough to hold the decryption of the particular + * ciphertext provided, the function returns + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len + * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0. + * \param label_len The length of the label in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer + * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes. + * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a private RSA operation to sign + * a message digest using PKCS#1. + * + * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 + * signature using the \p mode from the context. + * + * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size + * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. + * + * \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on + * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for details on + * \p md_alg and \p hash_id. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If the padding mode is PKCS#1 v2.1, + * this must be provided. If the padding mode is PKCS#1 v1.5 and + * \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, it is used for blinding + * and should be provided; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more + * more. It is ignored otherwise. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context argument. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. + * + * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature + * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN). + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context argument. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. + * + * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature + * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN). + * + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling + * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() + * afterwards) selects the hash used for the + * encoding operation and for the mask generation function + * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the + * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography + * Specifications. + * + * \note This function enforces that the provided salt length complies + * with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 + * step 3. The constraint is that the hash length plus the salt + * length plus 2 bytes must be at most the key length. If this + * constraint is not met, this function returns + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. It must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param saltlen The length of the salt that should be used. + * If passed #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, the function will use + * the largest possible salt length up to the hash length, + * which is the largest permitted by some standards including + * FIPS 186-4 §5.5. + * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. + * + * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature + * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN). + * + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling + * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() + * afterwards) selects the hash used for the + * encoding operation and for the mask generation function + * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the + * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography + * Specifications. + * + * \note This function always uses the maximum possible salt size, + * up to the length of the payload hash. This choice of salt + * size complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 (PKCS#1 + * v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. Furthermore this function enforces a + * minimum salt size which is the hash size minus 2 bytes. If + * this minimum size is too large given the key size (the salt + * size, plus the hash size, plus 2 bytes must be no more than + * the key size in bytes), this function returns + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. It must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of + * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe. + * + * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a public RSA operation and checks + * the message digest. + * + * This is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 + * verification using the mode from the context. + * + * \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on + * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() about \p md_alg and + * \p hash_id. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 verification + * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY). + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS verification + * operation (RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY). + * + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling + * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() + * afterwards) selects the hash used for the + * encoding operation and for the mask generation function + * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the + * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key + * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography + * Specifications. If the \c hash_id set in \p ctx is + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, the \p md_alg parameter is used. + * + * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function + * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library + * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it + * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. + * + * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support + * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead + * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS verification + * operation (RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY). + * + * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size + * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. + * + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling + * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() + * afterwards) is ignored. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see + * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. + * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. + * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. + * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. + * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable + * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length + * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * \param mgf1_hash_id The message digest algorithm used for the + * verification operation and the mask generation + * function (MGF1). For more details on the encoding + * operation and the mask generation function, consult + * RFC-3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards + * (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography + * Specifications. + * \param expected_salt_len The length of the salt used in padding. Use + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY to accept any salt length. + * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes + * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. + * + * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id, + int expected_salt_len, + const unsigned char *sig ); + +/** + * \brief This function copies the components of an RSA context. + * + * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. + * \param src The source context. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory allocation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief This function frees the components of an RSA key. + * + * \param ctx The RSA context to free. May be \c NULL, in which case + * this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, it must + * point to an initialized RSA context. + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The RSA checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* rsa.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d55492bb --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/** + * \file rsa_internal.h + * + * \brief Context-independent RSA helper functions + * + * This module declares some RSA-related helper functions useful when + * implementing the RSA interface. These functions are provided in a separate + * compilation unit in order to make it easy for designers of alternative RSA + * implementations to use them in their own code, as it is conceived that the + * functionality they provide will be necessary for most complete + * implementations. + * + * End-users of Mbed TLS who are not providing their own alternative RSA + * implementations should not use these functions directly, and should instead + * use only the functions declared in rsa.h. + * + * The interface provided by this module will be maintained through LTS (Long + * Term Support) branches of Mbed TLS, but may otherwise be subject to change, + * and must be considered an internal interface of the library. + * + * There are two classes of helper functions: + * + * (1) Parameter-generating helpers. These are: + * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes + * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent + * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt + * Each of these functions takes a set of core RSA parameters and + * generates some other, or CRT related parameters. + * + * (2) Parameter-checking helpers. These are: + * - mbedtls_rsa_validate_params + * - mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt + * They take a set of core or CRT related RSA parameters and check their + * validity. + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + + +/** + * \brief Compute RSA prime moduli P, Q from public modulus N=PQ + * and a pair of private and public key. + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param N RSA modulus N = PQ, with P, Q to be found + * \param E RSA public exponent + * \param D RSA private exponent + * \param P Pointer to MPI holding first prime factor of N on success + * \param Q Pointer to MPI holding second prime factor of N on success + * + * \return + * - 0 if successful. In this case, P and Q constitute a + * factorization of N. + * - A non-zero error code otherwise. + * + * \note It is neither checked that P, Q are prime nor that + * D, E are modular inverses wrt. P-1 and Q-1. For that, + * use the helper function \c mbedtls_rsa_validate_params. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( mbedtls_mpi const *N, mbedtls_mpi const *E, + mbedtls_mpi const *D, + mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q ); + +/** + * \brief Compute RSA private exponent from + * prime moduli and public key. + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param P First prime factor of RSA modulus + * \param Q Second prime factor of RSA modulus + * \param E RSA public exponent + * \param D Pointer to MPI holding the private exponent on success. + * + * \return + * - 0 if successful. In this case, D is set to a simultaneous + * modular inverse of E modulo both P-1 and Q-1. + * - A non-zero error code otherwise. + * + * \note This function does not check whether P and Q are primes. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( mbedtls_mpi const *P, + mbedtls_mpi const *Q, + mbedtls_mpi const *E, + mbedtls_mpi *D ); + + +/** + * \brief Generate RSA-CRT parameters + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param P First prime factor of N + * \param Q Second prime factor of N + * \param D RSA private exponent + * \param DP Output variable for D modulo P-1 + * \param DQ Output variable for D modulo Q-1 + * \param QP Output variable for the modular inverse of Q modulo P. + * + * \return 0 on success, non-zero error code otherwise. + * + * \note This function does not check whether P, Q are + * prime and whether D is a valid private exponent. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, + mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ); + + +/** + * \brief Check validity of core RSA parameters + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param N RSA modulus N = PQ + * \param P First prime factor of N + * \param Q Second prime factor of N + * \param D RSA private exponent + * \param E RSA public exponent + * \param f_rng PRNG to be used for primality check, or NULL + * \param p_rng PRNG context for f_rng, or NULL + * + * \return + * - 0 if the following conditions are satisfied + * if all relevant parameters are provided: + * - P prime if f_rng != NULL (%) + * - Q prime if f_rng != NULL (%) + * - 1 < N = P * Q + * - 1 < D, E < N + * - D and E are modular inverses modulo P-1 and Q-1 + * (%) This is only done if MBEDTLS_GENPRIME is defined. + * - A non-zero error code otherwise. + * + * \note The function can be used with a restricted set of arguments + * to perform specific checks only. E.g., calling it with + * (-,P,-,-,-) and a PRNG amounts to a primality check for P. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Check validity of RSA CRT parameters + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param P First prime factor of RSA modulus + * \param Q Second prime factor of RSA modulus + * \param D RSA private exponent + * \param DP MPI to check for D modulo P-1 + * \param DQ MPI to check for D modulo P-1 + * \param QP MPI to check for the modular inverse of Q modulo P. + * + * \return + * - 0 if the following conditions are satisfied: + * - D = DP mod P-1 if P, D, DP != NULL + * - Q = DQ mod P-1 if P, D, DQ != NULL + * - QP = Q^-1 mod P if P, Q, QP != NULL + * - \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if check failed, + * potentially including \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX if some + * MPI calculations failed. + * - \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if insufficient + * data was provided to check DP, DQ or QP. + * + * \note The function can be used with a restricted set of arguments + * to perform specific checks only. E.g., calling it with the + * parameters (P, -, D, DP, -, -) will check DP = D mod P-1. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, + const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* rsa_internal.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/sha1.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/sha1.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4c3251b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/sha1.h @@ -0,0 +1,352 @@ +/** + * \file sha1.h + * + * \brief This file contains SHA-1 definitions and functions. + * + * The Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) cryptographic hash function is defined in + * FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes + * a security risk. We recommend considering stronger message + * digests instead. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA1_H +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0035 +/** SHA-1 input data was malformed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0073 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The SHA-1 context structure. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_sha1_context +{ + uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint32_t state[5]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ +} +mbedtls_sha1_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ +#include "sha1_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a SHA-1 context. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * + */ +void mbedtls_sha1_init( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clears a SHA-1 context. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it is + * not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized + * SHA-1 context. + * + */ +void mbedtls_sha1_free( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-1 context. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param dst The SHA-1 context to clone to. This must be initialized. + * \param src The SHA-1 context to clone from. This must be initialized. + * + */ +void mbedtls_sha1_clone( mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha1_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-1 checksum calculation. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. This must be initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1 + * checksum calculation. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to use. This must be initialized and + * have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. This must be a writable + * buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +/** + * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only). + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param data The data block being processed. This must be a + * readable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-1 checksum calculation. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. This must be initialized. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_starts( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1 + * checksum calculation. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_update_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized and + * have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_update( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized and + * have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_finish( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +/** + * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only). + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha1_process() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized. + * \param data The data block being processed. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 64 bytes. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-1 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-1(input buffer). + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-1 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-1(input buffer). + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. This must be a writable + * buffer of size \c 20 Bytes. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The SHA-1 checkup routine. + * + * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use + * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering + * stronger message digests instead. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_sha1.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/sha256.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/sha256.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5b54be21 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/sha256.h @@ -0,0 +1,300 @@ +/** + * \file sha256.h + * + * \brief This file contains SHA-224 and SHA-256 definitions and functions. + * + * The Secure Hash Algorithms 224 and 256 (SHA-224 and SHA-256) cryptographic + * hash functions are defined in FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA256_H +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0037 +/** SHA-256 input data was malformed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0074 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The SHA-256 context structure. + * + * The structure is used both for SHA-256 and for SHA-224 + * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is + * made in the call to mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(). + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_sha256_context +{ + uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint32_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ + int is224; /*!< Determines which function to use: + 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. */ +} +mbedtls_sha256_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ +#include "sha256_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a SHA-256 context. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_sha256_init( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clears a SHA-256 context. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized SHA-256 context. + */ +void mbedtls_sha256_free( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-256 context. + * + * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. + * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_sha256_clone( mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha256_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum + * calculation. + * + * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param is224 This determines which function to use. This must be + * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * SHA-256 checksum calculation. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[32] ); + +/** + * \brief This function processes a single data block within + * the ongoing SHA-256 computation. This function is for + * internal use only. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized. + * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum + * calculation. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be + * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_starts( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + int is224 ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * SHA-256 checksum calculation. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_update_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to use. This must be + * initialized and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_update( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized and + * have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must be + * a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_finish( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[32] ); + +/** + * \brief This function processes a single data block within + * the ongoing SHA-256 computation. This function is for + * internal use only. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha256_process() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized. + * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must be + * a readable buffer of size \c 64 Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256 + * checksum of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-256 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-256(input buffer). + * + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. + * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be + * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[32], + int is224 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum + * of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-256 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-256(input buffer). + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must be + * a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. + * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be either + * \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[32], + int is224 ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief The SHA-224 and SHA-256 checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_sha256.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/sha512.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/sha512.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cca47c2f --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/sha512.h @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +/** + * \file sha512.h + * \brief This file contains SHA-384 and SHA-512 definitions and functions. + * + * The Secure Hash Algorithms 384 and 512 (SHA-384 and SHA-512) cryptographic + * hash functions are defined in FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS). + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA512_H +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0039 +/** SHA-512 input data was malformed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0075 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief The SHA-512 context structure. + * + * The structure is used both for SHA-384 and for SHA-512 + * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is + * made in the call to mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(). + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_sha512_context +{ + uint64_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint64_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char buffer[128]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + int is384; /*!< Determines which function to use: + 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. */ +#endif +} +mbedtls_sha512_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ +#include "sha512_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a SHA-512 context. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to initialize. This must + * not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_sha512_init( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clears a SHA-512 context. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, + * in which case this function does nothing. If it + * is not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized + * SHA-512 context. + */ +void mbedtls_sha512_free( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-512 context. + * + * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. + * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha512_context *src ); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum + * calculation. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be + * either \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. + * + * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must + * be \c 0, or the function will return + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * SHA-512 checksum calculation. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must + * be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[64] ); + +/** + * \brief This function processes a single data block within + * the ongoing SHA-512 computation. + * This function is for internal use only. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized. + * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This + * must be a readable buffer of length \c 128 Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[128] ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum + * calculation. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either + * \c 0 for SHA-512 or \c 1 for SHA-384. + * + * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must + * be \c 0, or the function will fail to work. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_starts( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + int is384 ); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * SHA-512 checksum calculation. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_update_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_update( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. This must + * be a writable buffer of size \c 64 Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_finish( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[64] ); + +/** + * \brief This function processes a single data block within + * the ongoing SHA-512 computation. This function is for + * internal use only. + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha512_process() in 2.7.0. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized. + * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must be + * a readable buffer of length \c 128 Bytes. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_process( + mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[128] ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384 + * checksum of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-512 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-512(input buffer). + * + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be + * a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either + * \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. + * + * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must + * be \c 0, or the function will return + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[64], + int is384 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384 + * checksum of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-512 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-512(input buffer). + * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_ret() in 2.7.0 + * + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a + * readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either + * \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. + * + * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must + * be \c 0, or the function will fail to work. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[64], + int is384 ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + + /** + * \brief The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checkup routine. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_sha512.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aecac93f --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,4427 @@ +/** + * \file ssl.h + * + * \brief SSL/TLS functions. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#endif + +/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due + * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap + * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "Record compression support via MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT is deprecated and will be removed in the next major revision of the library" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "Record compression support via MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT is deprecated and cannot be used if MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED is set" +#endif + +#include "zlib.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* + * SSL Error codes + */ +/** The requested feature is not available. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x7080 +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x7100 +/** Verification of the message MAC failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC -0x7180 +/** An invalid SSL record was received. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -0x7200 +/** The connection indicated an EOF. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -0x7280 +/** An unknown cipher was received. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -0x7300 +/** The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN -0x7380 +/** No RNG was provided to the SSL module. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -0x7400 +/** No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -0x7480 +/** Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE -0x7500 +/** The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED -0x7580 +/** The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -0x7600 +/** No CA Chain is set, but required to operate. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED -0x7680 +/** An unexpected message was received from our peer. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -0x7700 +/** A fatal alert message was received from our peer. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -0x7780 +/** Verification of our peer failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED -0x7800 +/** The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -0x7880 +/** Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -0x7900 +/** Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO -0x7980 +/** Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE -0x7A00 +/** Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -0x7A80 +/** Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -0x7B00 +/** Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -0x7B80 +/** Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -0x7C00 +/** Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP -0x7C80 +/** Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS -0x7D00 +/** Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -0x7D80 +/** Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -0x7E00 +/** Processing of the Finished handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED -0x7E80 +/** Memory allocation failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED -0x7F00 +/** Hardware acceleration function returned with error */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x7F80 +/** Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH -0x6F80 +/** Processing of the compression / decompression failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED -0x6F00 +/** Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION -0x6E80 +/** Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x6E00 +/** Session ticket has expired. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED -0x6D80 +/** Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -0x6D00 +/** Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY -0x6C80 +/** Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR -0x6C00 +/** A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING -0x6B80 +/** Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO -0x6B00 +/** DTLS client must retry for hello verification */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED -0x6A80 +/** A buffer is too small to receive or write a message */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x6A00 +/** None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE -0x6980 +/** No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ -0x6900 +/** Connection requires a write call. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE -0x6880 +/** The operation timed out. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT -0x6800 +/** The client initiated a reconnect from the same port. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT -0x6780 +/** Record header looks valid but is not expected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD -0x6700 +/** The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL -0x6680 +/** Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH -0x6600 +/** Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING -0x6580 +/** The asynchronous operation is not completed yet. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS -0x6500 +/** Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE -0x6480 +/** An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID -0x6000 +/** An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH -0x5F00 +/** A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS -0x7000 +/** Invalid value in SSL config */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG -0x5E80 + +/* + * Various constants + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 0 /*!< SSL v3.0 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 1 /*!< TLS v1.0 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 2 /*!< TLS v1.1 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 3 /*!< TLS v1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 4 /*!< TLS v1.3 (experimental) */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM 0 /*!< TLS */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM 1 /*!< DTLS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum host name defined in RFC 1035 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of a protocol name in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN 65535 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of list in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */ + +/* RFC 6066 section 4, see also mfl_code_to_length in ssl_tls.c + * NONE must be zero so that memset()ing structure to zero works */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE 0 /*!< don't use this extension */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 1 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^9 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 2 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^10 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 3 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^11 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 4 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^12 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID 5 /*!< first invalid value */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET 3 /* Used only for sni_authmode */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED -1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT 16 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE 2 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN 10 /* 80 bits, rfc 6066 section 7 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB 2 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED 0 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED 1 + +/* + * Default range for DTLS retransmission timer value, in milliseconds. + * RFC 6347 4.2.4.1 says from 1 second to 60 seconds. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN 1000 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX 60000 + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ +#endif + +/* + * Maximum fragment length in bytes, + * determines the size of each of the two internal I/O buffers. + * + * Note: the RFC defines the default size of SSL / TLS messages. If you + * change the value here, other clients / servers may not be able to + * communicate with you anymore. Only change this value if you control + * both sides of the connection and have it reduced at both sides, or + * if you're using the Max Fragment Length extension and you know all your + * peers are using it too! + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 /**< Size of the input / output buffer */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#endif + +/* + * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of + * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 +#endif + +/* + * Maximum length of CIDs for incoming and outgoing messages. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1 +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +/* + * Length of the verify data for secure renegotiation + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 36 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 12 +#endif + +/* + * Signaling ciphersuite values (SCSV) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF /**< renegotiation info ext */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE 0x5600 /**< RFC 7507 section 2 */ + +/* + * Supported Signature and Hash algorithms (For TLS 1.2) + * RFC 5246 section 7.4.1.4.1 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 5 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 6 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA 3 + +/* + * Client Certificate Types + * RFC 5246 section 7.4.4 plus RFC 4492 section 5.5 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN 64 + +/* + * Message, alert and handshake types + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT 21 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE 22 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA 23 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID 25 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL 2 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0 /* 0x00 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10 /* 0x0A */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20 /* 0x14 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED 21 /* 0x15 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW 22 /* 0x16 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30 /* 0x1E */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40 /* 0x28 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT 41 /* 0x29 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT 42 /* 0x2A */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT 43 /* 0x2B */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED 44 /* 0x2C */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED 45 /* 0x2D */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN 46 /* 0x2E */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47 /* 0x2F */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA 48 /* 0x30 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED 49 /* 0x31 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR 50 /* 0x32 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR 51 /* 0x33 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 60 /* 0x3C */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* 0x46 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* 0x47 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* 0x50 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* 0x56 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED 90 /* 0x5A */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100 /* 0x64 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT 110 /* 0x6E */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112 /* 0x70 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115 /* 0x73 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120 /* 0x78 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE 11 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE 14 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED 20 + +/* + * TLS extensions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME 0 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 0 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC 4 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 10 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 11 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG 13 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP 14 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN 16 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 22 /* 0x16 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 0x0017 /* 23 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET 35 + +/* The value of the CID extension is still TBD as of + * draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05). + * + * A future minor revision of Mbed TLS may change the default value of + * this option to match evolving standards and usage. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 /* TBD */ +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP 256 /* experimental */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF01 + +/* + * Size defines + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) +#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /* 256 bits */ +#endif + +/* Dummy type used only for its size */ +union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_rsa[48]; /* RFC 5246 8.1.1 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_dhm[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; /* RFC 5246 8.1.2 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_ecdh[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; /* RFC 4492 5.10 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_psk[4 + 2 * MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 2 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_dhe_psk[4 + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE + + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 3 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_rsa_psk[52 + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 4 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_ecdhe_psk[4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 5489 2 */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + unsigned char _pms_ecjpake[32]; /* Thread spec: SHA-256 output */ +#endif +}; + +#define MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE sizeof( union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * SSL state machine + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT, +} +mbedtls_ssl_states; + +/* + * The tls_prf function types. + */ +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256 +} +mbedtls_tls_prf_types; +/** + * \brief Callback type: send data on the network. + * + * \note That callback may be either blocking or non-blocking. + * + * \param ctx Context for the send callback (typically a file descriptor) + * \param buf Buffer holding the data to send + * \param len Length of the data to send + * + * \return The callback must return the number of bytes sent if any, + * or a non-zero error code. + * If performing non-blocking I/O, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE + * must be returned when the operation would block. + * + * \note The callback is allowed to send fewer bytes than requested. + * It must always return the number of bytes actually sent. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_send_t( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: receive data from the network. + * + * \note That callback may be either blocking or non-blocking. + * + * \param ctx Context for the receive callback (typically a file + * descriptor) + * \param buf Buffer to write the received data to + * \param len Length of the receive buffer + * + * \returns If data has been received, the positive number of bytes received. + * \returns \c 0 if the connection has been closed. + * \returns If performing non-blocking I/O, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ + * must be returned when the operation would block. + * \returns Another negative error code on other kinds of failures. + * + * \note The callback may receive fewer bytes than the length of the + * buffer. It must always return the number of bytes actually + * received and written to the buffer. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_recv_t( void *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: receive data from the network, with timeout + * + * \note That callback must block until data is received, or the + * timeout delay expires, or the operation is interrupted by a + * signal. + * + * \param ctx Context for the receive callback (typically a file descriptor) + * \param buf Buffer to write the received data to + * \param len Length of the receive buffer + * \param timeout Maximum number of milliseconds to wait for data + * 0 means no timeout (potentially waiting forever) + * + * \return The callback must return the number of bytes received, + * or a non-zero error code: + * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT if the operation timed out, + * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if interrupted by a signal. + * + * \note The callback may receive fewer bytes than the length of the + * buffer. It must always return the number of bytes actually + * received and written to the buffer. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t( void *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + uint32_t timeout ); +/** + * \brief Callback type: set a pair of timers/delays to watch + * + * \param ctx Context pointer + * \param int_ms Intermediate delay in milliseconds + * \param fin_ms Final delay in milliseconds + * 0 cancels the current timer. + * + * \note This callback must at least store the necessary information + * for the associated \c mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t callback to + * return correct information. + * + * \note If using an event-driven style of programming, an event must + * be generated when the final delay is passed. The event must + * cause a call to \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the proper + * SSL context to be scheduled. Care must be taken to ensure + * that at most one such call happens at a time. + * + * \note Only one timer at a time must be running. Calling this + * function while a timer is running must cancel it. Cancelled + * timers must not generate any event. + */ +typedef void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t( void * ctx, + uint32_t int_ms, + uint32_t fin_ms ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: get status of timers/delays + * + * \param ctx Context pointer + * + * \return This callback must return: + * -1 if cancelled (fin_ms == 0), + * 0 if none of the delays have passed, + * 1 if only the intermediate delay has passed, + * 2 if the final delay has passed. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t( void * ctx ); + +/* Defined below */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_config mbedtls_ssl_config; + +/* Defined in ssl_internal.h */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Callback type: start external signature operation. + * + * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to start + * a signature decryption operation using an + * external processor. The parameter \p cert contains + * the public key; it is up to the callback function to + * determine how to access the associated private key. + * + * This function typically sends or enqueues a request, and + * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows + * the handshake step to be non-blocking. + * + * The parameters \p ssl and \p cert are guaranteed to remain + * valid throughout the handshake. On the other hand, this + * function must save the contents of \p hash if the value + * is needed for later processing, because the \p hash buffer + * is no longer valid after this function returns. + * + * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() + * to store an operation context for later retrieval + * by the resume or cancel callback. + * + * \note For RSA signatures, this function must produce output + * that is consistent with PKCS#1 v1.5 in the same way as + * mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(). Before the private key operation, + * apply the padding steps described in RFC 8017, section 9.2 + * "EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5" as follows. + * - If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, apply the PKCS#1 v1.5 + * encoding, treating \p hash as the DigestInfo to be + * padded. In other words, apply EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 starting + * from step 3, with `T = hash` and `tLen = hash_len`. + * - If `md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE`, apply the PKCS#1 v1.5 + * encoding, treating \p hash as the hash to be encoded and + * padded. In other words, apply EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 starting + * from step 2, with `digestAlgorithm` obtained by calling + * mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md() on \p md_alg. + * + * \note For ECDSA signatures, the output format is the DER encoding + * `Ecdsa-Sig-Value` defined in + * [RFC 4492 section 5.4](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.4). + * + * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be + * modified other than via + * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(). + * \param cert Certificate containing the public key. + * In simple cases, this is one of the pointers passed to + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() when configuring the SSL + * connection. However, if other callbacks are used, this + * property may not hold. For example, if an SNI callback + * is registered with mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(), then + * this callback determines what certificate is used. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm. + * \param hash Buffer containing the hash. This buffer is + * no longer valid when the function returns. + * \param hash_len Size of the \c hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 if the operation was started successfully and the SSL + * stack should call the resume callback immediately. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation + * was started successfully and the SSL stack should return + * immediately without calling the resume callback yet. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH if the external + * processor does not support this key. The SSL stack will + * use the private key object instead. + * \return Any other error indicates a fatal failure and is + * propagated up the call chain. The callback should + * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and must not + * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as + * directed in the documentation of this callback. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, + size_t hash_len ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: start external decryption operation. + * + * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to start + * an RSA decryption operation using an + * external processor. The parameter \p cert contains + * the public key; it is up to the callback function to + * determine how to access the associated private key. + * + * This function typically sends or enqueues a request, and + * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows + * the handshake step to be non-blocking. + * + * The parameters \p ssl and \p cert are guaranteed to remain + * valid throughout the handshake. On the other hand, this + * function must save the contents of \p input if the value + * is needed for later processing, because the \p input buffer + * is no longer valid after this function returns. + * + * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() + * to store an operation context for later retrieval + * by the resume or cancel callback. + * + * \warning RSA decryption as used in TLS is subject to a potential + * timing side channel attack first discovered by Bleichenbacher + * in 1998. This attack can be remotely exploitable + * in practice. To avoid this attack, you must ensure that + * if the callback performs an RSA decryption, the time it + * takes to execute and return the result does not depend + * on whether the RSA decryption succeeded or reported + * invalid padding. + * + * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be + * modified other than via + * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(). + * \param cert Certificate containing the public key. + * In simple cases, this is one of the pointers passed to + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() when configuring the SSL + * connection. However, if other callbacks are used, this + * property may not hold. For example, if an SNI callback + * is registered with mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(), then + * this callback determines what certificate is used. + * \param input Buffer containing the input ciphertext. This buffer + * is no longer valid when the function returns. + * \param input_len Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 if the operation was started successfully and the SSL + * stack should call the resume callback immediately. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation + * was started successfully and the SSL stack should return + * immediately without calling the resume callback yet. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH if the external + * processor does not support this key. The SSL stack will + * use the private key object instead. + * \return Any other error indicates a fatal failure and is + * propagated up the call chain. The callback should + * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and must not + * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as + * directed in the documentation of this callback. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/** + * \brief Callback type: resume external operation. + * + * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to resume + * an external operation started by the + * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t or + * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t callback. + * + * This function typically checks the status of a pending + * request or causes the request queue to make progress, and + * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows + * the handshake step to be non-blocking. + * + * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data() + * to retrieve an operation context set by the start callback. + * It may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() to modify + * this context. + * + * Note that when this function returns a status other than + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, it must free any + * resources associated with the operation. + * + * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be + * modified other than via + * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(). + * \param output Buffer containing the output (signature or decrypted + * data) on success. + * \param output_len On success, number of bytes written to \p output. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 if output of the operation is available in the + * \p output buffer. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation + * is still in progress. Subsequent requests for progress + * on the SSL connection will call the resume callback + * again. + * \return Any other error means that the operation is aborted. + * The SSL handshake is aborted. The callback should + * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and must not + * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as + * directed in the documentation of this callback. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *output, + size_t *output_len, + size_t output_size ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: cancel external operation. + * + * This callback is called if an SSL connection is closed + * while an asynchronous operation is in progress. Note that + * this callback is not called if the + * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t callback has run and has + * returned a value other than + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, since in that case + * the asynchronous operation has already completed. + * + * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data() + * to retrieve an operation context set by the start callback. + * + * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be + * modified. + */ +typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN 48 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 32 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 48 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 20 +#else +/* This is already checked in check_config.h, but be sure. */ +#error "Bad configuration - need SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-512 enabled to compute digest of peer CRT." +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED && + !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH 255 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH 4 +/* + * For code readability use a typedef for DTLS-SRTP profiles + * + * Use_srtp extension protection profiles values as defined in + * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml + * + * Reminder: if this list is expanded mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + * must be updated too. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 ( (uint16_t) 0x0001) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 ( (uint16_t) 0x0002) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80 ( (uint16_t) 0x0005) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32 ( (uint16_t) 0x0006) +/* This one is not iana defined, but for code readability. */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ( (uint16_t) 0x0000) + +typedef uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile; + +typedef struct mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info_t +{ + /*! The SRTP profile that was negotiated. */ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; + /*! The length of mki_value. */ + uint16_t mki_len; + /*! The mki_value used, with max size of 256 bytes. */ + unsigned char mki_value[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH]; +} +mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +/* + * This structure is used for storing current session data. + * + * Note: when changing this definition, we need to check and update: + * - in tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function: + * ssl_populate_session() and ssl_serialize_session_save_load() + * - in library/ssl_tls.c: + * mbedtls_ssl_session_init() and mbedtls_ssl_session_free() + * mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and ssl_session_load() + * ssl_session_copy() + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_session +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + unsigned char mfl_code; /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t start; /*!< starting time */ +#endif + int ciphersuite; /*!< chosen ciphersuite */ + int compression; /*!< chosen compression */ + size_t id_len; /*!< session id length */ + unsigned char id[32]; /*!< session identifier */ + unsigned char master[48]; /*!< the master secret */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_x509_crt *peer_cert; /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /*! The digest of the peer's end-CRT. This must be kept to detect CRT + * changes during renegotiation, mitigating the triple handshake attack. */ + unsigned char *peer_cert_digest; + size_t peer_cert_digest_len; + mbedtls_md_type_t peer_cert_digest_type; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + uint32_t verify_result; /*!< verification result */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned char *ticket; /*!< RFC 5077 session ticket */ + size_t ticket_len; /*!< session ticket length */ + uint32_t ticket_lifetime; /*!< ticket lifetime hint */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + int trunc_hmac; /*!< flag for truncated hmac activation */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ +#endif +}; + +/** + * SSL/TLS configuration to be shared between mbedtls_ssl_context structures. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_config +{ + /* Group items by size and reorder them to maximize usage of immediate offset access. */ + + /* + * Numerical settings (char) + */ + + unsigned char max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version used */ + unsigned char max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version used */ + unsigned char min_major_ver; /*!< min. major version used */ + unsigned char min_minor_ver; /*!< min. minor version used */ + + /* + * Flags (could be bit-fields to save RAM, but separate bytes make + * the code smaller on architectures with an instruction for direct + * byte access). + */ + + uint8_t endpoint /*bool*/; /*!< 0: client, 1: server */ + uint8_t transport /*bool*/; /*!< stream (TLS) or datagram (DTLS) */ + uint8_t authmode /*2 bits*/; /*!< MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_XXX */ + /* needed even with renego disabled for LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE */ + uint8_t allow_legacy_renegotiation /*2 bits*/; /*!< MBEDTLS_LEGACY_XXX */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + uint8_t arc4_disabled /*bool*/; /*!< blacklist RC4 ciphersuites? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + uint8_t mfl_code /*3 bits*/; /*!< desired fragment length */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + uint8_t encrypt_then_mac /*bool*/; /*!< negotiate encrypt-then-mac? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + uint8_t extended_ms /*bool*/; /*!< negotiate extended master secret? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + uint8_t anti_replay /*bool*/; /*!< detect and prevent replay? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + uint8_t cbc_record_splitting /*bool*/; /*!< do cbc record splitting */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + uint8_t disable_renegotiation /*bool*/; /*!< disable renegotiation? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + uint8_t trunc_hmac /*bool*/; /*!< negotiate truncated hmac? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint8_t session_tickets /*bool*/; /*!< use session tickets? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + uint8_t fallback /*bool*/; /*!< is this a fallback? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + uint8_t cert_req_ca_list /*bool*/; /*!< enable sending CA list in + Certificate Request messages? */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t ignore_unexpected_cid /*bool*/; /*!< Determines whether DTLS + * record with unexpected CID + * should lead to failure. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + uint8_t dtls_srtp_mki_support /*bool*/; /*!< support having mki_value + in the use_srtp extension? */ +#endif + + /* + * Numerical settings (int or larger) + */ + + uint32_t read_timeout; /*!< timeout for mbedtls_ssl_read (ms) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint32_t hs_timeout_min; /*!< initial value of the handshake + retransmission timeout (ms) */ + uint32_t hs_timeout_max; /*!< maximum value of the handshake + retransmission timeout (ms) */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int renego_max_records; /*!< grace period for renegotiation */ + unsigned char renego_period[8]; /*!< value of the record counters + that triggers renegotiation */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + unsigned int badmac_limit; /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned int dhm_min_bitlen; /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */ +#endif + + /* + * Pointers + */ + + const int *ciphersuite_list[4]; /*!< allowed ciphersuites per version */ + + /** Callback for printing debug output */ + void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); + void *p_dbg; /*!< context for the debug function */ + + /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */ + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */ + + /** Callback to retrieve a session from the cache */ + int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *); + /** Callback to store a session into the cache */ + int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *); + void *p_cache; /*!< context for cache callbacks */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + /** Callback for setting cert according to SNI extension */ + int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void *p_sni; /*!< context for SNI callback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *p_vrfy; /*!< context for X.509 verify calllback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /** Callback to retrieve PSK key from identity */ + int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void *p_psk; /*!< context for PSK callback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /** Callback to create & write a cookie for ClientHello verification */ + int (*f_cookie_write)( void *, unsigned char **, unsigned char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t ); + /** Callback to verify validity of a ClientHello cookie */ + int (*f_cookie_check)( void *, const unsigned char *, size_t, + const unsigned char *, size_t ); + void *p_cookie; /*!< context for the cookie callbacks */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /** Callback to create & write a session ticket */ + int (*f_ticket_write)( void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *, + unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t *, uint32_t * ); + /** Callback to parse a session ticket into a session structure */ + int (*f_ticket_parse)( void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *p_ticket; /*!< context for the ticket callbacks */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + /** Callback to export key block and master secret */ + int (*f_export_keys)( void *, const unsigned char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t, size_t, size_t ); + /** Callback to export key block, master secret, + * tls_prf and random bytes. Should replace f_export_keys */ + int (*f_export_keys_ext)( void *, const unsigned char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t, size_t, size_t, + const unsigned char[32], const unsigned char[32], + mbedtls_tls_prf_types ); + void *p_export_keys; /*!< context for key export callback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + size_t cid_len; /*!< The length of CIDs for incoming DTLS records. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *cert_profile; /*!< verification profile */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< own certificate/key pair(s) */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs */ + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb; + void *p_ca_cb; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign_start; /*!< start asynchronous signature operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt_start; /*!< start asynchronous decryption operation */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume; /*!< resume asynchronous operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel; /*!< cancel asynchronous operation */ + void *p_async_config_data; /*!< Configuration data set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + const int *sig_hashes; /*!< allowed signature hashes */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list; /*!< allowed curves */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_mpi dhm_P; /*!< prime modulus for DHM */ + mbedtls_mpi dhm_G; /*!< generator for DHM */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK. This field + * should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * If either no PSK or a raw PSK have been + * configured, this has value \c 0. + */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + unsigned char *psk; /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should + * only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * If either no PSK or an opaque PSK + * have been configured, this has value NULL. */ + size_t psk_len; /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * Its value is non-zero if and only if + * \c psk is not \c NULL. */ + + unsigned char *psk_identity; /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * This is set if and only if either + * \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */ + size_t psk_identity_len;/*!< The length of PSK identity. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * Its value is non-zero if and only if + * \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque + * is not \c 0. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + const char **alpn_list; /*!< ordered list of protocols */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + /*! ordered list of supported srtp profile */ + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *dtls_srtp_profile_list; + /*! number of supported profiles */ + size_t dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +}; + +struct mbedtls_ssl_context +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf; /*!< configuration information */ + + /* + * Miscellaneous + */ + int state; /*!< SSL handshake: current state */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int renego_status; /*!< Initial, in progress, pending? */ + int renego_records_seen; /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS, + number of retransmissions of request if + renego_max_records is < 0 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + int major_ver; /*!< equal to MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 */ + int minor_ver; /*!< either 0 (SSL3) or 1 (TLS1.0) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + unsigned badmac_seen; /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *p_vrfy; /*!< context for X.509 verify callback */ +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send; /*!< Callback for network send */ + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv; /*!< Callback for network receive */ + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout; + /*!< Callback for network receive with timeout */ + + void *p_bio; /*!< context for I/O operations */ + + /* + * Session layer + */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session_in; /*!< current session data (in) */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session_out; /*!< current session data (out) */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session; /*!< negotiated session data */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session_negotiate; /*!< session data in negotiation */ + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake; /*!< params required only during + the handshake process */ + + /* + * Record layer transformations + */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_in; /*!< current transform params (in) */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_out; /*!< current transform params (in) */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform; /*!< negotiated transform params */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_negotiate; /*!< transform params in negotiation */ + + /* + * Timers + */ + void *p_timer; /*!< context for the timer callbacks */ + + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer; /*!< set timer callback */ + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer; /*!< get timer callback */ + + /* + * Record layer (incoming data) + */ + unsigned char *in_buf; /*!< input buffer */ + unsigned char *in_ctr; /*!< 64-bit incoming message counter + TLS: maintained by us + DTLS: read from peer */ + unsigned char *in_hdr; /*!< start of record header */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char *in_cid; /*!< The start of the CID; + * (the end is marked by in_len). */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + unsigned char *in_len; /*!< two-bytes message length field */ + unsigned char *in_iv; /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ + unsigned char *in_msg; /*!< message contents (in_iv+ivlen) */ + unsigned char *in_offt; /*!< read offset in application data */ + + int in_msgtype; /*!< record header: message type */ + size_t in_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */ + size_t in_left; /*!< amount of data read so far */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len; /*!< length of input buffer */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint16_t in_epoch; /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */ + size_t next_record_offset; /*!< offset of the next record in datagram + (equal to in_left if none) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + uint64_t in_window_top; /*!< last validated record seq_num */ + uint64_t in_window; /*!< bitmask for replay detection */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + + size_t in_hslen; /*!< current handshake message length, + including the handshake header */ + int nb_zero; /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */ + + int keep_current_message; /*!< drop or reuse current message + on next call to record layer? */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint8_t disable_datagram_packing; /*!< Disable packing multiple records + * within a single datagram. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Record layer (outgoing data) + */ + unsigned char *out_buf; /*!< output buffer */ + unsigned char *out_ctr; /*!< 64-bit outgoing message counter */ + unsigned char *out_hdr; /*!< start of record header */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char *out_cid; /*!< The start of the CID; + * (the end is marked by in_len). */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + unsigned char *out_len; /*!< two-bytes message length field */ + unsigned char *out_iv; /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ + unsigned char *out_msg; /*!< message contents (out_iv+ivlen) */ + + int out_msgtype; /*!< record header: message type */ + size_t out_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */ + size_t out_left; /*!< amount of data not yet written */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len; /*!< length of output buffer */ +#endif + + unsigned char cur_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint16_t mtu; /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + unsigned char *compress_buf; /*!< zlib data buffer */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + signed char split_done; /*!< current record already split? */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ + + /* + * PKI layer + */ + int client_auth; /*!< flag for client auth. */ + + /* + * User settings + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + char *hostname; /*!< expected peer CN for verification + (and SNI if available) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + const char *alpn_chosen; /*!< negotiated protocol */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + /* + * use_srtp extension + */ + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info dtls_srtp_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + + /* + * Information for DTLS hello verify + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + unsigned char *cli_id; /*!< transport-level ID of the client */ + size_t cli_id_len; /*!< length of cli_id */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + /* + * Secure renegotiation + */ + /* needed to know when to send extension on server */ + int secure_renegotiation; /*!< does peer support legacy or + secure renegotiation */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + size_t verify_data_len; /*!< length of verify data stored */ + char own_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ + char peer_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* CID configuration to use in subsequent handshakes. */ + + /*! The next incoming CID, chosen by the user and applying to + * all subsequent handshakes. This may be different from the + * CID currently used in case the user has re-configured the CID + * after an initial handshake. */ + unsigned char own_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ]; + uint8_t own_cid_len; /*!< The length of \c own_cid. */ + uint8_t negotiate_cid; /*!< This indicates whether the CID extension should + * be negotiated in the next handshake or not. + * Possible values are #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED + * and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT( 1 ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ + +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, + size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, + size_t ivlen, + const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, + size_t maclen); +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int direction ); +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + +/** + * \brief Return the name of the ciphersuite associated with the + * given ID + * + * \param ciphersuite_id SSL ciphersuite ID + * + * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name + */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( const int ciphersuite_id ); + +/** + * \brief Return the ID of the ciphersuite associated with the + * given name + * + * \param ciphersuite_name SSL ciphersuite name + * + * \return the ID with the ciphersuite or 0 if not found + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( const char *ciphersuite_name ); + +/** + * \brief Initialize an SSL context + * Just makes the context ready for mbedtls_ssl_setup() or + * mbedtls_ssl_free() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Set up an SSL context for use + * + * \note No copy of the configuration context is made, it can be + * shared by many mbedtls_ssl_context structures. + * + * \warning The conf structure will be accessed during the session. + * It must not be modified or freed as long as the session + * is active. + * + * \warning This function must be called exactly once per context. + * Calling mbedtls_ssl_setup again is not supported, even + * if no session is active. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param conf SSL configuration to use + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if + * memory allocation failed + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ); + +/** + * \brief Reset an already initialized SSL context for re-use + * while retaining application-set variables, function + * pointers and data. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Set the current endpoint type + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param endpoint must be MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint ); + +/** + * \brief Set the transport type (TLS or DTLS). + * Default: TLS + * + * \note For DTLS, you must either provide a recv callback that + * doesn't block, or one that handles timeouts, see + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). You also need to provide timer + * callbacks with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param transport transport type: + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM for TLS, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM for DTLS. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport ); + +/** + * \brief Set the certificate verification mode + * Default: NONE on server, REQUIRED on client + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param authmode can be: + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE: peer certificate is not checked + * (default on server) + * (insecure on client) + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL: peer certificate is checked, however the + * handshake continues even if verification failed; + * mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() can be called after the + * handshake is complete. + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED: peer *must* present a valid certificate, + * handshake is aborted if verification failed. + * (default on client) + * + * \note On client, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED is the recommended mode. + * With MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL, the user needs to call mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() at + * the right time(s), which may not be obvious, while REQUIRED always perform + * the verification as soon as possible. For example, REQUIRED was protecting + * against the "triple handshake" attack even before it was found. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Set the verification callback (Optional). + * + * If set, the provided verify callback is called for each + * certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted + * root. For more information, please see the documentation of + * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(). + * + * \note For per context callbacks and contexts, please use + * mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() instead. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to use. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification. + * \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/** + * \brief Set the random number generator callback + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Set the debug callback + * + * The callback has the following argument: + * void * opaque context for the callback + * int debug level + * const char * file name + * int line number + * const char * message + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param f_dbg debug function + * \param p_dbg debug parameter + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), + void *p_dbg ); + +/** + * \brief Set the underlying BIO callbacks for write, read and + * read-with-timeout. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param p_bio parameter (context) shared by BIO callbacks + * \param f_send write callback + * \param f_recv read callback + * \param f_recv_timeout blocking read callback with timeout. + * + * \note One of f_recv or f_recv_timeout can be NULL, in which case + * the other is used. If both are non-NULL, f_recv_timeout is + * used and f_recv is ignored (as if it were NULL). + * + * \note The two most common use cases are: + * - non-blocking I/O, f_recv != NULL, f_recv_timeout == NULL + * - blocking I/O, f_recv == NULL, f_recv_timeout != NULL + * + * \note For DTLS, you need to provide either a non-NULL + * f_recv_timeout callback, or a f_recv that doesn't block. + * + * \note See the documentations of \c mbedtls_ssl_send_t, + * \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_t and \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t for + * the conventions those callbacks must follow. + * + * \note On some platforms, net_sockets.c provides + * \c mbedtls_net_send(), \c mbedtls_net_recv() and + * \c mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() that are suitable to be used + * here. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_bio, + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + + +/** + * \brief Configure the use of the Connection ID (CID) + * extension in the next handshake. + * + * Reference: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * The DTLS CID extension allows the reliable association of + * DTLS records to DTLS connections across changes in the + * underlying transport (changed IP and Port metadata) by + * adding explicit connection identifiers (CIDs) to the + * headers of encrypted DTLS records. The desired CIDs are + * configured by the application layer and are exchanged in + * new `ClientHello` / `ServerHello` extensions during the + * handshake, where each side indicates the CID it wants the + * peer to use when writing encrypted messages. The CIDs are + * put to use once records get encrypted: the stack discards + * any incoming records that don't include the configured CID + * in their header, and adds the peer's requested CID to the + * headers of outgoing messages. + * + * This API enables or disables the use of the CID extension + * in the next handshake and sets the value of the CID to + * be used for incoming messages. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to configure. This must be initialized. + * \param enable This value determines whether the CID extension should + * be used or not. Possible values are: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED to enable the use of the CID. + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED (default) to disable the use + * of the CID. + * \param own_cid The address of the readable buffer holding the CID we want + * the peer to use when sending encrypted messages to us. + * This may be \c NULL if \p own_cid_len is \c 0. + * This parameter is unused if \p enabled is set to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. + * \param own_cid_len The length of \p own_cid. + * This parameter is unused if \p enabled is set to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. + * + * \note The value of \p own_cid_len must match the value of the + * \c len parameter passed to mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid() + * when configuring the ::mbedtls_ssl_config that \p ssl + * is bound to. + * + * \note This CID configuration applies to subsequent handshakes + * performed on the SSL context \p ssl, but does not trigger + * one. You still have to call `mbedtls_ssl_handshake()` + * (for the initial handshake) or `mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate()` + * (for a renegotiation handshake) explicitly after a + * successful call to this function to run the handshake. + * + * \note This call cannot guarantee that the use of the CID + * will be successfully negotiated in the next handshake, + * because the peer might not support it. Specifically: + * - On the Client, enabling the use of the CID through + * this call implies that the `ClientHello` in the next + * handshake will include the CID extension, thereby + * offering the use of the CID to the server. Only if + * the `ServerHello` contains the CID extension, too, + * the CID extension will actually be put to use. + * - On the Server, enabling the use of the CID through + * this call implies that that the server will look for + * the CID extension in a `ClientHello` from the client, + * and, if present, reply with a CID extension in its + * `ServerHello`. + * + * \note To check whether the use of the CID was negotiated + * after the subsequent handshake has completed, please + * use the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(). + * + * \warning If the use of the CID extension is enabled in this call + * and the subsequent handshake negotiates its use, Mbed TLS + * will silently drop every packet whose CID does not match + * the CID configured in \p own_cid. It is the responsibility + * of the user to adapt the underlying transport to take care + * of CID-based demultiplexing before handing datagrams to + * Mbed TLS. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the CID configuration + * applies to the next handshake. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int enable, + unsigned char const *own_cid, + size_t own_cid_len ); + +/** + * \brief Get information about the use of the CID extension + * in the current connection. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to query. + * \param enabled The address at which to store whether the CID extension + * is currently in use or not. If the CID is in use, + * `*enabled` is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + * otherwise, it is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. + * \param peer_cid The address of the buffer in which to store the CID + * chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used). + * This may be \c NULL in case the value of peer CID + * isn't needed. If it is not \c NULL, \p peer_cid_len + * must not be \c NULL. + * \param peer_cid_len The address at which to store the size of the CID + * chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used). + * This is also the number of Bytes in \p peer_cid that + * have been written. + * This may be \c NULL in case the length of the peer CID + * isn't needed. If it is \c NULL, \p peer_cid must be + * \c NULL, too. + * + * \note This applies to the state of the CID negotiated in + * the last complete handshake. If a handshake is in + * progress, this function will attempt to complete + * the handshake first. + * + * \note If CID extensions have been exchanged but both client + * and server chose to use an empty CID, this function + * sets `*enabled` to #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED + * (the rationale for this is that the resulting + * communication is the same as if the CID extensions + * hadn't been used). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ], + size_t *peer_cid_len ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +/** + * \brief Set the Maximum Transport Unit (MTU). + * Special value: 0 means unset (no limit). + * This represents the maximum size of a datagram payload + * handled by the transport layer (usually UDP) as determined + * by the network link and stack. In practice, this controls + * the maximum size datagram the DTLS layer will pass to the + * \c f_send() callback set using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). + * + * \note The limit on datagram size is converted to a limit on + * record payload by subtracting the current overhead of + * encapsulation and encryption/authentication if any. + * + * \note This can be called at any point during the connection, for + * example when a Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU) + * estimate becomes available from other sources, + * such as lower (or higher) protocol layers. + * + * \note This setting only controls the size of the packets we send, + * and does not restrict the size of the datagrams we're + * willing to receive. Client-side, you can request the + * server to use smaller records with \c + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(). + * + * \note If both a MTU and a maximum fragment length have been + * configured (or negotiated with the peer), the resulting + * lower limit on record payload (see first note) is used. + * + * \note This can only be used to decrease the maximum size + * of datagrams (hence records, see first note) sent. It + * cannot be used to increase the maximum size of records over + * the limit set by #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN. + * + * \note Values lower than the current record layer expansion will + * result in an error when trying to send data. + * + * \note Using record compression together with a non-zero MTU value + * will result in an error when trying to send data. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param mtu Value of the path MTU in bytes + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Set a connection-specific verification callback (optional). + * + * If set, the provided verify callback is called for each + * certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted + * root. For more information, please see the documentation of + * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(). + * + * \note This call is analogous to mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() but + * binds the verification callback and context to an SSL context + * as opposed to an SSL configuration. + * If mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() and mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() + * are both used, mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() takes precedence. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification. + * \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/** + * \brief Set the timeout period for mbedtls_ssl_read() + * (Default: no timeout.) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \param timeout Timeout value in milliseconds. + * Use 0 for no timeout (default). + * + * \note With blocking I/O, this will only work if a non-NULL + * \c f_recv_timeout was set with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). + * With non-blocking I/O, this will only work if timer + * callbacks were set with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(). + * + * \note With non-blocking I/O, you may also skip this function + * altogether and handle timeouts at the application layer. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) +/** + * \brief Check whether a buffer contains a valid and authentic record + * that has not been seen before. (DTLS only). + * + * This function does not change the user-visible state + * of the SSL context. Its sole purpose is to provide + * an indication of the legitimacy of an incoming record. + * + * This can be useful e.g. in distributed server environments + * using the DTLS Connection ID feature, in which connections + * might need to be passed between service instances on a change + * of peer address, but where such disruptive operations should + * only happen after the validity of incoming records has been + * confirmed. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * \param buf The address of the buffer holding the record to be checked. + * This must be a read/write buffer of length \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \note This routine only checks whether the provided buffer begins + * with a valid and authentic record that has not been seen + * before, but does not check potential data following the + * initial record. In particular, it is possible to pass DTLS + * datagrams containing multiple records, in which case only + * the first record is checked. + * + * \note This function modifies the input buffer \p buf. If you need + * to preserve the original record, you have to maintain a copy. + * + * \return \c 0 if the record is valid and authentic and has not been + * seen before. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if the check completed + * successfully but the record was found to be not authentic. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the check completed + * successfully but the record was found to be invalid for + * a reason different from authenticity checking. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD if the check completed + * successfully but the record was found to be unexpected + * in the state of the SSL context, including replayed records. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + * In this case, the SSL context becomes unusable and needs + * to be freed or reset before reuse. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ + +/** + * \brief Set the timer callbacks (Mandatory for DTLS.) + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param p_timer parameter (context) shared by timer callbacks + * \param f_set_timer set timer callback + * \param f_get_timer get timer callback. Must return: + * + * \note See the documentation of \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t and + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t for the conventions this pair of + * callbacks must follow. + * + * \note On some platforms, timing.c provides + * \c mbedtls_timing_set_delay() and + * \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay() that are suitable for using + * here, except if using an event-driven style. + * + * \note See also the "DTLS tutorial" article in our knowledge base. + * https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/dtls-tutorial + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: generate and write session ticket + * + * \note This describes what a callback implementation should do. + * This callback should generate an encrypted and + * authenticated ticket for the session and write it to the + * output buffer. Here, ticket means the opaque ticket part + * of the NewSessionTicket structure of RFC 5077. + * + * \param p_ticket Context for the callback + * \param session SSL session to be written in the ticket + * \param start Start of the output buffer + * \param end End of the output buffer + * \param tlen On exit, holds the length written + * \param lifetime On exit, holds the lifetime of the ticket in seconds + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t( void *p_ticket, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *tlen, + uint32_t *lifetime ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +/** + * \brief Callback type: Export key block and master secret + * + * \note This is required for certain uses of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS + * (RFC 5216) and Thread. The key pointers are ephemeral and + * therefore must not be stored. The master secret and keys + * should not be used directly except as an input to a key + * derivation function. + * + * \param p_expkey Context for the callback + * \param ms Pointer to master secret (fixed length: 48 bytes) + * \param kb Pointer to key block, see RFC 5246 section 6.3 + * (variable length: 2 * maclen + 2 * keylen + 2 * ivlen). + * \param maclen MAC length + * \param keylen Key length + * \param ivlen IV length + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t( void *p_expkey, + const unsigned char *ms, + const unsigned char *kb, + size_t maclen, + size_t keylen, + size_t ivlen ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: Export key block, master secret, + * handshake randbytes and the tls_prf function + * used to derive keys. + * + * \note This is required for certain uses of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS + * (RFC 5216) and Thread. The key pointers are ephemeral and + * therefore must not be stored. The master secret and keys + * should not be used directly except as an input to a key + * derivation function. + * + * \param p_expkey Context for the callback. + * \param ms Pointer to master secret (fixed length: 48 bytes). + * \param kb Pointer to key block, see RFC 5246 section 6.3. + * (variable length: 2 * maclen + 2 * keylen + 2 * ivlen). + * \param maclen MAC length. + * \param keylen Key length. + * \param ivlen IV length. + * \param client_random The client random bytes. + * \param server_random The server random bytes. + * \param tls_prf_type The tls_prf enum type. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t( void *p_expkey, + const unsigned char *ms, + const unsigned char *kb, + size_t maclen, + size_t keylen, + size_t ivlen, + const unsigned char client_random[32], + const unsigned char server_random[32], + mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +/** + * \brief Callback type: parse and load session ticket + * + * \note This describes what a callback implementation should do. + * This callback should parse a session ticket as generated + * by the corresponding mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t function, + * and, if the ticket is authentic and valid, load the + * session. + * + * \note The implementation is allowed to modify the first len + * bytes of the input buffer, eg to use it as a temporary + * area for the decrypted ticket contents. + * + * \param p_ticket Context for the callback + * \param session SSL session to be loaded + * \param buf Start of the buffer containing the ticket + * \param len Length of the ticket. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if not authentic, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED if expired, or + * any other non-zero code for other failures. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t( void *p_ticket, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Configure SSL session ticket callbacks (server only). + * (Default: none.) + * + * \note On server, session tickets are enabled by providing + * non-NULL callbacks. + * + * \note On client, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \param f_ticket_write Callback for writing a ticket + * \param f_ticket_parse Callback for parsing a ticket + * \param p_ticket Context shared by the two callbacks + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, + void *p_ticket ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +/** + * \brief Configure key export callback. + * (Default: none.) + * + * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \param f_export_keys Callback for exporting keys + * \param p_export_keys Context for the callback + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, + void *p_export_keys ); + +/** + * \brief Configure extended key export callback. + * (Default: none.) + * + * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t. + * \warning Exported key material must not be used for any purpose + * before the (D)TLS handshake is completed + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \param f_export_keys_ext Callback for exporting keys + * \param p_export_keys Context for the callback + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t *f_export_keys_ext, + void *p_export_keys ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +/** + * \brief Configure asynchronous private key operation callbacks. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \param f_async_sign Callback to start a signature operation. See + * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t + * for more information. This may be \c NULL if the + * external processor does not support any signature + * operation; in this case the private key object + * associated with the certificate will be used. + * \param f_async_decrypt Callback to start a decryption operation. See + * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t + * for more information. This may be \c NULL if the + * external processor does not support any decryption + * operation; in this case the private key object + * associated with the certificate will be used. + * \param f_async_resume Callback to resume an asynchronous operation. See + * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t + * for more information. This may not be \c NULL unless + * \p f_async_sign and \p f_async_decrypt are both + * \c NULL. + * \param f_async_cancel Callback to cancel an asynchronous operation. See + * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t + * for more information. This may be \c NULL if + * no cleanup is needed. + * \param config_data A pointer to configuration data which can be + * retrieved with + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(). The + * library stores this value without dereferencing it. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign, + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt, + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume, + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel, + void *config_data ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the configuration data set by + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \return The configuration data set by + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). + */ +void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the asynchronous operation user context. + * + * \note This function may only be called while a handshake + * is in progress. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to access. + * + * \return The asynchronous operation user context that was last + * set during the current handshake. If + * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() has not yet been + * called during the current handshake, this function returns + * \c NULL. + */ +void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the asynchronous operation user context. + * + * \note This function may only be called while a handshake + * is in progress. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to access. + * \param ctx The new value of the asynchronous operation user context. + * Call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data() later during the + * same handshake to retrieve this value. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +/** + * \brief Callback type: generate a cookie + * + * \param ctx Context for the callback + * \param p Buffer to write to, + * must be updated to point right after the cookie + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the output buffer + * \param info Client ID info that was passed to + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id() + * \param ilen Length of info in bytes + * + * \return The callback must return 0 on success, + * or a negative error code. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t( void *ctx, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen ); + +/** + * \brief Callback type: verify a cookie + * + * \param ctx Context for the callback + * \param cookie Cookie to verify + * \param clen Length of cookie + * \param info Client ID info that was passed to + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id() + * \param ilen Length of info in bytes + * + * \return The callback must return 0 if cookie is valid, + * or a negative error code. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *cookie, size_t clen, + const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Register callbacks for DTLS cookies + * (Server only. DTLS only.) + * + * Default: dummy callbacks that fail, in order to force you to + * register working callbacks (and initialize their context). + * + * To disable HelloVerifyRequest, register NULL callbacks. + * + * \warning Disabling hello verification allows your server to be used + * for amplification in DoS attacks against other hosts. + * Only disable if you known this can't happen in your + * particular environment. + * + * \note See comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() about handling + * the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED that is expected + * on the first handshake attempt when this is enabled. + * + * \note This is also necessary to handle client reconnection from + * the same port as described in RFC 6347 section 4.2.8 (only + * the variant with cookies is supported currently). See + * comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_read() for details. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param f_cookie_write Cookie write callback + * \param f_cookie_check Cookie check callback + * \param p_cookie Context for both callbacks + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, + void *p_cookie ); + +/** + * \brief Set client's transport-level identification info. + * (Server only. DTLS only.) + * + * This is usually the IP address (and port), but could be + * anything identify the client depending on the underlying + * network stack. Used for HelloVerifyRequest with DTLS. + * This is *not* used to route the actual packets. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param info Transport-level info identifying the client (eg IP + port) + * \param ilen Length of info in bytes + * + * \note An internal copy is made, so the info buffer can be reused. + * + * \return 0 on success, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used on client, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if out of memory. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *info, + size_t ilen ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +/** + * \brief Enable or disable anti-replay protection for DTLS. + * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.) + * Default: enabled. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param mode MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED. + * + * \warning Disabling this is a security risk unless the application + * protocol handles duplicated packets in a safe way. You + * should not disable this without careful consideration. + * However, if your application already detects duplicated + * packets and needs information about them to adjust its + * transmission strategy, then you'll want to disable this. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) +/** + * \brief Set a limit on the number of records with a bad MAC + * before terminating the connection. + * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.) + * Default: 0 (disabled). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param limit Limit, or 0 to disable. + * + * \note If the limit is N, then the connection is terminated when + * the Nth non-authentic record is seen. + * + * \note Records with an invalid header are not counted, only the + * ones going through the authentication-decryption phase. + * + * \note This is a security trade-off related to the fact that it's + * often relatively easy for an active attacker to inject UDP + * datagrams. On one hand, setting a low limit here makes it + * easier for such an attacker to forcibly terminated a + * connection. On the other hand, a high limit or no limit + * might make us waste resources checking authentication on + * many bogus packets. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +/** + * \brief Allow or disallow packing of multiple handshake records + * within a single datagram. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to configure. + * \param allow_packing This determines whether datagram packing may + * be used or not. A value of \c 0 means that every + * record will be sent in a separate datagram; a + * value of \c 1 means that, if space permits, + * multiple handshake messages (including CCS) belonging to + * a single flight may be packed within a single datagram. + * + * \note This is enabled by default and should only be disabled + * for test purposes, or if datagram packing causes + * interoperability issues with peers that don't support it. + * + * \note Allowing datagram packing reduces the network load since + * there's less overhead if multiple messages share the same + * datagram. Also, it increases the handshake efficiency + * since messages belonging to a single datagram will not + * be reordered in transit, and so future message buffering + * or flight retransmission (if no buffering is used) as + * means to deal with reordering are needed less frequently. + * + * \note Application records are not affected by this option and + * are currently always sent in separate datagrams. + * + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned allow_packing ); + +/** + * \brief Set retransmit timeout values for the DTLS handshake. + * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param min Initial timeout value in milliseconds. + * Default: 1000 (1 second). + * \param max Maximum timeout value in milliseconds. + * Default: 60000 (60 seconds). + * + * \note Default values are from RFC 6347 section 4.2.4.1. + * + * \note The 'min' value should typically be slightly above the + * expected round-trip time to your peer, plus whatever time + * it takes for the peer to process the message. For example, + * if your RTT is about 600ms and you peer needs up to 1s to + * do the cryptographic operations in the handshake, then you + * should set 'min' slightly above 1600. Lower values of 'min' + * might cause spurious resends which waste network resources, + * while larger value of 'min' will increase overall latency + * on unreliable network links. + * + * \note The more unreliable your network connection is, the larger + * your max / min ratio needs to be in order to achieve + * reliable handshakes. + * + * \note Messages are retransmitted up to log2(ceil(max/min)) times. + * For example, if min = 1s and max = 5s, the retransmit plan + * goes: send ... 1s -> resend ... 2s -> resend ... 4s -> + * resend ... 5s -> give up and return a timeout error. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t min, uint32_t max ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Set the session cache callbacks (server-side only) + * If not set, no session resuming is done (except if session + * tickets are enabled too). + * + * The session cache has the responsibility to check for stale + * entries based on timeout. See RFC 5246 for recommendations. + * + * Warning: session.peer_cert is cleared by the SSL/TLS layer on + * connection shutdown, so do not cache the pointer! Either set + * it to NULL or make a full copy of the certificate. + * + * The get callback is called once during the initial handshake + * to enable session resuming. The get function has the + * following parameters: (void *parameter, mbedtls_ssl_session *session) + * If a valid entry is found, it should fill the master of + * the session object with the cached values and return 0, + * return 1 otherwise. Optionally peer_cert can be set as well + * if it is properly present in cache entry. + * + * The set callback is called once during the initial handshake + * to enable session resuming after the entire handshake has + * been finished. The set function has the following parameters: + * (void *parameter, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session). The function + * should create a cache entry for future retrieval based on + * the data in the session structure and should keep in mind + * that the mbedtls_ssl_session object presented (and all its referenced + * data) is cleared by the SSL/TLS layer when the connection is + * terminated. It is recommended to add metadata to determine if + * an entry is still valid in the future. Return 0 if + * successfully cached, return 1 otherwise. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param p_cache parameter (context) for both callbacks + * \param f_get_cache session get callback + * \param f_set_cache session set callback + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void *p_cache, + int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *), + int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/** + * \brief Request resumption of session (client-side only) + * Session data is copied from presented session structure. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param session session context + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or + * arguments are otherwise invalid + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_session() + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/** + * \brief Load serialized session data into a session structure. + * On client, this can be used for loading saved sessions + * before resuming them with mbedtls_ssl_set_session(). + * On server, this can be used for alternative implementations + * of session cache or session tickets. + * + * \warning If a peer certificate chain is associated with the session, + * the serialized state will only contain the peer's + * end-entity certificate and the result of the chain + * verification (unless verification was disabled), but not + * the rest of the chain. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * \see mbedtls_ssl_set_session() + * + * \param session The session structure to be populated. It must have been + * initialised with mbedtls_ssl_session_init() but not + * populated yet. + * \param buf The buffer holding the serialized session data. It must be a + * readable buffer of at least \p len bytes. + * \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data + * was generated in a different version or configuration of + * Mbed TLS. + * \return Another negative value for other kinds of errors (for + * example, unsupported features in the embedded certificate). + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Save session structure as serialized data in a buffer. + * On client, this can be used for saving session data, + * potentially in non-volatile storage, for resuming later. + * On server, this can be used for alternative implementations + * of session cache or session tickets. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_load() + * \see mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer() + * + * \param session The session structure to be saved. + * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a + * writeable buffer of at least \p len bytes, or may be \c + * NULL if \p len is \c 0. + * \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf. + * \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have + * been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t. + * + * \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of + * whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible + * to determine the necessary size by calling this function + * with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ); + +/** + * \brief Get a pointer to the current session structure, for example + * to serialize it. + * + * \warning Ownership of the session remains with the SSL context, and + * the returned pointer is only guaranteed to be valid until + * the next API call operating on the same \p ssl context. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * + * \param ssl The SSL context. + * + * \return A pointer to the current session if successful. + * \return \c NULL if no session is active. + */ +const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the preference + * order. First in the list has the highest preference. + * (Overrides all version-specific lists) + * + * The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain + * valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config. + * + * Note: The server uses its own preferences + * over the preference of the client unless + * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE is defined! + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *ciphersuites ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL 1 +/** + * \brief Specify the length of Connection IDs for incoming + * encrypted DTLS records, as well as the behaviour + * on unexpected CIDs. + * + * By default, the CID length is set to \c 0, + * and unexpected CIDs are silently ignored. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to modify. + * \param len The length in Bytes of the CID fields in encrypted + * DTLS records using the CID mechanism. This must + * not be larger than #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX. + * \param ignore_other_cids This determines the stack's behaviour when + * receiving a record with an unexpected CID. + * Possible values are: + * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE + * In this case, the record is silently ignored. + * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL + * In this case, the stack fails with the specific + * error code #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID. + * + * \note The CID specification allows implementations to either + * use a common length for all incoming connection IDs or + * allow variable-length incoming IDs. Mbed TLS currently + * requires a common length for all connections sharing the + * same SSL configuration; this allows simpler parsing of + * record headers. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p own_cid_len + * is too large. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, size_t len, + int ignore_other_cids ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +/** + * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the + * preference order for a specific version of the protocol. + * (Only useful on the server side) + * + * The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain + * valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites + * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 + * supported) + * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * + * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 + * and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *ciphersuites, + int major, int minor ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Set the X.509 security profile used for verification + * + * \note The restrictions are enforced for all certificates in the + * chain. However, signatures in the handshake are not covered + * by this setting but by \b mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param profile Profile to use + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile ); + +/** + * \brief Set the data required to verify peer certificate + * + * \note See \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for notes regarding the + * parameters ca_chain (maps to trust_ca for that function) + * and ca_crl. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs) + * \param ca_crl trusted CA CRLs + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +/** + * \brief Set the trusted certificate callback. + * + * This API allows to register the set of trusted certificates + * through a callback, instead of a linked list as configured + * by mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(). + * + * This is useful for example in contexts where a large number + * of CAs are used, and the inefficiency of maintaining them + * in a linked list cannot be tolerated. It is also useful when + * the set of trusted CAs needs to be modified frequently. + * + * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t` for + * more information. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with. + * \param f_ca_cb The trusted certificate callback to use when verifying + * certificate chains. + * \param p_ca_cb The context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb (for example, + * a reference to a trusted CA database). + * + * \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(): + * Any call to this function overwrites the values set through + * earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() or + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(). + * + * \note This API is incompatible with CA indication in + * CertificateRequest messages: A server-side SSL context which + * is bound to an SSL configuration that uses a CA callback + * configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), and which requires + * client authentication, will send an empty CA list in the + * corresponding CertificateRequest message. + * + * \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(): + * If an SSL context is bound to an SSL configuration which uses + * CA callbacks configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), then + * calls to mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() have no effect. + * + * \note The use of this API disables the use of restartable ECC + * during X.509 CRT signature verification (but doesn't affect + * other uses). + * + * \warning This API is incompatible with the use of CRLs. Any call to + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() unsets CRLs configured through + * earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(). + * + * \warning In multi-threaded environments, the callback \p f_ca_cb + * must be thread-safe, and it is the user's responsibility + * to guarantee this (for example through a mutex + * contained in the callback context pointed to by \p p_ca_cb). + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +/** + * \brief Set own certificate chain and private key + * + * \note own_cert should contain in order from the bottom up your + * certificate chain. The top certificate (self-signed) + * can be omitted. + * + * \note On server, this function can be called multiple times to + * provision more than one cert/key pair (eg one ECDSA, one + * RSA with SHA-256, one RSA with SHA-1). An adequate + * certificate will be selected according to the client's + * advertised capabilities. In case multiple certificates are + * adequate, preference is given to the one set by the first + * call to this function, then second, etc. + * + * \note On client, only the first call has any effect. That is, + * only one client certificate can be provisioned. The + * server's preferences in its CertificateRequest message will + * be ignored and our only cert will be sent regardless of + * whether it matches those preferences - the server can then + * decide what it wants to do with it. + * + * \note The provided \p pk_key needs to match the public key in the + * first certificate in \p own_cert, or all handshakes using + * that certificate will fail. It is your responsibility + * to ensure that; this function will not perform any check. + * You may use mbedtls_pk_check_pair() in order to perform + * this check yourself, but be aware that this function can + * be computationally expensive on some key types. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param own_cert own public certificate chain + * \param pk_key own private key + * + * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Configure a pre-shared key (PSK) and identity + * to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * + * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually + * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead. + * + * \note A PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback + * takes precedence over a PSK configured by this function. + * + * \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key. + * Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() more + * than once will overwrite values configured in previous calls. + * Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting + * one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature, + * but feedback is welcomed. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with. + * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key to use. + * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes. + * \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity. + * \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity + * in bytes. + * + * \note The PSK and its identity are copied internally and + * hence need not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime + * of the SSL configuration. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Configure an opaque pre-shared key (PSK) and identity + * to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * + * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually + * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead. + * + * \note An opaque PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in + * the PSK callback takes precedence over an opaque PSK + * configured by this function. + * + * \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key. + * Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() more than + * once will overwrite values configured in previous calls. + * Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting + * one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature, + * but feedback is welcomed. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with. + * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK. + * Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully + * called again, the key slot \p psk must be populated with a + * key of type PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy + * allows its use for the key derivation algorithm applied + * in the handshake. + * \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity. + * \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity + * in bytes. + * + * \note The PSK identity hint is copied internally and hence need + * not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime of the + * SSL configuration. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + psa_key_id_t psk, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/** + * \brief Set the pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake. + * + * \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback, + * i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(). + * + * \note A PSK set by this function takes precedence over a PSK + * configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for. + * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key. + * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Set an opaque pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake. + * + * \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback, + * i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(). + * + * \note An opaque PSK set by this function takes precedence over an + * opaque PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for. + * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK. + * For the duration of the current handshake, the key slot + * must be populated with a key of type + * PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy allows its + * use for the key derivation algorithm + * applied in the handshake. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_key_id_t psk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/** + * \brief Set the PSK callback (server-side only). + * + * If set, the PSK callback is called for each + * handshake where a PSK-based ciphersuite was negotiated. + * The caller provides the identity received and wants to + * receive the actual PSK data and length. + * + * The callback has the following parameters: + * - \c void*: The opaque pointer \p p_psk. + * - \c mbedtls_ssl_context*: The SSL context to which + * the operation applies. + * - \c const unsigned char*: The PSK identity + * selected by the client. + * - \c size_t: The length of the PSK identity + * selected by the client. + * + * If a valid PSK identity is found, the callback should use + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() + * on the SSL context to set the correct PSK and return \c 0. + * Any other return value will result in a denied PSK identity. + * + * \note A dynamic PSK (i.e. set by the PSK callback) takes + * precedence over a static PSK (i.e. set by + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()). + * This means that if you set a PSK callback using this + * function, you don't need to set a PSK using + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()). + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with. + * \param f_psk The callback for selecting and setting the PSK based + * in the PSK identity chosen by the client. + * \param p_psk A pointer to an opaque structure to be passed to + * the callback, for example a PSK store. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_psk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif + +/** + * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values, + * read as hexadecimal strings (server-side only) + * (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG]) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus + * \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator + * + * \deprecated Superseded by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin. + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const char *dhm_P, + const char *dhm_G ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values + * from big-endian binary presentations. + * (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG]_BIN) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus in big-endian binary form + * \param P_len Length of DHM modulus + * \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator in big-endian binary form + * \param G_len Length of DHM generator + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, + const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len ); + +/** + * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values, + * read from existing context (server-side only) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param dhm_ctx Diffie-Hellman-Merkle context + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/** + * \brief Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters. + * (Client-side only.) + * (Default: 1024 bits.) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param bitlen Minimum bit length of the DHM prime + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned int bitlen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/** + * \brief Set the allowed curves in order of preference. + * (Default: all defined curves in order of decreasing size, + * except that Montgomery curves come last. This order + * is likely to change in a future version.) + * + * On server: this only affects selection of the ECDHE curve; + * the curves used for ECDH and ECDSA are determined by the + * list of available certificates instead. + * + * On client: this affects the list of curves offered for any + * use. The server can override our preference order. + * + * Both sides: limits the set of curves accepted for use in + * ECDHE and in the peer's end-entity certificate. + * + * \note This has no influence on which curves are allowed inside the + * certificate chains, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile() + * for that. For the end-entity certificate however, the key + * will be accepted only if it is allowed both by this list + * and by the cert profile. + * + * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference + * (preferred curve first). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param curves Ordered list of allowed curves, + * terminated by MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Set the allowed hashes for signatures during the handshake. + * (Default: all SHA-2 hashes, largest first. Also SHA-1 if + * the compile-time option + * `MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE` is enabled.) + * + * \note This only affects which hashes are offered and can be used + * for signatures during the handshake. Hashes for message + * authentication and the TLS PRF are controlled by the + * ciphersuite, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(). Hashes + * used for certificate signature are controlled by the + * verification profile, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(). + * + * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference + * (preferred hash first). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param hashes Ordered list of allowed signature hashes, + * terminated by \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *hashes ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Set or reset the hostname to check against the received + * server certificate. It sets the ServerName TLS extension, + * too, if that extension is enabled. (client-side only) + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param hostname the server hostname, may be NULL to clear hostname + + * \note Maximum hostname length MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN. + * + * \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED on + * allocation failure, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA on + * too long input hostname. + * + * Hostname set to the one provided on success (cleared + * when NULL). On allocation failure hostname is cleared. + * On too long input failure, old hostname is unchanged. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +/** + * \brief Set own certificate and key for the current handshake + * + * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() but for use within + * the SNI callback. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param own_cert own public certificate chain + * \param pk_key own private key + * + * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ); + +/** + * \brief Set the data required to verify peer certificate for the + * current handshake + * + * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() but for use within + * the SNI callback. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs) + * \param ca_crl trusted CA CRLs + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ); + +/** + * \brief Set authmode for the current handshake. + * + * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode() but for use within + * the SNI callback. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param authmode MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode ); + +/** + * \brief Set server side ServerName TLS extension callback + * (optional, server-side only). + * + * If set, the ServerName callback is called whenever the + * server receives a ServerName TLS extension from the client + * during a handshake. The ServerName callback has the + * following parameters: (void *parameter, mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + * const unsigned char *hostname, size_t len). If a suitable + * certificate is found, the callback must set the + * certificate(s) and key(s) to use with \c + * mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert() (can be called repeatedly), + * and may optionally adjust the CA and associated CRL with \c + * mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() as well as the client + * authentication mode with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(), + * then must return 0. If no matching name is found, the + * callback must either set a default cert, or + * return non-zero to abort the handshake at this point. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param f_sni verification function + * \param p_sni verification parameter + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_sni ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Set the EC J-PAKE password for current handshake. + * + * \note An internal copy is made, and destroyed as soon as the + * handshake is completed, or when the SSL context is reset or + * freed. + * + * \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place + * to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param pw EC J-PAKE password (pre-shared secret) + * \param pw_len length of pw in bytes + * + * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pw, + size_t pw_len ); +#endif /*MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +/** + * \brief Set the supported Application Layer Protocols. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param protos Pointer to a NULL-terminated list of supported protocols, + * in decreasing preference order. The pointer to the list is + * recorded by the library for later reference as required, so + * the lifetime of the table must be at least as long as the + * lifetime of the SSL configuration structure. + * + * \return 0 on success, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos ); + +/** + * \brief Get the name of the negotiated Application Layer Protocol. + * This function should be called after the handshake is + * completed. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Protocol name, or NULL if no protocol was negotiated. + */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile profile ) +{ + switch( profile ) + { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: + return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80" ); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: + return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32" ); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: + return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80" ); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: + return( "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32" ); + default: break; + } + return( "" ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ +/** + * \brief Manage support for mki(master key id) value + * in use_srtp extension. + * MKI is an optional part of SRTP used for key management + * and re-keying. See RFC3711 section 3.1 for details. + * The default value is + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to manage mki support. + * \param support_mki_value Enable or disable mki usage. Values are + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED + * or #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int support_mki_value ); + +/** + * \brief Set the supported DTLS-SRTP protection profiles. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param profiles Pointer to a List of MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET terminated + * supported protection profiles + * in decreasing preference order. + * The pointer to the list is recorded by the library + * for later reference as required, so the lifetime + * of the table must be at least as long as the lifetime + * of the SSL configuration structure. + * The list must not hold more than + * MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH elements + * (excluding the terminating MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET). + * + * \return 0 on success + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the list of + * protection profiles is incorrect. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles + ( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles ); + +/** + * \brief Set the mki_value for the current DTLS-SRTP session. + * + * \param ssl SSL context to use. + * \param mki_value The MKI value to set. + * \param mki_len The length of the MKI value. + * + * \note This function is relevant on client side only. + * The server discovers the mki value during handshake. + * A mki value set on server side using this function + * is ignored. + * + * \return 0 on success + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *mki_value, + uint16_t mki_len ); +/** + * \brief Get the negotiated DTLS-SRTP information: + * Protection profile and MKI value. + * + * \warning This function must be called after the handshake is + * completed. The value returned by this function must + * not be trusted or acted upon before the handshake completes. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to query. + * \param dtls_srtp_info The negotiated DTLS-SRTP information: + * - Protection profile in use. + * A direct mapping of the iana defined value for protection + * profile on an uint16_t. + http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml + * #MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET if the use of SRTP was not negotiated + * or peer's Hello packet was not parsed yet. + * - mki size and value( if size is > 0 ). + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +/** + * \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side + * and/or accepted at the server side + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION) + * + * \note This ignores ciphersuites from higher versions. + * + * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ); + +/** + * \brief Set the minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version + * (Default: TLS 1.0) + * + * \note Input outside of the SSL_MAX_XXXXX_VERSION and + * SSL_MIN_XXXXX_VERSION range is ignored. + * + * \note MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 (SSL v3) should be avoided. + * + * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/** + * \brief Set the fallback flag (client-side only). + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK). + * + * \note Set to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK when preparing a fallback + * connection, that is a connection with max_version set to a + * lower value than the value you're willing to use. Such + * fallback connections are not recommended but are sometimes + * necessary to interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) + * servers. + * + * \warning You should NOT set this to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK for + * non-fallback connections! This would appear to work for a + * while, then cause failures when the server is upgraded to + * support a newer TLS version. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param fallback MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +/** + * \brief Enable or disable Encrypt-then-MAC + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) + * + * \note This should always be enabled, it is a security + * improvement, and should not cause any interoperability + * issue (used only if the peer supports it too). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param etm MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +/** + * \brief Enable or disable Extended Master Secret negotiation. + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) + * + * \note This should always be enabled, it is a security fix to the + * protocol, and should not cause any interoperability issue + * (used only if the peer supports it too). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param ems MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +/** + * \brief Disable or enable support for RC4 + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED) + * + * \warning Use of RC4 in DTLS/TLS has been prohibited by RFC 7465 + * for security reasons. Use at your own risk. + * + * \note This function is deprecated and will be removed in + * a future version of the library. + * RC4 is disabled by default at compile time and needs to be + * actively enabled for use with legacy systems. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param arc4 MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char arc4 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Whether to send a list of acceptable CAs in + * CertificateRequest messages. + * (Default: do send) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param cert_req_ca_list MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + char cert_req_ca_list ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +/** + * \brief Set the maximum fragment length to emit and/or negotiate. + * (Typical: the smaller of #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, usually `2^14` bytes) + * (Server: set maximum fragment length to emit, + * usually negotiated by the client during handshake) + * (Client: set maximum fragment length to emit *and* + * negotiate with the server during handshake) + * (Default: #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) + * + * \note On the client side, the maximum fragment length extension + * *will not* be used, unless the maximum fragment length has + * been set via this function to a value different than + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE. + * + * \note With TLS, this currently only affects ApplicationData (sent + * with \c mbedtls_ssl_read()), not handshake messages. + * With DTLS, this affects both ApplicationData and handshake. + * + * \note This sets the maximum length for a record's payload, + * excluding record overhead that will be added to it, see + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(). + * + * \note For DTLS, it is also possible to set a limit for the total + * size of datagrams passed to the transport layer, including + * record overhead, see \c mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param mfl_code Code for maximum fragment length (allowed values: + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096) + * + * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +/** + * \brief Activate negotiation of truncated HMAC + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param truncate Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int truncate ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) +/** + * \brief Enable / Disable 1/n-1 record splitting + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED) + * + * \note Only affects SSLv3 and TLS 1.0, not higher versions. + * Does not affect non-CBC ciphersuites in any version. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param split MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/** + * \brief Enable / Disable session tickets (client only). + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED.) + * + * \note On server, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param use_tickets Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +/** + * \brief Enable / Disable renegotiation support for connection when + * initiated by peer + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) + * + * \warning It is recommended to always disable renegotiation unless you + * know you need it and you know what you're doing. In the + * past, there have been several issues associated with + * renegotiation or a poor understanding of its properties. + * + * \note Server-side, enabling renegotiation also makes the server + * susceptible to a resource DoS by a malicious client. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param renegotiation Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/** + * \brief Prevent or allow legacy renegotiation. + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION) + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION allows connections to + * be established even if the peer does not support + * secure renegotiation, but does not allow renegotiation + * to take place if not secure. + * (Interoperable and secure option) + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION allows renegotiations + * with non-upgraded peers. Allowing legacy renegotiation + * makes the connection vulnerable to specific man in the + * middle attacks. (See RFC 5746) + * (Most interoperable and least secure option) + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE breaks off connections + * if peer does not support secure renegotiation. Results + * in interoperability issues with non-upgraded peers + * that do not support renegotiation altogether. + * (Most secure option, interoperability issues) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param allow_legacy Prevent or allow (SSL_NO_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION, + * SSL_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +/** + * \brief Enforce renegotiation requests. + * (Default: enforced, max_records = 16) + * + * When we request a renegotiation, the peer can comply or + * ignore the request. This function allows us to decide + * whether to enforce our renegotiation requests by closing + * the connection if the peer doesn't comply. + * + * However, records could already be in transit from the peer + * when the request is emitted. In order to increase + * reliability, we can accept a number of records before the + * expected handshake records. + * + * The optimal value is highly dependent on the specific usage + * scenario. + * + * \note With DTLS and server-initiated renegotiation, the + * HelloRequest is retransmitted every time mbedtls_ssl_read() times + * out or receives Application Data, until: + * - max_records records have beens seen, if it is >= 0, or + * - the number of retransmits that would happen during an + * actual handshake has been reached. + * Please remember the request might be lost a few times + * if you consider setting max_records to a really low value. + * + * \warning On client, the grace period can only happen during + * mbedtls_ssl_read(), as opposed to mbedtls_ssl_write() and mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() + * which always behave as if max_record was 0. The reason is, + * if we receive application data from the server, we need a + * place to write it, which only happens during mbedtls_ssl_read(). + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param max_records Use MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED if you don't want to + * enforce renegotiation, or a non-negative value to enforce + * it but allow for a grace period of max_records records. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records ); + +/** + * \brief Set record counter threshold for periodic renegotiation. + * (Default: 2^48 - 1) + * + * Renegotiation is automatically triggered when a record + * counter (outgoing or incoming) crosses the defined + * threshold. The default value is meant to prevent the + * connection from being closed when the counter is about to + * reached its maximal value (it is not allowed to wrap). + * + * Lower values can be used to enforce policies such as "keys + * must be refreshed every N packets with cipher X". + * + * The renegotiation period can be disabled by setting + * conf->disable_renegotiation to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED. + * + * \note When the configured transport is + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM the maximum renegotiation + * period is 2^48 - 1, and for MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + * the maximum renegotiation period is 2^64 - 1. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param period The threshold value: a big-endian 64-bit number. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char period[8] ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/** + * \brief Check if there is data already read from the + * underlying transport but not yet processed. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return 0 if nothing's pending, 1 otherwise. + * + * \note This is different in purpose and behaviour from + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail in that it considers + * any kind of unprocessed data, not only unread + * application data. If \c mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes + * returns a non-zero value, this function will + * also signal pending data, but the converse does + * not hold. For example, in DTLS there might be + * further records waiting to be processed from + * the current underlying transport's datagram. + * + * \note If this function returns 1 (data pending), this + * does not imply that a subsequent call to + * \c mbedtls_ssl_read will provide any data; + * e.g., the unprocessed data might turn out + * to be an alert or a handshake message. + * + * \note This function is useful in the following situation: + * If the SSL/TLS module successfully returns from an + * operation - e.g. a handshake or an application record + * read - and you're awaiting incoming data next, you + * must not immediately idle on the underlying transport + * to have data ready, but you need to check the value + * of this function first. The reason is that the desired + * data might already be read but not yet processed. + * If, in contrast, a previous call to the SSL/TLS module + * returned MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, it is not necessary + * to call this function, as the latter error code entails + * that all internal data has been processed. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the number of application data bytes + * remaining to be read from the current record. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return How many bytes are available in the application + * data record read buffer. + * + * \note When working over a datagram transport, this is + * useful to detect the current datagram's boundary + * in case \c mbedtls_ssl_read has written the maximal + * amount of data fitting into the input buffer. + * + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the result of the certificate verification + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * + * \return \c 0 if the certificate verification was successful. + * \return \c -1u if the result is not available. This may happen + * e.g. if the handshake aborts early, or a verification + * callback returned a fatal error. + * \return A bitwise combination of \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX + * and \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX failure flags; see x509.h. + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the name of the current ciphersuite + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name + */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the current SSL version (SSLv3/TLSv1/etc) + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return a string containing the SSL version + */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the (maximum) number of bytes added by the record + * layer: header + encryption/MAC overhead (inc. padding) + * + * \note This function is not available (always returns an error) + * when record compression is enabled. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if compression is + * enabled, which makes expansion much less predictable + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +/** + * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for + * the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured + * value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the + * configured value and the negotiated one. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_record_payload() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for + * the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment + * length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. + * If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function + * works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(). + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_record_payload() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED +#endif + +/** + * \brief This function is a deprecated approach to getting the max + * fragment length. Its an alias for + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(), as the behaviour + * is the same. See \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() for + * more detail. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +/** + * \brief Return the current maximum outgoing record payload in bytes. + * This takes into account the config.h setting \c + * MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, the configured and negotiated + * max fragment length extension if used, and for DTLS the + * path MTU as configured and current record expansion. + * + * \note With DTLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will return an error if + * called with a larger length value. + * With TLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will fragment the input if + * necessary and return the number of bytes written; it is up + * to the caller to call \c mbedtls_ssl_write() again in + * order to send the remaining bytes if any. + * + * \note This function is not available (always returns an error) + * when record compression is enabled. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum payload for an outgoing record, + * or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. This must be initialized and setup. + * + * \return The current peer certificate, if available. + * The returned certificate is owned by the SSL context and + * is valid only until the next call to the SSL API. + * \return \c NULL if no peer certificate is available. This might + * be because the chosen ciphersuite doesn't use CRTs + * (PSK-based ciphersuites, for example), or because + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE has been disabled, + * allowing the stack to free the peer's CRT to save memory. + * + * \note For one-time inspection of the peer's certificate during + * the handshake, consider registering an X.509 CRT verification + * callback through mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() instead of calling + * this function. Using mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() also comes at + * the benefit of allowing you to influence the verification + * process, for example by masking expected and tolerated + * verification failures. + * + * \warning You must not use the pointer returned by this function + * after any further call to the SSL API, including + * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write(); this is + * because the pointer might change during renegotiation, + * which happens transparently to the user. + * If you want to use the certificate across API calls, + * you must make a copy. + */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/** + * \brief Save session in order to resume it later (client-side only) + * Session data is copied to presented session structure. + * + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param session session context + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or + * arguments are otherwise invalid. + * + * \note Only the server certificate is copied, and not the full chain, + * so you should not attempt to validate the certificate again + * by calling \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() on it. + * Instead, you should use the results from the verification + * in the original handshake by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() + * after loading the session again into a new SSL context + * using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_session(). + * + * \note Once the session object is not needed anymore, you should + * free it by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_session_free(). + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_session() + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/** + * \brief Perform the SSL handshake + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE + * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to + * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying + * transport - in this case you must call this function again + * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous + * operation is in progress (see + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you + * must call this function again when the operation is ready. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic + * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - + * in this case you must call this function again to complete + * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use + * and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in + * this case you must stop using the context (see below). + * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using + * the context (see below). + * + * \warning If this function returns something other than + * \c 0, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, + * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() + * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current + * connection must be closed. + * + * \note If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED specially for logging + * purposes, as it is an expected return value rather than an + * actual error, but you still need to reset/free the context. + * + * \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS: + * If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram + * from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed, + * and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport + * signal a new event. This is not true for a successful handshake, + * in which case the datagram of the underlying transport that is + * currently being processed might or might not contain further + * DTLS records. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Perform a single step of the SSL handshake + * + * \note The state of the context (ssl->state) will be at + * the next state after this function returns \c 0. Do not + * call this function if state is MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return See mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). + * + * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using + * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it + * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before + * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection + * must be closed. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +/** + * \brief Initiate an SSL renegotiation on the running connection. + * Client: perform the renegotiation right now. + * Server: request renegotiation, which will be performed + * during the next call to mbedtls_ssl_read() if honored by + * client. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return 0 if successful, or any mbedtls_ssl_handshake() return + * value except #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT that can't + * happen during a renegotiation. + * + * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using + * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it + * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before + * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection + * must be closed. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/** + * \brief Read at most 'len' application data bytes + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param buf buffer that will hold the data + * \param len maximum number of bytes to read + * + * \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful. + * \return \c 0 if the read end of the underlying transport was closed + * without sending a CloseNotify beforehand, which might happen + * because of various reasons (internal error of an underlying + * stack, non-conformant peer not sending a CloseNotify and + * such) - in this case you must stop using the context + * (see below). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY if the underlying + * transport is still functional, but the peer has + * acknowledged to not send anything anymore. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE + * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to + * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying + * transport - in this case you must call this function again + * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous + * operation is in progress (see + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you + * must call this function again when the operation is ready. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic + * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - + * in this case you must call this function again to complete + * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server + * side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a + * new connection using the same source port. See below. + * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using + * the context (see below). + * + * \warning If this function returns something other than + * a positive value, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT, + * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, + * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() + * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current + * connection must be closed. + * + * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT + * (which can only happen server-side), it means that a client + * is initiating a new connection using the same source port. + * You can either treat that as a connection close and wait + * for the client to resend a ClientHello, or directly + * continue with \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the same + * context (as it has been reset internally). Either way, you + * must make sure this is seen by the application as a new + * connection: application state, if any, should be reset, and + * most importantly the identity of the client must be checked + * again. WARNING: not validating the identity of the client + * again, or not transmitting the new identity to the + * application layer, would allow authentication bypass! + * + * \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS: + * - If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram + * from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed, + * and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport + * signal a new event. + * - This function may return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ even if data was + * initially available on the underlying transport, as this data may have + * been only e.g. duplicated messages or a renegotiation request. + * Therefore, you must be prepared to receive MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ even + * when reacting to an incoming-data event from the underlying transport. + * - On success, the datagram of the underlying transport that is currently + * being processed may contain further DTLS records. You should call + * \c mbedtls_ssl_check_pending to check for remaining records. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Try to write exactly 'len' application data bytes + * + * \warning This function will do partial writes in some cases. If the + * return value is non-negative but less than length, the + * function must be called again with updated arguments: + * buf + ret, len - ret (if ret is the return value) until + * it returns a value equal to the last 'len' argument. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param buf buffer holding the data + * \param len how many bytes must be written + * + * \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if + * successful (may be less than \p len). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE + * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to + * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying + * transport - in this case you must call this function again + * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous + * operation is in progress (see + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you + * must call this function again when the operation is ready. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic + * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - + * in this case you must call this function again to complete + * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. + * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using + * the context (see below). + * + * \warning If this function returns something other than + * a non-negative value, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, + * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() + * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current + * connection must be closed. + * + * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ, + * it must be called later with the *same* arguments, + * until it returns a value greater that or equal to 0. When + * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE there may be + * some partial data in the output buffer, however this is not + * yet sent. + * + * \note If the requested length is greater than the maximum + * fragment length (either the built-in limit or the one set + * or negotiated with the peer), then: + * - with TLS, less bytes than requested are written. + * - with DTLS, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA is returned. + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() may be used to + * query the active maximum fragment length. + * + * \note Attempting to write 0 bytes will result in an empty TLS + * application record being sent. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ); + +/** + * \brief Send an alert message + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level The alert level of the message + * (MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING or MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL) + * \param message The alert message (SSL_ALERT_MSG_*) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code. + * + * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using + * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or + * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it + * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char level, + unsigned char message ); +/** + * \brief Notify the peer that the connection is being closed + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code. + * + * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using + * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or + * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it + * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL context and clear memory + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) +/** + * \brief Save an active connection as serialized data in a buffer. + * This allows the freeing or re-using of the SSL context + * while still picking up the connection later in a way that + * it entirely transparent to the peer. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_load() + * + * \note This feature is currently only available under certain + * conditions, see the documentation of the return value + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA for details. + * + * \note When this function succeeds, it calls + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on \p ssl which as a result is + * no longer associated with the connection that has been + * serialized. This avoids creating copies of the connection + * state. You're then free to either re-use the context + * structure for a different connection, or call + * mbedtls_ssl_free() on it. See the documentation of + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() for more details. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to save. On success, it is no longer + * associated with the connection that has been serialized. + * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a + * writeable buffer of at least \p buf_len bytes, or may be \c + * NULL if \p buf_len is \c 0. + * \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf. + * \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have + * been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t. + * + * \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of + * whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible + * to determine the necessary size by calling this function + * with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0. However, + * the value of \p olen is only guaranteed to be correct when + * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or + * \c 0. If the return value is different, then the value of + * \p olen is undefined. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed + * while resetting the context. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a handshake is in + * progress, or there is pending data for reading or sending, + * or the connection does not use DTLS 1.2 with an AEAD + * ciphersuite, or renegotiation is enabled. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_save( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ); + +/** + * \brief Load serialized connection data to an SSL context. + * + * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() + * + * \warning The same serialized data must never be loaded into more + * that one context. In order to ensure that, after + * successfully loading serialized data to an SSL context, you + * should immediately destroy or invalidate all copies of the + * serialized data that was loaded. Loading the same data in + * more than one context would cause severe security failures + * including but not limited to loss of confidentiality. + * + * \note Before calling this function, the SSL context must be + * prepared in one of the two following ways. The first way is + * to take a context freshly initialised with + * mbedtls_ssl_init() and call mbedtls_ssl_setup() on it with + * the same ::mbedtls_ssl_config structure that was used in + * the original connection. The second way is to + * call mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on a context that was + * previously prepared as above but used in the meantime. + * Either way, you must not use the context to perform a + * handshake between calling mbedtls_ssl_setup() or + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and calling this function. You + * may however call other setter functions in that time frame + * as indicated in the note below. + * + * \note Before or after calling this function successfully, you + * also need to configure some connection-specific callbacks + * and settings before you can use the connection again + * (unless they were already set before calling + * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and the values are suitable for + * the present connection). Specifically, you want to call + * at least mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() and + * mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(). All other SSL setter functions + * are not necessary to call, either because they're only used + * in handshakes, or because the setting is already saved. You + * might choose to call them anyway, for example in order to + * share code between the cases of establishing a new + * connection and the case of loading an already-established + * connection. + * + * \note If you have new information about the path MTU, you want to + * call mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() after calling this function, as + * otherwise this function would overwrite your + * newly-configured value with the value that was active when + * the context was saved. + * + * \note When this function returns an error code, it calls + * mbedtls_ssl_free() on \p ssl. In this case, you need to + * prepare the context with the usual sequence starting with a + * call to mbedtls_ssl_init() if you want to use it again. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context structure to be populated. It must have + * been prepared as described in the note above. + * \param buf The buffer holding the serialized connection data. It must + * be a readable buffer of at least \p len bytes. + * \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data + * comes from a different Mbed TLS version or build. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize an SSL configuration context + * Just makes the context ready for + * mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() or mbedtls_ssl_config_free(). + * + * \note You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() unless you + * manually set all of the relevant fields yourself. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_init( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ); + +/** + * \brief Load reasonable default SSL configuration values. + * (You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_init() first.) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + * \param endpoint MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER + * \param transport MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM for TLS, or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM for DTLS + * \param preset a MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_XXX value + * + * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport() for notes on DTLS. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_ALLOC_FAILED on memory allocation error. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int endpoint, int transport, int preset ); + +/** + * \brief Free an SSL configuration context + * + * \param conf SSL configuration context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_free( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ); + +/** + * \brief Initialize SSL session structure + * + * \param session SSL session + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_session_init( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL session including the + * peer certificate and clear memory + * + * \note A session object can be freed even if the SSL context + * that was used to retrieve the session is still in use. + * + * \param session SSL session + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); + +/** + * \brief TLS-PRF function for key derivation. + * + * \param prf The tls_prf type function type to be used. + * \param secret Secret for the key derivation function. + * \param slen Length of the secret. + * \param label String label for the key derivation function, + * terminated with null character. + * \param random Random bytes. + * \param rlen Length of the random bytes buffer. + * \param dstbuf The buffer holding the derived key. + * \param dlen Length of the output buffer. + * + * \return 0 on success. An SSL specific error on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ssl.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..02eab96d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_cache.h + * + * \brief SSL session cache implementation + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /*!< 1 day */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /*!< Maximum entries in cache */ +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry; + +/** + * \brief This structure is used for storing cache entries + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t timestamp; /*!< entry timestamp */ +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_session session; /*!< entry session */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_x509_buf peer_cert; /*!< entry peer_cert */ +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *next; /*!< chain pointer */ +}; + +/** + * \brief Cache context + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context +{ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *chain; /*!< start of the chain */ + int timeout; /*!< cache entry timeout */ + int max_entries; /*!< maximum entries */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< mutex */ +#endif +}; + +/** + * \brief Initialize an SSL cache context + * + * \param cache SSL cache context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ); + +/** + * \brief Cache get callback implementation + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param data SSL cache context + * \param session session to retrieve entry for + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); + +/** + * \brief Cache set callback implementation + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param data SSL cache context + * \param session session to store entry for + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +/** + * \brief Set the cache timeout + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT (1 day)) + * + * A timeout of 0 indicates no timeout. + * + * \param cache SSL cache context + * \param timeout cache entry timeout in seconds + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int timeout ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +/** + * \brief Set the maximum number of cache entries + * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES (50)) + * + * \param cache SSL cache context + * \param max cache entry maximum + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int max ); + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in a cache context and clear memory + * + * \param cache SSL cache context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ssl_cache.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..93c32a5e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h @@ -0,0 +1,556 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_ciphersuites.h + * + * \brief SSL Ciphersuites for mbed TLS + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Supported ciphersuites (Official IANA names) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 0x01 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x02 /**< Weak! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x04 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x05 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x09 /**< Weak! Not in TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0A + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x15 /**< Weak! Not in TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x16 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2C /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2D /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2E /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x2F + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x33 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x35 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x39 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x3B /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x3C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x3D /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x41 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x45 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x67 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x6B /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x84 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x88 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x8A +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x8B +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x8C +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x8D + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x8E +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x8F +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x90 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x91 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x92 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x93 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x94 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x95 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x9C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x9D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x9E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x9F /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xA8 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xA9 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xAA /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xAB /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xAC /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xAD /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xAE +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xAF +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xB0 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xB1 /**< Weak! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xB2 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xB3 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xB4 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xB5 /**< Weak! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xB6 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xB7 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xB8 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xB9 /**< Weak! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xBA /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xBE /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0xC0 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0xC4 /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC001 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC002 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC003 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 /**< Not in SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC006 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC007 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC008 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A /**< Not in SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC00B /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC00C /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC00D /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F /**< Not in SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC010 /**< Weak! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC011 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC012 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 /**< Not in SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC025 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC026 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC027 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC028 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC029 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC02A /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02B /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02F /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC030 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC032 /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC033 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC034 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC035 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC036 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC037 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC038 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC039 /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xC03A /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xC03B /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC03C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC03D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC044 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC045 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC048 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC049 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC04A /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC04B /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC04C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC04D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC04E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC04F /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC050 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC051 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC052 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC053 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC05C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC05D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC05E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC05F /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC060 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC061 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC062 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC063 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC064 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC065 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC066 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC067 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC068 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC069 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC06A /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC06B /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC06C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC06D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC06E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC06F /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC070 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC071 /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC072 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC073 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC074 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC075 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC076 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC077 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC078 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC079 /**< Not in SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC07A /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC07B /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC07C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC07D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC086 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC087 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC088 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC089 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC08A /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC08B /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC08C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC08D /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC08E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC08F /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC090 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC091 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC092 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC093 /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC094 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC095 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC096 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC097 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC098 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC099 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC09A /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC09B /**< Not in SSL3! */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09C /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09D /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09E /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09F /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A0 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A1 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A2 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A3 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0A4 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0A5 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0A6 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0A7 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A8 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A9 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0AA /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0AB /**< TLS 1.2 */ +/* The last two are named with PSK_DHE in the RFC, which looks like a typo */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0AC /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0AD /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0AE /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0AF /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0FF /**< experimental */ + +/* RFC 7905 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA8 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA9 /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAA /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAB /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAC /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAD /**< TLS 1.2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAE /**< TLS 1.2 */ + +/* Reminder: update mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret when adding a new key exchange. + * Reminder: update MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__xxx below + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE, +} mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t; + +/* Key exchanges using a certificate */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges allowing client certificate requests */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges involving server signature in ServerKeyExchange */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges using ECDH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges that don't involve ephemeral keys */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges that involve ephemeral keys */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges using a PSK */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges using DHE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges using ECDHE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED +#endif + +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK 0x01 /**< Weak ciphersuite flag */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG 0x02 /**< Short authentication tag, + eg for CCM_8 */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS 0x04 /**< Can't be used with DTLS */ + +/** + * \brief This structure is used for storing ciphersuite information + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t +{ + int id; + const char * name; + + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher; + mbedtls_md_type_t mac; + mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_exchange; + + int min_major_ver; + int min_minor_ver; + int max_major_ver; + int max_minor_ver; + + unsigned char flags; +}; + +const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void ); + +const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string( const char *ciphersuite_name ); +const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( int ciphersuite_id ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); +#endif + +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ssl_ciphersuites.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2aa37317 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_cookie.h + * + * \brief DTLS cookie callbacks implementation + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module settings + * + * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. + * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * \{ + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */ +#endif + +/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Context for the default cookie functions. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t hmac_ctx; /*!< context for the HMAC portion */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + unsigned long serial; /*!< serial number for expiration */ +#endif + unsigned long timeout; /*!< timeout delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, + or in number of tickets issued */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; +#endif +} mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx; + +/** + * \brief Initialize cookie context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Setup cookie context (generate keys) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +/** + * \brief Set expiration delay for cookies + * (Default MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT) + * + * \param ctx Cookie context + * \param delay Delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies + * issued in the meantime. + * 0 to disable expiration (NOT recommended) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, unsigned long delay ); + +/** + * \brief Free cookie context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Generate cookie, see \c mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t + */ +mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write; + +/** + * \brief Verify cookie, see \c mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t + */ +mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ssl_cookie.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..77ad7554 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,1352 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/* Determine minimum supported version */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 + +/* Determine maximum supported version */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ + +/* + * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 + * + * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, + * but is distinct for resends. + * + * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 + +/* + * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: + * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256) + * and allow for a maximum of 1024 of compression expansion if + * enabled. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 1024 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 0 +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.0-1.2 (as + * opposed to the very different CBC construct used in SSLv3) is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD ( MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ + ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ) + +/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 + +/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for + RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes + (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ + ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) \ + : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) \ + ) + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in sig-hash algorithm ext., RFC 5246 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 + +/* + * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds + */ + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 +#error "Bad configuration - record content too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." +#endif + +/* Calculate buffer sizes */ + +/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes + long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the + implicit sequence number. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \ + + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) ) +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \ + + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) ) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx ) +{ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx ) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX; +#else + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx ) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; +#endif +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx ) +{ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx ) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX; +#else + return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx ) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; +#endif +} +#endif + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT +/* Compression buffer holds both IN and OUT buffers, so should be size of the larger */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ( \ + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) \ + ? MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + : MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ) +#endif + +/* + * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content + * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because + * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) + +/** + * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero + * otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( const uint8_t *cur, + const uint8_t *end, size_t need ) +{ + return( ( cur > end ) || ( need > (size_t)( end - cur ) ) ); +} + +/** + * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case, + * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cur, end, need ) \ + do { \ + if( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( ( cur ), ( end ), ( need ) ) != 0 ) \ + { \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t +{ + /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable + * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's + * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function - + * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures + * to hash algorithms. */ + mbedtls_md_type_t rsa; + mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa; +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); + +/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from + * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those + * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled + * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is + * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. + * + * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, + * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} + * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into + * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. + * + * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH + * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here + * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations + * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the + * computation of the maximum key length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 + +/** + * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) + * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set +{ + /*! The key for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ]; + /*! The key for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ]; + /*! The IV for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ]; + /*! The IV for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ]; + + size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and + * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ + size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and + * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ +}; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; + +/* + * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params +{ + /* + * Handshake specific crypto variables + */ + + uint8_t max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/ + uint8_t max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/ + uint8_t resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ + uint8_t cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + uint8_t sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint8_t new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + uint8_t extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + uint8_t async_in_progress; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + uint8_t ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ + enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ + ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ + } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ + size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */ +#endif + + size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ + + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; + + void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); + void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ +#endif + +/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due + * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap + * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_type_t ecdh_psa_type; + uint16_t ecdh_bits; + psa_key_id_t ecdh_psa_privkey; + unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ + size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */ + size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ + mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + struct + { + size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated + * buffers used for message buffering. */ + + uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has + * been seen in the current flight. */ + + struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer + { + unsigned is_valid : 1; + unsigned is_fragmented : 1; + unsigned is_complete : 1; + unsigned char *data; + size_t data_len; + } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; + + struct + { + unsigned char *data; + size_t len; + unsigned epoch; + } future_record; + + } buffering; + + unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ + unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ + + unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie + Srv: unused */ + unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length + Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ + + uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ + unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ + unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the + flight being received */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for + resending messages */ + unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter + for resending messages */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ + + uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension + * has been negotiated. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; /*! The peer's CID */ + uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of + * \c peer_cid. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Checksum contexts + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + mbedtls_md5_context fin_md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context fin_sha1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; +#else + mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256; +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; +#else + mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512; +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< random bytes */ + unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; + /*!< premaster secret */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the + * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). + * The library does not use it internally. */ + void *user_async_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +}; + +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; + +/* + * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records + * + * There are the following general types of record transformations: + * - Stream transformations (TLS versions <= 1.2 only) + * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher + * to the authenticated message. + * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions <= 1.2 only) + * In addition to the distinction of the order of encryption and + * authentication, there's a fundamental difference between the + * handling in SSL3 & TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2: For SSL3 + * and TLS 1.0, the final IV after processing a record is used + * as the IV for the next record. No explicit IV is contained + * in an encrypted record. The IV for the first record is extracted + * at key extraction time. In contrast, for TLS 1.1 and 1.2, no + * IV is generated at key extraction time, but every encrypted + * record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was encrypted. + * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions >= 1.2 only) + * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one + * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second + * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. + * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained + * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte + * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number + * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation + * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction + * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the + * latter to the encrypted record. + * + * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext + * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true + * content type. + * + * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: + * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. + * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. + * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. + * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. + * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, + * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. + * - For some transformations (currently AEAD and CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0) + * an implicit IV. It may be static (e.g. AEAD) or dynamic (e.g. CBC) + * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- + * dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). + * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. + * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. + * - The length of the authentication tag. + * + * Note: Except for CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, these parameters are + * constant across multiple encryption/decryption operations. + * For CBC, the implicit IV needs to be updated after each + * operation. + * + * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: + * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in + * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the + * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines + * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if + * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM + * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. + * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but + * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts + * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts + * are unused for AEAD transformations. + * - For stream/CBC transformations and versions > SSL3, the + * MAC keys are not stored explicitly but maintained within + * md_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - For stream/CBC transformations and version SSL3, the MAC + * keys are stored explicitly in mac_enc, mac_dec and have + * a fixed size of 20 bytes. These fields are unused for + * AEAD transformations or transformations >= TLS 1.0. + * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within + * the transformation context, its contents are stored within + * iv_{enc/dec}. + * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. + * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations + * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the + * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be + * different from the underlying cipher's block length + * in this case. + * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only + * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is + * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in + * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. + * Note: For CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, the fields iv_{enc/dec} + * still store IV's for continued use across multiple transformations, + * so it is not true that fixed_ivlen == 0 means that iv_{enc/dec} are + * not being used! + * - minor_ver denotes the SSL/TLS version + * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. + * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. + * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the + * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused + * in other transformations. + * + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_transform +{ + /* + * Session specific crypto layer + */ + size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ + size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ + size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ + size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ + size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ + + unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ + unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + /* Needed only for SSL v3.0 secret */ + unsigned char mac_enc[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (enc) */ + unsigned char mac_dec[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (dec) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */ + int minor_ver; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t in_cid_len; + uint8_t out_cid_len; + unsigned char in_cid [ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ]; + unsigned char out_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Session specific compression layer + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + z_stream ctx_deflate; /*!< compression context */ + z_stream ctx_inflate; /*!< decompression context */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the + * Master Secret and other session info, see ssl_populate_transform() */ + unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ +}; + +/* + * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise. + * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + return( transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0 ); +#else + (void) transform; + return( 1 ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Internal representation of record frames + * + * Instances come in two flavors: + * (1) Encrypted + * These always have data_offset = 0 + * (2) Unencrypted + * These have data_offset set to the amount of + * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, + * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV + * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used + * (e.g. for CBC in TLS 1.0, or stream ciphers). + * + * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case + * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to + * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the + * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to + * make space for the fixed IV. + * + */ +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#endif + +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t ctr[8]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. + * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by + * the 6-byte sequence number. + * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array + * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely + * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do + * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of + * MAC computations. */ + uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ + uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. + * Convert to internal presentation of versions + * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and + * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). + * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ + + unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ + size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ + size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ + size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ + unsigned char cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX ]; /* The CID */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +} mbedtls_record; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/* + * List of certificate + private key pairs + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ + mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +/* + * List of handshake messages kept around for resending + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item +{ + unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ + size_t len; /*!< length of p */ + unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg ); +/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); +/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); + +/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear + * memory + * + * \param transform SSL transform context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear + * memory + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +/** + * \brief Update record layer + * + * This function roughly separates the implementation + * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation + * of the secure transport. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest + * should be automatically updated in case + * a handshake message is found. + * + * \return 0 or non-zero error code. + * + * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here + * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: + * + * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying + * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into + * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which + * conceptually provides the following: + * + * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports + * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. + * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport + * for application data. + * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform + * securing the contents. + * + * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: + * + * a Updating + * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] + * + * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: + * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application + * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers + * provide access to the data for the user to process it. + * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically + * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers + * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application + * data (2) is user-controlled. + * + * b Reading of application data + * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] + * + * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data + * is different from the automatic consumption of control + * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. + * + * c Tracking availability of application data + * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] + * + * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for + * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer + * provides functionality for checking how much application + * data is still available in the internal buffer. + * + * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. + * + * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the + * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic + * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything + * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. + * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the + * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. + * + * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the + * record layer, but the current implementation deviates + * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of + * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record + * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which + * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility + * following the above definition. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned update_hs_digest ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex ); + +/** + * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence: + * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback + * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() + * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len ) +{ + if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0 ) + { + *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; + } + + else if( ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0 ) + { + *psk = ssl->conf->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; + } + + else + { + *psk = NULL; + *psk_len = 0; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence: + * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK + * callback + * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() + * Return an opaque PSK + */ +static inline psa_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + return( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ); + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ); + + return( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk ); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ); +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ); +#endif + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash ); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_md_type_t md ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + ( const uint16_t srtp_profile_value ) +{ + switch( srtp_profile_value ) + { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: + return srtp_profile_value; + default: break; + } + return( MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL ) + key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; + else + key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; + + return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key ); +} + +static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL ) + key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; + else + key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; + + return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert ); +} + +/* + * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions: + * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later). + * + * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we + * check a cert we received from them)! + * + * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, + int cert_endpoint, + uint32_t *flags ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport, + unsigned char ver[2] ); +void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport, + const unsigned char ver[2] ); + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ((void) ssl); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + return( 13 ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + return( 5 ); + } +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( (size_t) ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr ) ); +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( 12 ); +#else + ((void) ssl); +#endif + return( 4 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif + +/* Visible for testing purposes only */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec ); + +/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( 2 ); +#else + ((void) ssl); +#endif + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ); +#endif + +#endif /* ssl_internal.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8221051b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_ticket.h + * + * \brief TLS server ticket callbacks implementation + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/* + * This implementation of the session ticket callbacks includes key + * management, rotating the keys periodically in order to preserve forward + * secrecy, when MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME is defined. + */ + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Information for session ticket protection + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key +{ + unsigned char name[4]; /*!< random key identifier */ + uint32_t generation_time; /*!< key generation timestamp (seconds) */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; /*!< context for auth enc/decryption */ +} +mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key; + +/** + * \brief Context for session ticket handling functions + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context +{ + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key keys[2]; /*!< ticket protection keys */ + unsigned char active; /*!< index of the currently active key */ + + uint32_t ticket_lifetime; /*!< lifetime of tickets in seconds */ + + /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */ + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; +#endif +} +mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context; + +/** + * \brief Initialize a ticket context. + * (Just make it ready for mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup() + * or mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free().) + * + * \param ctx Context to be initialized + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Prepare context to be actually used + * + * \param ctx Context to be set up + * \param f_rng RNG callback function + * \param p_rng RNG callback context + * \param cipher AEAD cipher to use for ticket protection. + * Recommended value: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM. + * \param lifetime Tickets lifetime in seconds + * Recommended value: 86400 (one day). + * + * \note It is highly recommended to select a cipher that is at + * least as strong as the strongest ciphersuite + * supported. Usually that means a 256-bit key. + * + * \note The lifetime of the keys is twice the lifetime of tickets. + * It is recommended to pick a reasonable lifetime so as not + * to negate the benefits of forward secrecy. + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX error code + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher, + uint32_t lifetime ); + +/** + * \brief Implementation of the ticket write callback + * + * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t for description + */ +mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write; + +/** + * \brief Implementation of the ticket parse callback + * + * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t for description + */ +mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse; + +/** + * \brief Free a context's content and zeroize it. + * + * \param ctx Context to be cleaned up + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* ssl_ticket.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/threading.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/threading.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aa63e39e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/threading.h @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/** + * \file threading.h + * + * \brief Threading abstraction layer + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_THREADING_H +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be + * used. */ +/** The selected feature is not available. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x001A + +/** Bad input parameters to function. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x001C +/** Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR -0x001E + +#ifdef KINC_CONSOLE +typedef struct +{ + int mutex; + char is_valid; +} mbedtls_threading_mutex_t; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) +#include +typedef struct mbedtls_threading_mutex_t +{ + pthread_mutex_t mutex; + /* is_valid is 0 after a failed init or a free, and nonzero after a + * successful init. This field is not considered part of the public + * API of Mbed TLS and may change without notice. */ + char is_valid; +} mbedtls_threading_mutex_t; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) +/* You should define the mbedtls_threading_mutex_t type in your header */ +#include "threading_alt.h" + +/** + * \brief Set your alternate threading implementation function + * pointers and initialize global mutexes. If used, this + * function must be called once in the main thread before any + * other mbed TLS function is called, and + * mbedtls_threading_free_alt() must be called once in the main + * thread after all other mbed TLS functions. + * + * \note mutex_init() and mutex_free() don't return a status code. + * If mutex_init() fails, it should leave its argument (the + * mutex) in a state such that mutex_lock() will fail when + * called with this argument. + * + * \param mutex_init the init function implementation + * \param mutex_free the free function implementation + * \param mutex_lock the lock function implementation + * \param mutex_unlock the unlock function implementation + */ +void mbedtls_threading_set_alt( void (*mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), + void (*mutex_free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), + int (*mutex_lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), + int (*mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) ); + +/** + * \brief Free global mutexes. + */ +void mbedtls_threading_free_alt( void ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +/* + * The function pointers for mutex_init, mutex_free, mutex_ and mutex_unlock + * + * All these functions are expected to work or the result will be undefined. + */ +extern void (*mbedtls_mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); +extern void (*mbedtls_mutex_free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); +extern int (*mbedtls_mutex_lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); +extern int (*mbedtls_mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ); + +/* + * Global mutexes + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) +/* This mutex may or may not be used in the default definition of + * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(), but in order to determine that, + * we need to check POSIX features, hence modify _POSIX_C_SOURCE. + * With the current approach, this declaration is orphaned, lacking + * an accompanying definition, in case mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() + * doesn't need it, but that's not a problem. */ +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* threading.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/timing.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/timing.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b7290cfc --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/timing.h @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/** + * \file timing.h + * + * \brief Portable interface to timeouts and to the CPU cycle counter + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_TIMING_H +#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief timer structure + */ +struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time +{ + unsigned char opaque[32]; +}; + +/** + * \brief Context for mbedtls_timing_set/get_delay() + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_timing_delay_context +{ + struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time timer; + uint32_t int_ms; + uint32_t fin_ms; +} mbedtls_timing_delay_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ +#include "timing_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ + +extern volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed; + +/** + * \brief Return the CPU cycle counter value + * + * \warning This is only a best effort! Do not rely on this! + * In particular, it is known to be unreliable on virtual + * machines. + * + * \note This value starts at an unspecified origin and + * may wrap around. + */ +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ); + +/** + * \brief Return the elapsed time in milliseconds + * + * \param val points to a timer structure + * \param reset If 0, query the elapsed time. Otherwise (re)start the timer. + * + * \return Elapsed time since the previous reset in ms. When + * restarting, this is always 0. + * + * \note To initialize a timer, call this function with reset=1. + * + * Determining the elapsed time and resetting the timer is not + * atomic on all platforms, so after the sequence + * `{ get_timer(1); ...; time1 = get_timer(1); ...; time2 = + * get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately + * the delay since the first reset. + */ +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset ); + +/** + * \brief Setup an alarm clock + * + * \param seconds delay before the "mbedtls_timing_alarmed" flag is set + * (must be >=0) + * + * \warning Only one alarm at a time is supported. In a threaded + * context, this means one for the whole process, not one per + * thread. + */ +void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds ); + +/** + * \brief Set a pair of delays to watch + * (See \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay().) + * + * \param data Pointer to timing data. + * Must point to a valid \c mbedtls_timing_delay_context struct. + * \param int_ms First (intermediate) delay in milliseconds. + * The effect if int_ms > fin_ms is unspecified. + * \param fin_ms Second (final) delay in milliseconds. + * Pass 0 to cancel the current delay. + * + * \note To set a single delay, either use \c mbedtls_timing_set_timer + * directly or use this function with int_ms == fin_ms. + */ +void mbedtls_timing_set_delay( void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms ); + +/** + * \brief Get the status of delays + * (Memory helper: number of delays passed.) + * + * \param data Pointer to timing data + * Must point to a valid \c mbedtls_timing_delay_context struct. + * + * \return -1 if cancelled (fin_ms = 0), + * 0 if none of the delays are passed, + * 1 if only the intermediate delay is passed, + * 2 if the final delay is passed. + */ +int mbedtls_timing_get_delay( void *data ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed + */ +int mbedtls_timing_self_test( int verbose ); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* timing.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/version.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/version.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b3b441d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/version.h @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +/** + * \file version.h + * + * \brief Run-time version information + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * This set of compile-time defines and run-time variables can be used to + * determine the version number of the mbed TLS library used. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_VERSION_H +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/** + * The version number x.y.z is split into three parts. + * Major, Minor, Patchlevel + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 28 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 2 + +/** + * The single version number has the following structure: + * MMNNPP00 + * Major version | Minor version | Patch version + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x021C0200 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.28.2" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.28.2" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Get the version number. + * + * \return The constructed version number in the format + * MMNNPP00 (Major, Minor, Patch). + */ +unsigned int mbedtls_version_get_number( void ); + +/** + * Get the version string ("x.y.z"). + * + * \param string The string that will receive the value. + * (Should be at least 9 bytes in size) + */ +void mbedtls_version_get_string( char *string ); + +/** + * Get the full version string ("mbed TLS x.y.z"). + * + * \param string The string that will receive the value. The mbed TLS version + * string will use 18 bytes AT MOST including a terminating + * null byte. + * (So the buffer should be at least 18 bytes to receive this + * version string). + */ +void mbedtls_version_get_string_full( char *string ); + +/** + * \brief Check if support for a feature was compiled into this + * mbed TLS binary. This allows you to see at runtime if the + * library was for instance compiled with or without + * Multi-threading support. + * + * \note only checks against defines in the sections "System + * support", "mbed TLS modules" and "mbed TLS feature + * support" in config.h + * + * \param feature The string for the define to check (e.g. "MBEDTLS_AES_C") + * + * \return 0 if the feature is present, + * -1 if the feature is not present and + * -2 if support for feature checking as a whole was not + * compiled in. + */ +int mbedtls_version_check_feature( const char *feature ); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ + +#endif /* version.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/x509.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/x509.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..31b78df3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/x509.h @@ -0,0 +1,380 @@ +/** + * \file x509.h + * + * \brief X.509 generic defines and structures + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_H +#define MBEDTLS_X509_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +/** + * \addtogroup x509_module + * \{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA) +/** + * Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. + * That is, maximum length of the chain, excluding the end-entity certificate + * and the trusted root certificate. + * + * Set this to a low value to prevent an adversary from making you waste + * resources verifying an overlong certificate chain. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 +#endif + +/** + * \name X509 Error codes + * \{ + */ +/** Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x2080 +/** Requested OID is unknown. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID -0x2100 +/** The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT -0x2180 +/** The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION -0x2200 +/** The serial tag or value is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL -0x2280 +/** The algorithm tag or value is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG -0x2300 +/** The name tag or value is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME -0x2380 +/** The date tag or value is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE -0x2400 +/** The signature tag or value invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE -0x2480 +/** The extension tag or value is invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS -0x2500 +/** CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION -0x2580 +/** Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG -0x2600 +/** Signature algorithms do not match. (see \c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid) */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH -0x2680 +/** Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED -0x2700 +/** Format not recognized as DER or PEM. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT -0x2780 +/** Input invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x2800 +/** Allocation of memory failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED -0x2880 +/** Read/write of file failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x2900 +/** Destination buffer is too small. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x2980 +/** A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR -0x3000 +/** \} name X509 Error codes */ + +/** + * \name X509 Verify codes + * \{ + */ +/* Reminder: update x509_crt_verify_strings[] in library/x509_crt.c */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED 0x01 /**< The certificate validity has expired. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED 0x02 /**< The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL). */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH 0x04 /**< The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED 0x08 /**< The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED 0x10 /**< The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED 0x20 /**< The CRL is expired. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING 0x40 /**< Certificate was missing. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY 0x80 /**< Certificate verification was skipped. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER 0x0100 /**< Other reason (can be used by verify callback) */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE 0x0200 /**< The certificate validity starts in the future. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE 0x0400 /**< The CRL is from the future */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE 0x0800 /**< Usage does not match the keyUsage extension. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE 0x1000 /**< Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE 0x2000 /**< Usage does not match the nsCertType extension. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD 0x4000 /**< The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK 0x8000 /**< The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA). */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY 0x010000 /**< The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short). */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD 0x020000 /**< The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK 0x040000 /**< The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA). */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY 0x080000 /**< The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short). */ + +/** \} name X509 Verify codes */ +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ + +/* + * X.509 v3 Subject Alternative Name types. + * otherName [0] OtherName, + * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, + * dNSName [2] IA5String, + * x400Address [3] ORAddress, + * directoryName [4] Name, + * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, + * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, + * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, + * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME 0 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME 1 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME 2 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_X400_ADDRESS_NAME 3 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME 4 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_EDI_PARTY_NAME 5 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER 6 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS 7 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_REGISTERED_ID 8 + +/* + * X.509 v3 Key Usage Extension flags + * Reminder: update x509_info_key_usage() when adding new flags. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE (0x80) /* bit 0 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION (0x40) /* bit 1 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT (0x20) /* bit 2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT (0x10) /* bit 3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT (0x08) /* bit 4 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN (0x04) /* bit 5 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN (0x02) /* bit 6 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY (0x01) /* bit 7 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY (0x8000) /* bit 8 */ + +/* + * Netscape certificate types + * (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/tech-notes/tn3.html) + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT (0x80) /* bit 0 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER (0x40) /* bit 1 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL (0x20) /* bit 2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING (0x10) /* bit 3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED (0x08) /* bit 4 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA (0x04) /* bit 5 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA (0x02) /* bit 6 */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA (0x01) /* bit 7 */ + +/* + * X.509 extension types + * + * Comments refer to the status for using certificates. Status can be + * different for writing certificates or reading CRLs or CSRs. + * + * Those are defined in oid.h as oid.c needs them in a data structure. Since + * these were previously defined here, let's have aliases for compatibility. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME /* Supported (DNS) */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS /* Supported */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL +#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE + +/* + * Storage format identifiers + * Recognized formats: PEM and DER + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER 1 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM 2 + +#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE 256 /**< Maximum value size of a DN entry */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \addtogroup x509_module + * \{ */ + +/** + * \name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs + * \{ + */ + +/** + * Type-length-value structure that allows for ASN1 using DER. + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_buf mbedtls_x509_buf; + +/** + * Container for ASN1 bit strings. + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_bitstring mbedtls_x509_bitstring; + +/** + * Container for ASN1 named information objects. + * It allows for Relative Distinguished Names (e.g. cn=localhost,ou=code,etc.). + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_named_data mbedtls_x509_name; + +/** + * Container for a sequence of ASN.1 items + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence; + +/** Container for date and time (precision in seconds). */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_time +{ + int year, mon, day; /**< Date. */ + int hour, min, sec; /**< Time. */ +} +mbedtls_x509_time; + +/** \} name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs */ + +/** + * \brief Store the certificate DN in printable form into buf; + * no more than size characters will be written. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param dn The X509 name to represent + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn ); + +/** + * \brief Store the certificate serial in printable form into buf; + * no more than size characters will be written. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param serial The X509 serial to represent + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ); + +/** + * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time + * and tell if it's in the past. + * + * \note Intended usage is "if( is_past( valid_to ) ) ERROR". + * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors. + * + * \param to mbedtls_x509_time to check + * + * \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occurred, + * 0 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to ); + +/** + * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time + * and tell if it's in the future. + * + * \note Intended usage is "if( is_future( valid_from ) ) ERROR". + * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors. + * + * \param from mbedtls_x509_time to check + * + * \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occurred, + * 0 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from ); + +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_x509_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +/* + * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you + * know you do. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_name *cur ); +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg ); +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) +int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, + int *salt_len ); +#endif +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig ); +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, + void **sig_opts ); +int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *t ); +int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ); +int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag ); +int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const void *sig_opts ); +int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name ); +int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name ); +int mbedtls_x509_set_extension( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, + size_t val_len ); +int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ); +int mbedtls_x509_write_names( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ); +int mbedtls_x509_write_sig( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t size ); + +#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF \ + do { \ + if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= n ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \ + \ + n -= (size_t) ret; \ + p += (size_t) ret; \ + } while( 0 ) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* x509.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..92220090 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/** + * \file x509_crl.h + * + * \brief X.509 certificate revocation list parsing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \addtogroup x509_module + * \{ */ + +/** + * \name Structures and functions for parsing CRLs + * \{ + */ + +/** + * Certificate revocation list entry. + * Contains the CA-specific serial numbers and revocation dates. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry +{ + mbedtls_x509_buf raw; + + mbedtls_x509_buf serial; + + mbedtls_x509_time revocation_date; + + mbedtls_x509_buf entry_ext; + + struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *next; +} +mbedtls_x509_crl_entry; + +/** + * Certificate revocation list structure. + * Every CRL may have multiple entries. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl +{ + mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */ + + int version; /**< CRL version (1=v1, 2=v2) */ + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; /**< CRL signature type identifier */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw; /**< The raw issuer data (DER). */ + + mbedtls_x509_name issuer; /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */ + + mbedtls_x509_time this_update; + mbedtls_x509_time next_update; + + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry entry; /**< The CRL entries containing the certificate revocation times for this CA. */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf crl_ext; + + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid2; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig; + mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + + struct mbedtls_x509_crl *next; +} +mbedtls_x509_crl; + +/** + * \brief Parse a DER-encoded CRL and append it to the chained list + * + * \param chain points to the start of the chain + * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data in DER format + * \param buflen size of the buffer + * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); +/** + * \brief Parse one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list + * + * \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format + * + * \param chain points to the start of the chain + * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data in PEM or DER format + * \param buflen size of the buffer + * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief Load one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list + * + * \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format + * + * \param chain points to the start of the chain + * \param path filename to read the CRLs from (in PEM or DER encoding) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/** + * \brief Returns an informational string about the CRL. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param prefix A line prefix + * \param crl The X509 CRL to represent + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); + +/** + * \brief Initialize a CRL (chain) + * + * \param crl CRL chain to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crl_init( mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); + +/** + * \brief Unallocate all CRL data + * + * \param crl CRL chain to free + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crl_free( mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); + +/** \} name Structures and functions for parsing CRLs */ +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_x509_crl.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0f2885a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h @@ -0,0 +1,1097 @@ +/** + * \file x509_crt.h + * + * \brief X.509 certificate parsing and writing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +/** + * \addtogroup x509_module + * \{ + */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \name Structures and functions for parsing and writing X.509 certificates + * \{ + */ + +/** + * Container for an X.509 certificate. The certificate may be chained. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt +{ + int own_buffer; /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned + * by the structure or not. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */ + + int version; /**< The X.509 version. (1=v1, 2=v2, 3=v3) */ + mbedtls_x509_buf serial; /**< Unique id for certificate issued by a specific CA. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; /**< Signature algorithm, e.g. sha1RSA */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw; /**< The raw issuer data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw; /**< The raw subject data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */ + + mbedtls_x509_name issuer; /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */ + mbedtls_x509_name subject; /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */ + + mbedtls_x509_time valid_from; /**< Start time of certificate validity. */ + mbedtls_x509_time valid_to; /**< End time of certificate validity. */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf pk_raw; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf subject_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf v3_ext; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions. */ + mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName and OtherName are listed). */ + + mbedtls_x509_sequence certificate_policies; /**< Optional list of certificate policies (Only anyPolicy is printed and enforced, however the rest of the policies are still listed). */ + + int ext_types; /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */ + int ca_istrue; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */ + int max_pathlen; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: The maximum path length to the root certificate. Path length is 1 higher than RFC 5280 'meaning', so 1+ */ + + unsigned int key_usage; /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + + mbedtls_x509_sequence ext_key_usage; /**< Optional list of extended key usage OIDs. */ + + unsigned char ns_cert_type; /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf sig; /**< Signature: hash of the tbs part signed with the private key. */ + mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + + struct mbedtls_x509_crt *next; /**< Next certificate in the CA-chain. */ +} +mbedtls_x509_crt; + +/** + * From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6: + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name +{ + /** + * The type_id is an OID as defined in RFC 5280. + * To check the value of the type id, you should use + * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf. + */ + mbedtls_x509_buf type_id; /**< The type id. */ + union + { + /** + * From RFC 4108 section 5: + * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { + * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } + */ + struct + { + mbedtls_x509_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf val; /**< The named value. */ + } + hardware_module_name; + } + value; +} +mbedtls_x509_san_other_name; + +/** + * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name, according to type + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name +{ + int type; /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */ + union { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; /**< The otherName supported type. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */ + } + san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */ +} +mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name; + +/** + * Build flag from an algorithm/curve identifier (pk, md, ecp) + * Since 0 is always XXX_NONE, ignore it. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( id ) ( 1 << ( (id) - 1 ) ) + +/** + * Security profile for certificate verification. + * + * All lists are bitfields, built by ORing flags from MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(). + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt_profile +{ + uint32_t allowed_mds; /**< MDs for signatures */ + uint32_t allowed_pks; /**< PK algs for public keys; + * this applies to all certificates + * in the provided chain. */ + uint32_t allowed_curves; /**< Elliptic curves for ECDSA */ + uint32_t rsa_min_bitlen; /**< Minimum size for RSA keys */ +} +mbedtls_x509_crt_profile; + +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 0 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 1 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 2 + +#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN 32 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN 15 + +#if !defined( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN ) +#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 +#endif + +/** + * Container for writing a certificate (CRT) + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_cert +{ + int version; + mbedtls_mpi serial; + mbedtls_pk_context *subject_key; + mbedtls_pk_context *issuer_key; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *issuer; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + char not_before[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; + char not_after[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions; +} +mbedtls_x509write_cert; + +/** + * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + uint32_t flags; +} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item; + +/** + * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root + */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 ) + +/** + * Verification chain as built by \c mbedtls_crt_verify_chain() + */ +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item items[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE]; + unsigned len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + /* This stores the list of potential trusted signers obtained from + * the CA callback used for the CRT verification, if configured. + * We must track it somewhere because the callback passes its + * ownership to the caller. */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca_cb_result; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/** + * \brief Context for resuming X.509 verify operations + */ +typedef struct +{ + /* for check_signature() */ + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx pk; + + /* for find_parent_in() */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; /* non-null iff parent_in in progress */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *fallback_parent; + int fallback_signature_is_good; + + /* for find_parent() */ + int parent_is_trusted; /* -1 if find_parent is not in progress */ + + /* for verify_chain() */ + enum { + x509_crt_rs_none, + x509_crt_rs_find_parent, + } in_progress; /* none if no operation is in progress */ + int self_cnt; + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain; + +} mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ +typedef void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/** + * Default security profile. Should provide a good balance between security + * and compatibility with current deployments. + * + * This profile permits: + * - SHA2 hashes. + * - All supported elliptic curves. + * - RSA with 2048 bits and above. + * + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this profile, for example if + * new curves are added to the library. New minor versions of Mbed TLS will + * not reduce this profile unless serious security concerns require it. + */ +extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; + +/** + * Expected next default profile. Recommended for new deployments. + * Currently targets a 128-bit security level, except for allowing RSA-2048. + */ +extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next; + +/** + * NSA Suite B profile. + */ +extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; + +/** + * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it + * to the end of the provided chained list. + * + * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to. + * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point + * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through + * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). + * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate. + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. + * + * \note This function makes an internal copy of the CRT buffer + * \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused + * after this call returns. To avoid duplicating the CRT + * buffer (at the cost of stricter lifetime constraints), + * use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() instead. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief The type of certificate extension callbacks. + * + * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() routine when + * it encounters either an unsupported extension or a + * "certificate policies" extension containing any + * unsupported certificate policies. + * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback + * in other cases, if and when the need arises. + * + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * \param crt The certificate being parsed. + * \param oid The OID of the extension. + * \param critical Whether the extension is critical. + * \param p Pointer to the start of the extension value + * (the content of the OCTET STRING). + * \param end End of extension value. + * + * \note The callback must fail and return a negative error code + * if it can not parse or does not support the extension. + * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails. + * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips + * the extension and continues parsing. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t)( void *p_ctx, + mbedtls_x509_crt const *crt, + mbedtls_x509_buf const *oid, + int critical, + const unsigned char *p, + const unsigned char *end ); + +/** + * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it + * to the end of the provided chained list. + * + * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to. + * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point + * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through + * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). + * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate. + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. + * \param make_copy When not zero this function makes an internal copy of the + * CRT buffer \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed + * or reused after this call returns. + * When zero this function avoids duplicating the CRT buffer + * by taking temporary ownership thereof until the CRT + * is destroyed (like mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy()) + * \param cb A callback invoked for every unsupported certificate + * extension. + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * + * \note This call is functionally equivalent to + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), and/or + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() + * but it calls the callback with every unsupported + * certificate extension and additionally the + * "certificate policies" extension if it contains any + * unsupported certificate policies. + * The callback must return a negative error code if it + * does not know how to handle such an extension. + * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails. + * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips + * the extension and continues parsing. + * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback + * in other cases, if and when the need arises. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it + * to the end of the provided chained list. This is a + * variant of mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der() which takes + * temporary ownership of the CRT buffer until the CRT + * is destroyed. + * + * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to. + * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point + * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through + * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). + * \param buf The address of the readable buffer holding the DER encoded + * certificate to use. On success, this buffer must be + * retained and not be changed for the liftetime of the + * CRT chain \p chain, that is, until \p chain is destroyed + * through a call to mbedtls_x509_crt_free(). + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. + * + * \note This call is functionally equivalent to + * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), but it avoids creating a + * copy of the input buffer at the cost of stronger lifetime + * constraints. This is useful in constrained environments + * where duplication of the CRT cannot be tolerated. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Parse one DER-encoded or one or more concatenated PEM-encoded + * certificates and add them to the chained list. + * + * For CRTs in PEM encoding, the function parses permissively: + * if at least one certificate can be parsed, the function + * returns the number of certificates for which parsing failed + * (hence \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully). + * If no certificate could be parsed, the function returns + * the first (negative) error encountered during parsing. + * + * PEM encoded certificates may be interleaved by other data + * such as human readable descriptions of their content, as + * long as the certificates are enclosed in the PEM specific + * '-----{BEGIN/END} CERTIFICATE-----' delimiters. + * + * \param chain The chain to which to add the parsed certificates. + * \param buf The buffer holding the certificate data in PEM or DER format. + * For certificates in PEM encoding, this may be a concatenation + * of multiple certificates; for DER encoding, the buffer must + * comprise exactly one certificate. + * \param buflen The size of \p buf, including the terminating \c NULL byte + * in case of PEM encoded data. + * + * \return \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully. + * \return The (positive) number of certificates that couldn't + * be parsed if parsing was partly successful (see above). + * \return A negative X509 or PEM error code otherwise. + * + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief Load one or more certificates and add them + * to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some + * certificates can be parsed, the result is the number + * of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete + * correctly, the first error is returned. + * + * \param chain points to the start of the chain + * \param path filename to read the certificates from + * + * \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number + * if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ); + +/** + * \brief Load one or more certificate files from a path and add them + * to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some + * certificates can be parsed, the result is the number + * of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete + * correctly, the first error is returned. + * + * \param chain points to the start of the chain + * \param path directory / folder to read the certificate files from + * + * \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number + * if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +/** + * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames + * extension. + * + * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject + * alternative name. + * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation + * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_raw. + * + * \note Only "dnsName" and "otherName" of type hardware_module_name + * as defined in RFC 4180 is supported. + * + * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of + * subject alternative name. For example, after successful + * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the + * \p crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to + * this function. + * + * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the + * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the + * lifetime of the certificate. + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported + * SAN type. + * \return Another negative value for any other failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san ); +/** + * \brief Returns an informational string about the + * certificate. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param prefix A line prefix + * \param crt The X509 certificate to represent + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); + +/** + * \brief Returns an informational string about the + * verification status of a certificate. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param prefix A line prefix + * \param flags Verification flags created by mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + uint32_t flags ); + +/** + * \brief Verify a chain of certificates. + * + * The verify callback is a user-supplied callback that + * can clear / modify / add flags for a certificate. If set, + * the verification callback is called for each + * certificate in the chain (from the trust-ca down to the + * presented crt). The parameters for the callback are: + * (void *parameter, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int certificate_depth, + * int *flags). With the flags representing current flags for + * that specific certificate and the certificate depth from + * the bottom (Peer cert depth = 0). + * + * All flags left after returning from the callback + * are also returned to the application. The function should + * return 0 for anything (including invalid certificates) + * other than fatal error, as a non-zero return code + * immediately aborts the verification process. For fatal + * errors, a specific error code should be used (different + * from MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED which should not + * be returned at this point), or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR + * can be used if no better code is available. + * + * \note In case verification failed, the results can be displayed + * using \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info() + * + * \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() with the + * default security profile. + * + * \note It is your responsibility to provide up-to-date CRLs for + * all trusted CAs. If no CRL is provided for the CA that was + * used to sign the certificate, CRL verification is skipped + * silently, that is *without* setting any flag. + * + * \note The \c trust_ca list can contain two types of certificates: + * (1) those of trusted root CAs, so that certificates + * chaining up to those CAs will be trusted, and (2) + * self-signed end-entity certificates to be trusted (for + * specific peers you know) - in that case, the self-signed + * certificate doesn't need to have the CA bit set. + * + * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. + * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs. + * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs. + * \param cn The expected Common Name. This will be checked to be + * present in the certificate's subjectAltNames extension or, + * if this extension is absent, as a CN component in its + * Subject name. Currently only DNS names are supported. This + * may be \c NULL if the CN need not be verified. + * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. + * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is + * set to (uint32_t) -1. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation + * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. + * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. + * + * \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the + * passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the + * certificate chain verification failed. In this case, + * \c *flags will have one or more + * \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX + * flags set. + * \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error + * encountered during the verification process. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ); + +/** + * \brief Verify a chain of certificates with respect to + * a configurable security profile. + * + * \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(), but with explicit + * security profile. + * + * \note The restrictions on keys (RSA minimum size, allowed curves + * for ECDSA) apply to all certificates: trusted root, + * intermediate CAs if any, and end entity certificate. + * + * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. + * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs. + * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs. + * \param profile The security profile to use for the verification. + * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the + * CN need not be verified. + * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. + * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is + * set to (uint32_t) -1. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation + * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. + * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. + * + * \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the + * passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the + * certificate chain verification failed. In this case, + * \c *flags will have one or more + * \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX + * flags set. + * \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error + * encountered during the verification process. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ); + +/** + * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile() + * + * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile() + * but can return early and restart according to the limit + * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. + * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs. + * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs. + * \param profile The security profile to use for the verification. + * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the + * CN need not be verified. + * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. + * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is + * set to (uint32_t) -1. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation + * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. + * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be set to \c NULL + * to disable restartable ECC. + * + * \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile(), or + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ); + +/** + * \brief The type of trusted certificate callbacks. + * + * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the CRT + * verification routine mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb() + * when looking for trusted signers of a given certificate. + * + * On success, the callback returns a list of trusted + * certificates to be considered as potential signers + * for the input certificate. + * + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * \param child The certificate for which to search a potential signer. + * This will point to a readable certificate. + * \param candidate_cas The address at which to store the address of the first + * entry in the generated linked list of candidate signers. + * This will not be \c NULL. + * + * \note The callback must only return a non-zero value on a + * fatal error. If, in contrast, the search for a potential + * signer completes without a single candidate, the + * callback must return \c 0 and set \c *candidate_cas + * to \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *candidate_cas points + * to a heap-allocated linked list of instances of + * ::mbedtls_x509_crt, and ownership of this list is passed + * to the caller. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t)( void *p_ctx, + mbedtls_x509_crt const *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt **candidate_cas ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +/** + * \brief Version of \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() which + * uses a callback to acquire the list of trusted CA + * certificates. + * + * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified. + * \param f_ca_cb The callback to be used to query for potential signers + * of a given child certificate. See the documentation of + * ::mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t for more information. + * \param p_ca_cb The opaque context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb. + * \param profile The security profile for the verification. + * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the + * CN need not be verified. + * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. + * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is + * set to (uint32_t) -1. + * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation + * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information. + * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy. + * + * \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile(). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) +/** + * \brief Check usage of certificate against keyUsage extension. + * + * \param crt Leaf certificate used. + * \param usage Intended usage(s) (eg MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT + * before using the certificate to perform an RSA key + * exchange). + * + * \note Except for decipherOnly and encipherOnly, a bit set in the + * usage argument means this bit MUST be set in the + * certificate. For decipherOnly and encipherOnly, it means + * that bit MAY be set. + * + * \return 0 is these uses of the certificate are allowed, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keyUsage extension + * is present but does not match the usage argument. + * + * \note You should only call this function on leaf certificates, on + * (intermediate) CAs the keyUsage extension is automatically + * checked by \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + unsigned int usage ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) +/** + * \brief Check usage of certificate against extendedKeyUsage. + * + * \param crt Leaf certificate used. + * \param usage_oid Intended usage (eg MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH or + * MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH). + * \param usage_len Length of usage_oid (eg given by MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE()). + * + * \return 0 if this use of the certificate is allowed, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if not. + * + * \note Usually only makes sense on leaf certificates. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const char *usage_oid, + size_t usage_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Verify the certificate revocation status + * + * \param crt a certificate to be verified + * \param crl the CRL to verify against + * + * \return 1 if the certificate is revoked, 0 otherwise + * + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a certificate (chain) + * + * \param crt Certificate chain to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_init( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); + +/** + * \brief Unallocate all certificate data + * + * \param crt Certificate chain to free + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/** + * \brief Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/** \} name Structures and functions for parsing and writing X.509 certificates */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Initialize a CRT writing context + * + * \param ctx CRT context to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Set the version for a Certificate + * Default: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param version version to set (MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 or + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3) + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int version ); + +/** + * \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate. + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param serial serial number to set + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial ); + +/** + * \brief Set the validity period for a Certificate + * Timestamps should be in string format for UTC timezone + * i.e. "YYYYMMDDhhmmss" + * e.g. "20131231235959" for December 31st 2013 + * at 23:59:59 + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param not_before not_before timestamp + * \param not_after not_after timestamp + * + * \return 0 if timestamp was parsed successfully, or + * a specific error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *not_before, + const char *not_after ); + +/** + * \brief Set the issuer name for a Certificate + * Issuer names should contain a comma-separated list + * of OID types and values: + * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS CA" + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param issuer_name issuer name to set + * + * \return 0 if issuer name was parsed successfully, or + * a specific error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *issuer_name ); + +/** + * \brief Set the subject name for a Certificate + * Subject names should contain a comma-separated list + * of OID types and values: + * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS Server 1" + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param subject_name subject name to set + * + * \return 0 if subject name was parsed successfully, or + * a specific error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *subject_name ); + +/** + * \brief Set the subject public key for the certificate + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param key public key to include + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ); + +/** + * \brief Set the issuer key used for signing the certificate + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param key private key to sign with + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ); + +/** + * \brief Set the MD algorithm to use for the signature + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param md_alg MD algorithm to use + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); + +/** + * \brief Generic function to add to or replace an extension in the + * CRT + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param oid OID of the extension + * \param oid_len length of the OID + * \param critical if the extension is critical (per the RFC's definition) + * \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING + * \param val_len length of the value data + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, + const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ); + +/** + * \brief Set the basicConstraints extension for a CRT + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param is_ca is this a CA certificate + * \param max_pathlen maximum length of certificate chains below this + * certificate (only for CA certificates, -1 is + * unlimited) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + int is_ca, int max_pathlen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +/** + * \brief Set the subjectKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT + * Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key() has been + * called before + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Set the authorityKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT + * Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key() has been + * called before + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +/** + * \brief Set the Key Usage Extension flags + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param key_usage key usage flags to set + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned int key_usage ); + +/** + * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL) + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param ns_cert_type Netscape Cert Type flags to set + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char ns_cert_type ); + +/** + * \brief Free the contents of a CRT write context + * + * \param ctx CRT context to free + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Write a built up certificate to a X509 DER structure + * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the + * return value to determine where you should start + * using the buffer + * + * \param ctx certificate to write away + * \param buf buffer to write to + * \param size size of the buffer + * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific + * error code + * + * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the + * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable + * for countermeasures against timing attacks). + * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Write a built up certificate to a X509 PEM string + * + * \param ctx certificate to write away + * \param buf buffer to write to + * \param size size of the buffer + * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code + * + * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the + * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable + * for countermeasures against timing attacks). + * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ + +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_x509_crt.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2a1c0461 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h @@ -0,0 +1,306 @@ +/** + * \file x509_csr.h + * + * \brief X.509 certificate signing request parsing and writing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \addtogroup x509_module + * \{ */ + +/** + * \name Structures and functions for X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) + * \{ + */ + +/** + * Certificate Signing Request (CSR) structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_csr +{ + mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw CSR data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_buf cri; /**< The raw CertificateRequestInfo body (DER). */ + + int version; /**< CSR version (1=v1). */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw; /**< The raw subject data (DER). */ + mbedtls_x509_name subject; /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */ + + mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */ + + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig; + mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ +} +mbedtls_x509_csr; + +/** + * Container for writing a CSR + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_csr +{ + mbedtls_pk_context *key; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions; +} +mbedtls_x509write_csr; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) +/** + * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in DER format + * + * \note CSR attributes (if any) are currently silently ignored. + * + * \param csr CSR context to fill + * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data + * \param buflen size of the buffer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), DER or PEM format + * + * \note See notes for \c mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der() + * + * \param csr CSR context to fill + * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data + * \param buflen size of the buffer + * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/** + * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) + * + * \note See notes for \c mbedtls_x509_csr_parse() + * + * \param csr CSR context to fill + * \param path filename to read the CSR from + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/** + * \brief Returns an informational string about the + * CSR. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param prefix A line prefix + * \param csr The X509 CSR to represent + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ); + +/** + * \brief Initialize a CSR + * + * \param csr CSR to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_x509_csr_init( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ); + +/** + * \brief Unallocate all CSR data + * + * \param csr CSR to free + */ +void mbedtls_x509_csr_free( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ + +/** \} name Structures and functions for X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Initialize a CSR context + * + * \param ctx CSR context to initialize + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Set the subject name for a CSR + * Subject names should contain a comma-separated list + * of OID types and values: + * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=mbed TLS Server 1" + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param subject_name subject name to set + * + * \return 0 if subject name was parsed successfully, or + * a specific error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const char *subject_name ); + +/** + * \brief Set the key for a CSR (public key will be included, + * private key used to sign the CSR when writing it) + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param key Asymmetric key to include + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ); + +/** + * \brief Set the MD algorithm to use for the signature + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param md_alg MD algorithm to use + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ); + +/** + * \brief Set the Key Usage Extension flags + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param key_usage key usage flags to set + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + * + * \note The decipherOnly flag from the Key Usage + * extension is represented by bit 8 (i.e. + * 0x8000), which cannot typically be represented + * in an unsigned char. Therefore, the flag + * decipherOnly (i.e. + * #MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY) cannot be set using this + * function. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage ); + +/** + * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL) + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param ns_cert_type Netscape Cert Type flags to set + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + unsigned char ns_cert_type ); + +/** + * \brief Generic function to add to or replace an extension in the + * CSR + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param oid OID of the extension + * \param oid_len length of the OID + * \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING + * \param val_len length of the value data + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ); + +/** + * \brief Free the contents of a CSR context + * + * \param ctx CSR context to free + */ +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_free( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Write a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a + * DER structure + * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the + * return value to determine where you should start + * using the buffer + * + * \param ctx CSR to write away + * \param buf buffer to write to + * \param size size of the buffer + * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific + * error code + * + * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the + * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable + * for countermeasures against timing attacks). + * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +/** + * \brief Write a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a + * PEM string + * + * \param ctx CSR to write away + * \param buf buffer to write to + * \param size size of the buffer + * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code + * + * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the + * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable + * for countermeasures against timing attacks). + * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ + +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_x509_csr.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/xtea.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/xtea.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4bdc711f --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/mbedtls/xtea.h @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/** + * \file xtea.h + * + * \brief XTEA block cipher (32-bit) + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_XTEA_H +#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT 0 + +/** The data input has an invalid length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0028 + +/* MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ +/** XTEA hardware accelerator failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0029 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) +// Regular implementation +// + +/** + * \brief XTEA context structure + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_xtea_context +{ + uint32_t k[4]; /*!< key */ +} +mbedtls_xtea_context; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ +#include "xtea_alt.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize XTEA context + * + * \param ctx XTEA context to be initialized + */ +void mbedtls_xtea_init( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief Clear XTEA context + * + * \param ctx XTEA context to be cleared + */ +void mbedtls_xtea_free( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ); + +/** + * \brief XTEA key schedule + * + * \param ctx XTEA context to be initialized + * \param key the secret key + */ +void mbedtls_xtea_setup( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[16] ); + +/** + * \brief XTEA cipher function + * + * \param ctx XTEA context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT + * \param input 8-byte input block + * \param output 8-byte output block + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8] ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** + * \brief XTEA CBC cipher function + * + * \param ctx XTEA context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT + * \param length the length of input, multiple of 8 + * \param iv initialization vector for CBC mode + * \param input input block + * \param output output block + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the length % 8 != 0 + */ +int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/** + * \brief Checkup routine + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + */ +int mbedtls_xtea_self_test( int verbose ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* xtea.h */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..faa3b9e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto.h @@ -0,0 +1,3910 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto.h + * \brief Platform Security Architecture cryptography module + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_H + +#include "crypto_platform.h" + +#include + +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ block contains mock definitions for things that + * must be defined in the crypto_platform.h header. These mock definitions + * are present in this file as a convenience to generate pretty-printed + * documentation that includes those definitions. */ + +/** \defgroup platform Implementation-specific definitions + * @{ + */ + +/**@}*/ +#endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* The file "crypto_types.h" declares types that encode errors, + * algorithms, key types, policies, etc. */ +#include "crypto_types.h" + +/** \defgroup version API version + * @{ + */ + +/** + * The major version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1 + +/** + * The minor version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR 0 + +/**@}*/ + +/* The file "crypto_values.h" declares macros to build and analyze values + * of integral types defined in "crypto_types.h". */ +#include "crypto_values.h" + +/** \defgroup initialization Library initialization + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Library initialization. + * + * Applications must call this function before calling any other + * function in this module. + * + * Applications may call this function more than once. Once a call + * succeeds, subsequent calls are guaranteed to succeed. + * + * If the application calls other functions before calling psa_crypto_init(), + * the behavior is undefined. Implementations are encouraged to either perform + * the operation as if the library had been initialized or to return + * #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE or some other applicable error. In particular, + * implementations should not return a success status if the lack of + * initialization may have security implications, for example due to improper + * seeding of the random number generator. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** \def PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key attribute structure + * of type #psa_key_attributes_t. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. + * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {0} +#endif + +/** Return an initial value for a key attributes structure. + */ +static psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attributes_init(void); + +/** Declare a key as persistent and set its key identifier. + * + * If the attribute structure currently declares the key as volatile (which + * is the default content of an attribute structure), this function sets + * the lifetime attribute to #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. + * + * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given + * value in the structure. + * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute + * structure is passed to a key creation function such as + * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param key The persistent identifier for the key. + */ +static void psa_set_key_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ); + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER +/** Set the owner identifier of a key. + * + * When key identifiers encode key owner identifiers, psa_set_key_id() does + * not allow to define in key attributes the owner of volatile keys as + * psa_set_key_id() enforces the key to be persistent. + * + * This function allows to set in key attributes the owner identifier of a + * key. It is intended to be used for volatile keys. For persistent keys, + * it is recommended to use the PSA Cryptography API psa_set_key_id() to define + * the owner of a key. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param owner The key owner identifier. + */ +static void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner ); +#endif + +/** Set the location of a persistent key. + * + * To make a key persistent, you must give it a persistent key identifier + * with psa_set_key_id(). By default, a key that has a persistent identifier + * is stored in the default storage area identifier by + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. Call this function to choose a storage + * area, or to explicitly declare the key as volatile. + * + * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given + * value in the structure. + * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute + * structure is passed to a key creation function such as + * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param lifetime The lifetime for the key. + * If this is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, the + * key will be volatile, and the key identifier + * attribute is reset to 0. + */ +static void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime); + +/** Retrieve the key identifier from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The persistent identifier stored in the attribute structure. + * This value is unspecified if the attribute structure declares + * the key as volatile. + */ +static mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Retrieve the lifetime from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The lifetime value stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Declare usage flags for a key. + * + * Usage flags are part of a key's usage policy. They encode what + * kind of operations are permitted on the key. For more details, + * refer to the documentation of the type #psa_key_usage_t. + * + * This function overwrites any usage flags + * previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param usage_flags The usage flags to write. + */ +static void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_usage_t usage_flags); + +/** Retrieve the usage flags from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The usage flags stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Declare the permitted algorithm policy for a key. + * + * The permitted algorithm policy of a key encodes which algorithm or + * algorithms are permitted to be used with this key. The following + * algorithm policies are supported: + * - 0 does not allow any cryptographic operation with the key. The key + * may be used for non-cryptographic actions such as exporting (if + * permitted by the usage flags). + * - An algorithm value permits this particular algorithm. + * - An algorithm wildcard built from #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH allows the specified + * signature scheme with any hash algorithm. + * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC allows + * any MAC algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CMAC) which + * generates/verifies a MAC length greater than or equal to the length + * encoded in the wildcard algorithm. + * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG + * allows any AEAD algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CCM) which + * generates/verifies a tag length greater than or equal to the length + * encoded in the wildcard algorithm. + * + * This function overwrites any algorithm policy + * previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param alg The permitted algorithm policy to write. + */ +static void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + + +/** Retrieve the algorithm policy from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The algorithm stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Declare the type of a key. + * + * This function overwrites any key type + * previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param type The key type to write. + * If this is 0, the key type in \p attributes + * becomes unspecified. + */ +static void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type); + + +/** Declare the size of a key. + * + * This function overwrites any key size previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param bits The key size in bits. + * If this is 0, the key size in \p attributes + * becomes unspecified. Keys of size 0 are + * not supported. + */ +static void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t bits); + +/** Retrieve the key type from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The key type stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Retrieve the key size from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The key size stored in the attribute structure, in bits. + */ +static size_t psa_get_key_bits(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Retrieve the attributes of a key. + * + * This function first resets the attribute structure as with + * psa_reset_key_attributes(). It then copies the attributes of + * the given key into the given attribute structure. + * + * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources. + * Once you have called this function on an attribute structure, + * you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources. + * + * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to query. + * \param[in,out] attributes On success, the attributes of the key. + * On failure, equivalent to a + * freshly-initialized structure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Reset a key attribute structure to a freshly initialized state. + * + * You must initialize the attribute structure as described in the + * documentation of the type #psa_key_attributes_t before calling this + * function. Once the structure has been initialized, you may call this + * function at any time. + * + * This function frees any auxiliary resources that the structure + * may contain. + * + * \param[in,out] attributes The attribute structure to reset. + */ +void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_management Key management + * @{ + */ + +/** Remove non-essential copies of key material from memory. + * + * If the key identifier designates a volatile key, this functions does not do + * anything and returns successfully. + * + * If the key identifier designates a persistent key, then this function will + * free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key + * data in persistent storage is not affected and the key can still be used. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to purge. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key material will have been removed from memory if it is not + * currently required. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/** Make a copy of a key. + * + * Copy key material from one location to another. + * + * This function is primarily useful to copy a key from one location + * to another, since it populates a key using the material from + * another key which may have a different lifetime. + * + * This function may be used to share a key with a different party, + * subject to implementation-defined restrictions on key sharing. + * + * The policy on the source key must have the usage flag + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY set. + * This flag is sufficient to permit the copy if the key has the lifetime + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. + * Some secure elements do not provide a way to copy a key without + * making it extractable from the secure element. If a key is located + * in such a secure element, then the key must have both usage flags + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY and #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT in order to make + * a copy of the key outside the secure element. + * + * The resulting key may only be used in a way that conforms to + * both the policy of the original key and the policy specified in + * the \p attributes parameter: + * - The usage flags on the resulting key are the bitwise-and of the + * usage flags on the source policy and the usage flags in \p attributes. + * - If both allow the same algorithm or wildcard-based + * algorithm policy, the resulting key has the same algorithm policy. + * - If either of the policies allows an algorithm and the other policy + * allows a wildcard-based algorithm policy that includes this algorithm, + * the resulting key allows the same algorithm. + * - If the policies do not allow any algorithm in common, this function + * fails with the status #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. + * + * The effect of this function on implementation-defined attributes is + * implementation-defined. + * + * \param source_key The key to copy. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY. If a private or secret key is + * being copied outside of a secure element it must + * also allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * They are used as follows: + * - The key type and size may be 0. If either is + * nonzero, it must match the corresponding + * attribute of the source key. + * - The key location (the lifetime and, for + * persistent keys, the key identifier) is + * used directly. + * - The policy constraints (usage flags and + * algorithm policy) are combined from + * the source key and \p attributes so that + * both sets of restrictions apply, as + * described in the documentation of this function. + * \param[out] target_key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p source_key is invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The lifetime or identifier in \p attributes are invalid, or + * the policy constraints on the source and specified in + * \p attributes are incompatible, or + * \p attributes specifies a key type or key size + * which does not match the attributes of the source key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The source key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY usage flag, or + * the source key is not exportable and its lifetime does not + * allow copying it to the target's lifetime. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key); + + +/** + * \brief Destroy a key. + * + * This function destroys a key from both volatile + * memory and, if applicable, non-volatile storage. Implementations shall + * make a best effort to ensure that that the key material cannot be recovered. + * + * This function also erases any metadata such as policies and frees + * resources associated with the key. + * + * If a key is currently in use in a multipart operation, then destroying the + * key will cause the multipart operation to fail. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to erase. If this is \c 0, do nothing and + * return #PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p key was a valid identifier and the key material that it + * referred to has been erased. Alternatively, \p key is \c 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key cannot be erased because it is + * read-only, either due to a policy or due to physical restrictions. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid identifier nor \c 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * There was a failure in communication with the cryptoprocessor. + * The key material may still be present in the cryptoprocessor. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a + * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was + * written by an incompatible version of the library. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The storage is corrupted. Implementations shall make a best effort + * to erase key material even in this stage, however applications + * should be aware that it may be impossible to guarantee that the + * key material is not recoverable in such cases. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * An unexpected condition which is not a storage corruption or + * a communication failure occurred. The cryptoprocessor may have + * been compromised. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup import_export Key import and export + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Import a key in binary format. + * + * This function supports any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the + * documentation of psa_export_public_key() for the format of public keys + * and to the documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for + * other key types. + * + * The key data determines the key size. The attributes may optionally + * specify a key size; in this case it must match the size determined + * from the key data. A key size of 0 in \p attributes indicates that + * the key size is solely determined by the key data. + * + * Implementations must reject an attempt to import a key of size 0. + * + * This specification supports a single format for each key type. + * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard + * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats + * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to + * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted + * according to a different format. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * The key size is always determined from the + * \p data buffer. + * If the key size in \p attributes is nonzero, + * it must be equal to the size from \p data. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier to the newly created key. + * For persistent keys, this is the key identifier + * defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. The content of this + * buffer is interpreted according to the type declared + * in \p attributes. + * All implementations must support at least the format + * described in the documentation + * of psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() for + * the chosen type. Implementations may allow other + * formats, but should be conservative: implementations + * should err on the side of rejecting content if it + * may be erroneous (e.g. wrong type or truncated data). + * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the + * implementation in general or in this particular persistent location. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid, or + * the key data is not correctly formatted, or + * the size in \p attributes is nonzero and does not match the size + * of the key data. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + + + +/** + * \brief Export a key in binary format. + * + * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to + * create an equivalent object. + * + * If the implementation of psa_import_key() supports other formats + * beyond the format specified here, the output from psa_export_key() + * must use the representation specified here, not the original + * representation. + * + * For standard key types, the output format is as follows: + * + * - For symmetric keys (including MAC keys), the format is the + * raw bytes of the key. + * - For DES, the key data consists of 8 bytes. The parity bits must be + * correct. + * - For Triple-DES, the format is the concatenation of the + * two or three DES keys. + * - For RSA key pairs (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), the format + * is the non-encrypted DER encoding of the representation defined by + * PKCS\#1 (RFC 8017) as `RSAPrivateKey`, version 0. + * ``` + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER, -- must be 0 + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * } + * ``` + * - For elliptic curve key pairs (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR is true), the format is + * a representation of the private value as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string + * where `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size + * of the order of the curve's coordinate field. This byte string is + * in little-endian order for Montgomery curves (curve types + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), and in big-endian order for Weierstrass + * curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`, `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` + * and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`). + * For Weierstrass curves, this is the content of the `privateKey` field of + * the `ECPrivateKey` format defined by RFC 5915. For Montgomery curves, + * the format is defined by RFC 7748, and output is masked according to §5. + * For twisted Edwards curves, the private key is as defined by RFC 8032 + * (a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, a 57-byte string for Edwards448). + * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange key pairs (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR is true), the + * format is the representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte + * string. The length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes + * (leading zeroes are not stripped). + * - For public keys (key types for which #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY is + * true), the format is the same as for psa_export_public_key(). + * + * The policy on the key must have the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT set. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to export. It must allow the + * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, unless it is a public + * key. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT flag. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c type, \c bits) + * where \c type is the key type + * and \c bits is the key size in bits. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format. + * + * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to + * create an object that is equivalent to the public key. + * + * This specification supports a single format for each key type. + * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard + * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats + * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to + * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted + * according to a different format. + * + * For standard key types, the output format is as follows: + * - For RSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY), the DER encoding of + * the representation defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.1 as `RSAPublicKey`. + * ``` + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e + * ``` + * - For elliptic curve keys on a twisted Edwards curve (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true and #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY + * returns #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS), the public key is as defined + * by RFC 8032 + * (a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, a 57-byte string for Edwards448). + * - For other elliptic curve public keys (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true), the format is the uncompressed + * representation defined by SEC1 §2.3.3 as the content of an ECPoint. + * Let `m` be the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of + * `q` for a curve over `F_q`. The representation consists of: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian. + * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange public keys (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY is true), + * the format is the representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a + * big-endian byte string. The length of the byte string is the length of the + * base prime `p` in bytes. + * + * Exporting a public key object or the public part of a key pair is + * always permitted, regardless of the key's usage flags. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to export. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key is neither a public key nor a key pair. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(#PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\c type), \c bits) + * where \c type is the key type + * and \c bits is the key size in bits. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + + + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup hash Message digests + * @{ + */ + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message. + * + * \note To verify the hash of a message against an + * expected value, use psa_hash_compare() instead. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\p alg). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p hash_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message and compare it with a + * reference value. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the input. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected hash. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p input_length or \p hash_length do not match the hash size for \p alg + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart hash operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a hash operation object, the application must + * initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_hash_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_hash_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except + * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ +typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a hash operation object + * of type #psa_hash_operation_t. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. + * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. + */ +#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT {0} +#endif + +/** Return an initial value for a hash operation object. + */ +static psa_hash_operation_t psa_hash_operation_init(void); + +/** Set up a multipart hash operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to calculate a hash (message digest) + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_hash_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_hash_setup() to specify the algorithm. + * -# Call psa_hash_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. The hash that is calculated is the hash + * of the concatenation of these messages in order. + * -# To calculate the hash, call psa_hash_finish(). + * To compare the hash with an expected value, call psa_hash_verify(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_hash_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_hash_abort(). The + * application may call psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_hash_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_hash_finish() or psa_hash_verify(). + * - A call to psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_hash_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart hash operation. + * + * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message. + * + * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect + * a specific value for the hash. Call psa_hash_verify() instead. + * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as + * hash values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky + * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information + * about the hashed data which could allow an attacker to guess + * a valid hash and thereby bypass security controls. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is the + * hash algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) + * where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message and compare it with + * an expected value. + * + * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). It then + * compares the calculated hash with the expected hash passed as a + * parameter to this function. + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the + * comparison between the actual hash and the expected hash is performed + * in constant time. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected hash. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length); + +/** Abort a hash operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_hash_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_hash_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_hash_abort(), psa_hash_finish() or + * psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation); + +/** Clone a hash operation. + * + * This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to + * a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent + * to calling psa_hash_setup() on \p target_operation with the same + * algorithm that \p source_operation was set up for, then + * psa_hash_update() on \p target_operation with the same input that + * that was passed to \p source_operation. After this function returns, the + * two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of + * the objects do not affect the other object. + * + * \param[in] source_operation The active hash operation to clone. + * \param[in,out] target_operation The operation object to set up. + * It must be initialized but not active. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_clone(const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup MAC Message authentication codes + * @{ + */ + +/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message. + * + * \note To verify the MAC of a message against an + * expected value, use psa_mac_verify() instead. + * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as + * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky + * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information + * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess + * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p mac_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Calculate the MAC of a message and compare it with a reference value. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the input. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected value. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart MAC operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a MAC operation object, the application must + * initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_mac_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_mac_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except + * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ +typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a MAC operation object of type + * #psa_mac_operation_t. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. + * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0} +#endif + +/** Return an initial value for a MAC operation object. + */ +static psa_mac_operation_t psa_mac_operation_init(void); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation. + * + * This function sets up the calculation of the MAC + * (message authentication code) of a byte string. + * To verify the MAC of a message against an + * expected value, use psa_mac_verify_setup() instead. + * + * The sequence of operations to calculate a MAC is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_mac_sign_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC + * of the concatenation of these messages in order. + * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_sign_finish() to finish + * calculating the MAC value and retrieve it. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The + * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods: + * - A successful call to psa_mac_sign_finish(). + * - A call to psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must remain valid until the operation terminates. + * It must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation. + * + * This function sets up the verification of the MAC + * (message authentication code) of a byte string against an expected value. + * + * The sequence of operations to verify a MAC is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC + * of the concatenation of these messages in order. + * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_verify_finish() to finish + * calculating the actual MAC of the message and verify it against + * the expected value. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The + * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods: + * - A successful call to psa_mac_verify_finish(). + * - A call to psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must remain valid until the operation terminates. + * It must allow the usage + * PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c key is not compatible with \c alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \c alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation. + * + * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() + * before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to + * the MAC calculation. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message. + * + * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect + * a specific value for the MAC. Call psa_mac_verify_finish() instead. + * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as + * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky + * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information + * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess + * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. This is always + * #PSA_MAC_LENGTH(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size respectively of the key and \c alg is the + * MAC algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign + * operation), or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with + * an expected value. + * + * The application must call psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). It then + * compares the calculated MAC with the expected MAC passed as a + * parameter to this function. + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the + * comparison between the actual MAC and the expected MAC is performed + * in constant time. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected MAC. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify + * operation), or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** Abort a MAC operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_mac_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_mac_abort(), psa_mac_sign_finish() or + * psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup cipher Symmetric ciphers + * @{ + */ + +/** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * This function encrypts a message with a random IV (initialization + * vector). Use the multipart operation interface with a + * #psa_cipher_operation_t object to provide other forms of IV. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to encrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * The output contains the IV followed by + * the ciphertext proper. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * This function decrypts a message encrypted with a symmetric cipher. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to decrypt. + * This consists of the IV followed by the + * ciphertext proper. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the plaintext is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart cipher operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a cipher operation object, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_cipher_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except + * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ +typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a cipher operation object of + * type #psa_cipher_operation_t. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. + * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT {0} +#endif + +/** Return an initial value for a cipher operation object. + */ +static psa_cipher_operation_t psa_cipher_operation_init(void); + +/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with a symmetric cipher + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call either psa_cipher_generate_iv() or psa_cipher_set_iv() to + * generate or set the IV (initialization vector). You should use + * psa_cipher_generate_iv() unless the protocol you are implementing + * requires a specific IV value. + * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. + * -# Call psa_cipher_finish(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The + * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish(). + * - A call to psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with a symmetric cipher + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call psa_cipher_set_iv() with the IV (initialization vector) for the + * decryption. If the IV is prepended to the ciphertext, you can call + * psa_cipher_update() on a buffer containing the IV followed by the + * beginning of the message. + * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. + * -# Call psa_cipher_finish(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The + * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish(). + * - A call to psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Generate an IV for a symmetric encryption operation. + * + * This function generates a random IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption operation as appropriate + * for the chosen algorithm, key type and key size. + * + * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before + * calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] iv Buffer where the generated IV is to be written. + * \param iv_size Size of the \p iv buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] iv_length On success, the number of bytes of the + * generated IV. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p iv buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no IV set), + * or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_size, + size_t *iv_length); + +/** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation. + * + * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before + * calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_cipher_generate_iv() + * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires + * a non-random IV. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV to use. + * \param iv_length Size of the IV in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active cipher + * encrypt operation, with no IV set), or the library has not been + * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation. + * + * Before calling this function, you must: + * 1. Call either psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(). + * The choice of setup function determines whether this function + * encrypts or decrypts its input. + * 2. If the algorithm requires an IV, call psa_cipher_generate_iv() + * (recommended when encrypting) or psa_cipher_set_iv(). + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set + * if required for the algorithm), or the library has not been + * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation. + * + * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or + * psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. The choice + * of setup function determines whether this function encrypts or + * decrypts its input. + * + * This function finishes the encryption or decryption of the message + * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * psa_cipher_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set + * if required for the algorithm), or the library has not been + * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Abort a cipher operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized as described in #psa_cipher_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_cipher_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_cipher_abort() or psa_cipher_finish() + * is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized cipher operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup aead Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) + * @{ + */ + +/** Process an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the + * operation. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be authenticated and + * encrypted. + * \param plaintext_length Size of \p plaintext in bytes. + * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is not + * part of this output. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag + * are defined as separate outputs, the + * authentication tag is appended to the + * encrypted data. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \p alg, \p plaintext_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of \p key. + * - #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * plaintext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * ciphertext size of any supported AEAD + * encryption. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output + * in the \p ciphertext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p ciphertext_size is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg, + * \p plaintext_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length) can be used to + * determine the required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length); + +/** Process an authenticated decryption operation. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the + * operation. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag + * are defined as separate inputs, the buffer + * must contain the encrypted data followed + * by the authentication tag. + * \param ciphertext_length Size of \p ciphertext in bytes. + * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \p alg, \p ciphertext_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of \p key. + * - #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * ciphertext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * plaintext size of any supported AEAD + * decryption. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output + * in the \p plaintext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The ciphertext is not authentic. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p plaintext_size is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg, + * \p ciphertext_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length) can be used + * to determine the required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart AEAD operations. + * + * Before calling any function on an AEAD operation object, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_aead_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_aead_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except + * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ +typedef struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for an AEAD operation object of + * type #psa_aead_operation_t. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. + * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0} +#endif + +/** Return an initial value for an AEAD operation object. + */ +static psa_aead_operation_t psa_aead_operation_init(void); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with authentication + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the + * inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and + * psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths() + * for details. + * -# Call either psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce() to + * generate or set the nonce. You should use + * psa_aead_generate_nonce() unless the protocol you are implementing + * requires a specific nonce value. + * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message to encrypt each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_finish(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The + * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_aead_finish(). + * - A call to psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with authentication + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_aead_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the + * inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and + * psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths() + * for details. + * -# Call psa_aead_set_nonce() with the nonce for the decryption. + * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the ciphertext to decrypt each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_verify(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The + * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_aead_verify(). + * - A call to psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or the + * library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Generate a random nonce for an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * This function generates a random nonce for the authenticated encryption + * operation with an appropriate size for the chosen algorithm, key type + * and key size. + * + * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() before + * calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] nonce Buffer where the generated nonce is to be + * written. + * \param nonce_size Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] nonce_length On success, the number of bytes of the + * generated nonce. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p nonce buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active aead encrypt + * operation, with no nonce set), or the library has not been + * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_size, + size_t *nonce_length); + +/** Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the nonce for the authenticated + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * psa_aead_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_aead_generate_nonce() + * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires + * a non-random IV. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] nonce Buffer containing the nonce to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no nonce + * set), or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length); + +/** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD. + * + * The application must call this function before calling + * psa_aead_update_ad() or psa_aead_update() if the algorithm for + * the operation requires it. If the algorithm does not require it, + * calling this function is optional, but if this function is called + * then the implementation must enforce the lengths. + * + * You may call this function before or after setting the nonce with + * psa_aead_set_nonce() or psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required. + * - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling + * this function is not required. + * - For vendor-defined algorithm, refer to the vendor documentation. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param ad_length Size of the non-encrypted additional + * authenticated data in bytes. + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen + * algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and + * psa_aead_update_ad() and psa_aead_update() must not have been + * called yet), or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length); + +/** Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation. + * + * Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted. + * + * You may call this function multiple times to pass successive fragments + * of the additional data. You may not call this function after passing + * data to encrypt or decrypt with psa_aead_update(). + * + * Before calling this function, you must: + * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, + * there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until + * you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, + * treat the input as untrusted and prepare to undo any action that + * depends on the input if psa_aead_verify() returns an error status. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the fragment of + * additional data. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input length overflows the additional data length that + * was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce + * set, have lengths set if required by the algorithm, and + * psa_aead_update() must not have been called yet), or the library + * has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation. + * + * Before calling this function, you must: + * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * The choice of setup function determines whether this function + * encrypts or decrypts its input. + * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * 3. Call psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, + * there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until + * you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS: + * - Do not use the output in any way other than storing it in a + * confidential location. If you take any action that depends + * on the tentative decrypted data, this action will need to be + * undone if the input turns out not to be valid. Furthermore, + * if an adversary can observe that this action took place + * (for example through timing), they may be able to use this + * fact as an oracle to decrypt any message encrypted with the + * same key. + * - In particular, do not copy the output anywhere but to a + * memory or storage space that you have exclusive access to. + * + * This function does not require the input to be aligned to any + * particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process + * a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but + * it may delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent + * call to psa_aead_update(), psa_aead_finish() or psa_aead_verify() + * provides sufficient input. The amount of data that can be delayed + * in this way is bounded by #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg, \p input_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of key and \c alg is + * the algorithm that were used to set up the + * operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * input_length) evaluates to the maximum + * output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg, \p input_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length) can be used to + * determine the required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is + * less than the additional data length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or + * the total input length overflows the plaintext length that + * was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce + * set, and have lengths set if required by the algorithm), or the + * library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation. + * + * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * + * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data + * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the + * inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). + * + * This function has two output buffers: + * - \p ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from + * preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). + * - \p tag contains the authentication tag. + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] ciphertext Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext + * is to be written. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key + * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to + * set up the operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to + * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the number of bytes of + * returned ciphertext. + * \param[out] tag Buffer where the authentication tag is + * to be written. + * \param tag_size Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The exact tag size is #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c + * key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) where + * \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size of the key, and \c alg is the + * algorithm that were used in the call to + * psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * - #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum tag size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] tag_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned tag. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p ciphertext or \p tag buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the + * required \p ciphertext buffer size. #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c key_type, + * \c key_bits, \c alg) or #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE can be used to + * determine the required \p tag buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is + * less than the additional data length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or + * the total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is + * less than the plaintext length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active encryption + * operation with a nonce set), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length); + +/** Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in an AEAD operation. + * + * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * + * This function finishes the authenticated decryption of the message + * components: + * + * - The additional data consisting of the concatenation of the inputs + * passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update_ad(). + * - The ciphertext consisting of the concatenation of the inputs passed to + * preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). + * - The tag passed to this function call. + * + * If the authentication tag is correct, this function outputs any remaining + * plaintext and reports success. If the authentication tag is not correct, + * this function returns #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the + * comparison between the actual tag and the expected tag is performed + * in constant time. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] plaintext Buffer where the last part of the plaintext + * is to be written. This is the remaining data + * from previous calls to psa_aead_update() + * that could not be processed until the end + * of the input. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key + * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to + * set up the operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to + * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the number of bytes of + * returned plaintext. + * \param[in] tag Buffer containing the authentication tag. + * \param tag_length Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculations were successful, but the authentication tag is + * not correct. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p plaintext buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or + * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the + * required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is + * less than the additional data length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or + * the total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is + * less than the plaintext length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active decryption + * operation with a nonce set), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_verify(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length, + const uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_length); + +/** Abort an AEAD operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized as described in #psa_aead_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_aead_abort(), psa_aead_finish() or + * psa_aead_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized AEAD operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup asymmetric Asymmetric cryptography + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms, + * this includes the hashing step. + * + * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature algorithm, first use + * a multi-part hash operation and then pass the resulting hash to + * psa_sign_hash(). PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the + * hash algorithm to use. + * + * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with the type of + * \p key. + * \param[in] input The input message to sign. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The required signature size is + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size respectively of key. + * - #PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum signature size of any supported + * signature algorithm. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag, + * or it does not permit the requested algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t * signature_length ); + +/** \brief Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using + * a hash-and-sign verification algorithm. + * + * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature verification + * algorithm, first use a multi-part hash operation to hash the message + * and then pass the resulting hash to psa_verify_hash(). + * PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the hash algorithm + * to use. + * + * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair. The key must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with the type of + * \p key. + * \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag, + * or it does not permit the requested algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed signature + * is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_length ); + +/** + * \brief Sign a hash or short message with a private key. + * + * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must + * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() + * and psa_hash_finish(), or alternatively by calling psa_hash_compute(). + * Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash + * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg) + * to determine the hash algorithm to use. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH. + * \param alg A signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with + * the type of \p key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature of a hash or short message using a public key. + * + * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must + * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() + * and psa_hash_finish(), or alternatively by calling psa_hash_compute(). + * Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash + * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg) + * to determine the hash algorithm to use. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must be a public key or an asymmetric key pair. The + * key must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH. + * \param alg A signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with + * the type of \p key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Encrypt a short message with a public key. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of \p key. + * \param[in] input The message to encrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the encrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** + * \brief Decrypt a short message with a private key. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. It must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of \p key. + * \param[in] input The message to decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_derivation Key derivation and pseudorandom generation + * @{ + */ + +/** The type of the state data structure for key derivation operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a key derivation operation object, the + * application must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_derivation_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_key_derivation_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except + * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. + */ +typedef struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key derivation operation + * object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. + */ +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. + * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT {0} +#endif + +/** Return an initial value for a key derivation operation object. + */ +static psa_key_derivation_operation_t psa_key_derivation_operation_init(void); + +/** Set up a key derivation operation. + * + * A key derivation algorithm takes some inputs and uses them to generate + * a byte stream in a deterministic way. + * This byte stream can be used to produce keys and other + * cryptographic material. + * + * To derive a key: + * -# Start with an initialized object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. + * -# Call psa_key_derivation_setup() to select the algorithm. + * -# Provide the inputs for the key derivation by calling + * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key() + * as appropriate. Which inputs are needed, in what order, and whether + * they may be keys and if so of what type depends on the algorithm. + * -# Optionally set the operation's maximum capacity with + * psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(). You may do this before, in the middle + * of or after providing inputs. For some algorithms, this step is mandatory + * because the output depends on the maximum capacity. + * -# To derive a key, call psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + * To derive a byte string for a different purpose, call + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(). + * Successive calls to these functions use successive output bytes + * calculated by the key derivation algorithm. + * -# Clean up the key derivation operation object with + * psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * If this function returns an error, the key derivation operation object is + * not changed. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_key_derivation_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * Implementations must reject an attempt to derive a key of size 0. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object + * to set up. It must + * have been initialized but not set up yet. + * \param alg The key derivation algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c alg is not a key derivation algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Retrieve the current capacity of a key derivation operation. + * + * The capacity of a key derivation is the maximum number of bytes that it can + * return. When you get *N* bytes of output from a key derivation operation, + * this reduces its capacity by *N*. + * + * \param[in] operation The operation to query. + * \param[out] capacity On success, the capacity of the operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( + const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t *capacity); + +/** Set the maximum capacity of a key derivation operation. + * + * The capacity of a key derivation operation is the maximum number of bytes + * that the key derivation operation can return from this point onwards. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to modify. + * \param capacity The new capacity of the operation. + * It must be less or equal to the operation's + * current capacity. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p capacity is larger than the operation's current capacity. + * In this case, the operation object remains valid and its capacity + * remains unchanged. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or the + * library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t capacity); + +/** Use the maximum possible capacity for a key derivation operation. + * + * Use this value as the capacity argument when setting up a key derivation + * to indicate that the operation should have the maximum possible capacity. + * The value of the maximum possible capacity depends on the key derivation + * algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY ((size_t)(-1)) + +/** Provide an input for key derivation or key agreement. + * + * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. + * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement + * algorithm for information. + * + * This function passes direct inputs, which is usually correct for + * non-secret inputs. To pass a secret input, which should be in a key + * object, call psa_key_derivation_input_key() instead of this function. + * Refer to the documentation of individual step types + * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t) + * for more information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not + * have produced any output yet. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param[in] data Input data to use. + * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or + * \c step does not allow direct inputs. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length); + +/** Provide an input for key derivation in the form of a key. + * + * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. + * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement + * algorithm for information. + * + * This function obtains input from a key object, which is usually correct for + * secret inputs or for non-secret personalization strings kept in the key + * store. To pass a non-secret parameter which is not in the key store, + * call psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() instead of this function. + * Refer to the documentation of individual step types + * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t) + * for more information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not + * have produced any output yet. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param key Identifier of the key. It must have an + * appropriate type for step and must allow the + * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or + * \c step does not allow key inputs of the given type + * or does not allow key inputs at all. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/** Perform a key agreement and use the shared secret as input to a key + * derivation. + * + * A key agreement algorithm takes two inputs: a private key \p private_key + * a public key \p peer_key. + * The result of this function is passed as input to a key derivation. + * The output of this key derivation can be extracted by reading from the + * resulting operation to produce keys and other cryptographic material. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() with a + * key agreement and derivation algorithm + * \c alg (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg) is true + * and #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg) + * is false). + * The operation must be ready for an + * input of the type given by \p step. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \param[in] peer_key Public key of the peer. The peer key must be in the + * same format that psa_import_key() accepts for the + * public key type corresponding to the type of + * private_key. That is, this function performs the + * equivalent of + * #psa_import_key(..., + * `peer_key`, `peer_key_length`) where + * with key attributes indicating the public key + * type corresponding to the type of `private_key`. + * For example, for EC keys, this means that peer_key + * is interpreted as a point on the curve that the + * private key is on. The standard formats for public + * keys are documented in the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * \param peer_key_length Size of \p peer_key in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c private_key is not compatible with \c alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \c alg or not compatible with + * \c private_key, or \c step does not allow an input resulting + * from a key agreement. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this key agreement \p step, + * or the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length); + +/** Read some data from a key derivation operation. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and + * return those bytes. + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads the requested number of bytes from the + * stream. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output will be written. + * \param output_length Number of bytes to output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * The operation's capacity was less than + * \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case, + * no output is written to the output buffer. + * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus + * subsequent calls to this function will not + * succeed, even with a smaller output buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length); + +/** Derive a key from an ongoing key derivation operation. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm + * and uses those bytes to generate a key deterministically. + * The key's location, usage policy, type and size are taken from + * \p attributes. + * + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads as many bytes as required from the + * stream. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * How much output is produced and consumed from the operation, and how + * the key is derived, depends on the key type and on the key size + * (denoted \c bits below): + * + * - For key types for which the key is an arbitrary sequence of bytes + * of a given size, this function is functionally equivalent to + * calling #psa_key_derivation_output_bytes + * and passing the resulting output to #psa_import_key. + * However, this function has a security benefit: + * if the implementation provides an isolation boundary then + * the key material is not exposed outside the isolation boundary. + * As a consequence, for these key types, this function always consumes + * exactly (\c bits / 8) bytes from the operation. + * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme: + * + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC. + * + * - For ECC keys on a Montgomery elliptic curve + * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a + * Montgomery curve), this function always draws a byte string whose + * length is determined by the curve, and sets the mandatory bits + * accordingly. That is: + * + * - Curve25519 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 bits): draw a 32-byte + * string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 §5. + * - Curve448 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 bits): draw a 56-byte + * string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 §5. + * + * - For key types for which the key is represented by a single sequence of + * \c bits bits with constraints as to which bit sequences are acceptable, + * this function draws a byte string of length (\c bits / 8) bytes rounded + * up to the nearest whole number of bytes. If the resulting byte string + * is acceptable, it becomes the key, otherwise the drawn bytes are discarded. + * This process is repeated until an acceptable byte string is drawn. + * The byte string drawn from the operation is interpreted as specified + * for the output produced by psa_export_key(). + * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme: + * + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES. + * Force-set the parity bits, but discard forbidden weak keys. + * For 2-key and 3-key triple-DES, the three keys are generated + * successively (for example, for 3-key triple-DES, + * if the first 8 bytes specify a weak key and the next 8 bytes do not, + * discard the first 8 bytes, use the next 8 bytes as the first key, + * and continue reading output from the operation to derive the other + * two keys). + * - Finite-field Diffie-Hellman keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(\c group) + * where \c group designates any Diffie-Hellman group) and + * ECC keys on a Weierstrass elliptic curve + * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a + * Weierstrass curve). + * For these key types, interpret the byte string as integer + * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range + * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain + * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA, + * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC). + * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*. + * This method allows compliance to NIST standards, specifically + * the methods titled "key-pair generation by testing candidates" + * in NIST SP 800-56A §5.6.1.1.4 for Diffie-Hellman, + * in FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2 for DSA, and + * in NIST SP 800-56A §5.6.1.2.2 or + * FIPS 186-4 §B.4.2 for elliptic curve keys. + * + * - For other key types, including #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, + * the way in which the operation output is consumed is + * implementation-defined. + * + * In all cases, the data that is read is discarded from the operation. + * The operation's capacity is decreased by the number of bytes read. + * + * For algorithms that take an input step #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + * the input to that step must be provided with psa_key_derivation_input_key(). + * Future versions of this specification may include additional restrictions + * on the derived key based on the attributes and strength of the secret key. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * There was not enough data to create the desired key. + * Note that in this case, no output is written to the output buffer. + * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus subsequent calls to + * this function will not succeed, even with a smaller output buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the + * implementation in general or in this particular location. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input was not provided through + * a key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + +/** Abort a key derivation operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c + * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused + * for another operation by calling psa_key_derivation_setup() again. + * + * This function may be called at any time after the operation + * object has been initialized as described in #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. + * + * In particular, it is valid to call psa_key_derivation_abort() twice, or to + * call psa_key_derivation_abort() on an operation that has not been set up. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation); + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw shared secret. + * + * \warning The raw result of a key agreement algorithm such as finite-field + * Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman has biases and should + * not be used directly as key material. It should instead be passed as + * input to a key derivation algorithm. To chain a key agreement with + * a key derivation, use psa_key_derivation_key_agreement() and other + * functions from the key derivation interface. + * + * \param alg The key agreement algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p alg) + * is true). + * \param private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \param[in] peer_key Public key of the peer. It must be + * in the same format that psa_import_key() + * accepts. The standard formats for public + * keys are documented in the documentation + * of psa_export_public_key(). + * \param peer_key_length Size of \p peer_key in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or + * \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with + * \p private_key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p output_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup random Random generation + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Generate random bytes. + * + * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status + * and MUST NOT use the content of the output buffer if the return + * status is not #PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * \note To generate a key, use psa_generate_key() instead. + * + * \param[out] output Output buffer for the generated data. + * \param output_size Number of bytes to generate and output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size); + +/** + * \brief Generate a key or key pair. + * + * The key is generated randomly. + * Its location, usage policy, type and size are taken from \p attributes. + * + * Implementations must reject an attempt to generate a key of size 0. + * + * The following type-specific considerations apply: + * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), + * the public exponent is 65537. + * The modulus is a product of two probabilistic primes + * between 2^{n-1} and 2^n where n is the bit size specified in the + * attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + +/**@}*/ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +/* The file "crypto_sizes.h" contains definitions for size calculation + * macros whose definitions are implementation-specific. */ +#include "crypto_sizes.h" + +/* The file "crypto_struct.h" contains definitions for + * implementation-specific structs that are declared above. */ +#include "crypto_struct.h" + +/* The file "crypto_extra.h" contains vendor-specific definitions. This + * can include vendor-defined algorithms, extra functions, etc. */ +#include "crypto_extra.h" + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..711c43df --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/* + * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers + * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer. + * This file contains the context structures of those algorithms which need to + * rely on other algorithms, i.e. are 'composite' algorithms. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The + * definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the + * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H + +#include + +/* + * MAC multi-part operation definitions. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +typedef struct +{ + /** The HMAC algorithm in use */ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + /** The hash context. */ + struct psa_hash_operation_s hash_ctx; + /** The HMAC part of the context. */ + uint8_t opad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, {0}} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" + +typedef struct +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + union + { + unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t hmac; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cmac; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + } ctx; +} mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, {0}} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..96c45290 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +/* + * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers + * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer. + * This file contains the context structures of those algorithms which do not + * rely on other algorithms, i.e. are 'primitive' algorithms. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The + * definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the + * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H + +#include + +/* + * Hash multi-part operation definitions. + */ + +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH +#endif + +typedef struct +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + union + { + unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) + mbedtls_md2_context md2; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) + mbedtls_md4_context md4; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + mbedtls_md5_context md5; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + mbedtls_ripemd160_context ripemd160; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; +#endif + } ctx; +} mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT {0, {0}} + +/* + * Cipher multi-part operation definitions. + */ + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER 1 +#endif + +typedef struct { + /* Context structure for the Mbed TLS cipher implementation. */ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + uint8_t iv_length; + uint8_t block_length; + union { + unsigned int dummy; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher; + } ctx; +} mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, {0}} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_compat.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_compat.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d184042 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,528 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_compat.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Backward compatibility aliases + * + * This header declares alternative names for macro and functions. + * New application code should not use these names. + * These names may be removed in a future version of Mbed Crypto. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * To support both openless APIs and psa_open_key() temporarily, define + * psa_key_handle_t to be equal to mbedtls_svc_key_id_t. Do not mark the + * type and its utility macros and functions deprecated yet. This will be done + * in a subsequent phase. + */ +typedef mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_handle_t; + +#define PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT + +/** Check whether a handle is null. + * + * \param handle Handle + * + * \return Non-zero if the handle is null, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int psa_key_handle_is_null( psa_key_handle_t handle ) +{ + return( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( handle ) ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + +/* + * Mechanism for declaring deprecated values + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED +#endif + +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_deprecated_size_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_status_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_status_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_key_usage_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_ecc_family_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_dh_family_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_dh_family_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_ecc_family_t psa_ecc_curve_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_dh_family_t psa_dh_group_t; +typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_algorithm_t; + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_GROUP PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY + +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( type, value ) \ + ( (mbedtls_deprecated_##type) ( value ) ) + +/* + * Deprecated PSA Crypto error code definitions (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta2) + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ) +#define PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ) +#define PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ) +#define PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ) + +/* + * Deprecated PSA Crypto numerical encodings (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_key_usage_t, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_key_usage_t, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) + +/* + * Deprecated PSA Crypto size calculation macros (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ) ) +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE( key_type, key_bits ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( key_type, key_bits ) ) +#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( type ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( type ) ) +#define PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE ) +#define PSA_HASH_SIZE( alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_HASH_LENGTH( alg ) ) +#define PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE( key_type, key_bits, alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, alg ) ) +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE ) + +/* + * Deprecated PSA Crypto function names (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) + */ +MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED static inline psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_sign( psa_key_handle_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + return psa_sign_hash( key, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, signature_size, signature_length ); +} + +MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED static inline psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_verify( psa_key_handle_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + return psa_verify_hash( key, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, signature_length ); +} + +/* + * Size-specific elliptic curve families. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R2 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT239K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R2 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R2 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE25519 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE448 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) + +/* + * Curves that changed name due to PSA specification. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R2 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_K1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_R2 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ) +#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_MONTGOMERY \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) + +/* + * Finite-field Diffie-Hellman families. + */ +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE2048 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE3072 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE4096 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE6144 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE8192 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) + +/* + * Diffie-Hellman families that changed name due to PSA specification. + */ +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_RFC7919 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ) +#define PSA_DH_GROUP_CUSTOM \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM ) + +/* + * Deprecated PSA Crypto stream cipher algorithms (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ARC4 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ) +#define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20 \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ) + +/* + * Renamed AEAD tag length macros (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH( aead_alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG( aead_alg ) ) +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH( aead_alg, tag_length ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( aead_alg, tag_length ) ) + +/* + * Deprecated PSA AEAD output size macros (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) + */ + +/** The tag size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The tag size for the specified algorithm. + * If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified + * tag that can be distinguished from the rest of + * the ciphertext, return 0. + * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_1_ARG( alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ? \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg ) : \ + 0 ) + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of + * the ciphertext may be smaller. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG( alg, plaintext_length ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ? \ + (plaintext_length) + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg ) : \ + 0 ) + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of + * the plaintext may be smaller. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param ciphertext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG( alg, ciphertext_length ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) && \ + (ciphertext_length) > PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg ) ? \ + (ciphertext_length) - PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg ) : \ + 0 ) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output may be smaller + * in any given call. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +/* For all the AEAD modes defined in this specification, it is possible + * to emit output without delay. However, hardware may not always be + * capable of this. So for modes based on a block cipher, allow the + * implementation to delay the output until it has a full block. */ +#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG( alg, input_length ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER( alg ) ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, (input_length) ) : \ + (input_length) ) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(). + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an + * insufficient ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output may + * be smaller in any given call. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the + * specified algorithm. + * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE_1_ARG( alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER( alg ) ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE : \ + 0 ) + +/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(). + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_verify() will not fail due to an + * insufficient plaintext buffer size. The actual size of the output may + * be smaller in any given call. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return A sufficient plaintext buffer size for the + * specified algorithm. + * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE_1_ARG( alg ) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT( size_t, \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER( alg ) ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE : \ + 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** Open a handle to an existing persistent key. + * + * Open a handle to a persistent key. A key is persistent if it was created + * with a lifetime other than #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. A persistent key + * always has a nonzero key identifier, set with psa_set_key_id() when + * creating the key. Implementations may provide additional pre-provisioned + * keys that can be opened with psa_open_key(). Such keys have an application + * key identifier in the vendor range, as documented in the description of + * #psa_key_id_t. + * + * The application must eventually close the handle with psa_close_key() or + * psa_destroy_key() to release associated resources. If the application dies + * without calling one of these functions, the implementation should perform + * the equivalent of a call to psa_close_key(). + * + * Some implementations permit an application to open the same key multiple + * times. If this is successful, each call to psa_open_key() will return a + * different key handle. + * + * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0 + * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the + * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is + * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not + * deprecated yet but will be in the near future. + * + * \note Applications that rely on opening a key multiple times will not be + * portable to implementations that only permit a single key handle to be + * opened. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. + * + * + * \param key The persistent identifier of the key. + * \param[out] handle On success, a handle to the key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. The application can now use the value of `*handle` + * to access the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * The implementation does not have sufficient resources to open the + * key. This can be due to reaching an implementation limit on the + * number of open keys, the number of open key handles, or available + * memory. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no persistent key with key identifier \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not a valid persistent key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The specified key exists, but the application does not have the + * permission to access it. Note that this specification does not + * define any way to create such a key, but it may be possible + * through implementation-specific means. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_open_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_handle_t *handle ); + +/** Close a key handle. + * + * If the handle designates a volatile key, this will destroy the key material + * and free all associated resources, just like psa_destroy_key(). + * + * If this is the last open handle to a persistent key, then closing the handle + * will free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key + * data in persistent storage is not affected and can be opened again later + * with a call to psa_open_key(). + * + * Closing the key handle makes the handle invalid, and the key handle + * must not be used again by the application. + * + * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0 + * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the + * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is + * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not + * deprecated yet but will be in the near future. + * + * \note If the key handle was used to set up an active + * :ref:\`multipart operation \`, then closing the + * key handle can cause the multipart operation to fail. Applications should + * maintain the key handle until after the multipart operation has finished. + * + * \param handle The key handle to close. + * If this is \c 0, do nothing and return \c PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p handle was a valid handle or \c 0. It is now closed. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p handle is not a valid handle nor \c 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_config.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f261e013 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_config.h + * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines) + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +/** + * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled in config.h, + * this file determines which cryptographic mechanisms are enabled + * through the PSA Cryptography API (\c psa_xxx() functions). + * + * To enable a cryptographic mechanism, uncomment the definition of + * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol. + * To disable a cryptographic mechanism, comment out the definition of + * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol. + * The names of cryptographic mechanisms correspond to values + * defined in psa/crypto_values.h, with the prefix \c PSA_WANT_ instead + * of \c PSA_. + * + * Note that many cryptographic mechanisms involve two symbols: one for + * the key type (\c PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx) and one for the algorithm + * (\c PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx). Mechanisms with additional parameters may involve + * additional symbols. + */ +#else +/** + * When \c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled in config.h, + * this file is not used, and cryptographic mechanisms are supported + * through the PSA API if and only if they are supported through the + * mbedtls_xxx API. + */ +#endif +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H + +/* + * CBC-MAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +/* PBKDF2-HMAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. + * Note: when adding support, also adjust include/mbedtls/config_psa.h */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS 1 + +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +/* + * Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4249). Thus, do not enable it by + * default. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +/* + * SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541). Thus, do not enable it by + * default. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 + +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..26363c6b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_driver_common.h + * \brief Definitions for all PSA crypto drivers + * + * This file contains common definitions shared by all PSA crypto drivers. + * Do not include it directly: instead, include the header file(s) for + * the type(s) of driver that you are implementing. For example, if + * you are writing a dynamically registered driver for a secure element, + * include `psa/crypto_se_driver.h`. + * + * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver Model, containing functions for + * driver developers to implement to enable hardware to be called in a + * standardized way by a PSA Cryptographic API implementation. The functions + * comprising the driver model, which driver authors implement, are not + * intended to be called by application developers. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H + +#include +#include + +/* Include type definitions (psa_status_t, psa_algorithm_t, + * psa_key_type_t, etc.) and macros to build and analyze values + * of these types. */ +#include "crypto_types.h" +#include "crypto_values.h" +/* Include size definitions which are used to size some arrays in operation + * structures. */ +#include + +/** For encrypt-decrypt functions, whether the operation is an encryption + * or a decryption. */ +typedef enum { + PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_DECRYPT, + PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_ENCRYPT +} psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a7220091 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +/* + * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper + * interface. This file contains the context structures for 'composite' + * operations, i.e. those operations which need to make use of other operations + * from the primitives (crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h) + * + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic + * library. The definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h + * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H + +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */ +#include "psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were + * declared during the autogeneration process. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t; +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT + +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t; +typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +/* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the + * PSA Driver wrapper layer as the union of all possible driver's contexts. + * + * The union members are the driver's context structures, and the member names + * are formatted as `'drivername'_ctx`. This allows for procedural generation + * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c */ + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx; + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_mac_context_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2bb01ed4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +/* + * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper + * interface. This file contains the context structures for 'primitive' + * operations, i.e. those operations which do not rely on other contexts. + * + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic + * library. The definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h + * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H + +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */ +#include "psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were + * declared during the autogeneration process. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_HASH_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_HASH_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH */ + +typedef struct { + unsigned int initialised : 1; + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t ctx; +} mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \ + { 0, MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT } + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +/* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the + * PSA Driver wrapper layer as the union of all possible driver's contexts. + * + * The union members are the driver's context structures, and the member names + * are formatted as `'drivername'_ctx`. This allows for procedural generation + * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c */ + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_hash_context_t; + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx; + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_cipher_context_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_extra.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a34d5516 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_extra.h @@ -0,0 +1,816 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_extra.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS vendor extensions + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file is reserved for vendor-specific definitions. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include "crypto_types.h" +#include "crypto_compat.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* UID for secure storage seed */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID 0xFFFFFF52 + +/* See config.h for definition */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 +#endif + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Declare the enrollment algorithm for a key. + * + * An operation on a key may indifferently use the algorithm set with + * psa_set_key_algorithm() or with this function. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param alg2 A second algorithm that the key may be used + * for, in addition to the algorithm set with + * psa_set_key_algorithm(). + * + * \warning Setting an enrollment algorithm is not recommended, because + * using the same key with different algorithms can allow some + * attacks based on arithmetic relations between different + * computations made with the same key, or can escalate harmless + * side channels into exploitable ones. Use this function only + * if it is necessary to support a protocol for which it has been + * verified that the usage of the key with multiple algorithms + * is safe. + */ +static inline void psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg2) +{ + attributes->core.policy.alg2 = alg2; +} + +/** Retrieve the enrollment algorithm policy from key attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The enrollment algorithm stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.policy.alg2 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + +/** Retrieve the slot number where a key is stored. + * + * A slot number is only defined for keys that are stored in a secure + * element. + * + * This information is only useful if the secure element is not entirely + * managed through the PSA Cryptography API. It is up to the secure + * element driver to decide how PSA slot numbers map to any other interface + * that the secure element may have. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number containing the key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key is located in a secure element, and \p *slot_number + * indicates the slot number that contains it. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller is not permitted to query the slot number. + * Mbed Crypto currently does not return this error. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key is not located in a secure element. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ); + +/** Choose the slot number where a key is stored. + * + * This function declares a slot number in the specified attribute + * structure. + * + * A slot number is only meaningful for keys that are stored in a secure + * element. It is up to the secure element driver to decide how PSA slot + * numbers map to any other interface that the secure element may have. + * + * \note Setting a slot number in key attributes for a key creation can + * cause the following errors when creating the key: + * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if the selected secure element does + * not support choosing a specific slot number. + * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED if the caller is not permitted to + * choose slot numbers in general or to choose this specific slot. + * - #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT if the chosen slot number is not + * valid in general or not valid for this specific key. + * - #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS if there is already a key in the + * selected slot. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param slot_number The slot number to set. + */ +static inline void psa_set_key_slot_number( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ) +{ + attributes->core.flags |= MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER; + attributes->slot_number = slot_number; +} + +/** Remove the slot number attribute from a key attribute structure. + * + * This function undoes the action of psa_set_key_slot_number(). + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + */ +static inline void psa_clear_key_slot_number( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + attributes->core.flags &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER; +} + +/** Register a key that is already present in a secure element. + * + * The key must be located in a secure element designated by the + * lifetime field in \p attributes, in the slot set with + * psa_set_key_slot_number() in the attribute structure. + * This function makes the key available through the key identifier + * specified in \p attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the existing key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully registered. + * Note that depending on the design of the driver, this may or may + * not guarantee that a key actually exists in the designated slot + * and is compatible with the specified attributes. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There is already a key with the identifier specified in + * \p attributes. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The secure element driver for the specified lifetime does not + * support registering a key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The identifier in \p attributes is invalid, namely the identifier is + * not in the user range, or + * \p attributes specifies a lifetime which is not located + * in a secure element, or no slot number is specified in \p attributes, + * or the specified slot number is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller is not authorized to register the specified key slot. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** + * \brief Library deinitialization. + * + * This function clears all data associated with the PSA layer, + * including the whole key store. + * + * This is an Mbed TLS extension. + */ +void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( void ); + +/** \brief Statistics about + * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore. + * + * \note The content of this structure is not part of the stable API and ABI + * of Mbed Crypto and may change arbitrarily from version to version. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_psa_stats_s +{ + /** Number of slots containing key material for a volatile key. */ + size_t volatile_slots; + /** Number of slots containing key material for a key which is in + * internal persistent storage. */ + size_t persistent_slots; + /** Number of slots containing a reference to a key in a + * secure element. */ + size_t external_slots; + /** Number of slots which are occupied, but do not contain + * key material yet. */ + size_t half_filled_slots; + /** Number of slots that contain cache data. */ + size_t cache_slots; + /** Number of slots that are not used for anything. */ + size_t empty_slots; + /** Number of slots that are locked. */ + size_t locked_slots; + /** Largest key id value among open keys in internal persistent storage. */ + psa_key_id_t max_open_internal_key_id; + /** Largest key id value among open keys in secure elements. */ + psa_key_id_t max_open_external_key_id; +} mbedtls_psa_stats_t; + +/** \brief Get statistics about + * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore. + * + * \note When Mbed Crypto is built as part of a service, with isolation + * between the application and the keystore, the service may or + * may not expose this function. + */ +void mbedtls_psa_get_stats( mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats ); + +/** + * \brief Inject an initial entropy seed for the random generator into + * secure storage. + * + * This function injects data to be used as a seed for the random generator + * used by the PSA Crypto implementation. On devices that lack a trusted + * entropy source (preferably a hardware random number generator), + * the Mbed PSA Crypto implementation uses this value to seed its + * random generator. + * + * On devices without a trusted entropy source, this function must be + * called exactly once in the lifetime of the device. On devices with + * a trusted entropy source, calling this function is optional. + * In all cases, this function may only be called before calling any + * other function in the PSA Crypto API, including psa_crypto_init(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, it populates a file in + * persistent storage. Once the file has been created, this function + * can no longer succeed. + * + * If any error occurs, this function does not change the system state. + * You can call this function again after correcting the reason for the + * error if possible. + * + * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status. + * + * \warning If you use this function, you should use it as part of a + * factory provisioning process. The value of the injected seed + * is critical to the security of the device. It must be + * *secret*, *unpredictable* and (statistically) *unique per device*. + * You should be generate it randomly using a cryptographically + * secure random generator seeded from trusted entropy sources. + * You should transmit it securely to the device and ensure + * that its value is not leaked or stored anywhere beyond the + * needs of transmitting it from the point of generation to + * the call of this function, and erase all copies of the value + * once this function returns. + * + * This is an Mbed TLS extension. + * + * \note This function is only available on the following platforms: + * * If the compile-time option MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is enabled. + * Note that you must provide compatible implementations of + * mbedtls_nv_seed_read and mbedtls_nv_seed_write. + * * In a client-server integration of PSA Cryptography, on the client side, + * if the server supports this feature. + * \param[in] seed Buffer containing the seed value to inject. + * \param[in] seed_size Size of the \p seed buffer. + * The size of the seed in bytes must be greater + * or equal to both #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM + * and #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE. + * It must be less or equal to + * #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The seed value was injected successfully. The random generator + * of the PSA Crypto implementation is now ready for use. + * You may now call psa_crypto_init() and use the PSA Crypto + * implementation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p seed_size is out of range. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * There was a failure reading or writing from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The library has already been initialized. It is no longer + * possible to call this function. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed, + size_t seed_size); + +/** \addtogroup crypto_types + * @{ + */ + +/** DSA public key. + * + * The import and export format is the + * representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a big-endian byte + * string. The length of the byte string is the length of the base prime `p` + * in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4002) + +/** DSA key pair (private and public key). + * + * The import and export format is the + * representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte string. The + * length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes (leading zeroes + * are not stripped). + * + * Deterministic DSA key derivation with psa_generate_derived_key follows + * FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2: interpret the byte string as integer + * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range + * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain + * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA, + * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC). + * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*. + * + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7002) + +/** Whether a key type is a DSA key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(type) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000400) +/** DSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4, + * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000500) +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG +/** Deterministic DSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the deterministic variant defined by RFC 6979 of + * the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ + PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) + + +/* We need to expand the sample definition of this macro from + * the API definition. */ +#undef PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ + PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** Custom Diffie-Hellman group. + * + * For keys of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM), the group data comes + * from domain parameters set by psa_set_key_domain_parameters(). + */ +#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x7e) + + +/** + * \brief Set domain parameters for a key. + * + * Some key types require additional domain parameters in addition to + * the key type identifier and the key size. Use this function instead + * of psa_set_key_type() when you need to specify domain parameters. + * + * The format for the required domain parameters varies based on the key type. + * + * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), + * the domain parameter data consists of the public exponent, + * represented as a big-endian integer with no leading zeros. + * This information is used when generating an RSA key pair. + * When importing a key, the public exponent is read from the imported + * key data and the exponent recorded in the attribute structure is ignored. + * As an exception, the public exponent 65537 is represented by an empty + * byte string. + * - For DSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR), + * the `Dss-Params` format as defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.2. + * ``` + * Dss-Params ::= SEQUENCE { + * p INTEGER, + * q INTEGER, + * g INTEGER + * } + * ``` + * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange keys + * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM)), the + * `DomainParameters` format as defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.3. + * ``` + * DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE { + * p INTEGER, -- odd prime, p=jq +1 + * g INTEGER, -- generator, g + * q INTEGER, -- factor of p-1 + * j INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- subgroup factor + * validationParams ValidationParams OPTIONAL + * } + * ValidationParams ::= SEQUENCE { + * seed BIT STRING, + * pgenCounter INTEGER + * } + * ``` + * + * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources. + * Once you have called this function on an attribute structure, + * you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources. + * + * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change + * in future versions of the library. + * + * \param[in,out] attributes Attribute structure where the specified domain + * parameters will be stored. + * If this function fails, the content of + * \p attributes is not modified. + * \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value). + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key domain parameters. + * The content of this buffer is interpreted + * according to \p type as described above. + * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length); + +/** + * \brief Get domain parameters for a key. + * + * Get the domain parameters for a key with this function, if any. The format + * of the domain parameters written to \p data is specified in the + * documentation for psa_set_key_domain_parameters(). + * + * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change + * in future versions of the library. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * \param[out] data On success, the key domain parameters. + * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * The buffer is guaranteed to be large + * enough if its size in bytes is at least + * the value given by + * PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(). + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key domain parameters data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** Safe output buffer size for psa_get_key_domain_parameters(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change + * in future versions of the library. + * + * \param key_type A supported key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_get_key_domain_parameters() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported + * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a + * sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? sizeof(int) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_DH_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(key_type) ? PSA_DSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + 0) +#define PSA_DH_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (4 + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 5) * 3 /*without optional parts*/) +#define PSA_DSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (4 + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 5) * 2 /*p, g*/ + 34 /*q*/) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup psa_tls_helpers TLS helper functions + * @{ + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include + +/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA. + * + * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of + * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier + * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). + * \param[out] bits On success, the bit size of the curve. + * + * \return The corresponding PSA elliptic curve identifier + * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). + * \return \c 0 on failure (\p grpid is not recognized). + */ +static inline psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, + size_t *bits ) +{ + switch( grpid ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + *bits = 192; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + *bits = 224; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + *bits = 256; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + *bits = 384; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + *bits = 521; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + *bits = 256; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + *bits = 384; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + *bits = 512; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + *bits = 255; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + *bits = 192; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + *bits = 224; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + *bits = 256; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ); + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + *bits = 448; + return( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ); + default: + *bits = 0; + return( 0 ); + } +} + +/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS. + * + * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of + * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \param curve A PSA elliptic curve identifier + * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). + * \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve. + * \param bits_is_sloppy If true, \p bits may be the bit-length rounded up + * to the nearest multiple of 8. This allows the caller + * to infer the exact curve from the length of a key + * which is supplied as a byte string. + * + * \return The corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier + * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \c curve is not recognized. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \p bits is not + * correct for \p curve. + */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( psa_ecc_family_t curve, + size_t bits, + int bits_is_sloppy ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup psa_external_rng External random generator + * @{ + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** External random generator function, implemented by the platform. + * + * When the compile-time option #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG is enabled, + * this function replaces Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules for all + * random generation triggered via PSA crypto interfaces. + * + * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic + * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers + * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function + * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded + * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow + * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source + * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option. + * + * \param[in,out] context Pointer to the random generator context. + * This is all-bits-zero on the first call + * and preserved between successive calls. + * \param[out] output Output buffer. On success, this buffer + * contains random data with a uniform + * distribution. + * \param output_size The size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, set this value to \p output_size. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. The output buffer contains \p output_size bytes of + * cryptographic-quality random data, and \c *output_length is + * set to \p output_size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * The random generator requires extra entropy and there is no + * way to obtain entropy under current environment conditions. + * This error should not happen under normal circumstances since + * this function is responsible for obtaining as much entropy as + * it needs. However implementations of this function may return + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY if there is no way to obtain + * entropy without blocking indefinitely. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * A failure of the random generator hardware that isn't covered + * by #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( + mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup psa_builtin_keys Built-in keys + * @{ + */ + +/** The minimum value for a key identifier that is built into the + * implementation. + * + * The range of key identifiers from #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN + * to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX within the range from + * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN and #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX and must not intersect + * with any other set of implementation-chosen key identifiers. + * + * This value is part of the library's ABI since changing it would invalidate + * the values of built-in key identifiers in applications. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x7fff0000) + +/** The maximum value for a key identifier that is built into the + * implementation. + * + * See #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN for more information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x7fffefff) + +/** A slot number identifying a key in a driver. + * + * Values of this type are used to identify built-in keys. + */ +typedef uint64_t psa_drv_slot_number_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) +/** Test whether a key identifier belongs to the builtin key range. + * + * \param key_id Key identifier to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The key identifier is a builtin key identifier. + * \retval 0 + * The key identifier is not a builtin key identifier. + */ +static inline int psa_key_id_is_builtin( psa_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + return( ( key_id >= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN ) && + ( key_id <= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX ) ); +} + +/** Platform function to obtain the location and slot number of a built-in key. + * + * An application-specific implementation of this function must be provided if + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS is enabled. This would typically be provided + * as part of a platform's system image. + * + * #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(\p key_id) needs to be in the range from + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX. + * + * In a multi-application configuration + * (\c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER is defined), + * this function should check that #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(\p key_id) + * is allowed to use the given key. + * + * \param key_id The key ID for which to retrieve the + * location and slot attributes. + * \param[out] lifetime On success, the lifetime associated with the key + * corresponding to \p key_id. Lifetime is a + * combination of which driver contains the key, + * and with what persistence level the key is + * intended to be used. If the platform + * implementation does not contain specific + * information about the intended key persistence + * level, the persistence level may be reported as + * #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number known to the driver + * registered at the lifetime location reported + * through \p lifetime which corresponds to the + * requested built-in key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The requested key identifier designates a built-in key. + * In a multi-application configuration, the requested owner + * is allowed to access it. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * The requested key identifier is not a built-in key which is known + * to this function. If a key exists in the key storage with this + * identifier, the data from the storage will be used. + * \return (any other error) + * Any other error is propagated to the function that requested the key. + * Common errors include: + * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: the key exists but the requested owner + * is not allowed to access it. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + psa_key_lifetime_t *lifetime, + psa_drv_slot_number_t *slot_number ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +/** @} */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_platform.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_platform.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d3f518e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_platform.h @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_platform.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS platform definitions + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file contains platform-dependent type definitions. + * + * In implementations with isolation between the application and the + * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that + * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the + * module implements. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H + +/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it + * in each of its header files. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/* Translate between classic MBEDTLS_xxx feature symbols and PSA_xxx + * feature symbols. */ +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" + +/* PSA requires several types which C99 provides in stdint.h. */ +#include + +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + +/* Building for the PSA Crypto service on a PSA platform, a key owner is a PSA + * partition identifier. + * + * The function psa_its_identifier_of_slot() in psa_crypto_storage.c that + * translates a key identifier to a key storage file name assumes that + * mbedtls_key_owner_id_t is a 32-bit integer. This function thus needs + * reworking if mbedtls_key_owner_id_t is not defined as a 32-bit integer + * here anymore. + */ +typedef int32_t mbedtls_key_owner_id_t; + +/** Compare two key owner identifiers. + * + * \param id1 First key owner identifier. + * \param id2 Second key owner identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the two key owner identifiers are equal, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal( mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id1, + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id2 ) +{ + return( id1 == id2 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +/* + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is being built for SPM + * (Secure Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two + * parts: NSPE (Non-Secure Processing Environment) and SPE (Secure Processing + * Environment). When building for the SPE, an additional header file should be + * included. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SECURE 1 +#include "crypto_spe.h" +#endif // MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** The type of the context passed to mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(). + * + * Mbed TLS initializes the context to all-bits-zero before calling + * mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() for the first time. + * + * The definition of this type in the Mbed TLS source code is for + * demonstration purposes. Implementers of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() + * are expected to replace it with a custom definition. + */ +typedef struct { + uintptr_t opaque[2]; +} mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f8f8c92e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h @@ -0,0 +1,1395 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_se_driver.h + * \brief PSA external cryptoprocessor driver module + * + * This header declares types and function signatures for cryptography + * drivers that access key material via opaque references. + * This is meant for cryptoprocessors that have a separate key storage from the + * space in which the PSA Crypto implementation runs, typically secure + * elements (SEs). + * + * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver HAL (hardware abstraction layer), + * containing functions for driver developers to implement to enable hardware + * to be called in a standardized way by a PSA Cryptography API + * implementation. The functions comprising the driver HAL, which driver + * authors implement, are not intended to be called by application developers. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H + +#include "crypto_driver_common.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** \defgroup se_init Secure element driver initialization + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief Driver context structure + * + * Driver functions receive a pointer to this structure. + * Each registered driver has one instance of this structure. + * + * Implementations must include the fields specified here and + * may include other fields. + */ +typedef struct { + /** A read-only pointer to the driver's persistent data. + * + * Drivers typically use this persistent data to keep track of + * which slot numbers are available. This is only a guideline: + * drivers may use the persistent data for any purpose, keeping + * in mind the restrictions on when the persistent data is saved + * to storage: the persistent data is only saved after calling + * certain functions that receive a writable pointer to the + * persistent data. + * + * The core allocates a memory buffer for the persistent data. + * The pointer is guaranteed to be suitably aligned for any data type, + * like a pointer returned by `malloc` (but the core can use any + * method to allocate the buffer, not necessarily `malloc`). + * + * The size of this buffer is in the \c persistent_data_size field of + * this structure. + * + * Before the driver is initialized for the first time, the content of + * the persistent data is all-bits-zero. After a driver upgrade, if the + * size of the persistent data has increased, the original data is padded + * on the right with zeros; if the size has decreased, the original data + * is truncated to the new size. + * + * This pointer is to read-only data. Only a few driver functions are + * allowed to modify the persistent data. These functions receive a + * writable pointer. These functions are: + * - psa_drv_se_t::p_init + * - psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate + * - psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy + * + * The PSA Cryptography core saves the persistent data from one + * session to the next. It does this before returning from API functions + * that call a driver method that is allowed to modify the persistent + * data, specifically: + * - psa_crypto_init() causes a call to psa_drv_se_t::p_init, and may call + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy to complete an action + * that was interrupted by a power failure. + * - Key creation functions cause a call to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate, and may cause a call to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy in case an error occurs. + * - psa_destroy_key() causes a call to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy. + */ + const void *const persistent_data; + + /** The size of \c persistent_data in bytes. + * + * This is always equal to the value of the `persistent_data_size` field + * of the ::psa_drv_se_t structure when the driver is registered. + */ + const size_t persistent_data_size; + + /** Driver transient data. + * + * The core initializes this value to 0 and does not read or modify it + * afterwards. The driver may store whatever it wants in this field. + */ + uintptr_t transient_data; +} psa_drv_se_context_t; + +/** \brief A driver initialization function. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param location The location value for which this driver + * is registered. The driver will be invoked + * for all keys whose lifetime is in this + * location. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The driver is operational. + * The core will update the persistent data in storage. + * \return + * Any other return value prevents the driver from being used in + * this session. + * The core will NOT update the persistent data in storage. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_init_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + psa_key_location_t location); + +#if defined(__DOXYGEN_ONLY__) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* Mbed Crypto with secure element support enabled defines this type in + * crypto_types.h because it is also visible to applications through an + * implementation-specific extension. + * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible + * via crypto_se_driver.h. */ +/** An internal designation of a key slot between the core part of the + * PSA Crypto implementation and the driver. The meaning of this value + * is driver-dependent. */ +typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t; +#endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ || !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_mac Secure Element Message Authentication Codes + * Generation and authentication of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using + * a secure element can be done either as a single function call (via the + * `psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t` or `psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t` functions), or in + * parts using the following sequence: + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_update_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_update_t` + * - ... + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t` or `psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t` + * + * If a previously started secure element MAC operation needs to be terminated, + * it should be done so by the `psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t`. Failure to do so may + * result in allocated resources not being freed or in other undefined + * behavior. + */ +/**@{*/ +/** \brief A function that starts a secure element MAC operation for a PSA + * Crypto Driver implementation + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that will contain the + * hardware-specific MAC context + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the + * operation + * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used to underly the MAC + * operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *op_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm); + +/** \brief A function that continues a previously started secure element MAC + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously-established MAC operation to be + * updated + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be appended + * to the MAC operation + * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of the input message buffer + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_update_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length); + +/** \brief a function that completes a previously started secure element MAC + * operation by returning the resulting MAC. + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started MAC operation to be + * finished + * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be + * placed + * \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the buffer that has been + * allocated for the `output` buffer + * \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of + * bytes placed in the `p_mac` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t)(void *op_context, + uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *p_mac_length); + +/** \brief A function that completes a previously started secure element MAC + * operation by comparing the resulting MAC against a provided value + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously + * started MAC operation to be finished + * \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC + * will be compared against + * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of the value stored in `p_mac` + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each + * other + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did + * not match the provided MAC + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** \brief A function that aborts a previous started secure element MAC + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously + * started MAC operation to be aborted + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t)(void *op_context); + +/** \brief A function that performs a secure element MAC operation in one + * command and returns the calculated MAC + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed + * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `p_input` + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used + * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC + * operation + * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be + * placed + * \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the `p_mac` buffer + * \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of + * bytes placed in the `output` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *p_mac_length); + +/** \brief A function that performs a secure element MAC operation in one + * command and compares the resulting MAC against a provided value + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed + * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `input` + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used + * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC + * operation + * \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC will + * be compared against + * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of `mac` + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each + * other + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did + * not match the provided MAC + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to + * perform secure element MAC operations + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate the table as appropriate + * upon startup. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented (such as + * `psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t`), it should be set to NULL. + * + * Driver implementers should ensure that they implement all of the functions + * that make sense for their hardware, and that they provide a full solution + * (for example, if they support `p_setup`, they should also support + * `p_update` and at least one of `p_finish` or `p_finish_verify`). + * + */ +typedef struct { + /**The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element MAC context + * structure + */ + size_t context_size; + /** Function that performs a MAC setup operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t p_setup; + /** Function that performs a MAC update operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_update_t p_update; + /** Function that completes a MAC operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t p_finish; + /** Function that completes a MAC operation with a verify check + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t p_finish_verify; + /** Function that aborts a previously started MAC operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t p_abort; + /** Function that performs a MAC operation in one call + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t p_mac; + /** Function that performs a MAC and verify operation in one call + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t p_mac_verify; +} psa_drv_se_mac_t; +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_cipher Secure Element Symmetric Ciphers + * + * Encryption and Decryption using secure element keys in block modes other + * than ECB must be done in multiple parts, using the following flow: + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t` (optional depending upon block mode) + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t` + * - ... + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t` + * + * If a previously started secure element Cipher operation needs to be + * terminated, it should be done so by the `psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t`. Failure + * to do so may result in allocated resources not being freed or in other + * undefined behavior. + * + * In situations where a PSA Cryptographic API implementation is using a block + * mode not-supported by the underlying hardware or driver, it can construct + * the block mode itself, while calling the `psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t` function + * for the cipher operations. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief A function that provides the cipher setup function for a + * secure element driver + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that will contain the + * hardware-specific cipher context. + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the + * operation + * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher + * operation + * \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt + * or decrypt + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *op_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction); + +/** \brief A function that sets the initialization vector (if + * necessary) for a secure element cipher operation + * + * Rationale: The `psa_se_cipher_*` operation in the PSA Cryptographic API has + * two IV functions: one to set the IV, and one to generate it internally. The + * generate function is not necessary for the drivers to implement as the PSA + * Crypto implementation can do the generation using its RNG features. + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that contains the previously set up + * hardware-specific cipher context + * \param[in] p_iv A buffer containing the initialization vector + * \param[in] iv_length The size (in bytes) of the `p_iv` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_iv, + size_t iv_length); + +/** \brief A function that continues a previously started secure element cipher + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started cipher operation + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be + * encrypted/decrypted + * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to + * by `p_input` + * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the + * output will be placed + * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the + * `p_output` buffer + * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number + * of bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_size, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** \brief A function that completes a previously started secure element cipher + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started cipher operation + * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output + * will be placed + * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output` + * buffer + * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number of + * bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t)(void *op_context, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** \brief A function that aborts a previously started secure element cipher + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started cipher operation + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t)(void *op_context); + +/** \brief A function that performs the ECB block mode for secure element + * cipher operations + * + * Note: this function should only be used with implementations that do not + * provide a needed higher-level operation. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the operation + * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher operation + * \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt or + * decrypt + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be + * encrypted/decrypted + * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to by + * `p_input` + * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output + * will be placed + * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output` + * buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_size, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement + * cipher operations using secure elements. + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup or at build time. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented (such as + * `psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t`), it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element cipher + * context structure + */ + size_t context_size; + /** Function that performs a cipher setup operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t p_setup; + /** Function that sets a cipher IV (if necessary) */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t p_set_iv; + /** Function that performs a cipher update operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t p_update; + /** Function that completes a cipher operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t p_finish; + /** Function that aborts a cipher operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t p_abort; + /** Function that performs ECB mode for a cipher operation + * (Danger: ECB mode should not be used directly by clients of the PSA + * Crypto Client API) + */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t p_ecb; +} psa_drv_se_cipher_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_asymmetric Secure Element Asymmetric Cryptography + * + * Since the amount of data that can (or should) be encrypted or signed using + * asymmetric keys is limited by the key size, asymmetric key operations using + * keys in a secure element must be done in single function calls. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** + * \brief A function that signs a hash or short message with a private key in + * a secure element + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible + * with the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_hash The hash to sign + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_signature Buffer where the signature is to be written + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *p_signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *p_signature_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that verifies the signature a hash or short message using + * an asymmetric public key in a secure element + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_hash The hash whose signature is to be verified + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_signature Buffer containing the signature to verify + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *p_signature, + size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that encrypts a short message with an asymmetric public + * key in a secure element + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_input The message to encrypt + * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass `NULL`. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass `NULL`. + * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes + * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0. + * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the encrypted message is to + * be written + * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *p_salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that decrypts a short message with an asymmetric private + * key in a secure element. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_input The message to decrypt + * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass `NULL`. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass `NULL`. + * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes + * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0. + * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written + * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *p_salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement + * asymmetric cryptographic operations using secure elements. + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup or at build time. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** Function that performs an asymmetric sign operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t p_sign; + /** Function that performs an asymmetric verify operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t p_verify; + /** Function that performs an asymmetric encrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t p_encrypt; + /** Function that performs an asymmetric decrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t p_decrypt; +} psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_aead Secure Element Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data + * Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) operations with secure + * elements must be done in one function call. While this creates a burden for + * implementers as there must be sufficient space in memory for the entire + * message, it prevents decrypted data from being made available before the + * authentication operation is complete and the data is known to be authentic. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief A function that performs a secure element authenticated encryption + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use. + * \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true) + * \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use + * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that will be + * authenticated but not encrypted + * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes + * \param[in] p_plaintext Data that will be authenticated and + * encrypted + * \param[in] plaintext_length Size of `p_plaintext` in bytes + * \param[out] p_ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is + * not part of this output. For algorithms + * where the encrypted data and the + * authentication tag are defined as + * separate outputs, the authentication + * tag is appended to the encrypted data. + * \param[in] ciphertext_size Size of the `p_ciphertext` buffer in + * bytes + * \param[out] p_ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in + * the `p_ciphertext` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + const uint8_t *p_nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *p_additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *p_plaintext, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *p_ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *p_ciphertext_length); + +/** A function that performs a secure element authenticated decryption operation + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use + * \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true) + * \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use + * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that has been + * authenticated but not encrypted + * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes + * \param[in] p_ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. + * For algorithms where the encrypted data + * and the authentication tag are defined + * as separate inputs, the buffer must + * contain the encrypted data followed by + * the authentication tag. + * \param[in] ciphertext_length Size of `p_ciphertext` in bytes + * \param[out] p_plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data + * \param[in] plaintext_size Size of the `p_plaintext` buffer in + * bytes + * \param[out] p_plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in + * the `p_plaintext` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + const uint8_t *p_nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *p_additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *p_ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *p_plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *p_plaintext_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement + * secure element Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data operations + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** Function that performs the AEAD encrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t p_encrypt; + /** Function that performs the AEAD decrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t p_decrypt; +} psa_drv_se_aead_t; +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_key_management Secure Element Key Management + * Currently, key management is limited to importing keys in the clear, + * destroying keys, and exporting keys in the clear. + * Whether a key may be exported is determined by the key policies in place + * on the key slot. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** An enumeration indicating how a key is created. + */ +typedef enum +{ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, /**< During psa_import_key() */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, /**< During psa_generate_key() */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, /**< During psa_key_derivation_output_key() */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY, /**< During psa_copy_key() */ + +#ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ + /** A key is being registered with mbedtls_psa_register_se_key(). + * + * The core only passes this value to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_validate_slot_number, not to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate. The call to + * `p_validate_slot_number` is not followed by any other call to the + * driver: the key is considered successfully registered if the call to + * `p_validate_slot_number` succeeds, or if `p_validate_slot_number` is + * null. + * + * With this creation method, the driver must return #PSA_SUCCESS if + * the given attributes are compatible with the existing key in the slot, + * and #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST if the driver can determine that there + * is no key with the specified slot number. + * + * This is an Mbed Crypto extension. + */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER, +#endif +} psa_key_creation_method_t; + +/** \brief A function that allocates a slot for a key. + * + * To create a key in a specific slot in a secure element, the core + * first calls this function to determine a valid slot number, + * then calls a function to create the key material in that slot. + * In nominal conditions (that is, if no error occurs), + * the effect of a call to a key creation function in the PSA Cryptography + * API with a lifetime that places the key in a secure element is the + * following: + * -# The core calls psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate + * (or in some implementations + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_validate_slot_number). The driver + * selects (or validates) a suitable slot number given the key attributes + * and the state of the secure element. + * -# The core calls a key creation function in the driver. + * + * The key creation functions in the PSA Cryptography API are: + * - psa_import_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_import. + * - psa_generate_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_import. + * - psa_key_derivation_output_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t::p_derive. + * - psa_copy_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_export. + * + * In case of errors, other behaviors are possible. + * - If the PSA Cryptography subsystem dies after the first step, + * for example because the device has lost power abruptly, + * the second step may never happen, or may happen after a reset + * and re-initialization. Alternatively, after a reset and + * re-initialization, the core may call + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy on the slot number that + * was allocated (or validated) instead of calling a key creation function. + * - If an error occurs, the core may call + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy on the slot number that + * was allocated (or validated) instead of calling a key creation function. + * + * Errors and system resets also have an impact on the driver's persistent + * data. If a reset happens before the overall key creation process is + * completed (before or after the second step above), it is unspecified + * whether the persistent data after the reset is identical to what it + * was before or after the call to `p_allocate` (or `p_validate_slot_number`). + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param[in] attributes Attributes of the key. + * \param method The way in which the key is being created. + * \param[out] key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. + * This must be a valid slot for a key of the + * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * The core will record \c *key_slot as the key slot where the key + * is stored and will update the persistent data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t *key_slot); + +/** \brief A function that determines whether a slot number is valid + * for a key. + * + * To create a key in a specific slot in a secure element, the core + * first calls this function to validate the choice of slot number, + * then calls a function to create the key material in that slot. + * See the documentation of #psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t for more details. + * + * As of the PSA Cryptography API specification version 1.0, there is no way + * for applications to trigger a call to this function. However some + * implementations offer the capability to create or declare a key in + * a specific slot via implementation-specific means, generally for the + * sake of initial device provisioning or onboarding. Such a mechanism may + * be added to a future version of the PSA Cryptography API specification. + * + * This function may update the driver's persistent data through + * \p persistent_data. The core will save the updated persistent data at the + * end of the key creation process. See the description of + * ::psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param[in] attributes Attributes of the key. + * \param method The way in which the key is being created. + * \param[in] key_slot Slot where the key is to be stored. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The given slot number is valid for a key with the given + * attributes. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The given slot number is not valid for a key with the + * given attributes. This includes the case where the slot + * number is not valid at all. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There is already a key with the specified slot number. + * Drivers may choose to return this error from the key + * creation function instead. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot); + +/** \brief A function that imports a key into a secure element in binary format + * + * This function can support any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the + * documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for each key type. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. + * This must be a valid slot for a key of the + * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes, including the lifetime, + * the key type and the usage policy. + * Drivers should not access the key size stored + * in the attributes: it may not match the + * data passed in \p data. + * Drivers can call psa_get_key_lifetime(), + * psa_get_key_type(), + * psa_get_key_usage_flags() and + * psa_get_key_algorithm() to access this + * information. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits On success, the key size in bits. The driver + * must determine this value after parsing the + * key according to the key type. + * This value is not used if the function fails. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_import_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + size_t *bits); + +/** + * \brief A function that destroys a secure element key and restore the slot to + * its default state + * + * This function destroys the content of the key from a secure element. + * Implementations shall make a best effort to ensure that any previous content + * of the slot is unrecoverable. + * + * This function returns the specified slot to its default state. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param key_slot The key slot to erase. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The slot's content, if any, has been erased. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot); + +/** + * \brief A function that exports a secure element key in binary format + * + * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to + * create an equivalent object. + * + * If a key is created with `psa_import_key()` and then exported with + * this function, it is not guaranteed that the resulting data is + * identical: the implementation may choose a different representation + * of the same key if the format permits it. + * + * This function should generate output in the same format that + * `psa_export_key()` does. Refer to the + * documentation of `psa_export_key()` for the format for each key type. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key Slot whose content is to be exported. This must + * be an occupied key slot. + * \param[out] p_data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the `p_data` buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] p_data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_export_key_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key, + uint8_t *p_data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *p_data_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that generates a symmetric or asymmetric key on a secure + * element + * + * If the key type \c type recorded in \p attributes + * is asymmetric (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(\c type) = 1), + * the driver may export the public key at the time of generation, + * in the format documented for psa_export_public_key() by writing it + * to the \p pubkey buffer. + * This is optional, intended for secure elements that output the + * public key at generation time and that cannot export the public key + * later. Drivers that do not need this feature should leave + * \p *pubkey_length set to 0 and should + * implement the psa_drv_key_management_t::p_export_public function. + * Some implementations do not support this feature, in which case + * \p pubkey is \c NULL and \p pubkey_size is 0. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. + * This must be a valid slot for a key of the + * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes, including the lifetime, + * the key type and size, and the usage policy. + * Drivers can call psa_get_key_lifetime(), + * psa_get_key_type(), psa_get_key_bits(), + * psa_get_key_usage_flags() and + * psa_get_key_algorithm() to access this + * information. + * \param[out] pubkey A buffer where the driver can write the + * public key, when generating an asymmetric + * key pair. + * This is \c NULL when generating a symmetric + * key or if the core does not support + * exporting the public key at generation time. + * \param pubkey_size The size of the `pubkey` buffer in bytes. + * This is 0 when generating a symmetric + * key or if the core does not support + * exporting the public key at generation time. + * \param[out] pubkey_length On entry, this is always 0. + * On success, the number of bytes written to + * \p pubkey. If this is 0 or unchanged on return, + * the core will not read the \p pubkey buffer, + * and will instead call the driver's + * psa_drv_key_management_t::p_export_public + * function to export the public key when needed. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_generate_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, size_t *pubkey_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for secure + * element key management + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup or at build time. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** Function that allocates a slot for a key. */ + psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t p_allocate; + /** Function that checks the validity of a slot for a key. */ + psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t p_validate_slot_number; + /** Function that performs a key import operation */ + psa_drv_se_import_key_t p_import; + /** Function that performs a generation */ + psa_drv_se_generate_key_t p_generate; + /** Function that performs a key destroy operation */ + psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t p_destroy; + /** Function that performs a key export operation */ + psa_drv_se_export_key_t p_export; + /** Function that performs a public key export operation */ + psa_drv_se_export_key_t p_export_public; +} psa_drv_se_key_management_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup driver_derivation Secure Element Key Derivation and Agreement + * Key derivation is the process of generating new key material using an + * existing key and additional parameters, iterating through a basic + * cryptographic function, such as a hash. + * Key agreement is a part of cryptographic protocols that allows two parties + * to agree on the same key value, but starting from different original key + * material. + * The flows are similar, and the PSA Crypto Driver Model uses the same functions + * for both of the flows. + * + * There are two different final functions for the flows, + * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive` and `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export`. + * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive` is used when the key material should be + * placed in a slot on the hardware and not exposed to the caller. + * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export` is used when the key material should be + * returned to the PSA Cryptographic API implementation. + * + * Different key derivation algorithms require a different number of inputs. + * Instead of having an API that takes as input variable length arrays, which + * can be problematic to manage on embedded platforms, the inputs are passed + * to the driver via a function, `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral`, that + * is called multiple times with different `collateral_id`s. Thus, for a key + * derivation algorithm that required 3 parameter inputs, the flow would look + * something like: + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(kdf_algorithm, source_key, dest_key_size_bytes); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_0, + * p_collateral_0, + * collateral_0_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_1, + * p_collateral_1, + * collateral_1_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_2, + * p_collateral_2, + * collateral_2_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive(); + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + * + * key agreement example: + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(alg, source_key. dest_key_size_bytes); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(DHE_PUBKEY, p_pubkey, pubkey_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export(p_session_key, + * session_key_size, + * &session_key_length); + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief A function that Sets up a secure element key derivation operation by + * specifying the algorithm and the source key sot + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any + * context information for the implementation + * \param[in] kdf_alg The algorithm to be used for the key derivation + * \param[in] source_key The key to be used as the source material for + * the key derivation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *op_context, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + psa_key_slot_number_t source_key); + +/** \brief A function that provides collateral (parameters) needed for a secure + * element key derivation or key agreement operation + * + * Since many key derivation algorithms require multiple parameters, it is + * expected that this function may be called multiple times for the same + * operation, each with a different algorithm-specific `collateral_id` + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any + * context information for the implementation + * \param[in] collateral_id An ID for the collateral being provided + * \param[in] p_collateral A buffer containing the collateral data + * \param[in] collateral_size The size in bytes of the collateral + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t)(void *op_context, + uint32_t collateral_id, + const uint8_t *p_collateral, + size_t collateral_size); + +/** \brief A function that performs the final secure element key derivation + * step and place the generated key material in a slot + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any + * context information for the implementation + * \param[in] dest_key The slot where the generated key material + * should be placed + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t)(void *op_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t dest_key); + +/** \brief A function that performs the final step of a secure element key + * agreement and place the generated key material in a buffer + * + * \param[out] p_output Buffer in which to place the generated key + * material + * \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of `p_output` + * \param[out] p_output_length Upon success, contains the number of bytes of + * key material placed in `p_output` + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t)(void *op_context, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for secure + * element key derivation and agreement + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** The driver-specific size of the key derivation context */ + size_t context_size; + /** Function that performs a key derivation setup */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t p_setup; + /** Function that sets key derivation collateral */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t p_collateral; + /** Function that performs a final key derivation step */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t p_derive; + /** Function that performs a final key derivation or agreement and + * exports the key */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t p_export; +} psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_registration Secure element driver registration + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** A structure containing pointers to all the entry points of a + * secure element driver. + * + * Future versions of this specification may add extra substructures at + * the end of this structure. + */ +typedef struct { + /** The version of the driver HAL that this driver implements. + * This is a protection against loading driver binaries built against + * a different version of this specification. + * Use #PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION. + */ + uint32_t hal_version; + + /** The size of the driver's persistent data in bytes. + * + * This can be 0 if the driver does not need persistent data. + * + * See the documentation of psa_drv_se_context_t::persistent_data + * for more information about why and how a driver can use + * persistent data. + */ + size_t persistent_data_size; + + /** The driver initialization function. + * + * This function is called once during the initialization of the + * PSA Cryptography subsystem, before any other function of the + * driver is called. If this function returns a failure status, + * the driver will be unusable, at least until the next system reset. + * + * If this field is \c NULL, it is equivalent to a function that does + * nothing and returns #PSA_SUCCESS. + */ + psa_drv_se_init_t p_init; + + const psa_drv_se_key_management_t *key_management; + const psa_drv_se_mac_t *mac; + const psa_drv_se_cipher_t *cipher; + const psa_drv_se_aead_t *aead; + const psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t *asymmetric; + const psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t *derivation; +} psa_drv_se_t; + +/** The current version of the secure element driver HAL. + */ +/* 0.0.0 patchlevel 5 */ +#define PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION 0x00000005 + +/** Register an external cryptoprocessor (secure element) driver. + * + * This function is only intended to be used by driver code, not by + * application code. In implementations with separation between the + * PSA cryptography module and applications, this function should + * only be available to callers that run in the same memory space as + * the cryptography module, and should not be exposed to applications + * running in a different memory space. + * + * This function may be called before psa_crypto_init(). It is + * implementation-defined whether this function may be called + * after psa_crypto_init(). + * + * \note Implementations store metadata about keys including the lifetime + * value, which contains the driver's location indicator. Therefore, + * from one instantiation of the PSA Cryptography + * library to the next one, if there is a key in storage with a certain + * lifetime value, you must always register the same driver (or an + * updated version that communicates with the same secure element) + * with the same location value. + * + * \param location The location value through which this driver will + * be exposed to applications. + * This driver will be used for all keys such that + * `location == #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime )`. + * The value #PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE is reserved + * and may not be used for drivers. Implementations + * may reserve other values. + * \param[in] methods The method table of the driver. This structure must + * remain valid for as long as the cryptography + * module keeps running. It is typically a global + * constant. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * The driver was successfully registered. Applications can now + * use \p location to access keys through the methods passed to + * this function. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * This function was called after the initialization of the + * cryptography module, and this implementation does not support + * driver registration at this stage. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There is already a registered driver for this value of \p location. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p location is a reserved value. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * `methods->hal_version` is not supported by this implementation. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_register_se_driver( + psa_key_location_t location, + const psa_drv_se_t *methods); + +/**@}*/ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a0a52876 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h @@ -0,0 +1,1171 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_sizes.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS buffer size macros + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file contains the definitions of macros that are useful to + * compute buffer sizes. The signatures and semantics of these macros + * are standardized, but the definitions are not, because they depend on + * the available algorithms and, in some cases, on permitted tolerances + * on buffer sizes. + * + * In implementations with isolation between the application and the + * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that + * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the + * module implements. + * + * Macros that compute sizes whose values do not depend on the + * implementation are in crypto.h. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H + +/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it + * in each of its header files. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#define PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) (((bits) + 7) / 8) +#define PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(bytes) ((bytes) * 8) + +#define PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(block_size, length) \ + (((length) + (block_size) - 1) / (block_size) * (block_size)) + +/** The size of the output of psa_hash_finish(), in bytes. + * + * This is also the hash size that psa_hash_verify() expects. + * + * \param alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true), or an HMAC algorithm + * (#PSA_ALG_HMAC(\c hash_alg) where \c hash_alg is a + * hash algorithm). + * + * \return The hash size for the specified hash algorithm. + * If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) \ + ( \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD2 ? 16 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD4 ? 16 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 16 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 20 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 20 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 28 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 32 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 48 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 28 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 32 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 28 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 32 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 48 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 64 : \ + 0) + +/** The input block size of a hash algorithm, in bytes. + * + * Hash algorithms process their input data in blocks. Hash operations will + * retain any partial blocks until they have enough input to fill the block or + * until the operation is finished. + * This affects the output from psa_hash_suspend(). + * + * \param alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The block size in bytes for the specified hash algorithm. + * If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + * An implementation can return either 0 or the correct size for a + * hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support. + */ +#define PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg) \ + ( \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD2 ? 16 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD4 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 64 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 128 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 128 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 128 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 128 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 144 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 136 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 104 : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 72 : \ + 0) + +/** \def PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + * + * Maximum size of a hash. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value + * is the maximum size of a hash in bytes. + */ +/* Note: for HMAC-SHA-3, the block size is 144 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-226, + * 136 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-256, 104 bytes for SHA3-384, 72 bytes for + * HMAC-SHA3-512. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 64 +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128 +#else +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 32 +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +#endif + +/** \def PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE + * + * Maximum size of a MAC. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value + * is the maximum size of a MAC in bytes. + */ +/* All non-HMAC MACs have a maximum size that's smaller than the + * minimum possible value of PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE in this implementation. */ +/* Note that the encoding of truncated MAC algorithms limits this value + * to 64 bytes. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + +/** The length of a tag for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. + * + * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to store the + * tag output from psa_aead_finish(). + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type The type of the AEAD key. + * \param key_bits The size of the AEAD key in bits. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The tag length for the specified algorithm and key. + * If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified + * tag that can be distinguished from the rest of + * the ciphertext, return 0. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ + ((void) (key_bits), 0)) + +/** The maximum tag size for all supported AEAD algorithms, in bytes. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE 16 + +/* The maximum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro. + * + * Mbed TLS does not set a hard limit on the size of RSA keys: any key + * whose parameters fit in a bignum is accepted. However large keys can + * induce a large memory usage and long computation times. Unlike other + * auxiliary macros in this file and in crypto.h, which reflect how the + * library is configured, this macro defines how the library is + * configured. This implementation refuses to import or generate an + * RSA key whose size is larger than the value defined here. + * + * Note that an implementation may set different size limits for different + * operations, and does not need to accept all key sizes up to the limit. */ +#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096 + +/* The maximum size of an ECC key on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 521 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 448 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 255 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192 +#else +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 0 +#endif + +/** This macro returns the maximum supported length of the PSK for the + * TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS key derivation + * (#PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(\c hash_alg)). + * + * The maximum supported length does not depend on the chosen hash algorithm. + * + * Quoting RFC 4279, Sect 5.3: + * TLS implementations supporting these ciphersuites MUST support + * arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and arbitrary + * PSKs up to 64 octets in length. Supporting longer identities and + * keys is RECOMMENDED. + * + * Therefore, no implementation should define a value smaller than 64 + * for #PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE. + */ +#define PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE 128 + +/** The maximum size of a block cipher. */ +#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE 16 + +/** The size of the output of psa_mac_sign_finish(), in bytes. + * + * This is also the MAC size that psa_mac_verify_finish() expects. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type The type of the MAC key. + * \param key_bits The size of the MAC key in bits. + * \param alg A MAC algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The MAC size for the specified algorithm with + * the specified key parameters. + * \return 0 if the MAC algorithm is not recognized. + * \return Either 0 or the correct size for a MAC algorithm that + * the implementation recognizes, but does not support. + * \return Unspecified if the key parameters are not consistent + * with the algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ? PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg) : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) ? PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg)) : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + ((void)(key_type), (void)(key_bits), 0)) + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of + * the ciphertext may be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, plaintext_length) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ + (plaintext_length) + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_encrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, + * \p plaintext_length). + * + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(plaintext_length) \ + ((plaintext_length) + PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE) + + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of + * the plaintext may be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param ciphertext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, ciphertext_length) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ + (ciphertext_length) > PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) ? \ + (ciphertext_length) - PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_decrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, + * \p ciphertext_length). + * + * \param ciphertext_length Size of the ciphertext in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(ciphertext_length) \ + (ciphertext_length) + +/** The default nonce size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. + * + * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to + * store the nonce output from #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to + * #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(), + * just the default size that is generated by #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with + * algorithm \p alg. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The default nonce size for the specified key type and algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized, + * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) == 16 ? \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) ? 13 : \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) ? 12 : \ + 0 : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) ? 12 : \ + 0) + +/** The maximum default nonce size among all supported pairs of key types and + * AEAD algorithms, in bytes. + * + * This is equal to or greater than any value that #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH() + * may return. + * + * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to + * #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(), + * just the largest size that may be generated by + * #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE 13 + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output may be smaller + * in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +/* For all the AEAD modes defined in this specification, it is possible + * to emit output without delay. However, hardware may not always be + * capable of this. So for modes based on a block cipher, allow the + * implementation to delay the output until it has a full block. */ +#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), (input_length)) : \ + (input_length) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, (input_length))) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(). + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an + * insufficient ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output may + * be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the + * specified algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) + +/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(). + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_verify() will not fail due to an + * insufficient plaintext buffer size. The actual size of the output may + * be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return A sufficient plaintext buffer size for the + * specified algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) + +#define PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \ + 2 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)) + 1 : \ + 11 /*PKCS#1v1.5*/) + +/** + * \brief ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size + * + * \param curve_bits Curve size in bits. + * \return Signature size in bytes. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one. + */ +#define PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits) \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits) * 2) + +/** Sufficient signature buffer size for psa_sign_hash(). + * + * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a signature using a key + * of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. + * Note that the actual size of the signature may be smaller + * (some algorithms produce a variable-size signature). + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a + * key pair type or a public key type). + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * \param alg The signature algorithm. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_sign_hash() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? ((void)alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + ((void)alg, 0)) + +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) + +/** \def PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + * + * Maximum size of an asymmetric signature. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value + * is the maximum size of a signature in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ + PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(). + * + * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a ciphertext produced using + * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. + * Note that the actual size of the ciphertext may be smaller, depending + * on the algorithm. + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a + * key pair type or a public key type). + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * \param alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_asymmetric_encrypt() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \ + ((void)alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), for any + * supported asymmetric encryption. + * + * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). + */ +/* This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption. */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(). + * + * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a plaintext produced using + * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. + * Note that the actual size of the plaintext may be smaller, depending + * on the algorithm. + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a + * key pair type or a public key type). + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * \param alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_asymmetric_decrypt() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) - PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(), for any + * supported asymmetric decryption. + * + * This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption. + * + * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)) + +/* Maximum size of the ASN.1 encoding of an INTEGER with the specified + * number of bits. + * + * This definition assumes that bits <= 2^19 - 9 so that the length field + * is at most 3 bytes. The length of the encoding is the length of the + * bit string padded to a whole number of bytes plus: + * - 1 type byte; + * - 1 to 3 length bytes; + * - 0 to 1 bytes of leading 0 due to the sign bit. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(bits) \ + ((bits) / 8 + 5) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA public key. + * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32. + * + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e + * + * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - n : INTEGER; + * - 7 bytes for the public exponent. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) + 11) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA key pair. + * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32 and that the size + * difference between the two primes is at most 1 bit. + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, -- 0 + * modulus INTEGER, -- N-bit + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- 32-bit + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- N-bit + * prime1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * prime2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * coefficient INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * } + * + * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - 3 bytes of version; + * - 7 half-size INTEGERs plus 2 full-size INTEGERs, + * overapproximated as 9 half-size INTEGERS; + * - 7 bytes for the public exponent. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (9 * PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE((key_bits) / 2 + 1) + 14) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA public key. + * + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } -- contains DSAPublicKey + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters Dss-Params } -- SEQUENCE of 3 INTEGERs + * DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- public key, Y + * + * - 3 * 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - 1 + 1 + 7 bytes of algorithm (DSA OID); + * - 4 bytes of BIT STRING overhead; + * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y); + * - 1 + 1 + 32 bytes for 1 sub-size INTEGER (q <= 256 bits). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3 + 59) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA key pair. + * + * DSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, -- 0 + * prime INTEGER, -- p + * subprime INTEGER, -- q + * generator INTEGER, -- g + * public INTEGER, -- y + * private INTEGER, -- x + * } + * + * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - 3 bytes of version; + * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y); + * - 2 * (1 + 1 + 32) bytes for 2 sub-size INTEGERs (q, x <= 256 bits). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3 + 75) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC public key. + * + * The representation of an ECC public key is: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - where m is the bit size associated with the curve. + * + * - 1 byte + 2 * point size. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 1) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC key pair. + * + * An ECC key pair is represented by the secret value. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_key() or + * psa_export_public_key(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export + * a key by querying the key type and size at runtime. + * \code{c} + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * psa_status_t status; + * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); + * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits); + * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size); + * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...); + * size_t buffer_length; + * status = psa_export_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * \endcode + * + * \param key_type A supported key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + 0) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_public_key(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export + * a public key by querying the key type and size at runtime. + * \code{c} + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * psa_status_t status; + * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); + * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits); + * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size); + * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...); + * size_t buffer_length; + * status = psa_export_public_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * \endcode + * + * \param key_type A public key or key pair key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_export_public_key() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not + * supported, return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, + * the return value is unspecified. + * + * If the parameters are valid and supported, + * return the same result as + * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( + * \p #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\p key_type), + * \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + 0) + +/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric key pair. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is + * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() to export any + * asymmetric key pair, regardless of the exact key type and key size. + * + * See also #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) ? \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) + +/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric public key. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is + * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() or + * psa_export_public_key() to export any asymmetric public key, + * regardless of the exact key type and key size. + * + * See also #PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) ? \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_raw_key_agreement(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type A supported key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_raw_key_agreement() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that + * is not supported, return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, + * the return value is unspecified. + */ +/* FFDH is not yet supported in PSA. */ +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ + 0) + +/** Maximum size of the output from psa_raw_key_agreement(). + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is the + * maximum size of the output any raw key agreement algorithm, in bytes. + * + * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) + +/** The default IV size for a cipher algorithm, in bytes. + * + * The IV that is generated as part of a call to #psa_cipher_encrypt() is always + * the default IV length for the algorithm. + * + * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to + * store the IV output from #psa_cipher_generate_iv() when using + * a multi-part cipher operation. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The default IV size for the specified key type and algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not use an IV, return 0. + * If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized, + * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) > 1 && \ + ((alg) == PSA_ALG_CTR || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CFB || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_OFB || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_XTS || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ? 12 : \ + 0) + +/** The maximum IV size for all supported cipher algorithms, in bytes. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(). + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE 16 + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_encrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \ + (input_length) + 1) + \ + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : 0) : \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (input_length) + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : \ + 0)) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_encrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, \ + (input_length) + 1) + \ + PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_decrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) && \ + ((key_type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \ + (input_length) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_decrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (input_length) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ? \ + (((alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \ + input_length) : \ + (input_length)) : 0) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, input_length)) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(). + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_cipher_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient + * ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in + * any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(). + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + 0) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_struct.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..511b3973 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_struct.h @@ -0,0 +1,478 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_struct.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS structured type implementations + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file contains the definitions of some data structures with + * implementation-specific definitions. + * + * In implementations with isolation between the application and the + * cryptography module, it is expected that the front-end and the back-end + * would have different versions of this file. + * + *

Design notes about multipart operation structures

+ * + * For multipart operations without driver delegation support, each multipart + * operation structure contains a `psa_algorithm_t alg` field which indicates + * which specific algorithm the structure is for. When the structure is not in + * use, `alg` is 0. Most of the structure consists of a union which is + * discriminated by `alg`. + * + * For multipart operations with driver delegation support, each multipart + * operation structure contains an `unsigned int id` field indicating which + * driver got assigned to do the operation. When the structure is not in use, + * 'id' is 0. The structure contains also a driver context which is the union + * of the contexts of all drivers able to handle the type of multipart + * operation. + * + * Note that when `alg` or `id` is 0, the content of other fields is undefined. + * In particular, it is not guaranteed that a freshly-initialized structure + * is all-zero: we initialize structures to something like `{0, 0}`, which + * is only guaranteed to initializes the first member of the union; + * GCC and Clang initialize the whole structure to 0 (at the time of writing), + * but MSVC and CompCert don't. + * + * In Mbed Crypto, multipart operation structures live independently from + * the key. This allows Mbed Crypto to free the key objects when destroying + * a key slot. If a multipart operation needs to remember the key after + * the setup function returns, the operation structure needs to contain a + * copy of the key. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it + * in each of its header files. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" + +/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the primitive + * algorithms. */ +#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h" + +struct psa_hash_operation_s +{ + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h. + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. the driver context is not active, in use). */ + unsigned int id; + psa_driver_hash_context_t ctx; +}; + +#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT {0, {0}} +static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_hash_operation_s v = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +struct psa_cipher_operation_s +{ + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int id; + + unsigned int iv_required : 1; + unsigned int iv_set : 1; + + uint8_t default_iv_length; + + psa_driver_cipher_context_t ctx; +}; + +#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, 0, {0}} +static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_cipher_operation_s v = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the composite + * algorithms. */ +#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h" + +struct psa_mac_operation_s +{ + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int id; + uint8_t mac_size; + unsigned int is_sign : 1; + psa_driver_mac_context_t ctx; +}; + +#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, {0}} +static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_mac_operation_s v = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +struct psa_aead_operation_s +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + unsigned int key_set : 1; + unsigned int iv_set : 1; + uint8_t iv_size; + uint8_t block_size; + union + { + unsigned dummy; /* Enable easier initializing of the union. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher; + } ctx; +}; + +#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, {0}} +static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_aead_operation_s v = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t *info; + size_t info_length; +#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff +#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" +#endif + uint8_t offset_in_block; + uint8_t block_number; + unsigned int state : 2; + unsigned int info_set : 1; + uint8_t output_block[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + uint8_t prk[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + struct psa_mac_operation_s hmac; +} psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +typedef enum +{ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT, /* no input provided */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET, /* seed has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET, /* key has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET, /* label has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT /* output has been started */ +} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t; + +typedef struct psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_s +{ +#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff +#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" +#endif + + /* Indicates how many bytes in the current HMAC block have + * not yet been read by the user. */ + uint8_t left_in_block; + + /* The 1-based number of the block. */ + uint8_t block_number; + + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t state; + + uint8_t *secret; + size_t secret_length; + uint8_t *seed; + size_t seed_length; + uint8_t *label; + size_t label_length; + + uint8_t Ai[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + /* `HMAC_hash( prk, A(i) + seed )` in the notation of RFC 5246, Sect. 5. */ + uint8_t output_block[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; +} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +struct psa_key_derivation_s +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + unsigned int can_output_key : 1; + size_t capacity; + union + { + /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ + uint8_t dummy; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t hkdf; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t tls12_prf; +#endif + } ctx; +}; + +/* This only zeroes out the first byte in the union, the rest is unspecified. */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, 0, {0}} +static inline struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_key_derivation_s v = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +struct psa_key_policy_s +{ + psa_key_usage_t usage; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_algorithm_t alg2; +}; +typedef struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_t; + +#define PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT {0, 0, 0} +static inline struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_key_policy_s v = PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +/* The type used internally for key sizes. + * Public interfaces use size_t, but internally we use a smaller type. */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_bits_t; +/* The maximum value of the type used to represent bit-sizes. + * This is used to mark an invalid key size. */ +#define PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE ( (psa_key_bits_t) ( -1 ) ) +/* The maximum size of a key in bits. + * Currently defined as the maximum that can be represented, rounded down + * to a whole number of bytes. + * This is an uncast value so that it can be used in preprocessor + * conditionals. */ +#define PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 0xfff8 + +/** A mask of flags that can be stored in key attributes. + * + * This type is also used internally to store flags in slots. Internal + * flags are defined in library/psa_crypto_core.h. Internal flags may have + * the same value as external flags if they are properly handled during + * key creation and in psa_get_key_attributes. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_attributes_flag_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER \ + ( (psa_key_attributes_flag_t) 0x0001 ) + +/* A mask of key attribute flags used externally only. + * Only meant for internal checks inside the library. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY ( \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER | \ + 0 ) + +/* A mask of key attribute flags used both internally and externally. + * Currently there aren't any. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ( \ + 0 ) + +typedef struct +{ + psa_key_type_t type; + psa_key_bits_t bits; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id; + psa_key_policy_t policy; + psa_key_attributes_flag_t flags; +} psa_core_key_attributes_t; + +#define PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, 0, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT, 0} + +struct psa_key_attributes_s +{ + psa_core_key_attributes_t core; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + void *domain_parameters; + size_t domain_parameters_size; +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, 0, NULL, 0} +#else +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, NULL, 0} +#endif + +static inline struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_init( void ) +{ + const struct psa_key_attributes_s v = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + return( v ); +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = attributes->core.lifetime; + + attributes->core.id = key; + + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + attributes->core.lifetime = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ) ); + } +} + +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.id ); +} + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER +static inline void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner ) +{ + attributes->core.id.owner = owner; +} +#endif + +static inline void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime) +{ + attributes->core.lifetime = lifetime; + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + attributes->core.id.key_id = 0; +#else + attributes->core.id = 0; +#endif + } +} + +static inline psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.lifetime ); +} + +static inline void psa_extend_key_usage_flags( psa_key_usage_t *usage_flags ) +{ + if( *usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) + *usage_flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE; + + if( *usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) + *usage_flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_usage_t usage_flags) +{ + psa_extend_key_usage_flags( &usage_flags ); + attributes->core.policy.usage = usage_flags; +} + +static inline psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.policy.usage ); +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + attributes->core.policy.alg = alg; +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.policy.alg ); +} + +/* This function is declared in crypto_extra.h, which comes after this + * header file, but we need the function here, so repeat the declaration. */ +psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length); + +static inline void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type) +{ + if( attributes->domain_parameters == NULL ) + { + /* Common case: quick path */ + attributes->core.type = type; + } + else + { + /* Call the bigger function to free the old domain parameters. + * Ignore any errors which may arise due to type requiring + * non-default domain parameters, since this function can't + * report errors. */ + (void) psa_set_key_domain_parameters( attributes, type, NULL, 0 ); + } +} + +static inline psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.type ); +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t bits) +{ + if( bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + attributes->core.bits = PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE; + else + attributes->core.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; +} + +static inline size_t psa_get_key_bits( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return( attributes->core.bits ); +} + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_types.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_types.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..679cbc48 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,464 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_types.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: type aliases. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver + * header file. + * + * This file contains portable definitions of integral types for properties + * of cryptographic keys, designations of cryptographic algorithms, and + * error codes returned by the library. + * + * This header file does not declare any function. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H + +#include "crypto_platform.h" + +/* If MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined, make sure MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * is defined as well to include all PSA code. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#include + +/** \defgroup error Error codes + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Function return status. + * + * This is either #PSA_SUCCESS (which is zero), indicating success, + * or a small negative value indicating that an error occurred. Errors are + * encoded as one of the \c PSA_ERROR_xxx values defined here. */ +/* If #PSA_SUCCESS is already defined, it means that #psa_status_t + * is also defined in an external header, so prevent its multiple + * definition. + */ +#ifndef PSA_SUCCESS +typedef int32_t psa_status_t; +#endif + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of a key type. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx`. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_type_t; + +/** The type of PSA elliptic curve family identifiers. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`. + * + * The curve identifier is required to create an ECC key using the + * PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY() + * macros. + * + * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. + * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_ecc_family_t; + +/** The type of PSA Diffie-Hellman group family identifiers. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_DH_FAMILY_xxx`. + * + * The group identifier is required to create a Diffie-Hellman key using the + * PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY() + * macros. + * + * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. + * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_dh_family_t; + +/** \brief Encoding of a cryptographic algorithm. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_ALG_xxx`. + * + * For algorithms that can be applied to multiple key types, this type + * does not encode the key type. For example, for symmetric ciphers + * based on a block cipher, #psa_algorithm_t encodes the block cipher + * mode and the padding mode while the block cipher itself is encoded + * via #psa_key_type_t. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_algorithm_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes + * @{ + */ + +/** Encoding of key lifetimes. + * + * The lifetime of a key indicates where it is stored and what system actions + * may create and destroy it. + * + * Lifetime values have the following structure: + * - Bits 0-7 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(\c lifetime)): + * persistence level. This value indicates what device management + * actions can cause it to be destroyed. In particular, it indicates + * whether the key is _volatile_ or _persistent_. + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + * - Bits 8-31 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(\c lifetime)): + * location indicator. This value indicates which part of the system + * has access to the key material and can perform operations using the key. + * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information. + * + * Volatile keys are automatically destroyed when the application instance + * terminates or on a power reset of the device. Persistent keys are + * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an + * integration-specific device management event occurs (for example, + * a factory reset). + * + * Persistent keys have a key identifier of type #mbedtls_svc_key_id_t. + * This identifier remains valid throughout the lifetime of the key, + * even if the application instance that created the key terminates. + * The application can call psa_open_key() to open a persistent key that + * it created previously. + * + * The default lifetime of a key is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. The lifetime + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT is supported if persistent storage is + * available. Other lifetime values may be supported depending on the + * library configuration. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_xxx`. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t; + +/** Encoding of key persistence levels. + * + * What distinguishes different persistence levels is what device management + * events may cause keys to be destroyed. _Volatile_ keys are destroyed + * by a power reset. Persistent keys may be destroyed by events such as + * a transfer of ownership or a factory reset. What management events + * actually affect persistent keys at different levels is outside the + * scope of the PSA Cryptography specification. + * + * The PSA Cryptography specification defines the following values of + * persistence levels: + * - \c 0 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE: volatile key. + * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when + * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key + * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device. + * - \c 1 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT: + * persistent key with a default lifetime. + * - \c 2-254: currently not supported by Mbed TLS. + * - \c 255 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY: + * read-only or write-once key. + * A key with this persistence level cannot be destroyed. + * Mbed TLS does not currently offer a way to create such keys, but + * integrations of Mbed TLS can use it for built-in keys that the + * application cannot modify (for example, a hardware unique key (HUK)). + * + * \note Key persistence levels are 8-bit values. Key management + * interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which + * encode the persistence as the lower 8 bits of a 32-bit value. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_key_persistence_t; + +/** Encoding of key location indicators. + * + * If an integration of Mbed TLS can make calls to external + * cryptoprocessors such as secure elements, the location of a key + * indicates which secure element performs the operations on the key. + * Depending on the design of the secure element, the key + * material may be stored either in the secure element, or + * in wrapped (encrypted) form alongside the key metadata in the + * primary local storage. + * + * The PSA Cryptography API specification defines the following values of + * location indicators: + * - \c 0: primary local storage. + * This location is always available. + * The primary local storage is typically the same storage area that + * contains the key metadata. + * - \c 1: primary secure element. + * Integrations of Mbed TLS should support this value if there is a secure + * element attached to the operating environment. + * As a guideline, secure elements may provide higher resistance against + * side channel and physical attacks than the primary local storage, but may + * have restrictions on supported key types, sizes, policies and operations + * and may have different performance characteristics. + * - \c 2-0x7fffff: other locations defined by a PSA specification. + * The PSA Cryptography API does not currently assign any meaning to these + * locations, but future versions of that specification or other PSA + * specifications may do so. + * - \c 0x800000-0xffffff: vendor-defined locations. + * No PSA specification will assign a meaning to locations in this range. + * + * \note Key location indicators are 24-bit values. Key management + * interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which + * encode the location as the upper 24 bits of a 32-bit value. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_location_t; + +/** Encoding of identifiers of persistent keys. + * + * - Applications may freely choose key identifiers in the range + * #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX. + * - The implementation may define additional key identifiers in the range + * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX. + * - 0 is reserved as an invalid key identifier. + * - Key identifiers outside these ranges are reserved for future use. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to how values are allocated must require careful + * consideration to allow backward compatibility. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_id_t; + +/** Encoding of key identifiers as seen inside the PSA Crypto implementation. + * + * When PSA Crypto is built as a library inside an application, this type + * is identical to #psa_key_id_t. When PSA Crypto is built as a service + * that can store keys on behalf of multiple clients, this type + * encodes the #psa_key_id_t value seen by each client application as + * well as extra information that identifies the client that owns + * the key. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. +*/ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) +typedef psa_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_t; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ +/* Implementation-specific: The Mbed Cryptography library can be built as + * part of a multi-client service that exposes the PSA Cryptography API in each + * client and encodes the client identity in the key identifier argument of + * functions such as psa_open_key(). + */ +typedef struct +{ + psa_key_id_t key_id; + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner; +} mbedtls_svc_key_id_t; + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup policy Key policies + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of permitted usage on a key. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed as bitwise-ors of macros + * called `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx`. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_usage_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup attributes Key attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** The type of a structure containing key attributes. + * + * This is an opaque structure that can represent the metadata of a key + * object. Metadata that can be stored in attributes includes: + * - The location of the key in storage, indicated by its key identifier + * and its lifetime. + * - The key's policy, comprising usage flags and a specification of + * the permitted algorithm(s). + * - Information about the key itself: the key type and its size. + * - Additional implementation-defined attributes. + * + * The actual key material is not considered an attribute of a key. + * Key attributes do not contain information that is generally considered + * highly confidential. + * + * An attribute structure works like a simple data structure where each function + * `psa_set_key_xxx` sets a field and the corresponding function + * `psa_get_key_xxx` retrieves the value of the corresponding field. + * However, a future version of the library may report values that are + * equivalent to the original one, but have a different encoding. Invalid + * values may be mapped to different, also invalid values. + * + * An attribute structure may contain references to auxiliary resources, + * for example pointers to allocated memory or indirect references to + * pre-calculated values. In order to free such resources, the application + * must call psa_reset_key_attributes(). As an exception, calling + * psa_reset_key_attributes() on an attribute structure is optional if + * the structure has only been modified by the following functions + * since it was initialized or last reset with psa_reset_key_attributes(): + * - psa_set_key_id() + * - psa_set_key_lifetime() + * - psa_set_key_type() + * - psa_set_key_bits() + * - psa_set_key_usage_flags() + * - psa_set_key_algorithm() + * + * Before calling any function on a key attribute structure, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes; + * memset(&attributes, 0, sizeof(attributes)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_attributes_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes; + * attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + * \endcode + * + * A freshly initialized attribute structure contains the following + * values: + * + * - lifetime: #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. + * - key identifier: 0 (which is not a valid key identifier). + * - type: \c 0 (meaning that the type is unspecified). + * - key size: \c 0 (meaning that the size is unspecified). + * - usage flags: \c 0 (which allows no usage except exporting a public key). + * - algorithm: \c 0 (which allows no cryptographic usage, but allows + * exporting). + * + * A typical sequence to create a key is as follows: + * -# Create and initialize an attribute structure. + * -# If the key is persistent, call psa_set_key_id(). + * Also call psa_set_key_lifetime() to place the key in a non-default + * location. + * -# Set the key policy with psa_set_key_usage_flags() and + * psa_set_key_algorithm(). + * -# Set the key type with psa_set_key_type(). + * Skip this step if copying an existing key with psa_copy_key(). + * -# When generating a random key with psa_generate_key() or deriving a key + * with psa_key_derivation_output_key(), set the desired key size with + * psa_set_key_bits(). + * -# Call a key creation function: psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). This function reads + * the attribute structure, creates a key with these attributes, and + * outputs a key identifier to the newly created key. + * -# The attribute structure is now no longer necessary. + * You may call psa_reset_key_attributes(), although this is optional + * with the workflow presented here because the attributes currently + * defined in this specification do not require any additional resources + * beyond the structure itself. + * + * A typical sequence to query a key's attributes is as follows: + * -# Call psa_get_key_attributes(). + * -# Call `psa_get_key_xxx` functions to retrieve the attribute(s) that + * you are interested in. + * -# Call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free any resources that may be + * used by the attribute structure. + * + * Once a key has been created, it is impossible to change its attributes. + */ +typedef struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_t; + + +#ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* Mbed Crypto defines this type in crypto_types.h because it is also + * visible to applications through an implementation-specific extension. + * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible + * via crypto_se_driver.h. */ +typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ +#endif /* !__DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of the step of a key derivation. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx`. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t; + +/**@}*/ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_values.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a4b4927e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/include/psa/crypto_values.h @@ -0,0 +1,2373 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_values.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: macros to build and analyze integer values. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver + * header file. + * + * This file contains portable definitions of macros to build and analyze + * values of integral types that encode properties of cryptographic keys, + * designations of cryptographic algorithms, and error codes returned by + * the library. + * + * Note that many of the constants defined in this file are embedded in + * the persistent key store, as part of key metadata (including usage + * policies). As a consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage + * format version changes). + * + * This header file only defines preprocessor macros. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H + +/** \defgroup error Error codes + * @{ + */ + +/* PSA error codes */ + +/* Error codes are standardized across PSA domains (framework, crypto, storage, + * etc.). Do not change the values in this section or even the expansions + * of each macro: it must be possible to `#include` both this header + * and some other PSA component's headers in the same C source, + * which will lead to duplicate definitions of the `PSA_SUCCESS` and + * `PSA_ERROR_xxx` macros, which is ok if and only if the macros expand + * to the same sequence of tokens. + * + * If you must add a new + * value, check with the Arm PSA framework group to pick one that other + * domains aren't already using. */ + +/** The action was completed successfully. */ +#define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0) + +/** An error occurred that does not correspond to any defined + * failure cause. + * + * Implementations may use this error code if none of the other standard + * error codes are applicable. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ((psa_status_t)-132) + +/** The requested operation or a parameter is not supported + * by this implementation. + * + * Implementations should return this error code when an enumeration + * parameter such as a key type, algorithm, etc. is not recognized. + * If a combination of parameters is recognized and identified as + * not valid, return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ((psa_status_t)-134) + +/** The requested action is denied by a policy. + * + * Implementations should return this error code when the parameters + * are recognized as valid and supported, and a policy explicitly + * denies the requested operation. + * + * If a subset of the parameters of a function call identify a + * forbidden operation, and another subset of the parameters are + * not valid or not supported, it is unspecified whether the function + * returns #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or + * #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ((psa_status_t)-133) + +/** An output buffer is too small. + * + * Applications can call the \c PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function + * description to determine a sufficient buffer size. + * + * Implementations should preferably return this error code only + * in cases when performing the operation with a larger output + * buffer would succeed. However implementations may return this + * error if a function has invalid or unsupported parameters in addition + * to the parameters that determine the necessary output buffer size. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ((psa_status_t)-138) + +/** Asking for an item that already exists + * + * Implementations should return this error, when attempting + * to write an item (like a key) that already exists. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ((psa_status_t)-139) + +/** Asking for an item that doesn't exist + * + * Implementations should return this error, if a requested item (like + * a key) does not exist. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ((psa_status_t)-140) + +/** The requested action cannot be performed in the current state. + * + * Multipart operations return this error when one of the + * functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function + * descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions. + * + * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate + * that a key either exists or not, + * but shall instead return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS or #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * as applicable. + * + * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a + * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * instead. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ((psa_status_t)-137) + +/** The parameters passed to the function are invalid. + * + * Implementations may return this error any time a parameter or + * combination of parameters are recognized as invalid. + * + * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a + * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * instead. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ((psa_status_t)-135) + +/** There is not enough runtime memory. + * + * If the action is carried out across multiple security realms, this + * error can refer to available memory in any of the security realms. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ((psa_status_t)-141) + +/** There is not enough persistent storage. + * + * Functions that modify the key storage return this error code if + * there is insufficient storage space on the host media. In addition, + * many functions that do not otherwise access storage may return this + * error code if the implementation requires a mandatory log entry for + * the requested action and the log storage space is full. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ((psa_status_t)-142) + +/** There was a communication failure inside the implementation. + * + * This can indicate a communication failure between the application + * and an external cryptoprocessor or between the cryptoprocessor and + * an external volatile or persistent memory. A communication failure + * may be transient or permanent depending on the cause. + * + * \warning If a function returns this error, it is undetermined + * whether the requested action has completed or not. Implementations + * should return #PSA_SUCCESS on successful completion whenever + * possible, however functions may return #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * if the requested action was completed successfully in an external + * cryptoprocessor but there was a breakdown of communication before + * the cryptoprocessor could report the status to the application. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-145) + +/** There was a storage failure that may have led to data loss. + * + * This error indicates that some persistent storage is corrupted. + * It should not be used for a corruption of volatile memory + * (use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED), for a communication error + * between the cryptoprocessor and its external storage (use + * #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE), or when the storage is + * in a valid state but is full (use #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE). + * + * Note that a storage failure does not indicate that any data that was + * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data may no + * longer be readable from storage. + * + * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure + * the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global + * integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other + * data may or may not fail even if the data is still readable but + * its integrity cannot be guaranteed. + * + * Implementations should only use this error code to report a + * permanent storage corruption. However application writers should + * keep in mind that transient errors while reading the storage may be + * reported using this error code. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-146) + +/** A hardware failure was detected. + * + * A hardware failure may be transient or permanent depending on the + * cause. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-147) + +/** A tampering attempt was detected. + * + * If an application receives this error code, there is no guarantee + * that previously accessed or computed data was correct and remains + * confidential. Applications should not perform any security function + * and should enter a safe failure state. + * + * Implementations may return this error code if they detect an invalid + * state that cannot happen during normal operation and that indicates + * that the implementation's security guarantees no longer hold. Depending + * on the implementation architecture and on its security and safety goals, + * the implementation may forcibly terminate the application. + * + * This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach + * is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still + * protected. Implementations shall only return this error code + * to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that + * the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed, + * or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now + * considered compromised. Implementations shall not use this error code + * to indicate a hardware failure that merely makes it impossible to + * perform the requested operation (use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE, + * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE, + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY or other applicable error code + * instead). + * + * This error indicates an attack against the application. Implementations + * shall not return this error code as a consequence of the behavior of + * the application itself. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ((psa_status_t)-151) + +/** There is not enough entropy to generate random data needed + * for the requested action. + * + * This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator. + * Application writers should note that this error can be returned not + * only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such + * as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute + * an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that + * use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure + * to certain attacks. + * + * Implementations should avoid returning this error after psa_crypto_init() + * has succeeded. Implementations should generate sufficient + * entropy during initialization and subsequently use a cryptographically + * secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG). However implementations may return + * this error at any time if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded + * during normal operation. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ((psa_status_t)-148) + +/** The signature, MAC or hash is incorrect. + * + * Verification functions return this error if the verification + * calculations completed successfully, and the value to be verified + * was determined to be incorrect. + * + * If the value to verify has an invalid size, implementations may return + * either #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ((psa_status_t)-149) + +/** The decrypted padding is incorrect. + * + * \warning In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that + * the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding + * is correct, down to precise timing. Applications should prefer + * protocols that use authenticated encryption rather than plain + * encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of + * unauthenticated data, the application writer should take care not + * to reveal whether the padding is invalid. + * + * Implementations should strive to make valid and invalid padding + * as close as possible to indistinguishable to an external observer. + * In particular, the timing of a decryption operation should not + * depend on the validity of the padding. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ((psa_status_t)-150) + +/** Return this error when there's insufficient data when attempting + * to read from a resource. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ((psa_status_t)-143) + +/** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ((psa_status_t)-136) + +/** Stored data has been corrupted. + * + * This error indicates that some persistent storage has suffered corruption. + * It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific error + * codes: + * + * - A corruption of volatile memory - use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED. + * - A communication error between the cryptoprocessor and its external + * storage - use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE. + * - When the storage is in a valid state but is full - use + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE. + * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use + * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE. + * - When the stored data is not valid - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID. + * + * \note A storage corruption does not indicate that any data that was + * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data might no + * longer be readable from storage. + * + * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure the + * global integrity of the keystore. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ((psa_status_t)-152) + +/** Data read from storage is not valid for the implementation. + * + * This error indicates that some data read from storage does not have a valid + * format. It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific + * error codes: + * + * - When the storage or stored data is corrupted - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * - An invalid argument to the API - use #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * + * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a + * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was + * written by an incompatible version of the library. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ((psa_status_t)-153) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types + * @{ + */ + +/* Note that key type values, including ECC family and DH group values, are + * embedded in the persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a + * consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage format version + * changes). + */ + +/** An invalid key type value. + * + * Zero is not the encoding of any key type. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ((psa_key_type_t)0x0000) + +/** Vendor-defined key type flag. + * + * Key types defined by this standard will never have the + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set. Vendors who define additional key types + * must use an encoding with the #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should + * respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings whenever practical. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_type_t)0x8000) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x7000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW ((psa_key_type_t)0x1000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ((psa_key_type_t)0x2000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7000) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x3000) + +/** Whether a key type is vendor-defined. + * + * See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0) + +/** Whether a key type is an unstructured array of bytes. + * + * This encompasses both symmetric keys and non-key data. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW || \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC) + +/** Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK \ + & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY) +/** Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY) +/** Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public + * part. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR) +/** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type. + * + * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. + * + * \param type A public key type or key pair type. + * + * \return The corresponding key pair type. + * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair, + * the return value is undefined. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + ((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) +/** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type. + * + * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. + * + * \param type A public key type or key pair type. + * + * \return The corresponding public key type. + * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair, + * the return value is undefined. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + ((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) + +/** Raw data. + * + * A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation. + * Applications may use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ((psa_key_type_t)0x1001) + +/** HMAC key. + * + * The key policy determines which underlying hash algorithm the key can be + * used for. + * + * HMAC keys should generally have the same size as the underlying hash. + * This size can be calculated with #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where + * \c alg is the HMAC algorithm or the underlying hash algorithm. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((psa_key_type_t)0x1100) + +/** A secret for key derivation. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key + * can be used for. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((psa_key_type_t)0x1200) + +/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher. + * + * The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or + * 32 bytes (AES-256). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ((psa_key_type_t)0x2400) + +/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the + * ARIA block cipher. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ((psa_key_type_t)0x2406) + +/** Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES). + * + * The size of the key can be 64 bits (single DES), 128 bits (2-key 3DES) or + * 192 bits (3-key 3DES). + * + * Note that single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly + * deprecated and should only be used to decrypt legacy data. 3-key 3DES + * is weak and deprecated and should only be used in legacy protocols. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ((psa_key_type_t)0x2301) + +/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the + * Camellia block cipher. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((psa_key_type_t)0x2403) + +/** Key for the ARC4 stream cipher (also known as RC4 or ARCFOUR). + * + * Note that ARC4 is weak and deprecated and should only be used in + * legacy protocols. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2002) + +/** Key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * ChaCha20 and the ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction are defined in RFC 7539. + * + * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces, + * and should reject other sizes. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2004) + +/** RSA public key. + * + * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4001) +/** RSA key pair (private and public key). + * + * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7001) +/** Whether a key type is an RSA key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x4100) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x7100) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x00ff) +/** Elliptic curve key pair. + * + * The size of an elliptic curve key is the bit size associated with the curve, + * i.e. the bit size of *q* for a curve over a field *Fq*. + * See the documentation of `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families for details. + * + * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that + * identifies the ECC curve to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve)) +/** Elliptic curve public key. + * + * The size of an elliptic curve public key is the same as the corresponding + * private key (see #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR and the documentation of + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families). + * + * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that + * identifies the ECC curve to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve)) + +/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) \ + ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ + ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) + +/** Extract the curve from an elliptic curve key type. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) \ + ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) ? \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \ + 0)) + +/** SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17) + +/** SEC random curves over prime fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * secp192k1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12) +/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete) */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b) + +/** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * sect163k1, sect233k1, sect239k1, sect283k1, sect409k1, sect571k1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27) + +/** SEC random curves over binary fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * sect163r1, sect233r1, sect283r1, sect409r1, sect571r1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22) + +/** SEC additional random curves over binary fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curve: + * sect163r2. + * It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b) + +/** Brainpool P random curves. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1, + * brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1. + * It is defined in RFC 5639. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30) + +/** Curve25519 and Curve448. + * + * This family comprises the following Montgomery curves: + * - 255-bit: Bernstein et al., + * _Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records_, LNCS 3958, 2006. + * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X25519 when used with this curve. + * - 448-bit: Hamburg, + * _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015. + * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X448 when used with this curve. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41) + +/** The twisted Edwards curves Ed25519 and Ed448. + * + * These curves are suitable for EdDSA (#PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA for both curves, + * #PSA_ALG_ED25519PH for the 255-bit curve, + * #PSA_ALG_ED448PH for the 448-bit curve). + * + * This family comprises the following twisted Edwards curves: + * - 255-bit: Edwards25519, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent + * to Curve25519. + * Bernstein et al., _Twisted Edwards curves_, Africacrypt 2008. + * - 448-bit: Edwards448, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent + * to Curve448. + * Hamburg, _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x4200) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t)0x7200) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK ((psa_key_type_t)0x00ff) +/** Diffie-Hellman key pair. + * + * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the + * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group)) +/** Diffie-Hellman public key. + * + * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the + * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group)) + +/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) \ + ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ + ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) + +/** Extract the group from a Diffie-Hellman key type. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type) \ + ((psa_dh_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) ? \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) : \ + 0)) + +/** Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 7919 Appendix A. + * + * This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits): + * 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. A given implementation may support + * all of these sizes or only a subset. + */ +#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x03) + +#define PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) \ + (((type) >> 8) & 7) +/** The block size of a block cipher. + * + * \param type A cipher key type (value of type #psa_key_type_t). + * + * \return The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher. + * The return value is undefined if \p type is not a supported + * cipher key type. + * + * \note It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block + * cipher, for example CTR mode (#PSA_ALG_CTR). + * This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be + * used to determine the size of the data that #psa_cipher_update() + * might buffer for future processing in general. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its argument multiple times. + */ +#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \ + 1u << PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) : \ + 0u) + +/* Note that algorithm values are embedded in the persistent key store, + * as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they must not be changed + * (unless the storage format version changes). + */ + +/** Vendor-defined algorithm flag. + * + * Algorithms defined by this standard will never have the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG + * bit set. Vendors who define additional algorithms must use an encoding with + * the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should respect the bitwise structure + * used by standard encodings whenever practical. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x80000000) + +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x7f000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09000000) + +/** Whether an algorithm is vendor-defined. + * + * See also #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption + * with associated data (AEAD) algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric signature algorithm, + * also known as public-key signature algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric signature algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, + * also known as public-key encryption algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key agreement algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) + +/** An invalid algorithm identifier value. */ +#define PSA_ALG_NONE ((psa_algorithm_t)0) + +#define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x000000ff) +/** MD2 */ +#define PSA_ALG_MD2 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000001) +/** MD4 */ +#define PSA_ALG_MD4 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000002) +/** MD5 */ +#define PSA_ALG_MD5 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000003) +/** PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 */ +#define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000004) +/** SHA1 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000005) +/** SHA2-224 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000008) +/** SHA2-256 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000009) +/** SHA2-384 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000a) +/** SHA2-512 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000b) +/** SHA2-512/224 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000c) +/** SHA2-512/256 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000d) +/** SHA3-224 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000010) +/** SHA3-256 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000011) +/** SHA3-384 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000012) +/** SHA3-512 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000013) +/** The first 512 bits (64 bytes) of the SHAKE256 output. + * + * This is the prehashing for Ed448ph (see #PSA_ALG_ED448PH). For other + * scenarios where a hash function based on SHA3/SHAKE is desired, SHA3-512 + * has the same output size and a (theoretically) higher security strength. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000015) + +/** In a hash-and-sign algorithm policy, allow any hash algorithm. + * + * This value may be used to form the algorithm usage field of a policy + * for a signature algorithm that is parametrized by a hash. The key + * may then be used to perform operations using the same signature + * algorithm parametrized with any supported hash. + * + * That is, suppose that `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` is one of the following macros: + * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT, + * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA, #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA. + * Then you may create and use a key as follows: + * - Set the key usage field using #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example: + * ``` + * psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); // or VERIFY + * psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)); + * ``` + * - Import or generate key material. + * - Call psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), passing + * an algorithm built from `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` and a specific hash. Each + * call to sign or verify a message may use a different hash. + * ``` + * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), ...); + * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), ...); + * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA3_256), ...); + * ``` + * + * This value may not be used to build other algorithms that are + * parametrized over a hash. For any valid use of this macro to build + * an algorithm \c alg, #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(\c alg) is true. + * + * This value may not be used to build an algorithm specification to + * perform an operation. It is only valid to build policies. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x020000ff) + +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00c00000) +#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03800000) +/** Macro to build an HMAC algorithm. + * + * For example, #PSA_ALG_HMAC(#PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding HMAC algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(hmac_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hmac_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm. + * + * HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE) + +/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bits corresponding to + * PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK encode the length to which the MAC is + * truncated. As an exception, the value 0 means the untruncated algorithm, + * whatever its length is. The length is encoded in 6 bits, so it can + * reach up to 63; the largest MAC is 64 bytes so its trivial truncation + * to full length is correctly encoded as 0 and any non-trivial truncation + * is correctly encoded as a value between 1 and 63. */ +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x003f0000) +#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET 16 + +/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bit corresponding to + * #PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm + * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted + * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the + * same base class and having a (potentially truncated) MAC length greater or + * equal than the one encoded in #PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK. */ +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00008000) + +/** Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm. + * + * A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC + * algorithm except that the MAC value for the truncated algorithm + * consists of only the first \p mac_length bytes of the MAC value + * for the untruncated algorithm. + * + * \note This macro may allow constructing algorithm identifiers that + * are not valid, either because the specified length is larger + * than the untruncated MAC or because the specified length is + * smaller than permitted by the implementation. + * + * \note It is implementation-defined whether a truncated MAC that + * is truncated to the same length as the MAC of the untruncated + * algorithm is considered identical to the untruncated algorithm + * for policy comparison purposes. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated + * MAC algorithm. + * \param mac_length Desired length of the truncated MAC in bytes. + * This must be at most the full length of the MAC + * and must be at least an implementation-specified + * minimum. The implementation-specified minimum + * shall not be zero. + * + * \return The corresponding MAC algorithm with the specified + * length. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported + * MAC algorithm or if \p mac_length is too small or + * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \ + (((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \ + ((mac_length) << PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK)) + +/** Macro to build the base MAC algorithm corresponding to a truncated + * MAC algorithm. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated + * MAC algorithm. + * + * \return The corresponding base MAC algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported + * MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) \ + ((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) + +/** Length to which a MAC algorithm is truncated. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). + * + * \return Length of the truncated MAC in bytes. + * \return 0 if \p mac_alg is a non-truncated MAC algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported + * MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(mac_alg) \ + (((mac_alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) >> PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET) + +/** Macro to build a MAC minimum-MAC-length wildcard algorithm. + * + * A minimum-MAC-length MAC wildcard algorithm permits all MAC algorithms + * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the (potentially truncated) MAC + * length of the specific algorithm is equal to or larger then the wildcard + * algorithm's minimum MAC length. + * + * \note When setting the minimum required MAC length to less than the + * smallest MAC length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively + * becomes an 'any-MAC-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). + * \param min_mac_length Desired minimum length of the message authentication + * code in bytes. This must be at most the untruncated + * length of the MAC and must be at least 1. + * + * \return The corresponding MAC wildcard algorithm with the + * specified minimum length. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported MAC + * algorithm or if \p min_mac_length is less than 1 or + * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) \ + ( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) + +#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00000) +/** The CBC-MAC construction over a block cipher + * + * \warning CBC-MAC is insecure in many cases. + * A more secure mode, such as #PSA_ALG_CMAC, is recommended. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00100) +/** The CMAC construction over a block cipher */ +#define PSA_ALG_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00200) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \ + PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE) + +#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00800000) +#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00400000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher. + * + * A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages + * by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated + * from a key. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) == \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) + +/** The stream cipher mode of a stream cipher algorithm. + * + * The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type. + * - To use ChaCha20, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20. + * - To use ARC4, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04800100) + +/** The CTR stream cipher mode. + * + * CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher. + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * For example, to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with + * a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes). + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CTR ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01000) + +/** The CFB stream cipher mode. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CFB ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01100) + +/** The OFB stream cipher mode. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_OFB ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01200) + +/** The XTS cipher mode. + * + * XTS is a cipher mode which is built from a block cipher. It requires at + * least one full block of input, but beyond this minimum the input + * does not need to be a whole number of blocks. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_XTS ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0440ff00) + +/** The Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode of a block cipher, with no padding. + * + * \warning ECB mode does not protect the confidentiality of the encrypted data + * except in extremely narrow circumstances. It is recommended that applications + * only use ECB if they need to construct an operating mode that the + * implementation does not provide. Implementations are encouraged to provide + * the modes that applications need in preference to supporting direct access + * to ECB. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths are a + * multiple of the block size of the chosen block cipher. + * + * ECB mode does not accept an initialization vector (IV). When using a + * multi-part cipher operation with this algorithm, psa_cipher_generate_iv() + * and psa_cipher_set_iv() must not be called. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404400) + +/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode, with no padding. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths + * are whole number of blocks for the chosen block cipher. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404000) + +/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode with PKCS#7 padding. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * This is the padding method defined by PKCS#7 (RFC 2315) §10.3. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404100) + +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00400000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an AEAD mode on a block cipher. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm which is an AEAD mode based on + * a block cipher, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) == \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) + +/** The CCM authenticated encryption algorithm. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500100) + +/** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_GCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500200) + +/** The Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * The ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction is defined in RFC 7539. + * + * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces, + * and should reject other sizes. + * + * Implementations must support 16-byte tags and should reject other sizes. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05100500) + +/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bits corresponding to + * PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK encode the length of the AEAD tag. + * The constants for default lengths follow this encoding. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x003f0000) +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET 16 + +/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bit corresponding to + * #PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm + * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted + * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the + * same base class and having a tag length greater than or equal to the one + * encoded in #PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK. */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00008000) + +/** Macro to build a shortened AEAD algorithm. + * + * A shortened AEAD algorithm is similar to the corresponding AEAD + * algorithm, but has an authentication tag that consists of fewer bytes. + * Depending on the algorithm, the tag length may affect the calculation + * of the ciphertext. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) + * is true). + * \param tag_length Desired length of the authentication tag in bytes. + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the specified + * length. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm or if \p tag_length is not valid + * for the specified AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length) \ + (((aead_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \ + ((tag_length) << PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET & \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK)) + +/** Retrieve the tag length of a specified AEAD algorithm + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) + * is true). + * + * \return The tag length specified by the input algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg) \ + (((aead_alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >> \ + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET ) + +/** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default + * tag length for that algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg) \ + ( \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) \ + 0) +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, ref) \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, 0) == \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(ref, 0) ? \ + ref : + +/** Macro to build an AEAD minimum-tag-length wildcard algorithm. + * + * A minimum-tag-length AEAD wildcard algorithm permits all AEAD algorithms + * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the tag length of the specific + * algorithm is equal to or larger then the minimum tag length specified by the + * wildcard algorithm. + * + * \note When setting the minimum required tag length to less than the + * smallest tag length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively + * becomes an 'any-tag-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true). + * \param min_tag_length Desired minimum length of the authentication tag in + * bytes. This must be at least 1 and at most the largest + * allowed tag length of the algorithm. + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD wildcard algorithm with the + * specified minimum length. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm or if \p min_tag_length is less than 1 + * or too large for the specified AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \ + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) | \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) + +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000200) +/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name + * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** Raw PKCS#1 v1.5 signature. + * + * The input to this algorithm is the DigestInfo structure used by + * RFC 8017 (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications), §9.2 + * steps 3–6. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE) + +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000300) +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06001300) +/** RSA PSS signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name + * RSASSA-PSS, with the message generation function MGF1, and with + * a salt length equal to the length of the hash, or the largest + * possible salt length for the algorithm and key size if that is + * smaller than the hash length. The specified hash algorithm is + * used to hash the input message, to create the salted hash, and + * for the mask generation. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** RSA PSS signature with hashing with relaxed verification. + * + * This algorithm has the same behavior as #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS when signing, + * but allows an arbitrary salt length (including \c 0) when verifying a + * signature. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with standard salt. + * + * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard. + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg), + * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or + * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not + * a supported algorithm identifier or policy. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with any salt. + * + * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard. + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg), + * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or + * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not + * a supported algorithm identifier or policy. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS. + * + * This includes any of the RSA PSS algorithm variants, regardless of the + * constraints on salt length. + * + * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard. + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg) or + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg), + * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or + * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not + * a supported algorithm identifier or policy. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) || \ + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg)) + +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000600) +/** ECDSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the ECDSA signature scheme defined by ANSI X9.62, + * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). + * + * The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of + * the concatenation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of + * *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length + * of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented + * in big-endian order (most significant octet first). + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding ECDSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** ECDSA signature without hashing. + * + * This is the same signature scheme as #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but + * without specifying a hash algorithm. This algorithm may only be + * used to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that should be an + * already-calculated hash. Note that the input is padded with + * zeros on the left or truncated on the left as required to fit + * the curve size. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000700) +/** Deterministic ECDSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by RFC 6979. + * + * The representation of a signature is the same as with #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(). + * + * Note that when this algorithm is used for verification, signatures + * made with randomized ECDSA (#PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg)) with the + * same private key are accepted. In other words, + * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) differs from + * #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) only for signature, not for verification. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature + * algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00000100) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ + PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) + +/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm without prehashing (PureEdDSA), + * using standard parameters. + * + * Contexts are not supported in the current version of this specification + * because there is no suitable signature interface that can take the + * context as a parameter. A future version of this specification may add + * suitable functions and extend this algorithm to support contexts. + * + * PureEdDSA requires an elliptic curve key on a twisted Edwards curve. + * In this specification, the following curves are supported: + * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 255-bit: Ed25519 as specified + * in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards25519. + * The hash function used internally is SHA-512. + * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 448-bit: Ed448 as specified + * in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards448. + * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the + * SHAKE256 output. + * + * This algorithm can be used with psa_sign_message() and + * psa_verify_message(). Since there is no prehashing, it cannot be used + * with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(). + * + * The signature format is the concatenation of R and S as defined by + * RFC 8032 §5.1.6 and §5.2.6 (a 64-byte string for Ed25519, a 114-byte + * string for Ed448). + */ +#define PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000800) + +#define PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000900) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE) + +/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA), + * using SHA-512 and the Edwards25519 curve. + * + * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format. + * + * This algorithm is Ed25519 as specified in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards25519. + * The prehash is SHA-512. + * The hash function used internally is SHA-512. + * + * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature, + * you can either: + * - call psa_sign_message() on the message; + * - or calculate the SHA-512 hash of the message + * with psa_hash_compute() + * or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(), + * using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHA_512, + * then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash(). + * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or + * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ED25519PH \ + (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHA_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA), + * using SHAKE256 and the Edwards448 curve. + * + * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format. + * + * This algorithm is Ed448 as specified in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards448. + * The prehash is the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output. + * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the + * SHAKE256 output. + * + * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature, + * you can either: + * - call psa_sign_message() on the message; + * - or calculate the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output of the message + * with psa_hash_compute() + * or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(), + * using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512, + * then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash(). + * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or + * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ED448PH \ + (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/* Default definition, to be overridden if the library is extended with + * more hash-and-sign algorithms that we want to keep out of this header + * file. */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) 0 + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used + * with psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash(). + * + * This encompasses all strict hash-and-sign algorithms categorized by + * PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(), as well as algorithms that follow the + * paradigm more loosely: + * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW (expects its input to be an encoded hash) + * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY (doesn't specify what kind of hash the input is) + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a + * hash. 0 if alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used + * to sign a message. 0 if alg is not a signature algorithm. + * This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a + * supported algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || \ + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) || \ + PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used + * with psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message(). + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a + * message. 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used + * to sign an already-calculated hash. 0 if \p alg is not a signature + * algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a + * supported algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA ) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm. + * + * Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms + * structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that + * does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the + * hash value and the key. Hash-and-sign algorithms encode the hash + * used for the hashing step, and you can call #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH + * to extract this algorithm. + * + * Thus, for a hash-and-sign algorithm, + * `psa_sign_message(key, alg, input, ...)` is equivalent to + * ``` + * psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), input, ..., hash, ...); + * psa_sign_hash(key, alg, hash, ..., signature, ...); + * ``` + * Most usefully, separating the hash from the signature allows the hash + * to be calculated in multiple steps with psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() + * and psa_hash_finish(). Likewise psa_verify_message() is equivalent to + * calculating the hash and then calling psa_verify_hash(). + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) && \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) != 0) + +/** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm. + * + * A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is + * composed of two phases: first a hashing phase which does not use + * the key and produces a hash of the input message, then a signing + * phase which only uses the hash and the key and not the message + * itself. + * + * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The underlying hash algorithm if \p alg is a hash-and-sign + * algorithm. + * \return 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that does not + * follow the hash-and-sign structure. + * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a signature algorithm or + * if it is not supported by the implementation. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \ + 0) + +/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000200) + +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000300) +/** RSA OAEP encryption. + * + * This is the encryption scheme defined by RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name + * RSAES-OAEP, with the message generation function MGF1. + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true) to use + * for MGF1. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA OAEP encryption algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \ + 0) + +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000100) +/** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm. + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step. + * It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step. + * You must pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT before #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET. + * You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before + * starting to generate output. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding HKDF algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF algorithm. + * + * HKDF is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based on a hash + * function and the HMAC construction. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000200) +/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. + * + * TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule, + * specified in Section 5 of RFC 5246. It is based on HMAC and can be + * used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be + * passed in the order given here: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. + * + * For the application to TLS-1.2 key expansion, the seed is the + * concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random, + * and the label is "key expansion". + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` represents the + * TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000300) +/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm. + * + * In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret is derived + * from the PreSharedKey (PSK) through the application of padding + * (RFC 4279, Section 2) and the TLS-1.2 PRF (RFC 5246, Section 5). + * The latter is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256 + * or SHA-384. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be + * passed in the order given here: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. + * + * For the application to TLS-1.2, the seed (which is + * forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF) is the concatenation of the + * ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random, + * and the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret". + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` represents the + * TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0xfe00ffff) +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0xffff0000) + +/** Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with + * a key derivation. + * + * \param ka_alg A key agreement algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such + * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p ka_alg) is true). + * \param kdf_alg A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such + * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p kdf_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding key agreement and derivation + * algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p ka_alg is not a supported + * key agreement algorithm or \p kdf_alg is not a + * supported key derivation algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg) \ + ((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg)) + +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) + +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a raw key agreement algorithm. + * + * A raw key agreement algorithm is one that does not specify + * a key derivation function. + * Usually, raw key agreement algorithms are constructed directly with + * a \c PSA_ALG_xxx macro while non-raw key agreement algorithms are + * constructed with #PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(). + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a raw key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) && \ + PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) + +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT(alg) \ + ((PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg))) + +/** The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement algorithm. + * + * The shared secret produced by key agreement is + * `g^{ab}` in big-endian format. + * It is `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where `m` is the size of the prime `p` + * in bits. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_FFDH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09010000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm. + * + * This includes the raw finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as + * finite-field Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key agreement algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_FFDH) + +/** The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm. + * + * The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of + * the shared secret point. It is always `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where + * `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the + * order of the curve's coordinate field. When `m` is not a multiple of 8, + * the byte containing the most significant bit of the shared secret + * is padded with zero bits. The byte order is either little-endian + * or big-endian depending on the curve type. + * + * - For Montgomery curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), + * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` + * in little-endian byte order. + * The bit size is 448 for Curve448 and 255 for Curve25519. + * - For Weierstrass curves over prime fields (curve types + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`), + * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` + * in big-endian byte order. + * The bit size is `m = ceiling(log_2(p))` for the field `F_p`. + * - For Weierstrass curves over binary fields (curve types + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`), + * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` + * in big-endian byte order. + * The bit size is `m` for the field `F_{2^m}`. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECDH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09020000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman + * algorithm. + * + * This includes the raw elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as + * elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm, + * 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key agreement algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_ECDH) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard. + * + * Wildcard values may only be used to set the usage algorithm field in + * a policy, not to perform an operation. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding. + * \return 0 if \c alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding (suitable for + * an operation). + * \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) ? \ + (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \ + (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes + * @{ + */ + +/* Note that location and persistence level values are embedded in the + * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they + * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes). + */ + +/** The default lifetime for volatile keys. + * + * A volatile key only exists as long as the identifier to it is not destroyed. + * The key material is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset. + * + * A key with this lifetime is typically stored in the RAM area of the + * PSA Crypto subsystem. However this is an implementation choice. + * If an implementation stores data about the key in a non-volatile memory, + * it must release all the resources associated with the key and erase the + * key material if the calling application terminates. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ((psa_key_lifetime_t)0x00000000) + +/** The default lifetime for persistent keys. + * + * A persistent key remains in storage until it is explicitly destroyed or + * until the corresponding storage area is wiped. This specification does + * not define any mechanism to wipe a storage area, but integrations may + * provide their own mechanism (for example to perform a factory reset, + * to prepare for device refurbishment, or to uninstall an application). + * + * This lifetime value is the default storage area for the calling + * application. Integrations of Mbed TLS may support other persistent lifetimes. + * See ::psa_key_lifetime_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ((psa_key_lifetime_t)0x00000001) + +/** The persistence level of volatile keys. + * + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE ((psa_key_persistence_t)0x00) + +/** The default persistence level for persistent keys. + * + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT ((psa_key_persistence_t)0x01) + +/** A persistence level indicating that a key is never destroyed. + * + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY ((psa_key_persistence_t)0xff) + +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) \ + ((psa_key_persistence_t)((lifetime) & 0x000000ff)) + +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) \ + ((psa_key_location_t)((lifetime) >> 8)) + +/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is volatile. + * + * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when + * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key + * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device. + * + * A key that is not volatile is persistent. Persistent keys are + * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an + * implementation-specific device management event occurs (for example, + * a factory reset). + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type + * ::psa_key_lifetime_t). + * + * \return \c 1 if the key is volatile, otherwise \c 0. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime) \ + (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \ + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE) + +/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is read-only. + * + * Read-only keys cannot be created or destroyed through the PSA Crypto API. + * They must be created through platform-specific means that bypass the API. + * + * Some platforms may offer ways to destroy read-only keys. For example, + * consider a platform with multiple levels of privilege, where a + * low-privilege application can use a key but is not allowed to destroy + * it, and the platform exposes the key to the application with a read-only + * lifetime. High-privilege code can destroy the key even though the + * application sees the key as read-only. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type + * ::psa_key_lifetime_t). + * + * \return \c 1 if the key is read-only, otherwise \c 0. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(lifetime) \ + (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \ + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY) + +/** Construct a lifetime from a persistence level and a location. + * + * \param persistence The persistence level + * (value of type ::psa_key_persistence_t). + * \param location The location indicator + * (value of type ::psa_key_location_t). + * + * \return The constructed lifetime value. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \ + ((location) << 8 | (persistence)) + +/** The local storage area for persistent keys. + * + * This storage area is available on all systems that can store persistent + * keys without delegating the storage to a third-party cryptoprocessor. + * + * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ((psa_key_location_t)0x000000) + +#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_location_t)0x800000) + +/* Note that key identifier values are embedded in the + * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they + * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes). + */ + +/** The null key identifier. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_NULL ((psa_key_id_t)0) +/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x00000001) +/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the application. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x3fffffff) +/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x40000000) +/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x7fffffff) + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ( (psa_key_id_t)0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( id ) ( id ) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( id ) ( 0 ) + +/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. + * + * \param unused Unused parameter. + * \param key_id Identifier of the key. + */ +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( + unsigned int unused, psa_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + (void)unused; + + return( key_id ); +} + +/** Compare two key identifiers. + * + * \param id1 First key identifier. + * \param id2 Second key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2 ) +{ + return( id1 == id2 ); +} + +/** Check whether a key identifier is null. + * + * \param key Key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + return( key == 0 ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ( (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ 0, 0 } ) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( id ) ( ( id ).key_id ) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( id ) ( ( id ).owner ) + +/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. + * + * \param owner_id Identifier of the key owner. + * \param key_id Identifier of the key. + */ +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id, psa_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + return( (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ .key_id = key_id, + .owner = owner_id } ); +} + +/** Compare two key identifiers. + * + * \param id1 First key identifier. + * \param id2 Second key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2 ) +{ + return( ( id1.key_id == id2.key_id ) && + mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal( id1.owner, id2.owner ) ); +} + +/** Check whether a key identifier is null. + * + * \param key Key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + return( key.key_id == 0 ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup policy Key policies + * @{ + */ + +/* Note that key usage flags are embedded in the + * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they + * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes). + */ + +/** Whether the key may be exported. + * + * A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported + * regardless of the value of this permission flag. + * + * If a key does not have export permission, implementations shall not + * allow the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor, + * whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface. + * The key may however be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form + * where it is encrypted by another key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000001) + +/** Whether the key may be copied. + * + * This flag allows the use of psa_copy_key() to make a copy of the key + * with the same policy or a more restrictive policy. + * + * For lifetimes for which the key is located in a secure element which + * enforce the non-exportability of keys, copying a key outside the secure + * element also requires the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. + * Copying the key inside the secure element is permitted with just + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY if the secure element supports it. + * For keys with the lifetime #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY + * is sufficient to permit the copy. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000002) + +/** Whether the key may be used to encrypt a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric encryption operation, + * for an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation, + * or for an asymmetric encryption operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000100) + +/** Whether the key may be used to decrypt a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric decryption operation, + * for an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation, + * or for an asymmetric decryption operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000200) + +/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation or for + * an asymmetric message signature operation, if otherwise permitted by the + * key’s type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000400) + +/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation or for + * an asymmetric message signature verification operation, if otherwise + * permitted by the key’s type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000800) + +/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation + * or for an asymmetric signature operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00001000) + +/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message signature. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation + * or for an asymmetric signature verification operation, + * if otherwise permitted by by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00002000) + +/** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00004000) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation + * @{ + */ + +/* Key input steps are not embedded in the persistent storage, so you can + * change them if needed: it's only an ABI change. */ + +/** A secret input for key derivation. + * + * This should be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE + * (passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key()) + * or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement + * (obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()). + * + * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to + * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation + * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), not psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0101) + +/** A label for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0201) + +/** A salt for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0202) + +/** An information string for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0203) + +/** A seed for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0204) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup helper_macros Helper macros + * @{ + */ + +/* Helper macros */ + +/** Check if two AEAD algorithm identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm + * regardless of the tag length they encode. + * + * \param aead_alg_1 An AEAD algorithm identifier. + * \param aead_alg_2 An AEAD algorithm identifier. + * + * \return 1 if both identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm, + * 0 otherwise. + * Unspecified if neither \p aead_alg_1 nor \p aead_alg_2 are + * a supported AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(aead_alg_1, aead_alg_2) \ + (!(((aead_alg_1) ^ (aead_alg_2)) & \ + ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG))) + +/**@}*/ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/.gitignore b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3a63a63a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.o +libmbed* +*.sln +*.vcxproj diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/CMakeLists.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fd3a3e71 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +option(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY "Build mbed TLS static library." ON) +option(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY "Build mbed TLS shared library." OFF) +option(LINK_WITH_PTHREAD "Explicitly link mbed TLS library to pthread." OFF) +option(LINK_WITH_TRUSTED_STORAGE "Explicitly link mbed TLS library to trusted_storage." OFF) + +# Set the project root directory if it's not already defined, as may happen if +# the library folder is included directly by a parent project, without +# including the top level CMakeLists.txt. +if(NOT DEFINED MBEDTLS_DIR) + set(MBEDTLS_DIR ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}) +endif() + +set(src_crypto + aes.c + aesni.c + arc4.c + aria.c + asn1parse.c + asn1write.c + base64.c + bignum.c + blowfish.c + camellia.c + ccm.c + chacha20.c + chachapoly.c + cipher.c + cipher_wrap.c + constant_time.c + cmac.c + ctr_drbg.c + des.c + dhm.c + ecdh.c + ecdsa.c + ecjpake.c + ecp.c + ecp_curves.c + entropy.c + entropy_poll.c + error.c + gcm.c + havege.c + hkdf.c + hmac_drbg.c + md.c + md2.c + md4.c + md5.c + memory_buffer_alloc.c + mps_reader.c + mps_trace.c + nist_kw.c + oid.c + padlock.c + pem.c + pk.c + pk_wrap.c + pkcs12.c + pkcs5.c + pkparse.c + pkwrite.c + platform.c + platform_util.c + poly1305.c + psa_crypto.c + psa_crypto_aead.c + psa_crypto_cipher.c + psa_crypto_client.c + psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c + psa_crypto_ecp.c + psa_crypto_hash.c + psa_crypto_mac.c + psa_crypto_rsa.c + psa_crypto_se.c + psa_crypto_slot_management.c + psa_crypto_storage.c + psa_its_file.c + ripemd160.c + rsa.c + rsa_internal.c + sha1.c + sha256.c + sha512.c + threading.c + timing.c + version.c + version_features.c + xtea.c +) + +list(APPEND src_crypto ${thirdparty_src}) + +set(src_x509 + certs.c + pkcs11.c + x509.c + x509_create.c + x509_crl.c + x509_crt.c + x509_csr.c + x509write_crt.c + x509write_csr.c +) + +set(src_tls + debug.c + net_sockets.c + ssl_cache.c + ssl_ciphersuites.c + ssl_cli.c + ssl_cookie.c + ssl_msg.c + ssl_srv.c + ssl_ticket.c + ssl_tls.c + ssl_tls13_keys.c +) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-prototypes") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-prototypes -Wdocumentation -Wno-documentation-deprecated-sync -Wunreachable-code") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + +if(WIN32) + set(libs ${libs} ws2_32) +endif(WIN32) + +if(${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME} MATCHES "Darwin") + SET(CMAKE_C_ARCHIVE_CREATE " Scr ") + SET(CMAKE_CXX_ARCHIVE_CREATE " Scr ") + SET(CMAKE_C_ARCHIVE_FINISH " -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c ") + SET(CMAKE_CXX_ARCHIVE_FINISH " -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c ") +endif() + +if(HAIKU) + set(libs ${libs} network) +endif(HAIKU) + +if(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + set(libs ${libs} pkcs11-helper) +endif(USE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY) + +if(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + set(libs ${libs} ${ZLIB_LIBRARIES}) +endif(ENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + +if(LINK_WITH_PTHREAD) + set(libs ${libs} pthread) +endif() + +if(LINK_WITH_TRUSTED_STORAGE) + set(libs ${libs} trusted_storage) +endif() + +if (NOT USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND NOT USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + message(FATAL_ERROR "Need to choose static or shared mbedtls build!") +endif(NOT USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND NOT USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + +set(mbedtls_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedtls") +set(mbedx509_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedx509") +set(mbedcrypto_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedcrypto") + +set(mbedtls_target ${mbedtls_target} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(mbedx509_target ${mbedx509_target} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(mbedcrypto_target ${mbedcrypto_target} PARENT_SCOPE) + +if (USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + set(mbedtls_static_target ${mbedtls_target}) + set(mbedx509_static_target ${mbedx509_target}) + set(mbedcrypto_static_target ${mbedcrypto_target}) +endif() + +set(target_libraries ${mbedcrypto_target} ${mbedx509_target} ${mbedtls_target}) + +if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + string(APPEND mbedtls_static_target "_static") + string(APPEND mbedx509_static_target "_static") + string(APPEND mbedcrypto_static_target "_static") + + list(APPEND target_libraries + ${mbedcrypto_static_target} + ${mbedx509_static_target} + ${mbedtls_static_target}) +endif() + +if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + add_library(${mbedcrypto_static_target} STATIC ${src_crypto}) + set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedcrypto) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs}) + + add_library(${mbedx509_static_target} STATIC ${src_x509}) + set_target_properties(${mbedx509_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedx509) + target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_static_target}) + + add_library(${mbedtls_static_target} STATIC ${src_tls}) + set_target_properties(${mbedtls_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedtls) + target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_static_target}) +endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + +if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}) + add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto}) + set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.28.2 SOVERSION 7) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs}) + + add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509}) + set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.28.2 SOVERSION 1) + target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + + add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls}) + set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 2.28.2 SOVERSION 14) + target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target}) +endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + +foreach(target IN LISTS target_libraries) + # Include public header files from /include and other directories + # declared by /3rdparty/**/CMakeLists.txt. Include private header files + # from /library and others declared by /3rdparty/**/CMakeLists.txt. + # /library needs to be listed explicitly when building .c files outside + # of /library (which currently means: under /3rdparty). + target_include_directories(${target} + PUBLIC ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include/ + PUBLIC ${thirdparty_inc_public} + PRIVATE ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/ + PRIVATE ${thirdparty_inc}) + target_compile_definitions(${target} + PRIVATE ${thirdparty_def}) + install(TARGETS ${target} + DESTINATION ${LIB_INSTALL_DIR} + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ) +endforeach(target) + +set(lib_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}lib") + +add_custom_target(${lib_target} DEPENDS ${mbedcrypto_target} ${mbedx509_target} ${mbedtls_target}) +if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + add_dependencies(${lib_target} ${mbedcrypto_static_target} ${mbedx509_static_target} ${mbedtls_static_target}) +endif() diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/Makefile b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3b91e255 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ + +# Also see "include/mbedtls/config.h" + +CFLAGS ?= -O2 +WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral +LDFLAGS ?= + +# Include ../include for public headers and . for private headers. +# Note that . needs to be included explicitly for the sake of library +# files that are not in the /library directory (which currently means +# under /3rdparty). +LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I. -I../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 +LOCAL_LDFLAGS = + +ifdef DEBUG +LOCAL_CFLAGS += -g3 +endif + +# MicroBlaze specific options: +# CFLAGS += -mno-xl-soft-mul -mxl-barrel-shift + +# To compile on Plan9: +# CFLAGS += -D_BSD_EXTENSION + +# if were running on Windows build for Windows +ifdef WINDOWS +WINDOWS_BUILD=1 +else ifeq ($(shell uname -s),Darwin) +ifeq ($(AR),ar) +APPLE_BUILD ?= 1 +endif +endif + +# To compile as a shared library: +ifdef SHARED +# all code is position-indep with mingw, avoid warning about useless flag +ifndef WINDOWS_BUILD +LOCAL_CFLAGS += -fPIC -fpic +endif +endif + +SOEXT_TLS=so.14 +SOEXT_X509=so.1 +SOEXT_CRYPTO=so.7 + +# Set AR_DASH= (empty string) to use an ar implementation that does not accept +# the - prefix for command line options (e.g. llvm-ar) +AR_DASH ?= - + +ARFLAGS = $(AR_DASH)src +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) +ARFLAGS = $(AR_DASH)Src +RLFLAGS = -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c +RL ?= ranlib +endif +endif + +DLEXT ?= so +ifdef WINDOWS_BUILD +# Windows shared library extension: +DLEXT = dll +else ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) +# Mac OS X shared library extension: +DLEXT = dylib +endif +endif + +OBJS_CRYPTO= \ + aes.o \ + aesni.o \ + arc4.o \ + aria.o \ + asn1parse.o \ + asn1write.o \ + base64.o \ + bignum.o \ + blowfish.o \ + camellia.o \ + ccm.o \ + chacha20.o \ + chachapoly.o \ + cipher.o \ + cipher_wrap.o \ + cmac.o \ + constant_time.o \ + ctr_drbg.o \ + des.o \ + dhm.o \ + ecdh.o \ + ecdsa.o \ + ecjpake.o \ + ecp.o \ + ecp_curves.o \ + entropy.o \ + entropy_poll.o \ + error.o \ + gcm.o \ + havege.o \ + hkdf.o \ + hmac_drbg.o \ + md.o \ + md2.o \ + md4.o \ + md5.o \ + memory_buffer_alloc.o \ + mps_reader.o \ + mps_trace.o \ + nist_kw.o \ + oid.o \ + padlock.o \ + pem.o \ + pk.o \ + pk_wrap.o \ + pkcs12.o \ + pkcs5.o \ + pkparse.o \ + pkwrite.o \ + platform.o \ + platform_util.o \ + poly1305.o \ + psa_crypto.o \ + psa_crypto_aead.o \ + psa_crypto_cipher.o \ + psa_crypto_client.o \ + psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.o \ + psa_crypto_ecp.o \ + psa_crypto_hash.o \ + psa_crypto_mac.o \ + psa_crypto_rsa.o \ + psa_crypto_se.o \ + psa_crypto_slot_management.o \ + psa_crypto_storage.o \ + psa_its_file.o \ + ripemd160.o \ + rsa.o \ + rsa_internal.o \ + sha1.o \ + sha256.o \ + sha512.o \ + threading.o \ + timing.o \ + version.o \ + version_features.o \ + xtea.o \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +include ../3rdparty/Makefile.inc +LOCAL_CFLAGS+=$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES) +OBJS_CRYPTO+=$(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS) + +OBJS_X509= \ + certs.o \ + pkcs11.o \ + x509.o \ + x509_create.o \ + x509_crl.o \ + x509_crt.o \ + x509_csr.o \ + x509write_crt.o \ + x509write_csr.o \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +OBJS_TLS= \ + debug.o \ + net_sockets.o \ + ssl_cache.o \ + ssl_ciphersuites.o \ + ssl_cli.o \ + ssl_cookie.o \ + ssl_msg.o \ + ssl_srv.o \ + ssl_ticket.o \ + ssl_tls.o \ + ssl_tls13_keys.o \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +.SILENT: + +.PHONY: all static shared clean + +ifndef SHARED +all: static +else +all: shared static +endif + +static: libmbedcrypto.a libmbedx509.a libmbedtls.a + cd ../tests && echo "This is a seedfile that contains 64 bytes (65 on Windows)......" > seedfile + +shared: libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT) libmbedx509.$(DLEXT) libmbedtls.$(DLEXT) + +# Windows builds under Mingw can fail if make tries to create archives in the same +# directory at the same time - see https://bugs.launchpad.net/gcc-arm-embedded/+bug/1848002. +# This forces builds of the .a files to be serialised. +ifdef WINDOWS +libmbedtls.a: | libmbedx509.a +libmbedx509.a: | libmbedcrypto.a +endif + +# tls +libmbedtls.a: $(OBJS_TLS) + echo " AR $@" + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_TLS) +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) + echo " RL $@" + $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@ +endif +endif + +libmbedtls.$(SOEXT_TLS): $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.so + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedtls.so: libmbedtls.$(SOEXT_TLS) + echo " LN $@ -> $<" + ln -sf $< $@ + +libmbedtls.dylib: $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.dylib + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedtls.dll: $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.dll + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +# x509 +libmbedx509.a: $(OBJS_X509) + echo " AR $@" + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_X509) +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) + echo " RL $@" + $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@ +endif +endif + +libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509): $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.so + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedx509.so: libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509) + echo " LN $@ -> $<" + ln -sf $< $@ + +libmbedx509.dylib: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dylib + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedx509.dll: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dll + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedcrypto -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +# crypto +libmbedcrypto.a: $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " AR $@" + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) + echo " RL $@" + $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@ +endif +endif + +libmbedcrypto.$(SOEXT_CRYPTO): $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedcrypto.so: libmbedcrypto.$(SOEXT_CRYPTO) + echo " LN $@ -> $<" + ln -sf $< $@ + +libmbedcrypto.dylib: $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedcrypto.dll: $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +.c.o: + echo " CC $<" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ -c $< + +clean: +ifndef WINDOWS + rm -f *.o libmbed* + rm -f $(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS) +else + if exist *.o del /Q /F *.o + if exist libmbed* del /Q /F libmbed* + del /Q /F del_errors_out_if_the_file_list_is_empty_but_not_if_a_file_does_not_exist $(subst /,\,$(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS)) +endif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/aes.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/aes.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..74ea2672 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/aes.c @@ -0,0 +1,2183 @@ +/* + * FIPS-197 compliant AES implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The AES block cipher was designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen. + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/rijndael/Rijndael.pdf + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) +#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define AES_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define AES_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) || defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16) ) +static int aes_padlock_ace = -1; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) +/* + * Forward S-box + */ +static const unsigned char FSb[256] = +{ + 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, + 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76, + 0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0, + 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0, + 0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC, + 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x15, + 0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, + 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2, 0xEB, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x75, + 0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0, + 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84, + 0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED, 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, + 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A, 0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF, + 0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, + 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F, 0x50, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8, + 0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5, + 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2, + 0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, + 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x73, + 0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88, + 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14, 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB, + 0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C, + 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xE4, 0x79, + 0xE7, 0xC8, 0x37, 0x6D, 0x8D, 0xD5, 0x4E, 0xA9, + 0x6C, 0x56, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08, + 0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6, + 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F, 0x4B, 0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A, + 0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E, + 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x86, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E, + 0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94, + 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x55, 0x28, 0xDF, + 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, + 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16 +}; + +/* + * Forward tables + */ +#define FT \ +\ + V(A5,63,63,C6), V(84,7C,7C,F8), V(99,77,77,EE), V(8D,7B,7B,F6), \ + V(0D,F2,F2,FF), V(BD,6B,6B,D6), V(B1,6F,6F,DE), V(54,C5,C5,91), \ + V(50,30,30,60), V(03,01,01,02), V(A9,67,67,CE), V(7D,2B,2B,56), \ + V(19,FE,FE,E7), V(62,D7,D7,B5), V(E6,AB,AB,4D), V(9A,76,76,EC), \ + V(45,CA,CA,8F), V(9D,82,82,1F), V(40,C9,C9,89), V(87,7D,7D,FA), \ + V(15,FA,FA,EF), V(EB,59,59,B2), V(C9,47,47,8E), V(0B,F0,F0,FB), \ + V(EC,AD,AD,41), V(67,D4,D4,B3), V(FD,A2,A2,5F), V(EA,AF,AF,45), \ + V(BF,9C,9C,23), V(F7,A4,A4,53), V(96,72,72,E4), V(5B,C0,C0,9B), \ + V(C2,B7,B7,75), V(1C,FD,FD,E1), V(AE,93,93,3D), V(6A,26,26,4C), \ + V(5A,36,36,6C), V(41,3F,3F,7E), V(02,F7,F7,F5), V(4F,CC,CC,83), \ + V(5C,34,34,68), V(F4,A5,A5,51), V(34,E5,E5,D1), V(08,F1,F1,F9), \ + V(93,71,71,E2), V(73,D8,D8,AB), V(53,31,31,62), V(3F,15,15,2A), \ + V(0C,04,04,08), V(52,C7,C7,95), V(65,23,23,46), V(5E,C3,C3,9D), \ + V(28,18,18,30), V(A1,96,96,37), V(0F,05,05,0A), V(B5,9A,9A,2F), \ + V(09,07,07,0E), V(36,12,12,24), V(9B,80,80,1B), V(3D,E2,E2,DF), \ + V(26,EB,EB,CD), V(69,27,27,4E), V(CD,B2,B2,7F), V(9F,75,75,EA), \ + V(1B,09,09,12), V(9E,83,83,1D), V(74,2C,2C,58), V(2E,1A,1A,34), \ + V(2D,1B,1B,36), V(B2,6E,6E,DC), V(EE,5A,5A,B4), V(FB,A0,A0,5B), \ + V(F6,52,52,A4), V(4D,3B,3B,76), V(61,D6,D6,B7), V(CE,B3,B3,7D), \ + V(7B,29,29,52), V(3E,E3,E3,DD), V(71,2F,2F,5E), V(97,84,84,13), \ + V(F5,53,53,A6), V(68,D1,D1,B9), V(00,00,00,00), V(2C,ED,ED,C1), \ + V(60,20,20,40), V(1F,FC,FC,E3), V(C8,B1,B1,79), V(ED,5B,5B,B6), \ + V(BE,6A,6A,D4), V(46,CB,CB,8D), V(D9,BE,BE,67), V(4B,39,39,72), \ + V(DE,4A,4A,94), V(D4,4C,4C,98), V(E8,58,58,B0), V(4A,CF,CF,85), \ + V(6B,D0,D0,BB), V(2A,EF,EF,C5), V(E5,AA,AA,4F), V(16,FB,FB,ED), \ + V(C5,43,43,86), V(D7,4D,4D,9A), V(55,33,33,66), V(94,85,85,11), \ + V(CF,45,45,8A), V(10,F9,F9,E9), V(06,02,02,04), V(81,7F,7F,FE), \ + V(F0,50,50,A0), V(44,3C,3C,78), V(BA,9F,9F,25), V(E3,A8,A8,4B), \ + V(F3,51,51,A2), V(FE,A3,A3,5D), V(C0,40,40,80), V(8A,8F,8F,05), \ + V(AD,92,92,3F), V(BC,9D,9D,21), V(48,38,38,70), V(04,F5,F5,F1), \ + V(DF,BC,BC,63), V(C1,B6,B6,77), V(75,DA,DA,AF), V(63,21,21,42), \ + V(30,10,10,20), V(1A,FF,FF,E5), V(0E,F3,F3,FD), V(6D,D2,D2,BF), \ + V(4C,CD,CD,81), V(14,0C,0C,18), V(35,13,13,26), V(2F,EC,EC,C3), \ + V(E1,5F,5F,BE), V(A2,97,97,35), V(CC,44,44,88), V(39,17,17,2E), \ + V(57,C4,C4,93), V(F2,A7,A7,55), V(82,7E,7E,FC), V(47,3D,3D,7A), \ + V(AC,64,64,C8), V(E7,5D,5D,BA), V(2B,19,19,32), V(95,73,73,E6), \ + V(A0,60,60,C0), V(98,81,81,19), V(D1,4F,4F,9E), V(7F,DC,DC,A3), \ + V(66,22,22,44), V(7E,2A,2A,54), V(AB,90,90,3B), V(83,88,88,0B), \ + V(CA,46,46,8C), V(29,EE,EE,C7), V(D3,B8,B8,6B), V(3C,14,14,28), \ + V(79,DE,DE,A7), V(E2,5E,5E,BC), V(1D,0B,0B,16), V(76,DB,DB,AD), \ + V(3B,E0,E0,DB), V(56,32,32,64), V(4E,3A,3A,74), V(1E,0A,0A,14), \ + V(DB,49,49,92), V(0A,06,06,0C), V(6C,24,24,48), V(E4,5C,5C,B8), \ + V(5D,C2,C2,9F), V(6E,D3,D3,BD), V(EF,AC,AC,43), V(A6,62,62,C4), \ + V(A8,91,91,39), V(A4,95,95,31), V(37,E4,E4,D3), V(8B,79,79,F2), \ + V(32,E7,E7,D5), V(43,C8,C8,8B), V(59,37,37,6E), V(B7,6D,6D,DA), \ + V(8C,8D,8D,01), V(64,D5,D5,B1), V(D2,4E,4E,9C), V(E0,A9,A9,49), \ + V(B4,6C,6C,D8), V(FA,56,56,AC), V(07,F4,F4,F3), V(25,EA,EA,CF), \ + V(AF,65,65,CA), V(8E,7A,7A,F4), V(E9,AE,AE,47), V(18,08,08,10), \ + V(D5,BA,BA,6F), V(88,78,78,F0), V(6F,25,25,4A), V(72,2E,2E,5C), \ + V(24,1C,1C,38), V(F1,A6,A6,57), V(C7,B4,B4,73), V(51,C6,C6,97), \ + V(23,E8,E8,CB), V(7C,DD,DD,A1), V(9C,74,74,E8), V(21,1F,1F,3E), \ + V(DD,4B,4B,96), V(DC,BD,BD,61), V(86,8B,8B,0D), V(85,8A,8A,0F), \ + V(90,70,70,E0), V(42,3E,3E,7C), V(C4,B5,B5,71), V(AA,66,66,CC), \ + V(D8,48,48,90), V(05,03,03,06), V(01,F6,F6,F7), V(12,0E,0E,1C), \ + V(A3,61,61,C2), V(5F,35,35,6A), V(F9,57,57,AE), V(D0,B9,B9,69), \ + V(91,86,86,17), V(58,C1,C1,99), V(27,1D,1D,3A), V(B9,9E,9E,27), \ + V(38,E1,E1,D9), V(13,F8,F8,EB), V(B3,98,98,2B), V(33,11,11,22), \ + V(BB,69,69,D2), V(70,D9,D9,A9), V(89,8E,8E,07), V(A7,94,94,33), \ + V(B6,9B,9B,2D), V(22,1E,1E,3C), V(92,87,87,15), V(20,E9,E9,C9), \ + V(49,CE,CE,87), V(FF,55,55,AA), V(78,28,28,50), V(7A,DF,DF,A5), \ + V(8F,8C,8C,03), V(F8,A1,A1,59), V(80,89,89,09), V(17,0D,0D,1A), \ + V(DA,BF,BF,65), V(31,E6,E6,D7), V(C6,42,42,84), V(B8,68,68,D0), \ + V(C3,41,41,82), V(B0,99,99,29), V(77,2D,2D,5A), V(11,0F,0F,1E), \ + V(CB,B0,B0,7B), V(FC,54,54,A8), V(D6,BB,BB,6D), V(3A,16,16,2C) + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##a##b##c##d +static const uint32_t FT0[256] = { FT }; +#undef V + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##b##c##d##a +static const uint32_t FT1[256] = { FT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##c##d##a##b +static const uint32_t FT2[256] = { FT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##d##a##b##c +static const uint32_t FT3[256] = { FT }; +#undef V + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +#undef FT + +/* + * Reverse S-box + */ +static const unsigned char RSb[256] = +{ + 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, + 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E, 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, + 0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87, + 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4, 0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB, + 0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32, 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, + 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42, 0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, + 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49, 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25, + 0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, + 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D, 0x65, 0xB6, 0x92, + 0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, + 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84, + 0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A, + 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0x45, 0x06, + 0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02, + 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B, + 0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, + 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0, 0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73, + 0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, + 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8, 0x1C, 0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E, + 0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89, + 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B, + 0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, + 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4, + 0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, + 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F, + 0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D, + 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93, 0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF, + 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, + 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61, + 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, + 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D +}; + +/* + * Reverse tables + */ +#define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define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##a##b##c##d +static const uint32_t RT0[256] = { RT }; +#undef V + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##b##c##d##a +static const uint32_t RT1[256] = { RT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##c##d##a##b +static const uint32_t RT2[256] = { RT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a,b,c,d) 0x##d##a##b##c +static const uint32_t RT3[256] = { RT }; +#undef V + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +#undef RT + +/* + * Round constants + */ +static const uint32_t RCON[10] = +{ + 0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008, + 0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080, + 0x0000001B, 0x00000036 +}; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ + +/* + * Forward S-box & tables + */ +static unsigned char FSb[256]; +static uint32_t FT0[256]; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) +static uint32_t FT1[256]; +static uint32_t FT2[256]; +static uint32_t FT3[256]; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +/* + * Reverse S-box & tables + */ +static unsigned char RSb[256]; +static uint32_t RT0[256]; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) +static uint32_t RT1[256]; +static uint32_t RT2[256]; +static uint32_t RT3[256]; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +/* + * Round constants + */ +static uint32_t RCON[10]; + +/* + * Tables generation code + */ +#define ROTL8(x) ( ( (x) << 8 ) & 0xFFFFFFFF ) | ( (x) >> 24 ) +#define XTIME(x) ( ( (x) << 1 ) ^ ( ( (x) & 0x80 ) ? 0x1B : 0x00 ) ) +#define MUL(x,y) ( ( (x) && (y) ) ? pow[(log[(x)]+log[(y)]) % 255] : 0 ) + +static int aes_init_done = 0; + +static void aes_gen_tables( void ) +{ + int i, x, y, z; + int pow[256]; + int log[256]; + + /* + * compute pow and log tables over GF(2^8) + */ + for( i = 0, x = 1; i < 256; i++ ) + { + pow[i] = x; + log[x] = i; + x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ^ XTIME( x ) ); + } + + /* + * calculate the round constants + */ + for( i = 0, x = 1; i < 10; i++ ) + { + RCON[i] = (uint32_t) x; + x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( XTIME( x ) ); + } + + /* + * generate the forward and reverse S-boxes + */ + FSb[0x00] = 0x63; + RSb[0x63] = 0x00; + + for( i = 1; i < 256; i++ ) + { + x = pow[255 - log[i]]; + + y = x; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); + x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); + x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); + x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ( y << 1 ) | ( y >> 7 ) ); + x ^= y ^ 0x63; + + FSb[i] = (unsigned char) x; + RSb[x] = (unsigned char) i; + } + + /* + * generate the forward and reverse tables + */ + for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ ) + { + x = FSb[i]; + y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( XTIME( x ) ); + z = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( y ^ x ); + + FT0[i] = ( (uint32_t) y ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) x << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) x << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) z << 24 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + FT1[i] = ROTL8( FT0[i] ); + FT2[i] = ROTL8( FT1[i] ); + FT3[i] = ROTL8( FT2[i] ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + + x = RSb[i]; + + RT0[i] = ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x0E, x ) ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x09, x ) << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x0D, x ) << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) MUL( 0x0B, x ) << 24 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + RT1[i] = ROTL8( RT0[i] ); + RT2[i] = ROTL8( RT1[i] ); + RT3[i] = ROTL8( RT2[i] ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + } +} + +#undef ROTL8 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + +#define ROTL8(x) ( (uint32_t)( ( x ) << 8 ) + (uint32_t)( ( x ) >> 24 ) ) +#define ROTL16(x) ( (uint32_t)( ( x ) << 16 ) + (uint32_t)( ( x ) >> 16 ) ) +#define ROTL24(x) ( (uint32_t)( ( x ) << 24 ) + (uint32_t)( ( x ) >> 8 ) ) + +#define AES_RT0(idx) RT0[idx] +#define AES_RT1(idx) ROTL8( RT0[idx] ) +#define AES_RT2(idx) ROTL16( RT0[idx] ) +#define AES_RT3(idx) ROTL24( RT0[idx] ) + +#define AES_FT0(idx) FT0[idx] +#define AES_FT1(idx) ROTL8( FT0[idx] ) +#define AES_FT2(idx) ROTL16( FT0[idx] ) +#define AES_FT3(idx) ROTL24( FT0[idx] ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +#define AES_RT0(idx) RT0[idx] +#define AES_RT1(idx) RT1[idx] +#define AES_RT2(idx) RT2[idx] +#define AES_RT3(idx) RT3[idx] + +#define AES_FT0(idx) FT0[idx] +#define AES_FT1(idx) FT1[idx] +#define AES_FT2(idx) FT2[idx] +#define AES_FT3(idx) FT3[idx] + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +void mbedtls_aes_init( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ) +{ + AES_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_aes_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_aes_free( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_aes_context ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +void mbedtls_aes_xts_init( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ) +{ + AES_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->crypt ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->tweak ); +} + +void mbedtls_aes_xts_free( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->crypt ); + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->tweak ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/* + * AES key schedule (encryption) + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) +int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + unsigned int i; + uint32_t *RK; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + switch( keybits ) + { + case 128: ctx->nr = 10; break; + case 192: ctx->nr = 12; break; + case 256: ctx->nr = 14; break; + default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + if( aes_init_done == 0 ) + { + aes_gen_tables(); + aes_init_done = 1; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16) + if( aes_padlock_ace == -1 ) + aes_padlock_ace = mbedtls_padlock_has_support( MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE ); + + if( aes_padlock_ace ) + ctx->rk = RK = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16( ctx->buf ); + else +#endif + ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES ) ) + return( mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc( (unsigned char *) ctx->rk, key, keybits ) ); +#endif + + for( i = 0; i < ( keybits >> 5 ); i++ ) + { + RK[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, i << 2 ); + } + + switch( ctx->nr ) + { + case 10: + + for( i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4 ) + { + RK[4] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[3] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[3] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[3] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[3] ) ] << 24 ); + + RK[5] = RK[1] ^ RK[4]; + RK[6] = RK[2] ^ RK[5]; + RK[7] = RK[3] ^ RK[6]; + } + break; + + case 12: + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6 ) + { + RK[6] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[5] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[5] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[5] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[5] ) ] << 24 ); + + RK[7] = RK[1] ^ RK[6]; + RK[8] = RK[2] ^ RK[7]; + RK[9] = RK[3] ^ RK[8]; + RK[10] = RK[4] ^ RK[9]; + RK[11] = RK[5] ^ RK[10]; + } + break; + + case 14: + + for( i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8 ) + { + RK[8] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[7] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[7] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[7] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[7] ) ] << 24 ); + + RK[9] = RK[1] ^ RK[8]; + RK[10] = RK[2] ^ RK[9]; + RK[11] = RK[3] ^ RK[10]; + + RK[12] = RK[4] ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( RK[11] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( RK[11] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( RK[11] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( RK[11] ) ] << 24 ); + + RK[13] = RK[5] ^ RK[12]; + RK[14] = RK[6] ^ RK[13]; + RK[15] = RK[7] ^ RK[14]; + } + break; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ + +/* + * AES key schedule (decryption) + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) +int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + int i, j, ret; + mbedtls_aes_context cty; + uint32_t *RK; + uint32_t *SK; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + mbedtls_aes_init( &cty ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16) + if( aes_padlock_ace == -1 ) + aes_padlock_ace = mbedtls_padlock_has_support( MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE ); + + if( aes_padlock_ace ) + ctx->rk = RK = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16( ctx->buf ); + else +#endif + ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf; + + /* Also checks keybits */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &cty, key, keybits ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ctx->nr = cty.nr; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES ) ) + { + mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key( (unsigned char *) ctx->rk, + (const unsigned char *) cty.rk, ctx->nr ); + goto exit; + } +#endif + + SK = cty.rk + cty.nr * 4; + + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + + for( i = ctx->nr - 1, SK -= 8; i > 0; i--, SK -= 8 ) + { + for( j = 0; j < 4; j++, SK++ ) + { + *RK++ = AES_RT0( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *SK ) ] ) ^ + AES_RT1( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *SK ) ] ) ^ + AES_RT2( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *SK ) ] ) ^ + AES_RT3( FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *SK ) ] ); + } + } + + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &cty ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +static int mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits, + const unsigned char **key1, + unsigned int *key1bits, + const unsigned char **key2, + unsigned int *key2bits ) +{ + const unsigned int half_keybits = keybits / 2; + const unsigned int half_keybytes = half_keybits / 8; + + switch( keybits ) + { + case 256: break; + case 512: break; + default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); + } + + *key1bits = half_keybits; + *key2bits = half_keybits; + *key1 = &key[0]; + *key2 = &key[half_keybytes]; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *key1, *key2; + unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, + &key2, &key2bits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Set the tweak key. Always set tweak key for the encryption mode. */ + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->tweak, key2, key2bits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Set crypt key for encryption. */ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->crypt, key1, key1bits ); +} + +int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *key1, *key2; + unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys( key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, + &key2, &key2bits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Set the tweak key. Always set tweak key for encryption. */ + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->tweak, key2, key2bits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Set crypt key for decryption. */ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx->crypt, key1, key1bits ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#define AES_FROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ + do \ + { \ + (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y3 ) ); \ + \ + (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y0 ) ); \ + \ + (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y1 ) ); \ + \ + (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_FT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y2 ) ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define AES_RROUND(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) \ + do \ + { \ + (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y1 ) ); \ + \ + (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y2 ) ); \ + \ + (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y0 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y3 ) ); \ + \ + (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( Y3 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( Y2 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( Y1 ) ) ^ \ + AES_RT3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( Y0 ) ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * AES-ECB block encryption + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int i; + uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; + struct + { + uint32_t X[4]; + uint32_t Y[4]; + } t; + + t.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 0 ); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; + t.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 4 ); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; + t.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 8 ); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; + t.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 12 ); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; + + for( i = ( ctx->nr >> 1 ) - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + { + AES_FROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); + AES_FROUND( t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3], t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3] ); + } + + AES_FROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); + + t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[0] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[1] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[2] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[3] ) ] << 24 ); + + t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[1] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[2] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[3] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[0] ) ] << 24 ); + + t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[2] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[3] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[0] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[1] ) ] << 24 ); + + t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[3] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[0] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[1] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) FSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[2] ) ] << 24 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], output, 12 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* + * AES-ECB block decryption + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int i; + uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; + struct + { + uint32_t X[4]; + uint32_t Y[4]; + } t; + + t.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 0 ); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; + t.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 4 ); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; + t.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 8 ); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; + t.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 12 ); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; + + for( i = ( ctx->nr >> 1 ) - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + { + AES_RROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); + AES_RROUND( t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3], t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3] ); + } + + AES_RROUND( t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3] ); + + t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[0] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[3] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[2] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[1] ) ] << 24 ); + + t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[1] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[0] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[3] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[2] ) ] << 24 ); + + t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[2] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[1] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[0] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[3] ) ] << 24 ); + + t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( t.Y[3] ) ] ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( t.Y[2] ) ] << 8 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( t.Y[1] ) ] << 16 ) ^ + ( (uint32_t) RSb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( t.Y[0] ) ] << 24 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( t.X[3], output, 12 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* + * AES-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES ) ) + return( mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) + if( aes_padlock_ace ) + { + if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + // If padlock data misaligned, we just fall back to + // unaccelerated mode + // + } +#endif + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ) + return( mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); + else + return( mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * AES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char temp[16]; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + if( length % 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) + if( aes_padlock_ace ) + { + if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( ctx, mode, length, iv, input, output ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + // If padlock data misaligned, we just fall back to + // unaccelerated mode + // + } +#endif + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, 16 ); + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, 16 ); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } + else + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + memcpy( iv, output, 16 ); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + +typedef unsigned char mbedtls_be128[16]; + +/* + * GF(2^128) multiplication function + * + * This function multiplies a field element by x in the polynomial field + * representation. It uses 64-bit word operations to gain speed but compensates + * for machine endianness and hence works correctly on both big and little + * endian machines. + */ +static void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( unsigned char r[16], + const unsigned char x[16] ) +{ + uint64_t a, b, ra, rb; + + a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( x, 0 ); + b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( x, 8 ); + + ra = ( a << 1 ) ^ 0x0087 >> ( 8 - ( ( b >> 63 ) << 3 ) ); + rb = ( a >> 63 ) | ( b << 1 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( ra, r, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( rb, r, 8 ); +} + +/* + * AES-XTS buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char data_unit[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t blocks = length / 16; + size_t leftover = length % 16; + unsigned char tweak[16]; + unsigned char prev_tweak[16]; + unsigned char tmp[16]; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( data_unit != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + /* Data units must be at least 16 bytes long. */ + if( length < 16 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + + /* NIST SP 800-38E disallows data units larger than 2**20 blocks. */ + if( length > ( 1 << 20 ) * 16 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + + /* Compute the tweak. */ + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->tweak, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + data_unit, tweak ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + while( blocks-- ) + { + size_t i; + + if( leftover && ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) && blocks == 0 ) + { + /* We are on the last block in a decrypt operation that has + * leftover bytes, so we need to use the next tweak for this block, + * and this tweak for the leftover bytes. Save the current tweak for + * the leftovers and then update the current tweak for use on this, + * the last full block. */ + memcpy( prev_tweak, tweak, sizeof( tweak ) ); + mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( tweak, tweak ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + tmp[i] = input[i] ^ tweak[i]; + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = tmp[i] ^ tweak[i]; + + /* Update the tweak for the next block. */ + mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( tweak, tweak ); + + output += 16; + input += 16; + } + + if( leftover ) + { + /* If we are on the leftover bytes in a decrypt operation, we need to + * use the previous tweak for these bytes (as saved in prev_tweak). */ + unsigned char *t = mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ? prev_tweak : tweak; + + /* We are now on the final part of the data unit, which doesn't divide + * evenly by 16. It's time for ciphertext stealing. */ + size_t i; + unsigned char *prev_output = output - 16; + + /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block to our output for each + * byte of ciphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the + * remainder of the input for this final round (since the loop bounds + * are the same). */ + for( i = 0; i < leftover; i++ ) + { + output[i] = prev_output[i]; + tmp[i] = input[i] ^ t[i]; + } + + /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block for input in this + * round. */ + for( ; i < 16; i++ ) + tmp[i] = prev_output[i] ^ t[i]; + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return ret; + + /* Write the result back to the previous block, overriding the previous + * output we copied. */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + prev_output[i] = tmp[i] ^ t[i]; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * AES-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + + if( n > 15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ iv[n] ); + iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + else + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + + *iv_off = n; + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * AES-CFB8 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char c; + unsigned char ov[17]; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + while( length-- ) + { + memcpy( ov, iv, 16 ); + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + ov[16] = *input; + + c = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[0] ^ *input++ ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ) + ov[16] = c; + + memcpy( iv, ov + 1, 16 ); + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +/* + * AES-OFB (Output Feedback Mode) buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t n; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + + if( n > 15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + *output++ = *input++ ^ iv[n]; + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + + *iv_off = n; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * AES-CTR buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[16], + unsigned char stream_block[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c, i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + + AES_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + AES_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + n = *nc_off; + + if ( n > 0x0F ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 16; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + } + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ stream_block[n] ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + + *nc_off = n; + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * AES test vectors from: + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/rijndael/rijndael-vals.zip + */ +static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_dec[3][16] = +{ + { 0x44, 0x41, 0x6A, 0xC2, 0xD1, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x58, + 0x33, 0x03, 0x91, 0x7E, 0x6B, 0xE9, 0xEB, 0xE0 }, + { 0x48, 0xE3, 0x1E, 0x9E, 0x25, 0x67, 0x18, 0xF2, + 0x92, 0x29, 0x31, 0x9C, 0x19, 0xF1, 0x5B, 0xA4 }, + { 0x05, 0x8C, 0xCF, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x2D, + 0x1F, 0x6F, 0x56, 0x58, 0x5D, 0x8A, 0x4A, 0xDE } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_enc[3][16] = +{ + { 0xC3, 0x4C, 0x05, 0x2C, 0xC0, 0xDA, 0x8D, 0x73, + 0x45, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0x03, 0xBE, 0x29, 0x7F }, + { 0xF3, 0xF6, 0x75, 0x2A, 0xE8, 0xD7, 0x83, 0x11, + 0x38, 0xF0, 0x41, 0x56, 0x06, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x14 }, + { 0x8B, 0x79, 0xEE, 0xCC, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xEE, 0x5D, + 0xFF, 0x30, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x21, 0x63, 0x6D, 0xA4 } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_dec[3][16] = +{ + { 0xFA, 0xCA, 0x37, 0xE0, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x53, 0x73, + 0xDF, 0x70, 0x6E, 0x73, 0xF7, 0xC9, 0xAF, 0x86 }, + { 0x5D, 0xF6, 0x78, 0xDD, 0x17, 0xBA, 0x4E, 0x75, + 0xB6, 0x17, 0x68, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0xEF, 0x7C, 0x7B }, + { 0x48, 0x04, 0xE1, 0x81, 0x8F, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x75, + 0x19, 0xA3, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x57, 0x31, 0x04, 0x13 } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_enc[3][16] = +{ + { 0x8A, 0x05, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x09, 0x5A, 0xF4, 0x84, + 0x8A, 0x08, 0xD3, 0x28, 0xD3, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x3D }, + { 0x7B, 0xD9, 0x66, 0xD5, 0x3A, 0xD8, 0xC1, 0xBB, + 0x85, 0xD2, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE8, 0x7B, 0xB1, 0x04 }, + { 0xFE, 0x3C, 0x53, 0x65, 0x3E, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xB5, + 0x6F, 0xCD, 0x88, 0xB2, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x8F, 0xF0 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * AES-CFB128 test vectors from: + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf + */ +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_key[3][32] = +{ + { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, + 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }, + { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, + 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, + 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }, + { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE, + 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, + 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, + 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_iv[16] = +{ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_pt[64] = +{ + 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, + 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A, + 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C, + 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51, + 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11, + 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF, + 0xF6, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x4F, 0x9B, 0x17, + 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10 +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[3][64] = +{ + { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, + 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A, + 0xC8, 0xA6, 0x45, 0x37, 0xA0, 0xB3, 0xA9, 0x3F, + 0xCD, 0xE3, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x9F, 0x1C, 0xE5, 0x8B, + 0x26, 0x75, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xA3, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0x40, + 0xB1, 0x80, 0x8C, 0xF1, 0x87, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0xDF, + 0xC0, 0x4B, 0x05, 0x35, 0x7C, 0x5D, 0x1C, 0x0E, + 0xEA, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0xF7, 0xF2, 0xE6 }, + { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB, + 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74, + 0x67, 0xCE, 0x7F, 0x7F, 0x81, 0x17, 0x36, 0x21, + 0x96, 0x1A, 0x2B, 0x70, 0x17, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0x7A, + 0x2E, 0x1E, 0x8A, 0x1D, 0xD5, 0x9B, 0x88, 0xB1, + 0xC8, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0xED, 0x1E, 0xFA, 0xC4, 0xC9, + 0xC0, 0x5F, 0x9F, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0x83, 0x4F, 0xA0, + 0x42, 0xAE, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x4B, 0x09, 0xFF }, + { 0xDC, 0x7E, 0x84, 0xBF, 0xDA, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4B, + 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5D, 0x38, 0x60, + 0x39, 0xFF, 0xED, 0x14, 0x3B, 0x28, 0xB1, 0xC8, + 0x32, 0x11, 0x3C, 0x63, 0x31, 0xE5, 0x40, 0x7B, + 0xDF, 0x10, 0x13, 0x24, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0x92, + 0xA1, 0x3E, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x26, 0x7A, 0xE2, 0xF9, + 0x75, 0xA3, 0x85, 0x74, 0x1A, 0xB9, 0xCE, 0xF8, + 0x20, 0x31, 0x62, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xB1, 0xE4, 0x71 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +/* + * AES-OFB test vectors from: + * + * https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/final + */ +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_key[3][32] = +{ + { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, + 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }, + { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, + 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, + 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }, + { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE, + 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, + 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, + 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_iv[16] = +{ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_pt[64] = +{ + 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, + 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A, + 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C, + 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51, + 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11, + 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF, + 0xF6, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x4F, 0x9B, 0x17, + 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10 +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[3][64] = +{ + { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, + 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A, + 0x77, 0x89, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x16, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x03, + 0xf5, 0x3c, 0x52, 0xda, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0xd8, 0x25, + 0x97, 0x40, 0x05, 0x1e, 0x9c, 0x5f, 0xec, 0xf6, + 0x43, 0x44, 0xf7, 0xa8, 0x22, 0x60, 0xed, 0xcc, + 0x30, 0x4c, 0x65, 0x28, 0xf6, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x78, + 0x66, 0xa5, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0xae, 0x5e }, + { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB, + 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74, + 0xfc, 0xc2, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x63, 0x83, 0x7c, + 0x09, 0xe8, 0x17, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x10, 0x04, 0x01, + 0x8d, 0x9a, 0x9a, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xf6, 0x59, 0x6f, + 0x55, 0x9c, 0x6d, 0x4d, 0xaf, 0x59, 0xa5, 0xf2, + 0x6d, 0x9f, 0x20, 0x08, 0x57, 0xca, 0x6c, 0x3e, + 0x9c, 0xac, 0x52, 0x4b, 0xd9, 0xac, 0xc9, 0x2a }, + { 0xDC, 0x7E, 0x84, 0xBF, 0xDA, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4B, + 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5D, 0x38, 0x60, + 0x4f, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0x67, 0x40, 0xd2, 0x0b, 0x3a, + 0xc8, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xd8, 0x2a, 0x4f, 0xb0, 0x8d, + 0x71, 0xab, 0x47, 0xa0, 0x86, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xed, + 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0xba, 0x97, 0xc4, 0x08, + 0x01, 0x26, 0x14, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xf3, 0x7b, 0xe8, + 0x53, 0x8f, 0x5a, 0x8b, 0xe7, 0x40, 0xe4, 0x84 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * AES-CTR test vectors from: + * + * http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3686.html + */ + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_key[3][16] = +{ + { 0xAE, 0x68, 0x52, 0xF8, 0x12, 0x10, 0x67, 0xCC, + 0x4B, 0xF7, 0xA5, 0x76, 0x55, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x9E }, + { 0x7E, 0x24, 0x06, 0x78, 0x17, 0xFA, 0xE0, 0xD7, + 0x43, 0xD6, 0xCE, 0x1F, 0x32, 0x53, 0x91, 0x63 }, + { 0x76, 0x91, 0xBE, 0x03, 0x5E, 0x50, 0x20, 0xA8, + 0xAC, 0x6E, 0x61, 0x85, 0x29, 0xF9, 0xA0, 0xDC } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[3][16] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, + { 0x00, 0x6C, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0x54, 0x3B, 0x59, + 0xDA, 0x48, 0xD9, 0x0B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, + { 0x00, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x7B, 0x27, 0x77, 0x7F, 0x3F, + 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_pt[3][48] = +{ + { 0x53, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62, + 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x63, 0x6B, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x73, 0x67 }, + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F }, + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, + 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23 } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_ct[3][48] = +{ + { 0xE4, 0x09, 0x5D, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xA7, 0xB3, 0x79, + 0x2D, 0x61, 0x75, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x13, 0x11, 0xB8 }, + { 0x51, 0x04, 0xA1, 0x06, 0x16, 0x8A, 0x72, 0xD9, + 0x79, 0x0D, 0x41, 0xEE, 0x8E, 0xDA, 0xD3, 0x88, + 0xEB, 0x2E, 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x46, 0xDA, 0x57, 0xC8, + 0xFC, 0xE6, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x91, 0x41, 0xBE, 0x28 }, + { 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x9F, 0x2F, 0xFD, 0xD9, + 0xCF, 0x46, 0x52, 0xE9, 0xEF, 0xDB, 0x72, 0xD7, + 0x45, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x2B, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x78, 0x36, + 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x5C, 0xEA, 0xAE, 0xF3, 0x10, 0x53, + 0x25, 0xB2, 0x07, 0x2F } +}; + +static const int aes_test_ctr_len[3] = + { 16, 32, 36 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +/* + * AES-XTS test vectors from: + * + * IEEE P1619/D16 Annex B + * https://web.archive.org/web/20150629024421/http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf + * (Archived from original at http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf) + */ +static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_key[][32] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 }, + { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xfc, 0xfb, 0xfa, 0xf9, 0xf8, + 0xf7, 0xf6, 0xf5, 0xf4, 0xf3, 0xf2, 0xf1, 0xf0, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 }, +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_pt32[][32] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }, + { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }, +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_ct32[][32] = +{ + { 0x91, 0x7c, 0xf6, 0x9e, 0xbd, 0x68, 0xb2, 0xec, + 0x9b, 0x9f, 0xe9, 0xa3, 0xea, 0xdd, 0xa6, 0x92, + 0xcd, 0x43, 0xd2, 0xf5, 0x95, 0x98, 0xed, 0x85, + 0x8c, 0x02, 0xc2, 0x65, 0x2f, 0xbf, 0x92, 0x2e }, + { 0xc4, 0x54, 0x18, 0x5e, 0x6a, 0x16, 0x93, 0x6e, + 0x39, 0x33, 0x40, 0x38, 0xac, 0xef, 0x83, 0x8b, + 0xfb, 0x18, 0x6f, 0xff, 0x74, 0x80, 0xad, 0xc4, + 0x28, 0x93, 0x82, 0xec, 0xd6, 0xd3, 0x94, 0xf0 }, + { 0xaf, 0x85, 0x33, 0x6b, 0x59, 0x7a, 0xfc, 0x1a, + 0x90, 0x0b, 0x2e, 0xb2, 0x1e, 0xc9, 0x49, 0xd2, + 0x92, 0xdf, 0x4c, 0x04, 0x7e, 0x0b, 0x21, 0x53, + 0x21, 0x86, 0xa5, 0x97, 0x1a, 0x22, 0x7a, 0x89 }, +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_data_unit[][16] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = 0, i, j, u, mode; + unsigned int keybits; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char buf[64]; + const unsigned char *aes_tests; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + unsigned char iv[16]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + unsigned char prv[16]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + size_t offset; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + int len; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + unsigned char nonce_counter[16]; + unsigned char stream_block[16]; +#endif + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + + memset( key, 0, 32 ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * ECB mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-ECB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memset( buf, 0, 16 ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx, key, keybits ); + aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_dec[u]; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, keybits ); + aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_enc[u]; + } + + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + continue; + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + for( j = 0; j < 10000; j++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx, mode, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /* + * CBC mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-CBC-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memset( iv , 0, 16 ); + memset( prv, 0, 16 ); + memset( buf, 0, 16 ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &ctx, key, keybits ); + aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_dec[u]; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, keybits ); + aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_enc[u]; + } + + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + continue; + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + for( j = 0; j < 10000; j++ ) + { + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT ) + { + unsigned char tmp[16]; + + memcpy( tmp, prv, 16 ); + memcpy( prv, buf, 16 ); + memcpy( buf, tmp, 16 ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &ctx, mode, 16, iv, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + } + + if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + /* + * CFB128 mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-CFB128-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( iv, aes_test_cfb128_iv, 16 ); + memcpy( key, aes_test_cfb128_key[u], keybits / 8 ); + + offset = 0; + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, keybits ); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + continue; + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + memcpy( buf, aes_test_cfb128_ct[u], 64 ); + aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_pt; + } + else + { + memcpy( buf, aes_test_cfb128_pt, 64 ); + aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_ct[u]; + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, mode, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, 64 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + /* + * OFB mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-OFB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( iv, aes_test_ofb_iv, 16 ); + memcpy( key, aes_test_ofb_key[u], keybits / 8 ); + + offset = 0; + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, keybits ); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + continue; + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + memcpy( buf, aes_test_ofb_ct[u], 64 ); + aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_pt; + } + else + { + memcpy( buf, aes_test_ofb_pt, 64 ); + aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_ct[u]; + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( &ctx, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, 64 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + /* + * CTR mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + mode = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-CTR-128 (%s): ", + ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( nonce_counter, aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16 ); + memcpy( key, aes_test_ctr_key[u], 16 ); + + offset = 0; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, 128 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + len = aes_test_ctr_len[u]; + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + memcpy( buf, aes_test_ctr_ct[u], len ); + aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_pt[u]; + } + else + { + memcpy( buf, aes_test_ctr_pt[u], len ); + aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_ct[u]; + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( &ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, + stream_block, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_xts_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_xts_key); + mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx_xts; + + /* + * XTS mode + */ + mbedtls_aes_xts_init( &ctx_xts ); + + for( i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++ ) + { + const unsigned char *data_unit; + u = i >> 1; + mode = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-XTS-128 (%s): ", + ( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memset( key, 0, sizeof( key ) ); + memcpy( key, aes_test_xts_key[u], 32 ); + data_unit = aes_test_xts_data_unit[u]; + + len = sizeof( *aes_test_xts_ct32 ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ) + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( &ctx_xts, key, 256 ); + if( ret != 0) + goto exit; + memcpy( buf, aes_test_xts_ct32[u], len ); + aes_tests = aes_test_xts_pt32[u]; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( &ctx_xts, key, 256 ); + if( ret != 0) + goto exit; + memcpy( buf, aes_test_xts_pt32[u], len ); + aes_tests = aes_test_xts_ct32[u]; + } + + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( &ctx_xts, mode, len, data_unit, + buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, aes_tests, len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + mbedtls_aes_xts_free( &ctx_xts ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + + ret = 0; + +exit: + if( ret != 0 && verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/aesni.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/aesni.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..996292ff --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/aesni.c @@ -0,0 +1,464 @@ +/* + * AES-NI support functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * [AES-WP] http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-advanced-encryption-standard-aes-instructions-set + * [CLMUL-WP] http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-carry-less-multiplication-instruction-and-its-usage-for-computing-the-gcm-mode/ + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) + +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) +#warning "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is known to cause spurious error reports with some memory sanitizers as they do not understand the assembly code." +#endif +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" + +#include + +#ifndef asm +#define asm __asm +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + +/* + * AES-NI support detection routine + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_has_support( unsigned int what ) +{ + static int done = 0; + static unsigned int c = 0; + + if( ! done ) + { + asm( "movl $1, %%eax \n\t" + "cpuid \n\t" + : "=c" (c) + : + : "eax", "ebx", "edx" ); + done = 1; + } + + return( ( c & what ) != 0 ); +} + +/* + * Binutils needs to be at least 2.19 to support AES-NI instructions. + * Unfortunately, a lot of users have a lower version now (2014-04). + * Emit bytecode directly in order to support "old" version of gas. + * + * Opcodes from the Intel architecture reference manual, vol. 3. + * We always use registers, so we don't need prefixes for memory operands. + * Operand macros are in gas order (src, dst) as opposed to Intel order + * (dst, src) in order to blend better into the surrounding assembly code. + */ +#define AESDEC ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDE," +#define AESDECLAST ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDF," +#define AESENC ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDC," +#define AESENCLAST ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDD," +#define AESIMC ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDB," +#define AESKEYGENA ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x3A,0xDF," +#define PCLMULQDQ ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x3A,0x44," + +#define xmm0_xmm0 "0xC0" +#define xmm0_xmm1 "0xC8" +#define xmm0_xmm2 "0xD0" +#define xmm0_xmm3 "0xD8" +#define xmm0_xmm4 "0xE0" +#define xmm1_xmm0 "0xC1" +#define xmm1_xmm2 "0xD1" + +/* + * AES-NI AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + asm( "movdqu (%3), %%xmm0 \n\t" // load input + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key 0 + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // round 0 + "add $16, %1 \n\t" // point to next round key + "subl $1, %0 \n\t" // normal rounds = nr - 1 + "test %2, %2 \n\t" // mode? + "jz 2f \n\t" // 0 = decrypt + + "1: \n\t" // encryption loop + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key + AESENC xmm1_xmm0 "\n\t" // do round + "add $16, %1 \n\t" // point to next round key + "subl $1, %0 \n\t" // loop + "jnz 1b \n\t" + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key + AESENCLAST xmm1_xmm0 "\n\t" // last round + "jmp 3f \n\t" + + "2: \n\t" // decryption loop + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" + AESDEC xmm1_xmm0 "\n\t" // do round + "add $16, %1 \n\t" + "subl $1, %0 \n\t" + "jnz 2b \n\t" + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key + AESDECLAST xmm1_xmm0 "\n\t" // last round + + "3: \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%4) \n\t" // export output + : + : "r" (ctx->nr), "r" (ctx->rk), "r" (mode), "r" (input), "r" (output) + : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1" ); + + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * GCM multiplication: c = a times b in GF(2^128) + * Based on [CLMUL-WP] algorithms 1 (with equation 27) and 5. + */ +void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult( unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16] ) +{ + unsigned char aa[16], bb[16], cc[16]; + size_t i; + + /* The inputs are in big-endian order, so byte-reverse them */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + { + aa[i] = a[15 - i]; + bb[i] = b[15 - i]; + } + + asm( "movdqu (%0), %%xmm0 \n\t" // a1:a0 + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // b1:b0 + + /* + * Caryless multiplication xmm2:xmm1 = xmm0 * xmm1 + * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 1 (p. 13). + */ + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // copy of b1:b0 + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // same + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm4 \n\t" // same + PCLMULQDQ xmm0_xmm1 ",0x00 \n\t" // a0*b0 = c1:c0 + PCLMULQDQ xmm0_xmm2 ",0x11 \n\t" // a1*b1 = d1:d0 + PCLMULQDQ xmm0_xmm3 ",0x10 \n\t" // a0*b1 = e1:e0 + PCLMULQDQ xmm0_xmm4 ",0x01 \n\t" // a1*b0 = f1:f0 + "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm4 \n\t" // e1+f1:e0+f0 + "movdqa %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // same + "psrldq $8, %%xmm4 \n\t" // 0:e1+f1 + "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // e0+f0:0 + "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm2 \n\t" // d1:d0+e1+f1 + "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // c1+e0+f1:c0 + + /* + * Now shift the result one bit to the left, + * taking advantage of [CLMUL-WP] eq 27 (p. 20) + */ + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r1:r0 + "movdqa %%xmm2, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r3:r2 + "psllq $1, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r1<<1:r0<<1 + "psllq $1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1:r2<<1 + "psrlq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r1>>63:r0>>63 + "psrlq $63, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r3>>63:r2>>63 + "movdqa %%xmm3, %%xmm5 \n\t" // r1>>63:r0>>63 + "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r0>>63:0 + "pslldq $8, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r2>>63:0 + "psrldq $8, %%xmm5 \n\t" // 0:r1>>63 + "por %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r1<<1|r0>>63:r0<<1 + "por %%xmm4, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1 + "por %%xmm5, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1|r1>>63 + + /* + * Now reduce modulo the GCM polynomial x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1 + * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 5 (p. 20). + * Currently xmm2:xmm1 holds x3:x2:x1:x0 (already shifted). + */ + /* Step 2 (1) */ + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // x1:x0 + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm4 \n\t" // same + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm5 \n\t" // same + "psllq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // x1<<63:x0<<63 = stuff:a + "psllq $62, %%xmm4 \n\t" // x1<<62:x0<<62 = stuff:b + "psllq $57, %%xmm5 \n\t" // x1<<57:x0<<57 = stuff:c + + /* Step 2 (2) */ + "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // stuff:a+b + "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm3 \n\t" // stuff:a+b+c + "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // a+b+c:0 + "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // x1+a+b+c:x0 = d:x0 + + /* Steps 3 and 4 */ + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm0 \n\t" // d:x0 + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm4 \n\t" // same + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm5 \n\t" // same + "psrlq $1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1:x0>>1 = e1:e0' + "psrlq $2, %%xmm4 \n\t" // f1:x0>>2 = f1:f0' + "psrlq $7, %%xmm5 \n\t" // g1:x0>>7 = g1:g0' + "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1:e0'+f0' + "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1+g1:e0'+f0'+g0' + // e0'+f0'+g0' is almost e0+f0+g0, ex\tcept for some missing + // bits carried from d. Now get those\t bits back in. + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm3 \n\t" // d:x0 + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm4 \n\t" // same + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm5 \n\t" // same + "psllq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // d<<63:stuff + "psllq $62, %%xmm4 \n\t" // d<<62:stuff + "psllq $57, %%xmm5 \n\t" // d<<57:stuff + "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // d<<63+d<<62:stuff + "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm3 \n\t" // missing bits of d:stuff + "psrldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // 0:missing bits of d + "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1+g1:e0+f0+g0 + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // h1:h0 + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" // x3+h1:x2+h0 + + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%2) \n\t" // done + : + : "r" (aa), "r" (bb), "r" (cc) + : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "xmm2", "xmm3", "xmm4", "xmm5" ); + + /* Now byte-reverse the outputs */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + c[i] = cc[15 - i]; + + return; +} + +/* + * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys + */ +void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key( unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr ) +{ + unsigned char *ik = invkey; + const unsigned char *fk = fwdkey + 16 * nr; + + memcpy( ik, fk, 16 ); + + for( fk -= 16, ik += 16; fk > fwdkey; fk -= 16, ik += 16 ) + asm( "movdqu (%0), %%xmm0 \n\t" + AESIMC xmm0_xmm0 "\n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%1) \n\t" + : + : "r" (fk), "r" (ik) + : "memory", "xmm0" ); + + memcpy( ik, fk, 16 ); +} + +/* + * Key expansion, 128-bit case + */ +static void aesni_setkey_enc_128( unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key ) +{ + asm( "movdqu (%1), %%xmm0 \n\t" // copy the original key + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" // as round key 0 + "jmp 2f \n\t" // skip auxiliary routine + + /* + * Finish generating the next round key. + * + * On entry xmm0 is r3:r2:r1:r0 and xmm1 is X:stuff:stuff:stuff + * with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON. + * + * On exit, xmm0 is r7:r6:r5:r4 + * with r4 = X + r0, r5 = r4 + r1, r6 = r5 + r2, r7 = r6 + r3 + * and those are written to the round key buffer. + */ + "1: \n\t" + "pshufd $0xff, %%xmm1, %%xmm1 \n\t" // X:X:X:X + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm1 \n\t" // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:r4 + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // r2:r1:r0:0 + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm1 \n\t" // X+r3+r2:X+r2+r1:r5:r4 + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // etc + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // update xmm0 for next time! + "add $16, %0 \n\t" // point to next round key + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" // write it + "ret \n\t" + + /* Main "loop" */ + "2: \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x01 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x02 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x04 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x08 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x10 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x20 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x40 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x80 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x1B \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm1 ",0x36 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + : + : "r" (rk), "r" (key) + : "memory", "cc", "0" ); +} + +/* + * Key expansion, 192-bit case + */ +static void aesni_setkey_enc_192( unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key ) +{ + asm( "movdqu (%1), %%xmm0 \n\t" // copy original round key + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "movq 16(%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" + "movq %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t" + "add $8, %0 \n\t" + "jmp 2f \n\t" // skip auxiliary routine + + /* + * Finish generating the next 6 quarter-keys. + * + * On entry xmm0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, xmm1 is stuff:stuff:r5:r4 + * and xmm2 is stuff:stuff:X:stuff with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON. + * + * On exit, xmm0 is r9:r8:r7:r6 and xmm1 is stuff:stuff:r11:r10 + * and those are written to the round key buffer. + */ + "1: \n\t" + "pshufd $0x55, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t" // X:X:X:X + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:r4 + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // etc + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" // update xmm0 = r9:r8:r7:r6 + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "pshufd $0xff, %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r9:r9:r9:r9 + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // stuff:stuff:r9+r5:r10 + "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r2:r1:r0:0 + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm1 \n\t" // xmm1 = stuff:stuff:r11:r10 + "movq %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t" + "add $8, %0 \n\t" + "ret \n\t" + + "2: \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x01 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x02 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x04 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x08 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x10 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x20 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x40 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x80 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + + : + : "r" (rk), "r" (key) + : "memory", "cc", "0" ); +} + +/* + * Key expansion, 256-bit case + */ +static void aesni_setkey_enc_256( unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key ) +{ + asm( "movdqu (%1), %%xmm0 \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "movdqu 16(%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t" + "jmp 2f \n\t" // skip auxiliary routine + + /* + * Finish generating the next two round keys. + * + * On entry xmm0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, xmm1 is r7:r6:r5:r4 and + * xmm2 is X:stuff:stuff:stuff with X = rot( sub( r7 )) ^ RCON + * + * On exit, xmm0 is r11:r10:r9:r8 and xmm1 is r15:r14:r13:r12 + * and those have been written to the output buffer. + */ + "1: \n\t" + "pshufd $0xff, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" + + /* Set xmm2 to stuff:Y:stuff:stuff with Y = subword( r11 ) + * and proceed to generate next round key from there */ + AESKEYGENA xmm0_xmm2 ",0x00 \n\t" + "pshufd $0xaa, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t" + "ret \n\t" + + /* + * Main "loop" - Generating one more key than necessary, + * see definition of mbedtls_aes_context.buf + */ + "2: \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x01 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x02 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x04 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x08 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x10 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x20 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA xmm1_xmm2 ",0x40 \n\tcall 1b \n\t" + : + : "r" (rk), "r" (key) + : "memory", "cc", "0" ); +} + +/* + * Key expansion, wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc( unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits ) +{ + switch( bits ) + { + case 128: aesni_setkey_enc_128( rk, key ); break; + case 192: aesni_setkey_enc_192( rk, key ); break; + case 256: aesni_setkey_enc_256( rk, key ); break; + default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/arc4.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/arc4.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dcc13d53 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/arc4.c @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +/* + * An implementation of the ARCFOUR algorithm + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The ARCFOUR algorithm was publicly disclosed on 94/09. + * + * http://groups.google.com/group/sci.crypt/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) + +void mbedtls_arc4_init( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_arc4_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_arc4_free( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_arc4_context ) ); +} + +/* + * ARC4 key schedule + */ +void mbedtls_arc4_setup( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keylen ) +{ + int i, j, a; + unsigned int k; + unsigned char *m; + + ctx->x = 0; + ctx->y = 0; + m = ctx->m; + + for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ ) + m[i] = (unsigned char) i; + + j = k = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < 256; i++, k++ ) + { + if( k >= keylen ) k = 0; + + a = m[i]; + j = ( j + a + key[k] ) & 0xFF; + m[i] = m[j]; + m[j] = (unsigned char) a; + } +} + +/* + * ARC4 cipher function + */ +int mbedtls_arc4_crypt( mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int x, y, a, b; + size_t i; + unsigned char *m; + + x = ctx->x; + y = ctx->y; + m = ctx->m; + + for( i = 0; i < length; i++ ) + { + x = ( x + 1 ) & 0xFF; a = m[x]; + y = ( y + a ) & 0xFF; b = m[y]; + + m[x] = (unsigned char) b; + m[y] = (unsigned char) a; + + output[i] = (unsigned char) + ( input[i] ^ m[(unsigned char)( a + b )] ); + } + + ctx->x = x; + ctx->y = y; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * ARC4 tests vectors as posted by Eric Rescorla in sep. 1994: + * + * http://groups.google.com/group/comp.security.misc/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 + */ +static const unsigned char arc4_test_key[3][8] = +{ + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } +}; + +static const unsigned char arc4_test_pt[3][8] = +{ + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } +}; + +static const unsigned char arc4_test_ct[3][8] = +{ + { 0x75, 0xB7, 0x87, 0x80, 0x99, 0xE0, 0xC5, 0x96 }, + { 0x74, 0x94, 0xC2, 0xE7, 0x10, 0x4B, 0x08, 0x79 }, + { 0xDE, 0x18, 0x89, 0x41, 0xA3, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x3A } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_arc4_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char ibuf[8]; + unsigned char obuf[8]; + mbedtls_arc4_context ctx; + + mbedtls_arc4_init( &ctx ); + + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARC4 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + memcpy( ibuf, arc4_test_pt[i], 8 ); + + mbedtls_arc4_setup( &ctx, arc4_test_key[i], 8 ); + mbedtls_arc4_crypt( &ctx, 8, ibuf, obuf ); + + if( memcmp( obuf, arc4_test_ct[i], 8 ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_arc4_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/aria.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/aria.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5e52eea9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/aria.c @@ -0,0 +1,1045 @@ +/* + * ARIA implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * This implementation is based on the following standards: + * [1] http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/doc/ARIA-specification-e.pdf + * [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5794 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ARIA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +/* + * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( B A D C ), i.e. swap pairs of bytes + * + * This is submatrix P1 in [1] Appendix B.1 + * + * Common compilers fail to translate this to minimal number of instructions, + * so let's provide asm versions for common platforms with C fallback. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#if defined(__arm__) /* rev16 available from v6 up */ +/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 ) && \ + __ARM_ARCH >= 6 +static inline uint32_t aria_p1( uint32_t x ) +{ + uint32_t r; + __asm( "rev16 %0, %1" : "=l" (r) : "l" (x) ); + return( r ); +} +#define ARIA_P1 aria_p1 +#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && __ARMCC_VERSION < 6000000 && \ + ( __TARGET_ARCH_ARM >= 6 || __TARGET_ARCH_THUMB >= 3 ) +static inline uint32_t aria_p1( uint32_t x ) +{ + uint32_t r; + __asm( "rev16 r, x" ); + return( r ); +} +#define ARIA_P1 aria_p1 +#endif +#endif /* arm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + defined(__i386__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined( __x86_64__) +/* I couldn't find an Intel equivalent of rev16, so two instructions */ +#define ARIA_P1(x) ARIA_P2( ARIA_P3( x ) ) +#endif /* x86 gnuc */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && GNUC */ +#if !defined(ARIA_P1) +#define ARIA_P1(x) ((((x) >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF) ^ (((x) & 0x00FF00FF) << 8)) +#endif + +/* + * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( C D A B ), i.e. rotate by 16 bits + * + * This is submatrix P2 in [1] Appendix B.1 + * + * Common compilers will translate this to a single instruction. + */ +#define ARIA_P2(x) (((x) >> 16) ^ ((x) << 16)) + +/* + * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( D C B A ), i.e. change endianness + * + * This is submatrix P3 in [1] Appendix B.1 + * + * Some compilers fail to translate this to a single instruction, + * so let's provide asm versions for common platforms with C fallback. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#if defined(__arm__) /* rev available from v6 up */ +/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 ) && \ + __ARM_ARCH >= 6 +static inline uint32_t aria_p3( uint32_t x ) +{ + uint32_t r; + __asm( "rev %0, %1" : "=l" (r) : "l" (x) ); + return( r ); +} +#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3 +#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && __ARMCC_VERSION < 6000000 && \ + ( __TARGET_ARCH_ARM >= 6 || __TARGET_ARCH_THUMB >= 3 ) +static inline uint32_t aria_p3( uint32_t x ) +{ + uint32_t r; + __asm( "rev r, x" ); + return( r ); +} +#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3 +#endif +#endif /* arm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + defined(__i386__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined( __x86_64__) +static inline uint32_t aria_p3( uint32_t x ) +{ + __asm( "bswap %0" : "=r" (x) : "0" (x) ); + return( x ); +} +#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3 +#endif /* x86 gnuc */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && GNUC */ +#if !defined(ARIA_P3) +#define ARIA_P3(x) ARIA_P2( ARIA_P1 ( x ) ) +#endif + +/* + * ARIA Affine Transform + * (a, b, c, d) = state in/out + * + * If we denote the first byte of input by 0, ..., the last byte by f, + * then inputs are: a = 0123, b = 4567, c = 89ab, d = cdef. + * + * Reading [1] 2.4 or [2] 2.4.3 in columns and performing simple + * rearrangements on adjacent pairs, output is: + * + * a = 3210 + 4545 + 6767 + 88aa + 99bb + dccd + effe + * = 3210 + 4567 + 6745 + 89ab + 98ba + dcfe + efcd + * b = 0101 + 2323 + 5476 + 8998 + baab + eecc + ffdd + * = 0123 + 2301 + 5476 + 89ab + ba98 + efcd + fedc + * c = 0022 + 1133 + 4554 + 7667 + ab89 + dcdc + fefe + * = 0123 + 1032 + 4567 + 7654 + ab89 + dcfe + fedc + * d = 1001 + 2332 + 6644 + 7755 + 9898 + baba + cdef + * = 1032 + 2301 + 6745 + 7654 + 98ba + ba98 + cdef + * + * Note: another presentation of the A transform can be found as the first + * half of App. B.1 in [1] in terms of 4-byte operators P1, P2, P3 and P4. + * The implementation below uses only P1 and P2 as they are sufficient. + */ +static inline void aria_a( uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b, + uint32_t *c, uint32_t *d ) +{ + uint32_t ta, tb, tc; + ta = *b; // 4567 + *b = *a; // 0123 + *a = ARIA_P2( ta ); // 6745 + tb = ARIA_P2( *d ); // efcd + *d = ARIA_P1( *c ); // 98ba + *c = ARIA_P1( tb ); // fedc + ta ^= *d; // 4567+98ba + tc = ARIA_P2( *b ); // 2301 + ta = ARIA_P1( ta ) ^ tc ^ *c; // 2301+5476+89ab+fedc + tb ^= ARIA_P2( *d ); // ba98+efcd + tc ^= ARIA_P1( *a ); // 2301+7654 + *b ^= ta ^ tb; // 0123+2301+5476+89ab+ba98+efcd+fedc OUT + tb = ARIA_P2( tb ) ^ ta; // 2301+5476+89ab+98ba+cdef+fedc + *a ^= ARIA_P1( tb ); // 3210+4567+6745+89ab+98ba+dcfe+efcd OUT + ta = ARIA_P2( ta ); // 0123+7654+ab89+dcfe + *d ^= ARIA_P1( ta ) ^ tc; // 1032+2301+6745+7654+98ba+ba98+cdef OUT + tc = ARIA_P2( tc ); // 0123+5476 + *c ^= ARIA_P1( tc ) ^ ta; // 0123+1032+4567+7654+ab89+dcfe+fedc OUT +} + +/* + * ARIA Substitution Layer SL1 / SL2 + * (a, b, c, d) = state in/out + * (sa, sb, sc, sd) = 256 8-bit S-Boxes (see below) + * + * By passing sb1, sb2, is1, is2 as S-Boxes you get SL1 + * By passing is1, is2, sb1, sb2 as S-Boxes you get SL2 + */ +static inline void aria_sl( uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b, + uint32_t *c, uint32_t *d, + const uint8_t sa[256], const uint8_t sb[256], + const uint8_t sc[256], const uint8_t sd[256] ) +{ + *a = ( (uint32_t) sa[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *a ) ] ) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *a ) ]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *a ) ]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *a ) ]) << 24); + *b = ( (uint32_t) sa[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *b ) ] ) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *b ) ]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *b ) ]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *b ) ]) << 24); + *c = ( (uint32_t) sa[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *c ) ] ) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *c ) ]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *c ) ]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *c ) ]) << 24); + *d = ( (uint32_t) sa[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *d ) ] ) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *d ) ]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *d ) ]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[ MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( *d ) ]) << 24); +} + +/* + * S-Boxes + */ +static const uint8_t aria_sb1[256] = +{ + 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, + 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76, 0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0, + 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0, 0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26, + 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC, 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x15, + 0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2, + 0xEB, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x75, 0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0, + 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84, 0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED, + 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A, 0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF, + 0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F, + 0x50, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5, + 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC, + 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x73, + 0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14, + 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C, + 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xE4, 0x79, 0xE7, 0xC8, 0x37, 0x6D, + 0x8D, 0xD5, 0x4E, 0xA9, 0x6C, 0x56, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08, + 0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6, 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F, + 0x4B, 0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A, 0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E, + 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x86, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11, + 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x55, 0x28, 0xDF, + 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F, + 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16 +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_sb2[256] = +{ + 0xE2, 0x4E, 0x54, 0xFC, 0x94, 0xC2, 0x4A, 0xCC, 0x62, 0x0D, 0x6A, 0x46, + 0x3C, 0x4D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x5E, 0xFA, 0x64, 0xCB, 0xB4, 0x97, 0xBE, 0x2B, + 0xBC, 0x77, 0x2E, 0x03, 0xD3, 0x19, 0x59, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x06, 0x41, 0x6B, + 0x55, 0xF0, 0x99, 0x69, 0xEA, 0x9C, 0x18, 0xAE, 0x63, 0xDF, 0xE7, 0xBB, + 0x00, 0x73, 0x66, 0xFB, 0x96, 0x4C, 0x85, 0xE4, 0x3A, 0x09, 0x45, 0xAA, + 0x0F, 0xEE, 0x10, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x7F, 0xF4, 0x29, 0xAC, 0xCF, 0xAD, 0x91, + 0x8D, 0x78, 0xC8, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xCE, 0xCD, 0x08, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x38, + 0x5C, 0x83, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x47, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x93, 0xA4, 0x12, 0x53, + 0xFF, 0x87, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x36, 0x21, 0x58, 0x48, 0x01, 0x8E, 0x37, 0x74, + 0x32, 0xCA, 0xE9, 0xB1, 0xB7, 0xAB, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0xC4, 0x56, 0x42, 0x26, + 0x07, 0x98, 0x60, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xB9, 0x11, 0x40, 0xEC, 0x20, 0x8C, 0xBD, + 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x84, 0x04, 0x49, 0x23, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x50, 0x1F, 0x13, 0xDC, + 0xD8, 0xC0, 0x9E, 0x57, 0xE3, 0xC3, 0x7B, 0x65, 0x3B, 0x02, 0x8F, 0x3E, + 0xE8, 0x25, 0x92, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xDD, 0xFD, 0x17, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xD4, 0x9A, + 0x7E, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x67, 0xFE, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x43, 0xA7, 0xE1, 0xD0, 0xF5, + 0x68, 0xF2, 0x1B, 0x34, 0x70, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x79, 0x86, 0xA8, + 0x30, 0xC6, 0x51, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xF6, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0x24, + 0x16, 0x82, 0x5F, 0xDA, 0xE6, 0x75, 0xA2, 0xEF, 0x2C, 0xB2, 0x1C, 0x9F, + 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x80, 0x0A, 0x72, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x6C, 0x90, 0x0B, 0x5B, 0x33, + 0x7D, 0x5A, 0x52, 0xF3, 0x61, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0xB0, 0xD6, 0x3F, 0x7C, 0x6D, + 0xED, 0x14, 0xE0, 0xA5, 0x3D, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xDE, 0x71, 0x1A, + 0xAF, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0x81 +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_is1[256] = +{ + 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E, + 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, 0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87, + 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4, 0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB, 0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32, + 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42, 0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49, + 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, + 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D, 0x65, 0xB6, 0x92, 0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, + 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84, + 0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05, + 0xB8, 0xB3, 0x45, 0x06, 0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02, + 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, + 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0, 0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73, + 0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8, + 0x1C, 0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E, 0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89, + 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B, 0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B, + 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4, + 0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, + 0x27, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D, + 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93, 0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D, + 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61, + 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, + 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_is2[256] = +{ + 0x30, 0x68, 0x99, 0x1B, 0x87, 0xB9, 0x21, 0x78, 0x50, 0x39, 0xDB, 0xE1, + 0x72, 0x09, 0x62, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0xA0, 0xCC, 0xA3, + 0x2A, 0x1D, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xD6, 0x20, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0x81, 0x65, 0xF5, 0x89, + 0xCB, 0x9D, 0x77, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x43, 0x56, 0x17, 0xD4, 0x40, 0x1A, 0x4D, + 0xC0, 0x63, 0x6C, 0xE3, 0xB7, 0xC8, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x53, 0xAA, 0x38, 0x98, + 0x0C, 0xF4, 0x9B, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x22, 0x76, 0xAF, 0xDD, 0x3A, 0x0B, 0x58, + 0x67, 0x88, 0x06, 0xC3, 0x35, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x8B, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0xE6, 0x5F, + 0x02, 0x24, 0x75, 0x93, 0x66, 0x1E, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x54, 0xD8, 0x10, 0xCE, + 0x7A, 0xE8, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x12, 0x97, 0x32, 0xAB, 0xB4, 0x27, 0x0A, 0x23, + 0xDF, 0xEF, 0xCA, 0xD9, 0xB8, 0xFA, 0xDC, 0x31, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0xAD, 0x19, + 0x49, 0xBD, 0x51, 0x96, 0xEE, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x41, 0xDA, 0xFF, 0xCD, 0x55, + 0x86, 0x36, 0xBE, 0x61, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xBB, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x48, 0x69, 0x9A, + 0xE0, 0x47, 0x9E, 0x5C, 0x04, 0x4B, 0x34, 0x15, 0x79, 0x26, 0xA7, 0xDE, + 0x29, 0xAE, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x84, 0xE9, 0xD2, 0xBA, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0xB0, + 0xBF, 0xA4, 0x3B, 0x71, 0x44, 0x46, 0x2B, 0xFC, 0xEB, 0x6F, 0xD5, 0xF6, + 0x14, 0xFE, 0x7C, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFD, 0x2F, 0x18, 0x83, 0x16, 0xA5, + 0x91, 0x1F, 0x05, 0x95, 0x74, 0xA9, 0xC1, 0x5B, 0x4A, 0x85, 0x6D, 0x13, + 0x07, 0x4F, 0x4E, 0x45, 0xB2, 0x0F, 0xC9, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xBC, 0xEC, 0x73, + 0x90, 0x7B, 0xCF, 0x59, 0x8F, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x94, + 0x37, 0x9F, 0xD0, 0x2E, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0x28, 0x3F, 0x80, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xD3, + 0x25, 0x8A, 0xB5, 0xE7, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xEA, 0xF7, 0x4C, 0x11, 0x33, + 0x03, 0xA2, 0xAC, 0x60 +}; + +/* + * Helper for key schedule: r = FO( p, k ) ^ x + */ +static void aria_fo_xor( uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t p[4], + const uint32_t k[4], const uint32_t x[4] ) +{ + uint32_t a, b, c, d; + + a = p[0] ^ k[0]; + b = p[1] ^ k[1]; + c = p[2] ^ k[2]; + d = p[3] ^ k[3]; + + aria_sl( &a, &b, &c, &d, aria_sb1, aria_sb2, aria_is1, aria_is2 ); + aria_a( &a, &b, &c, &d ); + + r[0] = a ^ x[0]; + r[1] = b ^ x[1]; + r[2] = c ^ x[2]; + r[3] = d ^ x[3]; +} + +/* + * Helper for key schedule: r = FE( p, k ) ^ x + */ +static void aria_fe_xor( uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t p[4], + const uint32_t k[4], const uint32_t x[4] ) +{ + uint32_t a, b, c, d; + + a = p[0] ^ k[0]; + b = p[1] ^ k[1]; + c = p[2] ^ k[2]; + d = p[3] ^ k[3]; + + aria_sl( &a, &b, &c, &d, aria_is1, aria_is2, aria_sb1, aria_sb2 ); + aria_a( &a, &b, &c, &d ); + + r[0] = a ^ x[0]; + r[1] = b ^ x[1]; + r[2] = c ^ x[2]; + r[3] = d ^ x[3]; +} + +/* + * Big endian 128-bit rotation: r = a ^ (b <<< n), used only in key setup. + * + * We chose to store bytes into 32-bit words in little-endian format (see + * MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE / MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE ) so we need to reverse + * bytes here. + */ +static void aria_rot128( uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t a[4], + const uint32_t b[4], uint8_t n ) +{ + uint8_t i, j; + uint32_t t, u; + + const uint8_t n1 = n % 32; // bit offset + const uint8_t n2 = n1 ? 32 - n1 : 0; // reverse bit offset + + j = ( n / 32 ) % 4; // initial word offset + t = ARIA_P3( b[j] ); // big endian + for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) + { + j = ( j + 1 ) % 4; // get next word, big endian + u = ARIA_P3( b[j] ); + t <<= n1; // rotate + t |= u >> n2; + t = ARIA_P3( t ); // back to little endian + r[i] = a[i] ^ t; // store + t = u; // move to next word + } +} + +/* + * Set encryption key + */ +int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ) +{ + /* round constant masks */ + const uint32_t rc[3][4] = + { + { 0xB7C17C51, 0x940A2227, 0xE8AB13FE, 0xE06E9AFA }, + { 0xCC4AB16D, 0x20C8219E, 0xD5B128FF, 0xB0E25DEF }, + { 0x1D3792DB, 0x70E92621, 0x75972403, 0x0EC9E804 } + }; + + int i; + uint32_t w[4][4], *w2; + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + if( keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Copy key to W0 (and potential remainder to W1) */ + w[0][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 0 ); + w[0][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 4 ); + w[0][2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 8 ); + w[0][3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 12 ); + + memset( w[1], 0, 16 ); + if( keybits >= 192 ) + { + w[1][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 16 ); // 192 bit key + w[1][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 20 ); + } + if( keybits == 256 ) + { + w[1][2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 24 ); // 256 bit key + w[1][3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 28 ); + } + + i = ( keybits - 128 ) >> 6; // index: 0, 1, 2 + ctx->nr = 12 + 2 * i; // no. rounds: 12, 14, 16 + + aria_fo_xor( w[1], w[0], rc[i], w[1] ); // W1 = FO(W0, CK1) ^ KR + i = i < 2 ? i + 1 : 0; + aria_fe_xor( w[2], w[1], rc[i], w[0] ); // W2 = FE(W1, CK2) ^ W0 + i = i < 2 ? i + 1 : 0; + aria_fo_xor( w[3], w[2], rc[i], w[1] ); // W3 = FO(W2, CK3) ^ W1 + + for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) // create round keys + { + w2 = w[(i + 1) & 3]; + aria_rot128( ctx->rk[i ], w[i], w2, 128 - 19 ); + aria_rot128( ctx->rk[i + 4], w[i], w2, 128 - 31 ); + aria_rot128( ctx->rk[i + 8], w[i], w2, 61 ); + aria_rot128( ctx->rk[i + 12], w[i], w2, 31 ); + } + aria_rot128( ctx->rk[16], w[0], w[1], 19 ); + + /* w holds enough info to reconstruct the round keys */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( w, sizeof( w ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Set decryption key + */ +int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits ) +{ + int i, j, k, ret; + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( ctx, key, keybits ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* flip the order of round keys */ + for( i = 0, j = ctx->nr; i < j; i++, j-- ) + { + for( k = 0; k < 4; k++ ) + { + uint32_t t = ctx->rk[i][k]; + ctx->rk[i][k] = ctx->rk[j][k]; + ctx->rk[j][k] = t; + } + } + + /* apply affine transform to middle keys */ + for( i = 1; i < ctx->nr; i++ ) + { + aria_a( &ctx->rk[i][0], &ctx->rk[i][1], + &ctx->rk[i][2], &ctx->rk[i][3] ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Encrypt a block + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] ) +{ + int i; + + uint32_t a, b, c, d; + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 0 ); + b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 4 ); + c = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 8 ); + d = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, 12 ); + + i = 0; + while( 1 ) + { + a ^= ctx->rk[i][0]; + b ^= ctx->rk[i][1]; + c ^= ctx->rk[i][2]; + d ^= ctx->rk[i][3]; + i++; + + aria_sl( &a, &b, &c, &d, aria_sb1, aria_sb2, aria_is1, aria_is2 ); + aria_a( &a, &b, &c, &d ); + + a ^= ctx->rk[i][0]; + b ^= ctx->rk[i][1]; + c ^= ctx->rk[i][2]; + d ^= ctx->rk[i][3]; + i++; + + aria_sl( &a, &b, &c, &d, aria_is1, aria_is2, aria_sb1, aria_sb2 ); + if( i >= ctx->nr ) + break; + aria_a( &a, &b, &c, &d ); + } + + /* final key mixing */ + a ^= ctx->rk[i][0]; + b ^= ctx->rk[i][1]; + c ^= ctx->rk[i][2]; + d ^= ctx->rk[i][3]; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( a, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( b, output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( c, output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( d, output, 12 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Initialize context */ +void mbedtls_aria_init( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ) +{ + ARIA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_aria_context ) ); +} + +/* Clear context */ +void mbedtls_aria_free( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_aria_context ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * ARIA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; + + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + + if( length % MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( ctx, input, output ); + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + + input += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + output += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + length -= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + else + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output ); + memcpy( iv, output, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + + input += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + output += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + length -= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * ARIA-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + unsigned char c; + size_t n; + + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + + /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited + * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this + * outside of parameter validation. */ + if( n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( ctx, iv, iv ); + + c = *input++; + *output++ = c ^ iv[n]; + iv[n] = c; + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + else + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( ctx, iv, iv ); + + iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + + *iv_off = n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * ARIA-CTR buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c, i; + size_t n; + + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); + ARIA_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); + + n = *nc_off; + /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited + * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this + * outside of parameter validation. */ + if( n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) { + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( ctx, nonce_counter, + stream_block ); + + for( i = MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + } + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ stream_block[n] ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + + *nc_off = n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * Basic ARIA ECB test vectors from RFC 5794 + */ +static const uint8_t aria_test1_ecb_key[32] = // test key +{ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, // 128 bit + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, // 192 bit + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F // 256 bit +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_test1_ecb_pt[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = // plaintext +{ + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, // same for all + 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF // key sizes +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_test1_ecb_ct[3][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = // ciphertext +{ + { 0xD7, 0x18, 0xFB, 0xD6, 0xAB, 0x64, 0x4C, 0x73, // 128 bit + 0x9D, 0xA9, 0x5F, 0x3B, 0xE6, 0x45, 0x17, 0x78 }, + { 0x26, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x18, 0x05, 0xDB, 0xE7, 0xAA, // 192 bit + 0x25, 0xA4, 0x68, 0xCE, 0x26, 0x3A, 0x9E, 0x79 }, + { 0xF9, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0xC7, 0x9F, 0xB7, 0x2E, 0x2F, // 256 bit + 0x2B, 0x8F, 0x80, 0xC1, 0x97, 0x2D, 0x24, 0xFC } +}; + +/* + * Mode tests from "Test Vectors for ARIA" Version 1.0 + * http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/doc/ARIA-testvector-e.pdf + */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_key[32] = +{ + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, // 128 bit + 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff, + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, // 192 bit + 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff // 256 bit +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_test2_pt[48] = +{ + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, // same for all + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, +}; +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = +{ + 0x0f, 0x1e, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x5a, 0x69, 0x78, // same for CBC, CFB + 0x87, 0x96, 0xa5, 0xb4, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0xe1, 0xf0 // CTR has zero IV +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_cbc_ct[3][48] = // CBC ciphertext +{ + { 0x49, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x60, 0xb1, 0x49, 0x09, 0x10, // 128-bit key + 0x9c, 0xef, 0x0d, 0x22, 0xa9, 0x26, 0x81, 0x34, + 0xfa, 0xdf, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0x31, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x64, + 0x5f, 0xba, 0x75, 0x01, 0x8b, 0xdb, 0x15, 0x38, + 0xb5, 0x33, 0x34, 0x63, 0x4b, 0xbf, 0x7d, 0x4c, + 0xd4, 0xb5, 0x37, 0x70, 0x33, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x15 }, + { 0xaf, 0xe6, 0xcf, 0x23, 0x97, 0x4b, 0x53, 0x3c, // 192-bit key + 0x67, 0x2a, 0x82, 0x62, 0x64, 0xea, 0x78, 0x5f, + 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x7f, 0x78, 0x0d, 0xc7, 0xf3, 0xf1, + 0xe0, 0x96, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x23, 0x86, 0xd5, + 0x14, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xe7, 0x72, 0x59, 0xde, 0x92, + 0xdd, 0x11, 0x02, 0xff, 0xab, 0x08, 0x6c, 0x1e }, + { 0x52, 0x3a, 0x8a, 0x80, 0x6a, 0xe6, 0x21, 0xf1, // 256-bit key + 0x55, 0xfd, 0xd2, 0x8d, 0xbc, 0x34, 0xe1, 0xab, + 0x7b, 0x9b, 0x42, 0x43, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0xb2, 0xef, + 0xb9, 0x6e, 0x23, 0xb1, 0x3f, 0x0a, 0x6e, 0x52, + 0xf3, 0x61, 0x85, 0xd5, 0x0a, 0xd0, 0x02, 0xc5, + 0xf6, 0x01, 0xbe, 0xe5, 0x49, 0x3f, 0x11, 0x8b } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_cfb_ct[3][48] = // CFB ciphertext +{ + { 0x37, 0x20, 0xe5, 0x3b, 0xa7, 0xd6, 0x15, 0x38, // 128-bit key + 0x34, 0x06, 0xb0, 0x9f, 0x0a, 0x05, 0xa2, 0x00, + 0xc0, 0x7c, 0x21, 0xe6, 0x37, 0x0f, 0x41, 0x3a, + 0x5d, 0x13, 0x25, 0x00, 0xa6, 0x82, 0x85, 0x01, + 0x7c, 0x61, 0xb4, 0x34, 0xc7, 0xb7, 0xca, 0x96, + 0x85, 0xa5, 0x10, 0x71, 0x86, 0x1e, 0x4d, 0x4b }, + { 0x41, 0x71, 0xf7, 0x19, 0x2b, 0xf4, 0x49, 0x54, // 192-bit key + 0x94, 0xd2, 0x73, 0x61, 0x29, 0x64, 0x0f, 0x5c, + 0x4d, 0x87, 0xa9, 0xa2, 0x13, 0x66, 0x4c, 0x94, + 0x48, 0x47, 0x7c, 0x6e, 0xcc, 0x20, 0x13, 0x59, + 0x8d, 0x97, 0x66, 0x95, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0xc3, 0x86, + 0x8f, 0x17, 0xe3, 0x6e, 0xf6, 0x6f, 0xd8, 0x4b }, + { 0x26, 0x83, 0x47, 0x05, 0xb0, 0xf2, 0xc0, 0xe2, // 256-bit key + 0x58, 0x8d, 0x4a, 0x7f, 0x09, 0x00, 0x96, 0x35, + 0xf2, 0x8b, 0xb9, 0x3d, 0x8c, 0x31, 0xf8, 0x70, + 0xec, 0x1e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x66, 0xfa, + 0x40, 0x2d, 0xd9, 0xc2, 0x02, 0xbe, 0x30, 0x0c, + 0x45, 0x17, 0xd1, 0x96, 0xb1, 0x4d, 0x4c, 0xe1 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_ctr_ct[3][48] = // CTR ciphertext +{ + { 0xac, 0x5d, 0x7d, 0xe8, 0x05, 0xa0, 0xbf, 0x1c, // 128-bit key + 0x57, 0xc8, 0x54, 0x50, 0x1a, 0xf6, 0x0f, 0xa1, + 0x14, 0x97, 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x45, 0x19, 0xde, 0xa1, + 0x56, 0x9e, 0x91, 0xe5, 0xb5, 0xcc, 0xae, 0x2f, + 0xf3, 0xbf, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0x97, 0x5f, 0x45, 0x71, + 0xf4, 0x8b, 0xe1, 0x91, 0x61, 0x35, 0x46, 0xc3 }, + { 0x08, 0x62, 0x5c, 0xa8, 0xfe, 0x56, 0x9c, 0x19, // 192-bit key + 0xba, 0x7a, 0xf3, 0x76, 0x0a, 0x6e, 0xd1, 0xce, + 0xf4, 0xd1, 0x99, 0x26, 0x3e, 0x99, 0x9d, 0xde, + 0x14, 0x08, 0x2d, 0xbb, 0xa7, 0x56, 0x0b, 0x79, + 0xa4, 0xc6, 0xb4, 0x56, 0xb8, 0x70, 0x7d, 0xce, + 0x75, 0x1f, 0x98, 0x54, 0xf1, 0x88, 0x93, 0xdf }, + { 0x30, 0x02, 0x6c, 0x32, 0x96, 0x66, 0x14, 0x17, // 256-bit key + 0x21, 0x17, 0x8b, 0x99, 0xc0, 0xa1, 0xf1, 0xb2, + 0xf0, 0x69, 0x40, 0x25, 0x3f, 0x7b, 0x30, 0x89, + 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x0e, 0xa8, 0x6a, 0xa3, 0xc8, 0x8f, + 0x59, 0x40, 0xf0, 0x5a, 0xd7, 0xee, 0x41, 0xd7, + 0x13, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x72, 0x61, 0xe3, 0x48, 0xf1 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#define ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( cond ) \ + do { \ + if( cond ) { \ + if( verbose ) \ + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ + goto exit; \ + } else { \ + if( verbose ) \ + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i; + uint8_t blk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; + mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + int ret = 1; + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)) + size_t j; +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)) + uint8_t buf[48], iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; +#endif + + mbedtls_aria_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * Test set 1 + */ + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + /* test ECB encryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-ECB-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test1_ecb_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( &ctx, aria_test1_ecb_pt, blk ); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( + memcmp( blk, aria_test1_ecb_ct[i], MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) + != 0 ); + + /* test ECB decryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-ECB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( &ctx, aria_test1_ecb_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( &ctx, aria_test1_ecb_ct[i], blk ); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( + memcmp( blk, aria_test1_ecb_pt, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) + != 0 ); + } + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + /* + * Test set 2 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + /* Test CBC encryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CBC-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + memcpy( iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + memset( buf, 0x55, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, 48, iv, + aria_test2_pt, buf ); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, aria_test2_cbc_ct[i], 48 ) + != 0 ); + + /* Test CBC decryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CBC-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + memcpy( iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + memset( buf, 0xAA, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT, 48, iv, + aria_test2_cbc_ct[i], buf ); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, aria_test2_pt, 48 ) != 0 ); + } + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + /* Test CFB encryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CFB-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + memcpy( iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + memset( buf, 0x55, sizeof( buf ) ); + j = 0; + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, 48, &j, iv, + aria_test2_pt, buf ); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, aria_test2_cfb_ct[i], 48 ) != 0 ); + + /* Test CFB decryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CFB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + memcpy( iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); + memset( buf, 0xAA, sizeof( buf ) ); + j = 0; + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( &ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT, 48, &j, + iv, aria_test2_cfb_ct[i], buf ); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, aria_test2_pt, 48 ) != 0 ); + } + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + /* Test CTR encryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CTR-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + memset( iv, 0, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); // IV = 0 + memset( buf, 0x55, sizeof( buf ) ); + j = 0; + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, 48, &j, iv, blk, + aria_test2_pt, buf ); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, aria_test2_ctr_ct[i], 48 ) != 0 ); + + /* Test CTR decryption */ + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CTR-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i ); + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i ); + memset( iv, 0, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); // IV = 0 + memset( buf, 0xAA, sizeof( buf ) ); + j = 0; + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( &ctx, 48, &j, iv, blk, + aria_test2_ctr_ct[i], buf ); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, aria_test2_pt, 48 ) != 0 ); + } + if( verbose ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_aria_free( &ctx ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/asn1parse.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/asn1parse.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bf975852 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/asn1parse.c @@ -0,0 +1,475 @@ +/* + * Generic ASN.1 parsing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* + * ASN.1 DER decoding routines + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_len( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len ) +{ + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + if( ( **p & 0x80 ) == 0 ) + *len = *(*p)++; + else + { + switch( **p & 0x7F ) + { + case 1: + if( ( end - *p ) < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + *len = (*p)[1]; + (*p) += 2; + break; + + case 2: + if( ( end - *p ) < 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + *len = ( (size_t)(*p)[1] << 8 ) | (*p)[2]; + (*p) += 3; + break; + + case 3: + if( ( end - *p ) < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + *len = ( (size_t)(*p)[1] << 16 ) | + ( (size_t)(*p)[2] << 8 ) | (*p)[3]; + (*p) += 4; + break; + + case 4: + if( ( end - *p ) < 5 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + *len = ( (size_t)(*p)[1] << 24 ) | ( (size_t)(*p)[2] << 16 ) | + ( (size_t)(*p)[3] << 8 ) | (*p)[4]; + (*p) += 5; + break; + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + } + } + + if( *len > (size_t) ( end - *p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len, int tag ) +{ + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + if( **p != tag ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + + (*p)++; + + return( mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, len ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( len != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + + *val = ( **p != 0 ) ? 1 : 0; + (*p)++; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int asn1_get_tagged_int( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int tag, int *val ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, tag ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * len==0 is malformed (0 must be represented as 020100 for INTEGER, + * or 0A0100 for ENUMERATED tags + */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + /* This is a cryptography library. Reject negative integers. */ + if( ( **p & 0x80 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + + /* Skip leading zeros. */ + while( len > 0 && **p == 0 ) + { + ++( *p ); + --len; + } + + /* Reject integers that don't fit in an int. This code assumes that + * the int type has no padding bit. */ + if( len > sizeof( int ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + if( len == sizeof( int ) && ( **p & 0x80 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + + *val = 0; + while( len-- > 0 ) + { + *val = ( *val << 8 ) | **p; + (*p)++; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_int( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ) +{ + return( asn1_get_tagged_int( p, end, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER, val) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_enum( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val ) +{ + return( asn1_get_tagged_int( p, end, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED, val) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, *p, len ); + + *p += len; + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_bitstring *bs) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Certificate type is a single byte bitstring */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &bs->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Check length, subtract one for actual bit string length */ + if( bs->len < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + bs->len -= 1; + + /* Get number of unused bits, ensure unused bits <= 7 */ + bs->unused_bits = **p; + if( bs->unused_bits > 7 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); + (*p)++; + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + bs->p = *p; + *p += bs->len; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Traverse an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF " + * and call a callback for each entry found. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char tag_must_mask, unsigned char tag_must_val, + unsigned char tag_may_mask, unsigned char tag_may_val, + int (*cb)( void *ctx, int tag, + unsigned char *start, size_t len ), + void *ctx ) +{ + int ret; + size_t len; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + unsigned char const tag = *(*p)++; + + if( ( tag & tag_must_mask ) != tag_must_val ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( tag & tag_may_mask ) == tag_may_val ) + { + if( cb != NULL ) + { + ret = cb( ctx, tag, *p, len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + } + + *p += len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Get a bit string without unused bits + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( *len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); + --( *len ); + + if( **p != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); + ++( *p ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free( mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq ) +{ + while( seq != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next = seq->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq, sizeof( *seq ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq ); + seq = next; + } +} + +typedef struct +{ + int tag; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur; +} asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t; + +static int asn1_get_sequence_of_cb( void *ctx, + int tag, + unsigned char *start, + size_t len ) +{ + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t *cb_ctx = + (asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t *) ctx; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = + cb_ctx->cur; + + if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) + { + cur->next = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + + cur->buf.p = start; + cur->buf.len = len; + cur->buf.tag = tag; + + cb_ctx->cur = cur; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF " + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur, + int tag) +{ + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t cb_ctx = { tag, cur }; + memset( cur, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + return( mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + p, end, 0xFF, tag, 0, 0, + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb, &cb_ctx ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ); + + alg->tag = **p; + end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &alg->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + alg->p = *p; + *p += alg->len; + + if( *p == end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( params, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + params->tag = **p; + (*p)++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, ¶ms->len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + params->p = *p; + *p += params->len; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + + memset( ¶ms, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, alg, ¶ms ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( params.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && params.tag != 0 ) || params.len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur ) +{ + if( cur == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_free( cur->oid.p ); + mbedtls_free( cur->val.p ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cur, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_named_data ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; + + while( ( cur = *head ) != NULL ) + { + *head = cur->next; + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data( cur ); + mbedtls_free( cur ); + } +} + +mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len ) +{ + while( list != NULL ) + { + if( list->oid.len == len && + memcmp( list->oid.p, oid, len ) == 0 ) + { + break; + } + + list = list->next; + } + + return( list ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/asn1write.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/asn1write.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4b59927c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/asn1write.c @@ -0,0 +1,479 @@ +/* + * ASN.1 buffer writing functionality + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, size_t len ) +{ + if( len < 0x80 ) + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = (unsigned char) len; + return( 1 ); + } + + if( len <= 0xFF ) + { + if( *p - start < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = (unsigned char) len; + *--(*p) = 0x81; + return( 2 ); + } + + if( len <= 0xFFFF ) + { + if( *p - start < 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ); + *--(*p) = 0x82; + return( 3 ); + } + + if( len <= 0xFFFFFF ) + { + if( *p - start < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( len ); + *--(*p) = 0x83; + return( 4 ); + } + + int len_is_valid = 1; +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF + len_is_valid = ( len <= 0xFFFFFFFF ); +#endif + if( len_is_valid ) + { + if( *p - start < 5 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( len ); + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( len ); + *--(*p) = 0x84; + return( 5 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag ) +{ + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = tag; + + return( 1 ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +{ + size_t len = 0; + + if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < size ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + len = size; + (*p) -= len; + memcpy( *p, buf, len ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + // Write the MPI + // + len = mbedtls_mpi_size( X ); + + /* DER represents 0 with a sign bit (0=nonnegative) and 7 value bits, not + * as 0 digits. We need to end up with 020100, not with 0200. */ + if( len == 0 ) + len = 1; + + if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + (*p) -= len; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( X, *p, len ) ); + + // DER format assumes 2s complement for numbers, so the leftmost bit + // should be 0 for positive numbers and 1 for negative numbers. + // + if( X->s ==1 && **p & 0x80 ) + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = 0x00; + len += 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); + + ret = (int) len; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + // Write NULL + // + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, 0) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, + (const unsigned char *) oid, oid_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len , mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len , mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + size_t par_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if( par_len == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_null( p, start ) ); + else + len += par_len; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( p, start, oid, oid_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolean ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = (boolean) ? 255 : 0; + len++; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +static int asn1_write_tagged_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val, int tag ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + do + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + len += 1; + *--(*p) = val & 0xff; + val >>= 8; + } + while( val > 0 ); + + if( **p & 0x80 ) + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + *--(*p) = 0x00; + len += 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, tag ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ) +{ + return( asn1_write_tagged_int( p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val ) +{ + return( asn1_write_tagged_int( p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int tag, + const char *text, size_t text_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, + (const unsigned char *) text, text_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, tag ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING, text, text_len) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING, text, text_len) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING, text, text_len) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t bits ) +{ + size_t unused_bits, byte_len; + const unsigned char *cur_byte; + unsigned char cur_byte_shifted; + unsigned char bit; + + byte_len = ( bits + 7 ) / 8; + unused_bits = ( byte_len * 8 ) - bits; + + /* + * Named bitstrings require that trailing 0s are excluded in the encoding + * of the bitstring. Trailing 0s are considered part of the 'unused' bits + * when encoding this value in the first content octet + */ + if( bits != 0 ) + { + cur_byte = buf + byte_len - 1; + cur_byte_shifted = *cur_byte >> unused_bits; + + for( ; ; ) + { + bit = cur_byte_shifted & 0x1; + cur_byte_shifted >>= 1; + + if( bit != 0 ) + break; + + bits--; + if( bits == 0 ) + break; + + if( bits % 8 == 0 ) + cur_byte_shifted = *--cur_byte; + } + } + + return( mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( p, start, buf, bits ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + size_t unused_bits, byte_len; + + byte_len = ( bits + 7 ) / 8; + unused_bits = ( byte_len * 8 ) - bits; + + if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < byte_len + 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + len = byte_len + 1; + + /* Write the bitstring. Ensure the unused bits are zeroed */ + if( byte_len > 0 ) + { + byte_len--; + *--( *p ) = buf[byte_len] & ~( ( 0x1 << unused_bits ) - 1 ); + ( *p ) -= byte_len; + memcpy( *p, buf, byte_len ); + } + + /* Write unused bits */ + *--( *p ) = (unsigned char)unused_bits; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, buf, size ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + + +/* This is a copy of the ASN.1 parsing function mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(), + * which is replicated to avoid a dependency ASN1_WRITE_C on ASN1_PARSE_C. */ +static mbedtls_asn1_named_data *asn1_find_named_data( + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len ) +{ + while( list != NULL ) + { + if( list->oid.len == len && + memcmp( list->oid.p, oid, len ) == 0 ) + { + break; + } + + list = list->next; + } + + return( list ); +} + +mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( + mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + const unsigned char *val, + size_t val_len ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; + + if( ( cur = asn1_find_named_data( *head, oid, oid_len ) ) == NULL ) + { + // Add new entry if not present yet based on OID + // + cur = (mbedtls_asn1_named_data*)mbedtls_calloc( 1, + sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_named_data) ); + if( cur == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + cur->oid.len = oid_len; + cur->oid.p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, oid_len ); + if( cur->oid.p == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur ); + return( NULL ); + } + + memcpy( cur->oid.p, oid, oid_len ); + + cur->val.len = val_len; + if( val_len != 0 ) + { + cur->val.p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, val_len ); + if( cur->val.p == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur->oid.p ); + mbedtls_free( cur ); + return( NULL ); + } + } + + cur->next = *head; + *head = cur; + } + else if( val_len == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur->val.p ); + cur->val.p = NULL; + } + else if( cur->val.len != val_len ) + { + /* + * Enlarge existing value buffer if needed + * Preserve old data until the allocation succeeded, to leave list in + * a consistent state in case allocation fails. + */ + void *p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, val_len ); + if( p == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_free( cur->val.p ); + cur->val.p = p; + cur->val.len = val_len; + } + + if( val != NULL && val_len != 0 ) + memcpy( cur->val.p, val, val_len ); + + return( cur ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/base64.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/base64.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9021a041 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/base64.c @@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +/* + * RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#define BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ + +/* + * Encode a buffer into base64 format + */ +int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *src, size_t slen ) +{ + size_t i, n; + int C1, C2, C3; + unsigned char *p; + + if( slen == 0 ) + { + *olen = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + n = slen / 3 + ( slen % 3 != 0 ); + + if( n > ( BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX - 1 ) / 4 ) + { + *olen = BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + n *= 4; + + if( ( dlen < n + 1 ) || ( NULL == dst ) ) + { + *olen = n + 1; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + n = ( slen / 3 ) * 3; + + for( i = 0, p = dst; i < n; i += 3 ) + { + C1 = *src++; + C2 = *src++; + C3 = *src++; + + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) + & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) + ( C3 >> 6 ) ) + & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( C3 & 0x3F ); + } + + if( i < slen ) + { + C1 = *src++; + C2 = ( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) ? *src++ : 0; + + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) + & 0x3F ); + + if( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) & 0x3F ); + else *p++ = '='; + + *p++ = '='; + } + + *olen = p - dst; + *p = 0; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Decode a base64-formatted buffer + */ +int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *src, size_t slen ) +{ + size_t i; /* index in source */ + size_t n; /* number of digits or trailing = in source */ + uint32_t x; /* value accumulator */ + unsigned accumulated_digits = 0; + unsigned equals = 0; + int spaces_present = 0; + unsigned char *p; + + /* First pass: check for validity and get output length */ + for( i = n = 0; i < slen; i++ ) + { + /* Skip spaces before checking for EOL */ + spaces_present = 0; + while( i < slen && src[i] == ' ' ) + { + ++i; + spaces_present = 1; + } + + /* Spaces at end of buffer are OK */ + if( i == slen ) + break; + + if( ( slen - i ) >= 2 && + src[i] == '\r' && src[i + 1] == '\n' ) + continue; + + if( src[i] == '\n' ) + continue; + + /* Space inside a line is an error */ + if( spaces_present ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + + if( src[i] > 127 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + + if( src[i] == '=' ) + { + if( ++equals > 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + } + else + { + if( equals != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + if( mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( src[i] ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + } + n++; + } + + if( n == 0 ) + { + *olen = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + /* The following expression is to calculate the following formula without + * risk of integer overflow in n: + * n = ( ( n * 6 ) + 7 ) >> 3; + */ + n = ( 6 * ( n >> 3 ) ) + ( ( 6 * ( n & 0x7 ) + 7 ) >> 3 ); + n -= equals; + + if( dst == NULL || dlen < n ) + { + *olen = n; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + equals = 0; + for( x = 0, p = dst; i > 0; i--, src++ ) + { + if( *src == '\r' || *src == '\n' || *src == ' ' ) + continue; + + x = x << 6; + if( *src == '=' ) + ++equals; + else + x |= mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( *src ); + + if( ++accumulated_digits == 4 ) + { + accumulated_digits = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( x ); + if( equals <= 1 ) *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( x ); + if( equals <= 0 ) *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); + } + } + + *olen = p - dst; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char base64_test_dec[64] = +{ + 0x24, 0x48, 0x6E, 0x56, 0x87, 0x62, 0x5A, 0xBD, + 0xBF, 0x17, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0xC4, 0x17, 0x1A, 0x01, + 0x94, 0xED, 0x8F, 0x1E, 0x11, 0xB3, 0xD7, 0x09, + 0x0C, 0xB6, 0xE9, 0x10, 0x6F, 0x22, 0xEE, 0x13, + 0xCA, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x05, 0x76, 0xC9, 0xFA, 0x31, + 0x6C, 0x08, 0x34, 0xFF, 0x8D, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x38, + 0x00, 0x43, 0xE9, 0x54, 0x97, 0xAF, 0x50, 0x4B, + 0xD1, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x95, 0x31, 0x5A, 0x0B, 0x97 +}; + +static const unsigned char base64_test_enc[] = + "JEhuVodiWr2/F9mixBcaAZTtjx4Rs9cJDLbpEG8i7hPK" + "swcFdsn6MWwINP+Nwmw4AEPpVJevUEvRQbqVMVoLlw=="; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_base64_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + size_t len; + const unsigned char *src; + unsigned char buffer[128]; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " Base64 encoding test: " ); + + src = base64_test_dec; + + if( mbedtls_base64_encode( buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &len, src, 64 ) != 0 || + memcmp( base64_test_enc, buffer, 88 ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n Base64 decoding test: " ); + + src = base64_test_enc; + + if( mbedtls_base64_decode( buffer, sizeof( buffer ), &len, src, 88 ) != 0 || + memcmp( base64_test_dec, buffer, 64 ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/bignum.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/bignum.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..37193f55 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/bignum.c @@ -0,0 +1,3155 @@ +/* + * Multi-precision integer library + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this Multi-precision + * Integer library: + * + * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997 + * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone + * + * [2] Multi-Precision Math + * Tom St Denis + * https://github.com/libtom/libtommath/blob/develop/tommath.pdf + * + * [3] GNU Multi-Precision Arithmetic Library + * https://gmplib.org/manual/index.html + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define MPI_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ +#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ +#define biH (ciL << 2) /* half limb size */ + +#define MPI_SIZE_T_MAX ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ + +/* + * Convert between bits/chars and number of limbs + * Divide first in order to avoid potential overflows + */ +#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(i) ( (i) / biL + ( (i) % biL != 0 ) ) +#define CHARS_TO_LIMBS(i) ( (i) / ciL + ( (i) % ciL != 0 ) ) + +/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ +static void mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( mbedtls_mpi_uint *v, size_t n ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( v, ciL * n ); +} + +/* + * Initialize one MPI + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_init( mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + MPI_VALIDATE( X != NULL ); + + X->s = 1; + X->n = 0; + X->p = NULL; +} + +/* + * Unallocate one MPI + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_free( mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + if( X == NULL ) + return; + + if( X->p != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( X->p, X->n ); + mbedtls_free( X->p ); + } + + X->s = 1; + X->n = 0; + X->p = NULL; +} + +/* + * Enlarge to the specified number of limbs + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_grow( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( X->n < nblimbs ) + { + if( ( p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint*)mbedtls_calloc( nblimbs, ciL ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( X->p != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, X->p, X->n * ciL ); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( X->p, X->n ); + mbedtls_free( X->p ); + } + + X->n = nblimbs; + X->p = p; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Resize down as much as possible, + * while keeping at least the specified number of limbs + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + size_t i; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + /* Actually resize up if there are currently fewer than nblimbs limbs. */ + if( X->n <= nblimbs ) + return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, nblimbs ) ); + /* After this point, then X->n > nblimbs and in particular X->n > 0. */ + + for( i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + if( X->p[i] != 0 ) + break; + i++; + + if( i < nblimbs ) + i = nblimbs; + + if( ( p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint*)mbedtls_calloc( i, ciL ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( X->p != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, X->p, i * ciL ); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize( X->p, X->n ); + mbedtls_free( X->p ); + } + + X->n = i; + X->p = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Resize X to have exactly n limbs and set it to 0. */ +static int mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t limbs ) +{ + if( limbs == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( 0 ); + } + else if( X->n == limbs ) + { + memset( X->p, 0, limbs * ciL ); + X->s = 1; + return( 0 ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) ); + } +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of Y into X. + * + * This function is not constant-time. Leading zeros in Y may be removed. + * + * Ensure that X does not shrink. This is not guaranteed by the public API, + * but some code in the bignum module relies on this property, for example + * in mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(). + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_copy( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + if( X == Y ) + return( 0 ); + + if( Y->n == 0 ) + { + if( X->n != 0 ) + { + X->s = 1; + memset( X->p, 0, X->n * ciL ); + } + return( 0 ); + } + + for( i = Y->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + if( Y->p[i] != 0 ) + break; + i++; + + X->s = Y->s; + + if( X->n < i ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i ) ); + } + else + { + memset( X->p + i, 0, ( X->n - i ) * ciL ); + } + + memcpy( X->p, Y->p, i * ciL ); + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Swap the contents of X and Y + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi T; + MPI_VALIDATE( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE( Y != NULL ); + + memcpy( &T, X, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); + memcpy( X, Y, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); + memcpy( Y, &T, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); +} + +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sint_abs( mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) +{ + if( z >= 0 ) + return( z ); + /* Take care to handle the most negative value (-2^(biL-1)) correctly. + * A naive -z would have undefined behavior. + * Write this in a way that makes popular compilers happy (GCC, Clang, + * MSVC). */ + return( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0 - (mbedtls_mpi_uint) z ); +} + +/* + * Set value from integer + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lset( mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, 1 ) ); + memset( X->p, 0, X->n * ciL ); + + X->p[0] = mpi_sint_abs( z ); + X->s = ( z < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Get a specific bit + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos ) +{ + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( X->n * biL <= pos ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ( X->p[pos / biL] >> ( pos % biL ) ) & 0x01 ); +} + +/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */ +#define GET_BYTE( X, i ) \ + ( ( ( X )->p[( i ) / ciL] >> ( ( ( i ) % ciL ) * 8 ) ) & 0xff ) + +/* + * Set a bit to a specific value of 0 or 1 + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t off = pos / biL; + size_t idx = pos % biL; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( val != 0 && val != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( X->n * biL <= pos ) + { + if( val == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, off + 1 ) ); + } + + X->p[off] &= ~( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0x01 << idx ); + X->p[off] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) val << idx; + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Return the number of less significant zero-bits + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + size_t i, j, count = 0; + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL, 0 ); + + for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ ) + for( j = 0; j < biL; j++, count++ ) + if( ( ( X->p[i] >> j ) & 1 ) != 0 ) + return( count ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Count leading zero bits in a given integer + */ +static size_t mbedtls_clz( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) +{ + size_t j; + mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (biL - 1); + + for( j = 0; j < biL; j++ ) + { + if( x & mask ) break; + + mask >>= 1; + } + + return j; +} + +/* + * Return the number of bits + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + size_t i, j; + + if( X->n == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + for( i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i-- ) + if( X->p[i] != 0 ) + break; + + j = biL - mbedtls_clz( X->p[i] ); + + return( ( i * biL ) + j ); +} + +/* + * Return the total size in bytes + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_size( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + return( ( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) + 7 ) >> 3 ); +} + +/* + * Convert an ASCII character to digit value + */ +static int mpi_get_digit( mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, int radix, char c ) +{ + *d = 255; + + if( c >= 0x30 && c <= 0x39 ) *d = c - 0x30; + if( c >= 0x41 && c <= 0x46 ) *d = c - 0x37; + if( c >= 0x61 && c <= 0x66 ) *d = c - 0x57; + + if( *d >= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) radix ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Import from an ASCII string + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_string( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j, slen, n; + int sign = 1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint d; + mbedtls_mpi T; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + if( s[0] == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( X ); + return( 0 ); + } + + if( s[0] == '-' ) + { + ++s; + sign = -1; + } + + slen = strlen( s ); + + if( radix == 16 ) + { + if( slen > MPI_SIZE_T_MAX >> 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + n = BITS_TO_LIMBS( slen << 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + + for( i = slen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, s[i - 1] ) ); + X->p[j / ( 2 * ciL )] |= d << ( ( j % ( 2 * ciL ) ) << 2 ); + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < slen; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, s[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T, X, radix ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, &T, d ) ); + } + } + + if( sign < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) != 0 ) + X->s = -1; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Helper to write the digits high-order first. + */ +static int mpi_write_hlp( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, + char **p, const size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + size_t length = 0; + char *p_end = *p + buflen; + + do + { + if( length >= buflen ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, radix ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_int( X, NULL, X, radix ) ); + /* + * Write the residue in the current position, as an ASCII character. + */ + if( r < 0xA ) + *(--p_end) = (char)( '0' + r ); + else + *(--p_end) = (char)( 'A' + ( r - 0xA ) ); + + length++; + } while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) != 0 ); + + memmove( *p, p_end, length ); + *p += length; + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Export into an ASCII string + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_string( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, + char *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t n; + char *p; + mbedtls_mpi T; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + n = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ); /* Number of bits necessary to present `n`. */ + if( radix >= 4 ) n >>= 1; /* Number of 4-adic digits necessary to present + * `n`. If radix > 4, this might be a strict + * overapproximation of the number of + * radix-adic digits needed to present `n`. */ + if( radix >= 16 ) n >>= 1; /* Number of hexadecimal digits necessary to + * present `n`. */ + + n += 1; /* Terminating null byte */ + n += 1; /* Compensate for the divisions above, which round down `n` + * in case it's not even. */ + n += 1; /* Potential '-'-sign. */ + n += ( n & 1 ); /* Make n even to have enough space for hexadecimal writing, + * which always uses an even number of hex-digits. */ + + if( buflen < n ) + { + *olen = n; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + p = buf; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + if( X->s == -1 ) + { + *p++ = '-'; + buflen--; + } + + if( radix == 16 ) + { + int c; + size_t i, j, k; + + for( i = X->n, k = 0; i > 0; i-- ) + { + for( j = ciL; j > 0; j-- ) + { + c = ( X->p[i - 1] >> ( ( j - 1 ) << 3) ) & 0xFF; + + if( c == 0 && k == 0 && ( i + j ) != 2 ) + continue; + + *(p++) = "0123456789ABCDEF" [c / 16]; + *(p++) = "0123456789ABCDEF" [c % 16]; + k = 1; + } + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &T, X ) ); + + if( T.s == -1 ) + T.s = 1; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_write_hlp( &T, radix, &p, buflen ) ); + } + + *p++ = '\0'; + *olen = p - buf; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Read X from an opened file + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_file( mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint d; + size_t slen; + char *p; + /* + * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI, + * newline characters and '\0' + */ + char s[ MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ]; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( fin != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); + if( fgets( s, sizeof( s ) - 1, fin ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + slen = strlen( s ); + if( slen == sizeof( s ) - 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + if( slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\n' ) { slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; } + if( slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\r' ) { slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; } + + p = s + slen; + while( p-- > s ) + if( mpi_get_digit( &d, radix, *p ) != 0 ) + break; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( X, radix, p + 1 ) ); +} + +/* + * Write X into an opened file (or stdout if fout == NULL) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_file( const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fout ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n, slen, plen; + /* + * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI, + * newline characters and '\0' + */ + char s[ MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE ]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + if( radix < 2 || radix > 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_string( X, radix, s, sizeof( s ) - 2, &n ) ); + + if( p == NULL ) p = ""; + + plen = strlen( p ); + slen = strlen( s ); + s[slen++] = '\r'; + s[slen++] = '\n'; + + if( fout != NULL ) + { + if( fwrite( p, 1, plen, fout ) != plen || + fwrite( s, 1, slen, fout ) != slen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + else + mbedtls_printf( "%s%s", p, s ); + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + + +/* Convert a big-endian byte array aligned to the size of mbedtls_mpi_uint + * into the storage form used by mbedtls_mpi. */ + +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) +{ + uint8_t i; + unsigned char *x_ptr; + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = 0; + + for( i = 0, x_ptr = (unsigned char*) &x; i < ciL; i++, x_ptr++ ) + { + tmp <<= CHAR_BIT; + tmp |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) *x_ptr; + } + + return( tmp ); +} + +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint x ) +{ +#if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) + +/* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */ +#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ ) + return( x ); +#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ */ + +#if ( __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ ) + +/* For GCC and Clang, have builtins for byte swapping. */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) +#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3) +#define have_bswap +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) && \ + __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) +#define have_bswap +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(have_bswap) + /* The compiler is hopefully able to statically evaluate this! */ + switch( sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) ) + { + case 4: + return( __builtin_bswap32(x) ); + case 8: + return( __builtin_bswap64(x) ); + } +#endif +#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ */ +#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ */ + + /* Fall back to C-based reordering if we don't know the byte order + * or we couldn't use a compiler-specific builtin. */ + return( mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c( x ) ); +} + +static void mpi_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint * const p, size_t limbs ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_left; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_right; + if( limbs == 0 ) + return; + + /* + * Traverse limbs and + * - adapt byte-order in each limb + * - swap the limbs themselves. + * For that, simultaneously traverse the limbs from left to right + * and from right to left, as long as the left index is not bigger + * than the right index (it's not a problem if limbs is odd and the + * indices coincide in the last iteration). + */ + for( cur_limb_left = p, cur_limb_right = p + ( limbs - 1 ); + cur_limb_left <= cur_limb_right; + cur_limb_left++, cur_limb_right-- ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; + /* Note that if cur_limb_left == cur_limb_right, + * this code effectively swaps the bytes only once. */ + tmp = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( *cur_limb_left ); + *cur_limb_left = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host( *cur_limb_right ); + *cur_limb_right = tmp; + } +} + +/* + * Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( mbedtls_mpi *X, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < buflen; i++ ) + X->p[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i]) << ((i % ciL) << 3); + +cleanup: + + /* + * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers + * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any + * input is copied. + */ + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Import X from unsigned binary data, big endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen ); + size_t const overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - buflen; + unsigned char *Xp; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + + /* Avoid calling `memcpy` with NULL source or destination argument, + * even if buflen is 0. */ + if( buflen != 0 ) + { + Xp = (unsigned char*) X->p; + memcpy( Xp + overhead, buf, buflen ); + + mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); + } + +cleanup: + + /* + * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers + * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any + * input is copied. + */ + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + size_t stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + size_t i; + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + } + else + { + bytes_to_copy = buflen; + + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. + * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ ) + { + if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + } + + for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ ) + buf[i] = GET_BYTE( X, i ); + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + /* Write trailing 0 bytes */ + memset( buf + stored_bytes, 0, buflen - stored_bytes ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + size_t stored_bytes; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + unsigned char *p; + size_t i; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL ); + + stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; + + if( stored_bytes < buflen ) + { + /* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial + * null bytes and record the position at which to start + * writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution + * trace of this function does not depend on the value of the + * number. */ + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + p = buf + buflen - stored_bytes; + memset( buf, 0, buflen - stored_bytes ); + } + else + { + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. + * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + bytes_to_copy = buflen; + p = buf; + for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ ) + { + if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + } + + for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ ) + p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE( X, i ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Left-shift: X <<= count + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, v0, t1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + v0 = count / (biL ); + t1 = count & (biL - 1); + + i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ) + count; + + if( X->n * biL < i ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, BITS_TO_LIMBS( i ) ) ); + + ret = 0; + + /* + * shift by count / limb_size + */ + if( v0 > 0 ) + { + for( i = X->n; i > v0; i-- ) + X->p[i - 1] = X->p[i - v0 - 1]; + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + X->p[i - 1] = 0; + } + + /* + * shift by count % limb_size + */ + if( t1 > 0 ) + { + for( i = v0; i < X->n; i++ ) + { + r1 = X->p[i] >> (biL - t1); + X->p[i] <<= t1; + X->p[i] |= r0; + r0 = r1; + } + } + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Right-shift: X >>= count + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count ) +{ + size_t i, v0, v1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + v0 = count / biL; + v1 = count & (biL - 1); + + if( v0 > X->n || ( v0 == X->n && v1 > 0 ) ) + return mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ); + + /* + * shift by count / limb_size + */ + if( v0 > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < X->n - v0; i++ ) + X->p[i] = X->p[i + v0]; + + for( ; i < X->n; i++ ) + X->p[i] = 0; + } + + /* + * shift by count % limb_size + */ + if( v1 > 0 ) + { + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + { + r1 = X->p[i - 1] << (biL - v1); + X->p[i - 1] >>= v1; + X->p[i - 1] |= r0; + r0 = r1; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare unsigned values + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) +{ + size_t i, j; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + if( X->p[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + for( j = Y->n; j > 0; j-- ) + if( Y->p[j - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + if( i == 0 && j == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( i > j ) return( 1 ); + if( j > i ) return( -1 ); + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + { + if( X->p[i - 1] > Y->p[i - 1] ) return( 1 ); + if( X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] ) return( -1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare signed values + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y ) +{ + size_t i, j; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + if( X->p[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + for( j = Y->n; j > 0; j-- ) + if( Y->p[j - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + if( i == 0 && j == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( i > j ) return( X->s ); + if( j > i ) return( -Y->s ); + + if( X->s > 0 && Y->s < 0 ) return( 1 ); + if( Y->s > 0 && X->s < 0 ) return( -1 ); + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + { + if( X->p[i - 1] > Y->p[i - 1] ) return( X->s ); + if( X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] ) return( -X->s ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare signed values + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi Y; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + + *p = mpi_sint_abs( z ); + Y.s = ( z < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + Y.n = 1; + Y.p = p; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( X, &Y ) ); +} + +/* + * Unsigned addition: X = |A| + |B| (HAC 14.7) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *o, *p, c, tmp; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + if( X == B ) + { + const mbedtls_mpi *T = A; A = X; B = T; + } + + if( X != A ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, A ) ); + + /* + * X should always be positive as a result of unsigned additions. + */ + X->s = 1; + + for( j = B->n; j > 0; j-- ) + if( B->p[j - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* Exit early to avoid undefined behavior on NULL+0 when X->n == 0 + * and B is 0 (of any size). */ + if( j == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, j ) ); + + o = B->p; p = X->p; c = 0; + + /* + * tmp is used because it might happen that p == o + */ + for( i = 0; i < j; i++, o++, p++ ) + { + tmp= *o; + *p += c; c = ( *p < c ); + *p += tmp; c += ( *p < tmp ); + } + + while( c != 0 ) + { + if( i >= X->n ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i + 1 ) ); + p = X->p + i; + } + + *p += c; c = ( *p < c ); i++; p++; + } + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/** + * Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction. + * + * Calculate l - r where l and r have the same size. + * This function operates modulo (2^ciL)^n and returns the carry + * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `l < r`, and 0 otherwise). + * + * d may be aliased to l or r. + * + * \param n Number of limbs of \p d, \p l and \p r. + * \param[out] d The result of the subtraction. + * \param[in] l The left operand. + * \param[in] r The right operand. + * + * \return 1 if `l < r`. + * 0 if `l >= r`. + */ +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sub_hlp( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *l, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *r ) +{ + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t, z; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + { + z = ( l[i] < c ); t = l[i] - c; + c = ( t < r[i] ) + z; d[i] = t - r[i]; + } + + return( c ); +} + +/* + * Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9, 14.10) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + for( n = B->n; n > 0; n-- ) + if( B->p[n - 1] != 0 ) + break; + if( n > A->n ) + { + /* B >= (2^ciL)^n > A */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, A->n ) ); + + /* Set the high limbs of X to match A. Don't touch the lower limbs + * because X might be aliased to B, and we must not overwrite the + * significant digits of B. */ + if( A->n > n ) + memcpy( X->p + n, A->p + n, ( A->n - n ) * ciL ); + if( X->n > A->n ) + memset( X->p + A->n, 0, ( X->n - A->n ) * ciL ); + + carry = mpi_sub_hlp( n, X->p, A->p, B->p ); + if( carry != 0 ) + { + /* Propagate the carry to the first nonzero limb of X. */ + for( ; n < X->n && X->p[n] == 0; n++ ) + --X->p[n]; + /* If we ran out of space for the carry, it means that the result + * is negative. */ + if( n == X->n ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; + goto cleanup; + } + --X->p[n]; + } + + /* X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. */ + X->s = 1; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* Common function for signed addition and subtraction. + * Calculate A + B * flip_B where flip_B is 1 or -1. + */ +static int add_sub_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, + int flip_B ) +{ + int ret, s; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + s = A->s; + if( A->s * B->s * flip_B < 0 ) + { + int cmp = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ); + if( cmp >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, A, B ) ); + /* If |A| = |B|, the result is 0 and we must set the sign bit + * to +1 regardless of which of A or B was negative. Otherwise, + * since |A| > |B|, the sign is the sign of A. */ + X->s = cmp == 0 ? 1 : s; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( X, B, A ) ); + /* Since |A| < |B|, the sign is the opposite of A. */ + X->s = -s; + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( X, A, B ) ); + X->s = s; + } + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Signed addition: X = A + B + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + return( add_sub_mpi( X, A, B, 1 ) ); +} + +/* + * Signed subtraction: X = A - B + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + return( add_sub_mpi( X, A, B, -1 ) ); +} + +/* + * Signed addition: X = A + b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi B; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + p[0] = mpi_sint_abs( b ); + B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + B.n = 1; + B.p = p; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, A, &B ) ); +} + +/* + * Signed subtraction: X = A - b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi B; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + p[0] = mpi_sint_abs( b ); + B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + B.n = 1; + B.p = p; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( X, A, &B ) ); +} + +/** Helper for mbedtls_mpi multiplication. + * + * Add \p b * \p s to \p d. + * + * \param i The number of limbs of \p s. + * \param[in] s A bignum to multiply, of size \p i. + * It may overlap with \p d, but only if + * \p d <= \p s. + * Its leading limb must not be \c 0. + * \param[in,out] d The bignum to add to. + * It must be sufficiently large to store the + * result of the multiplication. This means + * \p i + 1 limbs if \p d[\p i - 1] started as 0 and \p b + * is not known a priori. + * \param b A scalar to multiply. + */ +static +#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__arm__) +/* + * Apple LLVM version 4.2 (clang-425.0.24) (based on LLVM 3.2svn) + * appears to need this to prevent bad ARM code generation at -O3. + */ +__attribute__ ((noinline)) +#endif +void mpi_mul_hlp( size_t i, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t = 0; + +#if defined(MULADDC_HUIT) + for( ; i >= 8; i -= 8 ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_HUIT + MULADDC_STOP + } + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_STOP + } +#else /* MULADDC_HUIT */ + for( ; i >= 16; i -= 16 ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_STOP + } + + for( ; i >= 8; i -= 8 ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_STOP + } + + for( ; i > 0; i-- ) + { + MULADDC_INIT + MULADDC_CORE + MULADDC_STOP + } +#endif /* MULADDC_HUIT */ + + t++; + + while( c != 0 ) + { + *d += c; c = ( *d < c ); d++; + } +} + +/* + * Baseline multiplication: X = A * B (HAC 14.12) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j; + mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; + int result_is_zero = 0; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); + + if( X == A ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TA, A ) ); A = &TA; } + if( X == B ) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, B ) ); B = &TB; } + + for( i = A->n; i > 0; i-- ) + if( A->p[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + if( i == 0 ) + result_is_zero = 1; + + for( j = B->n; j > 0; j-- ) + if( B->p[j - 1] != 0 ) + break; + if( j == 0 ) + result_is_zero = 1; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, i + j ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + + for( ; j > 0; j-- ) + mpi_mul_hlp( i, A->p, X->p + j - 1, B->p[j - 1] ); + + /* If the result is 0, we don't shortcut the operation, which reduces + * but does not eliminate side channels leaking the zero-ness. We do + * need to take care to set the sign bit properly since the library does + * not fully support an MPI object with a value of 0 and s == -1. */ + if( result_is_zero ) + X->s = 1; + else + X->s = A->s * B->s; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Baseline multiplication: X = A * b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b ) +{ + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + /* mpi_mul_hlp can't deal with a leading 0. */ + size_t n = A->n; + while( n > 0 && A->p[n - 1] == 0 ) + --n; + + /* The general method below doesn't work if n==0 or b==0. By chance + * calculating the result is trivial in those cases. */ + if( b == 0 || n == 0 ) + { + return( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) ); + } + + /* Calculate A*b as A + A*(b-1) to take advantage of mpi_mul_hlp */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* In general, A * b requires 1 limb more than b. If + * A->p[n - 1] * b / b == A->p[n - 1], then A * b fits in the same + * number of limbs as A and the call to grow() is not required since + * copy() will take care of the growth if needed. However, experimentally, + * making the call to grow() unconditional causes slightly fewer + * calls to calloc() in ECP code, presumably because it reuses the + * same mpi for a while and this way the mpi is more likely to directly + * grow to its final size. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, n + 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, A ) ); + mpi_mul_hlp( n, A->p, X->p, b - 1 ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Unsigned integer divide - double mbedtls_mpi_uint dividend, u1/u0, and + * mbedtls_mpi_uint divisor, d + */ +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_int_div_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint u1, + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, mbedtls_mpi_uint d, mbedtls_mpi_uint *r ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) + mbedtls_t_udbl dividend, quotient; +#else + const mbedtls_mpi_uint radix = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << biH; + const mbedtls_mpi_uint uint_halfword_mask = ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << biH ) - 1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint d0, d1, q0, q1, rAX, r0, quotient; + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0_msw, u0_lsw; + size_t s; +#endif + + /* + * Check for overflow + */ + if( 0 == d || u1 >= d ) + { + if (r != NULL) *r = ~0; + + return ( ~0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) + dividend = (mbedtls_t_udbl) u1 << biL; + dividend |= (mbedtls_t_udbl) u0; + quotient = dividend / d; + if( quotient > ( (mbedtls_t_udbl) 1 << biL ) - 1 ) + quotient = ( (mbedtls_t_udbl) 1 << biL ) - 1; + + if( r != NULL ) + *r = (mbedtls_mpi_uint)( dividend - (quotient * d ) ); + + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) quotient; +#else + + /* + * Algorithm D, Section 4.3.1 - The Art of Computer Programming + * Vol. 2 - Seminumerical Algorithms, Knuth + */ + + /* + * Normalize the divisor, d, and dividend, u0, u1 + */ + s = mbedtls_clz( d ); + d = d << s; + + u1 = u1 << s; + u1 |= ( u0 >> ( biL - s ) ) & ( -(mbedtls_mpi_sint)s >> ( biL - 1 ) ); + u0 = u0 << s; + + d1 = d >> biH; + d0 = d & uint_halfword_mask; + + u0_msw = u0 >> biH; + u0_lsw = u0 & uint_halfword_mask; + + /* + * Find the first quotient and remainder + */ + q1 = u1 / d1; + r0 = u1 - d1 * q1; + + while( q1 >= radix || ( q1 * d0 > radix * r0 + u0_msw ) ) + { + q1 -= 1; + r0 += d1; + + if ( r0 >= radix ) break; + } + + rAX = ( u1 * radix ) + ( u0_msw - q1 * d ); + q0 = rAX / d1; + r0 = rAX - q0 * d1; + + while( q0 >= radix || ( q0 * d0 > radix * r0 + u0_lsw ) ) + { + q0 -= 1; + r0 += d1; + + if ( r0 >= radix ) break; + } + + if (r != NULL) + *r = ( rAX * radix + u0_lsw - q0 * d ) >> s; + + quotient = q1 * radix + q0; + + return quotient; +#endif +} + +/* + * Division by mbedtls_mpi: A = Q * B + R (HAC 14.20) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, n, t, k; + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, T1, T2; + mbedtls_mpi_uint TP2[3]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( B, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); + /* + * Avoid dynamic memory allocations for constant-size T2. + * + * T2 is used for comparison only and the 3 limbs are assigned explicitly, + * so nobody increase the size of the MPI and we're safe to use an on-stack + * buffer. + */ + T2.s = 1; + T2.n = sizeof( TP2 ) / sizeof( *TP2 ); + T2.p = TP2; + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs( A, B ) < 0 ) + { + if( Q != NULL ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( Q, 0 ) ); + if( R != NULL ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( R, A ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &X, A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Y, B ) ); + X.s = Y.s = 1; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &Z, A->n + 2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &Z, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T1, A->n + 2 ) ); + + k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &Y ) % biL; + if( k < biL - 1 ) + { + k = biL - 1 - k; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &X, k ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &Y, k ) ); + } + else k = 0; + + n = X.n - 1; + t = Y.n - 1; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &Y, biL * ( n - t ) ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &Y ) >= 0 ) + { + Z.p[n - t]++; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &Y ) ); + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Y, biL * ( n - t ) ) ); + + for( i = n; i > t ; i-- ) + { + if( X.p[i] >= Y.p[t] ) + Z.p[i - t - 1] = ~0; + else + { + Z.p[i - t - 1] = mbedtls_int_div_int( X.p[i], X.p[i - 1], + Y.p[t], NULL); + } + + T2.p[0] = ( i < 2 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 2]; + T2.p[1] = ( i < 1 ) ? 0 : X.p[i - 1]; + T2.p[2] = X.p[i]; + + Z.p[i - t - 1]++; + do + { + Z.p[i - t - 1]--; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &T1, 0 ) ); + T1.p[0] = ( t < 1 ) ? 0 : Y.p[t - 1]; + T1.p[1] = Y.p[t]; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T1, &T1, Z.p[i - t - 1] ) ); + } + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T1, &T2 ) > 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &T1, &Y, Z.p[i - t - 1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &T1, biL * ( i - t - 1 ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &X, &X, &T1 ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &X, 0 ) < 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &T1, &Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &T1, biL * ( i - t - 1 ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &X, &X, &T1 ) ); + Z.p[i - t - 1]--; + } + } + + if( Q != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( Q, &Z ) ); + Q->s = A->s * B->s; + } + + if( R != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &X, k ) ); + X.s = A->s; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( R, &X ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( R, 0 ) == 0 ) + R->s = 1; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( TP2, sizeof( TP2 ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Division by int: A = Q * b + R + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_div_int( mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi B; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + p[0] = mpi_sint_abs( b ); + B.s = ( b < 0 ) ? -1 : 1; + B.n = 1; + B.p = p; + + return( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( Q, R, A, &B ) ); +} + +/* + * Modulo: R = A mod B + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( B, 0 ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( NULL, R, A, B ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( R, 0 ) < 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( R, R, B ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( R, B ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( R, R, B ) ); + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Modulo: r = A mod b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b ) +{ + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint x, y, z; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + + if( b == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO ); + + if( b < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE ); + + /* + * handle trivial cases + */ + if( b == 1 || A->n == 0 ) + { + *r = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + if( b == 2 ) + { + *r = A->p[0] & 1; + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * general case + */ + for( i = A->n, y = 0; i > 0; i-- ) + { + x = A->p[i - 1]; + y = ( y << biH ) | ( x >> biH ); + z = y / b; + y -= z * b; + + x <<= biH; + y = ( y << biH ) | ( x >> biH ); + z = y / b; + y -= z * b; + } + + /* + * If A is negative, then the current y represents a negative value. + * Flipping it to the positive side. + */ + if( A->s < 0 && y != 0 ) + y = b - y; + + *r = y; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Fast Montgomery initialization (thanks to Tom St Denis) + */ +static void mpi_montg_init( mbedtls_mpi_uint *mm, const mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint x, m0 = N->p[0]; + unsigned int i; + + x = m0; + x += ( ( m0 + 2 ) & 4 ) << 1; + + for( i = biL; i >= 8; i /= 2 ) + x *= ( 2 - ( m0 * x ) ); + + *mm = ~x + 1; +} + +/** Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) + * + * \param[in,out] A One of the numbers to multiply. + * It must have at least as many limbs as N + * (A->n >= N->n), and any limbs beyond n are ignored. + * On successful completion, A contains the result of + * the multiplication A * B * R^-1 mod N where + * R = (2^ciL)^n. + * \param[in] B One of the numbers to multiply. + * It must be nonzero and must not have more limbs than N + * (B->n <= N->n). + * \param[in] N The modulo. N must be odd. + * \param mm The value calculated by `mpi_montg_init(&mm, N)`. + * This is -N^-1 mod 2^ciL. + * \param[in,out] T A bignum for temporary storage. + * It must be at least twice the limb size of N plus 2 + * (T->n >= 2 * (N->n + 1)). + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * Note that unlike the usual convention in the library + * for `const mbedtls_mpi*`, the content of T can change. + */ +static void mpi_montmul( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + const mbedtls_mpi *T ) +{ + size_t i, n, m; + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, u1, *d; + + memset( T->p, 0, T->n * ciL ); + + d = T->p; + n = N->n; + m = ( B->n < n ) ? B->n : n; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + { + /* + * T = (T + u0*B + u1*N) / 2^biL + */ + u0 = A->p[i]; + u1 = ( d[0] + u0 * B->p[0] ) * mm; + + mpi_mul_hlp( m, B->p, d, u0 ); + mpi_mul_hlp( n, N->p, d, u1 ); + + *d++ = u0; d[n + 1] = 0; + } + + /* At this point, d is either the desired result or the desired result + * plus N. We now potentially subtract N, avoiding leaking whether the + * subtraction is performed through side channels. */ + + /* Copy the n least significant limbs of d to A, so that + * A = d if d < N (recall that N has n limbs). */ + memcpy( A->p, d, n * ciL ); + /* If d >= N then we want to set A to d - N. To prevent timing attacks, + * do the calculation without using conditional tests. */ + /* Set d to d0 + (2^biL)^n - N where d0 is the current value of d. */ + d[n] += 1; + d[n] -= mpi_sub_hlp( n, d, d, N->p ); + /* If d0 < N then d < (2^biL)^n + * so d[n] == 0 and we want to keep A as it is. + * If d0 >= N then d >= (2^biL)^n, and d <= (2^biL)^n + N < 2 * (2^biL)^n + * so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction + * which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d. + * This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */ + mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n] ); +} + +/* + * Montgomery reduction: A = A * R^-1 mod N + * + * See mpi_montmul() regarding constraints and guarantees on the parameters. + */ +static void mpi_montred( mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint z = 1; + mbedtls_mpi U; + + U.n = U.s = (int) z; + U.p = &z; + + mpi_montmul( A, &U, N, mm, T ); +} + +/** + * Select an MPI from a table without leaking the index. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to mbedtls_mpi_copy(R, T[idx]) except it + * reads the entire table in order to avoid leaking the value of idx to an + * attacker able to observe memory access patterns. + * + * \param[out] R Where to write the selected MPI. + * \param[in] T The table to read from. + * \param[in] T_size The number of elements in the table. + * \param[in] idx The index of the element to select; + * this must satisfy 0 <= idx < T_size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, or a negative error code. + */ +static int mpi_select( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *T, size_t T_size, size_t idx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + for( size_t i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( R, &T[i], + (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( i, idx ) ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N (HAC 14.85) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t window_bitsize; + size_t i, j, nblimbs; + size_t bufsize, nbits; + mbedtls_mpi_uint ei, mm, state; + mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[ (size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ], WW, Apos; + int neg; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( E != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( N != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) <= 0 || ( N->p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 0 ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( E ) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Init temps and window size + */ + mpi_montg_init( &mm, N ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Apos ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &WW ); + memset( W, 0, sizeof( W ) ); + + i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( E ); + + window_bitsize = ( i > 671 ) ? 6 : ( i > 239 ) ? 5 : + ( i > 79 ) ? 4 : ( i > 23 ) ? 3 : 1; + +#if( MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE < 6 ) + if( window_bitsize > MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) + window_bitsize = MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE; +#endif + + const size_t w_table_used_size = (size_t) 1 << window_bitsize; + + /* + * This function is not constant-trace: its memory accesses depend on the + * exponent value. To defend against timing attacks, callers (such as RSA + * and DHM) should use exponent blinding. However this is not enough if the + * adversary can find the exponent in a single trace, so this function + * takes extra precautions against adversaries who can observe memory + * access patterns. + * + * This function performs a series of multiplications by table elements and + * squarings, and we want the prevent the adversary from finding out which + * table element was used, and from distinguishing between multiplications + * and squarings. Firstly, when multiplying by an element of the window + * W[i], we do a constant-trace table lookup to obfuscate i. This leaves + * squarings as having a different memory access patterns from other + * multiplications. So secondly, we put the accumulator X in the table as + * well, and also do a constant-trace table lookup to multiply by X. + * + * This way, all multiplications take the form of a lookup-and-multiply. + * The number of lookup-and-multiply operations inside each iteration of + * the main loop still depends on the bits of the exponent, but since the + * other operations in the loop don't have an easily recognizable memory + * trace, an adversary is unlikely to be able to observe the exact + * patterns. + * + * An adversary may still be able to recover the exponent if they can + * observe both memory accesses and branches. However, branch prediction + * exploitation typically requires many traces of execution over the same + * data, which is defeated by randomized blinding. + * + * To achieve this, we make a copy of X and we use the table entry in each + * calculation from this point on. + */ + const size_t x_index = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &W[x_index] ); + mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[x_index], X ); + + j = N->n + 1; + /* All W[i] and X must have at least N->n limbs for the mpi_montmul() + * and mpi_montred() calls later. Here we ensure that W[1] and X are + * large enough, and later we'll grow other W[i] to the same length. + * They must not be shrunk midway through this function! + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[x_index], j ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], j ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &T, j * 2 ) ); + + /* + * Compensate for negative A (and correct at the end) + */ + neg = ( A->s == -1 ); + if( neg ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Apos, A ) ); + Apos.s = 1; + A = &Apos; + } + + /* + * If 1st call, pre-compute R^2 mod N + */ + if( prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &RR, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &RR, N->n * 2 * biL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &RR, &RR, N ) ); + + if( prec_RR != NULL ) + memcpy( prec_RR, &RR, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); + } + else + memcpy( &RR, prec_RR, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ); + + /* + * W[1] = A * R^2 * R^-1 mod N = A * R mod N + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( A, N ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &W[1], A, N ) ); + /* This should be a no-op because W[1] is already that large before + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(), but it's necessary to avoid an overflow + * in mpi_montmul() below, so let's make sure. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[1], N->n + 1 ) ); + } + else + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[1], A ) ); + + /* Note that this is safe because W[1] always has at least N->n limbs + * (it grew above and was preserved by mbedtls_mpi_copy()). */ + mpi_montmul( &W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T ); + + /* + * W[x_index] = R^2 * R^-1 mod N = R mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[x_index], &RR ) ); + mpi_montred( &W[x_index], N, mm, &T ); + + + if( window_bitsize > 1 ) + { + /* + * W[i] = W[1] ^ i + * + * The first bit of the sliding window is always 1 and therefore we + * only need to store the second half of the table. + * + * (There are two special elements in the table: W[0] for the + * accumulator/result and W[1] for A in Montgomery form. Both of these + * are already set at this point.) + */ + j = w_table_used_size / 2; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[j], N->n + 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[j], &W[1] ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < window_bitsize - 1; i++ ) + mpi_montmul( &W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T ); + + /* + * W[i] = W[i - 1] * W[1] + */ + for( i = j + 1; i < w_table_used_size; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &W[i], N->n + 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &W[i], &W[i - 1] ) ); + + mpi_montmul( &W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T ); + } + } + + nblimbs = E->n; + bufsize = 0; + nbits = 0; + size_t exponent_bits_in_window = 0; + state = 0; + + while( 1 ) + { + if( bufsize == 0 ) + { + if( nblimbs == 0 ) + break; + + nblimbs--; + + bufsize = sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) << 3; + } + + bufsize--; + + ei = (E->p[nblimbs] >> bufsize) & 1; + + /* + * skip leading 0s + */ + if( ei == 0 && state == 0 ) + continue; + + if( ei == 0 && state == 1 ) + { + /* + * out of window, square W[x_index] + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, w_table_used_size, x_index ) ); + mpi_montmul( &W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T ); + continue; + } + + /* + * add ei to current window + */ + state = 2; + + nbits++; + exponent_bits_in_window |= ( ei << ( window_bitsize - nbits ) ); + + if( nbits == window_bitsize ) + { + /* + * W[x_index] = W[x_index]^window_bitsize R^-1 mod N + */ + for( i = 0; i < window_bitsize; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, w_table_used_size, + x_index ) ); + mpi_montmul( &W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T ); + } + + /* + * W[x_index] = W[x_index] * W[exponent_bits_in_window] R^-1 mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, w_table_used_size, + exponent_bits_in_window ) ); + mpi_montmul( &W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T ); + + state--; + nbits = 0; + exponent_bits_in_window = 0; + } + } + + /* + * process the remaining bits + */ + for( i = 0; i < nbits; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, w_table_used_size, x_index ) ); + mpi_montmul( &W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T ); + + exponent_bits_in_window <<= 1; + + if( ( exponent_bits_in_window & ( (size_t) 1 << window_bitsize ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_select( &WW, W, w_table_used_size, 1 ) ); + mpi_montmul( &W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T ); + } + } + + /* + * W[x_index] = A^E * R * R^-1 mod N = A^E mod N + */ + mpi_montred( &W[x_index], N, mm, &T ); + + if( neg && E->n != 0 && ( E->p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) + { + W[x_index].s = -1; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &W[x_index], N, &W[x_index] ) ); + } + + /* + * Load the result in the output variable. + */ + mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &W[x_index] ); + +cleanup: + + /* The first bit of the sliding window is always 1 and therefore the first + * half of the table was unused. */ + for( i = w_table_used_size/2; i < w_table_used_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[i] ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[x_index] ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &W[1] ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Apos ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &WW ); + + if( prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B) (HAC 14.54) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t lz, lzt; + mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( B != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TA, A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, B ) ); + + lz = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TA ); + lzt = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TB ); + + /* The loop below gives the correct result when A==0 but not when B==0. + * So have a special case for B==0. Leverage the fact that we just + * calculated the lsb and lsb(B)==0 iff B is odd or 0 to make the test + * slightly more efficient than cmp_int(). */ + if( lzt == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &TB, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( G, A ); + goto cleanup; + } + + if( lzt < lz ) + lz = lzt; + + TA.s = TB.s = 1; + + /* We mostly follow the procedure described in HAC 14.54, but with some + * minor differences: + * - Sequences of multiplications or divisions by 2 are grouped into a + * single shift operation. + * - The procedure in HAC assumes that 0 < TB <= TA. + * - The condition TB <= TA is not actually necessary for correctness. + * TA and TB have symmetric roles except for the loop termination + * condition, and the shifts at the beginning of the loop body + * remove any significance from the ordering of TA vs TB before + * the shifts. + * - If TA = 0, the loop goes through 0 iterations and the result is + * correctly TB. + * - The case TB = 0 was short-circuited above. + * + * For the correctness proof below, decompose the original values of + * A and B as + * A = sa * 2^a * A' with A'=0 or A' odd, and sa = +-1 + * B = sb * 2^b * B' with B'=0 or B' odd, and sb = +-1 + * Then gcd(A, B) = 2^{min(a,b)} * gcd(A',B'), + * and gcd(A',B') is odd or 0. + * + * At the beginning, we have TA = |A| and TB = |B| so gcd(A,B) = gcd(TA,TB). + * The code maintains the following invariant: + * gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k (I) + */ + + /* Proof that the loop terminates: + * At each iteration, either the right-shift by 1 is made on a nonzero + * value and the nonnegative integer bitlen(TA) + bitlen(TB) decreases + * by at least 1, or the right-shift by 1 is made on zero and then + * TA becomes 0 which ends the loop (TB cannot be 0 if it is right-shifted + * since in that case TB is calculated from TB-TA with the condition TB>TA). + */ + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &TA, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + /* Divisions by 2 preserve the invariant (I). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TA, mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TA ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TB, mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &TB ) ) ); + + /* Set either TA or TB to |TA-TB|/2. Since TA and TB are both odd, + * TA-TB is even so the division by 2 has an integer result. + * Invariant (I) is preserved since any odd divisor of both TA and TB + * also divides |TA-TB|/2, and any odd divisor of both TA and |TA-TB|/2 + * also divides TB, and any odd divisor of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also + * divides TA. + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &TA, &TB ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &TA, &TA, &TB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TA, 1 ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &TB, &TB, &TA ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TB, 1 ) ); + } + /* Note that one of TA or TB is still odd. */ + } + + /* By invariant (I), gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k. + * At the loop exit, TA = 0, so gcd(TA,TB) = TB. + * - If there was at least one loop iteration, then one of TA or TB is odd, + * and TA = 0, so TB is odd and gcd(TA,TB) = gcd(A',B'). In this case, + * lz = min(a,b) so gcd(A,B) = 2^lz * TB. + * - If there was no loop iteration, then A was 0, and gcd(A,B) = B. + * In this case, lz = 0 and B = TB so gcd(A,B) = B = 2^lz * TB as well. + */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &TB, lz ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( G, &TB ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes. + * X must already have room for those bytes. + * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for + * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and mbedtls_mpi_random()). + * The size and sign of X are unchanged. + * n_bytes must not be 0. + */ +static int mpi_fill_random_internal( + mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t n_bytes, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( n_bytes ); + const size_t overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - n_bytes; + + if( X->n < limbs ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( X->p, 0, overhead ); + memset( (unsigned char *) X->p + limbs * ciL, 0, ( X->n - limbs ) * ciL ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, (unsigned char *) X->p + overhead, n_bytes ) ); + mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Fill X with size bytes of random. + * + * Use a temporary bytes representation to make sure the result is the same + * regardless of the platform endianness (useful when f_rng is actually + * deterministic, eg for tests). + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( size ); + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) ); + if( size == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + ret = mpi_fill_random_internal( X, size, f_rng, p_rng ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi_sint min, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + int count; + unsigned lt_lower = 1, lt_upper = 0; + size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ); + size_t n_bytes = ( n_bits + 7 ) / 8; + mbedtls_mpi lower_bound; + + if( min < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, min ) <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing + * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will + * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). + * + * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating + * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with + * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2, + * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has + * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2. + * + * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible + * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but + * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N + * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of + * failure is macroscopic. + */ + count = ( n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250 ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &lower_bound ); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the same number of limbs + * as the upper bound, even if the upper bound has leading zeros. + * This is necessary for the mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct() check. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, N->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( &lower_bound, N->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &lower_bound, min ) ); + + /* + * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG: + * - use the same byte ordering; + * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string; + * - try until result is in the desired range. + * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA. + */ + do + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random_internal( X, n_bytes, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits ) ); + + if( --count == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, &lower_bound, <_lower ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, N, <_upper ) ); + } + while( lt_lower != 0 || lt_upper == 0 ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &lower_bound ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Modular inverse: X = A^-1 mod N (HAC 14.61 / 14.64) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( A != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( N != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 1 ) <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TU ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TV ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &V1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &V2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, A, N ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &TA, A, N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TU, &TA ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TB, N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &TV, N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &U1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &U2, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &V1, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &V2, 1 ) ); + + do + { + while( ( TU.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TU, 1 ) ); + + if( ( U1.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 || ( U2.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &U1, &U1, &TB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U2, &U2, &TA ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &U1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &U2, 1 ) ); + } + + while( ( TV.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &TV, 1 ) ); + + if( ( V1.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 || ( V2.p[0] & 1 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &V1, &V1, &TB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V2, &V2, &TA ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &V1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &V2, 1 ) ); + } + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &TU, &TV ) >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &TU, &TU, &TV ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U1, &U1, &V1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &U2, &U2, &V2 ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &TV, &TV, &TU ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V1, &V1, &U1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V2, &V2, &U2 ) ); + } + } + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &TU, 0 ) != 0 ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &V1, 0 ) < 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &V1, &V1, N ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &V1, N ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &V1, &V1, N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, &V1 ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TU ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &G ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TV ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &V1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &V2 ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + +static const int small_prime[] = +{ + 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, + 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, + 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, + 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, + 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, + 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, + 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263, 269, + 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, + 317, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, + 373, 379, 383, 389, 397, 401, 409, 419, + 421, 431, 433, 439, 443, 449, 457, 461, + 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503, 509, + 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, + 577, 587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613, 617, + 619, 631, 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, + 673, 677, 683, 691, 701, 709, 719, 727, + 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 769, 773, + 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827, 829, + 839, 853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, + 887, 907, 911, 919, 929, 937, 941, 947, + 953, 967, 971, 977, 983, 991, 997, -103 +}; + +/* + * Small divisors test (X must be positive) + * + * Return values: + * 0: no small factor (possible prime, more tests needed) + * 1: certain prime + * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: certain non-prime + * other negative: error + */ +static int mpi_check_small_factors( const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + + if( ( X->p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + + for( i = 0; small_prime[i] > 0; i++ ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, small_prime[i] ) <= 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, small_prime[i] ) ); + + if( r == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Miller-Rabin pseudo-primality test (HAC 4.24) + */ +static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret, count; + size_t i, j, k, s; + mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &RR ); + + /* + * W = |X| - 1 + * R = W >> lsb( W ) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &W, X, 1 ) ); + s = mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &W ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R, &W ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &R, s ) ); + + for( i = 0; i < rounds; i++ ) + { + /* + * pick a random A, 1 < A < |X| - 1 + */ + count = 0; + do { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &A, X->n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + j = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &A ); + k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &W ); + if (j > k) { + A.p[A.n - 1] &= ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << ( k - ( A.n - 1 ) * biL - 1 ) ) - 1; + } + + if (count++ > 30) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + } while ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) <= 0 ); + + /* + * A = A^R mod |X| + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &A, &A, &R, X, &RR ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) == 0 ) + continue; + + j = 1; + while( j < s && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) != 0 ) + { + /* + * A = A * A mod |X| + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &A, &A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &A, &T, X ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) == 0 ) + break; + + j++; + } + + /* + * not prime if A != |X| - 1 or A == 1 + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, 1 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + break; + } + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &RR ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Pseudo-primality test: small factors, then Miller-Rabin + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi XX; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + XX.s = 1; + XX.n = X->n; + XX.p = X->p; + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XX, 0 ) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XX, 1 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XX, 2 ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( &XX ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == 1 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ret ); + } + + return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/* + * Pseudo-primality test, error probability 2^-80 + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + /* + * In the past our key generation aimed for an error rate of at most + * 2^-80. Since this function is deprecated, aim for the same certainty + * here as well. + */ + return( mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, 40, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} +#endif + +/* + * Prime number generation + * + * To generate an RSA key in a way recommended by FIPS 186-4, both primes must + * be either 1024 bits or 1536 bits long, and flags must contain + * MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 +// ceil(2^63.5) +#define CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 0xb504f333f9de6485ULL +#else +// ceil(2^31.5) +#define CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 0xb504f334U +#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + size_t k, n; + int rounds; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + mbedtls_mpi Y; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + if( nbits < 3 || nbits > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); + + n = BITS_TO_LIMBS( nbits ); + + if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR ) == 0 ) + { + /* + * 2^-80 error probability, number of rounds chosen per HAC, table 4.4 + */ + rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1300 ) ? 2 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 3 : + ( nbits >= 650 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 350 ) ? 8 : + ( nbits >= 250 ) ? 12 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 18 : 27 ); + } + else + { + /* + * 2^-100 error probability, number of rounds computed based on HAC, + * fact 4.48 + */ + rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1450 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 1150 ) ? 5 : + ( nbits >= 1000 ) ? 6 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 7 : + ( nbits >= 750 ) ? 8 : ( nbits >= 500 ) ? 13 : + ( nbits >= 250 ) ? 28 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 40 : 51 ); + } + + while( 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( X, n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + /* make sure generated number is at least (nbits-1)+0.5 bits (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 steps 4.4, 5.5) */ + if( X->p[n-1] < CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 ) continue; + + k = n * biL; + if( k > nbits ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, k - nbits ) ); + X->p[0] |= 1; + + if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH ) == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ); + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + /* + * A necessary condition for Y and X = 2Y + 1 to be prime + * is X = 2 mod 3 (which is equivalent to Y = 2 mod 3). + * Make sure it is satisfied, while keeping X = 3 mod 4 + */ + + X->p[0] |= 2; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_int( &r, X, 3 ) ); + if( r == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, X, 8 ) ); + else if( r == 1 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, X, 4 ) ); + + /* Set Y = (X-1) / 2, which is X / 2 because X is odd */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Y, X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Y, 1 ) ); + + while( 1 ) + { + /* + * First, check small factors for X and Y + * before doing Miller-Rabin on any of them + */ + if( ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( X ) ) == 0 && + ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( &Y ) ) == 0 && + ( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ) + == 0 && + ( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( &Y, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) ) + == 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Next candidates. We want to preserve Y = (X-1) / 2 and + * Y = 1 mod 2 and Y = 2 mod 3 (eq X = 3 mod 4 and X = 2 mod 3) + * so up Y by 6 and X by 12. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( X, X, 12 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &Y, &Y, 6 ) ); + } + } + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#define GCD_PAIR_COUNT 3 + +static const int gcd_pairs[GCD_PAIR_COUNT][3] = +{ + { 693, 609, 21 }, + { 1764, 868, 28 }, + { 768454923, 542167814, 1 } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret, i; + mbedtls_mpi A, E, N, X, Y, U, V; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &V ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &A, 16, + "EFE021C2645FD1DC586E69184AF4A31E" \ + "D5F53E93B5F123FA41680867BA110131" \ + "944FE7952E2517337780CB0DB80E61AA" \ + "E7C8DDC6C5C6AADEB34EB38A2F40D5E6" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &E, 16, + "B2E7EFD37075B9F03FF989C7C5051C20" \ + "34D2A323810251127E7BF8625A4F49A5" \ + "F3E27F4DA8BD59C47D6DAABA4C8127BD" \ + "5B5C25763222FEFCCFC38B832366C29E" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &N, 16, + "0066A198186C18C10B2F5ED9B522752A" \ + "9830B69916E535C8F047518A889A43A5" \ + "94B6BED27A168D31D4A52F88925AA8F5" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &X, &A, &N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, + "602AB7ECA597A3D6B56FF9829A5E8B85" \ + "9E857EA95A03512E2BAE7391688D264A" \ + "A5663B0341DB9CCFD2C4C5F421FEC814" \ + "8001B72E848A38CAE1C65F78E56ABDEF" \ + "E12D3C039B8A02D6BE593F0BBBDA56F1" \ + "ECF677152EF804370C1A305CAF3B5BF1" \ + "30879B56C61DE584A0F53A2447A51E" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #1 (mul_mpi): " ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &X, &Y, &A, &N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, + "256567336059E52CAE22925474705F39A94" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &V, 16, + "6613F26162223DF488E9CD48CC132C7A" \ + "0AC93C701B001B092E4E5B9F73BCD27B" \ + "9EE50D0657C77F374E903CDFA4C642" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #2 (div_mpi): " ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Y, &V ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &X, &A, &E, &N, NULL ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, + "36E139AEA55215609D2816998ED020BB" \ + "BD96C37890F65171D948E9BC7CBAA4D9" \ + "325D24D6A3C12710F10A09FA08AB87" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #3 (exp_mod): " ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &X, &A, &N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &U, 16, + "003A0AAEDD7E784FC07D8F9EC6E3BFD5" \ + "C3DBA76456363A10869622EAC2DD84EC" \ + "C5B8A74DAC4D09E03B5E0BE779F2DF61" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #4 (inv_mod): " ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &X, &U ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MPI test #5 (simple gcd): " ); + + for( i = 0; i < GCD_PAIR_COUNT; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &X, gcd_pairs[i][0] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &Y, gcd_pairs[i][1] ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &A, &X, &Y ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &A, gcd_pairs[i][2] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed at %d\n", i ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +cleanup: + + if( ret != 0 && verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &N ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &V ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/blowfish.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/blowfish.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..621e9f76 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/blowfish.c @@ -0,0 +1,667 @@ +/* + * Blowfish implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The Blowfish block cipher was designed by Bruce Schneier in 1993. + * http://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html + * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowfish_%28cipher%29 + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) + +#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define BLOWFISH_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +static const uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2] = { + 0x243F6A88L, 0x85A308D3L, 0x13198A2EL, 0x03707344L, + 0xA4093822L, 0x299F31D0L, 0x082EFA98L, 0xEC4E6C89L, + 0x452821E6L, 0x38D01377L, 0xBE5466CFL, 0x34E90C6CL, + 0xC0AC29B7L, 0xC97C50DDL, 0x3F84D5B5L, 0xB5470917L, + 0x9216D5D9L, 0x8979FB1BL +}; + +/* declarations of data at the end of this file */ +static const uint32_t S[4][256]; + +static uint32_t F( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t x ) +{ + unsigned short a, b, c, d; + uint32_t y; + + d = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); + x >>= 8; + c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); + x >>= 8; + b = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); + x >>= 8; + a = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ); + y = ctx->S[0][a] + ctx->S[1][b]; + y = y ^ ctx->S[2][c]; + y = y + ctx->S[3][d]; + + return( y ); +} + +static void blowfish_enc( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr ) +{ + uint32_t Xl, Xr, temp; + short i; + + Xl = *xl; + Xr = *xr; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS; ++i ) + { + Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[i]; + Xr = F( ctx, Xl ) ^ Xr; + + temp = Xl; + Xl = Xr; + Xr = temp; + } + + temp = Xl; + Xl = Xr; + Xr = temp; + + Xr = Xr ^ ctx->P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS]; + Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 1]; + + *xl = Xl; + *xr = Xr; +} + +static void blowfish_dec( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr ) +{ + uint32_t Xl, Xr, temp; + short i; + + Xl = *xl; + Xr = *xr; + + for( i = MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 1; i > 1; --i ) + { + Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[i]; + Xr = F( ctx, Xl ) ^ Xr; + + temp = Xl; + Xl = Xr; + Xr = temp; + } + + temp = Xl; + Xl = Xr; + Xr = temp; + + Xr = Xr ^ ctx->P[1]; + Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[0]; + + *xl = Xl; + *xr = Xr; +} + +void mbedtls_blowfish_init( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ) +{ + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_blowfish_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_blowfish_free( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_blowfish_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Blowfish key schedule + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + unsigned int i, j, k; + uint32_t data, datal, datar; + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + if( keybits < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS || + keybits > MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS || + keybits % 8 != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + keybits >>= 3; + + for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) + { + for( j = 0; j < 256; j++ ) + ctx->S[i][j] = S[i][j]; + } + + j = 0; + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; ++i ) + { + data = 0x00000000; + for( k = 0; k < 4; ++k ) + { + data = ( data << 8 ) | key[j++]; + if( j >= keybits ) + j = 0; + } + ctx->P[i] = P[i] ^ data; + } + + datal = 0x00000000; + datar = 0x00000000; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; i += 2 ) + { + blowfish_enc( ctx, &datal, &datar ); + ctx->P[i] = datal; + ctx->P[i + 1] = datar; + } + + for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) + { + for( j = 0; j < 256; j += 2 ) + { + blowfish_enc( ctx, &datal, &datar ); + ctx->S[i][j] = datal; + ctx->S[i][j + 1] = datar; + } + } + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Blowfish-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE] ) +{ + uint32_t X0, X1; + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + X0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + X1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ) + { + blowfish_dec( ctx, &X0, &X1 ); + } + else /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT */ + { + blowfish_enc( ctx, &X0, &X1 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X0, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X1, output, 4 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * Blowfish-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE]; + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + if( length % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE ); + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ); + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE;i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE ); + + input += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + output += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + length -= MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + else + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output ); + memcpy( iv, output, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE ); + + input += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + output += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + length -= MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * Blowfish CFB buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c; + size_t n; + + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + if( n >= 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ iv[n] ); + iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; + + n = ( n + 1 ) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + else + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + + iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + + *iv_off = n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * Blowfish CTR buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c, i; + size_t n; + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + n = *nc_off; + if( n >= 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) { + mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, + stream_block ); + + for( i = MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + } + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ stream_block[n] ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; + } + + *nc_off = n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +static const uint32_t S[4][256] = { + { 0xD1310BA6L, 0x98DFB5ACL, 0x2FFD72DBL, 0xD01ADFB7L, + 0xB8E1AFEDL, 0x6A267E96L, 0xBA7C9045L, 0xF12C7F99L, + 0x24A19947L, 0xB3916CF7L, 0x0801F2E2L, 0x858EFC16L, + 0x636920D8L, 0x71574E69L, 0xA458FEA3L, 0xF4933D7EL, + 0x0D95748FL, 0x728EB658L, 0x718BCD58L, 0x82154AEEL, + 0x7B54A41DL, 0xC25A59B5L, 0x9C30D539L, 0x2AF26013L, + 0xC5D1B023L, 0x286085F0L, 0xCA417918L, 0xB8DB38EFL, + 0x8E79DCB0L, 0x603A180EL, 0x6C9E0E8BL, 0xB01E8A3EL, + 0xD71577C1L, 0xBD314B27L, 0x78AF2FDAL, 0x55605C60L, + 0xE65525F3L, 0xAA55AB94L, 0x57489862L, 0x63E81440L, + 0x55CA396AL, 0x2AAB10B6L, 0xB4CC5C34L, 0x1141E8CEL, + 0xA15486AFL, 0x7C72E993L, 0xB3EE1411L, 0x636FBC2AL, + 0x2BA9C55DL, 0x741831F6L, 0xCE5C3E16L, 0x9B87931EL, + 0xAFD6BA33L, 0x6C24CF5CL, 0x7A325381L, 0x28958677L, + 0x3B8F4898L, 0x6B4BB9AFL, 0xC4BFE81BL, 0x66282193L, + 0x61D809CCL, 0xFB21A991L, 0x487CAC60L, 0x5DEC8032L, + 0xEF845D5DL, 0xE98575B1L, 0xDC262302L, 0xEB651B88L, + 0x23893E81L, 0xD396ACC5L, 0x0F6D6FF3L, 0x83F44239L, + 0x2E0B4482L, 0xA4842004L, 0x69C8F04AL, 0x9E1F9B5EL, + 0x21C66842L, 0xF6E96C9AL, 0x670C9C61L, 0xABD388F0L, + 0x6A51A0D2L, 0xD8542F68L, 0x960FA728L, 0xAB5133A3L, + 0x6EEF0B6CL, 0x137A3BE4L, 0xBA3BF050L, 0x7EFB2A98L, + 0xA1F1651DL, 0x39AF0176L, 0x66CA593EL, 0x82430E88L, + 0x8CEE8619L, 0x456F9FB4L, 0x7D84A5C3L, 0x3B8B5EBEL, + 0xE06F75D8L, 0x85C12073L, 0x401A449FL, 0x56C16AA6L, + 0x4ED3AA62L, 0x363F7706L, 0x1BFEDF72L, 0x429B023DL, + 0x37D0D724L, 0xD00A1248L, 0xDB0FEAD3L, 0x49F1C09BL, + 0x075372C9L, 0x80991B7BL, 0x25D479D8L, 0xF6E8DEF7L, + 0xE3FE501AL, 0xB6794C3BL, 0x976CE0BDL, 0x04C006BAL, + 0xC1A94FB6L, 0x409F60C4L, 0x5E5C9EC2L, 0x196A2463L, + 0x68FB6FAFL, 0x3E6C53B5L, 0x1339B2EBL, 0x3B52EC6FL, + 0x6DFC511FL, 0x9B30952CL, 0xCC814544L, 0xAF5EBD09L, + 0xBEE3D004L, 0xDE334AFDL, 0x660F2807L, 0x192E4BB3L, + 0xC0CBA857L, 0x45C8740FL, 0xD20B5F39L, 0xB9D3FBDBL, + 0x5579C0BDL, 0x1A60320AL, 0xD6A100C6L, 0x402C7279L, + 0x679F25FEL, 0xFB1FA3CCL, 0x8EA5E9F8L, 0xDB3222F8L, + 0x3C7516DFL, 0xFD616B15L, 0x2F501EC8L, 0xAD0552ABL, + 0x323DB5FAL, 0xFD238760L, 0x53317B48L, 0x3E00DF82L, + 0x9E5C57BBL, 0xCA6F8CA0L, 0x1A87562EL, 0xDF1769DBL, + 0xD542A8F6L, 0x287EFFC3L, 0xAC6732C6L, 0x8C4F5573L, + 0x695B27B0L, 0xBBCA58C8L, 0xE1FFA35DL, 0xB8F011A0L, + 0x10FA3D98L, 0xFD2183B8L, 0x4AFCB56CL, 0x2DD1D35BL, + 0x9A53E479L, 0xB6F84565L, 0xD28E49BCL, 0x4BFB9790L, + 0xE1DDF2DAL, 0xA4CB7E33L, 0x62FB1341L, 0xCEE4C6E8L, + 0xEF20CADAL, 0x36774C01L, 0xD07E9EFEL, 0x2BF11FB4L, + 0x95DBDA4DL, 0xAE909198L, 0xEAAD8E71L, 0x6B93D5A0L, + 0xD08ED1D0L, 0xAFC725E0L, 0x8E3C5B2FL, 0x8E7594B7L, + 0x8FF6E2FBL, 0xF2122B64L, 0x8888B812L, 0x900DF01CL, + 0x4FAD5EA0L, 0x688FC31CL, 0xD1CFF191L, 0xB3A8C1ADL, + 0x2F2F2218L, 0xBE0E1777L, 0xEA752DFEL, 0x8B021FA1L, + 0xE5A0CC0FL, 0xB56F74E8L, 0x18ACF3D6L, 0xCE89E299L, + 0xB4A84FE0L, 0xFD13E0B7L, 0x7CC43B81L, 0xD2ADA8D9L, + 0x165FA266L, 0x80957705L, 0x93CC7314L, 0x211A1477L, + 0xE6AD2065L, 0x77B5FA86L, 0xC75442F5L, 0xFB9D35CFL, + 0xEBCDAF0CL, 0x7B3E89A0L, 0xD6411BD3L, 0xAE1E7E49L, + 0x00250E2DL, 0x2071B35EL, 0x226800BBL, 0x57B8E0AFL, + 0x2464369BL, 0xF009B91EL, 0x5563911DL, 0x59DFA6AAL, + 0x78C14389L, 0xD95A537FL, 0x207D5BA2L, 0x02E5B9C5L, + 0x83260376L, 0x6295CFA9L, 0x11C81968L, 0x4E734A41L, + 0xB3472DCAL, 0x7B14A94AL, 0x1B510052L, 0x9A532915L, + 0xD60F573FL, 0xBC9BC6E4L, 0x2B60A476L, 0x81E67400L, + 0x08BA6FB5L, 0x571BE91FL, 0xF296EC6BL, 0x2A0DD915L, + 0xB6636521L, 0xE7B9F9B6L, 0xFF34052EL, 0xC5855664L, + 0x53B02D5DL, 0xA99F8FA1L, 0x08BA4799L, 0x6E85076AL }, + { 0x4B7A70E9L, 0xB5B32944L, 0xDB75092EL, 0xC4192623L, + 0xAD6EA6B0L, 0x49A7DF7DL, 0x9CEE60B8L, 0x8FEDB266L, + 0xECAA8C71L, 0x699A17FFL, 0x5664526CL, 0xC2B19EE1L, + 0x193602A5L, 0x75094C29L, 0xA0591340L, 0xE4183A3EL, + 0x3F54989AL, 0x5B429D65L, 0x6B8FE4D6L, 0x99F73FD6L, + 0xA1D29C07L, 0xEFE830F5L, 0x4D2D38E6L, 0xF0255DC1L, + 0x4CDD2086L, 0x8470EB26L, 0x6382E9C6L, 0x021ECC5EL, + 0x09686B3FL, 0x3EBAEFC9L, 0x3C971814L, 0x6B6A70A1L, + 0x687F3584L, 0x52A0E286L, 0xB79C5305L, 0xAA500737L, + 0x3E07841CL, 0x7FDEAE5CL, 0x8E7D44ECL, 0x5716F2B8L, + 0xB03ADA37L, 0xF0500C0DL, 0xF01C1F04L, 0x0200B3FFL, + 0xAE0CF51AL, 0x3CB574B2L, 0x25837A58L, 0xDC0921BDL, + 0xD19113F9L, 0x7CA92FF6L, 0x94324773L, 0x22F54701L, + 0x3AE5E581L, 0x37C2DADCL, 0xC8B57634L, 0x9AF3DDA7L, + 0xA9446146L, 0x0FD0030EL, 0xECC8C73EL, 0xA4751E41L, + 0xE238CD99L, 0x3BEA0E2FL, 0x3280BBA1L, 0x183EB331L, + 0x4E548B38L, 0x4F6DB908L, 0x6F420D03L, 0xF60A04BFL, + 0x2CB81290L, 0x24977C79L, 0x5679B072L, 0xBCAF89AFL, + 0xDE9A771FL, 0xD9930810L, 0xB38BAE12L, 0xDCCF3F2EL, + 0x5512721FL, 0x2E6B7124L, 0x501ADDE6L, 0x9F84CD87L, + 0x7A584718L, 0x7408DA17L, 0xBC9F9ABCL, 0xE94B7D8CL, + 0xEC7AEC3AL, 0xDB851DFAL, 0x63094366L, 0xC464C3D2L, + 0xEF1C1847L, 0x3215D908L, 0xDD433B37L, 0x24C2BA16L, + 0x12A14D43L, 0x2A65C451L, 0x50940002L, 0x133AE4DDL, + 0x71DFF89EL, 0x10314E55L, 0x81AC77D6L, 0x5F11199BL, + 0x043556F1L, 0xD7A3C76BL, 0x3C11183BL, 0x5924A509L, + 0xF28FE6EDL, 0x97F1FBFAL, 0x9EBABF2CL, 0x1E153C6EL, + 0x86E34570L, 0xEAE96FB1L, 0x860E5E0AL, 0x5A3E2AB3L, + 0x771FE71CL, 0x4E3D06FAL, 0x2965DCB9L, 0x99E71D0FL, + 0x803E89D6L, 0x5266C825L, 0x2E4CC978L, 0x9C10B36AL, + 0xC6150EBAL, 0x94E2EA78L, 0xA5FC3C53L, 0x1E0A2DF4L, + 0xF2F74EA7L, 0x361D2B3DL, 0x1939260FL, 0x19C27960L, + 0x5223A708L, 0xF71312B6L, 0xEBADFE6EL, 0xEAC31F66L, + 0xE3BC4595L, 0xA67BC883L, 0xB17F37D1L, 0x018CFF28L, + 0xC332DDEFL, 0xBE6C5AA5L, 0x65582185L, 0x68AB9802L, + 0xEECEA50FL, 0xDB2F953BL, 0x2AEF7DADL, 0x5B6E2F84L, + 0x1521B628L, 0x29076170L, 0xECDD4775L, 0x619F1510L, + 0x13CCA830L, 0xEB61BD96L, 0x0334FE1EL, 0xAA0363CFL, + 0xB5735C90L, 0x4C70A239L, 0xD59E9E0BL, 0xCBAADE14L, + 0xEECC86BCL, 0x60622CA7L, 0x9CAB5CABL, 0xB2F3846EL, + 0x648B1EAFL, 0x19BDF0CAL, 0xA02369B9L, 0x655ABB50L, + 0x40685A32L, 0x3C2AB4B3L, 0x319EE9D5L, 0xC021B8F7L, + 0x9B540B19L, 0x875FA099L, 0x95F7997EL, 0x623D7DA8L, + 0xF837889AL, 0x97E32D77L, 0x11ED935FL, 0x16681281L, + 0x0E358829L, 0xC7E61FD6L, 0x96DEDFA1L, 0x7858BA99L, + 0x57F584A5L, 0x1B227263L, 0x9B83C3FFL, 0x1AC24696L, + 0xCDB30AEBL, 0x532E3054L, 0x8FD948E4L, 0x6DBC3128L, + 0x58EBF2EFL, 0x34C6FFEAL, 0xFE28ED61L, 0xEE7C3C73L, + 0x5D4A14D9L, 0xE864B7E3L, 0x42105D14L, 0x203E13E0L, + 0x45EEE2B6L, 0xA3AAABEAL, 0xDB6C4F15L, 0xFACB4FD0L, + 0xC742F442L, 0xEF6ABBB5L, 0x654F3B1DL, 0x41CD2105L, + 0xD81E799EL, 0x86854DC7L, 0xE44B476AL, 0x3D816250L, + 0xCF62A1F2L, 0x5B8D2646L, 0xFC8883A0L, 0xC1C7B6A3L, + 0x7F1524C3L, 0x69CB7492L, 0x47848A0BL, 0x5692B285L, + 0x095BBF00L, 0xAD19489DL, 0x1462B174L, 0x23820E00L, + 0x58428D2AL, 0x0C55F5EAL, 0x1DADF43EL, 0x233F7061L, + 0x3372F092L, 0x8D937E41L, 0xD65FECF1L, 0x6C223BDBL, + 0x7CDE3759L, 0xCBEE7460L, 0x4085F2A7L, 0xCE77326EL, + 0xA6078084L, 0x19F8509EL, 0xE8EFD855L, 0x61D99735L, + 0xA969A7AAL, 0xC50C06C2L, 0x5A04ABFCL, 0x800BCADCL, + 0x9E447A2EL, 0xC3453484L, 0xFDD56705L, 0x0E1E9EC9L, + 0xDB73DBD3L, 0x105588CDL, 0x675FDA79L, 0xE3674340L, + 0xC5C43465L, 0x713E38D8L, 0x3D28F89EL, 0xF16DFF20L, + 0x153E21E7L, 0x8FB03D4AL, 0xE6E39F2BL, 0xDB83ADF7L }, + { 0xE93D5A68L, 0x948140F7L, 0xF64C261CL, 0x94692934L, + 0x411520F7L, 0x7602D4F7L, 0xBCF46B2EL, 0xD4A20068L, + 0xD4082471L, 0x3320F46AL, 0x43B7D4B7L, 0x500061AFL, + 0x1E39F62EL, 0x97244546L, 0x14214F74L, 0xBF8B8840L, + 0x4D95FC1DL, 0x96B591AFL, 0x70F4DDD3L, 0x66A02F45L, + 0xBFBC09ECL, 0x03BD9785L, 0x7FAC6DD0L, 0x31CB8504L, + 0x96EB27B3L, 0x55FD3941L, 0xDA2547E6L, 0xABCA0A9AL, + 0x28507825L, 0x530429F4L, 0x0A2C86DAL, 0xE9B66DFBL, + 0x68DC1462L, 0xD7486900L, 0x680EC0A4L, 0x27A18DEEL, + 0x4F3FFEA2L, 0xE887AD8CL, 0xB58CE006L, 0x7AF4D6B6L, + 0xAACE1E7CL, 0xD3375FECL, 0xCE78A399L, 0x406B2A42L, + 0x20FE9E35L, 0xD9F385B9L, 0xEE39D7ABL, 0x3B124E8BL, + 0x1DC9FAF7L, 0x4B6D1856L, 0x26A36631L, 0xEAE397B2L, + 0x3A6EFA74L, 0xDD5B4332L, 0x6841E7F7L, 0xCA7820FBL, + 0xFB0AF54EL, 0xD8FEB397L, 0x454056ACL, 0xBA489527L, + 0x55533A3AL, 0x20838D87L, 0xFE6BA9B7L, 0xD096954BL, + 0x55A867BCL, 0xA1159A58L, 0xCCA92963L, 0x99E1DB33L, + 0xA62A4A56L, 0x3F3125F9L, 0x5EF47E1CL, 0x9029317CL, + 0xFDF8E802L, 0x04272F70L, 0x80BB155CL, 0x05282CE3L, + 0x95C11548L, 0xE4C66D22L, 0x48C1133FL, 0xC70F86DCL, + 0x07F9C9EEL, 0x41041F0FL, 0x404779A4L, 0x5D886E17L, + 0x325F51EBL, 0xD59BC0D1L, 0xF2BCC18FL, 0x41113564L, + 0x257B7834L, 0x602A9C60L, 0xDFF8E8A3L, 0x1F636C1BL, + 0x0E12B4C2L, 0x02E1329EL, 0xAF664FD1L, 0xCAD18115L, + 0x6B2395E0L, 0x333E92E1L, 0x3B240B62L, 0xEEBEB922L, + 0x85B2A20EL, 0xE6BA0D99L, 0xDE720C8CL, 0x2DA2F728L, + 0xD0127845L, 0x95B794FDL, 0x647D0862L, 0xE7CCF5F0L, + 0x5449A36FL, 0x877D48FAL, 0xC39DFD27L, 0xF33E8D1EL, + 0x0A476341L, 0x992EFF74L, 0x3A6F6EABL, 0xF4F8FD37L, + 0xA812DC60L, 0xA1EBDDF8L, 0x991BE14CL, 0xDB6E6B0DL, + 0xC67B5510L, 0x6D672C37L, 0x2765D43BL, 0xDCD0E804L, + 0xF1290DC7L, 0xCC00FFA3L, 0xB5390F92L, 0x690FED0BL, + 0x667B9FFBL, 0xCEDB7D9CL, 0xA091CF0BL, 0xD9155EA3L, + 0xBB132F88L, 0x515BAD24L, 0x7B9479BFL, 0x763BD6EBL, + 0x37392EB3L, 0xCC115979L, 0x8026E297L, 0xF42E312DL, + 0x6842ADA7L, 0xC66A2B3BL, 0x12754CCCL, 0x782EF11CL, + 0x6A124237L, 0xB79251E7L, 0x06A1BBE6L, 0x4BFB6350L, + 0x1A6B1018L, 0x11CAEDFAL, 0x3D25BDD8L, 0xE2E1C3C9L, + 0x44421659L, 0x0A121386L, 0xD90CEC6EL, 0xD5ABEA2AL, + 0x64AF674EL, 0xDA86A85FL, 0xBEBFE988L, 0x64E4C3FEL, + 0x9DBC8057L, 0xF0F7C086L, 0x60787BF8L, 0x6003604DL, + 0xD1FD8346L, 0xF6381FB0L, 0x7745AE04L, 0xD736FCCCL, + 0x83426B33L, 0xF01EAB71L, 0xB0804187L, 0x3C005E5FL, + 0x77A057BEL, 0xBDE8AE24L, 0x55464299L, 0xBF582E61L, + 0x4E58F48FL, 0xF2DDFDA2L, 0xF474EF38L, 0x8789BDC2L, + 0x5366F9C3L, 0xC8B38E74L, 0xB475F255L, 0x46FCD9B9L, + 0x7AEB2661L, 0x8B1DDF84L, 0x846A0E79L, 0x915F95E2L, + 0x466E598EL, 0x20B45770L, 0x8CD55591L, 0xC902DE4CL, + 0xB90BACE1L, 0xBB8205D0L, 0x11A86248L, 0x7574A99EL, + 0xB77F19B6L, 0xE0A9DC09L, 0x662D09A1L, 0xC4324633L, + 0xE85A1F02L, 0x09F0BE8CL, 0x4A99A025L, 0x1D6EFE10L, + 0x1AB93D1DL, 0x0BA5A4DFL, 0xA186F20FL, 0x2868F169L, + 0xDCB7DA83L, 0x573906FEL, 0xA1E2CE9BL, 0x4FCD7F52L, + 0x50115E01L, 0xA70683FAL, 0xA002B5C4L, 0x0DE6D027L, + 0x9AF88C27L, 0x773F8641L, 0xC3604C06L, 0x61A806B5L, + 0xF0177A28L, 0xC0F586E0L, 0x006058AAL, 0x30DC7D62L, + 0x11E69ED7L, 0x2338EA63L, 0x53C2DD94L, 0xC2C21634L, + 0xBBCBEE56L, 0x90BCB6DEL, 0xEBFC7DA1L, 0xCE591D76L, + 0x6F05E409L, 0x4B7C0188L, 0x39720A3DL, 0x7C927C24L, + 0x86E3725FL, 0x724D9DB9L, 0x1AC15BB4L, 0xD39EB8FCL, + 0xED545578L, 0x08FCA5B5L, 0xD83D7CD3L, 0x4DAD0FC4L, + 0x1E50EF5EL, 0xB161E6F8L, 0xA28514D9L, 0x6C51133CL, + 0x6FD5C7E7L, 0x56E14EC4L, 0x362ABFCEL, 0xDDC6C837L, + 0xD79A3234L, 0x92638212L, 0x670EFA8EL, 0x406000E0L }, + { 0x3A39CE37L, 0xD3FAF5CFL, 0xABC27737L, 0x5AC52D1BL, + 0x5CB0679EL, 0x4FA33742L, 0xD3822740L, 0x99BC9BBEL, + 0xD5118E9DL, 0xBF0F7315L, 0xD62D1C7EL, 0xC700C47BL, + 0xB78C1B6BL, 0x21A19045L, 0xB26EB1BEL, 0x6A366EB4L, + 0x5748AB2FL, 0xBC946E79L, 0xC6A376D2L, 0x6549C2C8L, + 0x530FF8EEL, 0x468DDE7DL, 0xD5730A1DL, 0x4CD04DC6L, + 0x2939BBDBL, 0xA9BA4650L, 0xAC9526E8L, 0xBE5EE304L, + 0xA1FAD5F0L, 0x6A2D519AL, 0x63EF8CE2L, 0x9A86EE22L, + 0xC089C2B8L, 0x43242EF6L, 0xA51E03AAL, 0x9CF2D0A4L, + 0x83C061BAL, 0x9BE96A4DL, 0x8FE51550L, 0xBA645BD6L, + 0x2826A2F9L, 0xA73A3AE1L, 0x4BA99586L, 0xEF5562E9L, + 0xC72FEFD3L, 0xF752F7DAL, 0x3F046F69L, 0x77FA0A59L, + 0x80E4A915L, 0x87B08601L, 0x9B09E6ADL, 0x3B3EE593L, + 0xE990FD5AL, 0x9E34D797L, 0x2CF0B7D9L, 0x022B8B51L, + 0x96D5AC3AL, 0x017DA67DL, 0xD1CF3ED6L, 0x7C7D2D28L, + 0x1F9F25CFL, 0xADF2B89BL, 0x5AD6B472L, 0x5A88F54CL, + 0xE029AC71L, 0xE019A5E6L, 0x47B0ACFDL, 0xED93FA9BL, + 0xE8D3C48DL, 0x283B57CCL, 0xF8D56629L, 0x79132E28L, + 0x785F0191L, 0xED756055L, 0xF7960E44L, 0xE3D35E8CL, + 0x15056DD4L, 0x88F46DBAL, 0x03A16125L, 0x0564F0BDL, + 0xC3EB9E15L, 0x3C9057A2L, 0x97271AECL, 0xA93A072AL, + 0x1B3F6D9BL, 0x1E6321F5L, 0xF59C66FBL, 0x26DCF319L, + 0x7533D928L, 0xB155FDF5L, 0x03563482L, 0x8ABA3CBBL, + 0x28517711L, 0xC20AD9F8L, 0xABCC5167L, 0xCCAD925FL, + 0x4DE81751L, 0x3830DC8EL, 0x379D5862L, 0x9320F991L, + 0xEA7A90C2L, 0xFB3E7BCEL, 0x5121CE64L, 0x774FBE32L, + 0xA8B6E37EL, 0xC3293D46L, 0x48DE5369L, 0x6413E680L, + 0xA2AE0810L, 0xDD6DB224L, 0x69852DFDL, 0x09072166L, + 0xB39A460AL, 0x6445C0DDL, 0x586CDECFL, 0x1C20C8AEL, + 0x5BBEF7DDL, 0x1B588D40L, 0xCCD2017FL, 0x6BB4E3BBL, + 0xDDA26A7EL, 0x3A59FF45L, 0x3E350A44L, 0xBCB4CDD5L, + 0x72EACEA8L, 0xFA6484BBL, 0x8D6612AEL, 0xBF3C6F47L, + 0xD29BE463L, 0x542F5D9EL, 0xAEC2771BL, 0xF64E6370L, + 0x740E0D8DL, 0xE75B1357L, 0xF8721671L, 0xAF537D5DL, + 0x4040CB08L, 0x4EB4E2CCL, 0x34D2466AL, 0x0115AF84L, + 0xE1B00428L, 0x95983A1DL, 0x06B89FB4L, 0xCE6EA048L, + 0x6F3F3B82L, 0x3520AB82L, 0x011A1D4BL, 0x277227F8L, + 0x611560B1L, 0xE7933FDCL, 0xBB3A792BL, 0x344525BDL, + 0xA08839E1L, 0x51CE794BL, 0x2F32C9B7L, 0xA01FBAC9L, + 0xE01CC87EL, 0xBCC7D1F6L, 0xCF0111C3L, 0xA1E8AAC7L, + 0x1A908749L, 0xD44FBD9AL, 0xD0DADECBL, 0xD50ADA38L, + 0x0339C32AL, 0xC6913667L, 0x8DF9317CL, 0xE0B12B4FL, + 0xF79E59B7L, 0x43F5BB3AL, 0xF2D519FFL, 0x27D9459CL, + 0xBF97222CL, 0x15E6FC2AL, 0x0F91FC71L, 0x9B941525L, + 0xFAE59361L, 0xCEB69CEBL, 0xC2A86459L, 0x12BAA8D1L, + 0xB6C1075EL, 0xE3056A0CL, 0x10D25065L, 0xCB03A442L, + 0xE0EC6E0EL, 0x1698DB3BL, 0x4C98A0BEL, 0x3278E964L, + 0x9F1F9532L, 0xE0D392DFL, 0xD3A0342BL, 0x8971F21EL, + 0x1B0A7441L, 0x4BA3348CL, 0xC5BE7120L, 0xC37632D8L, + 0xDF359F8DL, 0x9B992F2EL, 0xE60B6F47L, 0x0FE3F11DL, + 0xE54CDA54L, 0x1EDAD891L, 0xCE6279CFL, 0xCD3E7E6FL, + 0x1618B166L, 0xFD2C1D05L, 0x848FD2C5L, 0xF6FB2299L, + 0xF523F357L, 0xA6327623L, 0x93A83531L, 0x56CCCD02L, + 0xACF08162L, 0x5A75EBB5L, 0x6E163697L, 0x88D273CCL, + 0xDE966292L, 0x81B949D0L, 0x4C50901BL, 0x71C65614L, + 0xE6C6C7BDL, 0x327A140AL, 0x45E1D006L, 0xC3F27B9AL, + 0xC9AA53FDL, 0x62A80F00L, 0xBB25BFE2L, 0x35BDD2F6L, + 0x71126905L, 0xB2040222L, 0xB6CBCF7CL, 0xCD769C2BL, + 0x53113EC0L, 0x1640E3D3L, 0x38ABBD60L, 0x2547ADF0L, + 0xBA38209CL, 0xF746CE76L, 0x77AFA1C5L, 0x20756060L, + 0x85CBFE4EL, 0x8AE88DD8L, 0x7AAAF9B0L, 0x4CF9AA7EL, + 0x1948C25CL, 0x02FB8A8CL, 0x01C36AE4L, 0xD6EBE1F9L, + 0x90D4F869L, 0xA65CDEA0L, 0x3F09252DL, 0xC208E69FL, + 0xB74E6132L, 0xCE77E25BL, 0x578FDFE3L, 0x3AC372E6L } +}; + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/camellia.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/camellia.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e90cd7f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/camellia.c @@ -0,0 +1,1080 @@ +/* + * Camellia implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The Camellia block cipher was designed by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric + * Corporation. + * + * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/01espec.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define CAMELLIA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +static const unsigned char SIGMA_CHARS[6][8] = +{ + { 0xa0, 0x9e, 0x66, 0x7f, 0x3b, 0xcc, 0x90, 0x8b }, + { 0xb6, 0x7a, 0xe8, 0x58, 0x4c, 0xaa, 0x73, 0xb2 }, + { 0xc6, 0xef, 0x37, 0x2f, 0xe9, 0x4f, 0x82, 0xbe }, + { 0x54, 0xff, 0x53, 0xa5, 0xf1, 0xd3, 0x6f, 0x1c }, + { 0x10, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xfa, 0xde, 0x68, 0x2d, 0x1d }, + { 0xb0, 0x56, 0x88, 0xc2, 0xb3, 0xe6, 0xc1, 0xfd } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY) + +static const unsigned char FSb[256] = +{ + 112,130, 44,236,179, 39,192,229,228,133, 87, 53,234, 12,174, 65, + 35,239,107,147, 69, 25,165, 33,237, 14, 79, 78, 29,101,146,189, + 134,184,175,143,124,235, 31,206, 62, 48,220, 95, 94,197, 11, 26, + 166,225, 57,202,213, 71, 93, 61,217, 1, 90,214, 81, 86,108, 77, + 139, 13,154,102,251,204,176, 45,116, 18, 43, 32,240,177,132,153, + 223, 76,203,194, 52,126,118, 5,109,183,169, 49,209, 23, 4,215, + 20, 88, 58, 97,222, 27, 17, 28, 50, 15,156, 22, 83, 24,242, 34, + 254, 68,207,178,195,181,122,145, 36, 8,232,168, 96,252,105, 80, + 170,208,160,125,161,137, 98,151, 84, 91, 30,149,224,255,100,210, + 16,196, 0, 72,163,247,117,219,138, 3,230,218, 9, 63,221,148, + 135, 92,131, 2,205, 74,144, 51,115,103,246,243,157,127,191,226, + 82,155,216, 38,200, 55,198, 59,129,150,111, 75, 19,190, 99, 46, + 233,121,167,140,159,110,188,142, 41,245,249,182, 47,253,180, 89, + 120,152, 6,106,231, 70,113,186,212, 37,171, 66,136,162,141,250, + 114, 7,185, 85,248,238,172, 10, 54, 73, 42,104, 60, 56,241,164, + 64, 40,211,123,187,201, 67,193, 21,227,173,244,119,199,128,158 +}; + +#define SBOX1(n) FSb[(n)] +#define SBOX2(n) (unsigned char)((FSb[(n)] >> 7 ^ FSb[(n)] << 1) & 0xff) +#define SBOX3(n) (unsigned char)((FSb[(n)] >> 1 ^ FSb[(n)] << 7) & 0xff) +#define SBOX4(n) FSb[((n) << 1 ^ (n) >> 7) &0xff] + +#else /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ + +static const unsigned char FSb[256] = +{ + 112, 130, 44, 236, 179, 39, 192, 229, 228, 133, 87, 53, 234, 12, 174, 65, + 35, 239, 107, 147, 69, 25, 165, 33, 237, 14, 79, 78, 29, 101, 146, 189, + 134, 184, 175, 143, 124, 235, 31, 206, 62, 48, 220, 95, 94, 197, 11, 26, + 166, 225, 57, 202, 213, 71, 93, 61, 217, 1, 90, 214, 81, 86, 108, 77, + 139, 13, 154, 102, 251, 204, 176, 45, 116, 18, 43, 32, 240, 177, 132, 153, + 223, 76, 203, 194, 52, 126, 118, 5, 109, 183, 169, 49, 209, 23, 4, 215, + 20, 88, 58, 97, 222, 27, 17, 28, 50, 15, 156, 22, 83, 24, 242, 34, + 254, 68, 207, 178, 195, 181, 122, 145, 36, 8, 232, 168, 96, 252, 105, 80, + 170, 208, 160, 125, 161, 137, 98, 151, 84, 91, 30, 149, 224, 255, 100, 210, + 16, 196, 0, 72, 163, 247, 117, 219, 138, 3, 230, 218, 9, 63, 221, 148, + 135, 92, 131, 2, 205, 74, 144, 51, 115, 103, 246, 243, 157, 127, 191, 226, + 82, 155, 216, 38, 200, 55, 198, 59, 129, 150, 111, 75, 19, 190, 99, 46, + 233, 121, 167, 140, 159, 110, 188, 142, 41, 245, 249, 182, 47, 253, 180, 89, + 120, 152, 6, 106, 231, 70, 113, 186, 212, 37, 171, 66, 136, 162, 141, 250, + 114, 7, 185, 85, 248, 238, 172, 10, 54, 73, 42, 104, 60, 56, 241, 164, + 64, 40, 211, 123, 187, 201, 67, 193, 21, 227, 173, 244, 119, 199, 128, 158 +}; + +static const unsigned char FSb2[256] = +{ + 224, 5, 88, 217, 103, 78, 129, 203, 201, 11, 174, 106, 213, 24, 93, 130, + 70, 223, 214, 39, 138, 50, 75, 66, 219, 28, 158, 156, 58, 202, 37, 123, + 13, 113, 95, 31, 248, 215, 62, 157, 124, 96, 185, 190, 188, 139, 22, 52, + 77, 195, 114, 149, 171, 142, 186, 122, 179, 2, 180, 173, 162, 172, 216, 154, + 23, 26, 53, 204, 247, 153, 97, 90, 232, 36, 86, 64, 225, 99, 9, 51, + 191, 152, 151, 133, 104, 252, 236, 10, 218, 111, 83, 98, 163, 46, 8, 175, + 40, 176, 116, 194, 189, 54, 34, 56, 100, 30, 57, 44, 166, 48, 229, 68, + 253, 136, 159, 101, 135, 107, 244, 35, 72, 16, 209, 81, 192, 249, 210, 160, + 85, 161, 65, 250, 67, 19, 196, 47, 168, 182, 60, 43, 193, 255, 200, 165, + 32, 137, 0, 144, 71, 239, 234, 183, 21, 6, 205, 181, 18, 126, 187, 41, + 15, 184, 7, 4, 155, 148, 33, 102, 230, 206, 237, 231, 59, 254, 127, 197, + 164, 55, 177, 76, 145, 110, 141, 118, 3, 45, 222, 150, 38, 125, 198, 92, + 211, 242, 79, 25, 63, 220, 121, 29, 82, 235, 243, 109, 94, 251, 105, 178, + 240, 49, 12, 212, 207, 140, 226, 117, 169, 74, 87, 132, 17, 69, 27, 245, + 228, 14, 115, 170, 241, 221, 89, 20, 108, 146, 84, 208, 120, 112, 227, 73, + 128, 80, 167, 246, 119, 147, 134, 131, 42, 199, 91, 233, 238, 143, 1, 61 +}; + +static const unsigned char FSb3[256] = +{ + 56, 65, 22, 118, 217, 147, 96, 242, 114, 194, 171, 154, 117, 6, 87, 160, + 145, 247, 181, 201, 162, 140, 210, 144, 246, 7, 167, 39, 142, 178, 73, 222, + 67, 92, 215, 199, 62, 245, 143, 103, 31, 24, 110, 175, 47, 226, 133, 13, + 83, 240, 156, 101, 234, 163, 174, 158, 236, 128, 45, 107, 168, 43, 54, 166, + 197, 134, 77, 51, 253, 102, 88, 150, 58, 9, 149, 16, 120, 216, 66, 204, + 239, 38, 229, 97, 26, 63, 59, 130, 182, 219, 212, 152, 232, 139, 2, 235, + 10, 44, 29, 176, 111, 141, 136, 14, 25, 135, 78, 11, 169, 12, 121, 17, + 127, 34, 231, 89, 225, 218, 61, 200, 18, 4, 116, 84, 48, 126, 180, 40, + 85, 104, 80, 190, 208, 196, 49, 203, 42, 173, 15, 202, 112, 255, 50, 105, + 8, 98, 0, 36, 209, 251, 186, 237, 69, 129, 115, 109, 132, 159, 238, 74, + 195, 46, 193, 1, 230, 37, 72, 153, 185, 179, 123, 249, 206, 191, 223, 113, + 41, 205, 108, 19, 100, 155, 99, 157, 192, 75, 183, 165, 137, 95, 177, 23, + 244, 188, 211, 70, 207, 55, 94, 71, 148, 250, 252, 91, 151, 254, 90, 172, + 60, 76, 3, 53, 243, 35, 184, 93, 106, 146, 213, 33, 68, 81, 198, 125, + 57, 131, 220, 170, 124, 119, 86, 5, 27, 164, 21, 52, 30, 28, 248, 82, + 32, 20, 233, 189, 221, 228, 161, 224, 138, 241, 214, 122, 187, 227, 64, 79 +}; + +static const unsigned char FSb4[256] = +{ + 112, 44, 179, 192, 228, 87, 234, 174, 35, 107, 69, 165, 237, 79, 29, 146, + 134, 175, 124, 31, 62, 220, 94, 11, 166, 57, 213, 93, 217, 90, 81, 108, + 139, 154, 251, 176, 116, 43, 240, 132, 223, 203, 52, 118, 109, 169, 209, 4, + 20, 58, 222, 17, 50, 156, 83, 242, 254, 207, 195, 122, 36, 232, 96, 105, + 170, 160, 161, 98, 84, 30, 224, 100, 16, 0, 163, 117, 138, 230, 9, 221, + 135, 131, 205, 144, 115, 246, 157, 191, 82, 216, 200, 198, 129, 111, 19, 99, + 233, 167, 159, 188, 41, 249, 47, 180, 120, 6, 231, 113, 212, 171, 136, 141, + 114, 185, 248, 172, 54, 42, 60, 241, 64, 211, 187, 67, 21, 173, 119, 128, + 130, 236, 39, 229, 133, 53, 12, 65, 239, 147, 25, 33, 14, 78, 101, 189, + 184, 143, 235, 206, 48, 95, 197, 26, 225, 202, 71, 61, 1, 214, 86, 77, + 13, 102, 204, 45, 18, 32, 177, 153, 76, 194, 126, 5, 183, 49, 23, 215, + 88, 97, 27, 28, 15, 22, 24, 34, 68, 178, 181, 145, 8, 168, 252, 80, + 208, 125, 137, 151, 91, 149, 255, 210, 196, 72, 247, 219, 3, 218, 63, 148, + 92, 2, 74, 51, 103, 243, 127, 226, 155, 38, 55, 59, 150, 75, 190, 46, + 121, 140, 110, 142, 245, 182, 253, 89, 152, 106, 70, 186, 37, 66, 162, 250, + 7, 85, 238, 10, 73, 104, 56, 164, 40, 123, 201, 193, 227, 244, 199, 158 +}; + +#define SBOX1(n) FSb[(n)] +#define SBOX2(n) FSb2[(n)] +#define SBOX3(n) FSb3[(n)] +#define SBOX4(n) FSb4[(n)] + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ + +static const unsigned char shifts[2][4][4] = +{ + { + { 1, 1, 1, 1 }, /* KL */ + { 0, 0, 0, 0 }, /* KR */ + { 1, 1, 1, 1 }, /* KA */ + { 0, 0, 0, 0 } /* KB */ + }, + { + { 1, 0, 1, 1 }, /* KL */ + { 1, 1, 0, 1 }, /* KR */ + { 1, 1, 1, 0 }, /* KA */ + { 1, 1, 0, 1 } /* KB */ + } +}; + +static const signed char indexes[2][4][20] = +{ + { + { 0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 38, 39, + 36, 37, 23, 20, 21, 22, 27, -1, -1, 26 }, /* KL -> RK */ + { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }, /* KR -> RK */ + { 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, + 18, 19, -1, 24, 25, -1, 31, 28, 29, 30 }, /* KA -> RK */ + { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 } /* KB -> RK */ + }, + { + { 0, 1, 2, 3, 61, 62, 63, 60, -1, -1, + -1, -1, 27, 24, 25, 26, 35, 32, 33, 34 }, /* KL -> RK */ + { -1, -1, -1, -1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, + 18, 19, -1, -1, -1, -1, 39, 36, 37, 38 }, /* KR -> RK */ + { -1, -1, -1, -1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 58, 59, + 56, 57, 31, 28, 29, 30, -1, -1, -1, -1 }, /* KA -> RK */ + { 4, 5, 6, 7, 65, 66, 67, 64, 20, 21, + 22, 23, -1, -1, -1, -1, 43, 40, 41, 42 } /* KB -> RK */ + } +}; + +static const signed char transposes[2][20] = +{ + { + 21, 22, 23, 20, + -1, -1, -1, -1, + 18, 19, 16, 17, + 11, 8, 9, 10, + 15, 12, 13, 14 + }, + { + 25, 26, 27, 24, + 29, 30, 31, 28, + 18, 19, 16, 17, + -1, -1, -1, -1, + -1, -1, -1, -1 + } +}; + +/* Shift macro for 128 bit strings with rotation smaller than 32 bits (!) */ +#define ROTL(DEST, SRC, SHIFT) \ +{ \ + (DEST)[0] = (SRC)[0] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[1] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \ + (DEST)[1] = (SRC)[1] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[2] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \ + (DEST)[2] = (SRC)[2] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[3] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \ + (DEST)[3] = (SRC)[3] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[0] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \ +} + +#define FL(XL, XR, KL, KR) \ +{ \ + (XR) = ((((XL) & (KL)) << 1) | (((XL) & (KL)) >> 31)) ^ (XR); \ + (XL) = ((XR) | (KR)) ^ (XL); \ +} + +#define FLInv(YL, YR, KL, KR) \ +{ \ + (YL) = ((YR) | (KR)) ^ (YL); \ + (YR) = ((((YL) & (KL)) << 1) | (((YL) & (KL)) >> 31)) ^ (YR); \ +} + +#define SHIFT_AND_PLACE(INDEX, OFFSET) \ +{ \ + TK[0] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 0]; \ + TK[1] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 1]; \ + TK[2] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 2]; \ + TK[3] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 3]; \ + \ + for( i = 1; i <= 4; i++ ) \ + if( shifts[(INDEX)][(OFFSET)][i -1] ) \ + ROTL(TK + i * 4, TK, ( 15 * i ) % 32); \ + \ + for( i = 0; i < 20; i++ ) \ + if( indexes[(INDEX)][(OFFSET)][i] != -1 ) { \ + RK[indexes[(INDEX)][(OFFSET)][i]] = TK[ i ]; \ + } \ +} + +static void camellia_feistel( const uint32_t x[2], const uint32_t k[2], + uint32_t z[2]) +{ + uint32_t I0, I1; + I0 = x[0] ^ k[0]; + I1 = x[1] ^ k[1]; + + I0 = ((uint32_t) SBOX1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( I0 )) << 24) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( I0 )) << 16) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( I0 )) << 8) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX4( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( I0 )) ); + I1 = ((uint32_t) SBOX2( MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( I1 )) << 24) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX3( MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( I1 )) << 16) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX4( MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( I1 )) << 8) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX1( MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( I1 )) ); + + I0 ^= (I1 << 8) | (I1 >> 24); + I1 ^= (I0 << 16) | (I0 >> 16); + I0 ^= (I1 >> 8) | (I1 << 24); + I1 ^= (I0 >> 8) | (I0 << 24); + + z[0] ^= I1; + z[1] ^= I0; +} + +void mbedtls_camellia_init( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ) +{ + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_camellia_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_camellia_free( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_camellia_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Camellia key schedule (encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + int idx; + size_t i; + uint32_t *RK; + unsigned char t[64]; + uint32_t SIGMA[6][2]; + uint32_t KC[16]; + uint32_t TK[20]; + + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + RK = ctx->rk; + + memset( t, 0, 64 ); + memset( RK, 0, sizeof(ctx->rk) ); + + switch( keybits ) + { + case 128: ctx->nr = 3; idx = 0; break; + case 192: + case 256: ctx->nr = 4; idx = 1; break; + default : return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < keybits / 8; ++i ) + t[i] = key[i]; + + if( keybits == 192 ) { + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + t[24 + i] = ~t[16 + i]; + } + + /* + * Prepare SIGMA values + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) { + SIGMA[i][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( SIGMA_CHARS[i], 0 ); + SIGMA[i][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( SIGMA_CHARS[i], 4 ); + } + + /* + * Key storage in KC + * Order: KL, KR, KA, KB + */ + memset( KC, 0, sizeof(KC) ); + + /* Store KL, KR */ + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + KC[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( t, i * 4 ); + + /* Generate KA */ + for( i = 0; i < 4; ++i ) + KC[8 + i] = KC[i] ^ KC[4 + i]; + + camellia_feistel( KC + 8, SIGMA[0], KC + 10 ); + camellia_feistel( KC + 10, SIGMA[1], KC + 8 ); + + for( i = 0; i < 4; ++i ) + KC[8 + i] ^= KC[i]; + + camellia_feistel( KC + 8, SIGMA[2], KC + 10 ); + camellia_feistel( KC + 10, SIGMA[3], KC + 8 ); + + if( keybits > 128 ) { + /* Generate KB */ + for( i = 0; i < 4; ++i ) + KC[12 + i] = KC[4 + i] ^ KC[8 + i]; + + camellia_feistel( KC + 12, SIGMA[4], KC + 14 ); + camellia_feistel( KC + 14, SIGMA[5], KC + 12 ); + } + + /* + * Generating subkeys + */ + + /* Manipulating KL */ + SHIFT_AND_PLACE( idx, 0 ); + + /* Manipulating KR */ + if( keybits > 128 ) { + SHIFT_AND_PLACE( idx, 1 ); + } + + /* Manipulating KA */ + SHIFT_AND_PLACE( idx, 2 ); + + /* Manipulating KB */ + if( keybits > 128 ) { + SHIFT_AND_PLACE( idx, 3 ); + } + + /* Do transpositions */ + for( i = 0; i < 20; i++ ) { + if( transposes[idx][i] != -1 ) { + RK[32 + 12 * idx + i] = RK[transposes[idx][i]]; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Camellia key schedule (decryption) + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + int idx, ret; + size_t i; + mbedtls_camellia_context cty; + uint32_t *RK; + uint32_t *SK; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + mbedtls_camellia_init( &cty ); + + /* Also checks keybits */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &cty, key, keybits ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ctx->nr = cty.nr; + idx = ( ctx->nr == 4 ); + + RK = ctx->rk; + SK = cty.rk + 24 * 2 + 8 * idx * 2; + + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + + for( i = 22 + 8 * idx, SK -= 6; i > 0; i--, SK -= 4 ) + { + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + } + + SK -= 2; + + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free( &cty ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Camellia-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int NR; + uint32_t *RK, X[4]; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + ( (void) mode ); + + NR = ctx->nr; + RK = ctx->rk; + + X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); + X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 8 ); + X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 12 ); + + X[0] ^= *RK++; + X[1] ^= *RK++; + X[2] ^= *RK++; + X[3] ^= *RK++; + + while( NR ) { + --NR; + camellia_feistel( X, RK, X + 2 ); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel( X + 2, RK, X ); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel( X, RK, X + 2 ); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel( X + 2, RK, X ); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel( X, RK, X + 2 ); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel( X + 2, RK, X ); + RK += 2; + + if( NR ) { + FL(X[0], X[1], RK[0], RK[1]); + RK += 2; + FLInv(X[2], X[3], RK[0], RK[1]); + RK += 2; + } + } + + X[2] ^= *RK++; + X[3] ^= *RK++; + X[0] ^= *RK++; + X[1] ^= *RK++; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X[2], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X[3], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X[0], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X[1], output, 12 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * Camellia-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + unsigned char temp[16]; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + if( length % 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, 16 ); + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ); + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, 16 ); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } + else + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output ); + memcpy( iv, output, 16 ); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * Camellia-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c; + size_t n; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || + mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( iv_off != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + n = *iv_off; + if( n >= 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ iv[n] ); + iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + else + { + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, iv, iv ); + + iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char)( iv[n] ^ *input++ ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + } + + *iv_off = n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * Camellia-CTR buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[16], + unsigned char stream_block[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int c, i; + size_t n; + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( nonce_counter != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( stream_block != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( nc_off != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + n = *nc_off; + if( n >= 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( length-- ) + { + if( n == 0 ) { + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, + stream_block ); + + for( i = 16; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + } + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char)( c ^ stream_block[n] ); + + n = ( n + 1 ) & 0x0F; + } + + *nc_off = n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * Camellia test vectors from: + * + * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/technology.html: + * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/cryptrec/intermediate.txt + * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/cryptrec/t_camellia.txt + * (For each bitlength: Key 0, Nr 39) + */ +#define CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB 2 + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ecb_key[3][CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB][32] = +{ + { + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } + }, + { + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10, + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } + }, + { + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10, + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, + 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } + }, +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ecb_plain[CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB][16] = +{ + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ecb_cipher[3][CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB][16] = +{ + { + { 0x67, 0x67, 0x31, 0x38, 0x54, 0x96, 0x69, 0x73, + 0x08, 0x57, 0x06, 0x56, 0x48, 0xea, 0xbe, 0x43 }, + { 0x38, 0x3C, 0x6C, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xEF, 0x7F, 0xDE, + 0x25, 0xCD, 0x47, 0x0B, 0xF7, 0x74, 0xA3, 0x31 } + }, + { + { 0xb4, 0x99, 0x34, 0x01, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xf8, + 0x4e, 0xe5, 0xce, 0xe7, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0x09, 0xb9 }, + { 0xD1, 0x76, 0x3F, 0xC0, 0x19, 0xD7, 0x7C, 0xC9, + 0x30, 0xBF, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x6F, 0x7C, 0x93, 0x64 } + }, + { + { 0x9a, 0xcc, 0x23, 0x7d, 0xff, 0x16, 0xd7, 0x6c, + 0x20, 0xef, 0x7c, 0x91, 0x9e, 0x3a, 0x75, 0x09 }, + { 0x05, 0x03, 0xFB, 0x10, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0x7C, + 0xF4, 0x5D, 0x8C, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x47, 0x43, 0x35 } + } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC 3 + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_key[3][32] = +{ + { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, + 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C } + , + { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, + 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, + 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B } + , + { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE, + 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, + 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, + 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_iv[16] = + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F } +; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_plain[CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC][16] = +{ + { 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, + 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A }, + { 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C, + 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51 }, + { 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11, + 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF } + +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_cipher[3][CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC][16] = +{ + { + { 0x16, 0x07, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x36, 0xBB, 0xF0, + 0x0D, 0xAE, 0xB0, 0xB5, 0x03, 0xC8, 0x31, 0xAB }, + { 0xA2, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0x67, 0x16, 0x29, 0xEF, 0x78, + 0x40, 0xC5, 0xA5, 0xDF, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x48, 0x87 }, + { 0x0F, 0x06, 0x16, 0x50, 0x08, 0xCF, 0x8B, 0x8B, + 0x5A, 0x63, 0x58, 0x63, 0x62, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x54 } + }, + { + { 0x2A, 0x48, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x5A, 0xC4, 0xA1, 0xA2, + 0x40, 0x59, 0x55, 0xFD, 0x21, 0x95, 0xCF, 0x93 }, + { 0x5D, 0x5A, 0x86, 0x9B, 0xD1, 0x4C, 0xE5, 0x42, + 0x64, 0xF8, 0x92, 0xA6, 0xDD, 0x2E, 0xC3, 0xD5 }, + { 0x37, 0xD3, 0x59, 0xC3, 0x34, 0x98, 0x36, 0xD8, + 0x84, 0xE3, 0x10, 0xAD, 0xDF, 0x68, 0xC4, 0x49 } + }, + { + { 0xE6, 0xCF, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xC0, 0x2B, 0x13, 0x4A, + 0x4D, 0x2C, 0x0B, 0x67, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x3E, 0xDA }, + { 0x36, 0xCB, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x4B, 0x40, + 0x70, 0xB1, 0xB7, 0xDE, 0x2B, 0x21, 0xEB, 0x50 }, + { 0xE3, 0x1A, 0x60, 0x55, 0x29, 0x7D, 0x96, 0xCA, + 0x33, 0x30, 0xCD, 0xF1, 0xB1, 0x86, 0x0A, 0x83 } + } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * Camellia-CTR test vectors from: + * + * http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc5528.html + */ + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_key[3][16] = +{ + { 0xAE, 0x68, 0x52, 0xF8, 0x12, 0x10, 0x67, 0xCC, + 0x4B, 0xF7, 0xA5, 0x76, 0x55, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x9E }, + { 0x7E, 0x24, 0x06, 0x78, 0x17, 0xFA, 0xE0, 0xD7, + 0x43, 0xD6, 0xCE, 0x1F, 0x32, 0x53, 0x91, 0x63 }, + { 0x76, 0x91, 0xBE, 0x03, 0x5E, 0x50, 0x20, 0xA8, + 0xAC, 0x6E, 0x61, 0x85, 0x29, 0xF9, 0xA0, 0xDC } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_nonce_counter[3][16] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, + { 0x00, 0x6C, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0x54, 0x3B, 0x59, + 0xDA, 0x48, 0xD9, 0x0B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, + { 0x00, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x7B, 0x27, 0x77, 0x7F, 0x3F, + 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_pt[3][48] = +{ + { 0x53, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62, + 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x63, 0x6B, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x73, 0x67 }, + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F }, + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, + 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23 } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_ct[3][48] = +{ + { 0xD0, 0x9D, 0xC2, 0x9A, 0x82, 0x14, 0x61, 0x9A, + 0x20, 0x87, 0x7C, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x0B, 0x3F }, + { 0xDB, 0xF3, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0xC0, 0x83, 0x96, 0xD4, + 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x90, 0x77, 0x65, 0xBB, 0xCB, 0x44, + 0x2B, 0x8E, 0x8E, 0x0F, 0x31, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xA7, + 0x2C, 0x74, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x53, 0x60, 0xE0, 0x48 }, + { 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x1F, 0xCD, 0xCB, 0x75, 0xEB, 0x88, + 0x2F, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0x85, 0xCF, 0x73, + 0x9C, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x2B, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0x73, 0xF1, + 0x4F, 0x2D, 0x5D, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x98, 0x89, 0xCD, + 0xDF, 0x50, 0x86, 0x96 } +}; + +static const int camellia_test_ctr_len[3] = + { 16, 32, 36 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, j, u, v; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char buf[64]; + unsigned char src[16]; + unsigned char dst[16]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + unsigned char iv[16]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + size_t offset, len; + unsigned char nonce_counter[16]; + unsigned char stream_block[16]; +#endif + int ret = 1; + + mbedtls_camellia_context ctx; + + mbedtls_camellia_init( &ctx ); + memset( key, 0, 32 ); + + for( j = 0; j < 6; j++ ) { + u = j >> 1; + v = j & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CAMELLIA-ECB-%3d (%s): ", 128 + u * 64, + (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + + for( i = 0; i < CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB; i++ ) { + memcpy( key, camellia_test_ecb_key[u][i], 16 + 8 * u ); + + if( v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) { + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( &ctx, key, 128 + u * 64 ); + memcpy( src, camellia_test_ecb_cipher[u][i], 16 ); + memcpy( dst, camellia_test_ecb_plain[i], 16 ); + } else { /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT */ + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, 128 + u * 64 ); + memcpy( src, camellia_test_ecb_plain[i], 16 ); + memcpy( dst, camellia_test_ecb_cipher[u][i], 16 ); + } + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( &ctx, v, src, buf ); + + if( memcmp( buf, dst, 16 ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /* + * CBC mode + */ + for( j = 0; j < 6; j++ ) + { + u = j >> 1; + v = j & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CAMELLIA-CBC-%3d (%s): ", 128 + u * 64, + ( v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( src, camellia_test_cbc_iv, 16 ); + memcpy( dst, camellia_test_cbc_iv, 16 ); + memcpy( key, camellia_test_cbc_key[u], 16 + 8 * u ); + + if( v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) { + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( &ctx, key, 128 + u * 64 ); + } else { + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, 128 + u * 64 ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC; i++ ) { + + if( v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) { + memcpy( iv , src, 16 ); + memcpy( src, camellia_test_cbc_cipher[u][i], 16 ); + memcpy( dst, camellia_test_cbc_plain[i], 16 ); + } else { /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT */ + memcpy( iv , dst, 16 ); + memcpy( src, camellia_test_cbc_plain[i], 16 ); + memcpy( dst, camellia_test_cbc_cipher[u][i], 16 ); + } + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( &ctx, v, 16, iv, src, buf ); + + if( memcmp( buf, dst, 16 ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + /* + * CTR mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + v = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CAMELLIA-CTR-128 (%s): ", + ( v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( nonce_counter, camellia_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16 ); + memcpy( key, camellia_test_ctr_key[u], 16 ); + + offset = 0; + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( &ctx, key, 128 ); + + if( v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT ) + { + len = camellia_test_ctr_len[u]; + memcpy( buf, camellia_test_ctr_ct[u], len ); + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( &ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, stream_block, + buf, buf ); + + if( memcmp( buf, camellia_test_ctr_pt[u], len ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } + else + { + len = camellia_test_ctr_len[u]; + memcpy( buf, camellia_test_ctr_pt[u], len ); + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( &ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, stream_block, + buf, buf ); + + if( memcmp( buf, camellia_test_ctr_ct[u], len ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free( &ctx ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ccm.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ccm.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e0d43334 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ccm.c @@ -0,0 +1,539 @@ +/* + * NIST SP800-38C compliant CCM implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * Definition of CCM: + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf + * RFC 3610 "Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)" + * + * Related: + * RFC 5116 "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption" + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) + +#define CCM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ) +#define CCM_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#define CCM_ENCRYPT 0 +#define CCM_DECRYPT 1 + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ccm_init( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ) +{ + CCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + if( cipher_info->block_size != 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Macros for common operations. + * Results in smaller compiled code than static inline functions. + */ + +/* + * Update the CBC-MAC state in y using a block in b + * (Always using b as the source helps the compiler optimise a bit better.) + */ +#define UPDATE_CBC_MAC \ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) \ + y[i] ^= b[i]; \ + \ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, y, 16, y, &olen ) ) != 0 ) \ + return( ret ); + +/* + * Encrypt or decrypt a partial block with CTR + * Warning: using b for temporary storage! src and dst must not be b! + * This avoids allocating one more 16 bytes buffer while allowing src == dst. + */ +#define CTR_CRYPT( dst, src, len ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctr, \ + 16, b, &olen ) ) != 0 ) \ + { \ + return( ret ); \ + } \ + \ + for( i = 0; i < (len); i++ ) \ + (dst)[i] = (src)[i] ^ b[i]; \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * Authenticated encryption or decryption + */ +static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + unsigned char q; + size_t len_left, olen; + unsigned char b[16]; + unsigned char y[16]; + unsigned char ctr[16]; + const unsigned char *src; + unsigned char *dst; + + /* + * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1 + * Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code. + * 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block) + * + * Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4). + */ + if( tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + /* Also implies q is within bounds */ + if( iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + if( add_len >= 0xFF00 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len; + + /* + * First block B_0: + * 0 .. 0 flags + * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) + * iv_len+1 .. 15 length + * + * With flags as (bits): + * 7 0 + * 6 add present? + * 5 .. 3 (t - 2) / 2 + * 2 .. 0 q - 1 + */ + b[0] = 0; + b[0] |= ( add_len > 0 ) << 6; + b[0] |= ( ( tag_len - 2 ) / 2 ) << 3; + b[0] |= q - 1; + + memcpy( b + 1, iv, iv_len ); + + for( i = 0, len_left = length; i < q; i++, len_left >>= 8 ) + b[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len_left ); + + if( len_left > 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + + /* Start CBC-MAC with first block */ + memset( y, 0, 16 ); + UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + + /* + * If there is additional data, update CBC-MAC with + * add_len, add, 0 (padding to a block boundary) + */ + if( add_len > 0 ) + { + size_t use_len; + len_left = add_len; + src = add; + + memset( b, 0, 16 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( add_len, b, 0 ); + + use_len = len_left < 16 - 2 ? len_left : 16 - 2; + memcpy( b + 2, src, use_len ); + len_left -= use_len; + src += use_len; + + UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + + while( len_left > 0 ) + { + use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left; + + memset( b, 0, 16 ); + memcpy( b, src, use_len ); + UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + + len_left -= use_len; + src += use_len; + } + } + + /* + * Prepare counter block for encryption: + * 0 .. 0 flags + * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) + * iv_len+1 .. 15 counter (initially 1) + * + * With flags as (bits): + * 7 .. 3 0 + * 2 .. 0 q - 1 + */ + ctr[0] = q - 1; + memcpy( ctr + 1, iv, iv_len ); + memset( ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, q ); + ctr[15] = 1; + + /* + * Authenticate and {en,de}crypt the message. + * + * The only difference between encryption and decryption is + * the respective order of authentication and {en,de}cryption. + */ + len_left = length; + src = input; + dst = output; + + while( len_left > 0 ) + { + size_t use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left; + + if( mode == CCM_ENCRYPT ) + { + memset( b, 0, 16 ); + memcpy( b, src, use_len ); + UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + } + + CTR_CRYPT( dst, src, use_len ); + + if( mode == CCM_DECRYPT ) + { + memset( b, 0, 16 ); + memcpy( b, dst, use_len ); + UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + } + + dst += use_len; + src += use_len; + len_left -= use_len; + + /* + * Increment counter. + * No need to check for overflow thanks to the length check above. + */ + for( i = 0; i < q; i++ ) + if( ++ctr[15-i] != 0 ) + break; + } + + /* + * Authentication: reset counter and crypt/mask internal tag + */ + for( i = 0; i < q; i++ ) + ctr[15-i] = 0; + + CTR_CRYPT( y, y, 16 ); + memcpy( tag, y, tag_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Authenticated encryption + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + return( ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, + add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + if( tag_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + return( mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add, + add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Authenticated decryption + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char check_tag[16]; + unsigned char i; + int diff; + + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = ccm_auth_crypt( ctx, CCM_DECRYPT, length, + iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + input, output, check_tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ + for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ ) + diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i]; + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, length ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + + if( tag_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + return( mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add, + add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* + * Examples 1 to 3 from SP800-38C Appendix C + */ + +#define NB_TESTS 3 +#define CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN 24 +#define CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN 32 +/* + * The data is the same for all tests, only the used length changes + */ +static const unsigned char key_test_data[] = { + 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, + 0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f +}; + +static const unsigned char iv_test_data[] = { + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b +}; + +static const unsigned char ad_test_data[] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13 +}; + +static const unsigned char msg_test_data[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN] = { + 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, + 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, + 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, +}; + +static const size_t iv_len_test_data [NB_TESTS] = { 7, 8, 12 }; +static const size_t add_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 8, 16, 20 }; +static const size_t msg_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 16, 24 }; +static const size_t tag_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 6, 8 }; + +static const unsigned char res_test_data[NB_TESTS][CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN] = { + { 0x71, 0x62, 0x01, 0x5b, 0x4d, 0xac, 0x25, 0x5d }, + { 0xd2, 0xa1, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0x51, 0xea, 0x5f, 0x62, + 0x08, 0x1a, 0x77, 0x92, 0x07, 0x3d, 0x59, 0x3d, + 0x1f, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xbf, 0xac, 0xcd }, + { 0xe3, 0xb2, 0x01, 0xa9, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x1a, 0x7a, + 0x9b, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xec, 0xcd, 0x97, 0xe7, 0x0b, + 0x61, 0x76, 0xaa, 0xd9, 0xa4, 0x42, 0x8a, 0xa5, + 0x48, 0x43, 0x92, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0xb0, 0x99, 0x51 } +}; + +int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_ccm_context ctx; + /* + * Some hardware accelerators require the input and output buffers + * would be in RAM, because the flash is not accessible. + * Use buffers on the stack to hold the test vectors data. + */ + unsigned char plaintext[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN]; + unsigned char ciphertext[CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN]; + size_t i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &ctx ); + + if( mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key_test_data, + 8 * sizeof key_test_data ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CCM: setup failed" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < NB_TESTS; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CCM-AES #%u: ", (unsigned int) i + 1 ); + + memset( plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN ); + memset( ciphertext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN ); + memcpy( plaintext, msg_test_data, msg_len_test_data[i] ); + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data, iv_len_test_data[i], + ad_test_data, add_len_test_data[i], + plaintext, ciphertext, + ciphertext + msg_len_test_data[i], + tag_len_test_data[i] ); + + if( ret != 0 || + memcmp( ciphertext, res_test_data[i], + msg_len_test_data[i] + tag_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + memset( plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN ); + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data, iv_len_test_data[i], + ad_test_data, add_len_test_data[i], + ciphertext, plaintext, + ciphertext + msg_len_test_data[i], + tag_len_test_data[i] ); + + if( ret != 0 || + memcmp( plaintext, msg_test_data, msg_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + mbedtls_ccm_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/certs.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/certs.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a5695e3c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/certs.c @@ -0,0 +1,1746 @@ +/* + * X.509 test certificates + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) + +/* + * Test CA Certificates + * + * We define test CA certificates for each choice of the following parameters: + * - PEM or DER encoding + * - SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash + * - RSA or EC key + * + * Things to add: + * - multiple EC curve types + * + */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt */ +#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIICBDCCAYigAwIBAgIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQAwPjELMAkGA1UE\r\n" \ + "BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0\r\n" \ + "IEVDIENBMB4XDTE5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFoXDTI5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFowPjELMAkGA1UE\r\n" \ + "BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0\r\n" \ + "IEVDIENBMHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEw9orNEE3WC+HVv78ibopQ0tO\r\n" \ + "4G7DDldTMzlY1FK0kZU5CyPfXxckYkj8GpUpziwth8KIUoCv1mqrId240xxuWLjK\r\n" \ + "6LJpjvNBrSnDtF91p0dv1RkpVWmaUzsgtGYWYDMeo1AwTjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/\r\n" \ + "MB0GA1UdDgQWBBSdbSAkSQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSdbSAk\r\n" \ + "SQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAA2gAMGUCMFHKrjAPpHB0BN1a\r\n" \ + "LH8TwcJ3vh0AxeKZj30mRdOKBmg/jLS3rU3g8VQBHpn8sOTTBwIxANxPO5AerimZ\r\n" \ + "hCjMe0d4CTHf1gFZMF70+IqEP+o5VHsIp2Cqvflb0VGWFC5l9a4cQg==\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt.der */ +#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x04, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x88, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x43, 0xe2, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x43, 0xcc, 0xe8, \ + 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, \ + 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ + 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, \ + 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, \ + 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x39, \ + 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x17, \ + 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, \ + 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ + 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, \ + 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, \ + 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x76, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, \ + 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, \ + 0x00, 0x22, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xda, 0x2b, 0x34, 0x41, 0x37, \ + 0x58, 0x2f, 0x87, 0x56, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0x89, 0xba, 0x29, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x4e, \ + 0xe0, 0x6e, 0xc3, 0x0e, 0x57, 0x53, 0x33, 0x39, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x52, 0xb4, \ + 0x91, 0x95, 0x39, 0x0b, 0x23, 0xdf, 0x5f, 0x17, 0x24, 0x62, 0x48, 0xfc, \ + 0x1a, 0x95, 0x29, 0xce, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x87, 0xc2, 0x88, 0x52, 0x80, 0xaf, \ + 0xd6, 0x6a, 0xab, 0x21, 0xdd, 0xb8, 0xd3, 0x1c, 0x6e, 0x58, 0xb8, 0xca, \ + 0xe8, 0xb2, 0x69, 0x8e, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xad, 0x29, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0x5f, 0x75, \ + 0xa7, 0x47, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0x19, 0x29, 0x55, 0x69, 0x9a, 0x53, 0x3b, 0x20, \ + 0xb4, 0x66, 0x16, 0x60, 0x33, 0x1e, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, \ + 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x9d, \ + 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, \ + 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, \ + 0x49, 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, \ + 0xdb, 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ + 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, \ + 0x30, 0x51, 0xca, 0xae, 0x30, 0x0f, 0xa4, 0x70, 0x74, 0x04, 0xdd, 0x5a, \ + 0x2c, 0x7f, 0x13, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0x77, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x00, 0xc5, 0xe2, 0x99, \ + 0x8f, 0x7d, 0x26, 0x45, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0x06, 0x68, 0x3f, 0x8c, 0xb4, 0xb7, \ + 0xad, 0x4d, 0xe0, 0xf1, 0x54, 0x01, 0x1e, 0x99, 0xfc, 0xb0, 0xe4, 0xd3, \ + 0x07, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0xdc, 0x4f, 0x3b, 0x90, 0x1e, 0xae, 0x29, 0x99, \ + 0x84, 0x28, 0xcc, 0x7b, 0x47, 0x78, 0x09, 0x31, 0xdf, 0xd6, 0x01, 0x59, \ + 0x30, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0xf8, 0x8a, 0x84, 0x3f, 0xea, 0x39, 0x54, 0x7b, 0x08, \ + 0xa7, 0x60, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xf9, 0x5b, 0xd1, 0x51, 0x96, 0x14, 0x2e, 0x65, \ + 0xf5, 0xae, 0x1c, 0x42 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.enc */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.enc */ +#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ + "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\r\n" \ + "DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,307EAB469933D64E\r\n" \ + "\r\n" \ + "IxbrRmKcAzctJqPdTQLA4SWyBYYGYJVkYEna+F7Pa5t5Yg/gKADrFKcm6B72e7DG\r\n" \ + "ihExtZI648s0zdYw6qSJ74vrPSuWDe5qm93BqsfVH9svtCzWHW0pm1p0KTBCFfUq\r\n" \ + "UsuWTITwJImcnlAs1gaRZ3sAWm7cOUidL0fo2G0fYUFNcYoCSLffCFTEHBuPnagb\r\n" \ + "a77x/sY1Bvii8S9/XhDTb6pTMx06wzrm\r\n" \ + "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +#define TEST_CA_PWD_EC_PEM "PolarSSLTest" + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.der */ +#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x81, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x30, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x15, 0x0e, \ + 0xa0, 0x71, 0xf0, 0x57, 0x10, 0x33, 0xa3, 0x38, 0xb8, 0x86, 0xc1, 0xa6, \ + 0x11, 0x5d, 0x6d, 0xb4, 0x03, 0xe1, 0x29, 0x76, 0x45, 0xd7, 0x87, 0x6f, \ + 0x23, 0xab, 0x44, 0x20, 0xea, 0x64, 0x7b, 0x85, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xe7, 0x85, \ + 0x95, 0xaa, 0x74, 0xd6, 0xd1, 0xa4, 0x5e, 0xea, 0xa0, 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, \ + 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22, 0xa1, 0x64, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00, 0x04, 0xc3, \ + 0xda, 0x2b, 0x34, 0x41, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2f, 0x87, 0x56, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0x89, \ + 0xba, 0x29, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x4e, 0xe0, 0x6e, 0xc3, 0x0e, 0x57, 0x53, 0x33, \ + 0x39, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x91, 0x95, 0x39, 0x0b, 0x23, 0xdf, 0x5f, \ + 0x17, 0x24, 0x62, 0x48, 0xfc, 0x1a, 0x95, 0x29, 0xce, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x87, \ + 0xc2, 0x88, 0x52, 0x80, 0xaf, 0xd6, 0x6a, 0xab, 0x21, 0xdd, 0xb8, 0xd3, \ + 0x1c, 0x6e, 0x58, 0xb8, 0xca, 0xe8, 0xb2, 0x69, 0x8e, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xad, \ + 0x29, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0x5f, 0x75, 0xa7, 0x47, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0x19, 0x29, 0x55, \ + 0x69, 0x9a, 0x53, 0x3b, 0x20, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x16, 0x60, 0x33, 0x1e \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt */ +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ + "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ + "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G\r\n" \ + "CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx\r\n" \ + "mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny\r\n" \ + "50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n\r\n" \ + "YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL\r\n" \ + "R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu\r\n" \ + "KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj\r\n" \ + "UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/\r\n" \ + "MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUA\r\n" \ + "A4IBAQA4qFSCth2q22uJIdE4KGHJsJjVEfw2/xn+MkTvCMfxVrvmRvqCtjE4tKDl\r\n" \ + "oK4MxFOek07oDZwvtAT9ijn1hHftTNS7RH9zd/fxNpfcHnMZXVC4w4DNA1fSANtW\r\n" \ + "5sY1JB5Je9jScrsLSS+mAjyv0Ow3Hb2Bix8wu7xNNrV5fIf7Ubm+wt6SqEBxu3Kb\r\n" \ + "+EfObAT4huf3czznhH3C17ed6NSbXwoXfby7stWUDeRJv08RaFOykf/Aae7bY5PL\r\n" \ + "yTVrkAnikMntJ9YI+hNNYt3inqq11A5cN0+rVTst8UKCxzQ4GpvroSwPKTFkbMw4\r\n" \ + "/anT1dVxr/BtwJfiESoK3/4CeXR1\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt.der + * using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt.der */ +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x29, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ + 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ + 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ + 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ + 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ + 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ + 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, \ + 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ + 0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, \ + 0x86, 0xde, 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, \ + 0x99, 0xd4, 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, \ + 0x9b, 0xc5, 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, \ + 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, \ + 0x93, 0xe8, 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, \ + 0xe7, 0x40, 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, \ + 0xf9, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, \ + 0x29, 0x00, 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, \ + 0xbd, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, \ + 0x60, 0xc3, 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, \ + 0x32, 0xbe, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, \ + 0xfb, 0xf5, 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, \ + 0xee, 0xe2, 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, \ + 0x47, 0xb1, 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, \ + 0xf1, 0x79, 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, \ + 0x6f, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, \ + 0xa1, 0x30, 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, \ + 0x28, 0xd1, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, \ + 0x09, 0xea, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, \ + 0xc9, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, \ + 0x9e, 0x99, 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, \ + 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, \ + 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, \ + 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, \ + 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, \ + 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, \ + 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, \ + 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ + 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, \ + 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x38, 0xa8, 0x54, 0x82, 0xb6, 0x1d, 0xaa, \ + 0xdb, 0x6b, 0x89, 0x21, 0xd1, 0x38, 0x28, 0x61, 0xc9, 0xb0, 0x98, 0xd5, \ + 0x11, 0xfc, 0x36, 0xff, 0x19, 0xfe, 0x32, 0x44, 0xef, 0x08, 0xc7, 0xf1, \ + 0x56, 0xbb, 0xe6, 0x46, 0xfa, 0x82, 0xb6, 0x31, 0x38, 0xb4, 0xa0, 0xe5, \ + 0xa0, 0xae, 0x0c, 0xc4, 0x53, 0x9e, 0x93, 0x4e, 0xe8, 0x0d, 0x9c, 0x2f, \ + 0xb4, 0x04, 0xfd, 0x8a, 0x39, 0xf5, 0x84, 0x77, 0xed, 0x4c, 0xd4, 0xbb, \ + 0x44, 0x7f, 0x73, 0x77, 0xf7, 0xf1, 0x36, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x1e, 0x73, 0x19, \ + 0x5d, 0x50, 0xb8, 0xc3, 0x80, 0xcd, 0x03, 0x57, 0xd2, 0x00, 0xdb, 0x56, \ + 0xe6, 0xc6, 0x35, 0x24, 0x1e, 0x49, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0xd2, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x0b, \ + 0x49, 0x2f, 0xa6, 0x02, 0x3c, 0xaf, 0xd0, 0xec, 0x37, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x81, \ + 0x8b, 0x1f, 0x30, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0x4d, 0x36, 0xb5, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x87, 0xfb, \ + 0x51, 0xb9, 0xbe, 0xc2, 0xde, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x40, 0x71, 0xbb, 0x72, 0x9b, \ + 0xf8, 0x47, 0xce, 0x6c, 0x04, 0xf8, 0x86, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0x73, 0x3c, 0xe7, \ + 0x84, 0x7d, 0xc2, 0xd7, 0xb7, 0x9d, 0xe8, 0xd4, 0x9b, 0x5f, 0x0a, 0x17, \ + 0x7d, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x94, 0x0d, 0xe4, 0x49, 0xbf, 0x4f, 0x11, \ + 0x68, 0x53, 0xb2, 0x91, 0xff, 0xc0, 0x69, 0xee, 0xdb, 0x63, 0x93, 0xcb, \ + 0xc9, 0x35, 0x6b, 0x90, 0x09, 0xe2, 0x90, 0xc9, 0xed, 0x27, 0xd6, 0x08, \ + 0xfa, 0x13, 0x4d, 0x62, 0xdd, 0xe2, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0x0e, 0x5c, \ + 0x37, 0x4f, 0xab, 0x55, 0x3b, 0x2d, 0xf1, 0x42, 0x82, 0xc7, 0x34, 0x38, \ + 0x1a, 0x9b, 0xeb, 0xa1, 0x2c, 0x0f, 0x29, 0x31, 0x64, 0x6c, 0xcc, 0x38, \ + 0xfd, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0x71, 0xaf, 0xf0, 0x6d, 0xc0, 0x97, 0xe2, \ + 0x11, 0x2a, 0x0a, 0xdf, 0xfe, 0x02, 0x79, 0x74, 0x75 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt */ +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ + "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ + "MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G\r\n" \ + "CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx\r\n" \ + "mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny\r\n" \ + "50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n\r\n" \ + "YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL\r\n" \ + "R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu\r\n" \ + "KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj\r\n" \ + "UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/\r\n" \ + "MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUA\r\n" \ + "A4IBAQABE3OEPfEd/bcJW5ZdU3/VgPNS4tMzh8gnJP/V2FcvFtGylMpQq6YnEBYI\r\n" \ + "yBHAL4DRvlMY5rnXGBp3ODR8MpqHC6AquRTCLzjS57iYff//4QFQqW9n92zctspv\r\n" \ + "czkaPKgjqo1No3Uq0Xaz10rcxyTUPrf5wNVRZ2V0KvllvAAVSzbI4mpdUXztjhST\r\n" \ + "S5A2BeWQAAOr0zq1F7TSRVJpJs7jmB2ai/igkh1IAjcuwV6VwlP+sbw0gjQ0NpGM\r\n" \ + "iHpnlzRAi/tIbtOvMIGOBU2TIfax/5jq1agUx5aPmT5TWAiJPOOP6l5xXnDwxeYS\r\n" \ + "NWqiX9GyusBZjezaCaHabjDLU0qQ\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt.der. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt.der */ +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x29, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ + 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ + 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ + 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ + 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ + 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ + 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, \ + 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ + 0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, \ + 0x86, 0xde, 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, \ + 0x99, 0xd4, 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, \ + 0x9b, 0xc5, 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, \ + 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, \ + 0x93, 0xe8, 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, \ + 0xe7, 0x40, 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, \ + 0xf9, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, \ + 0x29, 0x00, 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, \ + 0xbd, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, \ + 0x60, 0xc3, 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, \ + 0x32, 0xbe, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, \ + 0xfb, 0xf5, 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, \ + 0xee, 0xe2, 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, \ + 0x47, 0xb1, 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, \ + 0xf1, 0x79, 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, \ + 0x6f, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, \ + 0xa1, 0x30, 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, \ + 0x28, 0xd1, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, \ + 0x09, 0xea, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, \ + 0xc9, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, \ + 0x9e, 0x99, 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, \ + 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, \ + 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, \ + 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, \ + 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, \ + 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, \ + 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, \ + 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ + 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, \ + 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x13, 0x73, 0x84, 0x3d, 0xf1, 0x1d, \ + 0xfd, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x5b, 0x96, 0x5d, 0x53, 0x7f, 0xd5, 0x80, 0xf3, 0x52, \ + 0xe2, 0xd3, 0x33, 0x87, 0xc8, 0x27, 0x24, 0xff, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0x57, 0x2f, \ + 0x16, 0xd1, 0xb2, 0x94, 0xca, 0x50, 0xab, 0xa6, 0x27, 0x10, 0x16, 0x08, \ + 0xc8, 0x11, 0xc0, 0x2f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0xbe, 0x53, 0x18, 0xe6, 0xb9, 0xd7, \ + 0x18, 0x1a, 0x77, 0x38, 0x34, 0x7c, 0x32, 0x9a, 0x87, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0x2a, \ + 0xb9, 0x14, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x38, 0xd2, 0xe7, 0xb8, 0x98, 0x7d, 0xff, 0xff, \ + 0xe1, 0x01, 0x50, 0xa9, 0x6f, 0x67, 0xf7, 0x6c, 0xdc, 0xb6, 0xca, 0x6f, \ + 0x73, 0x39, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xa8, 0x23, 0xaa, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0x75, 0x2a, \ + 0xd1, 0x76, 0xb3, 0xd7, 0x4a, 0xdc, 0xc7, 0x24, 0xd4, 0x3e, 0xb7, 0xf9, \ + 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x51, 0x67, 0x65, 0x74, 0x2a, 0xf9, 0x65, 0xbc, 0x00, 0x15, \ + 0x4b, 0x36, 0xc8, 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x5d, 0x51, 0x7c, 0xed, 0x8e, 0x14, 0x93, \ + 0x4b, 0x90, 0x36, 0x05, 0xe5, 0x90, 0x00, 0x03, 0xab, 0xd3, 0x3a, 0xb5, \ + 0x17, 0xb4, 0xd2, 0x45, 0x52, 0x69, 0x26, 0xce, 0xe3, 0x98, 0x1d, 0x9a, \ + 0x8b, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x92, 0x1d, 0x48, 0x02, 0x37, 0x2e, 0xc1, 0x5e, 0x95, \ + 0xc2, 0x53, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xbc, 0x34, 0x82, 0x34, 0x34, 0x36, 0x91, 0x8c, \ + 0x88, 0x7a, 0x67, 0x97, 0x34, 0x40, 0x8b, 0xfb, 0x48, 0x6e, 0xd3, 0xaf, \ + 0x30, 0x81, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x4d, 0x93, 0x21, 0xf6, 0xb1, 0xff, 0x98, 0xea, \ + 0xd5, 0xa8, 0x14, 0xc7, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x99, 0x3e, 0x53, 0x58, 0x08, 0x89, \ + 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x8f, 0xea, 0x5e, 0x71, 0x5e, 0x70, 0xf0, 0xc5, 0xe6, 0x12, \ + 0x35, 0x6a, 0xa2, 0x5f, 0xd1, 0xb2, 0xba, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x8d, 0xec, 0xda, \ + 0x09, 0xa1, 0xda, 0x6e, 0x30, 0xcb, 0x53, 0x4a, 0x90 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca.key */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca.key */ +#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ + "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\r\n" \ + "DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,A8A95B05D5B7206B\r\n" \ + "\r\n" \ + "9Qd9GeArejl1GDVh2lLV1bHt0cPtfbh5h/5zVpAVaFpqtSPMrElp50Rntn9et+JA\r\n" \ + "7VOyboR+Iy2t/HU4WvA687k3Bppe9GwKHjHhtl//8xFKwZr3Xb5yO5JUP8AUctQq\r\n" \ + "Nb8CLlZyuUC+52REAAthdWgsX+7dJO4yabzUcQ22Tp9JSD0hiL43BlkWYUNK3dAo\r\n" \ + "PZlmiptjnzVTjg1MxsBSydZinWOLBV8/JQgxSPo2yD4uEfig28qbvQ2wNIn0pnAb\r\n" \ + "GxnSAOazkongEGfvcjIIs+LZN9gXFhxcOh6kc4Q/c99B7QWETwLLkYgZ+z1a9VY9\r\n" \ + "gEU7CwCxYCD+h9hY6FPmsK0/lC4O7aeRKpYq00rPPxs6i7phiexg6ax6yTMmArQq\r\n" \ + "QmK3TAsJm8V/J5AWpLEV6jAFgRGymGGHnof0DXzVWZidrcZJWTNuGEX90nB3ee2w\r\n" \ + "PXJEFWKoD3K3aFcSLdHYr3mLGxP7H9ThQai9VsycxZKS5kwvBKQ//YMrmFfwPk8x\r\n" \ + "vTeY4KZMaUrveEel5tWZC94RSMKgxR6cyE1nBXyTQnDOGbfpNNgBKxyKbINWoOJU\r\n" \ + "WJZAwlsQn+QzCDwpri7+sV1mS3gBE6UY7aQmnmiiaC2V3Hbphxct/en5QsfDOt1X\r\n" \ + "JczSfpRWLlbPznZg8OQh/VgCMA58N5DjOzTIK7sJJ5r+94ZBTCpgAMbF588f0NTR\r\n" \ + "KCe4yrxGJR7X02M4nvD4IwOlpsQ8xQxZtOSgXv4LkxvdU9XJJKWZ/XNKJeWztxSe\r\n" \ + "Z1vdTc2YfsDBA2SEv33vxHx2g1vqtw8SjDRT2RaQSS0QuSaMJimdOX6mTOCBKk1J\r\n" \ + "9Q5mXTrER+/LnK0jEmXsBXWA5bqqVZIyahXSx4VYZ7l7w/PHiUDtDgyRhMMKi4n2\r\n" \ + "iQvQcWSQTjrpnlJbca1/DkpRt3YwrvJwdqb8asZU2VrNETh5x0QVefDRLFiVpif/\r\n" \ + "tUaeAe/P1F8OkS7OIZDs1SUbv/sD2vMbhNkUoCms3/PvNtdnvgL4F0zhaDpKCmlT\r\n" \ + "P8vx49E7v5CyRNmED9zZg4o3wmMqrQO93PtTug3Eu9oVx1zPQM1NVMyBa2+f29DL\r\n" \ + "1nuTCeXdo9+ni45xx+jAI4DCwrRdhJ9uzZyC6962H37H6D+5naNvClFR1s6li1Gb\r\n" \ + "nqPoiy/OBsEx9CaDGcqQBp5Wme/3XW+6z1ISOx+igwNTVCT14mHdBMbya0eIKft5\r\n" \ + "X+GnwtgEMyCYyyWuUct8g4RzErcY9+yW9Om5Hzpx4zOuW4NPZgPDTgK+t2RSL/Yq\r\n" \ + "rE1njrgeGYcVeG3f+OftH4s6fPbq7t1A5ZgUscbLMBqr9tK+OqygR4EgKBPsH6Cz\r\n" \ + "L6zlv/2RV0qAHvVuDJcIDIgwY5rJtINEm32rhOeFNJwZS5MNIC1czXZx5//ugX7l\r\n" \ + "I4sy5nbVhwSjtAk8Xg5dZbdTZ6mIrb7xqH+fdakZor1khG7bC2uIwibD3cSl2XkR\r\n" \ + "wN48lslbHnqqagr6Xm1nNOSVl8C/6kbJEsMpLhAezfRtGwvOucoaE+WbeUNolGde\r\n" \ + "P/eQiddSf0brnpiLJRh7qZrl9XuqYdpUqnoEdMAfotDOID8OtV7gt8a48ad8VPW2\r\n" \ + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +#define TEST_CA_PWD_RSA_PEM "PolarSSLTest" + +/* This was generated from test-ca.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER tests/data_files/test-ca.key.der */ +#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, \ + 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, 0x86, 0xde, \ + 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, 0x99, 0xd4, \ + 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, 0x9b, 0xc5, \ + 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, 0xc0, 0x8d, \ + 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, 0x93, 0xe8, \ + 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, 0xe7, 0x40, \ + 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, 0xf9, 0x3e, \ + 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, 0x29, 0x00, \ + 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, 0xbd, 0x83, \ + 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, 0x60, 0xc3, \ + 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, 0x32, 0xbe, \ + 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, 0xfb, 0xf5, \ + 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, 0xee, 0xe2, \ + 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, 0x47, 0xb1, \ + 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, 0xf1, 0x79, \ + 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, 0x6f, 0x27, \ + 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, 0xa1, 0x30, \ + 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xd1, \ + 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, 0x09, 0xea, \ + 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, 0xc9, 0xab, \ + 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, 0x9e, 0x99, \ + 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ + 0x00, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x34, 0x6f, 0xdb, 0xc9, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x84, \ + 0xdc, 0x37, 0x45, 0xe1, 0x63, 0xad, 0xb8, 0xb6, 0x75, 0xb1, 0xc7, 0x35, \ + 0xb4, 0x77, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x77, 0xf9, 0x7e, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0xa3, 0xd1, 0xb7, \ + 0xcb, 0xa9, 0x5a, 0xc1, 0x87, 0xda, 0x5a, 0xfa, 0x17, 0xe4, 0xd5, 0x38, \ + 0x03, 0xde, 0x68, 0x98, 0x81, 0xec, 0xb5, 0xf2, 0x2a, 0x8d, 0xe9, 0x2c, \ + 0xf3, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x32, 0x17, 0x7f, 0x33, 0x81, 0xe8, 0x38, 0x72, 0xd5, \ + 0x9c, 0xfa, 0x4e, 0xfb, 0x26, 0xf5, 0x15, 0x0b, 0xaf, 0x84, 0x66, 0xab, \ + 0x02, 0xe0, 0x18, 0xd5, 0x91, 0x7c, 0xd6, 0x8f, 0xc9, 0x4b, 0x76, 0x08, \ + 0x2b, 0x1d, 0x81, 0x68, 0x30, 0xe1, 0xfa, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x13, 0x4e, 0x10, \ + 0x03, 0x35, 0x3e, 0xc5, 0xca, 0x58, 0x20, 0x8a, 0x21, 0x18, 0x38, 0xa0, \ + 0x0f, 0xed, 0xc4, 0xbb, 0x45, 0x6f, 0xf5, 0x84, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0x4e, \ + 0x9d, 0x58, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x35, 0x35, 0x69, 0xa1, 0xd2, 0xc4, 0xf2, 0xc1, \ + 0x48, 0x04, 0x20, 0x51, 0xb9, 0x6b, 0xa4, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4b, 0x84, 0x88, \ + 0x43, 0x48, 0x99, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0xa4, 0x97, 0xd6, 0xd6, 0x18, 0xf6, 0xec, \ + 0x5c, 0xd1, 0x31, 0x49, 0xc9, 0xf2, 0x8f, 0x0b, 0x4d, 0xef, 0x09, 0x02, \ + 0xfe, 0x7d, 0xfd, 0xbb, 0xaf, 0x2b, 0x83, 0x94, 0x22, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x3e, \ + 0x66, 0xf5, 0xe0, 0x57, 0xdc, 0xf2, 0xed, 0x2c, 0x3e, 0x81, 0x74, 0x76, \ + 0x1e, 0x96, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x1e, 0x32, 0x0e, 0x14, 0x31, 0xd0, 0x74, 0xf0, \ + 0xf4, 0x07, 0xbd, 0xc3, 0xd1, 0x22, 0xc2, 0xa8, 0x95, 0x92, 0x06, 0x7f, \ + 0x43, 0x02, 0x91, 0xbc, 0xdd, 0x23, 0x01, 0x89, 0x94, 0x20, 0x44, 0x64, \ + 0xf5, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xd2, 0x8f, 0xe8, 0x69, 0xa5, 0x29, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x50, \ + 0x9c, 0xe3, 0xe9, 0xcb, 0x75, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xe2, 0x29, 0x3e, \ + 0xaa, 0x6b, 0xd5, 0x59, 0x1e, 0x9c, 0xe6, 0x47, 0xd5, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0xe3, \ + 0xf1, 0x8e, 0x9e, 0xe9, 0x83, 0x5f, 0x10, 0x9f, 0x63, 0xec, 0x04, 0x44, \ + 0xcc, 0x3f, 0xf8, 0xd9, 0x3a, 0x17, 0xe0, 0x4f, 0xfe, 0xd8, 0x4d, 0xcd, \ + 0x46, 0x54, 0x74, 0xbf, 0x0a, 0xc4, 0x67, 0x9c, 0xa7, 0xd8, 0x89, 0x65, \ + 0x4c, 0xfd, 0x58, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x0f, 0xf4, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x55, 0xb0, 0x1d, \ + 0xed, 0xa7, 0x39, 0xfc, 0x4f, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0x75, 0x3a, 0xa3, 0x98, 0xa7, \ + 0x45, 0xf5, 0x66, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x65, 0xfb, 0x80, 0x23, 0xe6, 0xff, 0xfd, \ + 0x99, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0x6b, 0xff, 0x5e, 0x93, 0x66, 0xdf, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0xc3, \ + 0xf6, 0x38, 0x2e, 0xff, 0x69, 0xb5, 0xac, 0xae, 0xbb, 0xc6, 0x71, 0x16, \ + 0x6b, 0xd0, 0xf8, 0x22, 0xd9, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x20, 0xd2, 0xe2, 0x3a, \ + 0x70, 0x4b, 0xde, 0xab, 0x2f, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xda, 0x51, 0x9b, \ + 0xb8, 0xb2, 0x2a, 0x14, 0x75, 0x58, 0x40, 0x8d, 0x27, 0x70, 0xfa, 0x31, \ + 0x48, 0xb0, 0x20, 0x21, 0x34, 0xfa, 0x4c, 0x57, 0xa8, 0x11, 0x88, 0xf3, \ + 0xa7, 0xae, 0x21, 0xe9, 0xb6, 0x2b, 0xd1, 0xcd, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xd8, 0x0c, \ + 0x8a, 0x76, 0x22, 0x35, 0x44, 0xce, 0x3f, 0x25, 0x29, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x79, \ + 0xa7, 0x31, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x34, 0xb6, 0xf6, 0xb2, 0x3b, \ + 0xf3, 0x78, 0x5a, 0x04, 0x83, 0x33, 0x3e, 0xa2, 0xe2, 0x81, 0x82, 0x13, \ + 0xd4, 0x35, 0x17, 0x63, 0x9b, 0x9e, 0xc4, 0x8d, 0x91, 0x4c, 0x03, 0x77, \ + 0xc7, 0x71, 0x5b, 0xee, 0x83, 0x6d, 0xd5, 0x78, 0x88, 0xf6, 0x2c, 0x79, \ + 0xc2, 0x4a, 0xb4, 0x79, 0x90, 0x70, 0xbf, 0xdf, 0x34, 0x56, 0x96, 0x71, \ + 0xe3, 0x0e, 0x68, 0x91, 0xbc, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x33, 0xc0, 0xbe, 0x45, 0xd7, \ + 0xfc, 0x30, 0xfd, 0x01, 0x3b, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xd2, 0x9f, 0x2a, \ + 0xb7, 0x38, 0x19, 0xc7, 0x17, 0x95, 0x73, 0x78, 0xae, 0xf5, 0xcb, 0x75, \ + 0x83, 0x7f, 0x19, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x86, 0xfb, 0x4a, 0x15, 0x9a, 0xb6, 0x17, \ + 0x04, 0x49, 0x07, 0x8d, 0xf6, 0x66, 0x4a, 0x06, 0xf6, 0x05, 0xa7, 0xdf, \ + 0x66, 0x82, 0x3c, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x1d, 0x57, 0x89, 0x33, 0x5f, 0x9c, 0x05, \ + 0x75, 0x7f, 0xf3, 0x5d, 0xdc, 0x34, 0x65, 0x72, 0x85, 0x22, 0xa4, 0x14, \ + 0x1b, 0x41, 0xc3, 0xe4, 0xd0, 0x9e, 0x69, 0xd5, 0xeb, 0x38, 0x74, 0x70, \ + 0x43, 0xdc, 0xd9, 0x50, 0xe4, 0x97, 0x6d, 0x73, 0xd6, 0xfb, 0xc8, 0xa7, \ + 0xfa, 0xb4, 0xc2, 0xc4, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0x0c, 0xd5, 0x9f, 0x79, 0xb3, 0x54, \ + 0xc2, 0xb7, 0x6c, 0x3d, 0x7d, 0xcb, 0x2d, 0xf8, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x78, 0x5a, \ + 0x33, 0x2a, 0xb8, 0x0c, 0x6d, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xf2, 0x62, 0xd3, 0x42, 0xd0, \ + 0xbd, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0xa5, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xd4, 0xa9, 0x90, \ + 0x15, 0xde, 0xbf, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0xfb, 0xa1, 0xc2, 0xe4, 0x83, \ + 0xe3, 0x79, 0x65, 0x22, 0xd3, 0xb7, 0x49, 0x6c, 0x4d, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x22, \ + 0xb1, 0x60, 0xe7, 0x3a, 0x00, 0xb1, 0x38, 0xa2, 0xab, 0x0f, 0xb4, 0x6c, \ + 0xaa, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x34, 0xe3, 0x7c, 0x40, 0x78, 0x53, 0xb2, 0xf9, 0x23, \ + 0xea, 0xa0, 0x9a, 0xea, 0x60, 0xc8, 0x8f, 0xa6, 0xaf, 0xdf, 0x29, 0x09, \ + 0x4b, 0x06, 0x1e, 0x31, 0xad, 0x17, 0xda, 0xd8, 0xd1, 0xe9, 0x33, 0xab, \ + 0x5b, 0x18, 0x08, 0x5b, 0x87, 0xf8, 0xa5, 0x1f, 0xfd, 0xbb, 0xdc, 0xd8, \ + 0xed, 0x97, 0x57, 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x73, 0xd6, 0xf0, 0x9e, 0x01, 0xa6, 0x9b, \ + 0x48, 0x8e, 0x7a, 0xb4, 0xbb, 0xe5, 0x88, 0x91, 0xc5, 0x2a, 0xdf, 0x4b, \ + 0xba, 0xd0, 0x8b, 0x3e, 0x03, 0x97, 0x77, 0x2f, 0x47, 0x7e, 0x51, 0x0c, \ + 0xae, 0x65, 0x8d, 0xde, 0x87, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x20, 0x24, 0x0f, 0xd2, \ + 0xaf, 0xc2, 0x28, 0x3b, 0x97, 0x20, 0xb2, 0x92, 0x49, 0xeb, 0x09, 0x68, \ + 0x40, 0xb2, 0xbe, 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x83, 0x94, 0x34, 0x38, 0xd6, 0xc9, 0xec, \ + 0x34, 0x09, 0xf9, 0x41, 0x6d, 0x5c, 0x42, 0x94, 0xf7, 0x04, 0xfc, 0x32, \ + 0x39, 0x69, 0xbc, 0x1c, 0xfb, 0x3e, 0x61, 0x98, 0xc0, 0x80, 0xd8, 0x36, \ + 0x47, 0xc3, 0x6d, 0xc2, 0x2e, 0xe7, 0x81, 0x2a, 0x17, 0x34, 0x64, 0x30, \ + 0x4e, 0x96, 0xbb, 0x26, 0x16, 0xb9, 0x41, 0x36, 0xfe, 0x8a, 0xd6, 0x53, \ + 0x7c, 0xaa, 0xec, 0x39, 0x42, 0x50, 0xef, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0x01, 0x28, 0x32, \ + 0xca, 0x6d, 0xf5, 0x9a, 0x1e, 0x9f, 0x37, 0xbe, 0xfe, 0x38, 0x20, 0x22, \ + 0x91, 0x8c, 0xcd, 0x95, 0x02, 0xf2, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x1a, 0xb4, 0x43, 0xf0, \ + 0x19, 0xdf, 0x65, 0xc0, 0x92, 0xe7, 0x9d, 0x2f, 0x09, 0xe7, 0xec, 0x69, \ + 0xa8, 0xc2, 0x8f, 0x0d \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* + * Test server Certificates + * + * Test server certificates are defined for each choice + * of the following parameters: + * - PEM or DER encoding + * - SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash + * - RSA or EC key + * + * Things to add: + * - multiple EC curve types + */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server5.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM tests/data_files/server5.crt */ +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIICHzCCAaWgAwIBAgIBCTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjA+MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxHDAaBgNVBAMTE1BvbGFyc3NsIFRlc3QgRUMgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ + "MTMwOTI0MTU1MjA0WhcNMjMwOTIyMTU1MjA0WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMTCWxvY2FsaG9zdDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEG\r\n" \ + "CCqGSM49AwEHA0IABDfMVtl2CR5acj7HWS3/IG7ufPkGkXTQrRS192giWWKSTuUA\r\n" \ + "2CMR/+ov0jRdXRa9iojCa3cNVc2KKg76Aci07f+jgZ0wgZowCQYDVR0TBAIwADAd\r\n" \ + "BgNVHQ4EFgQUUGGlj9QH2deCAQzlZX+MY0anE74wbgYDVR0jBGcwZYAUnW0gJEkB\r\n" \ + "PyvLeLUZvH4kydv7NnyhQqRAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKEwhQb2xh\r\n" \ + "clNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAxMTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQYIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAoG\r\n" \ + "CCqGSM49BAMCA2gAMGUCMQCaLFzXptui5WQN8LlO3ddh1hMxx6tzgLvT03MTVK2S\r\n" \ + "C12r0Lz3ri/moSEpNZWqPjkCMCE2f53GXcYLqyfyJR078c/xNSUU5+Xxl7VZ414V\r\n" \ + "fGa5kHvHARBPc8YAIVIqDvHH1Q==\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/server5.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/server5.crt.der */ +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xa5, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x09, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ + 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, \ + 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ + 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x33, 0x30, 0x39, 0x32, 0x34, 0x31, 0x35, 0x35, 0x32, 0x30, 0x34, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x33, 0x30, 0x39, 0x32, 0x32, 0x31, 0x35, 0x35, \ + 0x32, 0x30, 0x34, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, \ + 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x59, \ + 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, \ + 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, \ + 0x04, 0x37, 0xcc, 0x56, 0xd9, 0x76, 0x09, 0x1e, 0x5a, 0x72, 0x3e, 0xc7, \ + 0x59, 0x2d, 0xff, 0x20, 0x6e, 0xee, 0x7c, 0xf9, 0x06, 0x91, 0x74, 0xd0, \ + 0xad, 0x14, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x68, 0x22, 0x59, 0x62, 0x92, 0x4e, 0xe5, 0x00, \ + 0xd8, 0x23, 0x11, 0xff, 0xea, 0x2f, 0xd2, 0x34, 0x5d, 0x5d, 0x16, 0xbd, \ + 0x8a, 0x88, 0xc2, 0x6b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0x55, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0x2a, 0x0e, 0xfa, \ + 0x01, 0xc8, 0xb4, 0xed, 0xff, 0xa3, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x30, 0x81, 0x9a, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x50, 0x61, 0xa5, \ + 0x8f, 0xd4, 0x07, 0xd9, 0xd7, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0c, 0xe5, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x8c, \ + 0x63, 0x46, 0xa7, 0x13, 0xbe, 0x30, 0x6e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, \ + 0x04, 0x67, 0x30, 0x65, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, \ + 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, 0xfb, \ + 0x36, 0x7c, 0xa1, 0x42, 0xa4, 0x40, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ + 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ + 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ + 0x03, 0x13, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, \ + 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x82, 0x09, \ + 0x00, 0xc1, 0x43, 0xe2, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x43, 0xcc, 0xe8, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, \ + 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, \ + 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0x9a, 0x2c, 0x5c, 0xd7, 0xa6, 0xdb, 0xa2, \ + 0xe5, 0x64, 0x0d, 0xf0, 0xb9, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xd7, 0x61, 0xd6, 0x13, 0x31, \ + 0xc7, 0xab, 0x73, 0x80, 0xbb, 0xd3, 0xd3, 0x73, 0x13, 0x54, 0xad, 0x92, \ + 0x0b, 0x5d, 0xab, 0xd0, 0xbc, 0xf7, 0xae, 0x2f, 0xe6, 0xa1, 0x21, 0x29, \ + 0x35, 0x95, 0xaa, 0x3e, 0x39, 0x02, 0x30, 0x21, 0x36, 0x7f, 0x9d, 0xc6, \ + 0x5d, 0xc6, 0x0b, 0xab, 0x27, 0xf2, 0x25, 0x1d, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xcf, 0xf1, \ + 0x35, 0x25, 0x14, 0xe7, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x97, 0xb5, 0x59, 0xe3, 0x5e, 0x15, \ + 0x7c, 0x66, 0xb9, 0x90, 0x7b, 0xc7, 0x01, 0x10, 0x4f, 0x73, 0xc6, 0x00, \ + 0x21, 0x52, 0x2a, 0x0e, 0xf1, 0xc7, 0xd5 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server5.key. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM tests/data_files/server5.key */ +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ + "MHcCAQEEIPEqEyB2AnCoPL/9U/YDHvdqXYbIogTywwyp6/UfDw6noAoGCCqGSM49\r\n" \ + "AwEHoUQDQgAEN8xW2XYJHlpyPsdZLf8gbu58+QaRdNCtFLX3aCJZYpJO5QDYIxH/\r\n" \ + "6i/SNF1dFr2KiMJrdw1VzYoqDvoByLTt/w==\r\n" \ + "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/server5.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER tests/data_files/server5.key.der */ +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xf1, 0x2a, 0x13, 0x20, 0x76, \ + 0x02, 0x70, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xbf, 0xfd, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x03, 0x1e, 0xf7, 0x6a, \ + 0x5d, 0x86, 0xc8, 0xa2, 0x04, 0xf2, 0xc3, 0x0c, 0xa9, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0x1f, \ + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ + 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x37, 0xcc, 0x56, \ + 0xd9, 0x76, 0x09, 0x1e, 0x5a, 0x72, 0x3e, 0xc7, 0x59, 0x2d, 0xff, 0x20, \ + 0x6e, 0xee, 0x7c, 0xf9, 0x06, 0x91, 0x74, 0xd0, 0xad, 0x14, 0xb5, 0xf7, \ + 0x68, 0x22, 0x59, 0x62, 0x92, 0x4e, 0xe5, 0x00, 0xd8, 0x23, 0x11, 0xff, \ + 0xea, 0x2f, 0xd2, 0x34, 0x5d, 0x5d, 0x16, 0xbd, 0x8a, 0x88, 0xc2, 0x6b, \ + 0x77, 0x0d, 0x55, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0x2a, 0x0e, 0xfa, 0x01, 0xc8, 0xb4, 0xed, \ + 0xff \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt */ +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ + "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ + "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \ + "AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" \ + "owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" \ + "NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n" \ + "tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P\r\n" \ + "hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" \ + "HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" \ + "VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" \ + "FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC465FJh\r\n" \ + "Pqel7zJngHIHJrqj/wVAxGAFOTF396XKATGAp+HRCqJ81Ry60CNK1jDzk8dv6M6U\r\n" \ + "HoS7RIFiM/9rXQCbJfiPD5xMTejZp5n5UYHAmxsxDaazfA5FuBhkfokKK6jD4Eq9\r\n" \ + "1C94xGKb6X4/VkaPF7cqoBBw/bHxawXc0UEPjqayiBpCYU/rJoVZgLqFVP7Px3sv\r\n" \ + "a1nOrNx8rPPI1hJ+ZOg8maiPTxHZnBVLakSSLQy/sWeWyazO1RnrbxjrbgQtYKz0\r\n" \ + "e3nwGpu1w13vfckFmUSBhHXH7AAS/HpKC4IH7G2GAk3+n8iSSN71sZzpxonQwVbo\r\n" \ + "pMZqLmbBm/7WPLc=\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt.der. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt.der */ +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x37, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ + 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ + 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ + 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ + 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x82, \ + 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, \ + 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, \ + 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, \ + 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, \ + 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, \ + 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, \ + 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 0x24, \ + 0xf5, 0x77, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x64, 0x8c, 0x9c, 0xb0, 0x28, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xda, \ + 0xea, 0x8c, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0x96, 0xbc, 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, \ + 0x36, 0xd4, 0xa3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xd8, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x61, 0xb4, \ + 0x66, 0x52, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x53, 0xaa, 0xab, 0x74, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x7d, \ + 0x19, 0x82, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0xd9, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x49, \ + 0x66, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x73, 0x46, 0xe8, 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0x69, 0x0c, \ + 0xb5, 0x00, 0x90, 0xe1, 0xda, 0x82, 0x10, 0x66, 0x7d, 0xae, 0x54, 0x2b, \ + 0x8b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x91, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x61, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x40, 0x49, 0x08, \ + 0xee, 0x68, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xd2, 0x46, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xaa, \ + 0x11, 0x03, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x44, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x0f, \ + 0x85, 0x8b, 0xda, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0x18, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x2f, 0xc7, \ + 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0x27, 0x89, 0x29, 0x01, 0xc5, \ + 0x90, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xf1, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x0e, 0xef, 0xd6, 0xde, \ + 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0x02, 0x3c, 0x9a, \ + 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x98, 0x5b, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x52, 0x96, \ + 0xd8, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x80, 0x88, 0x69, 0x39, 0x5a, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xb0, \ + 0xde, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xea, 0x12, 0x01, 0x30, 0x97, 0x02, \ + 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xa5, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x64, 0xb8, 0xdc, \ + 0xdf, 0x60, 0x0f, 0x50, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x60, 0xa8, 0x64, 0xaf, 0x4d, 0x8b, \ + 0x43, 0x93, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, \ + 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, \ + 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, \ + 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, \ + 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x2e, 0x3a, 0xe4, 0x52, 0x61, \ + 0x3e, 0xa7, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x32, 0x67, 0x80, 0x72, 0x07, 0x26, 0xba, 0xa3, \ + 0xff, 0x05, 0x40, 0xc4, 0x60, 0x05, 0x39, 0x31, 0x77, 0xf7, 0xa5, 0xca, \ + 0x01, 0x31, 0x80, 0xa7, 0xe1, 0xd1, 0x0a, 0xa2, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x1c, 0xba, \ + 0xd0, 0x23, 0x4a, 0xd6, 0x30, 0xf3, 0x93, 0xc7, 0x6f, 0xe8, 0xce, 0x94, \ + 0x1e, 0x84, 0xbb, 0x44, 0x81, 0x62, 0x33, 0xff, 0x6b, 0x5d, 0x00, 0x9b, \ + 0x25, 0xf8, 0x8f, 0x0f, 0x9c, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0xe8, 0xd9, 0xa7, 0x99, 0xf9, \ + 0x51, 0x81, 0xc0, 0x9b, 0x1b, 0x31, 0x0d, 0xa6, 0xb3, 0x7c, 0x0e, 0x45, \ + 0xb8, 0x18, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x89, 0x0a, 0x2b, 0xa8, 0xc3, 0xe0, 0x4a, 0xbd, \ + 0xd4, 0x2f, 0x78, 0xc4, 0x62, 0x9b, 0xe9, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x56, 0x46, 0x8f, \ + 0x17, 0xb7, 0x2a, 0xa0, 0x10, 0x70, 0xfd, 0xb1, 0xf1, 0x6b, 0x05, 0xdc, \ + 0xd1, 0x41, 0x0f, 0x8e, 0xa6, 0xb2, 0x88, 0x1a, 0x42, 0x61, 0x4f, 0xeb, \ + 0x26, 0x85, 0x59, 0x80, 0xba, 0x85, 0x54, 0xfe, 0xcf, 0xc7, 0x7b, 0x2f, \ + 0x6b, 0x59, 0xce, 0xac, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0xac, 0xf3, 0xc8, 0xd6, 0x12, 0x7e, \ + 0x64, 0xe8, 0x3c, 0x99, 0xa8, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0x11, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0x15, 0x4b, \ + 0x6a, 0x44, 0x92, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xbf, 0xb1, 0x67, 0x96, 0xc9, 0xac, 0xce, \ + 0xd5, 0x19, 0xeb, 0x6f, 0x18, 0xeb, 0x6e, 0x04, 0x2d, 0x60, 0xac, 0xf4, \ + 0x7b, 0x79, 0xf0, 0x1a, 0x9b, 0xb5, 0xc3, 0x5d, 0xef, 0x7d, 0xc9, 0x05, \ + 0x99, 0x44, 0x81, 0x84, 0x75, 0xc7, 0xec, 0x00, 0x12, 0xfc, 0x7a, 0x4a, \ + 0x0b, 0x82, 0x07, 0xec, 0x6d, 0x86, 0x02, 0x4d, 0xfe, 0x9f, 0xc8, 0x92, \ + 0x48, 0xde, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0xc6, 0x89, 0xd0, 0xc1, 0x56, 0xe8, \ + 0xa4, 0xc6, 0x6a, 0x2e, 0x66, 0xc1, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0xd6, 0x3c, 0xb7 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM tests/data_files/server2.crt */ +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM \ +"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ +"MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ +"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ +"MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ +"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \ +"AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" \ +"owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" \ +"NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n" \ +"tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P\r\n" \ +"hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" \ +"HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" \ +"VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" \ +"FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAJklg3Q4\r\n" \ +"cB7v7BzsxM/vLyKccO6op0/gZzM4ghuLq2Y32kl0sM6kSNUUmduuq3u/+GmUZN2A\r\n" \ +"O/7c+Hw7hDFEIvZk98aBGjCLqn3DmgHIv8ToQ67nellQxx2Uj309PdgjNi/r9HOc\r\n" \ +"KNAYPbBcg6MJGWWj2TI6vNaceios/DhOYx5V0j5nfqSJ/pnU0g9Ign2LAhgYpGJE\r\n" \ +"iEM9wW7hEMkwmk0h/sqZsrJsGH5YsF/VThSq/JVO1e2mZH2vruyZKJVBq+8tDNYp\r\n" \ +"HkK6tSyVYQhzIt3StMJWKMl/o5k2AYz6tSC164+1oG+ML3LWg8XrGKa91H4UOKap\r\n" \ +"Awgk0+4m0T25cNs=\r\n" \ +"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.crt.der. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER tests/data_files/server2.crt.der */ +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x37, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ + 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ + 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ + 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ + 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x82, \ + 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, \ + 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, \ + 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, \ + 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, \ + 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, \ + 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, \ + 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 0x24, \ + 0xf5, 0x77, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x64, 0x8c, 0x9c, 0xb0, 0x28, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xda, \ + 0xea, 0x8c, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0x96, 0xbc, 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, \ + 0x36, 0xd4, 0xa3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xd8, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x61, 0xb4, \ + 0x66, 0x52, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x53, 0xaa, 0xab, 0x74, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x7d, \ + 0x19, 0x82, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0xd9, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x49, \ + 0x66, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x73, 0x46, 0xe8, 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0x69, 0x0c, \ + 0xb5, 0x00, 0x90, 0xe1, 0xda, 0x82, 0x10, 0x66, 0x7d, 0xae, 0x54, 0x2b, \ + 0x8b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x91, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x61, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x40, 0x49, 0x08, \ + 0xee, 0x68, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xd2, 0x46, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xaa, \ + 0x11, 0x03, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x44, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x0f, \ + 0x85, 0x8b, 0xda, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0x18, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x2f, 0xc7, \ + 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0x27, 0x89, 0x29, 0x01, 0xc5, \ + 0x90, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xf1, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x0e, 0xef, 0xd6, 0xde, \ + 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0x02, 0x3c, 0x9a, \ + 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x98, 0x5b, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x52, 0x96, \ + 0xd8, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x80, 0x88, 0x69, 0x39, 0x5a, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xb0, \ + 0xde, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xea, 0x12, 0x01, 0x30, 0x97, 0x02, \ + 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xa5, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x64, 0xb8, 0xdc, \ + 0xdf, 0x60, 0x0f, 0x50, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x60, 0xa8, 0x64, 0xaf, 0x4d, 0x8b, \ + 0x43, 0x93, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, \ + 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, \ + 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, \ + 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, \ + 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x73, 0x0b, 0x4a, 0xc5, \ + 0xcb, 0xa0, 0xde, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x1c, 0x76, 0x04, 0x2b, 0x13, 0x0d, 0xc0, \ + 0x84, 0x11, 0xc5, 0x8f, 0x3a, 0xa7, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0x35, 0x7a, 0x77, 0xb8, \ + 0x20, 0x14, 0x82, 0xee, 0x54, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xb0, 0x52, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xce, \ + 0x59, 0x07, 0x4f, 0x51, 0x69, 0xfe, 0xd3, 0x2f, 0xe9, 0x09, 0xe7, 0x85, \ + 0x92, 0xd8, 0xba, 0xb1, 0xeb, 0xc5, 0x76, 0x5d, 0x61, 0x2d, 0xe9, 0x86, \ + 0xb5, 0xde, 0x2a, 0xf9, 0x3f, 0x53, 0x28, 0x42, 0x86, 0x83, 0x73, 0x43, \ + 0xe0, 0x04, 0x5f, 0x07, 0x90, 0x14, 0x65, 0x9f, 0x6e, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xbc, \ + 0x58, 0x19, 0x22, 0xc2, 0xeb, 0x39, 0x72, 0x51, 0x92, 0xd7, 0xb4, 0x1d, \ + 0x75, 0x2f, 0xd3, 0x3a, 0x2b, 0x01, 0xe7, 0xdb, 0x50, 0xae, 0xe2, 0xf1, \ + 0xd4, 0x4d, 0x5b, 0x3c, 0xbb, 0x41, 0x2b, 0x2a, 0xa4, 0xe2, 0x4a, 0x02, \ + 0xe5, 0x60, 0x14, 0x2c, 0x9c, 0x1f, 0xa6, 0xcc, 0x06, 0x4b, 0x25, 0x89, \ + 0x4e, 0x96, 0x30, 0x22, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0x58, 0x4d, 0xc3, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x6e, \ + 0x50, 0x1e, 0x8c, 0x65, 0xf5, 0xd9, 0x17, 0x35, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x43, 0xb2, \ + 0x29, 0xb7, 0xa8, 0x5e, 0x35, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x60, 0x42, 0x1a, 0x01, 0xcb, \ + 0xcb, 0x0b, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc1, 0x90, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xd1, 0x2c, \ + 0x02, 0xf4, 0x76, 0x41, 0xa4, 0xcb, 0x4b, 0x15, 0x98, 0x71, 0xf9, 0x35, \ + 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0x34, 0x96, 0x91, 0xbe, 0x32, 0x67, 0x2d, 0x6b, \ + 0xd3, 0x55, 0x04, 0x8a, 0x01, 0x50, 0xb4, 0xe3, 0x62, 0x78, 0x6c, 0x11, \ + 0x15, 0xa5, 0x2a, 0x11, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x1c, 0x9b, 0xc4, 0x10, 0x65, 0x60, \ + 0x87, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0x69, 0x59, 0x4e, 0x8f, 0x6b, 0xeb, 0xc1, 0xfe, 0x6b, \ + 0xe2, 0x63, 0x78, 0x95, 0x6e, 0xe0, 0x2d, 0xd7, 0xa7, 0x37, 0xa8 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.key. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/server2.key */ +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ + "MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwU2j3efNHdEE10lyuJmsDnjkOjxKzzoTFtBa5M2jAIin7h5r\r\n" \ + "lqdStJDvLXJ6PiSa/LY0rCT1d+AmZIycsCh9odrqjObJHJa8/sEEUrM21KP64bF2\r\n" \ + "2JDBYbRmUjaiJlOqq3ReB30Zgtsq2B+g2Q0cLUlm91slc0boC4pPaQy1AJDh2oIQ\r\n" \ + "Zn2uVCuLZXmRoeJhw81ASQjuaAzxi4bSRr/QuKoRAx5/VqgaHkQYDw+Fi9qLRF7i\r\n" \ + "GMZiL8dmjfpd2H3zJ4kpAcWQDj8n8TDISg7v1t7HxydrxwU9esQCPJodPg/oNJhb\r\n" \ + "y3NLUpbYEaIsgIhpOVrTD7DeWS8Rx/fqEgEwlwIDAQABAoIBAQCXR0S8EIHFGORZ\r\n" \ + "++AtOg6eENxD+xVs0f1IeGz57Tjo3QnXX7VBZNdj+p1ECvhCE/G7XnkgU5hLZX+G\r\n" \ + "Z0jkz/tqJOI0vRSdLBbipHnWouyBQ4e/A1yIJdlBtqXxJ1KE/ituHRbNc4j4kL8Z\r\n" \ + "/r6pvwnTI0PSx2Eqs048YdS92LT6qAv4flbNDxMn2uY7s4ycS4Q8w1JXnCeaAnYm\r\n" \ + "WYI5wxO+bvRELR2Mcz5DmVnL8jRyml6l6582bSv5oufReFIbyPZbQWlXgYnpu6He\r\n" \ + "GTc7E1zKYQGG/9+DQUl/1vQuCPqQwny0tQoX2w5tdYpdMdVm+zkLtbajzdTviJJa\r\n" \ + "TWzL6lt5AoGBAN86+SVeJDcmQJcv4Eq6UhtRr4QGMiQMz0Sod6ettYxYzMgxtw28\r\n" \ + "CIrgpozCc+UaZJLo7UxvC6an85r1b2nKPCLQFaggJ0H4Q0J/sZOhBIXaoBzWxveK\r\n" \ + "nupceKdVxGsFi8CDy86DBfiyFivfBj+47BbaQzPBj7C4rK7UlLjab2rDAoGBAN2u\r\n" \ + "AM2gchoFiu4v1HFL8D7lweEpi6ZnMJjnEu/dEgGQJFjwdpLnPbsj4c75odQ4Gz8g\r\n" \ + "sw9lao9VVzbusoRE/JGI4aTdO0pATXyG7eG1Qu+5Yc1YGXcCrliA2xM9xx+d7f+s\r\n" \ + "mPzN+WIEg5GJDYZDjAzHG5BNvi/FfM1C9dOtjv2dAoGAF0t5KmwbjWHBhcVqO4Ic\r\n" \ + "BVvN3BIlc1ue2YRXEDlxY5b0r8N4XceMgKmW18OHApZxfl8uPDauWZLXOgl4uepv\r\n" \ + "whZC3EuWrSyyICNhLY21Ah7hbIEBPF3L3ZsOwC+UErL+dXWLdB56Jgy3gZaBeW7b\r\n" \ + "vDrEnocJbqCm7IukhXHOBK8CgYEAwqdHB0hqyNSzIOGY7v9abzB6pUdA3BZiQvEs\r\n" \ + "3LjHVd4HPJ2x0N8CgrBIWOE0q8+0hSMmeE96WW/7jD3fPWwCR5zlXknxBQsfv0gP\r\n" \ + "3BC5PR0Qdypz+d+9zfMf625kyit4T/hzwhDveZUzHnk1Cf+IG7Q+TOEnLnWAWBED\r\n" \ + "ISOWmrUCgYAFEmRxgwAc/u+D6t0syCwAYh6POtscq9Y0i9GyWk89NzgC4NdwwbBH\r\n" \ + "4AgahOxIxXx2gxJnq3yfkJfIjwf0s2DyP0kY2y6Ua1OeomPeY9mrIS4tCuDQ6LrE\r\n" \ + "TB6l9VGoxJL4fyHnZb8L5gGvnB1bbD8cL6YPaDiOhcRseC9vBiEuVg==\r\n" \ + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This was generated from tests/data_files/server2.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER tests/data_files/server2.key.der */ +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, \ + 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, \ + 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, \ + 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, \ + 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, \ + 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 0x24, 0xf5, 0x77, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x64, 0x8c, 0x9c, \ + 0xb0, 0x28, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xda, 0xea, 0x8c, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0x96, 0xbc, \ + 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, 0x36, 0xd4, 0xa3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x76, \ + 0xd8, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x61, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x52, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x53, 0xaa, \ + 0xab, 0x74, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x7d, 0x19, 0x82, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x1f, 0xa0, \ + 0xd9, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x49, 0x66, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x73, 0x46, 0xe8, \ + 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0x69, 0x0c, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x90, 0xe1, 0xda, 0x82, 0x10, \ + 0x66, 0x7d, 0xae, 0x54, 0x2b, 0x8b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x91, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x61, \ + 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x40, 0x49, 0x08, 0xee, 0x68, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xd2, \ + 0x46, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xaa, 0x11, 0x03, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x1a, \ + 0x1e, 0x44, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x85, 0x8b, 0xda, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x5e, 0xe2, \ + 0x18, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x2f, 0xc7, 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xf3, \ + 0x27, 0x89, 0x29, 0x01, 0xc5, 0x90, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xf1, 0x30, 0xc8, \ + 0x4a, 0x0e, 0xef, 0xd6, 0xde, 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x3d, \ + 0x7a, 0xc4, 0x02, 0x3c, 0x9a, 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x98, 0x5b, \ + 0xcb, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x52, 0x96, 0xd8, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x80, 0x88, 0x69, \ + 0x39, 0x5a, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0xde, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xea, \ + 0x12, 0x01, 0x30, 0x97, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ + 0x01, 0x00, 0x97, 0x47, 0x44, 0xbc, 0x10, 0x81, 0xc5, 0x18, 0xe4, 0x59, \ + 0xfb, 0xe0, 0x2d, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0x9e, 0x10, 0xdc, 0x43, 0xfb, 0x15, 0x6c, \ + 0xd1, 0xfd, 0x48, 0x78, 0x6c, 0xf9, 0xed, 0x38, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x09, 0xd7, \ + 0x5f, 0xb5, 0x41, 0x64, 0xd7, 0x63, 0xfa, 0x9d, 0x44, 0x0a, 0xf8, 0x42, \ + 0x13, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x5e, 0x79, 0x20, 0x53, 0x98, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x86, \ + 0x67, 0x48, 0xe4, 0xcf, 0xfb, 0x6a, 0x24, 0xe2, 0x34, 0xbd, 0x14, 0x9d, \ + 0x2c, 0x16, 0xe2, 0xa4, 0x79, 0xd6, 0xa2, 0xec, 0x81, 0x43, 0x87, 0xbf, \ + 0x03, 0x5c, 0x88, 0x25, 0xd9, 0x41, 0xb6, 0xa5, 0xf1, 0x27, 0x52, 0x84, \ + 0xfe, 0x2b, 0x6e, 0x1d, 0x16, 0xcd, 0x73, 0x88, 0xf8, 0x90, 0xbf, 0x19, \ + 0xfe, 0xbe, 0xa9, 0xbf, 0x09, 0xd3, 0x23, 0x43, 0xd2, 0xc7, 0x61, 0x2a, \ + 0xb3, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xd4, 0xbd, 0xd8, 0xb4, 0xfa, 0xa8, 0x0b, 0xf8, \ + 0x7e, 0x56, 0xcd, 0x0f, 0x13, 0x27, 0xda, 0xe6, 0x3b, 0xb3, 0x8c, 0x9c, \ + 0x4b, 0x84, 0x3c, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x57, 0x9c, 0x27, 0x9a, 0x02, 0x76, 0x26, \ + 0x59, 0x82, 0x39, 0xc3, 0x13, 0xbe, 0x6e, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x2d, 0x1d, 0x8c, \ + 0x73, 0x3e, 0x43, 0x99, 0x59, 0xcb, 0xf2, 0x34, 0x72, 0x9a, 0x5e, 0xa5, \ + 0xeb, 0x9f, 0x36, 0x6d, 0x2b, 0xf9, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0xd1, 0x78, 0x52, 0x1b, \ + 0xc8, 0xf6, 0x5b, 0x41, 0x69, 0x57, 0x81, 0x89, 0xe9, 0xbb, 0xa1, 0xde, \ + 0x19, 0x37, 0x3b, 0x13, 0x5c, 0xca, 0x61, 0x01, 0x86, 0xff, 0xdf, 0x83, \ + 0x41, 0x49, 0x7f, 0xd6, 0xf4, 0x2e, 0x08, 0xfa, 0x90, 0xc2, 0x7c, 0xb4, \ + 0xb5, 0x0a, 0x17, 0xdb, 0x0e, 0x6d, 0x75, 0x8a, 0x5d, 0x31, 0xd5, 0x66, \ + 0xfb, 0x39, 0x0b, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0xcd, 0xd4, 0xef, 0x88, 0x92, 0x5a, \ + 0x4d, 0x6c, 0xcb, 0xea, 0x5b, 0x79, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xdf, 0x3a, \ + 0xf9, 0x25, 0x5e, 0x24, 0x37, 0x26, 0x40, 0x97, 0x2f, 0xe0, 0x4a, 0xba, \ + 0x52, 0x1b, 0x51, 0xaf, 0x84, 0x06, 0x32, 0x24, 0x0c, 0xcf, 0x44, 0xa8, \ + 0x77, 0xa7, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x8c, 0x58, 0xcc, 0xc8, 0x31, 0xb7, 0x0d, 0xbc, \ + 0x08, 0x8a, 0xe0, 0xa6, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x73, 0xe5, 0x1a, 0x64, 0x92, 0xe8, \ + 0xed, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0x0b, 0xa6, 0xa7, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0xf5, 0x6f, 0x69, 0xca, \ + 0x3c, 0x22, 0xd0, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x20, 0x27, 0x41, 0xf8, 0x43, 0x42, 0x7f, \ + 0xb1, 0x93, 0xa1, 0x04, 0x85, 0xda, 0xa0, 0x1c, 0xd6, 0xc6, 0xf7, 0x8a, \ + 0x9e, 0xea, 0x5c, 0x78, 0xa7, 0x55, 0xc4, 0x6b, 0x05, 0x8b, 0xc0, 0x83, \ + 0xcb, 0xce, 0x83, 0x05, 0xf8, 0xb2, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xdf, 0x06, 0x3f, 0xb8, \ + 0xec, 0x16, 0xda, 0x43, 0x33, 0xc1, 0x8f, 0xb0, 0xb8, 0xac, 0xae, 0xd4, \ + 0x94, 0xb8, 0xda, 0x6f, 0x6a, 0xc3, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xdd, 0xae, \ + 0x00, 0xcd, 0xa0, 0x72, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x8a, 0xee, 0x2f, 0xd4, 0x71, 0x4b, \ + 0xf0, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xc1, 0xe1, 0x29, 0x8b, 0xa6, 0x67, 0x30, 0x98, 0xe7, \ + 0x12, 0xef, 0xdd, 0x12, 0x01, 0x90, 0x24, 0x58, 0xf0, 0x76, 0x92, 0xe7, \ + 0x3d, 0xbb, 0x23, 0xe1, 0xce, 0xf9, 0xa1, 0xd4, 0x38, 0x1b, 0x3f, 0x20, \ + 0xb3, 0x0f, 0x65, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x55, 0x57, 0x36, 0xee, 0xb2, 0x84, 0x44, \ + 0xfc, 0x91, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xa4, 0xdd, 0x3b, 0x4a, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x7c, 0x86, \ + 0xed, 0xe1, 0xb5, 0x42, 0xef, 0xb9, 0x61, 0xcd, 0x58, 0x19, 0x77, 0x02, \ + 0xae, 0x58, 0x80, 0xdb, 0x13, 0x3d, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0x9d, 0xed, 0xff, 0xac, \ + 0x98, 0xfc, 0xcd, 0xf9, 0x62, 0x04, 0x83, 0x91, 0x89, 0x0d, 0x86, 0x43, \ + 0x8c, 0x0c, 0xc7, 0x1b, 0x90, 0x4d, 0xbe, 0x2f, 0xc5, 0x7c, 0xcd, 0x42, \ + 0xf5, 0xd3, 0xad, 0x8e, 0xfd, 0x9d, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x17, 0x4b, 0x79, \ + 0x2a, 0x6c, 0x1b, 0x8d, 0x61, 0xc1, 0x85, 0xc5, 0x6a, 0x3b, 0x82, 0x1c, \ + 0x05, 0x5b, 0xcd, 0xdc, 0x12, 0x25, 0x73, 0x5b, 0x9e, 0xd9, 0x84, 0x57, \ + 0x10, 0x39, 0x71, 0x63, 0x96, 0xf4, 0xaf, 0xc3, 0x78, 0x5d, 0xc7, 0x8c, \ + 0x80, 0xa9, 0x96, 0xd7, 0xc3, 0x87, 0x02, 0x96, 0x71, 0x7e, 0x5f, 0x2e, \ + 0x3c, 0x36, 0xae, 0x59, 0x92, 0xd7, 0x3a, 0x09, 0x78, 0xb9, 0xea, 0x6f, \ + 0xc2, 0x16, 0x42, 0xdc, 0x4b, 0x96, 0xad, 0x2c, 0xb2, 0x20, 0x23, 0x61, \ + 0x2d, 0x8d, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x1e, 0xe1, 0x6c, 0x81, 0x01, 0x3c, 0x5d, 0xcb, \ + 0xdd, 0x9b, 0x0e, 0xc0, 0x2f, 0x94, 0x12, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x75, 0x75, 0x8b, \ + 0x74, 0x1e, 0x7a, 0x26, 0x0c, 0xb7, 0x81, 0x96, 0x81, 0x79, 0x6e, 0xdb, \ + 0xbc, 0x3a, 0xc4, 0x9e, 0x87, 0x09, 0x6e, 0xa0, 0xa6, 0xec, 0x8b, 0xa4, \ + 0x85, 0x71, 0xce, 0x04, 0xaf, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xc2, 0xa7, 0x47, \ + 0x07, 0x48, 0x6a, 0xc8, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x20, 0xe1, 0x98, 0xee, 0xff, 0x5a, \ + 0x6f, 0x30, 0x7a, 0xa5, 0x47, 0x40, 0xdc, 0x16, 0x62, 0x42, 0xf1, 0x2c, \ + 0xdc, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x55, 0xde, 0x07, 0x3c, 0x9d, 0xb1, 0xd0, 0xdf, 0x02, \ + 0x82, 0xb0, 0x48, 0x58, 0xe1, 0x34, 0xab, 0xcf, 0xb4, 0x85, 0x23, 0x26, \ + 0x78, 0x4f, 0x7a, 0x59, 0x6f, 0xfb, 0x8c, 0x3d, 0xdf, 0x3d, 0x6c, 0x02, \ + 0x47, 0x9c, 0xe5, 0x5e, 0x49, 0xf1, 0x05, 0x0b, 0x1f, 0xbf, 0x48, 0x0f, \ + 0xdc, 0x10, 0xb9, 0x3d, 0x1d, 0x10, 0x77, 0x2a, 0x73, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0xbd, \ + 0xcd, 0xf3, 0x1f, 0xeb, 0x6e, 0x64, 0xca, 0x2b, 0x78, 0x4f, 0xf8, 0x73, \ + 0xc2, 0x10, 0xef, 0x79, 0x95, 0x33, 0x1e, 0x79, 0x35, 0x09, 0xff, 0x88, \ + 0x1b, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x4c, 0xe1, 0x27, 0x2e, 0x75, 0x80, 0x58, 0x11, 0x03, \ + 0x21, 0x23, 0x96, 0x9a, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x05, 0x12, 0x64, 0x71, \ + 0x83, 0x00, 0x1c, 0xfe, 0xef, 0x83, 0xea, 0xdd, 0x2c, 0xc8, 0x2c, 0x00, \ + 0x62, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0x3a, 0xdb, 0x1c, 0xab, 0xd6, 0x34, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0xb2, \ + 0x5a, 0x4f, 0x3d, 0x37, 0x38, 0x02, 0xe0, 0xd7, 0x70, 0xc1, 0xb0, 0x47, \ + 0xe0, 0x08, 0x1a, 0x84, 0xec, 0x48, 0xc5, 0x7c, 0x76, 0x83, 0x12, 0x67, \ + 0xab, 0x7c, 0x9f, 0x90, 0x97, 0xc8, 0x8f, 0x07, 0xf4, 0xb3, 0x60, 0xf2, \ + 0x3f, 0x49, 0x18, 0xdb, 0x2e, 0x94, 0x6b, 0x53, 0x9e, 0xa2, 0x63, 0xde, \ + 0x63, 0xd9, 0xab, 0x21, 0x2e, 0x2d, 0x0a, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xe8, 0xba, 0xc4, \ + 0x4c, 0x1e, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0x51, 0xa8, 0xc4, 0x92, 0xf8, 0x7f, 0x21, 0xe7, \ + 0x65, 0xbf, 0x0b, 0xe6, 0x01, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0x1d, 0x5b, 0x6c, 0x3f, 0x1c, \ + 0x2f, 0xa6, 0x0f, 0x68, 0x38, 0x8e, 0x85, 0xc4, 0x6c, 0x78, 0x2f, 0x6f, \ + 0x06, 0x21, 0x2e, 0x56 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* + * Test client Certificates + * + * Test client certificates are defined for each choice + * of the following parameters: + * - PEM or DER encoding + * - RSA or EC key + * + * Things to add: + * - hash type + * - multiple EC curve types + */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli2.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM tests/data_files/cli2.crt */ +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIIB3zCCAWOgAwIBAgIBDTAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREw\r\n" \ + "DwYDVQQKDAhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAwwTUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQTAe\r\n" \ + "Fw0xOTAyMTAxNDQ0MDBaFw0yOTAyMTAxNDQ0MDBaMEExCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREw\r\n" \ + "DwYDVQQKDAhQb2xhclNTTDEfMB0GA1UEAwwWUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVzdCBDbGllbnQg\r\n" \ + "MjBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABFflrrFz39Osu5O4gf8Sru7mU6zO\r\n" \ + "VVP2NA7MLuNjJQvfmOLzXGA2lsDVGBRw5X+f1UtFGOWwbNVc+JaPh3Cj5MejTTBL\r\n" \ + "MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHoAX4Zk/OBd5REQO7LmO8QmP8/iMB8GA1Ud\r\n" \ + "IwQYMBaAFJ1tICRJAT8ry3i1Gbx+JMnb+zZ8MAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQADaAAwZQIx\r\n" \ + "AMqme4DKMldUlplDET9Q6Eptre7uUWKhsLOF+zPkKDlfzpIkJYEFgcloDHGYw80u\r\n" \ + "IgIwNftyPXsabTqMM7iEHgVpX/GRozKklY9yQI/5eoA6gGW7Y+imuGR/oao5ySOb\r\n" \ + "a9Vk\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/cli2.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/cli2.crt.der */ +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xdf, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x63, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ + 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ + 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ + 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ + 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, \ + 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, \ + 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, \ + 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x41, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ + 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ + 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ + 0x03, 0x0c, 0x16, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, \ + 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, \ + 0x32, 0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ + 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, \ + 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x57, 0xe5, 0xae, 0xb1, 0x73, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0xac, \ + 0xbb, 0x93, 0xb8, 0x81, 0xff, 0x12, 0xae, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x53, 0xac, 0xce, \ + 0x55, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xcc, 0x2e, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x25, 0x0b, 0xdf, \ + 0x98, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x5c, 0x60, 0x36, 0x96, 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x18, 0x14, 0x70, \ + 0xe5, 0x7f, 0x9f, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x18, 0xe5, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0x5c, \ + 0xf8, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x87, 0x70, 0xa3, 0xe4, 0xc7, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, \ + 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, \ + 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x7a, 0x00, \ + 0x5f, 0x86, 0x64, 0xfc, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0xe5, 0x11, 0x10, 0x3b, 0xb2, 0xe6, \ + 0x3b, 0xc4, 0x26, 0x3f, 0xcf, 0xe2, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, \ + 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, \ + 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, \ + 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x31, \ + 0x00, 0xca, 0xa6, 0x7b, 0x80, 0xca, 0x32, 0x57, 0x54, 0x96, 0x99, 0x43, \ + 0x11, 0x3f, 0x50, 0xe8, 0x4a, 0x6d, 0xad, 0xee, 0xee, 0x51, 0x62, 0xa1, \ + 0xb0, 0xb3, 0x85, 0xfb, 0x33, 0xe4, 0x28, 0x39, 0x5f, 0xce, 0x92, 0x24, \ + 0x25, 0x81, 0x05, 0x81, 0xc9, 0x68, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x98, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x2e, \ + 0x22, 0x02, 0x30, 0x35, 0xfb, 0x72, 0x3d, 0x7b, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0x3a, 0x8c, \ + 0x33, 0xb8, 0x84, 0x1e, 0x05, 0x69, 0x5f, 0xf1, 0x91, 0xa3, 0x32, 0xa4, \ + 0x95, 0x8f, 0x72, 0x40, 0x8f, 0xf9, 0x7a, 0x80, 0x3a, 0x80, 0x65, 0xbb, \ + 0x63, 0xe8, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x64, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xc9, 0x23, 0x9b, \ + 0x6b, 0xd5, 0x64 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli2.key. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM tests/data_files/cli2.key */ +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ + "MHcCAQEEIPb3hmTxZ3/mZI3vyk7p3U3wBf+WIop6hDhkFzJhmLcqoAoGCCqGSM49\r\n" \ + "AwEHoUQDQgAEV+WusXPf06y7k7iB/xKu7uZTrM5VU/Y0Dswu42MlC9+Y4vNcYDaW\r\n" \ + "wNUYFHDlf5/VS0UY5bBs1Vz4lo+HcKPkxw==\r\n" \ + "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is generated from tests/data_files/cli2.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER tests/data_files/cli2.key.der */ +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0x86, 0x64, 0xf1, \ + 0x67, 0x7f, 0xe6, 0x64, 0x8d, 0xef, 0xca, 0x4e, 0xe9, 0xdd, 0x4d, 0xf0, \ + 0x05, 0xff, 0x96, 0x22, 0x8a, 0x7a, 0x84, 0x38, 0x64, 0x17, 0x32, 0x61, \ + 0x98, 0xb7, 0x2a, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ + 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x57, 0xe5, 0xae, \ + 0xb1, 0x73, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0xac, 0xbb, 0x93, 0xb8, 0x81, 0xff, 0x12, 0xae, \ + 0xee, 0xe6, 0x53, 0xac, 0xce, 0x55, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xcc, 0x2e, \ + 0xe3, 0x63, 0x25, 0x0b, 0xdf, 0x98, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x5c, 0x60, 0x36, 0x96, \ + 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x18, 0x14, 0x70, 0xe5, 0x7f, 0x9f, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x18, \ + 0xe5, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0x5c, 0xf8, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x87, 0x70, 0xa3, 0xe4, \ + 0xc7 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt */ +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ + "MIIDPzCCAiegAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ + "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ + "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ + "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMMEVBvbGFyU1NMIENsaWVudCAyMIIBIjAN\r\n" \ + "BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6f\r\n" \ + "M60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaFB9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu\r\n" \ + "1C93KYRhTYJQj6eVSHD1bk2y1RPD0hrt5kPqQhTrdOrA7R/UV06p86jt0uDBMHEw\r\n" \ + "MjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v\r\n" \ + "4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx/\r\n" \ + "/DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+vdqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQAB\r\n" \ + "o00wSzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITAf\r\n" \ + "BgNVHSMEGDAWgBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\r\n" \ + "AQEAXidv1d4pLlBiKWED95rMycBdgDcgyNqJxakFkRfRyA2y1mlyTn7uBXRkNLY5\r\n" \ + "ZFzK82GCjk2Q2OD4RZSCPAJJqLpHHU34t71ciffvy2KK81YvrxczRhMAE64i+qna\r\n" \ + "yP3Td2XuWJR05PVPoSemsNELs9gWttdnYy3ce+EY2Y0n7Rsi7982EeLIAA7H6ca4\r\n" \ + "2Es/NUH//JZJT32OP0doMxeDRA+vplkKqTLLWf7dX26LIriBkBaRCgR5Yv9LBPFc\r\n" \ + "NOtpzu/LbrY7QFXKJMI+JXDudCsOn8KCmiA4d6Emisqfh3V3485l7HEQNcvLTxlD\r\n" \ + "6zDQyi0/ykYUYZkwQTK1N2Nvlw==\r\n" \ + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" +/* END FILE */ + +/* This was generated from tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der + using `xxd -i.` */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der */ +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x3f, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x27, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ + 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ + 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ + 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ + 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ + 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ + 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ + 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ + 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ + 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ + 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3c, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ + 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ + 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ + 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1a, 0x30, 0x18, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ + 0x11, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6c, \ + 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x32, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, \ + 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, \ + 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, \ + 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc8, 0x74, 0xc4, 0xcc, 0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb5, 0x79, 0xe9, \ + 0x45, 0xd9, 0x14, 0x60, 0xb0, 0x7d, 0xbb, 0x93, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x1e, 0x9f, \ + 0x33, 0xad, 0x0d, 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x56, 0x65, 0xe5, 0xdc, 0x44, 0xd9, \ + 0xcc, 0x66, 0x85, 0x07, 0xd5, 0xf8, 0x27, 0xb0, 0x4a, 0x35, 0xd0, 0x63, \ + 0x9e, 0x0a, 0x6e, 0x1b, 0xb7, 0xda, 0xf0, 0x7e, 0xab, 0xee, 0x0c, 0x10, \ + 0x93, 0x86, 0x49, 0x18, 0x34, 0xf3, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0xd2, 0x57, 0xf5, 0x2e, \ + 0xd4, 0x2f, 0x77, 0x29, 0x84, 0x61, 0x4d, 0x82, 0x50, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x95, \ + 0x48, 0x70, 0xf5, 0x6e, 0x4d, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x13, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xed, \ + 0xe6, 0x43, 0xea, 0x42, 0x14, 0xeb, 0x74, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xed, 0x1f, 0xd4, \ + 0x57, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0xf3, 0xa8, 0xed, 0xd2, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0x30, 0x71, 0x30, \ + 0x32, 0x30, 0xd5, 0xd3, 0xf6, 0x08, 0xd0, 0x56, 0x4f, 0x46, 0x8e, 0xf2, \ + 0x5f, 0xf9, 0x3d, 0x67, 0x91, 0x88, 0x30, 0x2e, 0x42, 0xb2, 0xdf, 0x7d, \ + 0xfb, 0xe5, 0x0c, 0x77, 0xff, 0xec, 0x31, 0xc0, 0x78, 0x8f, 0xbf, 0xc2, \ + 0x7f, 0xca, 0xad, 0x6c, 0x21, 0xd6, 0x8d, 0xd9, 0x8b, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x6f, \ + 0xe0, 0x9b, 0xf8, 0x10, 0x56, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x8e, 0x13, 0x15, 0xe6, 0x34, \ + 0x04, 0x66, 0xc7, 0xee, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x0e, 0x6a, 0x95, 0xf6, 0x09, 0x9a, \ + 0x06, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x65, 0x71, 0xf8, 0xca, 0xa4, 0xb1, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xfe, \ + 0x3c, 0x8b, 0x35, 0x04, 0x67, 0xba, 0xe0, 0x4f, 0x76, 0x85, 0xfc, 0x7f, \ + 0xfc, 0x36, 0x6b, 0xb5, 0xe9, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0x03, 0x62, 0x4e, 0xb3, 0x3d, \ + 0x00, 0xcf, 0xaf, 0x76, 0xa0, 0x69, 0x56, 0x83, 0x6a, 0xd2, 0xa8, 0xd4, \ + 0xe7, 0x50, 0x71, 0xe6, 0xb5, 0x36, 0x05, 0x77, 0x05, 0x6d, 0x7b, 0xc8, \ + 0xe4, 0xc4, 0xfd, 0x4c, 0xd5, 0x21, 0x5f, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, \ + 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, \ + 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, \ + 0x04, 0x14, 0x71, 0xa1, 0x00, 0x73, 0x72, 0x40, 0x2f, 0x54, 0x76, 0x5e, \ + 0x33, 0xfc, 0x52, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0xf1, 0xdd, 0x6b, 0x46, 0x21, 0x30, 0x1f, \ + 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xb4, \ + 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, \ + 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, \ + 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, \ + 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x5e, 0x27, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0xde, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x50, 0x62, \ + 0x29, 0x61, 0x03, 0xf7, 0x9a, 0xcc, 0xc9, 0xc0, 0x5d, 0x80, 0x37, 0x20, \ + 0xc8, 0xda, 0x89, 0xc5, 0xa9, 0x05, 0x91, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xc8, 0x0d, 0xb2, \ + 0xd6, 0x69, 0x72, 0x4e, 0x7e, 0xee, 0x05, 0x74, 0x64, 0x34, 0xb6, 0x39, \ + 0x64, 0x5c, 0xca, 0xf3, 0x61, 0x82, 0x8e, 0x4d, 0x90, 0xd8, 0xe0, 0xf8, \ + 0x45, 0x94, 0x82, 0x3c, 0x02, 0x49, 0xa8, 0xba, 0x47, 0x1d, 0x4d, 0xf8, \ + 0xb7, 0xbd, 0x5c, 0x89, 0xf7, 0xef, 0xcb, 0x62, 0x8a, 0xf3, 0x56, 0x2f, \ + 0xaf, 0x17, 0x33, 0x46, 0x13, 0x00, 0x13, 0xae, 0x22, 0xfa, 0xa9, 0xda, \ + 0xc8, 0xfd, 0xd3, 0x77, 0x65, 0xee, 0x58, 0x94, 0x74, 0xe4, 0xf5, 0x4f, \ + 0xa1, 0x27, 0xa6, 0xb0, 0xd1, 0x0b, 0xb3, 0xd8, 0x16, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0x67, \ + 0x63, 0x2d, 0xdc, 0x7b, 0xe1, 0x18, 0xd9, 0x8d, 0x27, 0xed, 0x1b, 0x22, \ + 0xef, 0xdf, 0x36, 0x11, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xc7, 0xe9, 0xc6, 0xb8, \ + 0xd8, 0x4b, 0x3f, 0x35, 0x41, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x96, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0x8e, \ + 0x3f, 0x47, 0x68, 0x33, 0x17, 0x83, 0x44, 0x0f, 0xaf, 0xa6, 0x59, 0x0a, \ + 0xa9, 0x32, 0xcb, 0x59, 0xfe, 0xdd, 0x5f, 0x6e, 0x8b, 0x22, 0xb8, 0x81, \ + 0x90, 0x16, 0x91, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x79, 0x62, 0xff, 0x4b, 0x04, 0xf1, 0x5c, \ + 0x34, 0xeb, 0x69, 0xce, 0xef, 0xcb, 0x6e, 0xb6, 0x3b, 0x40, 0x55, 0xca, \ + 0x24, 0xc2, 0x3e, 0x25, 0x70, 0xee, 0x74, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x9f, 0xc2, 0x82, \ + 0x9a, 0x20, 0x38, 0x77, 0xa1, 0x26, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x9f, 0x87, 0x75, 0x77, \ + 0xe3, 0xce, 0x65, 0xec, 0x71, 0x10, 0x35, 0xcb, 0xcb, 0x4f, 0x19, 0x43, \ + 0xeb, 0x30, 0xd0, 0xca, 0x2d, 0x3f, 0xca, 0x46, 0x14, 0x61, 0x99, 0x30, \ + 0x41, 0x32, 0xb5, 0x37, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x97 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key. */ +/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key */ +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ + "MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6fM60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaF\r\n" \ + "B9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu1C93KYRhTYJQj6eVSHD1\r\n" \ + "bk2y1RPD0hrt5kPqQhTrdOrA7R/UV06p86jt0uDBMHEwMjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9\r\n" \ + "Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH\r\n" \ + "7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx//DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+v\r\n" \ + "dqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQABAoIBAGdNtfYDiap6bzst\r\n" \ + "yhCiI8m9TtrhZw4MisaEaN/ll3XSjaOG2dvV6xMZCMV+5TeXDHOAZnY18Yi18vzz\r\n" \ + "4Ut2TnNFzizCECYNaA2fST3WgInnxUkV3YXAyP6CNxJaCmv2aA0yFr2kFVSeaKGt\r\n" \ + "ymvljNp2NVkvm7Th8fBQBO7I7AXhz43k0mR7XmPgewe8ApZOG3hstkOaMvbWAvWA\r\n" \ + "zCZupdDjZYjOJqlA4eEA4H8/w7F83r5CugeBE8LgEREjLPiyejrU5H1fubEY+h0d\r\n" \ + "l5HZBJ68ybTXfQ5U9o/QKA3dd0toBEhhdRUDGzWtjvwkEQfqF1reGWj/tod/gCpf\r\n" \ + "DFi6X0ECgYEA4wOv/pjSC3ty6TuOvKX2rOUiBrLXXv2JSxZnMoMiWI5ipLQt+RYT\r\n" \ + "VPafL/m7Dn6MbwjayOkcZhBwk5CNz5A6Q4lJ64Mq/lqHznRCQQ2Mc1G8eyDF/fYL\r\n" \ + "Ze2pLvwP9VD5jTc2miDfw+MnvJhywRRLcemDFP8k4hQVtm8PMp3ZmNECgYEA4gz7\r\n" \ + "wzObR4gn8ibe617uQPZjWzUj9dUHYd+in1gwBCIrtNnaRn9I9U/Q6tegRYpii4ys\r\n" \ + "c176NmU+umy6XmuSKV5qD9bSpZWG2nLFnslrN15Lm3fhZxoeMNhBaEDTnLT26yoi\r\n" \ + "33gp0mSSWy94ZEqipms+ULF6sY1ZtFW6tpGFoy8CgYAQHhnnvJflIs2ky4q10B60\r\n" \ + "ZcxFp3rtDpkp0JxhFLhiizFrujMtZSjYNm5U7KkgPVHhLELEUvCmOnKTt4ap/vZ0\r\n" \ + "BxJNe1GZH3pW6SAvGDQpl9sG7uu/vTFP+lCxukmzxB0DrrDcvorEkKMom7ZCCRvW\r\n" \ + "KZsZ6YeH2Z81BauRj218kQKBgQCUV/DgKP2985xDTT79N08jUo3hTP5MVYCCuj/+\r\n" \ + "UeEw1TvZcx3LJby7P6Xad6a1/BqveaGyFKIfEFIaBUBItk801sDDpDaYc4gL00Xc\r\n" \ + "7lFuBHOZkxJYlss5QrGpuOEl9ZwUt5IrFLBdYaKqNHzNVC1pCPfb/JyH6Dr2HUxq\r\n" \ + "gxUwAQKBgQCcU6G2L8AG9d9c0UpOyL1tMvFe5Ttw0KjlQVdsh1MP6yigYo9DYuwu\r\n" \ + "bHFVW2r0dBTqegP2/KTOxKzaHfC1qf0RGDsUoJCNJrd1cwoCLG8P2EF4w3OBrKqv\r\n" \ + "8u4ytY0F+Vlanj5lm3TaoHSVF1+NWPyOTiwevIECGKwSxvlki4fDAA==\r\n" \ + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"/* END FILE */ + +/* This was generated from tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ +/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key.der */ +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER { \ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, \ + 0xc8, 0x74, 0xc4, 0xcc, 0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb5, 0x79, 0xe9, 0x45, 0xd9, 0x14, \ + 0x60, 0xb0, 0x7d, 0xbb, 0x93, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x1e, 0x9f, 0x33, 0xad, 0x0d, \ + 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x56, 0x65, 0xe5, 0xdc, 0x44, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0x66, 0x85, \ + 0x07, 0xd5, 0xf8, 0x27, 0xb0, 0x4a, 0x35, 0xd0, 0x63, 0x9e, 0x0a, 0x6e, \ + 0x1b, 0xb7, 0xda, 0xf0, 0x7e, 0xab, 0xee, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x93, 0x86, 0x49, \ + 0x18, 0x34, 0xf3, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0xd2, 0x57, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xd4, 0x2f, 0x77, \ + 0x29, 0x84, 0x61, 0x4d, 0x82, 0x50, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x95, 0x48, 0x70, 0xf5, \ + 0x6e, 0x4d, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x13, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xed, 0xe6, 0x43, 0xea, \ + 0x42, 0x14, 0xeb, 0x74, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xed, 0x1f, 0xd4, 0x57, 0x4e, 0xa9, \ + 0xf3, 0xa8, 0xed, 0xd2, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0x30, 0x71, 0x30, 0x32, 0x30, 0xd5, \ + 0xd3, 0xf6, 0x08, 0xd0, 0x56, 0x4f, 0x46, 0x8e, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0xf9, 0x3d, \ + 0x67, 0x91, 0x88, 0x30, 0x2e, 0x42, 0xb2, 0xdf, 0x7d, 0xfb, 0xe5, 0x0c, \ + 0x77, 0xff, 0xec, 0x31, 0xc0, 0x78, 0x8f, 0xbf, 0xc2, 0x7f, 0xca, 0xad, \ + 0x6c, 0x21, 0xd6, 0x8d, 0xd9, 0x8b, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x6f, 0xe0, 0x9b, 0xf8, \ + 0x10, 0x56, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x8e, 0x13, 0x15, 0xe6, 0x34, 0x04, 0x66, 0xc7, \ + 0xee, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x0e, 0x6a, 0x95, 0xf6, 0x09, 0x9a, 0x06, 0x67, 0xf4, \ + 0x65, 0x71, 0xf8, 0xca, 0xa4, 0xb1, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x3c, 0x8b, 0x35, \ + 0x04, 0x67, 0xba, 0xe0, 0x4f, 0x76, 0x85, 0xfc, 0x7f, 0xfc, 0x36, 0x6b, \ + 0xb5, 0xe9, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0x03, 0x62, 0x4e, 0xb3, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xcf, 0xaf, \ + 0x76, 0xa0, 0x69, 0x56, 0x83, 0x6a, 0xd2, 0xa8, 0xd4, 0xe7, 0x50, 0x71, \ + 0xe6, 0xb5, 0x36, 0x05, 0x77, 0x05, 0x6d, 0x7b, 0xc8, 0xe4, 0xc4, 0xfd, \ + 0x4c, 0xd5, 0x21, 0x5f, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ + 0x00, 0x67, 0x4d, 0xb5, 0xf6, 0x03, 0x89, 0xaa, 0x7a, 0x6f, 0x3b, 0x2d, \ + 0xca, 0x10, 0xa2, 0x23, 0xc9, 0xbd, 0x4e, 0xda, 0xe1, 0x67, 0x0e, 0x0c, \ + 0x8a, 0xc6, 0x84, 0x68, 0xdf, 0xe5, 0x97, 0x75, 0xd2, 0x8d, 0xa3, 0x86, \ + 0xd9, 0xdb, 0xd5, 0xeb, 0x13, 0x19, 0x08, 0xc5, 0x7e, 0xe5, 0x37, 0x97, \ + 0x0c, 0x73, 0x80, 0x66, 0x76, 0x35, 0xf1, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf2, 0xfc, 0xf3, \ + 0xe1, 0x4b, 0x76, 0x4e, 0x73, 0x45, 0xce, 0x2c, 0xc2, 0x10, 0x26, 0x0d, \ + 0x68, 0x0d, 0x9f, 0x49, 0x3d, 0xd6, 0x80, 0x89, 0xe7, 0xc5, 0x49, 0x15, \ + 0xdd, 0x85, 0xc0, 0xc8, 0xfe, 0x82, 0x37, 0x12, 0x5a, 0x0a, 0x6b, 0xf6, \ + 0x68, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x16, 0xbd, 0xa4, 0x15, 0x54, 0x9e, 0x68, 0xa1, 0xad, \ + 0xca, 0x6b, 0xe5, 0x8c, 0xda, 0x76, 0x35, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0xe1, \ + 0xf1, 0xf0, 0x50, 0x04, 0xee, 0xc8, 0xec, 0x05, 0xe1, 0xcf, 0x8d, 0xe4, \ + 0xd2, 0x64, 0x7b, 0x5e, 0x63, 0xe0, 0x7b, 0x07, 0xbc, 0x02, 0x96, 0x4e, \ + 0x1b, 0x78, 0x6c, 0xb6, 0x43, 0x9a, 0x32, 0xf6, 0xd6, 0x02, 0xf5, 0x80, \ + 0xcc, 0x26, 0x6e, 0xa5, 0xd0, 0xe3, 0x65, 0x88, 0xce, 0x26, 0xa9, 0x40, \ + 0xe1, 0xe1, 0x00, 0xe0, 0x7f, 0x3f, 0xc3, 0xb1, 0x7c, 0xde, 0xbe, 0x42, \ + 0xba, 0x07, 0x81, 0x13, 0xc2, 0xe0, 0x11, 0x11, 0x23, 0x2c, 0xf8, 0xb2, \ + 0x7a, 0x3a, 0xd4, 0xe4, 0x7d, 0x5f, 0xb9, 0xb1, 0x18, 0xfa, 0x1d, 0x1d, \ + 0x97, 0x91, 0xd9, 0x04, 0x9e, 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xb4, 0xd7, 0x7d, 0x0e, 0x54, \ + 0xf6, 0x8f, 0xd0, 0x28, 0x0d, 0xdd, 0x77, 0x4b, 0x68, 0x04, 0x48, 0x61, \ + 0x75, 0x15, 0x03, 0x1b, 0x35, 0xad, 0x8e, 0xfc, 0x24, 0x11, 0x07, 0xea, \ + 0x17, 0x5a, 0xde, 0x19, 0x68, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x87, 0x7f, 0x80, 0x2a, 0x5f, \ + 0x0c, 0x58, 0xba, 0x5f, 0x41, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xe3, 0x03, 0xaf, \ + 0xfe, 0x98, 0xd2, 0x0b, 0x7b, 0x72, 0xe9, 0x3b, 0x8e, 0xbc, 0xa5, 0xf6, \ + 0xac, 0xe5, 0x22, 0x06, 0xb2, 0xd7, 0x5e, 0xfd, 0x89, 0x4b, 0x16, 0x67, \ + 0x32, 0x83, 0x22, 0x58, 0x8e, 0x62, 0xa4, 0xb4, 0x2d, 0xf9, 0x16, 0x13, \ + 0x54, 0xf6, 0x9f, 0x2f, 0xf9, 0xbb, 0x0e, 0x7e, 0x8c, 0x6f, 0x08, 0xda, \ + 0xc8, 0xe9, 0x1c, 0x66, 0x10, 0x70, 0x93, 0x90, 0x8d, 0xcf, 0x90, 0x3a, \ + 0x43, 0x89, 0x49, 0xeb, 0x83, 0x2a, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0x87, 0xce, 0x74, 0x42, \ + 0x41, 0x0d, 0x8c, 0x73, 0x51, 0xbc, 0x7b, 0x20, 0xc5, 0xfd, 0xf6, 0x0b, \ + 0x65, 0xed, 0xa9, 0x2e, 0xfc, 0x0f, 0xf5, 0x50, 0xf9, 0x8d, 0x37, 0x36, \ + 0x9a, 0x20, 0xdf, 0xc3, 0xe3, 0x27, 0xbc, 0x98, 0x72, 0xc1, 0x14, 0x4b, \ + 0x71, 0xe9, 0x83, 0x14, 0xff, 0x24, 0xe2, 0x14, 0x15, 0xb6, 0x6f, 0x0f, \ + 0x32, 0x9d, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xd1, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xe2, 0x0c, 0xfb, \ + 0xc3, 0x33, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x88, 0x27, 0xf2, 0x26, 0xde, 0xeb, 0x5e, 0xee, \ + 0x40, 0xf6, 0x63, 0x5b, 0x35, 0x23, 0xf5, 0xd5, 0x07, 0x61, 0xdf, 0xa2, \ + 0x9f, 0x58, 0x30, 0x04, 0x22, 0x2b, 0xb4, 0xd9, 0xda, 0x46, 0x7f, 0x48, \ + 0xf5, 0x4f, 0xd0, 0xea, 0xd7, 0xa0, 0x45, 0x8a, 0x62, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0xac, \ + 0x73, 0x5e, 0xfa, 0x36, 0x65, 0x3e, 0xba, 0x6c, 0xba, 0x5e, 0x6b, 0x92, \ + 0x29, 0x5e, 0x6a, 0x0f, 0xd6, 0xd2, 0xa5, 0x95, 0x86, 0xda, 0x72, 0xc5, \ + 0x9e, 0xc9, 0x6b, 0x37, 0x5e, 0x4b, 0x9b, 0x77, 0xe1, 0x67, 0x1a, 0x1e, \ + 0x30, 0xd8, 0x41, 0x68, 0x40, 0xd3, 0x9c, 0xb4, 0xf6, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x22, \ + 0xdf, 0x78, 0x29, 0xd2, 0x64, 0x92, 0x5b, 0x2f, 0x78, 0x64, 0x4a, 0xa2, \ + 0xa6, 0x6b, 0x3e, 0x50, 0xb1, 0x7a, 0xb1, 0x8d, 0x59, 0xb4, 0x55, 0xba, \ + 0xb6, 0x91, 0x85, 0xa3, 0x2f, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x10, 0x1e, 0x19, 0xe7, \ + 0xbc, 0x97, 0xe5, 0x22, 0xcd, 0xa4, 0xcb, 0x8a, 0xb5, 0xd0, 0x1e, 0xb4, \ + 0x65, 0xcc, 0x45, 0xa7, 0x7a, 0xed, 0x0e, 0x99, 0x29, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x61, \ + 0x14, 0xb8, 0x62, 0x8b, 0x31, 0x6b, 0xba, 0x33, 0x2d, 0x65, 0x28, 0xd8, \ + 0x36, 0x6e, 0x54, 0xec, 0xa9, 0x20, 0x3d, 0x51, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x42, 0xc4, \ + 0x52, 0xf0, 0xa6, 0x3a, 0x72, 0x93, 0xb7, 0x86, 0xa9, 0xfe, 0xf6, 0x74, \ + 0x07, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x7b, 0x51, 0x99, 0x1f, 0x7a, 0x56, 0xe9, 0x20, 0x2f, \ + 0x18, 0x34, 0x29, 0x97, 0xdb, 0x06, 0xee, 0xeb, 0xbf, 0xbd, 0x31, 0x4f, \ + 0xfa, 0x50, 0xb1, 0xba, 0x49, 0xb3, 0xc4, 0x1d, 0x03, 0xae, 0xb0, 0xdc, \ + 0xbe, 0x8a, 0xc4, 0x90, 0xa3, 0x28, 0x9b, 0xb6, 0x42, 0x09, 0x1b, 0xd6, \ + 0x29, 0x9b, 0x19, 0xe9, 0x87, 0x87, 0xd9, 0x9f, 0x35, 0x05, 0xab, 0x91, \ + 0x8f, 0x6d, 0x7c, 0x91, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x94, 0x57, 0xf0, 0xe0, \ + 0x28, 0xfd, 0xbd, 0xf3, 0x9c, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x3e, 0xfd, 0x37, 0x4f, 0x23, \ + 0x52, 0x8d, 0xe1, 0x4c, 0xfe, 0x4c, 0x55, 0x80, 0x82, 0xba, 0x3f, 0xfe, \ + 0x51, 0xe1, 0x30, 0xd5, 0x3b, 0xd9, 0x73, 0x1d, 0xcb, 0x25, 0xbc, 0xbb, \ + 0x3f, 0xa5, 0xda, 0x77, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0xfc, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0x79, 0xa1, 0xb2, \ + 0x14, 0xa2, 0x1f, 0x10, 0x52, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x40, 0x48, 0xb6, 0x4f, 0x34, \ + 0xd6, 0xc0, 0xc3, 0xa4, 0x36, 0x98, 0x73, 0x88, 0x0b, 0xd3, 0x45, 0xdc, \ + 0xee, 0x51, 0x6e, 0x04, 0x73, 0x99, 0x93, 0x12, 0x58, 0x96, 0xcb, 0x39, \ + 0x42, 0xb1, 0xa9, 0xb8, 0xe1, 0x25, 0xf5, 0x9c, 0x14, 0xb7, 0x92, 0x2b, \ + 0x14, 0xb0, 0x5d, 0x61, 0xa2, 0xaa, 0x34, 0x7c, 0xcd, 0x54, 0x2d, 0x69, \ + 0x08, 0xf7, 0xdb, 0xfc, 0x9c, 0x87, 0xe8, 0x3a, 0xf6, 0x1d, 0x4c, 0x6a, \ + 0x83, 0x15, 0x30, 0x01, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x9c, 0x53, 0xa1, 0xb6, \ + 0x2f, 0xc0, 0x06, 0xf5, 0xdf, 0x5c, 0xd1, 0x4a, 0x4e, 0xc8, 0xbd, 0x6d, \ + 0x32, 0xf1, 0x5e, 0xe5, 0x3b, 0x70, 0xd0, 0xa8, 0xe5, 0x41, 0x57, 0x6c, \ + 0x87, 0x53, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x28, 0xa0, 0x62, 0x8f, 0x43, 0x62, 0xec, 0x2e, \ + 0x6c, 0x71, 0x55, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xf4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xea, 0x7a, 0x03, 0xf6, \ + 0xfc, 0xa4, 0xce, 0xc4, 0xac, 0xda, 0x1d, 0xf0, 0xb5, 0xa9, 0xfd, 0x11, \ + 0x18, 0x3b, 0x14, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x8d, 0x26, 0xb7, 0x75, 0x73, 0x0a, 0x02, \ + 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0xd8, 0x41, 0x78, 0xc3, 0x73, 0x81, 0xac, 0xaa, 0xaf, \ + 0xf2, 0xee, 0x32, 0xb5, 0x8d, 0x05, 0xf9, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x9e, 0x3e, 0x65, \ + 0x9b, 0x74, 0xda, 0xa0, 0x74, 0x95, 0x17, 0x5f, 0x8d, 0x58, 0xfc, 0x8e, \ + 0x4e, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0xbc, 0x81, 0x02, 0x18, 0xac, 0x12, 0xc6, 0xf9, 0x64, \ + 0x8b, 0x87, 0xc3, 0x00 \ +} +/* END FILE */ + +/* + * + * Test certificates and keys as C variables + * + */ + +/* + * CA + */ + +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem[] = TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem[] = TEST_CA_PWD_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CA_PWD_RSA_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM; + +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der[] = TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der[] = TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der[] = + TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der[] = + TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_der_len = 0; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_der_len = 0; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der ); + +/* + * Server + */ + +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem[] = ""; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem[] = ""; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM; + +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der[] = + TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der[] = + TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_der_len = 0; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_der_len = 0; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der ); + +/* + * Client + */ + +const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem[] = ""; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem[] = ""; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM; + +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER; +const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der ); + +/* + * + * Definitions of test CRTs without specification of all parameters, choosing + * them automatically according to the config. For example, mbedtls_test_ca_crt + * is one of mbedtls_test_ca_crt_{rsa|ec}_{sha1|sha256}_{pem|der}. + * + */ + +/* + * Dispatch between PEM and DER according to config + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + +/* PEM encoded test CA certificates and keys */ + +#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM +#define TEST_CA_PWD_RSA TEST_CA_PWD_RSA_PEM +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM +#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM +#define TEST_CA_PWD_EC TEST_CA_PWD_EC_PEM +#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM + +/* PEM encoded test server certificates and keys */ + +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM +#define TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA "" +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM +#define TEST_SRV_PWD_EC "" +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM + +/* PEM encoded test client certificates and keys */ + +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM +#define TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA "" +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM +#define TEST_CLI_PWD_EC "" +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +/* DER encoded test CA certificates and keys */ + +#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER +#define TEST_CA_PWD_RSA "" +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER +#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER +#define TEST_CA_PWD_EC "" +#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER + +/* DER encoded test server certificates and keys */ + +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER +#define TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA "" +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER +#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER +#define TEST_SRV_PWD_EC "" +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER + +/* DER encoded test client certificates and keys */ + +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER +#define TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA "" +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER +#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER +#define TEST_CLI_PWD_EC "" +#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[] = TEST_CA_KEY_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[] = TEST_CA_PWD_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[] = TEST_CA_KEY_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec[] = TEST_CA_PWD_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC; + +const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec[] = TEST_SRV_PWD_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_EC; + +const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa[] = TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec[] = TEST_CLI_PWD_EC; +const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_EC; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256 ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1 ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa ) -1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256 ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1 ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec ); + +/* + * Dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256 +#else +#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 +#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA; +const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len = + sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa ); + +/* + * Dispatch between RSA and EC + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + +#define TEST_CA_KEY TEST_CA_KEY_RSA +#define TEST_CA_PWD TEST_CA_PWD_RSA +#define TEST_CA_CRT TEST_CA_CRT_RSA + +#define TEST_SRV_KEY TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA +#define TEST_SRV_PWD TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA +#define TEST_SRV_CRT TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA + +#define TEST_CLI_KEY TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA +#define TEST_CLI_PWD TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA +#define TEST_CLI_CRT TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA + +#else /* no RSA, so assume ECDSA */ + +#define TEST_CA_KEY TEST_CA_KEY_EC +#define TEST_CA_PWD TEST_CA_PWD_EC +#define TEST_CA_CRT TEST_CA_CRT_EC + +#define TEST_SRV_KEY TEST_SRV_KEY_EC +#define TEST_SRV_PWD TEST_SRV_PWD_EC +#define TEST_SRV_CRT TEST_SRV_CRT_EC + +#define TEST_CLI_KEY TEST_CLI_KEY_EC +#define TEST_CLI_PWD TEST_CLI_PWD_EC +#define TEST_CLI_CRT TEST_CLI_CRT_EC +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +/* API stability forces us to declare + * mbedtls_test_{ca|srv|cli}_{key|pwd|crt} + * as pointers. */ +static const char test_ca_key[] = TEST_CA_KEY; +static const char test_ca_pwd[] = TEST_CA_PWD; +static const char test_ca_crt[] = TEST_CA_CRT; + +static const char test_srv_key[] = TEST_SRV_KEY; +static const char test_srv_pwd[] = TEST_SRV_PWD; +static const char test_srv_crt[] = TEST_SRV_CRT; + +static const char test_cli_key[] = TEST_CLI_KEY; +static const char test_cli_pwd[] = TEST_CLI_PWD; +static const char test_cli_crt[] = TEST_CLI_CRT; + +const char *mbedtls_test_ca_key = test_ca_key; +const char *mbedtls_test_ca_pwd = test_ca_pwd; +const char *mbedtls_test_ca_crt = test_ca_crt; + +const char *mbedtls_test_srv_key = test_srv_key; +const char *mbedtls_test_srv_pwd = test_srv_pwd; +const char *mbedtls_test_srv_crt = test_srv_crt; + +const char *mbedtls_test_cli_key = test_cli_key; +const char *mbedtls_test_cli_pwd = test_cli_pwd; +const char *mbedtls_test_cli_crt = test_cli_crt; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_len = + sizeof( test_ca_key ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_len = + sizeof( test_ca_pwd ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len = + sizeof( test_ca_crt ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_len = + sizeof( test_srv_key ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_len = + sizeof( test_srv_pwd ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len = + sizeof( test_srv_crt ); + +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_len = + sizeof( test_cli_key ); +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_len = + sizeof( test_cli_pwd ) - 1; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len = + sizeof( test_cli_crt ); + +/* + * + * Lists of certificates + * + */ + +/* List of CAs in PEM or DER, depending on config */ +const char * mbedtls_test_cas[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec, +#endif + NULL +}; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1 ), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256 ), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec ), +#endif + 0 +}; + +/* List of all available CA certificates in DER format */ +const unsigned char * mbedtls_test_cas_der[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + NULL +}; + +const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der ), +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der ), +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der ), +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + 0 +}; + +/* Concatenation of all available CA certificates in PEM format */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[] = +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + ""; +const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cas_pem ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/chacha20.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/chacha20.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bd070148 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/chacha20.c @@ -0,0 +1,546 @@ +/** + * \file chacha20.c + * + * \brief ChaCha20 cipher. + * + * \author Daniel King + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define CHACHA20_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#define ROTL32( value, amount ) \ + ( (uint32_t) ( (value) << (amount) ) | ( (value) >> ( 32 - (amount) ) ) ) + +#define CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX ( 12U ) + +#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ( 4U * 16U ) + +/** + * \brief ChaCha20 quarter round operation. + * + * The quarter round is defined as follows (from RFC 7539): + * 1. a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 16; + * 2. c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 12; + * 3. a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 8; + * 4. c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 7; + * + * \param state ChaCha20 state to modify. + * \param a The index of 'a' in the state. + * \param b The index of 'b' in the state. + * \param c The index of 'c' in the state. + * \param d The index of 'd' in the state. + */ +static inline void chacha20_quarter_round( uint32_t state[16], + size_t a, + size_t b, + size_t c, + size_t d ) +{ + /* a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 16; */ + state[a] += state[b]; + state[d] ^= state[a]; + state[d] = ROTL32( state[d], 16 ); + + /* c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 12 */ + state[c] += state[d]; + state[b] ^= state[c]; + state[b] = ROTL32( state[b], 12 ); + + /* a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 8; */ + state[a] += state[b]; + state[d] ^= state[a]; + state[d] = ROTL32( state[d], 8 ); + + /* c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 7; */ + state[c] += state[d]; + state[b] ^= state[c]; + state[b] = ROTL32( state[b], 7 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Perform the ChaCha20 inner block operation. + * + * This function performs two rounds: the column round and the + * diagonal round. + * + * \param state The ChaCha20 state to update. + */ +static void chacha20_inner_block( uint32_t state[16] ) +{ + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 0, 4, 8, 12 ); + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 1, 5, 9, 13 ); + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 2, 6, 10, 14 ); + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 3, 7, 11, 15 ); + + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 0, 5, 10, 15 ); + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 1, 6, 11, 12 ); + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 2, 7, 8, 13 ); + chacha20_quarter_round( state, 3, 4, 9, 14 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Generates a keystream block. + * + * \param initial_state The initial ChaCha20 state (key, nonce, counter). + * \param keystream Generated keystream bytes are written to this buffer. + */ +static void chacha20_block( const uint32_t initial_state[16], + unsigned char keystream[64] ) +{ + uint32_t working_state[16]; + size_t i; + + memcpy( working_state, + initial_state, + CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ); + + for( i = 0U; i < 10U; i++ ) + chacha20_inner_block( working_state ); + + working_state[ 0] += initial_state[ 0]; + working_state[ 1] += initial_state[ 1]; + working_state[ 2] += initial_state[ 2]; + working_state[ 3] += initial_state[ 3]; + working_state[ 4] += initial_state[ 4]; + working_state[ 5] += initial_state[ 5]; + working_state[ 6] += initial_state[ 6]; + working_state[ 7] += initial_state[ 7]; + working_state[ 8] += initial_state[ 8]; + working_state[ 9] += initial_state[ 9]; + working_state[10] += initial_state[10]; + working_state[11] += initial_state[11]; + working_state[12] += initial_state[12]; + working_state[13] += initial_state[13]; + working_state[14] += initial_state[14]; + working_state[15] += initial_state[15]; + + for( i = 0U; i < 16; i++ ) + { + size_t offset = i * 4U; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(working_state[i], keystream, offset); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( working_state, sizeof( working_state ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_chacha20_init( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ) +{ + CHACHA20_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->state, sizeof( ctx->state ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->keystream8, sizeof( ctx->keystream8 ) ); + + /* Initially, there's no keystream bytes available */ + ctx->keystream_bytes_used = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; +} + +void mbedtls_chacha20_free( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_chacha20_context ) ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32] ) +{ + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + /* ChaCha20 constants - the string "expand 32-byte k" */ + ctx->state[0] = 0x61707865; + ctx->state[1] = 0x3320646e; + ctx->state[2] = 0x79622d32; + ctx->state[3] = 0x6b206574; + + /* Set key */ + ctx->state[4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 0 ); + ctx->state[5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 4 ); + ctx->state[6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 8 ); + ctx->state[7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 12 ); + ctx->state[8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 16 ); + ctx->state[9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 20 ); + ctx->state[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 24 ); + ctx->state[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 28 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_chacha20_starts( mbedtls_chacha20_context* ctx, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + uint32_t counter ) +{ + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + + /* Counter */ + ctx->state[12] = counter; + + /* Nonce */ + ctx->state[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( nonce, 0 ); + ctx->state[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( nonce, 4 ); + ctx->state[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( nonce, 8 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->keystream8, sizeof( ctx->keystream8 ) ); + + /* Initially, there's no keystream bytes available */ + ctx->keystream_bytes_used = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_chacha20_update( mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, + size_t size, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + size_t offset = 0U; + size_t i; + + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( size == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( size == 0 || output != NULL ); + + /* Use leftover keystream bytes, if available */ + while( size > 0U && ctx->keystream_bytes_used < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ) + { + output[offset] = input[offset] + ^ ctx->keystream8[ctx->keystream_bytes_used]; + + ctx->keystream_bytes_used++; + offset++; + size--; + } + + /* Process full blocks */ + while( size >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ) + { + /* Generate new keystream block and increment counter */ + chacha20_block( ctx->state, ctx->keystream8 ); + ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++; + + for( i = 0U; i < 64U; i += 8U ) + { + output[offset + i ] = input[offset + i ] ^ ctx->keystream8[i ]; + output[offset + i+1] = input[offset + i+1] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+1]; + output[offset + i+2] = input[offset + i+2] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+2]; + output[offset + i+3] = input[offset + i+3] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+3]; + output[offset + i+4] = input[offset + i+4] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+4]; + output[offset + i+5] = input[offset + i+5] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+5]; + output[offset + i+6] = input[offset + i+6] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+6]; + output[offset + i+7] = input[offset + i+7] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+7]; + } + + offset += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + size -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + } + + /* Last (partial) block */ + if( size > 0U ) + { + /* Generate new keystream block and increment counter */ + chacha20_block( ctx->state, ctx->keystream8 ); + ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++; + + for( i = 0U; i < size; i++) + { + output[offset + i] = input[offset + i] ^ ctx->keystream8[i]; + } + + ctx->keystream_bytes_used = size; + + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( const unsigned char key[32], + const unsigned char nonce[12], + uint32_t counter, + size_t data_len, + const unsigned char* input, + unsigned char* output ) +{ + mbedtls_chacha20_context ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( data_len == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET( data_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + + mbedtls_chacha20_init( &ctx ); + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( &ctx, key ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_starts( &ctx, nonce, counter ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx, data_len, input, output ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_chacha20_free( &ctx ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char test_keys[2][32] = +{ + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }, + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_nonces[2][12] = +{ + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }, + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02 + } +}; + +static const uint32_t test_counters[2] = +{ + 0U, + 1U +}; + +static const unsigned char test_input[2][375] = +{ + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }, + { + 0x41, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x20, 0x73, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6d, + 0x69, 0x73, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, + 0x6f, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x49, 0x45, + 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6e, + 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x62, 0x79, 0x20, 0x74, + 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x72, + 0x69, 0x62, 0x75, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x66, + 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x70, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6c, 0x69, + 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x72, + 0x20, 0x70, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, + 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x49, 0x45, 0x54, 0x46, + 0x20, 0x49, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6e, 0x65, + 0x74, 0x2d, 0x44, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x74, 0x20, + 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x52, 0x46, 0x43, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x20, 0x73, + 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, + 0x20, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x77, 0x69, + 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, + 0x20, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x78, 0x74, + 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x49, + 0x45, 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x61, 0x63, 0x74, 0x69, + 0x76, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, + 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, + 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x22, 0x49, + 0x45, 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74, + 0x72, 0x69, 0x62, 0x75, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, + 0x22, 0x2e, 0x20, 0x53, 0x75, 0x63, 0x68, 0x20, + 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, + 0x74, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x75, + 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x20, + 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, + 0x74, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x49, 0x45, + 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x69, + 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20, + 0x77, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20, + 0x77, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20, + 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x63, + 0x74, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x63, + 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, + 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x61, + 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, + 0x79, 0x20, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6f, + 0x72, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x63, 0x65, 0x2c, + 0x20, 0x77, 0x68, 0x69, 0x63, 0x68, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x64, 0x64, 0x72, 0x65, + 0x73, 0x73, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_output[2][375] = +{ + { + 0x76, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xad, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0x90, + 0x40, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0x53, 0x86, 0xbd, 0x28, + 0xbd, 0xd2, 0x19, 0xb8, 0xa0, 0x8d, 0xed, 0x1a, + 0xa8, 0x36, 0xef, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0xc7, + 0xda, 0x41, 0x59, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x57, 0x48, 0x8d, + 0x77, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x37, + 0x6a, 0x43, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x18, 0xa1, 0x1c, + 0xc3, 0x87, 0xb6, 0x69, 0xb2, 0xee, 0x65, 0x86 + }, + { + 0xa3, 0xfb, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0xfa, 0x2f, 0xde, + 0x4f, 0x37, 0x6c, 0xa2, 0x3e, 0x82, 0x73, 0x70, + 0x41, 0x60, 0x5d, 0x9f, 0x4f, 0x4f, 0x57, 0xbd, + 0x8c, 0xff, 0x2c, 0x1d, 0x4b, 0x79, 0x55, 0xec, + 0x2a, 0x97, 0x94, 0x8b, 0xd3, 0x72, 0x29, 0x15, + 0xc8, 0xf3, 0xd3, 0x37, 0xf7, 0xd3, 0x70, 0x05, + 0x0e, 0x9e, 0x96, 0xd6, 0x47, 0xb7, 0xc3, 0x9f, + 0x56, 0xe0, 0x31, 0xca, 0x5e, 0xb6, 0x25, 0x0d, + 0x40, 0x42, 0xe0, 0x27, 0x85, 0xec, 0xec, 0xfa, + 0x4b, 0x4b, 0xb5, 0xe8, 0xea, 0xd0, 0x44, 0x0e, + 0x20, 0xb6, 0xe8, 0xdb, 0x09, 0xd8, 0x81, 0xa7, + 0xc6, 0x13, 0x2f, 0x42, 0x0e, 0x52, 0x79, 0x50, + 0x42, 0xbd, 0xfa, 0x77, 0x73, 0xd8, 0xa9, 0x05, + 0x14, 0x47, 0xb3, 0x29, 0x1c, 0xe1, 0x41, 0x1c, + 0x68, 0x04, 0x65, 0x55, 0x2a, 0xa6, 0xc4, 0x05, + 0xb7, 0x76, 0x4d, 0x5e, 0x87, 0xbe, 0xa8, 0x5a, + 0xd0, 0x0f, 0x84, 0x49, 0xed, 0x8f, 0x72, 0xd0, + 0xd6, 0x62, 0xab, 0x05, 0x26, 0x91, 0xca, 0x66, + 0x42, 0x4b, 0xc8, 0x6d, 0x2d, 0xf8, 0x0e, 0xa4, + 0x1f, 0x43, 0xab, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xd3, 0x25, 0x9d, + 0xc4, 0xb2, 0xd0, 0xdf, 0xb4, 0x8a, 0x6c, 0x91, + 0x39, 0xdd, 0xd7, 0xf7, 0x69, 0x66, 0xe9, 0x28, + 0xe6, 0x35, 0x55, 0x3b, 0xa7, 0x6c, 0x5c, 0x87, + 0x9d, 0x7b, 0x35, 0xd4, 0x9e, 0xb2, 0xe6, 0x2b, + 0x08, 0x71, 0xcd, 0xac, 0x63, 0x89, 0x39, 0xe2, + 0x5e, 0x8a, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0xf9, 0xd5, 0x28, 0x0f, + 0xa8, 0xca, 0x32, 0x8b, 0x35, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x76, + 0x59, 0x89, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0x3d, 0xaa, 0x8b, 0x6c, + 0xcc, 0x3a, 0xaf, 0x9f, 0x39, 0x79, 0xc9, 0x2b, + 0x37, 0x20, 0xfc, 0x88, 0xdc, 0x95, 0xed, 0x84, + 0xa1, 0xbe, 0x05, 0x9c, 0x64, 0x99, 0xb9, 0xfd, + 0xa2, 0x36, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0x18, 0xb0, 0x4b, 0x0b, + 0xc3, 0x9c, 0x1e, 0x87, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x3b, 0xfe, + 0x55, 0x69, 0x75, 0x3f, 0x88, 0x12, 0x8c, 0xc0, + 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x9b, 0x63, 0xd1, 0xa1, 0x6f, 0x80, + 0xef, 0x25, 0x54, 0xd7, 0x18, 0x9c, 0x41, 0x1f, + 0x58, 0x69, 0xca, 0x52, 0xc5, 0xb8, 0x3f, 0xa3, + 0x6f, 0xf2, 0x16, 0xb9, 0xc1, 0xd3, 0x00, 0x62, + 0xbe, 0xbc, 0xfd, 0x2d, 0xc5, 0xbc, 0xe0, 0x91, + 0x19, 0x34, 0xfd, 0xa7, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xf6, 0xe6, + 0x98, 0xce, 0xd7, 0x59, 0xc3, 0xff, 0x9b, 0x64, + 0x77, 0x33, 0x8f, 0x3d, 0xa4, 0xf9, 0xcd, 0x85, + 0x14, 0xea, 0x99, 0x82, 0xcc, 0xaf, 0xb3, 0x41, + 0xb2, 0x38, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xd1, 0xab, + 0x7a, 0xc6, 0x1d, 0xd2, 0x9c, 0x6f, 0x21, 0xba, + 0x5b, 0x86, 0x2f, 0x37, 0x30, 0xe3, 0x7c, 0xfd, + 0xc4, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x6c, 0x22, 0xf2, 0x21 + } +}; + +static const size_t test_lengths[2] = +{ + 64U, + 375U +}; + +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + +#define ASSERT( cond, args ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ! ( cond ) ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf args; \ + \ + return( -1 ); \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +int mbedtls_chacha20_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + unsigned char output[381]; + unsigned i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + for( i = 0U; i < 2U; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ChaCha20 test %u ", i ); + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_crypt( test_keys[i], + test_nonces[i], + test_counters[i], + test_lengths[i], + test_input[i], + output ); + + ASSERT( 0 == ret, ( "error code: %i\n", ret ) ); + + ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( output, test_output[i], test_lengths[i] ), + ( "failed (output)\n" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/chachapoly.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/chachapoly.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4adf8468 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/chachapoly.c @@ -0,0 +1,517 @@ +/** + * \file chachapoly.c + * + * \brief ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction based on RFC 7539. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT ( 0 ) +#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ( 1 ) +#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT ( 2 ) /* Encrypting or decrypting */ +#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_FINISHED ( 3 ) + +/** + * \brief Adds nul bytes to pad the AAD for Poly1305. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. + */ +static int chachapoly_pad_aad( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ) +{ + uint32_t partial_block_len = (uint32_t) ( ctx->aad_len % 16U ); + unsigned char zeroes[15]; + + if( partial_block_len == 0U ) + return( 0 ); + + memset( zeroes, 0, sizeof( zeroes ) ); + + return( mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, + zeroes, + 16U - partial_block_len ) ); +} + +/** + * \brief Adds nul bytes to pad the ciphertext for Poly1305. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. + */ +static int chachapoly_pad_ciphertext( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ) +{ + uint32_t partial_block_len = (uint32_t) ( ctx->ciphertext_len % 16U ); + unsigned char zeroes[15]; + + if( partial_block_len == 0U ) + return( 0 ); + + memset( zeroes, 0, sizeof( zeroes ) ); + return( mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, + zeroes, + 16U - partial_block_len ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_chachapoly_init( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ) +{ + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_chacha20_init( &ctx->chacha20_ctx ); + mbedtls_poly1305_init( &ctx->poly1305_ctx ); + ctx->aad_len = 0U; + ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT; + ctx->mode = MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT; +} + +void mbedtls_chachapoly_free( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_chacha20_free( &ctx->chacha20_ctx ); + mbedtls_poly1305_free( &ctx->poly1305_ctx ); + ctx->aad_len = 0U; + ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT; + ctx->mode = MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT; +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( &ctx->chacha20_ctx, key ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char poly1305_key[64]; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + + /* Set counter = 0, will be update to 1 when generating Poly1305 key */ + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_starts( &ctx->chacha20_ctx, nonce, 0U ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Generate the Poly1305 key by getting the ChaCha20 keystream output with + * counter = 0. This is the same as encrypting a buffer of zeroes. + * Only the first 256-bits (32 bytes) of the key is used for Poly1305. + * The other 256 bits are discarded. + */ + memset( poly1305_key, 0, sizeof( poly1305_key ) ); + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx->chacha20_ctx, sizeof( poly1305_key ), + poly1305_key, poly1305_key ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_starts( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, poly1305_key ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + ctx->aad_len = 0U; + ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD; + ctx->mode = mode; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( poly1305_key, 64U ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len ) +{ + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL ); + + if( ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + + ctx->aad_len += aad_len; + + return( mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, aad, aad_len ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_update( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( len == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( len == 0 || output != NULL ); + + if( ( ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ) && + ( ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + } + + if( ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ) + { + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT; + + ret = chachapoly_pad_aad( ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + ctx->ciphertext_len += len; + + if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT ) + { + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx->chacha20_ctx, len, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, output, len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else /* DECRYPT */ + { + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, input, len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update( &ctx->chacha20_ctx, len, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char len_block[16]; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( mac != NULL ); + + if( ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE ); + } + + if( ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD ) + { + ret = chachapoly_pad_aad( ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else if( ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT ) + { + ret = chachapoly_pad_ciphertext( ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_FINISHED; + + /* The lengths of the AAD and ciphertext are processed by + * Poly1305 as the final 128-bit block, encoded as little-endian integers. + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(ctx->aad_len, len_block, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(ctx->ciphertext_len, len_block, 8); + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, len_block, 16U ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_finish( &ctx->poly1305_ctx, mac ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static int chachapoly_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + unsigned char tag[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( ctx, nonce, mode ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( ctx, aad, aad_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_update( ctx, length, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( ctx, tag ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + unsigned char tag[16] ) +{ + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + return( chachapoly_crypt_and_tag( ctx, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT, + length, nonce, aad, aad_len, + input, output, tag ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char tag[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char check_tag[16]; + size_t i; + int diff; + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( nonce != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = chachapoly_crypt_and_tag( ctx, + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT, length, nonce, + aad, aad_len, input, output, check_tag ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ + for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < sizeof( check_tag ); i++ ) + diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i]; + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, length ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char test_key[1][32] = +{ + { + 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, + 0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x8f, + 0x90, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97, + 0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x9e, 0x9f + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_nonce[1][12] = +{ + { + 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* 32-bit common part */ + 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47 /* 64-bit IV */ + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_aad[1][12] = +{ + { + 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, + 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7 + } +}; + +static const size_t test_aad_len[1] = +{ + 12U +}; + +static const unsigned char test_input[1][114] = +{ + { + 0x4c, 0x61, 0x64, 0x69, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x47, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x6c, + 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, + 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x73, + 0x73, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, 0x27, 0x39, 0x39, + 0x3a, 0x20, 0x49, 0x66, 0x20, 0x49, 0x20, 0x63, + 0x6f, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x66, + 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x20, 0x6f, + 0x6e, 0x6c, 0x79, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x74, 0x69, 0x70, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, + 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x66, 0x75, 0x74, 0x75, + 0x72, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x73, + 0x63, 0x72, 0x65, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x77, 0x6f, + 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20, 0x62, 0x65, 0x20, 0x69, + 0x74, 0x2e + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_output[1][114] = +{ + { + 0xd3, 0x1a, 0x8d, 0x34, 0x64, 0x8e, 0x60, 0xdb, + 0x7b, 0x86, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0x53, 0xef, 0x7e, 0xc2, + 0xa4, 0xad, 0xed, 0x51, 0x29, 0x6e, 0x08, 0xfe, + 0xa9, 0xe2, 0xb5, 0xa7, 0x36, 0xee, 0x62, 0xd6, + 0x3d, 0xbe, 0xa4, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xa9, 0x67, 0x12, + 0x82, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0x69, 0xda, 0x92, 0x72, 0x8b, + 0x1a, 0x71, 0xde, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x06, 0x0b, 0x29, + 0x05, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xb6, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x3b, 0x36, + 0x92, 0xdd, 0xbd, 0x7f, 0x2d, 0x77, 0x8b, 0x8c, + 0x98, 0x03, 0xae, 0xe3, 0x28, 0x09, 0x1b, 0x58, + 0xfa, 0xb3, 0x24, 0xe4, 0xfa, 0xd6, 0x75, 0x94, + 0x55, 0x85, 0x80, 0x8b, 0x48, 0x31, 0xd7, 0xbc, + 0x3f, 0xf4, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x8e, 0x4b, 0x7a, 0x9d, + 0xe5, 0x76, 0xd2, 0x65, 0x86, 0xce, 0xc6, 0x4b, + 0x61, 0x16 + } +}; + +static const size_t test_input_len[1] = +{ + 114U +}; + +static const unsigned char test_mac[1][16] = +{ + { + 0x1a, 0xe1, 0x0b, 0x59, 0x4f, 0x09, 0xe2, 0x6a, + 0x7e, 0x90, 0x2e, 0xcb, 0xd0, 0x60, 0x06, 0x91 + } +}; + +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + +#define ASSERT( cond, args ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ! ( cond ) ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf args; \ + \ + return( -1 ); \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx; + unsigned i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char output[200]; + unsigned char mac[16]; + + for( i = 0U; i < 1U; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ChaCha20-Poly1305 test %u ", i ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init( &ctx ); + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( &ctx, test_key[i] ); + ASSERT( 0 == ret, ( "setkey() error code: %i\n", ret ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, + test_input_len[i], + test_nonce[i], + test_aad[i], + test_aad_len[i], + test_input[i], + output, + mac ); + + ASSERT( 0 == ret, ( "crypt_and_tag() error code: %i\n", ret ) ); + + ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( output, test_output[i], test_input_len[i] ), + ( "failure (wrong output)\n" ) ); + + ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( mac, test_mac[i], 16U ), + ( "failure (wrong MAC)\n" ) ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/check_crypto_config.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/check_crypto_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d7ad16a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/check_crypto_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/** + * \file check_crypto_config.h + * + * \brief Consistency checks for PSA configuration options + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * It is recommended to include this file from your crypto_config.h + * in order to catch dependency issues early. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) && \ + !( defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) ) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/cipher.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..67e32745 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,1632 @@ +/** + * \file cipher.c + * + * \brief Generic cipher wrapper for mbed TLS + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#define CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define CIPHER_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +static int supported_init = 0; + +const int *mbedtls_cipher_list( void ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; + int *type; + + if( ! supported_init ) + { + def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; + type = mbedtls_cipher_supported; + + while( def->type != 0 ) + *type++ = (*def++).type; + + *type = 0; + + supported_init = 1; + } + + return( mbedtls_cipher_supported ); +} + +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( + const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; + + for( def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++ ) + if( def->type == cipher_type ) + return( def->info ); + + return( NULL ); +} + +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( + const char *cipher_name ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; + + if( NULL == cipher_name ) + return( NULL ); + + for( def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++ ) + if( ! strcmp( def->info->name, cipher_name ) ) + return( def->info ); + + return( NULL ); +} + +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( + const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; + + for( def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++ ) + if( def->info->base->cipher == cipher_id && + def->info->key_bitlen == (unsigned) key_bitlen && + def->info->mode == mode ) + return( def->info ); + + return( NULL ); +} + +void mbedtls_cipher_init( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_cipher_context_t ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + if( ctx->cipher_ctx != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + if( cipher_psa->slot_state == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED ) + { + /* xxx_free() doesn't allow to return failures. */ + (void) psa_destroy_key( cipher_psa->slot ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cipher_psa, sizeof( *cipher_psa ) ); + mbedtls_free( cipher_psa ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t) ); + return; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + if( ctx->cmac_ctx ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->cmac_ctx, + sizeof( mbedtls_cmac_context_t ) ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->cmac_ctx ); + } +#endif + + if( ctx->cipher_ctx ) + ctx->cipher_info->base->ctx_free_func( ctx->cipher_ctx ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t) ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_cipher_context_t ) ); + + if( NULL == ( ctx->cipher_ctx = cipher_info->base->ctx_alloc_func() ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + /* + * Ignore possible errors caused by a cipher mode that doesn't use padding + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) + (void) mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 ); +#else + (void) mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + size_t taglen ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *cipher_psa; + + if( NULL == cipher_info || NULL == ctx ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Check that the underlying cipher mode and cipher type are + * supported by the underlying PSA Crypto implementation. */ + alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( cipher_info->mode, taglen ); + if( alg == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + if( mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( cipher_info->type ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_cipher_context_t ) ); + + cipher_psa = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa ) ); + if( cipher_psa == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED ); + cipher_psa->alg = alg; + ctx->cipher_ctx = cipher_psa; + ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info; + ctx->psa_enabled = 1; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +int mbedtls_cipher_setkey( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_operation_t operation ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT || + operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + size_t const key_bytelen = ( (size_t) key_bitlen + 7 ) / 8; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + /* PSA Crypto API only accepts byte-aligned keys. */ + if( key_bitlen % 8 != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Don't allow keys to be set multiple times. */ + if( cipher_psa->slot_state != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + key_type = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( + ctx->cipher_info->type ); + if( key_type == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + + /* Mbed TLS' cipher layer doesn't enforce the mode of operation + * (encrypt vs. decrypt): it is possible to setup a key for encryption + * and use it for AEAD decryption. Until tests relying on this + * are changed, allow any usage in PSA. */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, + /* mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( operation ); */ + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, cipher_psa->alg ); + + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, key, key_bytelen, + &cipher_psa->slot ); + switch( status ) + { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + break; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED ); + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + /* Indicate that we own the key slot and need to + * destroy it in mbedtls_cipher_free(). */ + cipher_psa->slot_state = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED; + + ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen; + ctx->operation = operation; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( ( ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN ) == 0 && + (int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen != key_bitlen ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen; + ctx->operation = operation; + + /* + * For OFB, CFB and CTR mode always use the encryption key schedule + */ + if( MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT == operation || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + return( ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_enc_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen ) ); + } + + if( MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == operation ) + return( ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_dec_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen ) ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len ) +{ + size_t actual_iv_size; + + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* avoid buffer overflow in ctx->iv */ + if( iv_len > MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ( ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN ) != 0 ) + actual_iv_size = iv_len; + else + { + actual_iv_size = ctx->cipher_info->iv_size; + + /* avoid reading past the end of input buffer */ + if( actual_iv_size > iv_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + if ( ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 ) + { + /* Even though the actual_iv_size is overwritten with a correct value + * of 12 from the cipher info, return an error to indicate that + * the input iv_len is wrong. */ + if( iv_len != 12 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if ( 0 != mbedtls_chacha20_starts( (mbedtls_chacha20_context*)ctx->cipher_ctx, + iv, + 0U ) ) /* Initial counter value */ + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if ( ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 && + iv_len != 12 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif +#endif + + if ( actual_iv_size != 0 ) + { + memcpy( ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size ); + ctx->iv_size = actual_iv_size; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* We don't support resetting PSA-based + * cipher contexts, yet. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + return( mbedtls_gcm_starts( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->operation, + ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, ad, ad_len ) ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) + { + int result; + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode; + + mode = ( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) + ? MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT + : MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT; + + result = mbedtls_chachapoly_starts( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->iv, + mode ); + if ( result != 0 ) + return( result ); + + return( mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ad, ad_len ) ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +int mbedtls_cipher_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t block_size; + + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + *olen = 0; + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ); + if ( 0 == block_size ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT ); + } + + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ) + { + if( ilen != block_size ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED ); + + *olen = ilen; + + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->ecb_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, input, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ) + { + *olen = ilen; + return( mbedtls_gcm_update( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, input, + output ) ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if ( ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + { + *olen = ilen; + return( mbedtls_chachapoly_update( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, input, output ) ); + } +#endif + + if( input == output && + ( ctx->unprocessed_len != 0 || ilen % block_size ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + size_t copy_len = 0; + + /* + * If there is not enough data for a full block, cache it. + */ + if( ( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT && NULL != ctx->add_padding && + ilen <= block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len ) || + ( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT && NULL == ctx->add_padding && + ilen < block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len ) || + ( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT && + ilen < block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len ) ) + { + memcpy( &( ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len] ), input, + ilen ); + + ctx->unprocessed_len += ilen; + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * Process cached data first + */ + if( 0 != ctx->unprocessed_len ) + { + copy_len = block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len; + + memcpy( &( ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len] ), input, + copy_len ); + + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cbc_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, block_size, ctx->iv, + ctx->unprocessed_data, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen += block_size; + output += block_size; + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + + input += copy_len; + ilen -= copy_len; + } + + /* + * Cache final, incomplete block + */ + if( 0 != ilen ) + { + /* Encryption: only cache partial blocks + * Decryption w/ padding: always keep at least one whole block + * Decryption w/o padding: only cache partial blocks + */ + copy_len = ilen % block_size; + if( copy_len == 0 && + ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT && + NULL != ctx->add_padding) + { + copy_len = block_size; + } + + memcpy( ctx->unprocessed_data, &( input[ilen - copy_len] ), + copy_len ); + + ctx->unprocessed_len += copy_len; + ilen -= copy_len; + } + + /* + * Process remaining full blocks + */ + if( ilen ) + { + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cbc_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, ilen, ctx->iv, input, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen += ilen; + } + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB ) + { + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cfb_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, ilen, &ctx->unprocessed_len, ctx->iv, + input, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB ) + { + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->ofb_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, &ctx->unprocessed_len, ctx->iv, input, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR ) + { + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->ctr_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, &ctx->unprocessed_len, ctx->iv, + ctx->unprocessed_data, input, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS ) + { + if( ctx->unprocessed_len > 0 ) { + /* We can only process an entire data unit at a time. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->xts_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, ilen, ctx->iv, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + { + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->stream_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, input, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) +/* + * PKCS7 (and PKCS5) padding: fill with ll bytes, with ll = padding_len + */ +static void add_pkcs_padding( unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t data_len ) +{ + size_t padding_len = output_len - data_len; + unsigned char i; + + for( i = 0; i < padding_len; i++ ) + output[data_len + i] = (unsigned char) padding_len; +} + +static int get_pkcs_padding( unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len ) +{ + size_t i, pad_idx; + unsigned char padding_len, bad = 0; + + if( NULL == input || NULL == data_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + padding_len = input[input_len - 1]; + *data_len = input_len - padding_len; + + /* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */ + bad |= padding_len > input_len; + bad |= padding_len == 0; + + /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len, + * so pick input_len, which is usually 8 or 16 (one block) */ + pad_idx = input_len - padding_len; + for( i = 0; i < input_len; i++ ) + bad |= ( input[i] ^ padding_len ) * ( i >= pad_idx ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING * ( bad != 0 ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) +/* + * One and zeros padding: fill with 80 00 ... 00 + */ +static void add_one_and_zeros_padding( unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len, size_t data_len ) +{ + size_t padding_len = output_len - data_len; + unsigned char i = 0; + + output[data_len] = 0x80; + for( i = 1; i < padding_len; i++ ) + output[data_len + i] = 0x00; +} + +static int get_one_and_zeros_padding( unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len ) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned char done = 0, prev_done, bad; + + if( NULL == input || NULL == data_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + bad = 0x80; + *data_len = 0; + for( i = input_len; i > 0; i-- ) + { + prev_done = done; + done |= ( input[i - 1] != 0 ); + *data_len |= ( i - 1 ) * ( done != prev_done ); + bad ^= input[i - 1] * ( done != prev_done ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING * ( bad != 0 ) ); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) +/* + * Zeros and len padding: fill with 00 ... 00 ll, where ll is padding length + */ +static void add_zeros_and_len_padding( unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len, size_t data_len ) +{ + size_t padding_len = output_len - data_len; + unsigned char i = 0; + + for( i = 1; i < padding_len; i++ ) + output[data_len + i - 1] = 0x00; + output[output_len - 1] = (unsigned char) padding_len; +} + +static int get_zeros_and_len_padding( unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len ) +{ + size_t i, pad_idx; + unsigned char padding_len, bad = 0; + + if( NULL == input || NULL == data_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + padding_len = input[input_len - 1]; + *data_len = input_len - padding_len; + + /* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */ + bad |= padding_len > input_len; + bad |= padding_len == 0; + + /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len */ + pad_idx = input_len - padding_len; + for( i = 0; i < input_len - 1; i++ ) + bad |= input[i] * ( i >= pad_idx ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING * ( bad != 0 ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) +/* + * Zero padding: fill with 00 ... 00 + */ +static void add_zeros_padding( unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len, size_t data_len ) +{ + size_t i; + + for( i = data_len; i < output_len; i++ ) + output[i] = 0x00; +} + +static int get_zeros_padding( unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len ) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned char done = 0, prev_done; + + if( NULL == input || NULL == data_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *data_len = 0; + for( i = input_len; i > 0; i-- ) + { + prev_done = done; + done |= ( input[i-1] != 0 ); + *data_len |= i * ( done != prev_done ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS */ + +/* + * No padding: don't pad :) + * + * There is no add_padding function (check for NULL in mbedtls_cipher_finish) + * but a trivial get_padding function + */ +static int get_no_padding( unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len ) +{ + if( NULL == input || NULL == data_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *data_len = input_len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + +int mbedtls_cipher_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + *olen = 0; + + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if ( ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) || + ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + if( ctx->unprocessed_len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED ); + + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + int ret = 0; + + if( MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT == ctx->operation ) + { + /* check for 'no padding' mode */ + if( NULL == ctx->add_padding ) + { + if( 0 != ctx->unprocessed_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + ctx->add_padding( ctx->unprocessed_data, mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( ctx ), + ctx->unprocessed_len ); + } + else if( mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ) != ctx->unprocessed_len ) + { + /* + * For decrypt operations, expect a full block, + * or an empty block if no padding + */ + if( NULL == ctx->add_padding && 0 == ctx->unprocessed_len ) + return( 0 ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED ); + } + + /* cipher block */ + if( 0 != ( ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cbc_func( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ), ctx->iv, + ctx->unprocessed_data, output ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Set output size for decryption */ + if( MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == ctx->operation ) + return( ctx->get_padding( output, mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ), + olen ) ); + + /* Set output size for encryption */ + *olen = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( ctx ); + return( 0 ); + } +#else + ((void) output); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) +int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( NULL == ctx->cipher_info || MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC != ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto knows about CBC padding + * schemes, we currently don't make them + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + if( mode != MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + switch( mode ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7: + ctx->add_padding = add_pkcs_padding; + ctx->get_padding = get_pkcs_padding; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS: + ctx->add_padding = add_one_and_zeros_padding; + ctx->get_padding = get_one_and_zeros_padding; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN: + ctx->add_padding = add_zeros_and_len_padding; + ctx->get_padding = get_zeros_and_len_padding; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS: + ctx->add_padding = add_zeros_padding; + ctx->get_padding = get_zeros_padding; + break; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE: + ctx->add_padding = NULL; + ctx->get_padding = get_no_padding; + break; + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT != ctx->operation ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + return( mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + tag, tag_len ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) + { + /* Don't allow truncated MAC for Poly1305 */ + if ( tag_len != 16U ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( + (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, tag ) ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + unsigned char check_tag[16]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + if( ctx->cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( MBEDTLS_DECRYPT != ctx->operation ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* Status to return on a non-authenticated algorithm. It would make sense + * to return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT or perhaps + * MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, but at the time I write this our + * unit tests assume 0. */ + ret = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + if( tag_len > sizeof( check_tag ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( 0 != ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( + (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + check_tag, tag_len ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */ + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) + { + /* Don't allow truncated MAC for Poly1305 */ + if ( tag_len != sizeof( check_tag ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( + (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*) ctx->cipher_ctx, check_tag ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */ + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( check_tag, tag_len ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +/* + * Packet-oriented wrapper for non-AEAD modes + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t finish_olen; + + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t part_len; + + if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) + { + status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &cipher_op, + cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg ); + } + else if( ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) + { + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &cipher_op, + cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg ); + } + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* In the following, we can immediately return on an error, + * because the PSA Crypto API guarantees that cipher operations + * are terminated by unsuccessful calls to psa_cipher_update(), + * and by any call to psa_cipher_finish(). */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + if( ctx->cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ) + { + status = psa_cipher_set_iv( &cipher_op, iv, iv_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_cipher_update( &cipher_op, + input, ilen, + output, ilen, olen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + status = psa_cipher_finish( &cipher_op, + output + *olen, ilen - *olen, + &part_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + *olen += part_len; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( ctx, iv, iv_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish( ctx, output + *olen, + &finish_olen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + *olen += finish_olen; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + */ +static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag + * at the end of the encrypted message. */ + if( output == NULL || tag != output + ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + status = psa_aead_encrypt( cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg, + iv, iv_len, + ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, + output, ilen + tag_len, olen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + *olen -= tag_len; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + *olen = ilen; + return( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, output, tag_len, tag ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + *olen = ilen; + return( mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, + iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output, + tag, tag_len ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) + { + /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */ + if ( ( iv_len != ctx->cipher_info->iv_size ) || + ( tag_len != 16U ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + return( mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, iv, ad, ad_len, input, output, tag ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} + +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + */ +static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ctx->psa_enabled == 1 ) + { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag + * at the end of the encrypted message. */ + if( input == NULL || tag != input + ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + status = psa_aead_decrypt( cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg, + iv, iv_len, + ad, ad_len, + input, ilen + tag_len, + output, ilen, olen ); + if( status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ); + else if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *olen = ilen; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, + iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + tag, tag_len, input, output ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if( MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *olen = ilen; + ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, + iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, output, tag, tag_len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if ( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */ + if ( ( iv_len != ctx->cipher_info->iv_size ) || + ( tag_len != 16U ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + *olen = ilen; + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, + iv, ad, ad_len, tag, input, output ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + tag, tag_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + tag, tag_len ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + if( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && +#endif + ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ) + { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + + /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, + * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ + if( iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + (void) iv; + (void) ad; + + return( mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, + output, olen, output_len ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */ + if( output_len < ilen + tag_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + int ret = mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + output + ilen, tag_len ); + *olen += tag_len; + return( ret ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +} + +/* + * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len ) +{ + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( output_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + if( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && +#endif + ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ) + { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = ( MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + + /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, + * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ + if( iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + (void) iv; + (void) ad; + + return( mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, + output, olen, output_len ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */ + if( ilen < tag_len || output_len < ilen - tag_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen - tag_len, output, olen, + input + ilen - tag_len, tag_len ) ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/cipher_wrap.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/cipher_wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c76bdcc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/cipher_wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,2400 @@ +/** + * \file cipher_wrap.c + * + * \brief Generic cipher wrapper for mbed TLS + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + +#include "mbedtls/cipher_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) +#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +/* shared by all GCM ciphers */ +static void *gcm_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_gcm_init( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void gcm_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_gcm_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +/* shared by all CCM ciphers */ +static void *ccm_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_ccm_init( (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void ccm_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ccm_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + +static int aes_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, operation, input, output ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int aes_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, size_t length, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, input, + output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static int aes_crypt_cfb128_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv_off, iv, + input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +static int aes_crypt_ofb_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, length, iv_off, + iv, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static int aes_crypt_ctr_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, nonce_counter, + stream_block, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +static int aes_crypt_xts_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, + const unsigned char data_unit[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx; + int mode; + + switch( operation ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT: + mode = MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DECRYPT: + mode = MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( xts_ctx, mode, length, + data_unit, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +static int aes_setkey_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static int aes_setkey_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static void * aes_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_context *aes = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_aes_context ) ); + + if( aes == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_aes_init( aes ); + + return( aes ); +} + +static void aes_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_free( (mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + aes_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + aes_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + aes_crypt_cfb128_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + aes_crypt_ofb_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + aes_crypt_ctr_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + aes_setkey_enc_wrap, + aes_setkey_dec_wrap, + aes_ctx_alloc, + aes_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 128, + "AES-128-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 192, + "AES-192-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 256, + "AES-256-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 128, + "AES-128-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 192, + "AES-192-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 256, + "AES-256-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 128, + "AES-128-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 192, + "AES-192-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 256, + "AES-256-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ofb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + 128, + "AES-128-OFB", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ofb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + 192, + "AES-192-OFB", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ofb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + 256, + "AES-256-OFB", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 128, + "AES-128-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 192, + "AES-192-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 256, + "AES-256-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +static int xts_aes_setkey_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx; + return( mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc( xts_ctx, key, key_bitlen ) ); +} + +static int xts_aes_setkey_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx; + return( mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec( xts_ctx, key, key_bitlen ) ); +} + +static void *xts_aes_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *xts_ctx ) ); + + if( xts_ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_aes_xts_init( xts_ctx ); + + return( xts_ctx ); +} + +static void xts_aes_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx; + + if( xts_ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_aes_xts_free( xts_ctx ); + mbedtls_free( xts_ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t xts_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + aes_crypt_xts_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + xts_aes_setkey_enc_wrap, + xts_aes_setkey_dec_wrap, + xts_aes_ctx_alloc, + xts_aes_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_xts_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, + 256, + "AES-128-XTS", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &xts_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_xts_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, + 512, + "AES-256-XTS", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &xts_aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +static int gcm_aes_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_gcm_setkey( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + gcm_aes_setkey_wrap, + gcm_aes_setkey_wrap, + gcm_ctx_alloc, + gcm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 128, + "AES-128-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 192, + "AES-192-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 256, + "AES-256-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +static int ccm_aes_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_ccm_setkey( (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + ccm_aes_setkey_wrap, + ccm_aes_setkey_wrap, + ccm_ctx_alloc, + ccm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 128, + "AES-128-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 192, + "AES-192-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 256, + "AES-256-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + +static int camellia_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, operation, input, + output ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int camellia_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, + input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static int camellia_crypt_cfb128_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, operation, length, + iv_off, iv, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static int camellia_crypt_ctr_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, + nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +static int camellia_setkey_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static int camellia_setkey_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static void * camellia_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_camellia_context ) ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_camellia_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void camellia_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_camellia_free( (mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t camellia_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + camellia_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + camellia_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + camellia_crypt_cfb128_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + camellia_crypt_ctr_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + camellia_setkey_enc_wrap, + camellia_setkey_dec_wrap, + camellia_ctx_alloc, + camellia_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 128, + "CAMELLIA-128-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 192, + "CAMELLIA-192-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 256, + "CAMELLIA-256-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 128, + "CAMELLIA-128-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 192, + "CAMELLIA-192-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 256, + "CAMELLIA-256-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 128, + "CAMELLIA-128-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 192, + "CAMELLIA-192-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 256, + "CAMELLIA-256-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 128, + "CAMELLIA-128-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 192, + "CAMELLIA-192-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 256, + "CAMELLIA-256-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &camellia_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +static int gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_gcm_setkey( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_camellia_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap, + gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap, + gcm_ctx_alloc, + gcm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 128, + "CAMELLIA-128-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 192, + "CAMELLIA-192-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 256, + "CAMELLIA-256-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_camellia_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +static int ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_ccm_setkey( (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_camellia_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap, + ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap, + ccm_ctx_alloc, + ccm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 128, + "CAMELLIA-128-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 192, + "CAMELLIA-192-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_camellia_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 256, + "CAMELLIA-256-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_camellia_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + +static int aria_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + (void) operation; + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, input, + output ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int aria_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, + input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static int aria_crypt_cfb128_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, operation, length, + iv_off, iv, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static int aria_crypt_ctr_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, + nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +static int aria_setkey_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static int aria_setkey_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static void * aria_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_aria_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_aria_context ) ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_aria_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void aria_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_aria_free( (mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t aria_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + aria_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + aria_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + aria_crypt_cfb128_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + aria_crypt_ctr_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + aria_setkey_enc_wrap, + aria_setkey_dec_wrap, + aria_ctx_alloc, + aria_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 128, + "ARIA-128-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 192, + "ARIA-192-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 256, + "ARIA-256-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 128, + "ARIA-128-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 192, + "ARIA-192-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 256, + "ARIA-256-CBC", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 128, + "ARIA-128-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 192, + "ARIA-192-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_cfb128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 256, + "ARIA-256-CFB128", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 128, + "ARIA-128-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 192, + "ARIA-192-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 256, + "ARIA-256-CTR", + 16, + 0, + 16, + &aria_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +static int gcm_aria_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_gcm_setkey( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aria_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + gcm_aria_setkey_wrap, + gcm_aria_setkey_wrap, + gcm_ctx_alloc, + gcm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 128, + "ARIA-128-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 192, + "ARIA-192-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_gcm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + 256, + "ARIA-256-GCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &gcm_aria_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +static int ccm_aria_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_ccm_setkey( (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aria_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + ccm_aria_setkey_wrap, + ccm_aria_setkey_wrap, + ccm_ctx_alloc, + ccm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 128, + "ARIA-128-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 192, + "ARIA-192-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_aria_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ccm_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + 256, + "ARIA-256-CCM", + 12, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + 16, + &ccm_aria_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + +static int des_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + ((void) operation); + return mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, input, output ); +} + +static int des3_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + ((void) operation); + return mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, input, output ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int des_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, size_t length, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, input, + output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int des3_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, size_t length, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, input, + output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +static int des_setkey_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( (mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, key ); +} + +static int des_setkey_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( (mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, key ); +} + +static int des3_set2key_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key ); +} + +static int des3_set2key_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key ); +} + +static int des3_set3key_dec_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key ); +} + +static int des3_set3key_enc_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key ); +} + +static void * des_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_des_context *des = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_des_context ) ); + + if( des == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_des_init( des ); + + return( des ); +} + +static void des_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_des_free( (mbedtls_des_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static void * des3_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_des3_context *des3; + des3 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_des3_context ) ); + + if( des3 == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_des3_init( des3 ); + + return( des3 ); +} + +static void des3_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_des3_free( (mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, + des_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + des_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + des_setkey_enc_wrap, + des_setkey_dec_wrap, + des_ctx_alloc, + des_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES, + "DES-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 8, + &des_info +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES, + "DES-CBC", + 8, + 0, + 8, + &des_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_ede_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, + des3_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + des3_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + des3_set2key_enc_wrap, + des3_set2key_dec_wrap, + des3_ctx_alloc, + des3_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE, + "DES-EDE-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 8, + &des_ede_info +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE, + "DES-EDE-CBC", + 8, + 0, + 8, + &des_ede_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_ede3_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES, + des3_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + des3_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + des3_set3key_enc_wrap, + des3_set3key_dec_wrap, + des3_ctx_alloc, + des3_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3, + "DES-EDE3-ECB", + 0, + 0, + 8, + &des_ede3_info +}; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3, + "DES-EDE3-CBC", + 8, + 0, + 8, + &des_ede3_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) + +static int blowfish_crypt_ecb_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, input, + output ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int blowfish_crypt_cbc_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, + input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static int blowfish_crypt_cfb64_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, length, + iv_off, iv, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static int blowfish_crypt_ctr_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output ) +{ + return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, + nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +static int blowfish_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_blowfish_setkey( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen ); +} + +static void * blowfish_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_blowfish_context ) ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_blowfish_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void blowfish_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_blowfish_free( (mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t blowfish_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH, + blowfish_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + blowfish_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + blowfish_crypt_cfb64_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + blowfish_crypt_ctr_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + blowfish_setkey_wrap, + blowfish_setkey_wrap, + blowfish_ctx_alloc, + blowfish_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_ecb_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + 128, + "BLOWFISH-ECB", + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, + 8, + &blowfish_info +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_cbc_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + 128, + "BLOWFISH-CBC", + 8, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, + 8, + &blowfish_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_cfb64_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + 128, + "BLOWFISH-CFB64", + 8, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, + 8, + &blowfish_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_ctr_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + 128, + "BLOWFISH-CTR", + 8, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, + 8, + &blowfish_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +static int arc4_crypt_stream_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + return( mbedtls_arc4_crypt( (mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx, length, input, output ) ); +} + +static int arc4_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + /* we get key_bitlen in bits, arc4 expects it in bytes */ + if( key_bitlen % 8 != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_arc4_setup( (mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen / 8 ); + return( 0 ); +} + +static void * arc4_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_arc4_context ) ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_arc4_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void arc4_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_arc4_free( (mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t arc4_base_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + arc4_crypt_stream_wrap, +#endif + arc4_setkey_wrap, + arc4_setkey_wrap, + arc4_ctx_alloc, + arc4_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t arc4_128_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, + 128, + "ARC4-128", + 0, + 0, + 1, + &arc4_base_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + +static int chacha20_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + if( key_bitlen != 256U ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if ( 0 != mbedtls_chacha20_setkey( (mbedtls_chacha20_context*)ctx, key ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int chacha20_stream_wrap( void *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update( ctx, length, input, output ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static void * chacha20_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_chacha20_context ) ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_chacha20_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void chacha20_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_chacha20_free( (mbedtls_chacha20_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t chacha20_base_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + chacha20_stream_wrap, +#endif + chacha20_setkey_wrap, + chacha20_setkey_wrap, + chacha20_ctx_alloc, + chacha20_ctx_free +}; +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t chacha20_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, + 256, + "CHACHA20", + 12, + 0, + 1, + &chacha20_base_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + +static int chachapoly_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + if( key_bitlen != 256U ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if ( 0 != mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context*)ctx, key ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void * chachapoly_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_chachapoly_context ) ); + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void chachapoly_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_chachapoly_free( (mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t chachapoly_base_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + chachapoly_setkey_wrap, + chachapoly_setkey_wrap, + chachapoly_ctx_alloc, + chachapoly_ctx_free +}; +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t chachapoly_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, + 256, + "CHACHA20-POLY1305", + 12, + 0, + 1, + &chachapoly_base_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +static int null_crypt_stream( void *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + memmove( output, input, length ); + return( 0 ); +} + +static int null_setkey( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) key); + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void * null_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + return( (void *) 1 ); +} + +static void null_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + ((void) ctx); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t null_base_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + null_crypt_stream, +#endif + null_setkey, + null_setkey, + null_ctx_alloc, + null_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t null_cipher_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, + 0, + "NULL", + 0, + 0, + 1, + &null_base_info +}; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +static void *kw_ctx_alloc( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_nist_kw_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( (mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void kw_ctx_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static int kw_aes_setkey_wrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( (mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen, 1 ); +} + +static int kw_aes_setkey_unwrap( void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen ) +{ + return mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( (mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen, 0 ); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t kw_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + kw_aes_setkey_wrap, + kw_aes_setkey_unwrap, + kw_ctx_alloc, + kw_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kw_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + 128, + "AES-128-KW", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kw_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + 192, + "AES-192-KW", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kw_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + 256, + "AES-256-KW", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kwp_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + 128, + "AES-128-KWP", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kwp_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + 192, + "AES-192-KWP", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kwp_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + 256, + "AES-256-KWP", + 0, + 0, + 16, + &kw_aes_info +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, &aes_128_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, &aes_192_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, &aes_256_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, &aes_128_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, &aes_192_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, &aes_256_cbc_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, &aes_128_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, &aes_192_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, &aes_256_cfb128_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, &aes_128_ofb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, &aes_192_ofb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, &aes_256_ofb_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, &aes_128_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, &aes_192_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, &aes_256_ctr_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, &aes_128_xts_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, &aes_256_xts_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, &aes_128_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, &aes_192_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, &aes_256_gcm_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, &aes_128_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, &aes_192_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, &aes_256_ccm_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, &arc4_128_info }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, &blowfish_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, &blowfish_cbc_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, &blowfish_cfb64_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, &blowfish_ctr_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, &camellia_128_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, &camellia_192_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, &camellia_256_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, &camellia_128_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, &camellia_192_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, &camellia_256_cbc_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, &camellia_128_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, &camellia_192_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, &camellia_256_cfb128_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, &camellia_128_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, &camellia_192_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, &camellia_256_ctr_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, &camellia_128_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, &camellia_192_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, &camellia_256_gcm_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, &camellia_128_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, &camellia_192_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, &camellia_256_ccm_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, &aria_128_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, &aria_192_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, &aria_256_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, &aria_128_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, &aria_192_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, &aria_256_cbc_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, &aria_128_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, &aria_192_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, &aria_256_cfb128_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, &aria_128_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, &aria_192_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, &aria_256_ctr_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, &aria_128_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, &aria_192_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, &aria_256_gcm_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, &aria_128_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, &aria_192_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, &aria_256_ccm_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, &des_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, &des_ede_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, &des_ede3_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, &des_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, &des_ede_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, &des_ede3_cbc_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, &chacha20_info }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, &chachapoly_info }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, &aes_128_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, &aes_192_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, &aes_256_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, &aes_128_nist_kwp_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, &aes_192_nist_kwp_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, &aes_256_nist_kwp_info }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, &null_cipher_info }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ + + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, NULL } +}; + +#define NUM_CIPHERS ( sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions) / \ + sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0]) ) +int mbedtls_cipher_supported[NUM_CIPHERS]; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/cmac.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/cmac.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3cc49d10 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/cmac.c @@ -0,0 +1,1087 @@ +/** + * \file cmac.c + * + * \brief NIST SP800-38B compliant CMAC implementation for AES and 3DES + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * - NIST SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The + * CMAC Mode for Authentication + * http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38b.pdf + * + * - RFC 4493 - The AES-CMAC Algorithm + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493 + * + * - RFC 4615 - The Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based Message + * Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 (AES-CMAC-PRF-128) + * Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4615 + * + * Additional test vectors: ISO/IEC 9797-1 + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * Multiplication by u in the Galois field of GF(2^n) + * + * As explained in NIST SP 800-38B, this can be computed: + * + * If MSB(p) = 0, then p = (p << 1) + * If MSB(p) = 1, then p = (p << 1) ^ R_n + * with R_64 = 0x1B and R_128 = 0x87 + * + * Input and output MUST NOT point to the same buffer + * Block size must be 8 bytes or 16 bytes - the block sizes for DES and AES. + */ +static int cmac_multiply_by_u( unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t blocksize ) +{ + const unsigned char R_128 = 0x87; + const unsigned char R_64 = 0x1B; + unsigned char R_n, mask; + unsigned char overflow = 0x00; + int i; + + if( blocksize == MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ) + { + R_n = R_128; + } + else if( blocksize == MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE ) + { + R_n = R_64; + } + else + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + for( i = (int)blocksize - 1; i >= 0; i-- ) + { + output[i] = input[i] << 1 | overflow; + overflow = input[i] >> 7; + } + + /* mask = ( input[0] >> 7 ) ? 0xff : 0x00 + * using bit operations to avoid branches */ + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is + * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + mask = - ( input[0] >> 7 ); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + output[ blocksize - 1 ] ^= R_n & mask; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Generate subkeys + * + * - as specified by RFC 4493, section 2.3 Subkey Generation Algorithm + */ +static int cmac_generate_subkeys( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char* K1, unsigned char* K2 ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + size_t olen, block_size; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( L, sizeof( L ) ); + + block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + + /* Calculate Ek(0) */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, L, block_size, L, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Generate K1 and K2 + */ + if( ( ret = cmac_multiply_by_u( K1, L , block_size ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = cmac_multiply_by_u( K2, K1 , block_size ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( L, sizeof( L ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) +static void cmac_xor_block( unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input1, + const unsigned char *input2, + const size_t block_size ) +{ + size_t idx; + + for( idx = 0; idx < block_size; idx++ ) + output[ idx ] = input1[ idx ] ^ input2[ idx ]; +} + +/* + * Create padded last block from (partial) last block. + * + * We can't use the padding option from the cipher layer, as it only works for + * CBC and we use ECB mode, and anyway we need to XOR K1 or K2 in addition. + */ +static void cmac_pad( unsigned char padded_block[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX], + size_t padded_block_len, + const unsigned char *last_block, + size_t last_block_len ) +{ + size_t j; + + for( j = 0; j < padded_block_len; j++ ) + { + if( j < last_block_len ) + padded_block[j] = last_block[j]; + else if( j == last_block_len ) + padded_block[j] = 0x80; + else + padded_block[j] = 0x00; + } +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keybits ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; + mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; + int retval; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || key == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( retval = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( ctx, key, (int)keybits, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + return( retval ); + + type = ctx->cipher_info->type; + + switch( type ) + { + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB: + break; + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* Allocated and initialise in the cipher context memory for the CMAC + * context */ + cmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_cmac_context_t ) ); + if( cmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->cmac_ctx = cmac_ctx; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cmac_ctx->state, sizeof( cmac_ctx->state ) ); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_cmac_context_t* cmac_ctx; + unsigned char *state; + int ret = 0; + size_t n, j, olen, block_size; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || input == NULL || + ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; + block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + state = ctx->cmac_ctx->state; + + /* Is there data still to process from the last call, that's greater in + * size than a block? */ + if( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len > 0 && + ilen > block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len ) + { + memcpy( &cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block[cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len], + input, + block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len ); + + cmac_xor_block( state, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, state, block_size ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, state, block_size, state, + &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + input += block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len; + ilen -= block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len; + cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + } + + /* n is the number of blocks including any final partial block */ + n = ( ilen + block_size - 1 ) / block_size; + + /* Iterate across the input data in block sized chunks, excluding any + * final partial or complete block */ + for( j = 1; j < n; j++ ) + { + cmac_xor_block( state, input, state, block_size ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, state, block_size, state, + &olen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ilen -= block_size; + input += block_size; + } + + /* If there is data left over that wasn't aligned to a block */ + if( ilen > 0 ) + { + memcpy( &cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block[cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len], + input, + ilen ); + cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len += ilen; + } + +exit: + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + mbedtls_cmac_context_t* cmac_ctx; + unsigned char *state, *last_block; + unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen, block_size; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL || + output == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; + block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + state = cmac_ctx->state; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K1, sizeof( K1 ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K2, sizeof( K2 ) ); + cmac_generate_subkeys( ctx, K1, K2 ); + + last_block = cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block; + + /* Calculate last block */ + if( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len < block_size ) + { + cmac_pad( M_last, block_size, last_block, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len ); + cmac_xor_block( M_last, M_last, K2, block_size ); + } + else + { + /* Last block is complete block */ + cmac_xor_block( M_last, last_block, K1, block_size ); + } + + + cmac_xor_block( state, M_last, state, block_size ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, state, block_size, state, + &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + memcpy( output, state, block_size ); + +exit: + /* Wipe the generated keys on the stack, and any other transients to avoid + * side channel leakage */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K1, sizeof( K1 ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K2, sizeof( K2 ) ); + + cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, + sizeof( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block ) ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( state, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_cmac_context_t* cmac_ctx; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; + + /* Reset the internal state */ + cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, + sizeof( cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cmac_ctx->state, + sizeof( cmac_ctx->state ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac( const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( cipher_info == NULL || key == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &ctx, key, keylen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &ctx, input, ilen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &ctx, output ); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* + * Implementation of AES-CMAC-PRF-128 defined in RFC 4615 + */ +int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( const unsigned char *key, size_t key_length, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + unsigned char zero_key[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char int_key[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if( key == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + { + /* Failing at this point must be due to a build issue */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto exit; + } + + if( key_length == MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ) + { + /* Use key as is */ + memcpy( int_key, key, MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); + } + else + { + memset( zero_key, 0, MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, zero_key, 128, key, + key_length, int_key ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, int_key, 128, input, in_len, + output ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( int_key, sizeof( int_key ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * CMAC test data for SP800-38B + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/AES_CMAC.pdf + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/TDES_CMAC.pdf + * + * AES-CMAC-PRF-128 test data from RFC 4615 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4615#page-4 + */ + +#define NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY 4 +#define NB_PRF_TESTS 3 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +/* All CMAC test inputs are truncated from the same 64 byte buffer. */ +static const unsigned char test_message[] = { + /* PT */ + 0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96, + 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a, + 0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, + 0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51, + 0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x11, + 0xe5, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0x52, 0xef, + 0xf6, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x17, + 0xad, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x37, 0x10 +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* Truncation point of message for AES CMAC tests */ +static const unsigned int aes_message_lengths[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY] = { + /* Mlen */ + 0, + 16, + 20, + 64 +}; + +/* CMAC-AES128 Test Data */ +static const unsigned char aes_128_key[16] = { + 0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, + 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c +}; +static const unsigned char aes_128_subkeys[2][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0xfb, 0xee, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x35, 0x71, 0x33, 0x66, + 0x7c, 0x85, 0xe0, 0x8f, 0x72, 0x36, 0xa8, 0xde + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0xf7, 0xdd, 0xac, 0x30, 0x6a, 0xe2, 0x66, 0xcc, + 0xf9, 0x0b, 0xc1, 0x1e, 0xe4, 0x6d, 0x51, 0x3b + } +}; +static const unsigned char aes_128_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* Example #1 */ + 0xbb, 0x1d, 0x69, 0x29, 0xe9, 0x59, 0x37, 0x28, + 0x7f, 0xa3, 0x7d, 0x12, 0x9b, 0x75, 0x67, 0x46 + }, + { + /* Example #2 */ + 0x07, 0x0a, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6b, 0x4d, 0x41, 0x44, + 0xf7, 0x9b, 0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd0, 0x4a, 0x28, 0x7c + }, + { + /* Example #3 */ + 0x7d, 0x85, 0x44, 0x9e, 0xa6, 0xea, 0x19, 0xc8, + 0x23, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x78, 0x83, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xde + }, + { + /* Example #4 */ + 0x51, 0xf0, 0xbe, 0xbf, 0x7e, 0x3b, 0x9d, 0x92, + 0xfc, 0x49, 0x74, 0x17, 0x79, 0x36, 0x3c, 0xfe + } +}; + +/* CMAC-AES192 Test Data */ +static const unsigned char aes_192_key[24] = { + 0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x0e, 0x64, 0x52, + 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, + 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b +}; +static const unsigned char aes_192_subkeys[2][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0x44, 0x8a, 0x5b, 0x1c, 0x93, 0x51, 0x4b, 0x27, + 0x3e, 0xe6, 0x43, 0x9d, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xa2, 0x96 + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0x89, 0x14, 0xb6, 0x39, 0x26, 0xa2, 0x96, 0x4e, + 0x7d, 0xcc, 0x87, 0x3b, 0xa9, 0xb5, 0x45, 0x2c + } +}; +static const unsigned char aes_192_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* Example #1 */ + 0xd1, 0x7d, 0xdf, 0x46, 0xad, 0xaa, 0xcd, 0xe5, + 0x31, 0xca, 0xc4, 0x83, 0xde, 0x7a, 0x93, 0x67 + }, + { + /* Example #2 */ + 0x9e, 0x99, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x31, 0xe7, 0x10, 0x90, + 0x06, 0x62, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0x61, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x84 + }, + { + /* Example #3 */ + 0x3d, 0x75, 0xc1, 0x94, 0xed, 0x96, 0x07, 0x04, + 0x44, 0xa9, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0xc7, 0x40, 0xec, 0xf8 + }, + { + /* Example #4 */ + 0xa1, 0xd5, 0xdf, 0x0e, 0xed, 0x79, 0x0f, 0x79, + 0x4d, 0x77, 0x58, 0x96, 0x59, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0x11 + } +}; + +/* CMAC-AES256 Test Data */ +static const unsigned char aes_256_key[32] = { + 0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, + 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81, + 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7, + 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4 +}; +static const unsigned char aes_256_subkeys[2][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0xca, 0xd1, 0xed, 0x03, 0x29, 0x9e, 0xed, 0xac, + 0x2e, 0x9a, 0x99, 0x80, 0x86, 0x21, 0x50, 0x2f + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0x95, 0xa3, 0xda, 0x06, 0x53, 0x3d, 0xdb, 0x58, + 0x5d, 0x35, 0x33, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x42, 0xa0, 0xd9 + } +}; +static const unsigned char aes_256_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* Example #1 */ + 0x02, 0x89, 0x62, 0xf6, 0x1b, 0x7b, 0xf8, 0x9e, + 0xfc, 0x6b, 0x55, 0x1f, 0x46, 0x67, 0xd9, 0x83 + }, + { + /* Example #2 */ + 0x28, 0xa7, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82, + 0xbd, 0x4b, 0xf2, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0xc3, 0x5c + }, + { + /* Example #3 */ + 0x15, 0x67, 0x27, 0xdc, 0x08, 0x78, 0x94, 0x4a, + 0x02, 0x3c, 0x1f, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0xad, 0x6d, 0x93 + }, + { + /* Example #4 */ + 0xe1, 0x99, 0x21, 0x90, 0x54, 0x9f, 0x6e, 0xd5, + 0x69, 0x6a, 0x2c, 0x05, 0x6c, 0x31, 0x54, 0x10 + } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +/* Truncation point of message for 3DES CMAC tests */ +static const unsigned int des3_message_lengths[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY] = { + 0, + 16, + 20, + 32 +}; + +/* CMAC-TDES (Generation) - 2 Key Test Data */ +static const unsigned char des3_2key_key[24] = { + /* Key1 */ + 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + /* Key2 */ + 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xEF, 0x01, + /* Key3 */ + 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef +}; +static const unsigned char des3_2key_subkeys[2][8] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0x0d, 0xd2, 0xcb, 0x7a, 0x3d, 0x88, 0x88, 0xd9 + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0x1b, 0xa5, 0x96, 0xf4, 0x7b, 0x11, 0x11, 0xb2 + } +}; +static const unsigned char des3_2key_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* Sample #1 */ + 0x79, 0xce, 0x52, 0xa7, 0xf7, 0x86, 0xa9, 0x60 + }, + { + /* Sample #2 */ + 0xcc, 0x18, 0xa0, 0xb7, 0x9a, 0xf2, 0x41, 0x3b + }, + { + /* Sample #3 */ + 0xc0, 0x6d, 0x37, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x10, 0x19, 0x69 + }, + { + /* Sample #4 */ + 0x9c, 0xd3, 0x35, 0x80, 0xf9, 0xb6, 0x4d, 0xfb + } +}; + +/* CMAC-TDES (Generation) - 3 Key Test Data */ +static const unsigned char des3_3key_key[24] = { + /* Key1 */ + 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xaa, 0xcd, 0xef, + /* Key2 */ + 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0x01, + /* Key3 */ + 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0x01, 0x23 +}; +static const unsigned char des3_3key_subkeys[2][8] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0x9d, 0x74, 0xe7, 0x39, 0x33, 0x17, 0x96, 0xc0 + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0x3a, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x72, 0x66, 0x2f, 0x2d, 0x9b + } +}; +static const unsigned char des3_3key_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* Sample #1 */ + 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xd3, 0x7d, 0xf9, 0x36, 0xc5, 0x50 + }, + { + /* Sample #2 */ + 0x30, 0x23, 0x9c, 0xf1, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0x66, 0x09 + }, + { + /* Sample #3 */ + 0x6c, 0x9f, 0x3e, 0xe4, 0x92, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0xe2 + }, + { + /* Sample #4 */ + 0x99, 0x42, 0x9b, 0xd0, 0xbF, 0x79, 0x04, 0xe5 + } +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* AES AES-CMAC-PRF-128 Test Data */ +static const unsigned char PRFK[] = { + /* Key */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0xed, 0xcb +}; + +/* Sizes in bytes */ +static const size_t PRFKlen[NB_PRF_TESTS] = { + 18, + 16, + 10 +}; + +/* Message */ +static const unsigned char PRFM[] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13 +}; + +static const unsigned char PRFT[NB_PRF_TESTS][16] = { + { + 0x84, 0xa3, 0x48, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x5d, 0x23, 0x5b, + 0xab, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x0d, 0x2b, 0x4d, 0xa0, 0x9a + }, + { + 0x98, 0x0a, 0xe8, 0x7b, 0x5f, 0x4c, 0x9c, 0x52, + 0x14, 0xf5, 0xb6, 0xa8, 0x45, 0x5e, 0x4c, 0x2d + }, + { + 0x29, 0x0d, 0x9e, 0x11, 0x2e, 0xdb, 0x09, 0xee, + 0x14, 0x1f, 0xcf, 0x64, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0x2f, 0x3d + } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +static int cmac_test_subkeys( int verbose, + const char* testname, + const unsigned char* key, + int keybits, + const unsigned char* subkeys, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, + int block_size, + int num_tests ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_type ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + { + /* Failing at this point must be due to a build issue */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < num_tests; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " %s CMAC subkey #%d: ", testname, i + 1 ); + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "test execution failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx, key, keybits, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* When CMAC is implemented by an alternative implementation, or + * the underlying primitive itself is implemented alternatively, + * AES-192 may be unavailable. This should not cause the selftest + * function to fail. */ + if( ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) && + cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB ) { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + goto next_test; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "test execution failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = cmac_generate_subkeys( &ctx, K1, K2 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + if( ( ret = memcmp( K1, subkeys, block_size ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = memcmp( K2, &subkeys[block_size], block_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +next_test: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); + } + + ret = 0; + goto exit; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx ); + +exit: + return( ret ); +} + +static int cmac_test_wth_cipher( int verbose, + const char* testname, + const unsigned char* key, + int keybits, + const unsigned char* messages, + const unsigned int message_lengths[4], + const unsigned char* expected_result, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, + int block_size, + int num_tests ) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_type ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + { + /* Failing at this point must be due to a build issue */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto exit; + } + + for( i = 0; i < num_tests; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " %s CMAC #%d: ", testname, i + 1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac( cipher_info, key, keybits, messages, + message_lengths[i], output ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* When CMAC is implemented by an alternative implementation, or + * the underlying primitive itself is implemented alternatively, + * AES-192 and/or 3DES may be unavailable. This should not cause + * the selftest function to fail. */ + if( ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) && + ( cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB || + cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB ) ) { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + continue; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = memcmp( output, &expected_result[i * block_size], block_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +static int test_aes128_cmac_prf( int verbose ) +{ + int i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + for( i = 0; i < NB_PRF_TESTS; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_printf( " AES CMAC 128 PRF #%d: ", i ); + ret = mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128( PRFK, PRFKlen[i], PRFM, 20, output ); + if( ret != 0 || + memcmp( output, PRFT[i], MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ) != 0 ) + { + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( ret ); + } + else if( verbose != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + } + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +int mbedtls_cmac_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + /* AES-128 */ + if( ( ret = cmac_test_subkeys( verbose, + "AES 128", + aes_128_key, + 128, + (const unsigned char*)aes_128_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher( verbose, + "AES 128", + aes_128_key, + 128, + test_message, + aes_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char*)aes_128_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* AES-192 */ + if( ( ret = cmac_test_subkeys( verbose, + "AES 192", + aes_192_key, + 192, + (const unsigned char*)aes_192_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher( verbose, + "AES 192", + aes_192_key, + 192, + test_message, + aes_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char*)aes_192_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* AES-256 */ + if( ( ret = cmac_test_subkeys( verbose, + "AES 256", + aes_256_key, + 256, + (const unsigned char*)aes_256_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher ( verbose, + "AES 256", + aes_256_key, + 256, + test_message, + aes_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char*)aes_256_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + /* 3DES 2 key */ + if( ( ret = cmac_test_subkeys( verbose, + "3DES 2 key", + des3_2key_key, + 192, + (const unsigned char*)des3_2key_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher( verbose, + "3DES 2 key", + des3_2key_key, + 192, + test_message, + des3_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char*)des3_2key_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* 3DES 3 key */ + if( ( ret = cmac_test_subkeys( verbose, + "3DES 3 key", + des3_3key_key, + 192, + (const unsigned char*)des3_3key_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher( verbose, + "3DES 3 key", + des3_3key_key, + 192, + test_message, + des3_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char*)des3_3key_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if( ( ret = test_aes128_cmac_prf( verbose ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/common.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1663d502 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,350 @@ +/** + * \file common.h + * + * \brief Utility macros for internal use in the library + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H +#define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#else +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* Define `inline` on some non-C99-compliant compilers. */ +#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/** Helper to define a function as static except when building invasive tests. + * + * If a function is only used inside its own source file and should be + * declared `static` to allow the compiler to optimize for code size, + * but that function has unit tests, define it with + * ``` + * MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_foo(...) { ... } + * ``` + * and declare it in a header in the `library/` directory with + * ``` + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + * int mbedtls_foo(...); + * #endif + * ``` + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +#else +#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE static +#endif + +/** Return an offset into a buffer. + * + * This is just the addition of an offset to a pointer, except that this + * function also accepts an offset of 0 into a buffer whose pointer is null. + * (`p + n` has undefined behavior when `p` is null, even when `n == 0`. + * A null pointer is a valid buffer pointer when the size is 0, for example + * as the result of `malloc(0)` on some platforms.) + * + * \param p Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes. + * This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero. + * \param n An offset in bytes. + * \return Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p. + * Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the + * buffer is at least \p n + 1. + */ +static inline unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset( + unsigned char *p, size_t n ) +{ + return( p == NULL ? NULL : p + n ); +} + +/** Return an offset into a read-only buffer. + * + * Similar to mbedtls_buffer_offset(), but for const pointers. + * + * \param p Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes. + * This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero. + * \param n An offset in bytes. + * \return Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p. + * Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the + * buffer is at least \p n + 1. + */ +static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const( + const unsigned char *p, size_t n ) +{ + return( p == NULL ? NULL : p + n ); +} + +/** Byte Reading Macros + * + * Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th + * byte from x, where byte 0 is the least significant byte. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( x ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 8 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 16 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 24 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 32 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 40 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 48 ) & 0xff ) ) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( x ) ( (uint8_t) ( ( ( x ) >> 56 ) & 0xff ) ) + +/** + * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant + * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data , offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] << 24 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant + * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant + * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint32_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] << 24 ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant + * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant + * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] ) \ + | ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant + * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant + * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint16_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant + * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant + * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] << 56 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 48 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 40 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] << 32 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 4] << 24 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 5] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 6] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 7] ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant + * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ +} +#endif + +/** + * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant + * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE( data, offset ) \ + ( \ + ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 7] << 56 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 6] << 48 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 5] << 40 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 4] << 32 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 3] << 24 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 2] << 16 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) + 1] << 8 ) \ + | ( (uint64_t) ( data )[( offset ) ] ) \ + ) +#endif + +/** + * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant + * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE( n, data, offset ) \ +{ \ + ( data )[( offset ) ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6( n ); \ + ( data )[( offset ) + 7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7( n ); \ +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/constant_time.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/constant_time.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2401b043 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/constant_time.c @@ -0,0 +1,831 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + + /* + * The following functions are implemented without using comparison operators, as those + * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +#include "constant_time_invasive.h" +#endif + +#include + +int mbedtls_ct_memcmp( const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n ) +{ + size_t i; + volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; + volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; + volatile unsigned char diff = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + { + /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff. + * This avoids IAR compiler warning: + * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */ + unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; + diff |= x ^ y; + } + + return( (int)diff ); +} + +unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( unsigned value ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is + * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + +size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask( size_t value ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( mbedtls_mpi_uint value ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is + * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) ); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +/** Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison: + * - if \p x < \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 + * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return All-bits-one if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise zero. + */ +static size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt( size_t x, + size_t y ) +{ + /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */ + const size_t sub = x - y; + + /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */ + const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 ); + + /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */ + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask( sub1 ); + + return( mask ); +} + +size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( size_t x, + size_t y ) +{ + return( ~mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt( x, y ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + +/* Return 0xff if low <= c <= high, 0 otherwise. + * + * Constant flow with respect to c. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( unsigned char low, + unsigned char high, + unsigned char c ) +{ + /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */ + unsigned low_mask = ( (unsigned) c - low ) >> 8; + /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */ + unsigned high_mask = ( (unsigned) high - c ) >> 8; + return( ~( low_mask | high_mask ) & 0xff ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( size_t x, + size_t y ) +{ + /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ + const size_t diff = x ^ y; + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */ + const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | (size_t) -diff ); + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */ + const unsigned diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 ); + + return( 1 ^ diff1 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** Constant-flow "greater than" comparison: + * return x > y + * + * This is equivalent to \p x > \p y, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return 1 if \p x greater than \p y, otherwise 0. + */ +static unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_gt( size_t x, + size_t y ) +{ + /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (y - x). */ + return( ( y - x ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint y ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint ret; + mbedtls_mpi_uint cond; + + /* + * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different. + */ + cond = ( x ^ y ); + /* + * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and + * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x> ( sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) * 8 - 1 ); + + return (unsigned) ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if( unsigned condition, + unsigned if1, + unsigned if0 ) +{ + unsigned mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( condition ); + return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Select between two sign values without branches. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0` but uses only bit + * operations in order to avoid branches. + * + * \note if1 and if0 must be either 1 or -1, otherwise the result + * is undefined. + * + * \param condition Condition to test; must be either 0 or 1. + * \param if1 The first sign; must be either +1 or -1. + * \param if0 The second sign; must be either +1 or -1. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0. + * */ +static int mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( unsigned char condition, + int if1, + int if0 ) +{ + /* In order to avoid questions about what we can reasonably assume about + * the representations of signed integers, move everything to unsigned + * by taking advantage of the fact that if1 and if0 are either +1 or -1. */ + unsigned uif1 = if1 + 1; + unsigned uif0 = if0 + 1; + + /* condition was 0 or 1, mask is 0 or 2 as are uif1 and uif0 */ + const unsigned mask = condition << 1; + + /* select uif1 or uif0 */ + unsigned ur = ( uif0 & ~mask ) | ( uif1 & mask ); + + /* ur is now 0 or 2, convert back to -1 or +1 */ + return( (int) ur - 1 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, + unsigned char condition ) +{ + size_t i; + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* all-bits 1 if condition is 1, all-bits 0 if condition is 0 */ + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -condition; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( unsigned char value ) +{ + unsigned char digit = 0; + /* For each range of values, if value is in that range, mask digit with + * the corresponding value. Since value can only be in a single range, + * only at most one masking will change digit. */ + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 0, 25, value ) & ( 'A' + value ); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 26, 51, value ) & ( 'a' + value - 26 ); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 52, 61, value ) & ( '0' + value - 52 ); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 62, 62, value ) & '+'; + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 63, 63, value ) & '/'; + return( digit ); +} + +signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( unsigned char c ) +{ + unsigned char val = 0; + /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with + * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range, + * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus + * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */ + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 'A', 'Z', c ) & ( c - 'A' + 0 + 1 ); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( 'a', 'z', c ) & ( c - 'a' + 26 + 1 ); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( '0', '9', c ) & ( c - '0' + 52 + 1 ); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( '+', '+', c ) & ( c - '+' + 62 + 1 ); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( '/', '/', c ) & ( c - '/' + 63 + 1 ); + /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is + * a digit with the value v. */ + return( val - 1 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer. + * + * `mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally + * equivalent to + * ``` + * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset); + * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset); + * ``` + * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing) + * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at + * the expense of performance. + * + * \param start Pointer to the start of the buffer. + * \param total Total size of the buffer. + * \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes. + */ +static void mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left( void *start, + size_t total, + size_t offset ) +{ + volatile unsigned char *buf = start; + size_t i, n; + if( total == 0 ) + return; + for( i = 0; i < total; i++ ) + { + unsigned no_op = mbedtls_ct_size_gt( total - offset, i ); + /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last + * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and + * zero out the last byte. */ + for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ ) + { + unsigned char current = buf[n]; + unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; + buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( no_op, current, next ); + } + buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t len, + size_t c1, + size_t c2 ) +{ + /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */ + const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( c1, c2 ); + const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_mask( equal ); + + /* dest[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dest[i] */ + for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask ); +} + +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t offset, + size_t offset_min, + size_t offset_max, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t offsetval; + + for( offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++ ) + { + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( dest, src + offsetval, len, + offsetval, offset ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_ct_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + /* + * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() + * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. + * + * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means + * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit + * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. + * + * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to + * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen + * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. + * + * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. + */ + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info ); + /* TLS 1.0-1.2 only support SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, + * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ + const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; + const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; + const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; + const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); + + unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_md_context_t aux; + size_t offset; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init( &aux ); + +#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \ + do { \ + ret = (func_call); \ + if( ret != 0 ) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while( 0 ) + + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) ); + + /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, + * so we can start directly with the message */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) ); + + /* Fill the hash buffer in advance with something that is + * not a valid hash (barring an attack on the hash and + * deliberately-crafted input), in case the caller doesn't + * check the return status properly. */ + memset( output, '!', hash_size ); + + /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ + for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ ) + { + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) ); + /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size, + offset, data_len_secret ); + + if( offset < max_data_len ) + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) ); + } + + /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) ); + + /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) ); + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) ); + + /* Done, get ready for next time */ + MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ); + +#undef MD_CHK + +cleanup: + mbedtls_md_free( &aux ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + +/* + * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information + * about whether the assignment was made or not. + * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.) + */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_ARM64) && (_MSC_FULL_VER < 193131103) +/* + * MSVC miscompiles this function if it's inlined prior to Visual Studio 2022 version 17.1. See: + * https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/t/c-compiler-miscompiles-part-of-mbedtls-library-on/1646989 + */ +__declspec(noinline) +#endif +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned char assign ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */ + limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( assign );; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) ); + + X->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( assign, Y->s, X->s ); + + mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign ); + + for( i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++ ) + X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information + * about whether the swap was made or not. + * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which would lead to + * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned char swap ) +{ + int ret, s; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + + if( X == Y ) + return( 0 ); + + /* all-bits 1 if swap is 1, all-bits 0 if swap is 0 */ + limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( swap ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, Y->n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( Y, X->n ) ); + + s = X->s; + X->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( swap, Y->s, X->s ); + Y->s = mbedtls_ct_cond_select_sign( swap, s, Y->s ); + + + for( i = 0; i < X->n; i++ ) + { + tmp = X->p[i]; + X->p[i] = ( X->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( Y->p[i] & limb_mask ); + Y->p[i] = ( Y->p[i] & ~limb_mask ) | ( tmp & limb_mask ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Compare signed values in constant time + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( const mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned *ret ) +{ + size_t i; + /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */ + unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative; + + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( Y != NULL ); + MPI_VALIDATE_RET( ret != NULL ); + + if( X->n != Y->n ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + /* + * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0. + * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0. + */ + X_is_negative = ( X->s & 2 ) >> 1; + Y_is_negative = ( Y->s & 2 ) >> 1; + + /* + * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger. + * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it + * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0). + */ + cond = ( X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative ); + *ret = cond & X_is_negative; + + /* + * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still + * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already. + */ + done = cond; + + for( i = X->n; i > 0; i-- ) + { + /* + * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both + * X and Y are negative. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1] ); + *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & X_is_negative; + done |= cond; + + /* + * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both + * X and Y are positive. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1] ); + *ret |= cond & ( 1 - done ) & ( 1 - X_is_negative ); + done |= cond; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( int mode, + unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, plaintext_max_size; + + /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must + * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than + * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise + * this would open the execution of the function to + * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle + * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory + * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access + * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to + * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared + * branch predictor). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + unsigned bad = 0; + unsigned char pad_done = 0; + size_t plaintext_size = 0; + unsigned output_too_large; + + plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ) ? ilen - 11 + : output_max_len; + + /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant + * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ + bad |= input[0]; + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ) + { + /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 + * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ + bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; + + /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find + * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ + for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ ) + { + pad_done |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char)-input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1; + pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; + } + } + else + { + /* Decode EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 + * where PS must be at least 8 bytes with the value 0xFF. */ + bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; + + /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find + * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. + * If there's a non-0xff byte in the padding, the padding is bad. */ + for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ ) + { + pad_done |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if( input[i], 0, 1 ); + pad_count += mbedtls_ct_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 ); + bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if( pad_done, 0, input[i] ^ 0xFF ); + } + } + + /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ + bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 ); + + /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ + bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_gt( 8, pad_count ); + + /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of + * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding + * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the + * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output + * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding + * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the + * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( + bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) ); + + /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output + * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ + output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_size_gt( plaintext_size, + plaintext_max_size ); + + /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: + * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). + * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted + * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. + * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ + ret = - (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if( + bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, + mbedtls_ct_uint_if( output_too_large, + - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE, + 0 ) ); + + /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the + * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. + * We need to copy the same amount of data + * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to + * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or + * through memory or cache access patterns. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( bad | output_too_large ); + for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ ) + input[i] &= ~bad; + + /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. + * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because + * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity + * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( output_too_large, + (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) plaintext_size ); + + /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in + * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from + * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that + * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the + * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive + * information. */ + mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left( input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size ); + + /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output + * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer + * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined + * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the + * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext + * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other + * secrets. */ + if( output_max_len != 0 ) + memcpy( output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size ); + + /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case + * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen + * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent + * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ + *olen = plaintext_size; + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/constant_time_internal.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/constant_time_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ff2d0ff9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/constant_time_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,335 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#endif + +#include + +/** Turn a value into a mask: + * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param value The value to analyze. + * + * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( unsigned value ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + +/** Turn a value into a mask: + * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param value The value to analyze. + * + * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask( size_t value ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Turn a value into a mask: + * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -1 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param value The value to analyze. + * + * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( mbedtls_mpi_uint value ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) + +/** Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison: + * - if \p x >= \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 + * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 + * + * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches + * with bit operations using masks. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return All-bits-one if \p x is greater or equal than \p y, + * otherwise zero. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( size_t x, + size_t y ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ + +/** Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison: + * return x == y + * + * This is equivalent to \p x == \p y, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return 1 if \p x equals to \p y, otherwise 0. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( size_t x, + size_t y ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Decide if an integer is less than the other, without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to \p x < \p y, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return 1 if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise 0. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint y ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +/** Choose between two integer values without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled + * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition is nonzero. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition is zero. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if( unsigned condition, + unsigned if1, + unsigned if0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Conditionally assign a value without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to `if ( condition ) dest = src`, but is likely + * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param n \p dest and \p src must be arrays of limbs of size n. + * \param dest The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point + * to an initialized MPI. + * \param src The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an + * initialized MPI. + * \param condition Condition to test, must be 0 or 1. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign( size_t n, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, + unsigned char condition ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + +/** Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit. + * + * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII + * but not EBCDIC). + * + * \param value A value in the range 0..63. + * + * \return A base64 digit converted from \p value. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char( unsigned char value ); + +/** Given a Base64 digit, return its value. + * + * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'), + * return -1. + * + * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII + * but not EBCDIC). + * + * \param c A base64 digit. + * + * \return The value of the base64 digit \p c. + */ +signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value( unsigned char c ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + +/** Conditional memcpy without branches. + * + * This is equivalent to `if ( c1 == c2 ) memcpy(dest, src, len)`, but is likely + * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * + * \param dest The pointer to conditionally copy to. + * \param src The pointer to copy from. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest. + * \param len The number of bytes to copy. + * \param c1 The first value to analyze in the condition. + * \param c2 The second value to analyze in the condition. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t len, + size_t c1, size_t c2 ); + +/** Copy data from a secret position with constant flow. + * + * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p + * dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p + * offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len. + * Functionally equivalent to `memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)`. + * + * \note This function reads from \p dest, but the value that + * is read does not influence the result and this + * function's behavior is well-defined regardless of the + * contents of the buffers. This may result in false + * positives from static or dynamic analyzers, especially + * if \p dest is not initialized. + * + * \param dest The destination buffer. This must point to a writable + * buffer of at least \p len bytes. + * \param src The base of the source buffer. This must point to a + * readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len + * bytes. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest. + * \param offset The offset in the source buffer from which to copy. + * This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater + * than \p offset_max. + * \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset. + * \param offset_max The maximal value of \p offset. + * \param len The number of bytes to copy. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t offset, + size_t offset_min, + size_t offset_max, + size_t len ); + +/** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. + * + * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p + * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not + * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p + * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p + * max_data_len bytes from \p data. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured + * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the + * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5. + * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after + * the computation is complete to prepare for the + * next computation. + * \param add_data The first part of the message whose HMAC is being + * calculated. This must point to a readable buffer + * of \p add_data_len bytes. + * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes. + * \param data The buffer containing the second part of the + * message. This must point to a readable buffer + * of \p max_data_len bytes. + * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data. + * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no + * greater than \p max_data_len. + * \param min_data_len The minimal length of the second part of the + * message, read from \p data. + * \param max_data_len The maximal length of the second part of the + * message, read from \p data. + * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to + * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the + * HMAC value. + * + * \retval 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED + * The hardware accelerator failed. + */ +int mbedtls_ct_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption + * operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding). + * + * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value + * (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen + * in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which + * one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants. + * + * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \param input The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5 + * encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM" + * by the terminology. + * \param ilen The length of the payload in the \p input buffer. + * \param output The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the + * PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p output_max_len bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the payload. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE + * The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding. + */ +int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( int mode, + unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len, + size_t *olen ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/constant_time_invasive.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/constant_time_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4620ca13 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/constant_time_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/** + * \file constant_time_invasive.h + * + * \brief Constant-time module: interfaces for invasive testing only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when + * building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +/** Turn a value into a mask: + * - if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, + * return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1 + * - otherwise, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 + * + * \param low The value to analyze. + * \param high The value to analyze. + * \param c The value to analyze. + * + * \return All-bits-one if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, otherwise zero. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range( unsigned char low, + unsigned char high, + unsigned char c ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ctr_drbg.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ctr_drbg.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ed31576a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ctr_drbg.c @@ -0,0 +1,891 @@ +/* + * CTR_DRBG implementation based on AES-256 (NIST SP 800-90) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The NIST SP 800-90 DRBGs are described in the following publication. + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90/SP800-90revised_March2007.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* + * CTR_DRBG context initialization + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) ); + /* Indicate that the entropy nonce length is not set explicitly. + * See mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). */ + ctx->reseed_counter = -1; + + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; +} + +/* + * This function resets CTR_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */ + if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL ) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + mbedtls_aes_free( &ctx->aes_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ) ); + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; + ctx->reseed_counter = -1; +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int resistance ) +{ + ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ) +{ + ctx->entropy_len = len; +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len ) +{ + /* If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() has already been called, it's + * too late. Return the error code that's closest to making sense. */ + if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + + if( len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); +#if SIZE_MAX > INT_MAX + /* This shouldn't be an issue because + * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT < INT_MAX in any sensible + * configuration, but make sure anyway. */ + if( len > INT_MAX ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); +#endif + + /* For backward compatibility with Mbed TLS <= 2.19, store the + * entropy nonce length in a field that already exists, but isn't + * used until after the initial seeding. */ + /* Due to the capping of len above, the value fits in an int. */ + ctx->reseed_counter = (int) len; + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int interval ) +{ + ctx->reseed_interval = interval; +} + +static int block_cipher_df( unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) +{ + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16]; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; + unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; + unsigned char *p, *iv; + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; + int ret = 0; + + int i, j; + size_t buf_len, use_len; + + if( data_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16 ); + mbedtls_aes_init( &aes_ctx ); + + /* + * Construct IV (16 bytes) and S in buffer + * IV = Counter (in 32-bits) padded to 16 with zeroes + * S = Length input string (in 32-bits) || Length of output (in 32-bits) || + * data || 0x80 + * (Total is padded to a multiple of 16-bytes with zeroes) + */ + p = buf + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( data_len, p, 0); + p += 4 + 3; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; + memcpy( p, data, data_len ); + p[data_len] = 0x80; + + buf_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 8 + data_len + 1; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; i++ ) + key[i] = i; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, key, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Reduce data to MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN bytes of data + */ + for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + { + p = buf; + memset( chain, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + use_len = buf_len; + + while( use_len > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i++ ) + chain[i] ^= p[i]; + p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + use_len -= ( use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ? + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + chain, chain ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + } + + memcpy( tmp + j, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + + /* + * Update IV + */ + buf[3]++; + } + + /* + * Do final encryption with reduced data + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &aes_ctx, tmp, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + iv = tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; + p = output; + + for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + iv, iv ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + memcpy( p, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + } +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &aes_ctx ); + /* + * tidy up the stack + */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( chain, sizeof( chain ) ); + if( 0 != ret ) + { + /* + * wipe partial seed from memory + */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Update (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.2) + * ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, provided_data) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Update(provided_data, Key, V) + * with inputs and outputs + * ctx->aes_ctx = Key + * ctx->counter = V + */ +static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN] ) +{ + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char *p = tmp; + int i, j; + int ret = 0; + + memset( tmp, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); + + for( j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + { + /* + * Increase counter + */ + for( i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* + * Crypt counter block + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + ctx->counter, p ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + } + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; i++ ) + tmp[i] ^= data[i]; + + /* + * Update key and counter + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, tmp, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + memcpy( ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, additional, add_len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string, + * security_strength) -> initial_working_state + * with inputs + * ctx->counter = all-bits-0 + * ctx->aes_ctx = context from all-bits-0 key + * additional[:add_len] = entropy_input || nonce || personalization_string + * and with outputs + * ctx = initial_working_state + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ) +{ + unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( add_len == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( add_input, sizeof( add_input ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ) +{ + /* MAX_INPUT would be more logical here, but we have to match + * block_cipher_df()'s limits since we can't propagate errors */ + if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + add_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT; + (void) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.4.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional_input) + * -> new_working_state + * with inputs + * ctx contains working_state + * additional[:len] = additional_input + * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy + * for (ctx->entropy_len + nonce_len) bytes + * and with output + * ctx contains new_working_state + */ +static int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t len, + size_t nonce_len ) +{ + unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; + size_t seedlen = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ctx->entropy_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + if( nonce_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + if( len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len - nonce_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); + + /* Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy to seed state. */ + if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; + + /* Gather entropy for a nonce if requested. */ + if( nonce_len != 0 ) + { + if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed + seedlen, nonce_len ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + seedlen += nonce_len; + } + + /* Add additional data if provided. */ + if( additional != NULL && len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len ); + seedlen += len; + } + + /* Reduce to 384 bits. */ + if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( seed, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* Update state. */ + if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, seed ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + ctx->reseed_counter = 1; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, sizeof( seed ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( ctx, additional, len, 0 ) ); +} + +/* Return a "good" nonce length for CTR_DRBG. The chosen nonce length + * is sufficient to achieve the maximum security strength given the key + * size and entropy length. If there is enough entropy in the initial + * call to the entropy function to serve as both the entropy input and + * the nonce, don't make a second call to get a nonce. */ +static size_t good_nonce_len( size_t entropy_len ) +{ + if( entropy_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2 ) + return( 0 ); + else + return( ( entropy_len + 1 ) / 2 ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy, custom, len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string, + * security_strength) -> initial_working_state + * with inputs + * custom[:len] = nonce || personalization_string + * where entropy_input comes from f_entropy for ctx->entropy_len bytes + * and with outputs + * ctx = initial_working_state + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; + size_t nonce_len; + + memset( key, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ); + + /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + mbedtls_aes_init( &ctx->aes_ctx ); + + ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; + ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; + + if( ctx->entropy_len == 0 ) + ctx->entropy_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; + /* ctx->reseed_counter contains the desired amount of entropy to + * grab for a nonce (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). + * If it's -1, indicating that the entropy nonce length was not set + * explicitly, use a sufficiently large nonce for security. */ + nonce_len = ( ctx->reseed_counter >= 0 ? + (size_t) ctx->reseed_counter : + good_nonce_len( ctx->entropy_len ) ); + + /* Initialize with an empty key. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, key, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Do the initial seeding. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal( ctx, custom, len, + nonce_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Generate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.5.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, output_len, additional, add_len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional[:add_len]) + * -> working_state_after_reseed + * if required, then + * CTR_DRBG_Generate(working_state_after_reseed, + * requested_number_of_bits, additional_input) + * -> status, returned_bits, new_working_state + * with inputs + * ctx contains working_state + * requested_number_of_bits = 8 * output_len + * additional[:add_len] = additional_input + * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy + * and with outputs + * status = SUCCESS (this function does the reseed internally) + * returned_bits = output[:output_len] + * ctx contains new_working_state + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; + unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char *p = output; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; + int i; + size_t use_len; + + if( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG ); + + if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + memset( add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ); + + if( ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval || + ctx->prediction_resistance ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + add_len = 0; + } + + if( add_len > 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + while( output_len > 0 ) + { + /* + * Increase counter + */ + for( i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* + * Crypt counter block + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + ctx->counter, tmp ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + use_len = ( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) + ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : output_len; + /* + * Copy random block to destination + */ + memcpy( p, tmp, use_len ); + p += use_len; + output_len -= use_len; + } + + if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ctx->reseed_counter++; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( add_input, sizeof( add_input ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( ctx, output, output_len, NULL, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + FILE *f; + unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( ctx, buf, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f ) != + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + else + { + ret = 0; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + fclose( f ); + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const char *path ) +{ + int ret = 0; + FILE *f = NULL; + size_t n; + unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; + unsigned char c; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ); + if( fread( &c, 1, 1, f ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + goto exit; + } + if( n == 0 || ferror( f ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + fclose( f ); + f = NULL; + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, buf, n ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + if( f != NULL ) + fclose( f ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* The CTR_DRBG NIST test vectors used here are available at + * https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/documents/drbg/drbgtestvectors.zip + * + * The parameters used to derive the test data are: + * + * [AES-128 use df] + * [PredictionResistance = True/False] + * [EntropyInputLen = 128] + * [NonceLen = 64] + * [PersonalizationStringLen = 128] + * [AdditionalInputLen = 0] + * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512] + * + * [AES-256 use df] + * [PredictionResistance = True/False] + * [EntropyInputLen = 256] + * [NonceLen = 128] + * [PersonalizationStringLen = 256] + * [AdditionalInputLen = 0] + * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512] + * + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) +static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] = + { 0x04, 0xd9, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xdc, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xbb, + 0xf1, 0x08, 0x77, 0x2b, 0x9e, 0x08, 0xca, 0x92, + 0x65, 0x16, 0xda, 0x99, 0xa2, 0x59, 0xf3, 0xe8, + 0x38, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x51, 0x70, 0x7b, 0x20, + 0xec, 0x53, 0xd0, 0x66, 0xc3, 0x0f, 0xe3, 0xb0, + 0xe0, 0x86, 0xa6, 0xaa, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xad, + 0xf7, 0xef, 0x06, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xe8 }; + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] = + { 0x07, 0x0d, 0x59, 0x63, 0x98, 0x73, 0xa5, 0x45, + 0x27, 0x38, 0x22, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xa9, + 0x74, 0x18, 0x1f, 0x3c, 0x22, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x20, + 0x4a, 0x47, 0xc2, 0xf3, 0x85, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6f, + 0x00, 0x2e, 0x71, 0xda, 0xed, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x5c }; + +static const unsigned char pers_pr[] = + { 0xbf, 0xa4, 0x9a, 0x8f, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0xb1, 0x7a, + 0x9d, 0xfa, 0x45, 0xed, 0x21, 0x52, 0xb3, 0xad }; + +static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] = + { 0x4e, 0x61, 0x79, 0xd4, 0xc2, 0x72, 0xa1, 0x4c, + 0xf1, 0x3d, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0xa3, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x0f }; + +static const unsigned char result_pr[] = + { 0xc9, 0x0a, 0xaf, 0x85, 0x89, 0x71, 0x44, 0x66, + 0x4f, 0x25, 0x0b, 0x2b, 0xde, 0xd8, 0xfa, 0xff, + 0x52, 0x5a, 0x1b, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x41, 0x7a, 0x10, + 0x1f, 0xef, 0x1e, 0x62, 0x23, 0xe9, 0x20, 0x30, + 0xc9, 0x0d, 0xad, 0x69, 0xb4, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0xf4, + 0x87, 0x42, 0xd5, 0xae, 0x5e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0xcc, + 0xd9, 0xfd, 0x0b, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xe3, 0xd4, 0x06, + 0x37, 0x36, 0x0f, 0x3f, 0x72, 0x82, 0x0c, 0xcf }; + +static const unsigned char result_nopr[] = + { 0x31, 0xc9, 0x91, 0x09, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x10, 0x13, + 0x3c, 0xd3, 0x96, 0xf9, 0xbc, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xc0, + 0x7c, 0xc1, 0x61, 0x5f, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x99, 0xaf, + 0xd7, 0xf2, 0x36, 0xfd, 0x40, 0x1a, 0x8b, 0xf2, + 0x33, 0x38, 0xee, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x5f, 0x83, 0xb7, + 0xa2, 0x53, 0xdc, 0xee, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf2, + 0xee, 0x96, 0xc6, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0xff, 0x02, + 0x76, 0x70, 0x69, 0xaa, 0x69, 0xd1, 0x3b, 0xe8 }; +#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] = + { 0xca, 0x58, 0xfd, 0xf2, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xcb, 0x49, + 0xd4, 0xe0, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x39, 0x50, 0xd9, 0x8a, + 0x6a, 0xb3, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xdf, 0x74, 0xd5, 0x85, + 0x8f, 0xd1, 0xba, 0x64, 0x54, 0x7b, 0xdb, 0x1e, + 0xc5, 0xea, 0x24, 0xc0, 0xfa, 0x0c, 0x90, 0x15, + 0x09, 0x20, 0x92, 0x42, 0x32, 0x36, 0x45, 0x45, + 0x7d, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6b, 0xcf, 0xa2, 0x15, 0xc8, + 0x2f, 0x9f, 0xbc, 0x88, 0x3f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0x2c, + 0xb7, 0x16, 0xd1, 0x80, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0xb3, + 0x88, 0x1b, 0x21, 0x45, 0xef, 0xa1, 0x7f, 0xce, + 0xc8, 0x92, 0x35, 0x55, 0x2a, 0xd9, 0x1d, 0x8e, + 0x12, 0x38, 0xac, 0x01, 0x4e, 0x38, 0x18, 0x76, + 0x9c, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xd4, 0x13, 0xb6, 0x2c, 0x77, + 0xc0, 0xe7, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x47, 0x44, 0x95, 0xbe }; + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] = + { 0x4c, 0xfb, 0x21, 0x86, 0x73, 0x34, 0x6d, 0x9d, + 0x50, 0xc9, 0x22, 0xe4, 0x9b, 0x0d, 0xfc, 0xd0, + 0x90, 0xad, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x5c, 0x3b, 0xa4, 0x73, + 0x27, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0xa6, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x5c, + 0x01, 0x69, 0x62, 0xa7, 0xfd, 0x27, 0x87, 0xa2, + 0x4b, 0xf6, 0xbe, 0x47, 0xef, 0x37, 0x83, 0xf1, + 0xb7, 0xec, 0x46, 0x07, 0x23, 0x63, 0x83, 0x4a, + 0x1b, 0x01, 0x33, 0xf2, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x91, 0xdb, + 0x4f, 0x11, 0xa6, 0x86, 0x51, 0xf2, 0x3e, 0x3a, + 0x8b, 0x1f, 0xdc, 0x03, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xc7, 0xe7 }; + +static const unsigned char pers_pr[] = + { 0x5a, 0x70, 0x95, 0xe9, 0x81, 0x40, 0x52, 0x33, + 0x91, 0x53, 0x7e, 0x75, 0xd6, 0x19, 0x9d, 0x1e, + 0xad, 0x0d, 0xc6, 0xa7, 0xde, 0x6c, 0x1f, 0xe0, + 0xea, 0x18, 0x33, 0xa8, 0x7e, 0x06, 0x20, 0xe9 }; + +static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] = + { 0x88, 0xee, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xe8, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0x29, + 0x4b, 0xda, 0xcd, 0x60, 0x99, 0xeb, 0xe4, 0xbf, + 0x55, 0xec, 0xd9, 0x11, 0x3f, 0x71, 0xe5, 0xeb, + 0xcb, 0x45, 0x75, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0xa6, 0x8a, 0x6b }; + +static const unsigned char result_pr[] = + { 0xce, 0x2f, 0xdb, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0xb7, 0x39, 0x85, + 0x04, 0xc5, 0xc0, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x31, 0xc6, 0x1d, + 0x9b, 0x5a, 0x59, 0xf8, 0x7e, 0x0d, 0xcc, 0x62, + 0x7b, 0x65, 0x11, 0x55, 0x10, 0xeb, 0x9e, 0x3d, + 0xa4, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0x6a, 0x18, 0xc0, 0x74, 0xdb, + 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x23, 0x63, 0x21, 0xd0, 0x39, + 0xf9, 0xa7, 0xc4, 0x52, 0x84, 0x3b, 0x49, 0x40, + 0x72, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xdb, 0xc3, 0x43 }; + +static const unsigned char result_nopr[] = + { 0xa5, 0x51, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x90, 0xbe, 0xf3, 0xad, + 0xaf, 0x28, 0xf6, 0xb7, 0x95, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xf3, + 0xd6, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xb2, 0x7d, 0xd0, 0x46, 0x7b, + 0x0c, 0x75, 0xf5, 0xfa, 0x93, 0x1e, 0x97, 0x14, + 0x75, 0xb2, 0x7c, 0xae, 0x03, 0xa2, 0x96, 0x54, + 0xe2, 0xf4, 0x09, 0x66, 0xea, 0x33, 0x64, 0x30, + 0x40, 0xd1, 0x40, 0x0f, 0xe6, 0x77, 0x87, 0x3a, + 0xf8, 0x09, 0x7c, 0x1f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x02, 0x98 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ + +static size_t test_offset; +static int ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data, unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = data; + memcpy( buf, p + test_offset, len ); + test_offset += len; + return( 0 ); +} + +#define CHK( c ) if( (c) != 0 ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ + return( 1 ); \ + } + +#define SELF_TEST_OUTPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH 64 + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[ sizeof( result_pr ) ]; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = True) + */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = TRUE) : " ); + + test_offset = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2 ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, + ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, + (void *) entropy_source_pr, + pers_pr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ) ); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUTPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, sizeof( result_pr ) ) ); + CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, sizeof( result_pr ) ) ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + /* + * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = FALSE) + */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " CTR_DRBG (PR = FALSE): " ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + test_offset = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2 ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctx, + ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, + (void *) entropy_source_nopr, + pers_nopr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUTPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, sizeof( result_nopr ) ) ); + CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, sizeof( result_nopr ) ) ); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/debug.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/debug.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..353b4bf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/debug.c @@ -0,0 +1,408 @@ +/* + * Debugging routines + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#define DEBUG_BUF_SIZE 512 + +static int debug_threshold = 0; + +void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( int threshold ) +{ + debug_threshold = threshold; +} + +/* + * All calls to f_dbg must be made via this function + */ +static inline void debug_send_line( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str ) +{ + /* + * If in a threaded environment, we need a thread identifier. + * Since there is no portable way to get one, use the address of the ssl + * context instead, as it shouldn't be shared between threads. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + char idstr[20 + DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; /* 0x + 16 nibbles + ': ' */ + mbedtls_snprintf( idstr, sizeof( idstr ), "%p: %s", (void*)ssl, str ); + ssl->conf->f_dbg( ssl->conf->p_dbg, level, file, line, idstr ); +#else + ssl->conf->f_dbg( ssl->conf->p_dbg, level, file, line, str ); +#endif +} + +MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6) +void mbedtls_debug_print_msg( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *format, ... ) +{ + va_list argp; + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold ) + { + return; + } + + va_start( argp, format ); + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp ); + va_end( argp ); + + if( ret >= 0 && ret < DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1 ) + { + str[ret] = '\n'; + str[ret + 1] = '\0'; + } + + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); +} + +void mbedtls_debug_print_ret( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, int ret ) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold ) + { + return; + } + + /* + * With non-blocking I/O and examples that just retry immediately, + * the logs would be quickly flooded with WANT_READ, so ignore that. + * Don't ignore WANT_WRITE however, since is is usually rare. + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ) + return; + + mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "%s() returned %d (-0x%04x)\n", + text, ret, (unsigned int) -ret ); + + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); +} + +void mbedtls_debug_print_buf( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + char txt[17]; + size_t i, idx = 0; + + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold ) + { + return; + } + + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "dumping '%s' (%u bytes)\n", + text, (unsigned int) len ); + + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + + idx = 0; + memset( txt, 0, sizeof( txt ) ); + for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + { + if( i >= 4096 ) + break; + + if( i % 16 == 0 ) + { + if( i > 0 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " %s\n", txt ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + + idx = 0; + memset( txt, 0, sizeof( txt ) ); + } + + idx += mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "%04x: ", + (unsigned int) i ); + + } + + idx += mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " %02x", + (unsigned int) buf[i] ); + txt[i % 16] = ( buf[i] > 31 && buf[i] < 127 ) ? buf[i] : '.' ; + } + + if( len > 0 ) + { + for( /* i = i */; i % 16 != 0; i++ ) + idx += mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " " ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " %s\n", txt ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X ) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold ) + { + return; + } + + mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "%s(X)", text ); + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, file, line, str, &X->X ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "%s(Y)", text ); + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, file, line, str, &X->Y ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + size_t bitlen; + size_t idx = 0; + + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + NULL == X || + level > debug_threshold ) + { + return; + } + + bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X ); + + mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "value of '%s' (%u bits) is:\n", + text, (unsigned) bitlen ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + + if( bitlen == 0 ) + { + str[0] = ' '; str[1] = '0'; str[2] = '0'; + idx = 3; + } + else + { + int n; + for( n = (int) ( ( bitlen - 1 ) / 8 ); n >= 0; n-- ) + { + size_t limb_offset = n / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); + size_t offset_in_limb = n % sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); + unsigned char octet = + ( X->p[limb_offset] >> ( offset_in_limb * 8 ) ) & 0xff; + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, " %02x", octet ); + idx += 3; + /* Wrap lines after 16 octets that each take 3 columns */ + if( idx >= 3 * 16 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "\n" ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + idx = 0; + } + } + } + + if( idx != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_snprintf( str + idx, sizeof( str ) - idx, "\n" ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void debug_print_pk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) +{ + size_t i; + mbedtls_pk_debug_item items[MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS]; + char name[16]; + + memset( items, 0, sizeof( items ) ); + + if( mbedtls_pk_debug( pk, items ) != 0 ) + { + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, + "invalid PK context\n" ); + return; + } + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS; i++ ) + { + if( items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE ) + return; + + mbedtls_snprintf( name, sizeof( name ), "%s%s", text, items[i].name ); + name[sizeof( name ) - 1] = '\0'; + + if( items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI ) + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value ); + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP ) + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value ); + else +#endif + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, + "should not happen\n" ); + } +} + +static void debug_print_line_by_line( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text ) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + const char *start, *cur; + + start = text; + for( cur = text; *cur != '\0'; cur++ ) + { + if( *cur == '\n' ) + { + size_t len = cur - start + 1; + if( len > DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1 ) + len = DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1; + + memcpy( str, start, len ); + str[len] = '\0'; + + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + + start = cur + 1; + } + } +} + +void mbedtls_debug_print_crt( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + int i = 0; + + if( NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + NULL == crt || + level > debug_threshold ) + { + return; + } + + while( crt != NULL ) + { + char buf[1024]; + + mbedtls_snprintf( str, sizeof( str ), "%s #%d:\n", text, ++i ); + debug_send_line( ssl, level, file, line, str ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_info( buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, "", crt ); + debug_print_line_by_line( ssl, level, file, line, buf ); + + debug_print_pk( ssl, level, file, line, "crt->", &crt->pk ); + + crt = crt->next; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +static void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, + int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + const mbedtls_ecdh_context* ctx = ecdh; +#else + const mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed* ctx = &ecdh->ctx.mbed_ecdh; +#endif + + switch( attr ) + { + case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q: + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: Q", + &ctx->Q ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP: + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp( ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: Qp", + &ctx->Qp ); + break; + case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z: + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi( ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: z", + &ctx->z ); + break; + default: + break; + } +} + +void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal( ssl, level, file, line, ecdh, attr ); +#else + switch( ecdh->var ) + { + default: + mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal( ssl, level, file, line, ecdh, + attr ); + } +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/des.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/des.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..65f5681c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/des.c @@ -0,0 +1,1055 @@ +/* + * FIPS-46-3 compliant Triple-DES implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * DES, on which TDES is based, was originally designed by Horst Feistel + * at IBM in 1974, and was adopted as a standard by NIST (formerly NBS). + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips46-3/fips46-3.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) + +/* + * Expanded DES S-boxes + */ +static const uint32_t SB1[64] = +{ + 0x01010400, 0x00000000, 0x00010000, 0x01010404, + 0x01010004, 0x00010404, 0x00000004, 0x00010000, + 0x00000400, 0x01010400, 0x01010404, 0x00000400, + 0x01000404, 0x01010004, 0x01000000, 0x00000004, + 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00010400, + 0x00010400, 0x01010000, 0x01010000, 0x01000404, + 0x00010004, 0x01000004, 0x01000004, 0x00010004, + 0x00000000, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01000000, + 0x00010000, 0x01010404, 0x00000004, 0x01010000, + 0x01010400, 0x01000000, 0x01000000, 0x00000400, + 0x01010004, 0x00010000, 0x00010400, 0x01000004, + 0x00000400, 0x00000004, 0x01000404, 0x00010404, + 0x01010404, 0x00010004, 0x01010000, 0x01000404, + 0x01000004, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01010400, + 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00000000, + 0x00010004, 0x00010400, 0x00000000, 0x01010004 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB2[64] = +{ + 0x80108020, 0x80008000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020, + 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020, 0x80008020, + 0x80000020, 0x80108020, 0x80108000, 0x80000000, + 0x80008000, 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020, + 0x00108000, 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x00000000, + 0x80000000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020, 0x80100000, + 0x00100020, 0x80000020, 0x00000000, 0x00108000, + 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x80100000, 0x00008020, + 0x00000000, 0x00108020, 0x80100020, 0x00100000, + 0x80008020, 0x80100000, 0x80108000, 0x00008000, + 0x80100000, 0x80008000, 0x00000020, 0x80108020, + 0x00108020, 0x00000020, 0x00008000, 0x80000000, + 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x00100000, 0x80000020, + 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x80000020, 0x00100020, + 0x00108000, 0x00000000, 0x80008000, 0x00008020, + 0x80000000, 0x80100020, 0x80108020, 0x00108000 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB3[64] = +{ + 0x00000208, 0x08020200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008, + 0x08000200, 0x00000000, 0x00020208, 0x08000200, + 0x00020008, 0x08000008, 0x08000008, 0x00020000, + 0x08020208, 0x00020008, 0x08020000, 0x00000208, + 0x08000000, 0x00000008, 0x08020200, 0x00000200, + 0x00020200, 0x08020000, 0x08020008, 0x00020208, + 0x08000208, 0x00020200, 0x00020000, 0x08000208, + 0x00000008, 0x08020208, 0x00000200, 0x08000000, + 0x08020200, 0x08000000, 0x00020008, 0x00000208, + 0x00020000, 0x08020200, 0x08000200, 0x00000000, + 0x00000200, 0x00020008, 0x08020208, 0x08000200, + 0x08000008, 0x00000200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008, + 0x08000208, 0x00020000, 0x08000000, 0x08020208, + 0x00000008, 0x00020208, 0x00020200, 0x08000008, + 0x08020000, 0x08000208, 0x00000208, 0x08020000, + 0x00020208, 0x00000008, 0x08020008, 0x00020200 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB4[64] = +{ + 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080, + 0x00802080, 0x00800081, 0x00800001, 0x00002001, + 0x00000000, 0x00802000, 0x00802000, 0x00802081, + 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00800080, 0x00800001, + 0x00000001, 0x00002000, 0x00800000, 0x00802001, + 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002001, 0x00002080, + 0x00800081, 0x00000001, 0x00002080, 0x00800080, + 0x00002000, 0x00802080, 0x00802081, 0x00000081, + 0x00800080, 0x00800001, 0x00802000, 0x00802081, + 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00802000, + 0x00002080, 0x00800080, 0x00800081, 0x00000001, + 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080, + 0x00802081, 0x00000081, 0x00000001, 0x00002000, + 0x00800001, 0x00002001, 0x00802080, 0x00800081, + 0x00002001, 0x00002080, 0x00800000, 0x00802001, + 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002000, 0x00802080 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB5[64] = +{ + 0x00000100, 0x02080100, 0x02080000, 0x42000100, + 0x00080000, 0x00000100, 0x40000000, 0x02080000, + 0x40080100, 0x00080000, 0x02000100, 0x40080100, + 0x42000100, 0x42080000, 0x00080100, 0x40000000, + 0x02000000, 0x40080000, 0x40080000, 0x00000000, + 0x40000100, 0x42080100, 0x42080100, 0x02000100, + 0x42080000, 0x40000100, 0x00000000, 0x42000000, + 0x02080100, 0x02000000, 0x42000000, 0x00080100, + 0x00080000, 0x42000100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000, + 0x40000000, 0x02080000, 0x42000100, 0x40080100, + 0x02000100, 0x40000000, 0x42080000, 0x02080100, + 0x40080100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000, 0x42080000, + 0x42080100, 0x00080100, 0x42000000, 0x42080100, + 0x02080000, 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x42000000, + 0x00080100, 0x02000100, 0x40000100, 0x00080000, + 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x02080100, 0x40000100 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB6[64] = +{ + 0x20000010, 0x20400000, 0x00004000, 0x20404010, + 0x20400000, 0x00000010, 0x20404010, 0x00400000, + 0x20004000, 0x00404010, 0x00400000, 0x20000010, + 0x00400010, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010, + 0x00000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00004000, + 0x00404000, 0x20004010, 0x00000010, 0x20400010, + 0x20400010, 0x00000000, 0x00404010, 0x20404000, + 0x00004010, 0x00404000, 0x20404000, 0x20000000, + 0x20004000, 0x00000010, 0x20400010, 0x00404000, + 0x20404010, 0x00400000, 0x00004010, 0x20000010, + 0x00400000, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010, + 0x20000010, 0x20404010, 0x00404000, 0x20400000, + 0x00404010, 0x20404000, 0x00000000, 0x20400010, + 0x00000010, 0x00004000, 0x20400000, 0x00404010, + 0x00004000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00000000, + 0x20404000, 0x20000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB7[64] = +{ + 0x00200000, 0x04200002, 0x04000802, 0x00000000, + 0x00000800, 0x04000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800, + 0x04200802, 0x00200000, 0x00000000, 0x04000002, + 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x04200002, 0x00000802, + 0x04000800, 0x00200802, 0x00200002, 0x04000800, + 0x04000002, 0x04200000, 0x04200800, 0x00200002, + 0x04200000, 0x00000800, 0x00000802, 0x04200802, + 0x00200800, 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x00200800, + 0x04000000, 0x00200800, 0x00200000, 0x04000802, + 0x04000802, 0x04200002, 0x04200002, 0x00000002, + 0x00200002, 0x04000000, 0x04000800, 0x00200000, + 0x04200800, 0x00000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800, + 0x00000802, 0x04000002, 0x04200802, 0x04200000, + 0x00200800, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x04200802, + 0x00000000, 0x00200802, 0x04200000, 0x00000800, + 0x04000002, 0x04000800, 0x00000800, 0x00200002 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB8[64] = +{ + 0x10001040, 0x00001000, 0x00040000, 0x10041040, + 0x10000000, 0x10001040, 0x00000040, 0x10000000, + 0x00040040, 0x10040000, 0x10041040, 0x00041000, + 0x10041000, 0x00041040, 0x00001000, 0x00000040, + 0x10040000, 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00001040, + 0x00041000, 0x00040040, 0x10040040, 0x10041000, + 0x00001040, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x10040040, + 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00041040, 0x00040000, + 0x00041040, 0x00040000, 0x10041000, 0x00001000, + 0x00000040, 0x10040040, 0x00001000, 0x00041040, + 0x10001000, 0x00000040, 0x10000040, 0x10040000, + 0x10040040, 0x10000000, 0x00040000, 0x10001040, + 0x00000000, 0x10041040, 0x00040040, 0x10000040, + 0x10040000, 0x10001000, 0x10001040, 0x00000000, + 0x10041040, 0x00041000, 0x00041000, 0x00001040, + 0x00001040, 0x00040040, 0x10000000, 0x10041000 +}; + +/* + * PC1: left and right halves bit-swap + */ +static const uint32_t LHs[16] = +{ + 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0x00000100, 0x00000101, + 0x00010000, 0x00010001, 0x00010100, 0x00010101, + 0x01000000, 0x01000001, 0x01000100, 0x01000101, + 0x01010000, 0x01010001, 0x01010100, 0x01010101 +}; + +static const uint32_t RHs[16] = +{ + 0x00000000, 0x01000000, 0x00010000, 0x01010000, + 0x00000100, 0x01000100, 0x00010100, 0x01010100, + 0x00000001, 0x01000001, 0x00010001, 0x01010001, + 0x00000101, 0x01000101, 0x00010101, 0x01010101, +}; + +/* + * Initial Permutation macro + */ +#define DES_IP(X,Y) \ + do \ + { \ + T = (((X) >> 4) ^ (Y)) & 0x0F0F0F0F; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 4); \ + T = (((X) >> 16) ^ (Y)) & 0x0000FFFF; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 16); \ + T = (((Y) >> 2) ^ (X)) & 0x33333333; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 2); \ + T = (((Y) >> 8) ^ (X)) & 0x00FF00FF; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 8); \ + (Y) = (((Y) << 1) | ((Y) >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = ((X) ^ (Y)) & 0xAAAAAAAA; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= T; \ + (X) = (((X) << 1) | ((X) >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * Final Permutation macro + */ +#define DES_FP(X,Y) \ + do \ + { \ + (X) = (((X) << 31) | ((X) >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = ((X) ^ (Y)) & 0xAAAAAAAA; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= T; \ + (Y) = (((Y) << 31) | ((Y) >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = (((Y) >> 8) ^ (X)) & 0x00FF00FF; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 8); \ + T = (((Y) >> 2) ^ (X)) & 0x33333333; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 2); \ + T = (((X) >> 16) ^ (Y)) & 0x0000FFFF; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 16); \ + T = (((X) >> 4) ^ (Y)) & 0x0F0F0F0F; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 4); \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * DES round macro + */ +#define DES_ROUND(X,Y) \ + do \ + { \ + T = *SK++ ^ (X); \ + (Y) ^= SB8[ (T ) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB6[ (T >> 8) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB4[ (T >> 16) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB2[ (T >> 24) & 0x3F ]; \ + \ + T = *SK++ ^ (((X) << 28) | ((X) >> 4)); \ + (Y) ^= SB7[ (T ) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB5[ (T >> 8) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB3[ (T >> 16) & 0x3F ] ^ \ + SB1[ (T >> 24) & 0x3F ]; \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define SWAP(a,b) \ + do \ + { \ + uint32_t t = (a); (a) = (b); (b) = t; t = 0; \ + } while( 0 ) + +void mbedtls_des_init( mbedtls_des_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_des_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_des_free( mbedtls_des_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_des_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_des3_init( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_des3_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_des3_free( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_des3_context ) ); +} + +static const unsigned char odd_parity_table[128] = { 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, + 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, + 47, 49, 50, 52, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 79, 81, + 82, 84, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 103, 104, 107, 109, 110, 112, + 115, 117, 118, 121, 122, 124, 127, 128, 131, 133, 134, 137, 138, 140, + 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 152, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 167, 168, + 171, 173, 174, 176, 179, 181, 182, 185, 186, 188, 191, 193, 194, 196, + 199, 200, 203, 205, 206, 208, 211, 213, 214, 217, 218, 220, 223, 224, + 227, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236, 239, 241, 242, 244, 247, 248, 251, 253, + 254 }; + +void mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ) +{ + int i; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE; i++ ) + key[i] = odd_parity_table[key[i] / 2]; +} + +/* + * Check the given key's parity, returns 1 on failure, 0 on SUCCESS + */ +int mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ) +{ + int i; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE; i++ ) + if( key[i] != odd_parity_table[key[i] / 2] ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Table of weak and semi-weak keys + * + * Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weak_key + * + * Weak: + * Alternating ones + zeros (0x0101010101010101) + * Alternating 'F' + 'E' (0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE) + * '0xE0E0E0E0F1F1F1F1' + * '0x1F1F1F1F0E0E0E0E' + * + * Semi-weak: + * 0x011F011F010E010E and 0x1F011F010E010E01 + * 0x01E001E001F101F1 and 0xE001E001F101F101 + * 0x01FE01FE01FE01FE and 0xFE01FE01FE01FE01 + * 0x1FE01FE00EF10EF1 and 0xE01FE01FF10EF10E + * 0x1FFE1FFE0EFE0EFE and 0xFE1FFE1FFE0EFE0E + * 0xE0FEE0FEF1FEF1FE and 0xFEE0FEE0FEF1FEF1 + * + */ + +#define WEAK_KEY_COUNT 16 + +static const unsigned char weak_key_table[WEAK_KEY_COUNT][MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] = +{ + { 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 }, + { 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE }, + { 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E }, + { 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1 }, + + { 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E }, + { 0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01 }, + { 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1 }, + { 0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01 }, + { 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE }, + { 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01 }, + { 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1 }, + { 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E }, + { 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE }, + { 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E }, + { 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE }, + { 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1 } +}; + +int mbedtls_des_key_check_weak( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ) +{ + int i; + + for( i = 0; i < WEAK_KEY_COUNT; i++ ) + if( memcmp( weak_key_table[i], key, MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE) == 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) +void mbedtls_des_setkey( uint32_t SK[32], const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ) +{ + int i; + uint32_t X, Y, T; + + X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( key, 0 ); + Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( key, 4 ); + + /* + * Permuted Choice 1 + */ + T = ((Y >> 4) ^ X) & 0x0F0F0F0F; X ^= T; Y ^= (T << 4); + T = ((Y ) ^ X) & 0x10101010; X ^= T; Y ^= (T ); + + X = (LHs[ (X ) & 0xF] << 3) | (LHs[ (X >> 8) & 0xF ] << 2) + | (LHs[ (X >> 16) & 0xF] << 1) | (LHs[ (X >> 24) & 0xF ] ) + | (LHs[ (X >> 5) & 0xF] << 7) | (LHs[ (X >> 13) & 0xF ] << 6) + | (LHs[ (X >> 21) & 0xF] << 5) | (LHs[ (X >> 29) & 0xF ] << 4); + + Y = (RHs[ (Y >> 1) & 0xF] << 3) | (RHs[ (Y >> 9) & 0xF ] << 2) + | (RHs[ (Y >> 17) & 0xF] << 1) | (RHs[ (Y >> 25) & 0xF ] ) + | (RHs[ (Y >> 4) & 0xF] << 7) | (RHs[ (Y >> 12) & 0xF ] << 6) + | (RHs[ (Y >> 20) & 0xF] << 5) | (RHs[ (Y >> 28) & 0xF ] << 4); + + X &= 0x0FFFFFFF; + Y &= 0x0FFFFFFF; + + /* + * calculate subkeys + */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + { + if( i < 2 || i == 8 || i == 15 ) + { + X = ((X << 1) | (X >> 27)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + Y = ((Y << 1) | (Y >> 27)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + } + else + { + X = ((X << 2) | (X >> 26)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + Y = ((Y << 2) | (Y >> 26)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + } + + *SK++ = ((X << 4) & 0x24000000) | ((X << 28) & 0x10000000) + | ((X << 14) & 0x08000000) | ((X << 18) & 0x02080000) + | ((X << 6) & 0x01000000) | ((X << 9) & 0x00200000) + | ((X >> 1) & 0x00100000) | ((X << 10) & 0x00040000) + | ((X << 2) & 0x00020000) | ((X >> 10) & 0x00010000) + | ((Y >> 13) & 0x00002000) | ((Y >> 4) & 0x00001000) + | ((Y << 6) & 0x00000800) | ((Y >> 1) & 0x00000400) + | ((Y >> 14) & 0x00000200) | ((Y ) & 0x00000100) + | ((Y >> 5) & 0x00000020) | ((Y >> 10) & 0x00000010) + | ((Y >> 3) & 0x00000008) | ((Y >> 18) & 0x00000004) + | ((Y >> 26) & 0x00000002) | ((Y >> 24) & 0x00000001); + + *SK++ = ((X << 15) & 0x20000000) | ((X << 17) & 0x10000000) + | ((X << 10) & 0x08000000) | ((X << 22) & 0x04000000) + | ((X >> 2) & 0x02000000) | ((X << 1) & 0x01000000) + | ((X << 16) & 0x00200000) | ((X << 11) & 0x00100000) + | ((X << 3) & 0x00080000) | ((X >> 6) & 0x00040000) + | ((X << 15) & 0x00020000) | ((X >> 4) & 0x00010000) + | ((Y >> 2) & 0x00002000) | ((Y << 8) & 0x00001000) + | ((Y >> 14) & 0x00000808) | ((Y >> 9) & 0x00000400) + | ((Y ) & 0x00000200) | ((Y << 7) & 0x00000100) + | ((Y >> 7) & 0x00000020) | ((Y >> 3) & 0x00000011) + | ((Y << 2) & 0x00000004) | ((Y >> 21) & 0x00000002); + } +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT */ + +/* + * DES key schedule (56-bit, encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ) +{ + mbedtls_des_setkey( ctx->sk, key ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * DES key schedule (56-bit, decryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] ) +{ + int i; + + mbedtls_des_setkey( ctx->sk, key ); + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i += 2 ) + { + SWAP( ctx->sk[i ], ctx->sk[30 - i] ); + SWAP( ctx->sk[i + 1], ctx->sk[31 - i] ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void des3_set2key( uint32_t esk[96], + uint32_t dsk[96], + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE*2] ) +{ + int i; + + mbedtls_des_setkey( esk, key ); + mbedtls_des_setkey( dsk + 32, key + 8 ); + + for( i = 0; i < 32; i += 2 ) + { + dsk[i ] = esk[30 - i]; + dsk[i + 1] = esk[31 - i]; + + esk[i + 32] = dsk[62 - i]; + esk[i + 33] = dsk[63 - i]; + + esk[i + 64] = esk[i ]; + esk[i + 65] = esk[i + 1]; + + dsk[i + 64] = dsk[i ]; + dsk[i + 65] = dsk[i + 1]; + } +} + +/* + * Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2] ) +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; + + des3_set2key( ctx->sk, sk, key ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sk, sizeof( sk ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, decryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2] ) +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; + + des3_set2key( sk, ctx->sk, key ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sk, sizeof( sk ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void des3_set3key( uint32_t esk[96], + uint32_t dsk[96], + const unsigned char key[24] ) +{ + int i; + + mbedtls_des_setkey( esk, key ); + mbedtls_des_setkey( dsk + 32, key + 8 ); + mbedtls_des_setkey( esk + 64, key + 16 ); + + for( i = 0; i < 32; i += 2 ) + { + dsk[i ] = esk[94 - i]; + dsk[i + 1] = esk[95 - i]; + + esk[i + 32] = dsk[62 - i]; + esk[i + 33] = dsk[63 - i]; + + dsk[i + 64] = esk[30 - i]; + dsk[i + 65] = esk[31 - i]; + } +} + +/* + * Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3] ) +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; + + des3_set3key( ctx->sk, sk, key ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sk, sizeof( sk ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, decryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3] ) +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; + + des3_set3key( sk, ctx->sk, key ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sk, sizeof( sk ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * DES-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) +int mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8] ) +{ + int i; + uint32_t X, Y, T, *SK; + + SK = ctx->sk; + + X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); + + DES_IP( X, Y ); + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + { + DES_ROUND( Y, X ); + DES_ROUND( X, Y ); + } + + DES_FP( Y, X ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( Y, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X, output, 4 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char temp[8]; + + if( length % 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + memcpy( iv, output, 8 ); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + else /* MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT */ + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, 8 ); + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( ctx, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, 8 ); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +/* + * 3DES-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) +int mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8] ) +{ + int i; + uint32_t X, Y, T, *SK; + + SK = ctx->sk; + + X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); + + DES_IP( X, Y ); + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + { + DES_ROUND( Y, X ); + DES_ROUND( X, Y ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + { + DES_ROUND( X, Y ); + DES_ROUND( Y, X ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + { + DES_ROUND( Y, X ); + DES_ROUND( X, Y ); + } + + DES_FP( Y, X ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( Y, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( X, output, 4 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * 3DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char temp[8]; + + if( length % 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( ctx, output, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + memcpy( iv, output, 8 ); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + else /* MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT */ + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, 8 ); + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( ctx, input, output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, 8 ); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * DES and 3DES test vectors from: + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/des/tripledes-vectors.zip + */ +static const unsigned char des3_test_keys[24] = +{ + 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, + 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0x01, + 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0x01, 0x23 +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_buf[8] = +{ + 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x77, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74 +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_ecb_dec[3][8] = +{ + { 0x37, 0x2B, 0x98, 0xBF, 0x52, 0x65, 0xB0, 0x59 }, + { 0xC2, 0x10, 0x19, 0x9C, 0x38, 0x5A, 0x65, 0xA1 }, + { 0xA2, 0x70, 0x56, 0x68, 0x69, 0xE5, 0x15, 0x1D } +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_ecb_enc[3][8] = +{ + { 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x97, 0xEA, 0x84, 0x26, 0x73, 0xFB }, + { 0xB3, 0x92, 0x4D, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0xB5, 0x42, 0x93 }, + { 0xDA, 0x37, 0x64, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x6F, 0x62, 0x6F } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const unsigned char des3_test_iv[8] = +{ + 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x90, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_cbc_dec[3][8] = +{ + { 0x58, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xEF, 0x85, 0x14, 0x65, 0x9A }, + { 0x5F, 0xC8, 0x78, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x92, 0xD9, 0x54 }, + { 0x25, 0xF9, 0x75, 0x85, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x48, 0xBF } +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_cbc_enc[3][8] = +{ + { 0x91, 0x1C, 0x6D, 0xCF, 0x48, 0xA7, 0xC3, 0x4D }, + { 0x60, 0x1A, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x66, 0xF1 }, + { 0xA1, 0x50, 0x0F, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x64, 0x76 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_des_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, j, u, v, ret = 0; + mbedtls_des_context ctx; + mbedtls_des3_context ctx3; + unsigned char buf[8]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + unsigned char prv[8]; + unsigned char iv[8]; +#endif + + mbedtls_des_init( &ctx ); + mbedtls_des3_init( &ctx3 ); + /* + * ECB mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + v = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " DES%c-ECB-%3d (%s): ", + ( u == 0 ) ? ' ' : '3', 56 + u * 56, + ( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( buf, des3_test_buf, 8 ); + + switch( i ) + { + case 0: + ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 1: + ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 2: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 3: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 4: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 5: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + default: + return( 1 ); + } + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ ) + { + if( u == 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb( &ctx, buf, buf ); + else + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb( &ctx3, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + if( ( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT && + memcmp( buf, des3_test_ecb_dec[u], 8 ) != 0 ) || + ( v != MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT && + memcmp( buf, des3_test_ecb_enc[u], 8 ) != 0 ) ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /* + * CBC mode + */ + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + u = i >> 1; + v = i & 1; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " DES%c-CBC-%3d (%s): ", + ( u == 0 ) ? ' ' : '3', 56 + u * 56, + ( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT ) ? "dec" : "enc" ); + + memcpy( iv, des3_test_iv, 8 ); + memcpy( prv, des3_test_iv, 8 ); + memcpy( buf, des3_test_buf, 8 ); + + switch( i ) + { + case 0: + ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &ctx, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 1: + ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_enc( &ctx, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 2: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 3: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 4: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + case 5: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc( &ctx3, des3_test_keys ); + break; + + default: + return( 1 ); + } + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT ) + { + for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ ) + { + if( u == 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf ); + else + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &ctx3, v, 8, iv, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + } + else + { + for( j = 0; j < 100; j++ ) + { + unsigned char tmp[8]; + + if( u == 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf ); + else + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &ctx3, v, 8, iv, buf, buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + memcpy( tmp, prv, 8 ); + memcpy( prv, buf, 8 ); + memcpy( buf, tmp, 8 ); + } + + memcpy( buf, prv, 8 ); + } + + if( ( v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT && + memcmp( buf, des3_test_cbc_dec[u], 8 ) != 0 ) || + ( v != MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT && + memcmp( buf, des3_test_cbc_enc[u], 8 ) != 0 ) ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_des_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_des3_free( &ctx3 ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + ret = 1; + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/dhm.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/dhm.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4d2e33e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/dhm.c @@ -0,0 +1,711 @@ +/* + * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation + * of the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm: + * + * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 12 + * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) + +#define DHM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define DHM_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +/* + * helper to validate the mbedtls_mpi size and import it + */ +static int dhm_read_bignum( mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret, n; + + if( end - *p < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; + (*p) += 2; + + if( (int)( end - *p ) < n ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( X, *p, n ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ) ); + + (*p) += n; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Verify sanity of parameter with regards to P + * + * Parameter should be: 2 <= public_param <= P - 2 + * + * This means that we need to return an error if + * public_param < 2 or public_param > P-2 + * + * For more information on the attack, see: + * http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/psandqs.pdf + * http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2005-2643 + */ +static int dhm_check_range( const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi U; + int ret = 0; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &U, P, 2 ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( param, 2 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &U ) > 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); + return( ret ); +} + +void mbedtls_dhm_init( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) +{ + DHM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_dhm_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Parse the ServerKeyExchange parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL && *p != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->P, p, end ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->G, p, end ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = dhm_read_bignum( &ctx->GY, p, end ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GY, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Pick a random R in the range [2, M-2] for blinding or key generation. + */ +static int dhm_random_below( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *M, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( R, 3, M, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( R, R, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +static int dhm_make_common( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( x_size < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( (unsigned) x_size < mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + } + else + { + /* Generate X as large as possible ( <= P - 2 ) */ + ret = dhm_random_below( &ctx->X, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * Calculate GX = G^X mod P + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->GX, &ctx->G, &ctx->X, + &ctx->P , &ctx->RP ) ); + + if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GX, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + size_t n1, n2, n3; + unsigned char *p; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + ret = dhm_make_common( ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Export P, G, GX. RFC 5246 §4.4 states that "leading zero octets are + * not required". We omit leading zeros for compactness. + */ +#define DHM_MPI_EXPORT( X, n ) \ + do { \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( ( X ), \ + p + 2, \ + ( n ) ) ); \ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); \ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); \ + p += ( n ); \ + } while( 0 ) + + n1 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); + n2 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->G ); + n3 = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->GX ); + + p = output; + DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->P , n1 ); + DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->G , n2 ); + DHM_MPI_EXPORT( &ctx->GX, n3 ); + + *olen = p - output; + + ctx->len = n1; + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Set prime modulus and generator + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_set_group( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *G ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P, P ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->G, G ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED, ret ) ); + } + + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Import the peer's public value G^Y + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_read_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + + if( ilen < 1 || ilen > ctx->len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->GY, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Create own private value X and export G^X + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + unsigned char *output, size_t olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + if( olen < 1 || olen > ctx->len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = dhm_make_common( ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->GX, output, olen ) ); + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ); + return( ret ); +} + + +/* + * Use the blinding method and optimisation suggested in section 10 of: + * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, + * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer + * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113. + */ +static int dhm_update_blinding( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_mpi R; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + + /* + * Don't use any blinding the first time a particular X is used, + * but remember it to use blinding next time. + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->pX ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->pX, &ctx->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->Vf, 1 ) ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * Ok, we need blinding. Can we re-use existing values? + * If yes, just update them by squaring them. + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * We need to generate blinding values from scratch + */ + + /* Vi = random( 2, P-2 ) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* Vf = Vi^-X mod P + * First compute Vi^-1 = R * (R Vi)^-1, (avoiding leaks from inv_mod), + * then elevate to the Xth power. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &R, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vi, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Derive and export the shared secret (G^Y)^X mod P + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi GYb; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + if( output_size < ctx->len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GY, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &GYb ); + + /* Blind peer's value */ + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_update_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P ) ); + } + else + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &GYb, &ctx->GY ) ); + + /* Do modular exponentiation */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->K, &GYb, &ctx->X, + &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); + + /* Unblind secret value */ + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P ) ); + } + + /* Output the secret without any leading zero byte. This is mandatory + * for TLS per RFC 5246 §8.1.2. */ + *olen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->K ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->K, output, *olen ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &GYb ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED, ret ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free the components of a DHM key + */ +void mbedtls_dhm_free( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->pX ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GY ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->GX ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->X ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->G ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_dhm_context ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +/* + * Parse DHM parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, + size_t dhminlen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhm != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhmin != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( dhminlen == 0 || dhmin[dhminlen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----", + "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----", + dhmin, NULL, 0, &dhminlen ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + dhminlen = pem.buflen; + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + goto exit; + + p = ( ret == 0 ) ? pem.buf : (unsigned char *) dhmin; +#else + p = (unsigned char *) dhmin; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + end = p + dhminlen; + + /* + * DHParams ::= SEQUENCE { + * prime INTEGER, -- P + * generator INTEGER, -- g + * privateValueLength INTEGER OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); + goto exit; + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->P ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &dhm->G ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( p != end ) + { + /* This might be the optional privateValueLength. + * If so, we can cleanly discard it */ + mbedtls_mpi rec; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &rec ); + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &rec ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &rec ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); + goto exit; + } + if ( p != end ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + goto exit; + } + } + + ret = 0; + + dhm->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &dhm->P ); + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); +#endif + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_dhm_free( dhm ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. + * + * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. + * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced + * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. + */ +static int load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) +{ + FILE *f; + long size; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END ); + if( ( size = ftell( f ) ) == -1 ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET ); + + *n = (size_t) size; + + if( *n + 1 == 0 || + ( *buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *n + 1 ) ) == NULL ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + if( fread( *buf, 1, *n, f ) != *n ) + { + fclose( f ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( *buf, *n + 1 ); + mbedtls_free( *buf ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + + fclose( f ); + + (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; + + if( strstr( (const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN " ) != NULL ) + ++*n; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Load and parse DHM parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( dhm != NULL ); + DHM_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( dhm, buf, n ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = +"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n" +"MIGHAoGBAJ419DBEOgmQTzo5qXl5fQcN9TN455wkOL7052HzxxRVMyhYmwQcgJvh\r\n" +"1sa18fyfR9OiVEMYglOpkqVoGLN7qd5aQNNi5W7/C+VBdHTBJcGZJyyP5B3qcz32\r\n" +"9mLJKudlVudV0Qxk5qUJaPZ/xupz0NyoVpviuiBOI1gNi8ovSXWzAgEC\r\n" +"-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n"; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ +static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = { + 0x30, 0x81, 0x87, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x9e, 0x35, 0xf4, 0x30, 0x44, + 0x3a, 0x09, 0x90, 0x4f, 0x3a, 0x39, 0xa9, 0x79, 0x79, 0x7d, 0x07, 0x0d, + 0xf5, 0x33, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x38, 0xbe, 0xf4, 0xe7, 0x61, 0xf3, + 0xc7, 0x14, 0x55, 0x33, 0x28, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x80, 0x9b, 0xe1, + 0xd6, 0xc6, 0xb5, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x9f, 0x47, 0xd3, 0xa2, 0x54, 0x43, 0x18, + 0x82, 0x53, 0xa9, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x68, 0x18, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xa9, 0xde, 0x5a, + 0x40, 0xd3, 0x62, 0xe5, 0x6e, 0xff, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0x41, 0x74, 0x74, 0xc1, + 0x25, 0xc1, 0x99, 0x27, 0x2c, 0x8f, 0xe4, 0x1d, 0xea, 0x73, 0x3d, 0xf6, + 0xf6, 0x62, 0xc9, 0x2a, 0xe7, 0x65, 0x56, 0xe7, 0x55, 0xd1, 0x0c, 0x64, + 0xe6, 0xa5, 0x09, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x7f, 0xc6, 0xea, 0x73, 0xd0, 0xdc, 0xa8, + 0x56, 0x9b, 0xe2, 0xba, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x23, 0x58, 0x0d, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x2f, + 0x49, 0x75, 0xb3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +static const size_t mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_dhm_params ); + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; + + mbedtls_dhm_init( &dhm ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " DHM parameter load: " ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm( &dhm, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_dhm_params, + mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecdh.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecdh.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..724c938a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecdh.c @@ -0,0 +1,731 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg + * RFC 4492 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECDH_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) +typedef mbedtls_ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed; +#endif + +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id( + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ctx->grp.id ); +#else + return( ctx->grp_id ); +#endif +} + +int mbedtls_ecdh_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ) +{ + /* At this time, all groups support ECDH. */ + (void) gid; + return( 1 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) +/* + * Generate public key (restartable version) + * + * Note: this internal function relies on its caller preserving the value of + * the output parameter 'd' across continuation calls. This would not be + * acceptable for a public function but is OK here as we control call sites. + */ +static int ecdh_gen_public_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + int restarting = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restarting = ( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ); +#endif + /* If multiplication is in progress, we already generated a privkey */ + if( !restarting ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, Q, d, &grp->G, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate public key + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + return( ecdh_gen_public_restartable( grp, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) +/* + * Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1) + */ +static int ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *z, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point P; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &P, d, Q, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &P ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( z, &P.X ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1) + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( z != NULL ); + return( ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( grp, z, Q, d, + f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ + +static void ecdh_init_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &ctx->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Qp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->z ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx->rs ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_init( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + ecdh_init_internal( ctx ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Vi ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Vf ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->_d ); +#else + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdh_context ) ); + + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE; +#endif + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + ctx->restart_enabled = 0; +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_setup_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, grp_id ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Setup context + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_setup( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_setup_internal( ctx, grp_id ) ); +#else + switch( grp_id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST; + ctx->grp_id = grp_id; + return( mbedtls_everest_setup( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, grp_id ) ); +#endif + default: + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0; + ctx->grp_id = grp_id; + ecdh_init_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh ); + return( ecdh_setup_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, grp_id ) ); + } +#endif +} + +static void ecdh_free_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ctx->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Qp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->z ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->rs ); +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Enable restartable operations for context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + ctx->restart_enabled = 1; +} +#endif + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Vi ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Vf ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->_d ); + ecdh_free_internal( ctx ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + mbedtls_everest_free( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh ); + break; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + ecdh_free_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh ); + break; + default: + break; + } + + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE; + ctx->grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_make_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + size_t *olen, int point_format, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng, + int restart_enabled ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t grp_len, pt_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if( ctx->grp.pbits == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( restart_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ctx->rs; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ( ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( &ctx->grp, &grp_len, buf, + blen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + buf += grp_len; + blen -= grp_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, point_format, + &pt_len, buf, blen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + *olen = grp_len + pt_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int restart_enabled = 0; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_make_params_internal( ctx, olen, ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, restart_enabled ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_make_params( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_make_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, + ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_read_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, buf, + end - *buf ) ); +} + +/* + * Read the ServerKeyExchange parameters (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( &grp_id, buf, end - *buf ) ) + != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( ctx, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_read_params_internal( ctx, buf, end ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_read_params( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + buf, end) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_read_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, + buf, end ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_get_params_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_ecdh_side side ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* If it's not our key, just import the public part as Qp */ + if( side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Qp, &key->Q ) ); + + /* Our key: import public (as Q) and private parts */ + if( side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Get parameters from a keypair + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_ecdh_side side ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS || + side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ); + + if( mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id( ctx ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + { + /* This is the first call to get_params(). Set up the context + * for use with the group. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( ctx, key->grp.id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else + { + /* This is not the first call to get_params(). Check that the + * current key's group is the same as the context's, which was set + * from the first key's group. */ + if( mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id( ctx ) != key->grp.id ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_get_params_internal( ctx, key, side ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + { + mbedtls_everest_ecdh_side s = side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ? + MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_OURS : + MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_THEIRS; + return( mbedtls_everest_get_params( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + key, s) ); + } +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_get_params_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, + key, side ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_make_public_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + size_t *olen, int point_format, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng, + int restart_enabled ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if( ctx->grp.pbits == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( restart_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ctx->rs; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ( ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + return mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, point_format, olen, + buf, blen ); +} + +/* + * Setup and export the client public value + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int restart_enabled = 0; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_make_public_internal( ctx, olen, ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, restart_enabled ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_make_public( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_make_public_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, + ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_read_public_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, &p, + blen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( (size_t)( p - buf ) != blen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse and import the client's public value + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_read_public_internal( ctx, buf, blen ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_read_public( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + buf, blen ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_read_public_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, + buf, blen ) ); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_calc_secret_internal( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, + size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng, + int restart_enabled ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( restart_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ctx->rs; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( ( ret = ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, + &ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng, + rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, + &ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if( mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->z ) > blen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *olen = ctx->grp.pbits / 8 + ( ( ctx->grp.pbits % 8 ) != 0 ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &ctx->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &ctx->z, buf, *olen ); + + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->z, buf, *olen ); +} + +/* + * Derive and export the shared secret + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int restart_enabled = 0; + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECDH_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return( ecdh_calc_secret_internal( ctx, olen, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled ) ); +#else + switch( ctx->var ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return( mbedtls_everest_calc_secret( &ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return( ecdh_calc_secret_internal( &ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, buf, + blen, f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled ) ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecdsa.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecdsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4bae6a93 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecdsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,1006 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curve DSA + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECDSA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/* + * Sub-context for ecdsa_verify() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver +{ + mbedtls_mpi u1, u2; /* intermediate values */ + enum { /* what to do next? */ + ecdsa_ver_init = 0, /* getting started */ + ecdsa_ver_muladd, /* muladd step */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init verify restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_ver_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->u1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->u2 ); + ctx->state = ecdsa_ver_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a verify restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_ver_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->u1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->u2 ); + + ecdsa_restart_ver_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig +{ + int sign_tries; + int key_tries; + mbedtls_mpi k; /* per-signature random */ + mbedtls_mpi r; /* r value */ + enum { /* what to do next? */ + ecdsa_sig_init = 0, /* getting started */ + ecdsa_sig_mul, /* doing ecp_mul() */ + ecdsa_sig_modn, /* mod N computations */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init verify sign sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_sig_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx ) +{ + ctx->sign_tries = 0; + ctx->key_tries = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->k ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->r ); + ctx->state = ecdsa_sig_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a sign restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_sig_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->k ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->r ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +/* + * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign_det() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; /* DRBG state */ + enum { /* what to do next? */ + ecdsa_det_init = 0, /* getting started */ + ecdsa_det_sign, /* make signature */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init verify sign_det sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_det_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx->rng_ctx ); + ctx->state = ecdsa_det_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a sign_det restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_det_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx->rng_ctx ); + + ecdsa_restart_det_init( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#define ECDSA_RS_ECP ( rs_ctx == NULL ? NULL : &rs_ctx->ecp ) + +/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */ +#define ECDSA_BUDGET( ops ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( grp, ECDSA_RS_ECP, ops ) ); + +/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER( SUB ) do { \ + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ecp.depth++ == 0 ) \ + rs_ctx->ecp.ops_done = 0; \ + \ + /* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \ + if( mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \ + rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + { \ + rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *rs_ctx->SUB ) ); \ + if( rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); \ + \ + ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_init( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + } \ +} while( 0 ) + +/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) do { \ + /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \ + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) \ + { \ + ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + mbedtls_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \ + } \ + \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL ) \ + rs_ctx->ecp.depth--; \ +} while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#define ECDSA_RS_ECP NULL + +#define ECDSA_BUDGET( ops ) /* no-op; for compatibility */ + +#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER( SUB ) (void) rs_ctx +#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) (void) rs_ctx + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) +/* + * Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len + * SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3 + */ +static int derive_mpi( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *x, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; + size_t use_size = blen > n_size ? n_size : blen; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( x, buf, use_size ) ); + if( use_size * 8 > grp->nbits ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( x, use_size * 8 - grp->nbits ) ); + + /* While at it, reduce modulo N */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( x, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( x, x, &grp->N ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC || !ECDSA_SIGN_ALT || !ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) +/* + * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3) + * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message) + */ +static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret, key_tries, sign_tries; + int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries; + mbedtls_ecp_point R; + mbedtls_mpi k, e, t; + mbedtls_mpi *pk = &k, *pr = r; + + /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ + if( ! mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( grp->id ) || grp->N.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t ); + + ECDSA_RS_ENTER( sig ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL ) + { + /* redirect to our context */ + p_sign_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->sign_tries; + p_key_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->key_tries; + pk = &rs_ctx->sig->k; + pr = &rs_ctx->sig->r; + + /* jump to current step */ + if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_mul ) + goto mul; + if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_modn ) + goto modn; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + *p_sign_tries = 0; + do + { + if( (*p_sign_tries)++ > 10 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair + * and set r = xR mod n + */ + *p_key_tries = 0; + do + { + if( (*p_key_tries)++ > 10 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL ) + rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_mul; + +mul: +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &R, pk, &grp->G, + f_rng_blind, + p_rng_blind, + ECDSA_RS_ECP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pr, &R.X, &grp->N ) ); + } + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( pr, 0 ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL ) + rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_modn; + +modn: +#endif + /* + * Accounting for everything up to the end of the loop + * (step 6, but checking now avoids saving e and t) + */ + ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 4 ); + + /* + * Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) ); + + /* + * Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step, + * avoiding a potential timing leak. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &t, f_rng_blind, + p_rng_blind ) ); + + /* + * Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, pr, d ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pk, pk, &t ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pk, pk, &grp->N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, pk, &grp->N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) ); + } + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL ) + mbedtls_mpi_copy( r, pr ); +#endif + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t ); + + ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( sig ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid ) +{ + switch( gid ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: return 0; +#endif +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: return 0; +#endif + default: return 1; + } +} + +/* + * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 ); + + /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ + return( ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +/* + * Deterministic signature wrapper + */ +static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx; + unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_mpi h; + + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &h ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx ); + + ECDSA_RS_ENTER( det ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL ) + { + /* redirect to our context */ + p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx; + + /* jump to current step */ + if( rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign ) + goto sign; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL ) + rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign; + +sign: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + (void) f_rng_blind; + (void) p_rng_blind; + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng ); +#else + if( f_rng_blind != NULL ) + ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, + f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx ); + else + { + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng_blind_det; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* + * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a + * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid + * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the + * risk that they leak this way. + */ + const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT"; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind; + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind ); + p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng_blind_det, md_info, + data, 2 * grp_len ); + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( p_rng_blind_det, + (const unsigned char*) blind_label, + strlen( blind_label ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind ); + goto cleanup; + } +#else + /* + * In the case of restartable computations we would either need to store + * the second RNG in the restart context too or set it up at every + * restart. The first option would penalize the correct application of + * the function and the second would defeat the purpose of the + * restartable feature. + * + * Therefore in this case we reuse the original RNG. This comes with the + * price that the resulting signature might not be a valid deterministic + * ECDSA signature with a very low probability (same magnitude as + * successfully guessing the private key). However even then it is still + * a valid ECDSA signature. + */ + p_rng_blind_det = p_rng; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /* + * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and + * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information + * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL + * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should + * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed. + */ + ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng_blind_det, + rs_ctx ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind ); +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ + +cleanup: + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &h ); + + ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( det ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Deterministic signature wrappers + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, + mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 ); + + return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, + NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, + mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng_blind ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng_blind != NULL ); + + return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, + f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) +/* + * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4) + * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message) + */ +static int ecdsa_verify_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2; + mbedtls_ecp_point R; + mbedtls_mpi *pu1 = &u1, *pu2 = &u2; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 ); + + /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ + if( ! mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do( grp->id ) || grp->N.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ECDSA_RS_ENTER( ver ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL ) + { + /* redirect to our context */ + pu1 = &rs_ctx->ver->u1; + pu2 = &rs_ctx->ver->u2; + + /* jump to current step */ + if( rs_ctx->ver->state == ecdsa_ver_muladd ) + goto muladd; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /* + * Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1 + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( r, &grp->N ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( s, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) ); + + /* + * Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n + */ + ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &s_inv, s, &grp->N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pu1, &e, &s_inv ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pu1, pu1, &grp->N ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pu2, r, &s_inv ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pu2, pu2, &grp->N ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL ) + rs_ctx->ver->state = ecdsa_ver_muladd; + +muladd: +#endif + /* + * Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( grp, + &R, pu1, &grp->G, pu2, Q, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &R ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Step 6: convert xR to an integer (no-op) + * Step 7: reduce xR mod n (gives v) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &R.X, &R.X, &grp->N ) ); + + /* + * Step 8: check if v (that is, R.X) is equal to r + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, r ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 ); + + ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( ver ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *r, + const mbedtls_mpi *s) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 ); + + return( ecdsa_verify_restartable( grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + +/* + * Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1 + */ +static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = {0}; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof( buf ); + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, s ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &p, buf, r ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + memcpy( sig, p, len ); + *slen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compute and write signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng, + p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); +#else + (void) md_alg; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + (void) rs_ctx; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#else + /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, + p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Compute and write signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( + ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, + NULL, NULL ) ); +} +#endif + +/* + * Read and check signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( + ctx, hash, hlen, sig, slen, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Restartable read and check signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig; + const unsigned char *end = sig + slen; + size_t len; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( p + len != end ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + goto cleanup; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &r ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &s ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) + (void) rs_ctx; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen, + &ctx->Q, &r, &s ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#else + if( ( ret = ecdsa_verify_restartable( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen, + &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + + /* At this point we know that the buffer starts with a valid signature. + * Return 0 if the buffer just contains the signature, and a specific + * error code if the valid signature is followed by more data. */ + if( p != end ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) +/* + * Generate key pair + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = 0; + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, gid ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, + &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ + +/* + * Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &ctx->grp, &key->grp ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->d, &key->d ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy( &ctx->Q, &key->Q ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( ctx ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ctx ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + ECDSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx->ecp ); + + ctx->ver = NULL; + ctx->sig = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + ctx->det = NULL; +#endif +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->ecp ); + + ecdsa_restart_ver_free( ctx->ver ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->ver ); + ctx->ver = NULL; + + ecdsa_restart_sig_free( ctx->sig ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->sig ); + ctx->sig = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + ecdsa_restart_det_free( ctx->det ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->det ); + ctx->det = NULL; +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecjpake.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecjpake.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fe0b9d93 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecjpake.c @@ -0,0 +1,1136 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curve J-PAKE + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References in the code are to the Thread v1.0 Specification, + * available to members of the Thread Group http://threadgroup.org/ + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECJPAKE_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +/* + * Convert a mbedtls_ecjpake_role to identifier string + */ +static const char * const ecjpake_id[] = { + "client", + "server" +}; + +#define ID_MINE ( ecjpake_id[ ctx->role ] ) +#define ID_PEER ( ecjpake_id[ 1 - ctx->role ] ) + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ecjpake_init( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ) +{ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + ctx->md_info = NULL; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &ctx->grp ); + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xm1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xm2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xp1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xp2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Xp ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->xm1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->xm2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->s ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ecjpake_free( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + ctx->md_info = NULL; + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ctx->grp ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xm1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xm2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xp1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xp2 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Xp ); + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->xm1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->xm2 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->s ); +} + +/* + * Setup context + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve, + const unsigned char *secret, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT || + role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( secret != NULL || len == 0 ); + + ctx->role = role; + + if( ( ctx->md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, curve ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->s, secret, len ) ); + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check if context is ready for use + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_check( const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx ) +{ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( ctx->md_info == NULL || + ctx->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || + ctx->s.p == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Write a point plus its length to a buffer + */ +static int ecjpake_write_len_point( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Need at least 4 for length plus 1 for point */ + if( end < *p || end - *p < 5 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( grp, P, pf, + &len, *p + 4, end - ( *p + 4 ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( len, *p, 0 ); + + *p += 4 + len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Size of the temporary buffer for ecjpake_hash: + * 3 EC points plus their length, plus ID and its length (4 + 6 bytes) + */ +#define ECJPAKE_HASH_BUF_LEN ( 3 * ( 4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN ) + 4 + 6 ) + +/* + * Compute hash for ZKP (7.4.2.2.2.1) + */ +static int ecjpake_hash( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *V, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + mbedtls_mpi *h ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[ECJPAKE_HASH_BUF_LEN]; + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + sizeof( buf ); + const size_t id_len = strlen( id ); + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + /* Write things to temporary buffer */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_write_len_point( &p, end, grp, pf, G ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_write_len_point( &p, end, grp, pf, V ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_write_len_point( &p, end, grp, pf, X ) ); + + if( end - p < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( id_len, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < id_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( p, id, id_len ); + p += id_len; + + /* Compute hash */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash ) ); + + /* Turn it into an integer mod n */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( h, hash, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( h, h, &grp->N ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Parse a ECShnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) and verify it (7.4.2.3.3) + */ +static int ecjpake_zkp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + const unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point V, VV; + mbedtls_mpi r, h; + size_t r_len; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &V ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &VV ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &h ); + + /* + * struct { + * ECPoint V; + * opaque r<1..2^8-1>; + * } ECSchnorrZKP; + */ + if( end < *p ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( grp, &V, p, end - *p ) ); + + if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < 1 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + r_len = *(*p)++; + + if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < r_len || r_len == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &r, *p, r_len ) ); + *p += r_len; + + /* + * Verification + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_hash( md_info, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( (mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, + &VV, &h, X, &r, G ) ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( &VV, &V ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &V ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &VV ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &h ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate ZKP (7.4.2.3.2) and write it as ECSchnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) + */ +static int ecjpake_zkp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + const mbedtls_mpi *x, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point V; + mbedtls_mpi v; + mbedtls_mpi h; /* later recycled to hold r */ + size_t len; + + if( end < *p ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &V ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &v ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &h ); + + /* Compute signature */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( (mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, + G, &v, &V, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_hash( md_info, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &h, &h, x ) ); /* x*h */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &h, &v, &h ) ); /* v - x*h */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &h, &h, &grp->N ) ); /* r */ + + /* Write it out */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( grp, &V, + pf, &len, *p, end - *p ) ); + *p += len; + + len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &h ); /* actually r */ + if( end < *p || (size_t)( end - *p ) < 1 + len || len > 255 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + + *(*p)++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, *p, len ) ); /* r */ + *p += len; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &V ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &v ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &h ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Parse a ECJPAKEKeyKP (7.4.2.2.1) and check proof + * Output: verified public key X + */ +static int ecjpake_kkp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + const unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( end < *p ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * struct { + * ECPoint X; + * ECSchnorrZKP zkp; + * } ECJPAKEKeyKP; + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( grp, X, p, end - *p ) ); + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( X ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_zkp_read( md_info, grp, pf, G, X, id, p, end ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate an ECJPAKEKeyKP + * Output: the serialized structure, plus private/public key pair + */ +static int ecjpake_kkp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *x, + mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( end < *p ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Generate key (7.4.2.3.1) and write it out */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( (mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, G, x, X, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( grp, X, + pf, &len, *p, end - *p ) ); + *p += len; + + /* Generate and write proof */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_zkp_write( md_info, grp, pf, G, x, X, id, + p, end, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Read a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList (7.4.2.3) and check proofs + * Outputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb + */ +static int ecjpake_kkpp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xa, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xb, + const char *id, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + + /* + * struct { + * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp_pair_list[2]; + * } ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList; + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_read( md_info, grp, pf, G, Xa, id, &p, end ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_read( md_info, grp, pf, G, Xb, id, &p, end ) ); + + if( p != end ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList + * Outputs: the serialized structure, plus two private/public key pairs + */ +static int ecjpake_kkpp_write( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *xm1, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xa, + mbedtls_mpi *xm2, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xb, + const char *id, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_write( md_info, grp, pf, G, xm1, Xa, id, + &p, end, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_write( md_info, grp, pf, G, xm2, Xb, id, + &p, end, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + *olen = p - buf; + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Read and process the first round message + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + return( ecjpake_kkpp_read( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, + &ctx->grp.G, + &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, ID_PEER, + buf, len ) ); +} + +/* + * Generate and write the first round message + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + return( ecjpake_kkpp_write( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, + &ctx->grp.G, + &ctx->xm1, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->Xm2, + ID_MINE, buf, len, olen, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Compute the sum of three points R = A + B + C + */ +static int ecjpake_ecp_add3( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *A, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *B, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *C ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi one; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &one ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &one, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( grp, R, &one, A, &one, B ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( grp, R, &one, R, &one, C ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &one ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Read and process second round message (C: 7.4.2.5, S: 7.4.2.6) + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GB, S: GA */ + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &G ); + + /* + * Server: GA = X3 + X4 + X1 (7.4.2.6.1) + * Client: GB = X1 + X2 + X3 (7.4.2.5.1) + * Unified: G = Xm1 + Xm2 + Xp1 + * We need that before parsing in order to check Xp as we read it + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_ecp_add3( &ctx->grp, &G, + &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->Xp1 ) ); + + /* + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; // only client reading server msg + * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp; + * } Client/ServerECJPAKEParams; + */ + if( ctx->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( &grp, &p, len ) ); + if( grp.id != ctx->grp.id ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_kkp_read( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, + ctx->point_format, + &G, &ctx->Xp, ID_PEER, &p, end ) ); + + if( p != end ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &G ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Compute R = +/- X * S mod N, taking care not to leak S + */ +static int ecjpake_mul_secret( mbedtls_mpi *R, int sign, + const mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *S, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi b; /* Blinding value, then s + N * blinding */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &b ); + + /* b = s + rnd-128-bit * N */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &b, 16, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &b, &b, N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &b, &b, S ) ); + + /* R = sign * X * b mod N */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( R, X, &b ) ); + R->s *= sign; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( R, R, N ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &b ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate and write the second round message (S: 7.4.2.5, C: 7.4.2.6) + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GA, S: GB */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Xm; /* C: Xc, S: Xs */ + mbedtls_mpi xm; /* C: xc, S: xs */ + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + size_t ec_len; + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &G ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Xm ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &xm ); + + /* + * First generate private/public key pair (S: 7.4.2.5.1, C: 7.4.2.6.1) + * + * Client: GA = X1 + X3 + X4 | xs = x2 * s | Xc = xc * GA + * Server: GB = X3 + X1 + X2 | xs = x4 * s | Xs = xs * GB + * Unified: G = Xm1 + Xp1 + Xp2 | xm = xm2 * s | Xm = xm * G + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_ecp_add3( &ctx->grp, &G, + &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, &ctx->Xm1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_mul_secret( &xm, 1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->s, + &ctx->grp.N, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &Xm, &xm, &G, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* + * Now write things out + * + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; // only server writing its message + * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp; + * } Client/ServerECJPAKEParams; + */ + if( ctx->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER ) + { + if( end < p ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( &ctx->grp, &ec_len, + p, end - p ) ); + p += ec_len; + } + + if( end < p ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &Xm, + ctx->point_format, &ec_len, p, end - p ) ); + p += ec_len; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_zkp_write( ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, + ctx->point_format, + &G, &xm, &Xm, ID_MINE, + &p, end, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + *olen = p - buf; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &G ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Xm ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &xm ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Derive PMS (7.4.2.7 / 7.4.2.8) + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point K; + mbedtls_mpi m_xm2_s, one; + unsigned char kx[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t x_bytes; + + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + *olen = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); + if( len < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &m_xm2_s ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &one ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &one, 1 ) ); + + /* + * Client: K = ( Xs - X4 * x2 * s ) * x2 + * Server: K = ( Xc - X2 * x4 * s ) * x4 + * Unified: K = ( Xp - Xp2 * xm2 * s ) * xm2 + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_mul_secret( &m_xm2_s, -1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->s, + &ctx->grp.N, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( &ctx->grp, &K, + &one, &ctx->Xp, + &m_xm2_s, &ctx->Xp2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &K, &ctx->xm2, &K, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* PMS = SHA-256( K.X ) */ + x_bytes = ( ctx->grp.pbits + 7 ) / 8; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &K.X, kx, x_bytes ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_md( ctx->md_info, kx, x_bytes, buf ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &m_xm2_s ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &one ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#undef ID_MINE +#undef ID_PEER + +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + (void) verbose; + return( 0 ); +} +#else + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_password[] = { + 0x74, 0x68, 0x72, 0x65, 0x61, 0x64, 0x6a, 0x70, 0x61, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x74, + 0x65, 0x73, 0x74 +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x1[] = { + 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, + 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, + 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x21 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x2[] = { + 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, + 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, + 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x81 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x3[] = { + 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, + 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, + 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x81 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x4[] = { + 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcc, + 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7, 0xd8, + 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xe1 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_cli_one[] = { + 0x41, 0x04, 0xac, 0xcf, 0x01, 0x06, 0xef, 0x85, 0x8f, 0xa2, 0xd9, 0x19, + 0x33, 0x13, 0x46, 0x80, 0x5a, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x8b, 0xba, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0x44, + 0xe5, 0xc7, 0x89, 0x28, 0x79, 0x14, 0x61, 0x87, 0xdd, 0x26, 0x66, 0xad, + 0xa7, 0x81, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0x11, 0x13, 0x72, 0x25, 0x1a, 0x89, 0x10, 0x62, + 0x1f, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xf1, 0x28, 0xac, 0x48, 0xe3, 0x81, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0xf9, + 0x06, 0x07, 0x31, 0xf6, 0x94, 0xa4, 0x41, 0x04, 0x1d, 0xd0, 0xbd, 0x5d, + 0x45, 0x66, 0xc9, 0xbe, 0xd9, 0xce, 0x7d, 0xe7, 0x01, 0xb5, 0xe8, 0x2e, + 0x08, 0xe8, 0x4b, 0x73, 0x04, 0x66, 0x01, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x03, 0xc7, 0x9e, + 0xb9, 0x82, 0x17, 0x22, 0x36, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0x72, 0x8a, 0xe4, 0xbf, 0x73, + 0x61, 0x0d, 0x34, 0xde, 0x44, 0x24, 0x6e, 0xf3, 0xd9, 0xc0, 0x5a, 0x22, + 0x36, 0xfb, 0x66, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x3d, 0x74, 0x49, 0x30, 0x8b, 0xab, 0xce, + 0x20, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x16, 0x66, 0x29, 0x92, 0xe9, 0x23, 0x5c, 0x25, 0x00, + 0x2f, 0x11, 0xb1, 0x50, 0x87, 0xb8, 0x27, 0x38, 0xe0, 0x3c, 0x94, 0x5b, + 0xf7, 0xa2, 0x99, 0x5d, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x98, 0x34, 0x58, 0x41, 0x04, 0x7e, + 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x70, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0xdb, 0xd7, 0x92, 0x62, + 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x77, 0x99, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x18, 0x40, 0x9a, 0xc5, + 0x36, 0x1c, 0x5f, 0xe6, 0x69, 0xd7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x47, 0x79, 0x0a, 0xeb, + 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x75, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x7f, 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x35, + 0x93, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x91, 0xb7, 0xe3, 0x2b, 0xb0, + 0x13, 0xbb, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x95, 0x58, 0xd3, 0x2e, 0xd1, 0xeb, + 0xfc, 0x18, 0x16, 0xaf, 0x4f, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x55, 0xfc, 0xb4, 0xca, 0x47, + 0xb2, 0xa0, 0x2d, 0x1e, 0x7c, 0xaf, 0x11, 0x79, 0xea, 0x3f, 0xe1, 0x39, + 0x5b, 0x22, 0xb8, 0x61, 0x96, 0x40, 0x16, 0xfa, 0xba, 0xf7, 0x2c, 0x97, + 0x56, 0x95, 0xd9, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x19, 0x7f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x40, + 0x63, 0x4e, 0xd5, 0x97, 0x64, 0x93, 0x77, 0x87, 0xbe, 0x20, 0xbc, 0x4d, + 0xee, 0xbb, 0xf9, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x0a, 0x33, 0x5f, 0x04, 0x6c, 0xa3, 0xaa, + 0x94, 0x1e, 0x45, 0x86, 0x4c, 0x7c, 0xad, 0xef, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x3d, + 0x8b, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x44, 0x3e, 0xf0 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_srv_one[] = { + 0x41, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x70, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0xdb, + 0xd7, 0x92, 0x62, 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x77, 0x99, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x18, + 0x40, 0x9a, 0xc5, 0x36, 0x1c, 0x5f, 0xe6, 0x69, 0xd7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x47, + 0x79, 0x0a, 0xeb, 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x75, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x7f, + 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x35, 0x93, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x91, 0xb7, + 0xe3, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x13, 0xbb, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x04, 0x09, 0xf8, 0x5b, 0x3d, + 0x20, 0xeb, 0xd7, 0x88, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x64, 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x05, 0x6d, 0x64, + 0x28, 0xfe, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0x28, 0x7a, 0xa3, 0x65, 0xf1, 0x31, 0xf4, 0x36, + 0x0f, 0xf3, 0x86, 0xd8, 0x46, 0x89, 0x8b, 0xc4, 0xb4, 0x15, 0x83, 0xc2, + 0xa5, 0x19, 0x7f, 0x65, 0xd7, 0x87, 0x42, 0x74, 0x6c, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xec, + 0x0a, 0x4f, 0xfe, 0x2f, 0x27, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x0a, 0x1d, 0x8f, 0xb5, 0x16, + 0x20, 0x93, 0x4d, 0x74, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xe5, 0x4d, 0xf4, 0x24, 0xfd, 0x96, + 0x30, 0x6c, 0x01, 0x17, 0xbf, 0x13, 0x1a, 0xfa, 0xbf, 0x90, 0xa9, 0xd3, + 0x3d, 0x11, 0x98, 0xd9, 0x05, 0x19, 0x37, 0x35, 0x14, 0x41, 0x04, 0x19, + 0x0a, 0x07, 0x70, 0x0f, 0xfa, 0x4b, 0xe6, 0xae, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xee, 0x0f, + 0x06, 0xae, 0xb5, 0x44, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xdd, 0xaa, 0xbe, 0xdf, 0x70, 0xf8, + 0x62, 0x33, 0x21, 0x33, 0x2c, 0x54, 0xf3, 0x55, 0xf0, 0xfb, 0xfe, 0xc7, + 0x83, 0xed, 0x35, 0x9e, 0x5d, 0x0b, 0xf7, 0x37, 0x7a, 0x0f, 0xc4, 0xea, + 0x7a, 0xce, 0x47, 0x3c, 0x9c, 0x11, 0x2b, 0x41, 0xcc, 0xd4, 0x1a, 0xc5, + 0x6a, 0x56, 0x12, 0x41, 0x04, 0x36, 0x0a, 0x1c, 0xea, 0x33, 0xfc, 0xe6, + 0x41, 0x15, 0x64, 0x58, 0xe0, 0xa4, 0xea, 0xc2, 0x19, 0xe9, 0x68, 0x31, + 0xe6, 0xae, 0xbc, 0x88, 0xb3, 0xf3, 0x75, 0x2f, 0x93, 0xa0, 0x28, 0x1d, + 0x1b, 0xf1, 0xfb, 0x10, 0x60, 0x51, 0xdb, 0x96, 0x94, 0xa8, 0xd6, 0xe8, + 0x62, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x13, 0x24, 0xa3, 0xd9, 0xe2, 0x78, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xee, + 0x4f, 0x7c, 0x59, 0x19, 0x99, 0x65, 0xa8, 0xdd, 0x4a, 0x20, 0x91, 0x84, + 0x7d, 0x2d, 0x22, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0x5f, 0xaa, 0x2a, 0x3f, 0xb3, 0x3f, + 0xd2, 0xd1, 0xe0, 0x55, 0xa0, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x61, 0xec, 0xfb, 0x8d, 0x80, + 0xec, 0x00, 0xc2, 0xc9, 0xeb, 0x12 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_srv_two[] = { + 0x03, 0x00, 0x17, 0x41, 0x04, 0x0f, 0xb2, 0x2b, 0x1d, 0x5d, 0x11, 0x23, + 0xe0, 0xef, 0x9f, 0xeb, 0x9d, 0x8a, 0x2e, 0x59, 0x0a, 0x1f, 0x4d, 0x7c, + 0xed, 0x2c, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x58, 0x6e, 0x8f, 0x2a, 0x16, 0xd4, 0xeb, 0x2f, + 0xda, 0x43, 0x28, 0xa2, 0x0b, 0x07, 0xd8, 0xfd, 0x66, 0x76, 0x54, 0xca, + 0x18, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0x32, 0xa3, 0x33, 0xa0, 0x84, 0x54, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x26, + 0xee, 0x88, 0x04, 0xfd, 0x7a, 0xf0, 0xaa, 0xa7, 0xa6, 0x41, 0x04, 0x55, + 0x16, 0xea, 0x3e, 0x54, 0xa0, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0xb2, 0xce, 0x78, 0x6b, 0x38, + 0xd3, 0x83, 0x37, 0x00, 0x29, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0xe4, 0x45, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xd6, + 0x01, 0xb4, 0x08, 0xa2, 0x4a, 0xe6, 0x46, 0x5c, 0x8a, 0xc9, 0x05, 0xb9, + 0xeb, 0x03, 0xb5, 0xd3, 0x69, 0x1c, 0x13, 0x9e, 0xf8, 0x3f, 0x1c, 0xd4, + 0x20, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0xec, 0x39, 0x22, 0x18, 0xa5, 0x9e, 0xd2, + 0x43, 0xd3, 0xc8, 0x20, 0xff, 0x72, 0x4a, 0x9a, 0x70, 0xb8, 0x8c, 0xb8, + 0x6f, 0x20, 0xb4, 0x34, 0xc6, 0x86, 0x5a, 0xa1, 0xcd, 0x79, 0x06, 0xdd, + 0x7c, 0x9b, 0xce, 0x35, 0x25, 0xf5, 0x08, 0x27, 0x6f, 0x26, 0x83, 0x6c +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_cli_two[] = { + 0x41, 0x04, 0x69, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xe8, 0x5e, 0x90, 0xce, 0x3f, 0x12, 0x46, + 0x74, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x07, 0xe9, 0x39, 0xe8, 0x1d, 0x1d, 0xc1, 0xc5, 0xcb, + 0x98, 0x8b, 0x58, 0xc3, 0x10, 0xc9, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x52, 0x4d, 0x93, 0x72, + 0x0b, 0x45, 0x54, 0x1c, 0x83, 0xee, 0x88, 0x41, 0x19, 0x1d, 0xa7, 0xce, + 0xd8, 0x6e, 0x33, 0x12, 0xd4, 0x36, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x98, + 0x9a, 0xba, 0x4a, 0xff, 0xd1, 0xee, 0x41, 0x04, 0x07, 0x7e, 0x8c, 0x31, + 0xe2, 0x0e, 0x6b, 0xed, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xc1, 0x35, 0x93, 0xe6, 0x9f, 0x15, + 0xbe, 0x85, 0xc2, 0x7d, 0x68, 0xcd, 0x09, 0xcc, 0xb8, 0xc4, 0x18, 0x36, + 0x08, 0x91, 0x7c, 0x5c, 0x3d, 0x40, 0x9f, 0xac, 0x39, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xe8, + 0x2f, 0x72, 0x92, 0xd3, 0x6f, 0x0d, 0x23, 0xe0, 0x55, 0x91, 0x3f, 0x45, + 0xa5, 0x2b, 0x85, 0xdd, 0x8a, 0x20, 0x52, 0xe9, 0xe1, 0x29, 0xbb, 0x4d, + 0x20, 0x0f, 0x01, 0x1f, 0x19, 0x48, 0x35, 0x35, 0xa6, 0xe8, 0x9a, 0x58, + 0x0c, 0x9b, 0x00, 0x03, 0xba, 0xf2, 0x14, 0x62, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x1a, 0x82, + 0xcc, 0x38, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xae, 0x60, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0x4c +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_pms[] = { + 0xf3, 0xd4, 0x7f, 0x59, 0x98, 0x44, 0xdb, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x69, 0xbb, 0xe7, + 0x98, 0x1e, 0x39, 0xd9, 0x31, 0xfd, 0x74, 0x3b, 0xf2, 0x2e, 0x98, 0xf9, + 0xb4, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x19, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x51 +}; + +/* Load my private keys and generate the corresponding public keys */ +static int ecjpake_test_load( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len1, + const unsigned char *xm2, size_t len2 ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm1, xm1, len1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->xm2, xm2, len2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm1, + &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->xm2, + &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +/* For tests we don't need a secure RNG; + * use the LGC from Numerical Recipes for simplicity */ +static int ecjpake_lgc( void *p, unsigned char *out, size_t len ) +{ + static uint32_t x = 42; + (void) p; + + while( len > 0 ) + { + size_t use_len = len > 4 ? 4 : len; + x = 1664525 * x + 1013904223; + memcpy( out, &x, use_len ); + out += use_len; + len -= use_len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define TEST_ASSERT( x ) \ + do { \ + if( x ) \ + ret = 0; \ + else \ + { \ + ret = 1; \ + goto cleanup; \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecjpake_context cli; + mbedtls_ecjpake_context srv; + unsigned char buf[512], pms[32]; + size_t len, pmslen; + + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &cli ); + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &srv ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECJPAKE test #0 (setup): " ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &cli, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + ecjpake_test_password, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_password ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &srv, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + ecjpake_test_password, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_password ) ) == 0 ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECJPAKE test #1 (random handshake): " ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &cli, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &srv, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &srv, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &cli, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &srv, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &cli, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &cli, + pms, sizeof( pms ), &pmslen, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &cli, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &srv, buf, len ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &srv, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( len == pmslen ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, pms, len ) == 0 ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + /* 'reference handshake' tests can only be run against implementations + * for which we have 100% control over how the random ephemeral keys + * are generated. This is only the case for the internal mbed TLS + * implementation, so these tests are skipped in case the internal + * implementation is swapped out for an alternative one. */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECJPAKE test #2 (reference handshake): " ); + + /* Simulate generation of round one */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_test_load( &cli, + ecjpake_test_x1, sizeof( ecjpake_test_x1 ), + ecjpake_test_x2, sizeof( ecjpake_test_x2 ) ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecjpake_test_load( &srv, + ecjpake_test_x3, sizeof( ecjpake_test_x3 ), + ecjpake_test_x4, sizeof( ecjpake_test_x4 ) ) ); + + /* Read round one */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &srv, + ecjpake_test_cli_one, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_cli_one ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &cli, + ecjpake_test_srv_one, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_srv_one ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Skip generation of round two, read round two */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &cli, + ecjpake_test_srv_two, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_srv_two ) ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &srv, + ecjpake_test_cli_two, + sizeof( ecjpake_test_cli_two ) ) == 0 ); + + /* Server derives PMS */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &srv, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( len == sizeof( ecjpake_test_pms ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len ) == 0 ); + + memset( buf, 0, len ); /* Avoid interferences with next step */ + + /* Client derives PMS */ + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &cli, + buf, sizeof( buf ), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL ) == 0 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( len == sizeof( ecjpake_test_pms ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len ) == 0 ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &cli ); + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &srv ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#undef TEST_ASSERT + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecp.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ad19e05f --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecp.c @@ -0,0 +1,3611 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): generic functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 http://www.secg.org/index.php?action=secg,docs_secg + * GECC = Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone + * FIPS 186-3 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf + * RFC 4492 for the related TLS structures and constants + * RFC 7748 for the Curve448 and Curve25519 curve definitions + * + * [Curve25519] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf + * + * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis + * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and + * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302. + * + * + * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to + * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology + * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342. + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +/** + * \brief Function level alternative implementation. + * + * The MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT macro enables alternative implementations to + * replace certain functions in this module. The alternative implementations are + * typically hardware accelerators and need to activate the hardware before the + * computation starts and deactivate it after it finishes. The + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free() functions serve + * this purpose. + * + * To preserve the correct functionality the following conditions must hold: + * + * - The alternative implementation must be activated by + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() before any of the replaceable functions is + * called. + * - mbedtls_internal_ecp_free() must \b only be called when the alternative + * implementation is activated. + * - mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() must \b not be called when the alternative + * implementation is activated. + * - Public functions must not return while the alternative implementation is + * activated. + * - Replaceable functions are guarded by \c MBEDTLS_ECP_XXX_ALT macros and + * before calling them an \code if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + * \endcode ensures that the alternative implementation supports the current + * group. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" + +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECP_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ecp_internal.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#else +#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * Counts of point addition and doubling, and field multiplications. + * Used to test resistance of point multiplication to simple timing attacks. + */ +static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count, mul_count; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) +/* + * Currently ecp_mul() takes a RNG function as an argument, used for + * side-channel protection, but it can be NULL. The initial reasoning was + * that people will pass non-NULL RNG when they care about side-channels, but + * unfortunately we have some APIs that call ecp_mul() with a NULL RNG, with + * no opportunity for the user to do anything about it. + * + * The obvious strategies for addressing that include: + * - change those APIs so that they take RNG arguments; + * - require a global RNG to be available to all crypto modules. + * + * Unfortunately those would break compatibility. So what we do instead is + * have our own internal DRBG instance, seeded from the secret scalar. + * + * The following is a light-weight abstraction layer for doing that with + * HMAC_DRBG (first choice) or CTR_DRBG. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + +/* DRBG context type */ +typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context; + +/* DRBG context init */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG context free */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG function */ +static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) ); +} + +/* DRBG context seeding */ +static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + /* The list starts with strong hashes */ + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_md_list()[0]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + + if( secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, + secret_bytes, secret_len ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( ctx, md_info, secret_bytes, secret_len ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +/* DRBG context type */ +typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context; + +/* DRBG context init */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG context free */ +static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( ctx ); +} + +/* DRBG function */ +static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Since CTR_DRBG doesn't have a seed_buf() function the way HMAC_DRBG does, + * we need to pass an entropy function when seeding. So we use a dummy + * function for that, and pass the actual entropy as customisation string. + * (During seeding of CTR_DRBG the entropy input and customisation string are + * concatenated before being used to update the secret state.) + */ +static int ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len) +{ + (void) ctx; + memset( out, 0, len ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* DRBG context seeding */ +static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + + if( secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, + secret_bytes, secret_len ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctx, ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy, NULL, + secret_bytes, secret_len ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#else +#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." +#endif /* DRBG modules */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Maximum number of "basic operations" to be done in a row. + * + * Default value 0 means that ECC operations will not yield. + * Note that regardless of the value of ecp_max_ops, always at + * least one step is performed before yielding. + * + * Setting ecp_max_ops=1 can be suitable for testing purposes + * as it will interrupt computation at all possible points. + */ +static unsigned ecp_max_ops = 0; + +/* + * Set ecp_max_ops + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( unsigned max_ops ) +{ + ecp_max_ops = max_ops; +} + +/* + * Check if restart is enabled + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled( void ) +{ + return( ecp_max_ops != 0 ); +} + +/* + * Restart sub-context for ecp_mul_comb() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point R; /* current intermediate result */ + size_t i; /* current index in various loops, 0 outside */ + mbedtls_ecp_point *T; /* table for precomputed points */ + unsigned char T_size; /* number of points in table T */ + enum { /* what were we doing last time we returned? */ + ecp_rsm_init = 0, /* nothing so far, dummy initial state */ + ecp_rsm_pre_dbl, /* precompute 2^n multiples */ + ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl, /* normalize precomputed 2^n multiples */ + ecp_rsm_pre_add, /* precompute remaining points by adding */ + ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add, /* normalize all precomputed points */ + ecp_rsm_comb_core, /* ecp_mul_comb_core() */ + ecp_rsm_final_norm, /* do the final normalization */ + } state; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; + unsigned char drbg_seeded; +#endif +}; + +/* + * Init restart_mul sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_rsm_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->R ); + ctx->i = 0; + ctx->T = NULL; + ctx->T_size = 0; + ctx->state = ecp_rsm_init; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_init( &ctx->drbg_ctx ); + ctx->drbg_seeded = 0; +#endif +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart_mul sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_rsm_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx ) +{ + unsigned char i; + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->R ); + + if( ctx->T != NULL ) + { + for( i = 0; i < ctx->T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( ctx->T + i ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->T ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_free( &ctx->drbg_ctx ); +#endif + + ecp_restart_rsm_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Restart context for ecp_muladd() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point mP; /* mP value */ + mbedtls_ecp_point R; /* R intermediate result */ + enum { /* what should we do next? */ + ecp_rsma_mul1 = 0, /* first multiplication */ + ecp_rsma_mul2, /* second multiplication */ + ecp_rsma_add, /* addition */ + ecp_rsma_norm, /* normalization */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init restart_muladd sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_ma_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->mP ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->R ); + ctx->state = ecp_rsma_mul1; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart_muladd sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_ma_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->mP ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->R ); + + ecp_restart_ma_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + ctx->ops_done = 0; + ctx->depth = 0; + ctx->rsm = NULL; + ctx->ma = NULL; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + ecp_restart_rsm_free( ctx->rsm ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->rsm ); + + ecp_restart_ma_free( ctx->ma ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->ma ); + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( ctx ); +} + +/* + * Check if we can do the next step + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + unsigned ops ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ecp_max_ops != 0 ) + { + /* scale depending on curve size: the chosen reference is 256-bit, + * and multiplication is quadratic. Round to the closest integer. */ + if( grp->pbits >= 512 ) + ops *= 4; + else if( grp->pbits >= 384 ) + ops *= 2; + + /* Avoid infinite loops: always allow first step. + * Because of that, however, it's not generally true + * that ops_done <= ecp_max_ops, so the check + * ops_done > ecp_max_ops below is mandatory. */ + if( ( rs_ctx->ops_done != 0 ) && + ( rs_ctx->ops_done > ecp_max_ops || + ops > ecp_max_ops - rs_ctx->ops_done ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ); + } + + /* update running count */ + rs_ctx->ops_done += ops; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECP_RS_ENTER( SUB ) do { \ + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0 ) \ + rs_ctx->ops_done = 0; \ + \ + /* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \ + if( mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \ + rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + { \ + rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *rs_ctx->SUB ) ); \ + if( rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); \ + \ + ecp_restart_## SUB ##_init( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + } \ +} while( 0 ) + +/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECP_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) do { \ + /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \ + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) \ + { \ + ecp_restart_## SUB ##_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + mbedtls_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \ + rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \ + } \ + \ + if( rs_ctx != NULL ) \ + rs_ctx->depth--; \ +} while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#define ECP_RS_ENTER( sub ) (void) rs_ctx; +#define ECP_RS_LEAVE( sub ) (void) rs_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * List of supported curves: + * - internal ID + * - TLS NamedCurve ID (RFC 4492 sec. 5.1.1, RFC 7071 sec. 2, RFC 8446 sec. 4.2.7) + * - size in bits + * - readable name + * + * Curves are listed in order: largest curves first, and for a given size, + * fastest curves first. This provides the default order for the SSL module. + * + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new curves! + */ +static const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info ecp_supported_curves[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, 25, 521, "secp521r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, 28, 512, "brainpoolP512r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, 24, 384, "secp384r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, 27, 384, "brainpoolP384r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, 23, 256, "secp256r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, 22, 256, "secp256k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, 26, 256, "brainpoolP256r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, 21, 224, "secp224r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, 20, 224, "secp224k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, 19, 192, "secp192r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, 18, 192, "secp192k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, 29, 256, "x25519" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, 30, 448, "x448" }, +#endif + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0, NULL }, +}; + +#define ECP_NB_CURVES sizeof( ecp_supported_curves ) / \ + sizeof( ecp_supported_curves[0] ) + +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_supported_grp_id[ECP_NB_CURVES]; + +/* + * List of supported curves and associated info + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_list( void ) +{ + return( ecp_supported_curves ); +} + +/* + * List of supported curves, group ID only + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list( void ) +{ + static int init_done = 0; + + if( ! init_done ) + { + size_t i = 0; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + ecp_supported_grp_id[i++] = curve_info->grp_id; + } + ecp_supported_grp_id[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + + init_done = 1; + } + + return( ecp_supported_grp_id ); +} + +/* + * Get the curve info for the internal identifier + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( curve_info->grp_id == grp_id ) + return( curve_info ); + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Get the curve info from the TLS identifier + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( uint16_t tls_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( curve_info->tls_id == tls_id ) + return( curve_info ); + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Get the curve info from the name + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( const char *name ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + if( name == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++ ) + { + if( strcmp( curve_info->name, name ) == 0 ) + return( curve_info ); + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Get the type of a curve + */ +mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + if( grp->G.X.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_NONE ); + + if( grp->G.Y.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ); +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a point + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_init( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( pt != NULL ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->X ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->Y ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &pt->Z ); +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a group + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_init( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( grp != NULL ); + + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->A ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->B ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &grp->G ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &grp->N ); + grp->pbits = 0; + grp->nbits = 0; + grp->h = 0; + grp->modp = NULL; + grp->t_pre = NULL; + grp->t_post = NULL; + grp->t_data = NULL; + grp->T = NULL; + grp->T_size = 0; +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a key pair + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE( key != NULL ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &key->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &key->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &key->Q ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a point + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_free( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + if( pt == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->X ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->Y ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->Z ) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a group + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_free( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + size_t i; + + if( grp == NULL ) + return; + + if( grp->h != 1 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->A ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->B ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &grp->G ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->N ); + } + + if( grp->T != NULL ) + { + for( i = 0; i < grp->T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &grp->T[i] ); + mbedtls_free( grp->T ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( grp, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_group ) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a key pair + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + if( key == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &key->grp ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &key->d ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &key->Q ); +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of a point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_copy( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->X, &Q->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->Y, &Q->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &P->Z, &Q->Z ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of a group object + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( dst != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( src != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( dst, src->id ) ); +} + +/* + * Set point to zero + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->X , 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Y , 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z , 0 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Tell if a point is zero + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 0 ) == 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compare two points lazily + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp( const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->X, &Q->X ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Y, &Q->Y ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Z, &Q->Z ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +/* + * Import a non-zero point from ASCII strings + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string( mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, + const char *x, const char *y ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( x != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( y != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &P->X, radix, x ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &P->Y, radix, y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P->Z, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Export a point into unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.3 and RFC7748) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t plen; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ); + + plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + (void) format; /* Montgomery curves always use the same point format */ + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + *olen = plen; + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &P->X, buf, plen ) ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + /* + * Common case: P == 0 + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + if( buflen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x00; + *olen = 1; + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ) + { + *olen = 2 * plen + 1; + + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x04; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); + } + else if( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) + { + *olen = plen + 1; + + if( buflen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + buf[0] = 0x02 + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &P->Y, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &P->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + } + } +#endif + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Import a point from unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.4 and RFC7748) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t plen; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + if( ilen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + plen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + if( plen != ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( &pt->X, buf, plen ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &pt->Y ); + + if( grp->id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + /* Set most significant bit to 0 as prescribed in RFC7748 §5 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &pt->X, plen * 8 - 1, 0 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + if( buf[0] == 0x00 ) + { + if( ilen == 1 ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( pt ) ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( buf[0] != 0x04 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ilen != 2 * plen + 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->X, buf + 1, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &pt->Y, + buf + 1 + plen, plen ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + } +#endif + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Import a point from a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; + * } ECPoint; + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + unsigned char data_len; + const unsigned char *buf_start; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + + /* + * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least one for data) + */ + if( buf_len < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + data_len = *(*buf)++; + if( data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len - 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Save buffer start for read_binary and update buf + */ + buf_start = *buf; + *buf += data_len; + + return( mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( grp, pt, buf_start, data_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Export a point as a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; + * } ECPoint; + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ); + + /* + * buffer length must be at least one, for our length byte + */ + if( blen < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( grp, pt, format, + olen, buf + 1, blen - 1) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * write length to the first byte and update total length + */ + buf[0] = (unsigned char) *olen; + ++*olen; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Set a group from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( &grp_id, buf, len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( grp, grp_id ) ); +} + +/* + * Read a group id from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492) and convert it to + * mbedtls_ecp_group_id. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id( mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len ) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( *buf != NULL ); + + /* + * We expect at least three bytes (see below) + */ + if( len < 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled + */ + if( *(*buf)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + tls_id = *(*buf)++; + tls_id <<= 8; + tls_id |= *(*buf)++; + + if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_id ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + *grp = curve_info->grp_id; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Write the ECParameters record corresponding to a group (RFC 4492) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp->id ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * We are going to write 3 bytes (see below) + */ + *olen = 3; + if( blen < *olen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* + * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve + */ + *buf++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( curve_info->tls_id, buf, 0 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Wrapper around fast quasi-modp functions, with fall-back to mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi. + * See the documentation of struct mbedtls_ecp_group. + * + * This function is in the critial loop for mbedtls_ecp_mul, so pay attention to perf. + */ +static int ecp_modp( mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( grp->modp == NULL ) + return( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( N, N, &grp->P ) ); + + /* N->s < 0 is a much faster test, which fails only if N is 0 */ + if( ( N->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) != 0 ) || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N ) > 2 * grp->pbits ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( grp->modp( N ) ); + + /* N->s < 0 is a much faster test, which fails only if N is 0 */ + while( N->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &grp->P ) ); + + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( N, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) + /* we known P, N and the result are positive */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( N, N, &grp->P ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Fast mod-p functions expect their argument to be in the 0..p^2 range. + * + * In order to guarantee that, we need to ensure that operands of + * mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi are in the 0..p range. So, after each operation we will + * bring the result back to this range. + * + * The following macros are shortcuts for doing that. + */ + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, general case, to use after mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#define INC_MUL_COUNT mul_count++; +#else +#define INC_MUL_COUNT +#endif + +#define MOD_MUL( N ) \ + do \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_modp( &(N), grp ) ); \ + INC_MUL_COUNT \ + } while( 0 ) + +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_MUL( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi + * N->s < 0 is a very fast test, which fails only if N is 0 + */ +#define MOD_SUB( N ) \ + while( (N).s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &(N), 0 ) != 0 ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &(N), &(N), &grp->P ) ) + +#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) ) ) || \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) ) ) +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_SUB( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int. + * We known P, N and the result are positive, so sub_abs is correct, and + * a bit faster. + */ +#define MOD_ADD( N ) \ + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &(N), &grp->P ) >= 0 ) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs( &(N), &(N), &grp->P ) ) + +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( X, A, B ) ); + MOD_ADD( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) ) +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + size_t count ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( X, count ) ); + MOD_ADD( *X ); +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in + * Jacobian coordinates. + * + * For multiplication, we'll use a comb method with countermeasures against + * SPA, hence timing attacks. + */ + +/* + * Normalize jacobian coordinates so that Z == 0 || Z == 1 (GECC 3.2.1) + * Cost: 1N := 1I + 3M + 1S + */ +static int ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac( grp, pt ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi Zi, ZZi; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ZZi ); + + /* + * X = X / Z^2 mod p + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &Zi, &pt->Z, &grp->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->X, &pt->X, &ZZi ) ); + + /* + * Y = Y / Z^3 mod p + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ZZi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &Zi ) ); + + /* + * Z = 1 + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ZZi ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Normalize jacobian coordinates of an array of (pointers to) points, + * using Montgomery's trick to perform only one inversion mod P. + * (See for example Cohen's "A Course in Computational Algebraic Number + * Theory", Algorithm 10.3.4.) + * + * Warning: fails (returning an error) if one of the points is zero! + * This should never happen, see choice of w in ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * Cost: 1N(t) := 1I + (6t - 3)M + 1S + */ +static int ecp_normalize_jac_many( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t T_size ) +{ + if( T_size < 2 ) + return( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, *T ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, T, T_size ) ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi *c, u, Zi, ZZi; + + if( ( c = mbedtls_calloc( T_size, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi ) ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_mpi_init( &c[i] ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &u ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ZZi ); + + /* + * c[i] = Z_0 * ... * Z_i + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &c[0], &T[0]->Z ) ); + for( i = 1; i < T_size; i++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &c[i], &c[i-1], &T[i]->Z ) ); + } + + /* + * u = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_n) mod P + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &u, &c[T_size-1], &grp->P ) ); + + for( i = T_size - 1; ; i-- ) + { + /* + * Zi = 1 / Z_i mod p + * u = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_i) mod P + */ + if( i == 0 ) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &Zi, &u ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &Zi, &u, &c[i-1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &u, &u, &T[i]->Z ) ); + } + + /* + * proceed as in normalize() + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T[i]->X, &T[i]->X, &ZZi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &ZZi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &Zi ) ); + + /* + * Post-precessing: reclaim some memory by shrinking coordinates + * - not storing Z (always 1) + * - shrinking other coordinates, but still keeping the same number of + * limbs as P, as otherwise it will too likely be regrown too fast. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shrink( &T[i]->X, grp->P.n ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shrink( &T[i]->Y, grp->P.n ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T[i]->Z ); + + if( i == 0 ) + break; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &u ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ZZi ); + for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &c[i] ); + mbedtls_free( c ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Conditional point inversion: Q -> -Q = (Q.X, -Q.Y, Q.Z) without leak. + * "inv" must be 0 (don't invert) or 1 (invert) or the result will be invalid + */ +static int ecp_safe_invert_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + unsigned char inv ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char nonzero; + mbedtls_mpi mQY; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &mQY ); + + /* Use the fact that -Q.Y mod P = P - Q.Y unless Q.Y == 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &mQY, &grp->P, &Q->Y ) ); + nonzero = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Q->Y, 0 ) != 0; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &Q->Y, &mQY, inv & nonzero ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &mQY ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Point doubling R = 2 P, Jacobian coordinates + * + * Based on http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian.html#doubling-dbl-1998-cmo-2 . + * + * We follow the variable naming fairly closely. The formula variations that trade a MUL for a SQR + * (plus a few ADDs) aren't useful as our bignum implementation doesn't distinguish squaring. + * + * Standard optimizations are applied when curve parameter A is one of { 0, -3 }. + * + * Cost: 1D := 3M + 4S (A == 0) + * 4M + 4S (A == -3) + * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise + */ +static int ecp_double_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + dbl_count++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac( grp, R, P ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi M, S, T, U; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U ); + + /* Special case for A = -3 */ + if( grp->A.p == NULL ) + { + /* M = 3(X + Z^2)(X - Z^2) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &T, &P->X, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &U, &P->X, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &T, &U ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &S, 3 ) ); MOD_ADD( M ); + } + else + { + /* M = 3.X^2 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->X, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &S, 3 ) ); MOD_ADD( M ); + + /* Optimize away for "koblitz" curves with A = 0 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &grp->A, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + /* M += A.Z^4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T, &S, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &T, &grp->A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &M, &M, &S ) ); + } + } + + /* S = 4.X.Y^2 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T, &P->Y, &P->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &T, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &P->X, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &S, 1 ) ); + + /* U = 8.Y^4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &U, &T, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &U, 1 ) ); + + /* T = M^2 - 2.S */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T, &M, &M ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T, &T, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T, &T, &S ) ); + + /* S = M(S - T) - U */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &S, &S, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S, &S, &M ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &S, &S, &U ) ); + + /* U = 2.Y.Z */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &U, &P->Y, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &U, 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->X, &T ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Y, &S ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Z, &U ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &M ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &S ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Addition: R = P + Q, mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates (GECC 3.22) + * + * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine), + * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized. + * + * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, (3) P == Q. + * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in ecp_mul_comb(): + * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base point, the factor + * being less than its order, so none of them is zero; + * - Q is an odd multiple of the base point, P an even multiple, + * due to the choice of precomputed points in the modified comb method. + * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information. + * + * We accept Q->Z being unset (saving memory in tables) as meaning 1. + * + * Cost: 1A := 8M + 3S + */ +static int ecp_add_mixed( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + add_count++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, P, Q ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi T1, T2, T3, T4, X, Y, Z; + + /* + * Trivial cases: P == 0 or Q == 0 (case 1) + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, Q ) ); + + if( Q->Z.p != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Q->Z, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); + + /* + * Make sure Q coordinates are normalized + */ + if( Q->Z.p != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &Q->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T2 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T3 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T4 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Z ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T1, &P->Z, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T2, &T1, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T1, &T1, &Q->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T2, &T2, &Q->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T1, &T1, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T2, &T2, &P->Y ) ); + + /* Special cases (2) and (3) */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &T1, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &T2, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = ecp_double_jac( grp, R, P ); + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( R ); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &Z, &P->Z, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T3, &T1, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T4, &T3, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T3, &T3, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &T1, &T3 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod( grp, &T1, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &X, &T2, &T2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &X, &X, &T1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &X, &X, &T4 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &T3, &T3, &X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T3, &T3, &T2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &T4, &T4, &P->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &Y, &T3, &T4 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->X, &X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Y, &Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &R->Z, &Z ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T2 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T3 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T4 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &X ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Y ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Z ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Randomize jacobian coordinates: + * (X, Y, Z) -> (l^2 X, l^3 Y, l Z) for random l + * This is sort of the reverse operation of ecp_normalize_jac(). + * + * This countermeasure was first suggested in [2]. + */ +static int ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac( grp, pt, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi l, ll; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ll ); + + /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( &l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* Z = l * Z */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Z, &pt->Z, &l ) ); + + /* X = l^2 * X */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ll, &l, &l ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->X, &pt->X, &ll ) ); + + /* Y = l^3 * Y */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &ll, &ll, &l ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ll ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ll ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Check and define parameters used by the comb method (see below for details) + */ +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 2 || MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE > 7 +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE out of bounds" +#endif + +/* d = ceil( n / w ) */ +#define COMB_MAX_D ( MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 1 ) / 2 + +/* number of precomputed points */ +#define COMB_MAX_PRE ( 1 << ( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1 ) ) + +/* + * Compute the representation of m that will be used with our comb method. + * + * The basic comb method is described in GECC 3.44 for example. We use a + * modified version that provides resistance to SPA by avoiding zero + * digits in the representation as in [3]. We modify the method further by + * requiring that all K_i be odd, which has the small cost that our + * representation uses one more K_i, due to carries, but saves on the size of + * the precomputed table. + * + * Summary of the comb method and its modifications: + * + * - The goal is to compute m*P for some w*d-bit integer m. + * + * - The basic comb method splits m into the w-bit integers + * x[0] .. x[d-1] where x[i] consists of the bits in m whose + * index has residue i modulo d, and computes m * P as + * S[x[0]] + 2 * S[x[1]] + .. + 2^(d-1) S[x[d-1]], where + * S[i_{w-1} .. i_0] := i_{w-1} 2^{(w-1)d} P + ... + i_1 2^d P + i_0 P. + * + * - If it happens that, say, x[i+1]=0 (=> S[x[i+1]]=0), one can replace the sum by + * .. + 2^{i-1} S[x[i-1]] - 2^i S[x[i]] + 2^{i+1} S[x[i]] + 2^{i+2} S[x[i+2]] .., + * thereby successively converting it into a form where all summands + * are nonzero, at the cost of negative summands. This is the basic idea of [3]. + * + * - More generally, even if x[i+1] != 0, we can first transform the sum as + * .. - 2^i S[x[i]] + 2^{i+1} ( S[x[i]] + S[x[i+1]] ) + 2^{i+2} S[x[i+2]] .., + * and then replace S[x[i]] + S[x[i+1]] = S[x[i] ^ x[i+1]] + 2 S[x[i] & x[i+1]]. + * Performing and iterating this procedure for those x[i] that are even + * (keeping track of carry), we can transform the original sum into one of the form + * S[x'[0]] +- 2 S[x'[1]] +- .. +- 2^{d-1} S[x'[d-1]] + 2^d S[x'[d]] + * with all x'[i] odd. It is therefore only necessary to know S at odd indices, + * which is why we are only computing half of it in the first place in + * ecp_precompute_comb and accessing it with index abs(i) / 2 in ecp_select_comb. + * + * - For the sake of compactness, only the seven low-order bits of x[i] + * are used to represent its absolute value (K_i in the paper), and the msb + * of x[i] encodes the sign (s_i in the paper): it is set if and only if + * if s_i == -1; + * + * Calling conventions: + * - x is an array of size d + 1 + * - w is the size, ie number of teeth, of the comb, and must be between + * 2 and 7 (in practice, between 2 and MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) + * - m is the MPI, expected to be odd and such that bitlength(m) <= w * d + * (the result will be incorrect if these assumptions are not satisfied) + */ +static void ecp_comb_recode_core( unsigned char x[], size_t d, + unsigned char w, const mbedtls_mpi *m ) +{ + size_t i, j; + unsigned char c, cc, adjust; + + memset( x, 0, d+1 ); + + /* First get the classical comb values (except for x_d = 0) */ + for( i = 0; i < d; i++ ) + for( j = 0; j < w; j++ ) + x[i] |= mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, i + d * j ) << j; + + /* Now make sure x_1 .. x_d are odd */ + c = 0; + for( i = 1; i <= d; i++ ) + { + /* Add carry and update it */ + cc = x[i] & c; + x[i] = x[i] ^ c; + c = cc; + + /* Adjust if needed, avoiding branches */ + adjust = 1 - ( x[i] & 0x01 ); + c |= x[i] & ( x[i-1] * adjust ); + x[i] = x[i] ^ ( x[i-1] * adjust ); + x[i-1] |= adjust << 7; + } +} + +/* + * Precompute points for the adapted comb method + * + * Assumption: T must be able to hold 2^{w - 1} elements. + * + * Operation: If i = i_{w-1} ... i_1 is the binary representation of i, + * sets T[i] = i_{w-1} 2^{(w-1)d} P + ... + i_1 2^d P + P. + * + * Cost: d(w-1) D + (2^{w-1} - 1) A + 1 N(w-1) + 1 N(2^{w-1} - 1) + * + * Note: Even comb values (those where P would be omitted from the + * sum defining T[i] above) are not needed in our adaption + * the comb method. See ecp_comb_recode_core(). + * + * This function currently works in four steps: + * (1) [dbl] Computation of intermediate T[i] for 2-power values of i + * (2) [norm_dbl] Normalization of coordinates of these T[i] + * (3) [add] Computation of all T[i] + * (4) [norm_add] Normalization of all T[i] + * + * Step 1 can be interrupted but not the others; together with the final + * coordinate normalization they are the largest steps done at once, depending + * on the window size. Here are operation counts for P-256: + * + * step (2) (3) (4) + * w = 5 142 165 208 + * w = 4 136 77 160 + * w = 3 130 33 136 + * w = 2 124 11 124 + * + * So if ECC operations are blocking for too long even with a low max_ops + * value, it's useful to set MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE to a lower value in order + * to minimize maximum blocking time. + */ +static int ecp_precompute_comb( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point T[], const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + unsigned char w, size_t d, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + size_t j = 0; + const unsigned char T_size = 1U << ( w - 1 ); + mbedtls_ecp_point *cur, *TT[COMB_MAX_PRE - 1]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + { + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_dbl ) + goto dbl; + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl ) + goto norm_dbl; + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_add ) + goto add; + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add ) + goto norm_add; + } +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + { + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_dbl; + + /* initial state for the loop */ + rs_ctx->rsm->i = 0; + } + +dbl: +#endif + /* + * Set T[0] = P and + * T[2^{l-1}] = 2^{dl} P for l = 1 .. w-1 (this is not the final value) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &T[0], P ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->i != 0 ) + j = rs_ctx->rsm->i; + else +#endif + j = 0; + + for( ; j < d * ( w - 1 ); j++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL ); + + i = 1U << ( j / d ); + cur = T + i; + + if( j % d == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( cur, T + ( i >> 1 ) ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_double_jac( grp, cur, cur ) ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl; + +norm_dbl: +#endif + /* + * Normalize current elements in T. As T has holes, + * use an auxiliary array of pointers to elements in T. + */ + j = 0; + for( i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1 ) + TT[j++] = T + i; + + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 6 * j - 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, TT, j ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_add; + +add: +#endif + /* + * Compute the remaining ones using the minimal number of additions + * Be careful to update T[2^l] only after using it! + */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ( T_size - 1 ) * MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD ); + + for( i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1 ) + { + j = i; + while( j-- ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, &T[i + j], &T[j], &T[i] ) ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add; + +norm_add: +#endif + /* + * Normalize final elements in T. Even though there are no holes now, we + * still need the auxiliary array for homogeneity with the previous + * call. Also, skip T[0] which is already normalised, being a copy of P. + */ + for( j = 0; j + 1 < T_size; j++ ) + TT[j] = T + j + 1; + + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 6 * j - 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac_many( grp, TT, j ) ); + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_dbl ) + rs_ctx->rsm->i = j; + } +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Select precomputed point: R = sign(i) * T[ abs(i) / 2 ] + * + * See ecp_comb_recode_core() for background + */ +static int ecp_select_comb( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char T_size, + unsigned char i ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char ii, j; + + /* Ignore the "sign" bit and scale down */ + ii = ( i & 0x7Fu ) >> 1; + + /* Read the whole table to thwart cache-based timing attacks */ + for( j = 0; j < T_size; j++ ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &R->X, &T[j].X, j == ii ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &R->Y, &T[j].Y, j == ii ) ); + } + + /* Safely invert result if i is "negative" */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_safe_invert_jac( grp, R, i >> 7 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Core multiplication algorithm for the (modified) comb method. + * This part is actually common with the basic comb method (GECC 3.44) + * + * Cost: d A + d D + 1 R + */ +static int ecp_mul_comb_core( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char T_size, + const unsigned char x[], size_t d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point Txi; + size_t i; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Txi ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && + rs_ctx->rsm->state != ecp_rsm_comb_core ) + { + rs_ctx->rsm->i = 0; + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_comb_core; + } + + /* new 'if' instead of nested for the sake of the 'else' branch */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->i != 0 ) + { + /* restore current index (R already pointing to rs_ctx->rsm->R) */ + i = rs_ctx->rsm->i; + } + else +#endif + { + /* Start with a non-zero point and randomize its coordinates */ + i = d; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, R, T, T_size, x[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 1 ) ); + + int have_rng = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng == NULL ) + have_rng = 0; +#endif + if( have_rng ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + } + + while( i != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD ); + --i; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_double_jac( grp, R, R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, &Txi, T, T_size, x[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, R, &Txi ) ); + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Txi ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + rs_ctx->rsm->i = i; + /* no need to save R, already pointing to rs_ctx->rsm->R */ + } +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Recode the scalar to get constant-time comb multiplication + * + * As the actual scalar recoding needs an odd scalar as a starting point, + * this wrapper ensures that by replacing m by N - m if necessary, and + * informs the caller that the result of multiplication will be negated. + * + * This works because we only support large prime order for Short Weierstrass + * curves, so N is always odd hence either m or N - m is. + * + * See ecp_comb_recode_core() for background. + */ +static int ecp_comb_recode_scalar( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1], + size_t d, + unsigned char w, + unsigned char *parity_trick ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi M, mm; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &M ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &mm ); + + /* N is always odd (see above), just make extra sure */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &grp->N, 0 ) != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* do we need the parity trick? */ + *parity_trick = ( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, 0 ) == 0 ); + + /* execute parity fix in constant time */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &M, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &mm, &grp->N, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign( &M, &mm, *parity_trick ) ); + + /* actual scalar recoding */ + ecp_comb_recode_core( k, d, w, &M ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &mm ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &M ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Perform comb multiplication (for short Weierstrass curves) + * once the auxiliary table has been pre-computed. + * + * Scalar recoding may use a parity trick that makes us compute -m * P, + * if that is the case we'll need to recover m * P at the end. + */ +static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *T, + unsigned char T_size, + unsigned char w, + size_t d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char parity_trick; + unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1]; + mbedtls_ecp_point *RR = R; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + { + RR = &rs_ctx->rsm->R; + + if( rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_final_norm ) + goto final_norm; + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_comb_recode_scalar( grp, m, k, d, w, + &parity_trick ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_comb_core( grp, RR, T, T_size, k, d, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_safe_invert_jac( grp, RR, parity_trick ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_final_norm; + +final_norm: + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV ); +#endif + /* + * Knowledge of the jacobian coordinates may leak the last few bits of the + * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow, + * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value + * of its input via side-channels [2]. + * + * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191 + * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 + * + * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. + */ + int have_rng = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng == NULL ) + have_rng = 0; +#endif + if( have_rng ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, RR, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, RR ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, RR ) ); +#endif + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Pick window size based on curve size and whether we optimize for base point + */ +static unsigned char ecp_pick_window_size( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + unsigned char p_eq_g ) +{ + unsigned char w; + + /* + * Minimize the number of multiplications, that is minimize + * 10 * d * w + 18 * 2^(w-1) + 11 * d + 7 * w, with d = ceil( nbits / w ) + * (see costs of the various parts, with 1S = 1M) + */ + w = grp->nbits >= 384 ? 5 : 4; + + /* + * If P == G, pre-compute a bit more, since this may be re-used later. + * Just adding one avoids upping the cost of the first mul too much, + * and the memory cost too. + */ + if( p_eq_g ) + w++; + + /* + * Make sure w is within bounds. + * (The last test is useful only for very small curves in the test suite.) + */ +#if( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 6 ) + if( w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE ) + w = MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE; +#endif + if( w >= grp->nbits ) + w = 2; + + return( w ); +} + +/* + * Multiplication using the comb method - for curves in short Weierstrass form + * + * This function is mainly responsible for administrative work: + * - managing the restart context if enabled + * - managing the table of precomputed points (passed between the below two + * functions): allocation, computation, ownership transfer, freeing. + * + * It delegates the actual arithmetic work to: + * ecp_precompute_comb() and ecp_mul_comb_with_precomp() + * + * See comments on ecp_comb_recode_core() regarding the computation strategy. + */ +static int ecp_mul_comb( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char w, p_eq_g, i; + size_t d; + unsigned char T_size = 0, T_ok = 0; + mbedtls_ecp_point *T = NULL; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; + + ecp_drbg_init( &drbg_ctx ); +#endif + + ECP_RS_ENTER( rsm ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng == NULL ) + { + /* Adjust pointers */ + f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + p_rng = &rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_ctx; + else +#endif + p_rng = &drbg_ctx; + + /* Initialize internal DRBG if necessary */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx == NULL || rs_ctx->rsm == NULL || + rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_seeded == 0 ) +#endif + { + const size_t m_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( p_rng, m, m_len ) ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ) + rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_seeded = 1; +#endif + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + + /* Is P the base point ? */ +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 + p_eq_g = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->Y, &grp->G.Y ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &P->X, &grp->G.X ) == 0 ); +#else + p_eq_g = 0; +#endif + + /* Pick window size and deduce related sizes */ + w = ecp_pick_window_size( grp, p_eq_g ); + T_size = 1U << ( w - 1 ); + d = ( grp->nbits + w - 1 ) / w; + + /* Pre-computed table: do we have it already for the base point? */ + if( p_eq_g && grp->T != NULL ) + { + /* second pointer to the same table, will be deleted on exit */ + T = grp->T; + T_ok = 1; + } + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* Pre-computed table: do we have one in progress? complete? */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->T != NULL ) + { + /* transfer ownership of T from rsm to local function */ + T = rs_ctx->rsm->T; + rs_ctx->rsm->T = NULL; + rs_ctx->rsm->T_size = 0; + + /* This effectively jumps to the call to mul_comb_after_precomp() */ + T_ok = rs_ctx->rsm->state >= ecp_rsm_comb_core; + } + else +#endif + /* Allocate table if we didn't have any */ + { + T = mbedtls_calloc( T_size, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_point ) ); + if( T == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &T[i] ); + + T_ok = 0; + } + + /* Compute table (or finish computing it) if not done already */ + if( !T_ok ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_precompute_comb( grp, T, P, w, d, rs_ctx ) ); + + if( p_eq_g ) + { + /* almost transfer ownership of T to the group, but keep a copy of + * the pointer to use for calling the next function more easily */ + grp->T = T; + grp->T_size = T_size; + } + } + + /* Actual comb multiplication using precomputed points */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp( grp, R, m, + T, T_size, w, d, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); + +cleanup: + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_free( &drbg_ctx ); +#endif + + /* does T belong to the group? */ + if( T == grp->T ) + T = NULL; + + /* does T belong to the restart context? */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && T != NULL ) + { + /* transfer ownership of T from local function to rsm */ + rs_ctx->rsm->T_size = T_size; + rs_ctx->rsm->T = T; + T = NULL; + } +#endif + + /* did T belong to us? then let's destroy it! */ + if( T != NULL ) + { + for( i = 0; i < T_size; i++ ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &T[i] ); + mbedtls_free( T ); + } + + /* prevent caller from using invalid value */ + int should_free_R = ( ret != 0 ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* don't free R while in progress in case R == P */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + should_free_R = 0; +#endif + if( should_free_R ) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( R ); + + ECP_RS_LEAVE( rsm ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +/* + * For Montgomery curves, we do all the internal arithmetic in projective + * coordinates. Import/export of points uses only the x coordinates, which is + * internally represented as X / Z. + * + * For scalar multiplication, we'll use a Montgomery ladder. + */ + +/* + * Normalize Montgomery x/z coordinates: X = X/Z, Z = 1 + * Cost: 1M + 1I + */ +static int ecp_normalize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, P ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &P->Z, &P->Z, &grp->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->X, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &P->Z, 1 ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Randomize projective x/z coordinates: + * (X, Z) -> (l X, l Z) for random l + * This is sort of the reverse operation of ecp_normalize_mxz(). + * + * This countermeasure was first suggested in [2]. + * Cost: 2M + */ +static int ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi l; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); + + /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( &l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->X, &P->X, &l ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->Z, &P->Z, &l ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &l ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Double-and-add: R = 2P, S = P + Q, with d = X(P - Q), + * for Montgomery curves in x/z coordinates. + * + * http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/montgom/xz/ladder/mladd-1987-m.op3 + * with + * d = X1 + * P = (X2, Z2) + * Q = (X3, Z3) + * R = (X4, Z4) + * S = (X5, Z5) + * and eliminating temporary variables tO, ..., t4. + * + * Cost: 5M + 4S + */ +static int ecp_double_add_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *d ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + return( mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz( grp, R, S, P, Q, d ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi A, AA, B, BB, E, C, D, DA, CB; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &B ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &BB ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &C ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &CB ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &A, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &AA, &A, &A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &B, &P->X, &P->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &BB, &B, &B ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &E, &AA, &BB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &C, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &D, &Q->X, &Q->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &DA, &D, &A ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &CB, &C, &B ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &S->X, &DA, &CB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S->X, &S->X, &S->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod( grp, &S->Z, &DA, &CB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S->Z, &S->Z, &S->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &S->Z, d, &S->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &R->X, &AA, &BB ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &R->Z, &grp->A, &E ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &R->Z, &BB, &R->Z ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &R->Z, &E, &R->Z ) ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &A ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &AA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &B ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &BB ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &C ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &DA ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &CB ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Multiplication with Montgomery ladder in x/z coordinates, + * for curves in Montgomery form + */ +static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + unsigned char b; + mbedtls_ecp_point RP; + mbedtls_mpi PX; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; + + ecp_drbg_init( &drbg_ctx ); +#endif + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &RP ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &PX ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng == NULL ) + { + const size_t m_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &drbg_ctx, m, m_len ) ); + f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random; + p_rng = &drbg_ctx; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ + + /* Save PX and read from P before writing to R, in case P == R */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &PX, &P->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( &RP, P ) ); + + /* Set R to zero in modified x/z coordinates */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->X, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 0 ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R->Y ); + + /* RP.X might be slightly larger than P, so reduce it */ + MOD_ADD( RP.X ); + + /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */ + int have_rng = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng == NULL ) + have_rng = 0; +#endif + if( have_rng ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */ + i = grp->nbits + 1; /* one past the (zero-based) required msb for private keys */ + while( i-- > 0 ) + { + b = mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, i ); + /* + * if (b) R = 2R + P else R = 2R, + * which is: + * if (b) double_add( RP, R, RP, R ) + * else double_add( R, RP, R, RP ) + * but using safe conditional swaps to avoid leaks + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->X, &RP.X, b ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->Z, &RP.Z, b ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_double_add_mxz( grp, R, &RP, R, &RP, &PX ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->X, &RP.X, b ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->Z, &RP.Z, b ) ); + } + + /* + * Knowledge of the projective coordinates may leak the last few bits of the + * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow, + * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value + * of its input via side-channels [2]. + * + * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191 + * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 + * + * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. + */ + have_rng = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + if( f_rng == NULL ) + have_rng = 0; +#endif + if( have_rng ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, R ) ); + +cleanup: +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + ecp_drbg_free( &drbg_ctx ); +#endif + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &RP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &PX ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Restartable multiplication R = m * P + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + char is_grp_capable = 0; +#endif + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0 ) + rs_ctx->ops_done = 0; +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + + int restarting = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restarting = ( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL ); +#endif + /* skip argument check when restarting */ + if( !restarting ) + { + /* check_privkey is free */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK ); + + /* Common sanity checks */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, P ) ); + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_mxz( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_mul_comb( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ); +#endif + +cleanup: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( is_grp_capable ) + mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL ) + rs_ctx->depth--; +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Multiplication R = m * P + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * Check that an affine point is valid as a public key, + * short weierstrass curves (SEC1 3.2.3.1) + */ +static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi YY, RHS; + + /* pt coordinates must be normalized for our checks */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->X, 0 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Y, 0 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->X, &grp->P ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->Y, &grp->P ) >= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &RHS ); + + /* + * YY = Y^2 + * RHS = X (X^2 + A) + B = X^3 + A X + B + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &YY, &pt->Y, &pt->Y ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &RHS, &pt->X, &pt->X ) ); + + /* Special case for A = -3 */ + if( grp->A.p == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &RHS, &RHS, 3 ) ); MOD_SUB( RHS ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->A ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &pt->X ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mod( grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->B ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &YY, &RHS ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &RHS ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * R = m * P with shortcuts for m == 0, m == 1 and m == -1 + * NOT constant-time - ONLY for short Weierstrass! + */ +static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_set_zero( R ) ); + } + else if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, 1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); + } + else if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( m, -1 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, P ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &R->Y, 0 ) != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &R->Y, &grp->P, &R->Y ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, R, m, P, + NULL, NULL, rs_ctx ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Restartable linear combination + * NOT constant-time + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point mP; + mbedtls_ecp_point *pmP = &mP; + mbedtls_ecp_point *pR = R; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + char is_grp_capable = 0; +#endif + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) != MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &mP ); + + ECP_RS_ENTER( ma ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + { + /* redirect intermediate results to restart context */ + pmP = &rs_ctx->ma->mP; + pR = &rs_ctx->ma->R; + + /* jump to next operation */ + if( rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_mul2 ) + goto mul2; + if( rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_add ) + goto add; + if( rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_norm ) + goto norm; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, pmP, m, P, rs_ctx ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_mul2; + +mul2: +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, pR, n, Q, rs_ctx ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_add; + +add: +#endif + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, pR, pmP, pR ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_norm; + +norm: +#endif + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, pR ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_copy( R, pR ) ); +#endif + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if( is_grp_capable ) + mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &mP ); + + ECP_RS_LEAVE( ma ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Linear combination + * NOT constant-time + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( R != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( m != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( P != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + return( mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( grp, R, m, P, n, Q, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) {s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)(p)} +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x) +/* + * Constants for the two points other than 0, 1, -1 (mod p) in + * https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate + * See ecp_check_pubkey_x25519(). + */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint x25519_bad_point_1[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xe0, 0xeb, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x41, 0xb8, 0xae ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x56, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x6a ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xda, 0x09, 0x8d, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x32, 0xb1, 0xfd ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x86, 0x62, 0x05, 0x16, 0x5f, 0x49, 0xb8, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint x25519_bad_point_2[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5f, 0x9c, 0x95, 0xbc, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x8c, 0x24 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xb1, 0xd0, 0xb1, 0x55, 0x9c, 0x83, 0xef, 0x5b ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0x44, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0x58, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0x86 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xd8, 0x22, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0x9f, 0x11, 0x57 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi ecp_x25519_bad_point_1 = ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY( + x25519_bad_point_1 ); +static const mbedtls_mpi ecp_x25519_bad_point_2 = ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY( + x25519_bad_point_2 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that the input point is not one of the low-order points. + * This is recommended by the "May the Fourth" paper: + * https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/806.pdf + * Those points are never sent by an honest peer. + */ +static int ecp_check_bad_points_mx( const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_mpi XmP; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &XmP ); + + /* Reduce X mod P so that we only need to check values less than P. + * We know X < 2^256 so we can proceed by subtraction. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &XmP, X ) ); + while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, P ) >= 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &XmP, &XmP, P ) ); + + /* Check against the known bad values that are less than P. For Curve448 + * these are 0, 1 and -1. For Curve25519 we check the values less than P + * from the following list: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &XmP, 1 ) <= 0 ) /* takes care of 0 and 1 */ + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, &ecp_x25519_bad_point_1 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, &ecp_x25519_bad_point_2 ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + } +#else + (void) grp_id; +#endif + + /* Final check: check if XmP + 1 is P (final because it changes XmP!) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &XmP, &XmP, 1 ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &XmP, P ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &XmP ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check validity of a public key for Montgomery curves with x-only schemes + */ +static int ecp_check_pubkey_mx( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + /* [Curve25519 p. 5] Just check X is the correct number of bytes */ + /* Allow any public value, if it's too big then we'll just reduce it mod p + * (RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 3). */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_size( &pt->X ) > ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + /* Implicit in all standards (as they don't consider negative numbers): + * X must be non-negative. This is normally ensured by the way it's + * encoded for transmission, but let's be extra sure. */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->X, 0 ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + return( ecp_check_bad_points_mx( &pt->X, &grp->P, grp->id ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that a point is valid as a public key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pt != NULL ); + + /* Must use affine coordinates */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 1 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return( ecp_check_pubkey_mx( grp, pt ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( ecp_check_pubkey_sw( grp, pt ) ); +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +/* + * Check that an mbedtls_mpi is valid as a private key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *d ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 0 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 1 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) - 1 != grp->nbits ) /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based! */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + /* see [Curve25519] page 5 */ + if( grp->nbits == 254 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( d, 2 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + /* see SEC1 3.2 */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); + else + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( size_t high_bit, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + size_t n_random_bytes = high_bit / 8 + 1; + + /* [Curve25519] page 5 */ + /* Generate a (high_bit+1)-bit random number by generating just enough + * random bytes, then shifting out extra bits from the top (necessary + * when (high_bit+1) is not a multiple of 8). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_random_bytes, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_random_bytes - high_bit - 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, high_bit, 1 ) ); + + /* Make sure the last two bits are unset for Curve448, three bits for + Curve25519 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 0, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) ); + if( high_bit == 254 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) ); + } + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +static int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw( + const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_mpi_random( d, 1, N, f_rng, p_rng ); + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + default: + return( ret ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Generate a private key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( grp->nbits, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw( &grp->N, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} + +/* + * Generate a keypair with configurable base point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( G != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, d, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Generate key pair, wrapper for conventional base point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( Q != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( grp, &grp->G, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Generate a keypair, prettier wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &key->grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &key->grp, &key->d, &key->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +#define ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE 32 +/* + * Read a private key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_read_key( mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &key->grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* + * If it is Curve25519 curve then mask the key as mandated by RFC7748 + */ + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( buflen != ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + + /* Set the three least significant bits to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 0, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 1, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, 2, 0 ) ); + + /* Set the most significant bit to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, + ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 1, 0 ) + ); + + /* Set the second most significant bit to 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &key->d, + ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 2, 1 ) + ); + } + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &key->grp, &key->d ) ); + } + +#endif +cleanup: + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &key->d ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Write a private key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY ) + { + if( key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) + { + if( buflen < ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + } + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( &key->grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &key->d, buf, buflen ) ); + } + +#endif +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + + +/* + * Check a public-private key pair + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL ); + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL ); + + if( pub->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || + pub->grp.id != prv->grp.id || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.X, &prv->Q.X ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + + /* mbedtls_ecp_mul() needs a non-const group... */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_copy( &grp, &prv->grp ); + + /* Also checks d is valid */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.X, &prv->Q.X ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y ) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &Q ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* Adjust the exponent to be a valid private point for the specified curve. + * This is sometimes necessary because we use a single set of exponents + * for all curves but the validity of values depends on the curve. */ +static int self_test_adjust_exponent( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *m ) +{ + int ret = 0; + switch( grp->id ) + { + /* If Curve25519 is available, then that's what we use for the + * Montgomery test, so we don't need the adjustment code. */ +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + /* Move highest bit from 254 to N-1. Setting bit N-1 is + * necessary to enforce the highest-bit-set constraint. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, 254, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, grp->nbits, 1 ) ); + /* Copy second-highest bit from 253 to N-2. This is not + * necessary but improves the test variety a bit. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( m, grp->nbits - 1, + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( m, 253 ) ) ); + break; +#endif +#endif /* ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) */ + default: + /* Non-Montgomery curves and Curve25519 need no adjustment. */ + (void) grp; + (void) m; + goto cleanup; + } +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +/* Calculate R = m.P for each m in exponents. Check that the number of + * basic operations doesn't depend on the value of m. */ +static int self_test_point( int verbose, + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const char *const *exponents, + size_t n_exponents ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i = 0; + unsigned long add_c_prev, dbl_c_prev, mul_c_prev; + add_count = 0; + dbl_count = 0; + mul_count = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[0] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) ); + + for( i = 1; i < n_exponents; i++ ) + { + add_c_prev = add_count; + dbl_c_prev = dbl_count; + mul_c_prev = mul_count; + add_count = 0; + dbl_count = 0; + mul_count = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( m, 16, exponents[i] ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( self_test_adjust_exponent( grp, m ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL ) ); + + if( add_count != add_c_prev || + dbl_count != dbl_c_prev || + mul_count != mul_c_prev ) + { + ret = 1; + break; + } + } + +cleanup: + if( verbose != 0 ) + { + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i ); + else + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point R, P; + mbedtls_mpi m; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + /* Exponents especially adapted for secp192k1, which has the lowest + * order n of all supported curves (secp192r1 is in a slightly larger + * field but the order of its base point is slightly smaller). */ + const char *sw_exponents[] = + { + "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", /* one */ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE26F2FC170F69466A74DEFD8C", /* n - 1 */ + "5EA6F389A38B8BC81E767753B15AA5569E1782E30ABE7D25", /* random */ + "400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", /* one and zeros */ + "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", /* all ones */ + "555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555", /* 101010... */ + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + const char *m_exponents[] = + { + /* Valid private values for Curve25519. In a build with Curve448 + * but not Curve25519, they will be adjusted in + * self_test_adjust_exponent(). */ + "4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", + "5C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C30", + "5715ECCE24583F7A7023C24164390586842E816D7280A49EF6DF4EAE6B280BF8", + "41A2B017516F6D254E1F002BCCBADD54BE30F8CEC737A0E912B4963B6BA74460", + "5555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555550", + "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8", + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &m ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + /* Use secp192r1 if available, or any available curve */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 ) ); +#else + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id ) ); +#endif + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): " ); + /* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &m, 2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL ) ); + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, + sw_exponents, + sizeof( sw_exponents ) / sizeof( sw_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP SW test #2 (constant op_count, other point): " ); + /* We computed P = 2G last time, use it */ + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &P, + sw_exponents, + sizeof( sw_exponents ) / sizeof( sw_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ECP Montgomery test (constant op_count): " ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 ) ); +#else +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED is defined, but no curve is supported for self-test" +#endif + ret = self_test_point( verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, + m_exponents, + sizeof( m_exponents ) / sizeof( m_exponents[0] )); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +cleanup: + + if( ret < 0 && verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R ); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &m ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecp_curves.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecp_curves.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..47761eef --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecp_curves.c @@ -0,0 +1,1475 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" + +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define ECP_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) {s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)(p)} + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x) + +/* + * Note: the constants are in little-endian order + * to be directly usable in MPIs + */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp192r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB1, 0xB9, 0x46, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0xB8, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x49, 0x30, 0x24, 0x72, 0xAB, 0xE9, 0xA7, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xE5, 0x19, 0x05, 0x21, 0x64 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x31, 0x28, 0xD2, 0xB4, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x6B, 0x14 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp224r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x23, 0x43, 0x39, 0x0B, 0x27 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0xD8, 0xBF, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0xB0, 0x44, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x56, 0x32, 0x41, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0xB3, 0x04, 0x0C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x85, 0x0A, 0x05, 0xB4 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3D, 0x2A, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x45, 0x29, 0xDD, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3E, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0xA2, 0x16, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp256r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4B, 0x60, 0xD2, 0x27, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF6, 0xB0, 0x53, 0xCC, 0xB0, 0x06, 0x1D, 0x65 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x86, 0x98, 0x76, 0x55, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xB3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0x93, 0x3A, 0xAA, 0xD8, 0x35, 0xC6, 0x5A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x51, 0x25, 0x63, 0xFC, 0xC2, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x9E, 0x17, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xBC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp384r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEF, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0xD3, 0xED, 0xC8, 0x85, 0x2A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x8A, 0x8D, 0x39, 0x56, 0xC6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x87, 0x13, 0x50, 0x8F, 0x08, 0x14, 0x03 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x12, 0x41, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x6E, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x18 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x2D, 0xF8, 0xE3, 0x6B, 0x05, 0x8E, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0xE2, 0xA7, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xB3 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x73, 0x29, 0xC5, 0xCC, 0x6A, 0x19, 0xEC, 0xEC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7A, 0xA7, 0xB0, 0x48, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x58 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x2D, 0x37, 0xF4, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x63, 0xC7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp521r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xFF, 0x01 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x6B, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0x45, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF1, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x3D, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x73, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xBF, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0xBD, 0xC0, 0x52, 0x16 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7B, 0x93, 0x7E, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x39, 0x19, 0x56 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE1, 0x09, 0xF1, 0x8E, 0x91, 0x89, 0xB4, 0xB8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x15, 0xB3, 0x99, 0x5B, 0x72, 0xDA, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEE, 0x40, 0x85, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x92 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1F, 0x9A, 0x1C, 0x8E, 0x61, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x51, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xC6, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x18, 0x01 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x09, 0x64, 0x38, 0x91, 0x1E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xBB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x47, 0x9C, 0x89, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD0, 0xA5, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x48, 0x01, 0xCC, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x96, 0x2F, 0xBF, 0x83, 0x87, 0x86, 0x51 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0xFF, 0x01 ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x37, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x03, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xFD, 0xDE, 0x74, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x69, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6D, 0xE5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x05, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4( 0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0xCA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x84, 0x61, 0xEC, 0xD2, 0xE8, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x2F, 0xFC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x00, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2( 0x07, 0x00 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 5639 3.4) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x77, 0x53, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0x48, 0x13, 0x20 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x20, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0x6E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x72, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3, 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x80, 0xFB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE7, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x30, 0x75, 0xF6, 0xEE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x57, 0x30, 0x2C, 0xFC, 0x75, 0x09, 0x5A, 0x7D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB6, 0x07, 0x8C, 0xFF, 0x18, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0x6B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCE, 0xE1, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x29, 0x16, 0x84, 0x95 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBF, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xBB, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9, 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x56, 0x48, 0x97, 0x82, 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x90 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF7, 0xA6, 0x61, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0x7A, 0x39, 0x8C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9 ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 5639 3.6) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x53, 0xEC, 0x07, 0x31, 0x13, 0x00, 0x47, 0x87 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x1A, 0x1D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xA7, 0xD3, 0xAC ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0x11, 0xB7, 0x7F, 0x19, 0xDA, 0xB1, 0x12 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB4, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEB, 0xD4, 0x3A, 0x50, 0x4A, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x8A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0xBA, 0xEF, 0x65, 0x91, 0x13 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x87, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x4F, 0x8E, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0xC2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA0, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xCE, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x72, 0x3C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0C, 0x15, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0xC6, 0x82, 0xC3, 0x7B ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x86, 0xB7, 0x3A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x94, 0xC9, 0xDB, 0x95, 0x02, 0x39, 0xB4, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD5, 0x62, 0xEB, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x88, 0x2E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA6, 0xD2, 0xDC, 0x07, 0xE1, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0x2F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x7C, 0x44, 0xF0, 0x16, 0x54, 0xB5, 0x39, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x65, 0x65, 0x04, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x32, 0x88, 0x3B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0xAF, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0xCF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x25, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x16, 0x1F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB3, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 5639 3.7) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xF3, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x58, 0x56, 0x60, 0xAA, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x85, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x81, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xE6, 0x80, 0xA3, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xA1, 0xCD, 0xAE ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x42, 0x68, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x7D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x71, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B, 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D, 0x8D, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0x94 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC5, 0x4C, 0x23, 0xAC, 0x45, 0x71, 0x32, 0xE2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x89, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x8B, 0x31, 0xA3, 0x30, 0x78 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x23, 0xF7, 0x16, 0x80, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x09, 0x28 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0xE5, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xB7, 0x50, 0x40, 0x98 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x67, 0x3E, 0x08, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7, 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D, 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8, 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81 ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D ), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x69, 0x00, 0xA9, 0x9C, 0x82, 0x96, 0x87, 0xB5 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xDD, 0xDA, 0x5D, 0x08, 0x81, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x1D ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x47, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x7F, 0x19, 0x61, 0x86, 0x41 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x19, 0x26, 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x55 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x70, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6 ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F ), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA ), +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ +#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +/* + * Create an MPI from embedded constants + * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof mbedtls_mpi_uint) + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_load( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len ) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = len / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p; +} + +/* + * Set an MPI to static value 1 + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_set1( mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint one[] = { 1 }; + X->s = 1; + X->n = 1; + X->p = one; +} + +/* + * Make group available from embedded constants + */ +static int ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t plen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *a, size_t alen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen) +{ + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->P, p, plen ); + if( a != NULL ) + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->A, a, alen ); + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->B, b, blen ); + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->N, n, nlen ); + + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->G.X, gx, gxlen ); + ecp_mpi_load( &grp->G.Y, gy, gylen ); + ecp_mpi_set1( &grp->G.Z ); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->N ); + + grp->h = 1; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* Forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p384( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p521( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif + +#define NIST_MODP( P ) grp->modp = ecp_mod_ ## P; +#else +#define NIST_MODP( P ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +/* Additional forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p255( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p448( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi * ); +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +#define LOAD_GROUP_A( G ) ecp_group_load( grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof( G ## _p ), \ + G ## _a, sizeof( G ## _a ), \ + G ## _b, sizeof( G ## _b ), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof( G ## _gx ), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof( G ## _gy ), \ + G ## _n, sizeof( G ## _n ) ) + +#define LOAD_GROUP( G ) ecp_group_load( grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof( G ## _p ), \ + NULL, 0, \ + G ## _b, sizeof( G ## _b ), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof( G ## _gx ), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof( G ## _gy ), \ + G ## _n, sizeof( G ## _n ) ) +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve25519() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve25519_a24 = 0x01DB42; +static const unsigned char curve25519_part_of_n[] = { + 0x14, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0xA2, 0xF7, 0x9C, 0xD6, + 0x58, 0x12, 0x63, 0x1A, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xED, +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve25519 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve25519( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->A, curve25519_a24 ) ); + + /* P = 2^255 - 19 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 255 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 19 ) ); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + + /* N = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->N, + curve25519_part_of_n, sizeof( curve25519_part_of_n ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &grp->N, 252, 1 ) ); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.X, 9 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->G.Y ); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 254; + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve448() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve448_a24 = 0x98AA; +static const unsigned char curve448_part_of_n[] = { + 0x83, 0x35, 0xDC, 0x16, 0x3B, 0xB1, 0x24, + 0xB6, 0x51, 0x29, 0xC9, 0x6F, 0xDE, 0x93, + 0x3D, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x70, 0xAA, 0xDC, + 0x87, 0x3D, 0x6D, 0x54, 0xA7, 0xBB, 0x0D, +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve448 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve448( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi Ns; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Ns ); + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->A, curve448_a24 ) ); + + /* P = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &grp->P, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &grp->P, &grp->P, 1 ) ); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.X, 5 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->G.Y ); + + /* N = 2^446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( &grp->N, 446, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &Ns, + curve448_part_of_n, sizeof( curve448_part_of_n ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &grp->N, &grp->N, &Ns ) ); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 447; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Ns ); + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Set a group using well-known domain parameters + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_load( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id ) +{ + ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( grp ); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( grp ); + + grp->id = id; + + switch( id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + NIST_MODP( p192 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp192r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + NIST_MODP( p224 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp224r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + NIST_MODP( p256 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp256r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + NIST_MODP( p384 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp384r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + NIST_MODP( p521 ); + return( LOAD_GROUP( secp521r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p192k1; + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp192k1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p224k1; + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp224k1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p256k1; + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( secp256k1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP256r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP384r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + return( LOAD_GROUP_A( brainpoolP512r1 ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p255; + return( ecp_use_curve25519( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p448; + return( ecp_use_curve448( grp ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + + default: + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* + * Fast reduction modulo the primes used by the NIST curves. + * + * These functions are critical for speed, but not needed for correct + * operations. So, we make the choice to heavily rely on the internals of our + * bignum library, which creates a tight coupling between these functions and + * our MPI implementation. However, the coupling between the ECP module and + * MPI remains loose, since these functions can be deactivated at will. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Compared to the way things are presented in FIPS 186-3 D.2, + * we proceed in columns, from right (least significant chunk) to left, + * adding chunks to N in place, and keeping a carry for the next chunk. + * This avoids moving things around in memory, and uselessly adding zeros, + * compared to the more straightforward, line-oriented approach. + * + * For this prime we need to handle data in chunks of 64 bits. + * Since this is always a multiple of our basic mbedtls_mpi_uint, we can + * use a mbedtls_mpi_uint * to designate such a chunk, and small loops to handle it. + */ + +/* Add 64-bit chunks (dst += src) and update carry */ +static inline void add64( mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry ) +{ + unsigned char i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + for( i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++, dst++, src++ ) + { + *dst += c; c = ( *dst < c ); + *dst += *src; c += ( *dst < *src ); + } + *carry += c; +} + +/* Add carry to a 64-bit chunk and update carry */ +static inline void carry64( mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry ) +{ + unsigned char i; + for( i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++, dst++ ) + { + *dst += *carry; + *carry = ( *dst < *carry ); + } +} + +#define WIDTH 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) +#define A( i ) N->p + (i) * WIDTH +#define ADD( i ) add64( p, A( i ), &c ) +#define NEXT p += WIDTH; carry64( p, &c ) +#define LAST p += WIDTH; *p = c; while( ++p < end ) *p = 0 + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end; + + /* Make sure we have enough blocks so that A(5) is legal */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( N, 6 * WIDTH ) ); + + p = N->p; + end = p + N->n; + + ADD( 3 ); ADD( 5 ); NEXT; // A0 += A3 + A5 + ADD( 3 ); ADD( 4 ); ADD( 5 ); NEXT; // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5 + ADD( 4 ); ADD( 5 ); LAST; // A2 += A4 + A5 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#undef WIDTH +#undef A +#undef ADD +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * The reader is advised to first understand ecp_mod_p192() since the same + * general structure is used here, but with additional complications: + * (1) chunks of 32 bits, and (2) subtractions. + */ + +/* + * For these primes, we need to handle data in chunks of 32 bits. + * This makes it more complicated if we use 64 bits limbs in MPI, + * which prevents us from using a uniform access method as for p192. + * + * So, we define a mini abstraction layer to access 32 bit chunks, + * load them in 'cur' for work, and store them back from 'cur' when done. + * + * While at it, also define the size of N in terms of 32-bit chunks. + */ +#define LOAD32 cur = A( i ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) /* 32 bit */ + +#define MAX32 N->n +#define A( j ) N->p[j] +#define STORE32 N->p[i] = cur; + +#else /* 64-bit */ + +#define MAX32 N->n * 2 +#define A( j ) (j) % 2 ? (uint32_t)( N->p[(j)/2] >> 32 ) : \ + (uint32_t)( N->p[(j)/2] ) +#define STORE32 \ + if( i % 2 ) { \ + N->p[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \ + N->p[i/2] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur) << 32; \ + } else { \ + N->p[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \ + N->p[i/2] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur; \ + } + +#endif /* sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) */ + +/* + * Helpers for addition and subtraction of chunks, with signed carry. + */ +static inline void add32( uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry ) +{ + *dst += src; + *carry += ( *dst < src ); +} + +static inline void sub32( uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry ) +{ + *carry -= ( *dst < src ); + *dst -= src; +} + +#define ADD( j ) add32( &cur, A( j ), &c ); +#define SUB( j ) sub32( &cur, A( j ), &c ); + +#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ +#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ + +/* + * Helpers for the main 'loop' + */ +#define INIT( b ) \ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; \ + signed char c = 0, cc; \ + uint32_t cur; \ + size_t i = 0, bits = (b); \ + /* N is the size of the product of two b-bit numbers, plus one */ \ + /* limb for fix_negative */ \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( N, ( b ) * 2 / biL + 1 ) ); \ + LOAD32; + +#define NEXT \ + STORE32; i++; LOAD32; \ + cc = c; c = 0; \ + if( cc < 0 ) \ + sub32( &cur, -cc, &c ); \ + else \ + add32( &cur, cc, &c ); \ + +#define LAST \ + STORE32; i++; \ + cur = c > 0 ? c : 0; STORE32; \ + cur = 0; while( ++i < MAX32 ) { STORE32; } \ + if( c < 0 ) mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( N, c, bits ); + +/* + * If the result is negative, we get it in the form + * c * 2^bits + N, with c negative and N positive shorter than 'bits' + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits ) +{ + size_t i; + + /* Set N := 2^bits - 1 - N. We know that 0 <= N < 2^bits, so + * set the absolute value to 0xfff...fff - N. There is no carry + * since we're subtracting from all-bits-one. */ + for( i = 0; i <= bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ); i++ ) + { + N->p[i] = ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint)0 - N->p[i]; + } + /* Add 1, taking care of the carry. */ + i = 0; + do + ++N->p[i]; + while( N->p[i++] == 0 && i <= bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + /* Invert the sign. + * Now N = N0 - 2^bits where N0 is the initial value of N. */ + N->s = -1; + + /* Add |c| * 2^bits to the absolute value. Since c and N are + * negative, this adds c * 2^bits. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint msw = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -c; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + if( bits == 224 ) + msw <<= 32; +#endif + N->p[bits / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint)] += msw; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + INIT( 224 ); + + SUB( 7 ); SUB( 11 ); NEXT; // A0 += -A7 - A11 + SUB( 8 ); SUB( 12 ); NEXT; // A1 += -A8 - A12 + SUB( 9 ); SUB( 13 ); NEXT; // A2 += -A9 - A13 + SUB( 10 ); ADD( 7 ); ADD( 11 ); NEXT; // A3 += -A10 + A7 + A11 + SUB( 11 ); ADD( 8 ); ADD( 12 ); NEXT; // A4 += -A11 + A8 + A12 + SUB( 12 ); ADD( 9 ); ADD( 13 ); NEXT; // A5 += -A12 + A9 + A13 + SUB( 13 ); ADD( 10 ); LAST; // A6 += -A13 + A10 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + INIT( 256 ); + + ADD( 8 ); ADD( 9 ); + SUB( 11 ); SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD( 9 ); ADD( 10 ); + SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); SUB( 15 ); NEXT; // A1 + + ADD( 10 ); ADD( 11 ); + SUB( 13 ); SUB( 14 ); SUB( 15 ); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD( 11 ); ADD( 11 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 13 ); + SUB( 15 ); SUB( 8 ); SUB( 9 ); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD( 12 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 14 ); + SUB( 9 ); SUB( 10 ); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD( 13 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 15 ); + SUB( 10 ); SUB( 11 ); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD( 14 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 13 ); + SUB( 8 ); SUB( 9 ); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 8 ); + SUB( 10 ); SUB( 11 ); SUB( 12 ); SUB( 13 ); LAST; // A7 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p384( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + INIT( 384 ); + + ADD( 12 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 20 ); + SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD( 13 ); ADD( 22 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 12 ); SUB( 20 ); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD( 14 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 13 ); SUB( 21 ); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD( 15 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 21 ); + SUB( 14 ); SUB( 22 ); SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD( 21 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 16 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 12 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 22 ); + SUB( 15 ); SUB( 23 ); SUB( 23 ); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD( 22 ); ADD( 22 ); ADD( 17 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 13 ); ADD( 21 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 16 ); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD( 23 ); ADD( 23 ); ADD( 18 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 14 ); ADD( 22 ); + SUB( 17 ); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD( 19 ); ADD( 16 ); ADD( 15 ); ADD( 23 ); + SUB( 18 ); NEXT; // A7 + + ADD( 20 ); ADD( 17 ); ADD( 16 ); + SUB( 19 ); NEXT; // A8 + + ADD( 21 ); ADD( 18 ); ADD( 17 ); + SUB( 20 ); NEXT; // A9 + + ADD( 22 ); ADD( 19 ); ADD( 18 ); + SUB( 21 ); NEXT; // A10 + + ADD( 23 ); ADD( 20 ); ADD( 19 ); + SUB( 22 ); LAST; // A11 + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#undef A +#undef LOAD32 +#undef STORE32 +#undef MAX32 +#undef INIT +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Here we have an actual Mersenne prime, so things are more straightforward. + * However, chunks are aligned on a 'weird' boundary (521 bits). + */ + +/* Size of p521 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_WIDTH ( 521 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) + 1 ) + +/* Bits to keep in the most significant mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_MASK 0x01FF + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5) + * Write N as A1 + 2^521 A0, return A0 + A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p521( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P521_WIDTH + 1]; + /* Worst case for the size of M is when mbedtls_mpi_uint is 16 bits: + * we need to hold bits 513 to 1056, which is 34 limbs, that is + * P521_WIDTH + 1. Otherwise P521_WIDTH is enough. */ + + if( N->n < P521_WIDTH ) + return( 0 ); + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - ( P521_WIDTH - 1 ); + if( M.n > P521_WIDTH + 1 ) + M.n = P521_WIDTH + 1; + M.p = Mp; + memcpy( Mp, N->p + P521_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, 521 % ( 8 * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) ) ); + + /* N = A0 */ + N->p[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK; + for( i = P521_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +#undef P521_WIDTH +#undef P521_MASK +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p255 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P255_WIDTH ( 255 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) + 1 ) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 + * Write N as A0 + 2^255 A1, return A0 + 19 * A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p255( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P255_WIDTH + 2]; + + if( N->n < P255_WIDTH ) + return( 0 ); + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - ( P255_WIDTH - 1 ); + if( M.n > P255_WIDTH + 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + M.p = Mp; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + P255_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, 255 % ( 8 * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) ) ); + M.n++; /* Make room for multiplication by 19 */ + + /* N = A0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( N, 255, 0 ) ); + for( i = P255_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + 19 * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_int( &M, &M, 19 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p448 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P448_WIDTH ( 448 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) + +/* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */ +#define DIV_ROUND_UP( X, Y ) ( ( ( X ) + ( Y ) - 1 ) / ( Y ) ) +#define P224_WIDTH_MIN ( 28 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) +#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP( 28, sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) +#define P224_UNUSED_BITS ( ( P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) * 8 ) - 224 ) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 + * Write N as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return + * A0 + A1 + B1 + (B0 + B1) * 2^224. This is different to the reference + * implementation of Curve448, which uses its own special 56-bit limbs rather + * than a generic bignum library. We could squeeze some extra speed out on + * 32-bit machines by splitting N up into 32-bit limbs and doing the + * arithmetic using the limbs directly as we do for the NIST primes above, + * but for 64-bit targets it should use half the number of operations if we do + * the reduction with 224-bit limbs, since mpi_add_mpi will then use 64-bit adds. + */ +static int ecp_mod_p448( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M, Q; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P448_WIDTH + 1], Qp[P448_WIDTH]; + + if( N->n <= P448_WIDTH ) + return( 0 ); + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - ( P448_WIDTH ); + if( M.n > P448_WIDTH ) + /* Shouldn't be called with N larger than 2^896! */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + M.p = Mp; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof( Mp ) ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + P448_WIDTH, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + + /* N = A0 */ + for( i = P448_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N += A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &M ) ); + + /* Q = B1, N += B1 */ + Q = M; + Q.p = Qp; + memcpy( Qp, Mp, sizeof( Qp ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &Q, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &Q ) ); + + /* M = (B0 + B1) * 2^224, N += M */ + if( sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) > 4 ) + Mp[P224_WIDTH_MIN] &= ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint)-1 ) >> ( P224_UNUSED_BITS ); + for( i = P224_WIDTH_MAX; i < M.n; ++i ) + Mp[i] = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &M, &M, &Q ) ); + M.n = P448_WIDTH + 1; /* Make room for shifted carry bit from the addition */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &M, 224 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo P = 2^s - R, + * with R about 33 bits, used by the Koblitz curves. + * + * Write N as A0 + 2^224 A1, return A0 + R * A1. + * Actually do two passes, since R is big. + */ +#define P_KOBLITZ_MAX ( 256 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) // Max limbs in P +#define P_KOBLITZ_R ( 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ) // Limbs in R +static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz( mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, + size_t adjust, size_t shift, mbedtls_mpi_uint mask ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M, R; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P_KOBLITZ_MAX + P_KOBLITZ_R + 1]; + + if( N->n < p_limbs ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Init R */ + R.s = 1; + R.p = Rp; + R.n = P_KOBLITZ_R; + + /* Common setup for M */ + M.s = 1; + M.p = Mp; + + /* M = A1 */ + M.n = N->n - ( p_limbs - adjust ); + if( M.n > p_limbs + adjust ) + M.n = p_limbs + adjust; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + if( shift != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, shift ) ); + M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */ + + /* N = A0 */ + if( mask != 0 ) + N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask; + for( i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + R * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &M, &M, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + + /* Second pass */ + + /* M = A1 */ + M.n = N->n - ( p_limbs - adjust ); + if( M.n > p_limbs + adjust ) + M.n = p_limbs + adjust; + memset( Mp, 0, sizeof Mp ); + memcpy( Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) ); + if( shift != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &M, shift ) ); + M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */ + + /* N = A0 */ + if( mask != 0 ) + N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask; + for( i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++ ) + N->p[i] = 0; + + /* N = A0 + R * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &M, &M, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_abs( N, N, &M ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x0100001119 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00 ) }; + + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 192 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, + 0 ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00 ) }; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 4, 1, 32, 0xFFFFFFFF ) ); +#else + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 224 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, + 0 ) ); +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256k1( mbedtls_mpi *N ) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00 ) }; + return( ecp_mod_koblitz( N, Rp, 256 / 8 / sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ), 0, 0, + 0 ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecp_invasive.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecp_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..71c77027 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ecp_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/** + * \file ecp_invasive.h + * + * \brief ECP module: interfaces for invasive testing only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when + * building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* Preconditions: + * - bits is a multiple of 64 or is 224 + * - c is -1 or -2 + * - 0 <= N < 2^bits + * - N has room for bits plus one limb + * + * Behavior: + * Set N to c * 2^bits + old_value_of_N. + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +/** Generate a private key on a Montgomery curve (Curve25519 or Curve448). + * + * This function implements key generation for the set of secret keys + * specified in [Curve25519] p. 5 and in [Curve448]. The resulting value + * has the lower bits masked but is not necessarily canonical. + * + * \note - [Curve25519] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf + * - [RFC7748] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748 + * + * \p high_bit The position of the high-order bit of the key to generate. + * This is the bit-size of the key minus 1: + * 254 for Curve25519 or 447 for Curve448. + * \param d The randomly generated key. This is a number of size + * exactly \p n_bits + 1 bits, with the least significant bits + * masked as specified in [Curve25519] and in [RFC7748] §5. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_xxx or MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( size_t n_bits, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/entropy.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/entropy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e3b337ff --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/entropy.c @@ -0,0 +1,728 @@ +/* + * Entropy accumulator implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) +#warning "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! " +#warning "**** THIS BUILD HAS NO DEFINED ENTROPY SOURCES " +#warning "**** THIS BUILD IS *NOT* SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE " +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) +#include "mbedtls/havege.h" +#endif + +#define ENTROPY_MAX_LOOP 256 /**< Maximum amount to loop before error */ + +void mbedtls_entropy_init( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->source_count = 0; + memset( ctx->source, 0, sizeof( ctx->source ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + ctx->accumulator_started = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx->accumulator ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx->accumulator ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + mbedtls_havege_init( &ctx->havege_data ); +#endif + + /* Reminder: Update ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG in the test files + * when adding more strong entropy sources here. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_null_entropy_poll, NULL, + 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardclock_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_havege_poll, &ctx->havege_data, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_hardware_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( ctx, mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); + ctx->initial_entropy_run = 0; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES */ +} + +void mbedtls_entropy_free( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) +{ + /* If the context was already free, don't call free() again. + * This is important for mutexes which don't allow double-free. */ + if( ctx->accumulator_started == -1 ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + mbedtls_havege_free( &ctx->havege_data ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + mbedtls_sha512_free( &ctx->accumulator ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx->accumulator ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + ctx->initial_entropy_run = 0; +#endif + ctx->source_count = 0; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->source, sizeof( ctx->source ) ); + ctx->accumulator_started = -1; +} + +int mbedtls_entropy_add_source( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, + mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source, void *p_source, + size_t threshold, int strong ) +{ + int idx, ret = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + idx = ctx->source_count; + if( idx >= MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES; + goto exit; + } + + ctx->source[idx].f_source = f_source; + ctx->source[idx].p_source = p_source; + ctx->source[idx].threshold = threshold; + ctx->source[idx].strong = strong; + + ctx->source_count++; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Entropy accumulator update + */ +static int entropy_update( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len ) +{ + unsigned char header[2]; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t use_len = len; + const unsigned char *p = data; + int ret = 0; + + if( use_len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_ret( data, len, tmp, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_ret( data, len, tmp, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif + p = tmp; + use_len = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + header[0] = source_id; + header[1] = use_len & 0xFF; + + /* + * Start the accumulator if this has not already happened. Note that + * it is sufficient to start the accumulator here only because all calls to + * gather entropy eventually execute this code. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + if( ctx->accumulator_started == 0 && + ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + else + ctx->accumulator_started = 1; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, header, 2 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, p, use_len ); +#else + if( ctx->accumulator_started == 0 && + ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + else + ctx->accumulator_started = 1; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, header, 2 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, p, use_len ); +#endif + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + ret = entropy_update( ctx, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL, data, len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Run through the different sources to add entropy to our accumulator + */ +static int entropy_gather_internal( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + int i; + int have_one_strong = 0; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER]; + size_t olen; + + if( ctx->source_count == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED ); + + /* + * Run through our entropy sources + */ + for( i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++ ) + { + if( ctx->source[i].strong == MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ) + have_one_strong = 1; + + olen = 0; + if( ( ret = ctx->source[i].f_source( ctx->source[i].p_source, + buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Add if we actually gathered something + */ + if( olen > 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = entropy_update( ctx, (unsigned char) i, + buf, olen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ctx->source[i].size += olen; + } + } + + if( have_one_strong == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Thread-safe wrapper for entropy_gather_internal() + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_gather( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + ret = entropy_gather_internal( ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) +{ + int ret, count = 0, i, thresholds_reached; + size_t strong_size; + mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx = (mbedtls_entropy_context *) data; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if( len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + /* Update the NV entropy seed before generating any entropy for outside + * use. + */ + if( ctx->initial_entropy_run == 0 ) + { + ctx->initial_entropy_run = 1; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + /* + * Always gather extra entropy before a call + */ + do + { + if( count++ > ENTROPY_MAX_LOOP ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = entropy_gather_internal( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + thresholds_reached = 1; + strong_size = 0; + for( i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++ ) + { + if( ctx->source[i].size < ctx->source[i].threshold ) + thresholds_reached = 0; + if( ctx->source[i].strong == MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ) + strong_size += ctx->source[i].size; + } + } + while( ! thresholds_reached || strong_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) + /* + * Note that at this stage it is assumed that the accumulator was started + * in a previous call to entropy_update(). If this is not guaranteed, the + * code below will fail. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &ctx->accumulator, buf ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Reset accumulator and counters and recycle existing entropy + */ + mbedtls_sha512_free( &ctx->accumulator ); + mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx->accumulator ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, buf, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Perform second SHA-512 on entropy + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_ret( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + buf, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; +#else /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &ctx->accumulator, buf ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Reset accumulator and counters and recycle existing entropy + */ + mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx->accumulator ); + mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx->accumulator ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx->accumulator, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx->accumulator, buf, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* + * Perform second SHA-256 on entropy + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_ret( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + buf, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ + + for( i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++ ) + ctx->source[i].size = 0; + + memcpy( output, buf, len ); + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +int mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + /* Read new seed and write it to NV */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_func( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( mbedtls_nv_seed_write( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + /* Manually update the remaining stream with a separator value to diverge */ + memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + FILE *f = NULL; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_func( ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + if( fwrite( buf, 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, f ) != MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( f != NULL ) + fclose( f ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = 0; + FILE *f; + size_t n; + unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE ]; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END ); + n = (size_t) ftell( f ); + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET ); + + if( n > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE ) + n = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE; + + if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + else + ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( ctx, buf, n ); + + fclose( f ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) +/* + * Dummy source function + */ +static int entropy_dummy_source( void *data, unsigned char *output, + size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + ((void) data); + + memset( output, 0x2a, len ); + *olen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + +static int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_gather( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t entropy_len = 0; + size_t olen = 0; + size_t attempts = buf_len; + + while( attempts > 0 && entropy_len < buf_len ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hardware_poll( NULL, buf + entropy_len, + buf_len - entropy_len, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + entropy_len += olen; + attempts--; + } + + if( entropy_len < buf_len ) + { + ret = 1; + } + + return( ret ); +} + + +static int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_check_bits( const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len ) +{ + unsigned char set= 0xFF; + unsigned char unset = 0x00; + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < buf_len; i++ ) + { + set &= buf[i]; + unset |= buf[i]; + } + + return( set == 0xFF || unset == 0x00 ); +} + +/* + * A test to ensure hat the entropy sources are functioning correctly + * and there is no obvious failure. The test performs the following checks: + * - The entropy source is not providing only 0s (all bits unset) or 1s (all + * bits set). + * - The entropy source is not providing values in a pattern. Because the + * hardware could be providing data in an arbitrary length, this check polls + * the hardware entropy source twice and compares the result to ensure they + * are not equal. + * - The error code returned by the entropy source is not an error. + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char buf0[2 * sizeof( unsigned long long int )]; + unsigned char buf1[2 * sizeof( unsigned long long int )]; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ENTROPY_BIAS test: " ); + + memset( buf0, 0x00, sizeof( buf0 ) ); + memset( buf1, 0x00, sizeof( buf1 ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_gather( buf0, sizeof( buf0 ) ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_gather( buf1, sizeof( buf1 ) ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Make sure that the returned values are not all 0 or 1 */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_check_bits( buf0, sizeof( buf0 ) ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_check_bits( buf1, sizeof( buf1 ) ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Make sure that the entropy source is not returning values in a + * pattern */ + ret = memcmp( buf0, buf1, sizeof( buf0 ) ) == 0; + +cleanup: + if( verbose != 0 ) + { + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + else + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + } + + return( ret != 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ + +/* + * The actual entropy quality is hard to test, but we can at least + * test that the functions don't cause errors and write the correct + * amount of data to buffers. + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = 1; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; + unsigned char acc[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; + size_t i, j; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " ENTROPY test: " ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) + mbedtls_entropy_init( &ctx ); + + /* First do a gather to make sure we have default sources */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_gather( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &ctx, entropy_dummy_source, NULL, 16, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual( &ctx, buf, sizeof buf ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * To test that mbedtls_entropy_func writes correct number of bytes: + * - use the whole buffer and rely on ASan to detect overruns + * - collect entropy 8 times and OR the result in an accumulator: + * any byte should then be 0 with probably 2^(-64), so requiring + * each of the 32 or 64 bytes to be non-zero has a false failure rate + * of at most 2^(-58) which is acceptable. + */ + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_func( &ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( buf ); j++ ) + acc[j] |= buf[j]; + } + + for( j = 0; j < sizeof( buf ); j++ ) + { + if( acc[j] == 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test( 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif + +cleanup: + mbedtls_entropy_free( &ctx ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ + + if( verbose != 0 ) + { + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + else + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + } + + return( ret != 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/entropy_poll.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/entropy_poll.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a858c189 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/entropy_poll.c @@ -0,0 +1,289 @@ +/* + * Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) +/* Ensure that syscall() is available even when compiling with -std=c99 */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) +#include "mbedtls/havege.h" +#endif +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + +#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ + !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) +#error "Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in config.h" +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) +#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400 +#endif +#include +#include + +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + HCRYPTPROV provider; + ((void) data); + *olen = 0; + + if( CryptAcquireContext( &provider, NULL, NULL, + PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT ) == FALSE ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + + if( CryptGenRandom( provider, (DWORD) len, output ) == FALSE ) + { + CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + + CryptReleaseContext( provider, 0 ); + *olen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* + * Test for Linux getrandom() support. + * Since there is no wrapper in the libc yet, use the generic syscall wrapper + * available in GNU libc and compatible libc's (eg uClibc). + */ +#if ((defined(__linux__) && defined(__GLIBC__)) || defined(__midipix__)) +#include +#include +#if defined(SYS_getrandom) +#define HAVE_GETRANDOM +#include + +static int getrandom_wrapper( void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags ) +{ + /* MemSan cannot understand that the syscall writes to the buffer */ +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) + memset( buf, 0, buflen ); +#endif +#endif + return( syscall( SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, flags ) ); +} +#endif /* SYS_getrandom */ +#endif /* __linux__ || __midipix__ */ + +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) +#include +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || \ + (defined(__DragonFly__) && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) +#include +#include +#define HAVE_GETRANDOM +static int getrandom_wrapper( void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags ) +{ + return getrandom( buf, buflen, flags ); +} +#endif /* (__FreeBSD__ && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || + (__DragonFly__ && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) */ +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __DragonFly__ */ + +/* + * Some BSD systems provide KERN_ARND. + * This is equivalent to reading from /dev/urandom, only it doesn't require an + * open file descriptor, and provides up to 256 bytes per call (basically the + * same as getentropy(), but with a longer history). + * + * Documentation: https://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?sysctl+7 + */ +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) +#include +#include +#if defined(KERN_ARND) +#define HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND + +static int sysctl_arnd_wrapper( unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int name[2]; + size_t len; + + name[0] = CTL_KERN; + name[1] = KERN_ARND; + + while( buflen > 0 ) + { + len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen; + if( sysctl(name, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1 ) + return( -1 ); + buflen -= len; + buf += len; + } + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* KERN_ARND */ +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __NetBSD__ */ + +#include + +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + FILE *file; + size_t read_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ((void) data); + +#if defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) + ret = getrandom_wrapper( output, len, 0 ); + if( ret >= 0 ) + { + *olen = ret; + return( 0 ); + } + else if( errno != ENOSYS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + /* Fall through if the system call isn't known. */ +#else + ((void) ret); +#endif /* HAVE_GETRANDOM */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND) + ((void) file); + ((void) read_len); + if( sysctl_arnd_wrapper( output, len ) == -1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + *olen = len; + return( 0 ); +#else + + *olen = 0; + + file = fopen( "/dev/urandom", "rb" ); + if( file == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + + read_len = fread( output, 1, len, file ); + if( read_len != len ) + { + fclose( file ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + + fclose( file ); + *olen = len; + + return( 0 ); +#endif /* HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND */ +} +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) +int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + ((void) data); + ((void) output); + + *olen = 0; + if( len < sizeof(unsigned char) ) + return( 0 ); + + output[0] = 0; + *olen = sizeof(unsigned char); + return( 0 ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +int mbedtls_hardclock_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned long timer = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); + ((void) data); + *olen = 0; + + if( len < sizeof(unsigned long) ) + return( 0 ); + + memcpy( output, &timer, sizeof(unsigned long) ); + *olen = sizeof(unsigned long); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) +int mbedtls_havege_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + mbedtls_havege_state *hs = (mbedtls_havege_state *) data; + *olen = 0; + + if( mbedtls_havege_random( hs, output, len ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + + *olen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll( void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t use_len = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE; + ((void) data); + + memset( buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ); + + if( mbedtls_nv_seed_read( buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + + if( len < use_len ) + use_len = len; + + memcpy( output, buf, use_len ); + *olen = use_len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/error.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/error.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8573369a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/error.c @@ -0,0 +1,976 @@ +/* + * Error message information + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) +#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) +#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) +#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" +#endif + + +const char * mbedtls_high_level_strerr( int error_code ) +{ + int high_level_error_code; + + if( error_code < 0 ) + error_code = -error_code; + + /* Extract the high-level part from the error code. */ + high_level_error_code = error_code & 0xFF80; + + switch( high_level_error_code ) + { + /* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "CIPHER - The selected feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "CIPHER - Bad input parameters" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "CIPHER - Failed to allocate memory" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING): + return( "CIPHER - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED): + return( "CIPHER - Decryption of block requires a full block" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "CIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT): + return( "CIPHER - The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CIPHER - Cipher hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "DHM - Bad input parameters" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Reading of the DHM parameters failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Making of the DHM parameters failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Reading of the public values failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Making of the public value failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Calculation of the DHM secret failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "DHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Allocation of memory failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "DHM - Read or write of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "DHM - DHM hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Setting the modulus and generator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "ECP - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "ECP - The buffer is too small to write to" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "ECP - The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supported" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "ECP - The signature is not valid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "ECP - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED): + return( "ECP - Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY): + return( "ECP - Invalid private or public key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH): + return( "ECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "ECP - The ECP hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "ECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "MD - The selected feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "MD - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "MD - Failed to allocate memory" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "MD - Opening or reading of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "MD - MD hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT): + return( "PEM - No PEM header or footer found" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA): + return( "PEM - PEM string is not as expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "PEM - Failed to allocate memory" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV): + return( "PEM - RSA IV is not in hex-format" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG): + return( "PEM - Unsupported key encryption algorithm" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED): + return( "PEM - Private key password can't be empty" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PEM - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PEM - Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PEM - Bad input parameters to function" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "PK - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH): + return( "PK - Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PK - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "PK - Read/write of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION): + return( "PK - Unsupported key version" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PK - Invalid key tag or value" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG): + return( "PK - Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED): + return( "PK - Private key password can't be empty" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PK - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY): + return( "PK - The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG): + return( "PK - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE): + return( "PK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH): + return( "PK - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "PK - PK hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PKCS12 - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PKCS12 - Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PKCS12 - PBE ASN.1 data not as expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PKCS12 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PKCS5 - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PKCS5 - Unexpected ASN.1 data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PKCS5 - Requested encryption or digest alg not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "RSA - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING): + return( "RSA - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED): + return( "RSA - Something failed during generation of a key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED): + return( "RSA - Key failed to pass the validity check of the library" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The public key operation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The private key operation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The PKCS#1 verification failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE): + return( "RSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enough" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zeros" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION): + return( "RSA - The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "RSA - RSA hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "SSL - The requested feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SSL - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC): + return( "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD): + return( "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF): + return( "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER): + return( "SSL - An unknown cipher was received" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN): + return( "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG): + return( "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE): + return( "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE): + return( "SSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE): + return( "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE): + return( "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Verification of our peer failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY): + return( "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST): + return( "SSL - Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY): + return( "SSL - Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC): + return( "SSL - Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED): + return( "SSL - Processing of the Finished handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH): + return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Processing of the compression / decompression failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION): + return( "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET): + return( "SSL - Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED): + return( "SSL - Session ticket has expired" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH): + return( "SSL - Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY): + return( "SSL - Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR): + return( "SSL - Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING): + return( "SSL - A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO): + return( "SSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verification" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a message" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE): + return( "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ): + return( "SSL - No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE): + return( "SSL - Connection requires a write call" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT): + return( "SSL - The operation timed out" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT): + return( "SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same port" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD): + return( "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL): + return( "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH): + return( "SSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING): + return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "SSL - The asynchronous operation is not completed yet" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE): + return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID): + return( "SSL - An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH): + return( "SSL - An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG): + return( "SSL - Invalid value in SSL config" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "X509 - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID): + return( "X509 - Requested OID is unknown" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION): + return( "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL): + return( "X509 - The serial tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG): + return( "X509 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME): + return( "X509 - The name tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE): + return( "X509 - The date tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE): + return( "X509 - The signature tag or value invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS): + return( "X509 - The extension tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION): + return( "X509 - CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG): + return( "X509 - Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH): + return( "X509 - Signature algorithms do not match. (see \\c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT): + return( "X509 - Format not recognized as DER or PEM" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "X509 - Input invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "X509 - Allocation of memory failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "X509 - Read/write of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "X509 - Destination buffer is too small" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR): + return( "X509 - A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ + /* End Auto-Generated Code. */ + + default: + break; + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +const char * mbedtls_low_level_strerr( int error_code ) +{ + int low_level_error_code; + + if( error_code < 0 ) + error_code = -error_code; + + /* Extract the low-level part from the error code. */ + low_level_error_code = error_code & ~0xFF80; + + switch( low_level_error_code ) + { + /* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH): + return( "AES - Invalid key length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "AES - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "AES - Invalid input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "AES - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "AES - AES hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "ARC4 - ARC4 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "ARIA - Bad input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "ARIA - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "ARIA - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "ARIA - ARIA hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA): + return( "ASN1 - Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG): + return( "ASN1 - ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH): + return( "ASN1 - Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH): + return( "ASN1 - Actual length differs from expected length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA): + return( "ASN1 - Data is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "ASN1 - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL): + return( "ASN1 - Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "BASE64 - Output buffer too small" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER): + return( "BASE64 - Invalid character in input" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "BIGNUM - An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "BIGNUM - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER): + return( "BIGNUM - There is an invalid character in the digit string" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "BIGNUM - The buffer is too small to write to" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE): + return( "BIGNUM - The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO): + return( "BIGNUM - The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE): + return( "BIGNUM - The input arguments are not acceptable" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "BIGNUM - Memory allocation failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "BLOWFISH - Bad input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "BLOWFISH - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "BLOWFISH - Blowfish hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "CAMELLIA - Bad input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "CAMELLIA - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CAMELLIA - Camellia hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT): + return( "CCM - Bad input parameters to the function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "CCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CCM - CCM hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "CHACHA20 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "CHACHA20 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CHACHA20 - Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE): + return( "CHACHAPOLY - The requested operation is not permitted in the current state" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "CHACHAPOLY - Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "CMAC - CMAC hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): + return( "CTR_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG): + return( "CTR_DRBG - The requested random buffer length is too big" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG): + return( "CTR_DRBG - The input (entropy + additional data) is too large" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "CTR_DRBG - Read or write error in file" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "DES - The data input has an invalid length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "DES - DES hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): + return( "ENTROPY - Critical entropy source failure" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES): + return( "ENTROPY - No more sources can be added" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED): + return( "ENTROPY - No sources have been added to poll" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE): + return( "ENTROPY - No strong sources have been added to poll" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "ENTROPY - Read/write error in file" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR): + return( "ERROR - Generic error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED): + return( "ERROR - This is a bug in the library" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "GCM - GCM hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT): + return( "GCM - Bad input parameters to function" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "HKDF - Bad input parameters to function" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - Too many random requested in single call" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - Read/write error in file" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "MD2 - MD2 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "MD4 - MD4 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "MD5 - MD5 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED): + return( "NET - Failed to open a socket" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED): + return( "NET - The connection to the given server / port failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED): + return( "NET - Binding of the socket failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED): + return( "NET - Could not listen on the socket" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED): + return( "NET - Could not accept the incoming connection" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED): + return( "NET - Reading information from the socket failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED): + return( "NET - Sending information through the socket failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET): + return( "NET - Connection was reset by peer" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST): + return( "NET - Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "NET - Buffer is too small to hold the data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT): + return( "NET - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED): + return( "NET - Polling the net context failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "NET - Input invalid" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND): + return( "OID - OID is not found" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL): + return( "OID - output buffer is too small" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED): + return( "PADLOCK - Input data should be aligned" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED): + return( "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "POLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "POLY1305 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "POLY1305 - Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "RIPEMD160 - RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 input data was malformed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 input data was malformed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 input data was malformed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "THREADING - The selected feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "THREADING - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR): + return( "THREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "XTEA - The data input has an invalid length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "XTEA - XTEA hardware accelerator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ + /* End Auto-Generated Code. */ + + default: + break; + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + size_t len; + int use_ret; + const char * high_level_error_description = NULL; + const char * low_level_error_description = NULL; + + if( buflen == 0 ) + return; + + memset( buf, 0x00, buflen ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + ret = -ret; + + if( ret & 0xFF80 ) + { + use_ret = ret & 0xFF80; + + // Translate high level error code. + high_level_error_description = mbedtls_high_level_strerr( ret ); + + if( high_level_error_description == NULL ) + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret ); + else + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "%s", high_level_error_description ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + // Early return in case of a fatal error - do not try to translate low + // level code. + if(use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE)) + return; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ + } + + use_ret = ret & ~0xFF80; + + if( use_ret == 0 ) + return; + + // If high level code is present, make a concatenation between both + // error strings. + // + len = strlen( buf ); + + if( len > 0 ) + { + if( buflen - len < 5 ) + return; + + mbedtls_snprintf( buf + len, buflen - len, " : " ); + + buf += len + 3; + buflen -= len + 3; + } + + // Translate low level error code. + low_level_error_description = mbedtls_low_level_strerr( ret ); + + if( low_level_error_description == NULL ) + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret ); + else + mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "%s", low_level_error_description ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +/* + * Provide a dummy implementation when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is not defined + */ +void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + ((void) ret); + + if( buflen > 0 ) + buf[0] = '\0'; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +void (*mbedtls_test_hook_error_add)( int, int, const char *, int ); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C || MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/gcm.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/gcm.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d0b73379 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/gcm.c @@ -0,0 +1,995 @@ +/* + * NIST SP800-38D compliant GCM implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf + * + * See also: + * [MGV] http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf + * + * We use the algorithm described as Shoup's method with 4-bit tables in + * [MGV] 4.1, pp. 12-13, to enhance speed without using too much memory. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define GCM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ) +#define GCM_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +/* + * Initialize a context + */ +void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) +{ + GCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Precompute small multiples of H, that is set + * HH[i] || HL[i] = H times i, + * where i is seen as a field element as in [MGV], ie high-order bits + * correspond to low powers of P. The result is stored in the same way, that + * is the high-order bit of HH corresponds to P^0 and the low-order bit of HL + * corresponds to P^127. + */ +static int gcm_gen_table( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) +{ + int ret, i, j; + uint64_t hi, lo; + uint64_t vl, vh; + unsigned char h[16]; + size_t olen = 0; + + memset( h, 0, 16 ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, h, 16, h, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* pack h as two 64-bits ints, big-endian */ + hi = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( h, 0 ); + lo = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( h, 4 ); + vh = (uint64_t) hi << 32 | lo; + + hi = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( h, 8 ); + lo = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( h, 12 ); + vl = (uint64_t) hi << 32 | lo; + + /* 8 = 1000 corresponds to 1 in GF(2^128) */ + ctx->HL[8] = vl; + ctx->HH[8] = vh; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + /* With CLMUL support, we need only h, not the rest of the table */ + if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL ) ) + return( 0 ); +#endif + + /* 0 corresponds to 0 in GF(2^128) */ + ctx->HH[0] = 0; + ctx->HL[0] = 0; + + for( i = 4; i > 0; i >>= 1 ) + { + uint32_t T = ( vl & 1 ) * 0xe1000000U; + vl = ( vh << 63 ) | ( vl >> 1 ); + vh = ( vh >> 1 ) ^ ( (uint64_t) T << 32); + + ctx->HL[i] = vl; + ctx->HH[i] = vh; + } + + for( i = 2; i <= 8; i *= 2 ) + { + uint64_t *HiL = ctx->HL + i, *HiH = ctx->HH + i; + vh = *HiH; + vl = *HiL; + for( j = 1; j < i; j++ ) + { + HiH[j] = vh ^ ctx->HH[j]; + HiL[j] = vl ^ ctx->HL[j]; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( keybits == 128 || keybits == 192 || keybits == 256 ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + if( cipher_info->block_size != 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = gcm_gen_table( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Shoup's method for multiplication use this table with + * last4[x] = x times P^128 + * where x and last4[x] are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV] + */ +static const uint64_t last4[16] = +{ + 0x0000, 0x1c20, 0x3840, 0x2460, + 0x7080, 0x6ca0, 0x48c0, 0x54e0, + 0xe100, 0xfd20, 0xd940, 0xc560, + 0x9180, 0x8da0, 0xa9c0, 0xb5e0 +}; + +/* + * Sets output to x times H using the precomputed tables. + * x and output are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV]. + */ +static void gcm_mult( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int i = 0; + unsigned char lo, hi, rem; + uint64_t zh, zl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) + if( mbedtls_aesni_has_support( MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL ) ) { + unsigned char h[16]; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HH[8] >> 32, h, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HH[8], h, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HL[8] >> 32, h, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->HL[8], h, 12 ); + + mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult( output, x, h ); + return; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C && MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 */ + + lo = x[15] & 0xf; + + zh = ctx->HH[lo]; + zl = ctx->HL[lo]; + + for( i = 15; i >= 0; i-- ) + { + lo = x[i] & 0xf; + hi = ( x[i] >> 4 ) & 0xf; + + if( i != 15 ) + { + rem = (unsigned char) zl & 0xf; + zl = ( zh << 60 ) | ( zl >> 4 ); + zh = ( zh >> 4 ); + zh ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + zh ^= ctx->HH[lo]; + zl ^= ctx->HL[lo]; + + } + + rem = (unsigned char) zl & 0xf; + zl = ( zh << 60 ) | ( zl >> 4 ); + zh = ( zh >> 4 ); + zh ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + zh ^= ctx->HH[hi]; + zl ^= ctx->HL[hi]; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( zh >> 32, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( zh, output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( zl >> 32, output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( zl, output, 12 ); +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char work_buf[16]; + size_t i; + const unsigned char *p; + size_t use_len, olen = 0; + uint64_t iv_bits; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + + /* IV and AD are limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ + /* IV is not allowed to be zero length */ + if( iv_len == 0 || + ( (uint64_t) iv_len ) >> 61 != 0 || + ( (uint64_t) add_len ) >> 61 != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + } + + memset( ctx->y, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->y) ); + memset( ctx->buf, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->buf) ); + + ctx->mode = mode; + ctx->len = 0; + ctx->add_len = 0; + + if( iv_len == 12 ) + { + memcpy( ctx->y, iv, iv_len ); + ctx->y[15] = 1; + } + else + { + memset( work_buf, 0x00, 16 ); + iv_bits = (uint64_t)iv_len * 8; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( iv_bits, work_buf, 8 ); + + p = iv; + while( iv_len > 0 ) + { + use_len = ( iv_len < 16 ) ? iv_len : 16; + + for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) + ctx->y[i] ^= p[i]; + + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y ); + + iv_len -= use_len; + p += use_len; + } + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + ctx->y[i] ^= work_buf[i]; + + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, + ctx->base_ectr, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + ctx->add_len = add_len; + p = add; + while( add_len > 0 ) + { + use_len = ( add_len < 16 ) ? add_len : 16; + + for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) + ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; + + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + + add_len -= use_len; + p += use_len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char ectr[16]; + size_t i; + const unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *out_p = output; + size_t use_len, olen = 0; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + if( output > input && (size_t) ( output - input ) < length ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes + * Also check for possible overflow */ + if( ctx->len + length < ctx->len || + (uint64_t) ctx->len + length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + } + + ctx->len += length; + + p = input; + while( length > 0 ) + { + use_len = ( length < 16 ) ? length : 16; + + for( i = 16; i > 12; i-- ) + if( ++ctx->y[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, + &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < use_len; i++ ) + { + if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT ) + ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; + out_p[i] = ectr[i] ^ p[i]; + if( ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT ) + ctx->buf[i] ^= out_p[i]; + } + + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + + length -= use_len; + p += use_len; + out_p += use_len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, + size_t tag_len ) +{ + unsigned char work_buf[16]; + size_t i; + uint64_t orig_len; + uint64_t orig_add_len; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + + orig_len = ctx->len * 8; + orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8; + + if( tag_len > 16 || tag_len < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT ); + + memcpy( tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len ); + + if( orig_len || orig_add_len ) + { + memset( work_buf, 0x00, 16 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_add_len >> 32 ), work_buf, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_add_len ), work_buf, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_len >> 32 ), work_buf, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( orig_len ), work_buf, 12 ); + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + ctx->buf[i] ^= work_buf[i]; + + gcm_mult( ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf ); + + for( i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ ) + tag[i] ^= ctx->buf[i]; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t tag_len, + unsigned char *tag ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, add, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( ctx, length, input, output ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( ctx, tag, tag_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *tag, + size_t tag_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char check_tag[16]; + size_t i; + int diff; + + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL ); + GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, length, + iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + input, output, tag_len, check_tag ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ + for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < tag_len; i++ ) + diff |= tag[i] ^ check_tag[i]; + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( output, length ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* + * AES-GCM test vectors from: + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/mac/gcmtestvectors.zip + */ +#define MAX_TESTS 6 + +static const int key_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; + +static const unsigned char key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, + 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08, + 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, + 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08 }, +}; + +static const size_t iv_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 12, 12, 12, 12, 8, 60 }; + +static const int iv_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2 }; + +static const unsigned char iv_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad, + 0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88 }, + { 0x93, 0x13, 0x22, 0x5d, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, + 0x55, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0xff, 0x52, 0x69, 0xaa, + 0x6a, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x38, 0x53, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xa1, + 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x03, 0xd2, 0xa3, 0x18, 0xa7, 0x28, + 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x51, 0x56, 0x80, 0x95, 0x39, + 0xfc, 0xf0, 0xe2, 0x42, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x52, 0x54, + 0x16, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0xde, 0x6a, 0x57, + 0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b }, +}; + +static const size_t add_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 0, 0, 0, 20, 20, 20 }; + +static const int add_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 }; + +static const unsigned char additional_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = +{ + { 0x00 }, + { 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, + 0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2 }, +}; + +static const size_t pt_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 0, 16, 64, 60, 60, 60 }; + +static const int pt_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; + +static const unsigned char pt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, + 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a, + 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda, + 0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72, + 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53, + 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25, + 0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57, + 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55 }, +}; + +static const unsigned char ct_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = +{ + { 0x00 }, + { 0x03, 0x88, 0xda, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x92, + 0xf3, 0x28, 0xc2, 0xb9, 0x71, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x78 }, + { 0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24, + 0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c, + 0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0, + 0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e, + 0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c, + 0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05, + 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97, + 0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91, 0x47, 0x3f, 0x59, 0x85 }, + { 0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24, + 0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c, + 0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0, + 0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e, + 0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c, + 0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05, + 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97, + 0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91 }, + { 0x61, 0x35, 0x3b, 0x4c, 0x28, 0x06, 0x93, 0x4a, + 0x77, 0x7f, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x55, + 0x69, 0x9b, 0x2a, 0x71, 0x4f, 0xcd, 0xc6, 0xf8, + 0x37, 0x66, 0xe5, 0xf9, 0x7b, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x23, + 0x73, 0x80, 0x69, 0x00, 0xe4, 0x9f, 0x24, 0xb2, + 0x2b, 0x09, 0x75, 0x44, 0xd4, 0x89, 0x6b, 0x42, + 0x49, 0x89, 0xb5, 0xe1, 0xeb, 0xac, 0x0f, 0x07, + 0xc2, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x98 }, + { 0x8c, 0xe2, 0x49, 0x98, 0x62, 0x56, 0x15, 0xb6, + 0x03, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0x94, + 0xbe, 0x91, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xc3, 0xa2, 0x11, 0xa8, + 0xba, 0x26, 0x2a, 0x3c, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x2c, 0xa7, + 0x01, 0xe4, 0xa9, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0x90, + 0xcc, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x81, 0xd4, 0x8c, 0x7c, 0x6f, + 0xd6, 0x28, 0x75, 0xd2, 0xac, 0xa4, 0x17, 0x03, + 0x4c, 0x34, 0xae, 0xe5 }, + { 0x00 }, + { 0x98, 0xe7, 0x24, 0x7c, 0x07, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x41, + 0x1c, 0x26, 0x7e, 0x43, 0x84, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x00 }, + { 0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41, + 0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57, + 0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84, + 0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c, + 0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25, + 0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47, + 0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9, + 0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10, 0xac, 0xad, 0xe2, 0x56 }, + { 0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41, + 0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57, + 0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84, + 0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c, + 0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25, + 0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47, + 0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9, + 0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10 }, + { 0x0f, 0x10, 0xf5, 0x99, 0xae, 0x14, 0xa1, 0x54, + 0xed, 0x24, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x25, 0x32, 0x4d, 0xb8, + 0xc5, 0x66, 0x63, 0x2e, 0xf2, 0xbb, 0xb3, 0x4f, + 0x83, 0x47, 0x28, 0x0f, 0xc4, 0x50, 0x70, 0x57, + 0xfd, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xdf, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x1f, 0x75, + 0xc6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xd4, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xd1, 0xc9, + 0xe9, 0x3a, 0x19, 0xa5, 0x8e, 0x8b, 0x47, 0x3f, + 0xa0, 0xf0, 0x62, 0xf7 }, + { 0xd2, 0x7e, 0x88, 0x68, 0x1c, 0xe3, 0x24, 0x3c, + 0x48, 0x30, 0x16, 0x5a, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0xf9, 0xff, + 0x1d, 0xe9, 0xa1, 0xd8, 0xe6, 0xb4, 0x47, 0xef, + 0x6e, 0xf7, 0xb7, 0x98, 0x28, 0x66, 0x6e, 0x45, + 0x81, 0xe7, 0x90, 0x12, 0xaf, 0x34, 0xdd, 0xd9, + 0xe2, 0xf0, 0x37, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x29, 0x2d, 0xb3, + 0xe6, 0x7c, 0x03, 0x67, 0x45, 0xfa, 0x22, 0xe7, + 0xe9, 0xb7, 0x37, 0x3b }, + { 0x00 }, + { 0xce, 0xa7, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x6e, + 0x07, 0x4e, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0xba, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x18 }, + { 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07, + 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d, + 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9, + 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa, + 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d, + 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38, + 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a, + 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62, 0x89, 0x80, 0x15, 0xad }, + { 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07, + 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d, + 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9, + 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa, + 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d, + 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38, + 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a, + 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62 }, + { 0xc3, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xf1, 0xca, 0x78, 0x7d, 0x32, + 0xae, 0x47, 0xc1, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0x98, 0x44, 0xcb, + 0xaf, 0x1a, 0xe1, 0x4d, 0x0b, 0x97, 0x6a, 0xfa, + 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xf7, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xba, 0x9d, 0xe0, + 0xfe, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xd3, 0x39, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xf0, + 0x95, 0x4c, 0xc2, 0x36, 0x3b, 0xc7, 0x3f, 0x78, + 0x62, 0xac, 0x43, 0x0e, 0x64, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x99, + 0xf4, 0x7c, 0x9b, 0x1f }, + { 0x5a, 0x8d, 0xef, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x9e, 0x53, 0xf1, + 0xf7, 0x5d, 0x78, 0x53, 0x65, 0x9e, 0x2a, 0x20, + 0xee, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x2a, 0xaf, 0xde, 0x64, 0x19, + 0xa0, 0x58, 0xab, 0x4f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x6b, 0xf4, + 0x0f, 0xc0, 0xc3, 0xb7, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x45, + 0x2d, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0xde, + 0xa2, 0x41, 0x89, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0x2e, + 0x44, 0xae, 0x7e, 0x3f }, +}; + +static const unsigned char tag_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = +{ + { 0x58, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xce, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0x30, 0x61, + 0x36, 0x7f, 0x1d, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x45, 0x5a }, + { 0xab, 0x6e, 0x47, 0xd4, 0x2c, 0xec, 0x13, 0xbd, + 0xf5, 0x3a, 0x67, 0xb2, 0x12, 0x57, 0xbd, 0xdf }, + { 0x4d, 0x5c, 0x2a, 0xf3, 0x27, 0xcd, 0x64, 0xa6, + 0x2c, 0xf3, 0x5a, 0xbd, 0x2b, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0xb4 }, + { 0x5b, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0xbc, 0x32, 0x21, 0xa5, 0xdb, + 0x94, 0xfa, 0xe9, 0x5a, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x1a, 0x47 }, + { 0x36, 0x12, 0xd2, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x3b, 0x07, 0x85, + 0x56, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0x4a, 0xac, 0xa2, 0xfc, 0xcb }, + { 0x61, 0x9c, 0xc5, 0xae, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x0b, 0xfa, + 0x46, 0x2a, 0xf4, 0x3c, 0x16, 0x99, 0xd0, 0x50 }, + { 0xcd, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0xc7, 0x73, 0xf7, 0x4b, + 0xa0, 0x0e, 0xd1, 0xf3, 0x12, 0x57, 0x24, 0x35 }, + { 0x2f, 0xf5, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x03, 0x39, 0x27, 0xab, + 0x8e, 0xf4, 0xd4, 0x58, 0x75, 0x14, 0xf0, 0xfb }, + { 0x99, 0x24, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0x58, 0x73, 0x36, 0xbf, + 0xb1, 0x18, 0x02, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x4a, 0x14 }, + { 0x25, 0x19, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x80, 0xf1, 0x47, 0x8f, + 0x37, 0xba, 0x55, 0xbd, 0x6d, 0x27, 0x61, 0x8c }, + { 0x65, 0xdc, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xcf, 0x62, 0x3a, 0x24, + 0x09, 0x4f, 0xcc, 0xa4, 0x0d, 0x35, 0x33, 0xf8 }, + { 0xdc, 0xf5, 0x66, 0xff, 0x29, 0x1c, 0x25, 0xbb, + 0xb8, 0x56, 0x8f, 0xc3, 0xd3, 0x76, 0xa6, 0xd9 }, + { 0x53, 0x0f, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0x45, 0x36, 0xb9, + 0xa9, 0x63, 0xb4, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x8b }, + { 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xc8, 0xa7, 0x99, 0x99, 0x6b, 0xf0, + 0x26, 0x5b, 0x98, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x19 }, + { 0xb0, 0x94, 0xda, 0xc5, 0xd9, 0x34, 0x71, 0xbd, + 0xec, 0x1a, 0x50, 0x22, 0x70, 0xe3, 0xcc, 0x6c }, + { 0x76, 0xfc, 0x6e, 0xce, 0x0f, 0x4e, 0x17, 0x68, + 0xcd, 0xdf, 0x88, 0x53, 0xbb, 0x2d, 0x55, 0x1b }, + { 0x3a, 0x33, 0x7d, 0xbf, 0x46, 0xa7, 0x92, 0xc4, + 0x5e, 0x45, 0x49, 0x13, 0xfe, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf2 }, + { 0xa4, 0x4a, 0x82, 0x66, 0xee, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0xb0, + 0xc8, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0x9a }, +}; + +int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[64]; + unsigned char tag_buf[16]; + int i, j, ret; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + + for( j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) + { + int key_len = 128 + 64 * j; + + for( i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++ ) + { + mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", + key_len, i, "enc" ); + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], + key_len ); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && key_len == 192 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + break; + } + else if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + pt_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i], + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + buf, 16, tag_buf ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + /* Allow alternative implementations to only support 12-byte nonces. */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && + iv_len_test_data[i] != 12 ) + { + mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" ); + break; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) */ + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if ( memcmp( buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", + key_len, i, "dec" ); + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], + key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, + pt_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i], + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], buf, 16, tag_buf ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ", + key_len, i, "enc" ); + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], + key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( pt_len_test_data[i] > 32 ) + { + size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len, + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]] + 32, + buf + 32 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len_test_data[i], + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, tag_buf, 16 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ", + key_len, i, "dec" ); + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], + key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( pt_len_test_data[i] > 32 ) + { + size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, 32, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, rest_len, + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i] + 32, + buf + 32 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, pt_len_test_data[i], + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + buf ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, tag_buf, 16 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + pt_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 || + memcmp( tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + ret = 0; + +exit: + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/havege.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/havege.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2a360a15 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/havege.c @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +/** + * \brief HAVEGE: HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The HAVEGE RNG was designed by Andre Seznec in 2002. + * + * http://www.irisa.fr/caps/projects/hipsor/publi.php + * + * Contact: seznec(at)irisa_dot_fr - orocheco(at)irisa_dot_fr + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/havege.h" +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include +#include + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ + * On average, one iteration accesses two 8-word blocks in the havege WALK + * table, and generates 16 words in the RES array. + * + * The data read in the WALK table is updated and permuted after each use. + * The result of the hardware clock counter read is used for this update. + * + * 25 conditional tests are present. The conditional tests are grouped in + * two nested groups of 12 conditional tests and 1 test that controls the + * permutation; on average, there should be 6 tests executed and 3 of them + * should be mispredicted. + * ------------------------------------------------------------------------ + */ + +#define SWAP(X,Y) { uint32_t *T = (X); (X) = (Y); (Y) = T; } + +#define TST1_ENTER if( PTEST & 1 ) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1; +#define TST2_ENTER if( PTEST & 1 ) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1; + +#define TST1_LEAVE U1++; } +#define TST2_LEAVE U2++; } + +#define ONE_ITERATION \ + \ + PTEST = PT1 >> 20; \ + \ + TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ + TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ + TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ + \ + TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ + TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ + TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ + \ + PTX = (PT1 >> 18) & 7; \ + PT1 &= 0x1FFF; \ + PT2 &= 0x1FFF; \ + CLK = (uint32_t) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ + \ + i = 0; \ + A = &WALK[PT1 ]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ + B = &WALK[PT2 ]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ + C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 1]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ + D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 4]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ + \ + IN = (*A >> (1)) ^ (*A << (31)) ^ CLK; \ + *A = (*B >> (2)) ^ (*B << (30)) ^ CLK; \ + *B = IN ^ U1; \ + *C = (*C >> (3)) ^ (*C << (29)) ^ CLK; \ + *D = (*D >> (4)) ^ (*D << (28)) ^ CLK; \ + \ + A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 2]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ + B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 2]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ + C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 3]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ + D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 6]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ + \ + if( PTEST & 1 ) SWAP( A, C ); \ + \ + IN = (*A >> (5)) ^ (*A << (27)) ^ CLK; \ + *A = (*B >> (6)) ^ (*B << (26)) ^ CLK; \ + *B = IN; CLK = (uint32_t) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ + *C = (*C >> (7)) ^ (*C << (25)) ^ CLK; \ + *D = (*D >> (8)) ^ (*D << (24)) ^ CLK; \ + \ + A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 4]; \ + B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 1]; \ + \ + PTEST = PT2 >> 1; \ + \ + PT2 = (RES[(i - 8) ^ PTY] ^ WALK[PT2 ^ PTY ^ 7]); \ + PT2 = ((PT2 & 0x1FFF) & (~8)) ^ ((PT1 ^ 8) & 0x8); \ + PTY = (PT2 >> 10) & 7; \ + \ + TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ + TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ + TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ + \ + TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ + TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ + TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ + \ + C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 5]; \ + D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 5]; \ + \ + RES[i++] ^= *A; \ + RES[i++] ^= *B; \ + RES[i++] ^= *C; \ + RES[i++] ^= *D; \ + \ + IN = (*A >> ( 9)) ^ (*A << (23)) ^ CLK; \ + *A = (*B >> (10)) ^ (*B << (22)) ^ CLK; \ + *B = IN ^ U2; \ + *C = (*C >> (11)) ^ (*C << (21)) ^ CLK; \ + *D = (*D >> (12)) ^ (*D << (20)) ^ CLK; \ + \ + A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 6]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ + B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 3]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ + C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 7]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ + D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 7]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ + \ + IN = (*A >> (13)) ^ (*A << (19)) ^ CLK; \ + *A = (*B >> (14)) ^ (*B << (18)) ^ CLK; \ + *B = IN; \ + *C = (*C >> (15)) ^ (*C << (17)) ^ CLK; \ + *D = (*D >> (16)) ^ (*D << (16)) ^ CLK; \ + \ + PT1 = ( RES[( i - 8 ) ^ PTX] ^ \ + WALK[PT1 ^ PTX ^ 7] ) & (~1); \ + PT1 ^= (PT2 ^ 0x10) & 0x10; \ + \ + for( n++, i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) \ + hs->pool[n % MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE] ^= RES[i]; + +/* + * Entropy gathering function + */ +static void havege_fill( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ) +{ + size_t n = 0; + size_t i; + uint32_t U1, U2, *A, *B, *C, *D; + uint32_t PT1, PT2, *WALK, RES[16]; + uint32_t PTX, PTY, CLK, PTEST, IN; + + WALK = hs->WALK; + PT1 = hs->PT1; + PT2 = hs->PT2; + + PTX = U1 = 0; + PTY = U2 = 0; + + (void)PTX; + + memset( RES, 0, sizeof( RES ) ); + + while( n < MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE * 4 ) + { + ONE_ITERATION + ONE_ITERATION + ONE_ITERATION + ONE_ITERATION + } + + hs->PT1 = PT1; + hs->PT2 = PT2; + + hs->offset[0] = 0; + hs->offset[1] = MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE / 2; +} + +/* + * HAVEGE initialization + */ +void mbedtls_havege_init( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ) +{ + memset( hs, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_havege_state ) ); + + havege_fill( hs ); +} + +void mbedtls_havege_free( mbedtls_havege_state *hs ) +{ + if( hs == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hs, sizeof( mbedtls_havege_state ) ); +} + +/* + * HAVEGE rand function + */ +int mbedtls_havege_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + uint32_t val; + size_t use_len; + mbedtls_havege_state *hs = (mbedtls_havege_state *) p_rng; + unsigned char *p = buf; + + while( len > 0 ) + { + use_len = len; + if( use_len > sizeof( val ) ) + use_len = sizeof( val ); + + if( hs->offset[1] >= MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE ) + havege_fill( hs ); + + val = hs->pool[hs->offset[0]++]; + val ^= hs->pool[hs->offset[1]++]; + + memcpy( p, &val, use_len ); + + len -= use_len; + p += use_len; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/hkdf.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/hkdf.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5013729d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/hkdf.c @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +/* + * HKDF implementation -- RFC 5869 + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) + +#include +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +int mbedtls_hkdf( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *salt, + size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, + const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, + unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char prk[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_hkdf_expand( md, prk, mbedtls_md_get_size( md ), + info, info_len, okm, okm_len ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( prk, sizeof( prk ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_hkdf_extract( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, + const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, + unsigned char *prk ) +{ + unsigned char null_salt[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE] = { '\0' }; + + if( salt == NULL ) + { + size_t hash_len; + + if( salt_len != 0 ) + { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + + if( hash_len == 0 ) + { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + salt = null_salt; + salt_len = hash_len; + } + + return( mbedtls_md_hmac( md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_hkdf_expand( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *prk, + size_t prk_len, const unsigned char *info, + size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len ) +{ + size_t hash_len; + size_t where = 0; + size_t n; + size_t t_len = 0; + size_t i; + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + unsigned char t[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + if( okm == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + + if( prk_len < hash_len || hash_len == 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( info == NULL ) + { + info = (const unsigned char *) ""; + info_len = 0; + } + + n = okm_len / hash_len; + + if( okm_len % hash_len != 0 ) + { + n++; + } + + /* + * Per RFC 5869 Section 2.3, okm_len must not exceed + * 255 times the hash length + */ + if( n > 255 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + memset( t, 0, hash_len ); + + /* + * Compute T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N) + * Where T(N) is defined in RFC 5869 Section 2.3 + */ + for( i = 1; i <= n; i++ ) + { + size_t num_to_copy; + unsigned char c = i & 0xff; + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, prk, prk_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, t, t_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, info, info_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + /* The constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a single octet. + * */ + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, &c, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx, t ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + num_to_copy = i != n ? hash_len : okm_len - where; + memcpy( okm + where, t, num_to_copy ); + where += hash_len; + t_len = hash_len; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( t, sizeof( t ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/hmac_drbg.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/hmac_drbg.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..69272fa7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/hmac_drbg.c @@ -0,0 +1,622 @@ +/* + * HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * The NIST SP 800-90A DRBGs are described in the following publication. + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf + * References below are based on rev. 1 (January 2012). + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG context initialization + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) ); + + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2) + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ) +{ + size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info ); + unsigned char rounds = ( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) ? 2 : 1; + unsigned char sep[1]; + unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ ) + { + /* Step 1 or 4 */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + sep, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( rounds == 2 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, K ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* Step 2 or 5 */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K, sizeof( K ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len ) +{ + (void) mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/* + * Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA) + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + /* + * Set initial working state. + * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the + * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, + mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + memset( ctx->V, 0x01, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Internal function used both for seeding and reseeding the DRBG. + * Comments starting with arabic numbers refer to section 10.1.2.4 + * of SP800-90A, while roman numbers refer to section 9.2. + */ +static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len, + int use_nonce ) +{ + unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; + size_t seedlen = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + { + size_t total_entropy_len; + + if( use_nonce == 0 ) + total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len; + else + total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len * 3 / 2; + + /* III. Check input length */ + if( len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT || + total_entropy_len + len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + } + } + + memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); + + /* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */ + if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, + seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; + + /* For initial seeding, allow adding of nonce generated + * from the entropy source. See Sect 8.6.7 in SP800-90A. */ + if( use_nonce ) + { + /* Note: We don't merge the two calls to f_entropy() in order + * to avoid requesting too much entropy from f_entropy() + * at once. Specifically, if the underlying digest is not + * SHA-1, 3 / 2 * entropy_len is at least 36 Bytes, which + * is larger than the maximum of 32 Bytes that our own + * entropy source implementation can emit in a single + * call in configurations disabling SHA-512. */ + if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, + seed + seedlen, + ctx->entropy_len / 2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); + } + + seedlen += ctx->entropy_len / 2; + } + + + /* 1. Concatenate entropy and additional data if any */ + if( additional != NULL && len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len ); + seedlen += len; + } + + /* 2. Update state */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* 3. Reset reseed_counter */ + ctx->reseed_counter = 1; + +exit: + /* 4. Done */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, seedlen ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG reseeding: 10.1.2.4 + 9.2 + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) +{ + return( hmac_drbg_reseed_core( ctx, additional, len, 0 ) ); +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG initialisation (10.1.2.3 + 9.1) + * + * The nonce is not passed as a separate parameter but extracted + * from the entropy source as suggested in 8.6.7. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info, + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t md_size; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* + * Set initial working state. + * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the + * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_size ); + + ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; + ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; + + if( ctx->entropy_len == 0 ) + { + /* + * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by + * each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2, + * min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength. + * + * (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.) + */ + ctx->entropy_len = md_size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */ + md_size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */ + 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */ + } + + if( ( ret = hmac_drbg_reseed_core( ctx, custom, len, + 1 /* add nonce */ ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Set prediction resistance + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + int resistance ) +{ + ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; +} + +/* + * Set entropy length grabbed for seeding + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ) +{ + ctx->entropy_len = len; +} + +/* + * Set reseed interval + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int interval ) +{ + ctx->reseed_interval = interval; +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG random function with optional additional data: + * 10.1.2.5 (arabic) + 9.3 (Roman) + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t out_len, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; + size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info ); + size_t left = out_len; + unsigned char *out = output; + + /* II. Check request length */ + if( out_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG ); + + /* III. Check input length */ + if( add_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); + + /* 1. (aka VII and IX) Check reseed counter and PR */ + if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL && /* For no-reseeding instances */ + ( ctx->prediction_resistance == MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON || + ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval ) ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + add_len = 0; /* VII.4 */ + } + + /* 2. Use additional data if any */ + if( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, + additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + /* 3, 4, 5. Generate bytes */ + while( left != 0 ) + { + size_t use_len = left > md_len ? md_len : left; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, + ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + memcpy( out, ctx->V, use_len ); + out += use_len; + left -= use_len; + } + + /* 6. Update */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, + additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* 7. Update reseed counter */ + ctx->reseed_counter++; + +exit: + /* 8. Done */ + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG random function + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( ctx, output, out_len, NULL, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(). + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */ + if( ctx->md_ctx.md_info != NULL ) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx->md_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) ); + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + FILE *f; + unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( fwrite( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ) != sizeof( buf ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + fclose( f ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = 0; + FILE *f = NULL; + size_t n; + unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; + unsigned char c; + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ); + if( fread( &c, 1, 1, f ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + goto exit; + } + if( n == 0 || ferror( f ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + fclose( f ); + f = NULL; + + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, buf, n ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + if( f != NULL ) + fclose( f ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +/* Dummy checkup routine */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + (void) verbose; + return( 0 ); +} +#else + +#define OUTPUT_LEN 80 + +/* From a NIST PR=true test vector */ +static const unsigned char entropy_pr[] = { + 0xa0, 0xc9, 0xab, 0x58, 0xf1, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xa4, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbd, 0x4f, + 0xf7, 0x3e, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xef, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x02, 0x8c, 0xf8, 0x11, + 0x48, 0xa5, 0x84, 0xfe, 0x69, 0xab, 0x5a, 0xee, 0x42, 0xaa, 0x4d, 0x42, + 0x17, 0x60, 0x99, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0x13, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x86, 0xa3, + 0x7b, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x54, 0x75, 0x69, 0x51, 0xe4 }; +static const unsigned char result_pr[OUTPUT_LEN] = { + 0x9a, 0x00, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0xd5, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0x31, 0xec, 0xb1, 0x39, + 0x9b, 0x60, 0x81, 0x48, 0xd1, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x25, 0x0d, 0x3c, 0x1e, 0x94, + 0x10, 0x10, 0x98, 0x12, 0x93, 0x25, 0xca, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xcc, 0x2d, 0x54, + 0x73, 0x19, 0x70, 0xc0, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0x89, 0x25, 0x19, 0x95, 0x5e, + 0x4b, 0xc6, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0x2b, 0xf8, 0xa3, 0x01, 0xab, + 0x46, 0x05, 0x5c, 0x09, 0xa6, 0x71, 0x88, 0xf1, 0xa7, 0x40, 0xee, 0xf3, + 0xe1, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x9b, 0x44, 0xaf, 0x03, 0x44 }; + +/* From a NIST PR=false test vector */ +static const unsigned char entropy_nopr[] = { + 0x79, 0x34, 0x9b, 0xbf, 0x7c, 0xdd, 0xa5, 0x79, 0x95, 0x57, 0x86, 0x66, + 0x21, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x83, 0x11, 0x46, 0x73, 0x3a, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x35, 0xc8, + 0xc7, 0x21, 0x5b, 0x5b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x74, 0xe3, + 0xe9, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0xdf }; +static const unsigned char result_nopr[OUTPUT_LEN] = { + 0xc6, 0xa1, 0x6a, 0xb8, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0x34, 0xab, 0x7f, + 0xec, 0x5a, 0xdc, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x3e, 0x15, 0x9c, 0xa6, + 0xac, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0xbe, 0x22, 0x83, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x0a, + 0xff, 0xb1, 0x0d, 0x71, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xc1, 0xa5, 0xcf, 0x73, 0x22, 0xec, + 0x1a, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x4e, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x12, 0x27, 0x46, 0xe0, 0x87, 0xfd, + 0xb5, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x34, 0x93, 0xd5, 0xbb, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xed, 0x49, + 0xe8, 0x5f, 0x13, 0x0f, 0xc8, 0xa4, 0x59, 0xb7 }; + +/* "Entropy" from buffer */ +static size_t test_offset; +static int hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = data; + memcpy( buf, p + test_offset, len ); + test_offset += len; + return( 0 ); +} + +#define CHK( c ) if( (c) != 0 ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ + return( 1 ); \ + } + +/* + * Checkup routine for HMAC_DRBG with SHA-1 + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[OUTPUT_LEN]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * PR = True + */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " HMAC_DRBG (PR = True) : " ); + + test_offset = 0; + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info, + hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_pr, + NULL, 0 ) ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ); + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); + CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + /* + * PR = False + */ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " HMAC_DRBG (PR = False) : " ); + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx ); + + test_offset = 0; + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info, + hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_nopr, + NULL, 0 ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); + CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); + CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/md.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/md.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..53a84b01 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/md.c @@ -0,0 +1,884 @@ +/** + * \file md.c + * + * \brief Generic message digest wrapper for mbed TLS + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info = { + "MD2", + MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, + 16, + 16, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info = { + "MD4", + MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, + 16, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = { + "MD5", + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, + 16, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = { + "RIPEMD160", + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, + 20, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = { + "SHA1", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + 20, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = { + "SHA224", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, + 28, + 64, +}; + +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = { + "SHA256", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + 32, + 64, +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = { + "SHA384", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + 48, + 128, +}; +#endif + +const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = { + "SHA512", + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, + 64, + 128, +}; +#endif + +/* + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new hash! + */ +static const int supported_digests[] = { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; + +const int *mbedtls_md_list( void ) +{ + return( supported_digests ); +} + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string( const char *md_name ) +{ + if( NULL == md_name ) + return( NULL ); + + /* Get the appropriate digest information */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + if( !strcmp( "MD2", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD2 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + if( !strcmp( "MD4", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD4 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + if( !strcmp( "MD5", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + if( !strcmp( "RIPEMD160", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + if( !strcmp( "SHA1", md_name ) || !strcmp( "SHA", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( !strcmp( "SHA224", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ); + if( !strcmp( "SHA256", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( !strcmp( "SHA384", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ); +#endif + if( !strcmp( "SHA512", md_name ) ) + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ); +#endif + return( NULL ); +} + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type ) +{ + switch( md_type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( &mbedtls_md2_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( &mbedtls_md4_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( &mbedtls_md5_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( &mbedtls_ripemd160_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( &mbedtls_sha1_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( &mbedtls_sha224_info ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( &mbedtls_sha256_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( &mbedtls_sha384_info ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( &mbedtls_sha512_info ); +#endif + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} + +void mbedtls_md_init( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md_context_t ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md_free( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return; + + if( ctx->md_ctx != NULL ) + { + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + mbedtls_md2_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + mbedtls_md4_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + mbedtls_sha1_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + mbedtls_sha512_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + break; + } + mbedtls_free( ctx->md_ctx ); + } + + if( ctx->hmac_ctx != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->hmac_ctx, + 2 * ctx->md_info->block_size ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->hmac_ctx ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md_context_t ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_clone( mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, + const mbedtls_md_context_t *src ) +{ + if( dst == NULL || dst->md_info == NULL || + src == NULL || src->md_info == NULL || + dst->md_info != src->md_info ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + switch( src->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + mbedtls_md2_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + mbedtls_md4_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + mbedtls_sha1_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + mbedtls_sha256_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + mbedtls_sha512_clone( dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_md_init_ctx( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) +{ + return mbedtls_md_setup( ctx, md_info, 1 ); +} +#endif + +#define ALLOC( type ) \ + do { \ + ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_##type##_context ) ); \ + if( ctx->md_ctx == NULL ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); \ + mbedtls_##type##_init( ctx->md_ctx ); \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +int mbedtls_md_setup( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL || ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ctx->md_info = md_info; + ctx->md_ctx = NULL; + ctx->hmac_ctx = NULL; + + switch( md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + ALLOC( md2 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + ALLOC( md4 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + ALLOC( md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + ALLOC( ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + ALLOC( sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + ALLOC( sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + ALLOC( sha512 ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( hmac != 0 ) + { + ctx->hmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 2, md_info->block_size ); + if( ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_md_free( ctx ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#undef ALLOC + +int mbedtls_md_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 1 ) ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 0 ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 1 ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( ctx->md_ctx, 0 ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_md_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_md2_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_md4_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_md_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( ctx->md_ctx, output ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_md( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_md2_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_md4_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_md5_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_sha1_ret( input, ilen, output ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, 1 ) ); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, 0 ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_md_file( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + FILE *f; + size_t n; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + while( ( n = fread( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ) ) > 0 ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, buf, n ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ferror( f ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR; + else + ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, output ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + fclose( f ); + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *ipad, *opad; + size_t i; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( keylen > (size_t) ctx->md_info->block_size ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + keylen = ctx->md_info->size; + key = sum; + } + + ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; + opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; + + memset( ipad, 0x36, ctx->md_info->block_size ); + memset( opad, 0x5C, ctx->md_info->block_size ); + + for( i = 0; i < keylen; i++ ) + { + ipad[i] = (unsigned char)( ipad[i] ^ key[i] ); + opad[i] = (unsigned char)( opad[i] ^ key[i] ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, ipad, + ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sum, sizeof( sum ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_update( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, input, ilen ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *opad; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, tmp ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, opad, + ctx->md_info->block_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( ctx, tmp, + ctx->md_info->size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + return( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *ipad; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + return( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, ipad, ctx->md_info->block_size ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx, key, keylen ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_md_process( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + switch( ctx->md_info->type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: + return( mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx->md_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: + return( mbedtls_internal_md4_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return( mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx->md_ctx, data ) ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +} + +unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + return md_info->size; +} + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + + return md_info->type; +} + +const char *mbedtls_md_get_name( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ) +{ + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + return md_info->name; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/md2.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/md2.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f8293a1d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/md2.c @@ -0,0 +1,353 @@ +/* + * RFC 1115/1319 compliant MD2 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The MD2 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1989. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1115.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1319.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) + +static const unsigned char PI_SUBST[256] = +{ + 0x29, 0x2E, 0x43, 0xC9, 0xA2, 0xD8, 0x7C, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x36, + 0x54, 0xA1, 0xEC, 0xF0, 0x06, 0x13, 0x62, 0xA7, 0x05, 0xF3, + 0xC0, 0xC7, 0x73, 0x8C, 0x98, 0x93, 0x2B, 0xD9, 0xBC, 0x4C, + 0x82, 0xCA, 0x1E, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x3C, 0xFD, 0xD4, 0xE0, 0x16, + 0x67, 0x42, 0x6F, 0x18, 0x8A, 0x17, 0xE5, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x4E, + 0xC4, 0xD6, 0xDA, 0x9E, 0xDE, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xFB, 0xF5, 0x8E, + 0xBB, 0x2F, 0xEE, 0x7A, 0xA9, 0x68, 0x79, 0x91, 0x15, 0xB2, + 0x07, 0x3F, 0x94, 0xC2, 0x10, 0x89, 0x0B, 0x22, 0x5F, 0x21, + 0x80, 0x7F, 0x5D, 0x9A, 0x5A, 0x90, 0x32, 0x27, 0x35, 0x3E, + 0xCC, 0xE7, 0xBF, 0xF7, 0x97, 0x03, 0xFF, 0x19, 0x30, 0xB3, + 0x48, 0xA5, 0xB5, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x5E, 0x92, 0x2A, 0xAC, 0x56, + 0xAA, 0xC6, 0x4F, 0xB8, 0x38, 0xD2, 0x96, 0xA4, 0x7D, 0xB6, + 0x76, 0xFC, 0x6B, 0xE2, 0x9C, 0x74, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x45, 0x9D, + 0x70, 0x59, 0x64, 0x71, 0x87, 0x20, 0x86, 0x5B, 0xCF, 0x65, + 0xE6, 0x2D, 0xA8, 0x02, 0x1B, 0x60, 0x25, 0xAD, 0xAE, 0xB0, + 0xB9, 0xF6, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x61, 0x69, 0x34, 0x40, 0x7E, 0x0F, + 0x55, 0x47, 0xA3, 0x23, 0xDD, 0x51, 0xAF, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x5C, + 0xF9, 0xCE, 0xBA, 0xC5, 0xEA, 0x26, 0x2C, 0x53, 0x0D, 0x6E, + 0x85, 0x28, 0x84, 0x09, 0xD3, 0xDF, 0xCD, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x81, + 0x4D, 0x52, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x37, 0xC8, 0x6C, 0xC1, 0xAB, 0xFA, + 0x24, 0xE1, 0x7B, 0x08, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0xB1, 0x4A, 0x78, 0x88, + 0x95, 0x8B, 0xE3, 0x63, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xCB, 0xD5, 0xFE, + 0x3B, 0x00, 0x1D, 0x39, 0xF2, 0xEF, 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x66, 0x58, + 0xD0, 0xE4, 0xA6, 0x77, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xEB, 0x75, 0x4B, 0x0A, + 0x31, 0x44, 0x50, 0xB4, 0x8F, 0xED, 0x1F, 0x1A, 0xDB, 0x99, + 0x8D, 0x33, 0x9F, 0x11, 0x83, 0x14 +}; + +void mbedtls_md2_init( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md2_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md2_free( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md2_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md2_clone( mbedtls_md2_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md2_context *src ) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * MD2 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx->cksum, 0, 16 ); + memset( ctx->state, 0, 46 ); + memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 16 ); + ctx->left = 0; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md2_starts( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( ctx ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) +{ + int i, j; + unsigned char t = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + { + ctx->state[i + 16] = ctx->buffer[i]; + ctx->state[i + 32] = + (unsigned char)( ctx->buffer[i] ^ ctx->state[i]); + } + + for( i = 0; i < 18; i++ ) + { + for( j = 0; j < 48; j++ ) + { + ctx->state[j] = (unsigned char) + ( ctx->state[j] ^ PI_SUBST[t] ); + t = ctx->state[j]; + } + + t = (unsigned char)( t + i ); + } + + t = ctx->cksum[15]; + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + { + ctx->cksum[i] = (unsigned char) + ( ctx->cksum[i] ^ PI_SUBST[ctx->buffer[i] ^ t] ); + t = ctx->cksum[i]; + } + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &t, sizeof( t ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md2_process( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * MD2 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_md2_update_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + + while( ilen > 0 ) + { + if( ilen > 16 - ctx->left ) + fill = 16 - ctx->left; + else + fill = ilen; + + memcpy( ctx->buffer + ctx->left, input, fill ); + + ctx->left += fill; + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + + if( ctx->left == 16 ) + { + ctx->left = 0; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md2_update( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_md2_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +/* + * MD2 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + unsigned char x; + + x = (unsigned char)( 16 - ctx->left ); + + for( i = ctx->left; i < 16; i++ ) + ctx->buffer[i] = x; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memcpy( ctx->buffer, ctx->cksum, 16 ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memcpy( output, ctx->state, 16 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md2_finish( mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ + +/* + * output = MD2( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_md2_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md2_context ctx; + + mbedtls_md2_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md2_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_md2_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md2( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_md2_ret( input, ilen, output ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * RFC 1319 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char md2_test_str[7][81] = +{ + { "" }, + { "a" }, + { "abc" }, + { "message digest" }, + { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, + { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, + { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } +}; + +static const size_t md2_test_strlen[7] = +{ + 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 +}; + +static const unsigned char md2_test_sum[7][16] = +{ + { 0x83, 0x50, 0xE5, 0xA3, 0xE2, 0x4C, 0x15, 0x3D, + 0xF2, 0x27, 0x5C, 0x9F, 0x80, 0x69, 0x27, 0x73 }, + { 0x32, 0xEC, 0x01, 0xEC, 0x4A, 0x6D, 0xAC, 0x72, + 0xC0, 0xAB, 0x96, 0xFB, 0x34, 0xC0, 0xB5, 0xD1 }, + { 0xDA, 0x85, 0x3B, 0x0D, 0x3F, 0x88, 0xD9, 0x9B, + 0x30, 0x28, 0x3A, 0x69, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0xD6, 0xBB }, + { 0xAB, 0x4F, 0x49, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x2A, 0x53, 0x0B, + 0x21, 0x9F, 0xF3, 0x30, 0x31, 0xFE, 0x06, 0xB0 }, + { 0x4E, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x02, 0x92, 0xAB, + 0x5A, 0x41, 0x08, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x47, 0x94, 0x0B }, + { 0xDA, 0x33, 0xDE, 0xF2, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xF1, 0x39, + 0x75, 0x35, 0x28, 0x46, 0xC3, 0x03, 0x38, 0xCD }, + { 0xD5, 0x97, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x0D, + 0xC9, 0x80, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x66, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xD8 } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_md2_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char md2sum[16]; + + for( i = 0; i < 7; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MD2 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md2_ret( md2_test_str[i], md2_test_strlen[i], md2sum ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( md2sum, md2_test_sum[i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/md4.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/md4.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a4122134 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/md4.c @@ -0,0 +1,454 @@ +/* + * RFC 1186/1320 compliant MD4 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The MD4 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1990. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1186.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) + +void mbedtls_md4_init( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md4_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md4_free( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md4_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md4_clone( mbedtls_md4_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md4_context *src ) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * MD4 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md4_starts( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( ctx ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + struct + { + uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; + } local; + + local.X[ 0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 0 ); + local.X[ 1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 4 ); + local.X[ 2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 8 ); + local.X[ 3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 12 ); + local.X[ 4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 16 ); + local.X[ 5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 20 ); + local.X[ 6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 24 ); + local.X[ 7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 28 ); + local.X[ 8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 32 ); + local.X[ 9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 36 ); + local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 40 ); + local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 44 ); + local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 48 ); + local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 52 ); + local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 56 ); + local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 60 ); + +#define S(x,n) (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) + + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; + +#define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~(x)) & (z))) +#define P(a,b,c,d,x,s) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += F((b),(c),(d)) + (x); \ + (a) = S((a),(s)); \ + } while( 0 ) + + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 0], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 1], 7 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 2], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[ 3], 19 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 4], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 5], 7 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 6], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[ 7], 19 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 8], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 9], 7 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[10], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[11], 19 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[12], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[13], 7 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[14], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 19 ); + +#undef P +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (z))) +#define P(a,b,c,d,x,s) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += F((b),(c),(d)) + (x) + 0x5A827999; \ + (a) = S((a),(s)); \ + } while( 0 ) + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 0], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 4], 5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 8], 9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[12], 13 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 1], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 5], 5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 9], 9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[13], 13 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 2], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 6], 5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[10], 9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[14], 13 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 3], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 7], 5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[11], 9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 13 ); + +#undef P +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) +#define P(a,b,c,d,x,s) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += F((b),(c),(d)) + (x) + 0x6ED9EBA1; \ + (a) = S((a),(s)); \ + } while( 0 ) + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 0], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 8], 9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 4], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[12], 15 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 2], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[10], 9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 6], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[14], 15 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 1], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[ 9], 9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 5], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[13], 15 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[ 3], 3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[11], 9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[ 7], 11 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 15 ); + +#undef F +#undef P + + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md4_process( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_md4_process( ctx, data ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * MD4 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_md4_update_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), + (void *) input, fill ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md4_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 64 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md4_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), + (void *) input, ilen ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md4_update( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_md4_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +static const unsigned char md4_padding[64] = +{ + 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +}; + +/* + * MD4 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t last, padn; + uint32_t high, low; + unsigned char msglen[8]; + + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( low, msglen, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( high, msglen, 4 ); + + last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + padn = ( last < 56 ) ? ( 56 - last ) : ( 120 - last ); + + ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret( ctx, (unsigned char *)md4_padding, padn ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret( ctx, msglen, 8 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md4_finish( mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ + +/* + * output = MD4( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_md4_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md4_context ctx; + + mbedtls_md4_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_md4_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md4( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_md4_ret( input, ilen, output ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * RFC 1320 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char md4_test_str[7][81] = +{ + { "" }, + { "a" }, + { "abc" }, + { "message digest" }, + { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, + { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, + { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } +}; + +static const size_t md4_test_strlen[7] = +{ + 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 +}; + +static const unsigned char md4_test_sum[7][16] = +{ + { 0x31, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xE0, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0xE9, 0x31, + 0xB7, 0x3C, 0x59, 0xD7, 0xE0, 0xC0, 0x89, 0xC0 }, + { 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xB3, 0x1D, 0xE3, 0x3E, 0x46, + 0x24, 0x5E, 0x05, 0xFB, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0xFB, 0x24 }, + { 0xA4, 0x48, 0x01, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x21, 0xD8, 0x52, + 0x5F, 0xC1, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0x7A, 0xA6, 0x72, 0x9D }, + { 0xD9, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x64, 0x54, 0x9F, 0xE8, + 0x18, 0x87, 0x48, 0x06, 0xE1, 0xC7, 0x01, 0x4B }, + { 0xD7, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x30, 0x8A, 0xA5, 0xBB, 0xCD, + 0xEE, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x63, 0xDF, 0x41, 0x2D, 0xA9 }, + { 0x04, 0x3F, 0x85, 0x82, 0xF2, 0x41, 0xDB, 0x35, + 0x1C, 0xE6, 0x27, 0xE1, 0x53, 0xE7, 0xF0, 0xE4 }, + { 0xE3, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x38, 0xF2, 0x19, + 0x9C, 0x3E, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x4F, 0xCC, 0x05, 0x36 } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_md4_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char md4sum[16]; + + for( i = 0; i < 7; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MD4 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md4_ret( md4_test_str[i], md4_test_strlen[i], md4sum ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( md4sum, md4_test_sum[i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/md5.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/md5.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e53bfe63 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/md5.c @@ -0,0 +1,468 @@ +/* + * RFC 1321 compliant MD5 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The MD5 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1991. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) + +void mbedtls_md5_init( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_md5_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md5_free( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_md5_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_md5_clone( mbedtls_md5_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md5_context *src ) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * MD5 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md5_starts( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( ctx ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + struct + { + uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; + } local; + + local.X[ 0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 0 ); + local.X[ 1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 4 ); + local.X[ 2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 8 ); + local.X[ 3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 12 ); + local.X[ 4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 16 ); + local.X[ 5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 20 ); + local.X[ 6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 24 ); + local.X[ 7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 28 ); + local.X[ 8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 32 ); + local.X[ 9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 36 ); + local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 40 ); + local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 44 ); + local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 48 ); + local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 52 ); + local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 56 ); + local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 60 ); + +#define S(x,n) \ + ( ( (x) << (n) ) | ( ( (x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> ( 32 - (n) ) ) ) + +#define P(a,b,c,d,k,s,t) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += F((b),(c),(d)) + local.X[(k)] + (t); \ + (a) = S((a),(s)) + (b); \ + } while( 0 ) + + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; + +#define F(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 0, 7, 0xD76AA478 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 1, 12, 0xE8C7B756 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 2, 17, 0x242070DB ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 3, 22, 0xC1BDCEEE ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 4, 7, 0xF57C0FAF ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 5, 12, 0x4787C62A ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 6, 17, 0xA8304613 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 7, 22, 0xFD469501 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 7, 0x698098D8 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 9, 12, 0x8B44F7AF ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 10, 17, 0xFFFF5BB1 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 11, 22, 0x895CD7BE ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 12, 7, 0x6B901122 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 13, 12, 0xFD987193 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 14, 17, 0xA679438E ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 15, 22, 0x49B40821 ); + +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((y) ^ ((z) & ((x) ^ (y)))) + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 5, 0xF61E2562 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 9, 0xC040B340 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 11, 14, 0x265E5A51 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 0, 20, 0xE9B6C7AA ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 5, 0xD62F105D ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 10, 9, 0x02441453 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 15, 14, 0xD8A1E681 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 4, 20, 0xE7D3FBC8 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 5, 0x21E1CDE6 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 14, 9, 0xC33707D6 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 3, 14, 0xF4D50D87 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 8, 20, 0x455A14ED ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 5, 0xA9E3E905 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 2, 9, 0xFCEFA3F8 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 7, 14, 0x676F02D9 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 12, 20, 0x8D2A4C8A ); + +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 4, 0xFFFA3942 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 8, 11, 0x8771F681 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 11, 16, 0x6D9D6122 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 14, 23, 0xFDE5380C ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 4, 0xA4BEEA44 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 4, 11, 0x4BDECFA9 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 7, 16, 0xF6BB4B60 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 10, 23, 0xBEBFBC70 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 4, 0x289B7EC6 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 11, 0xEAA127FA ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 3, 16, 0xD4EF3085 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 6, 23, 0x04881D05 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 4, 0xD9D4D039 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 11, 0xE6DB99E5 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 15, 16, 0x1FA27CF8 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 2, 23, 0xC4AC5665 ); + +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((y) ^ ((x) | ~(z))) + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 0, 6, 0xF4292244 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 7, 10, 0x432AFF97 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 14, 15, 0xAB9423A7 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 5, 21, 0xFC93A039 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 12, 6, 0x655B59C3 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 10, 0x8F0CCC92 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 10, 15, 0xFFEFF47D ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 1, 21, 0x85845DD1 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 6, 0x6FA87E4F ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 10, 0xFE2CE6E0 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 6, 15, 0xA3014314 ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 13, 21, 0x4E0811A1 ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 4, 6, 0xF7537E82 ); + P( local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 11, 10, 0xBD3AF235 ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 2, 15, 0x2AD7D2BB ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 9, 21, 0xEB86D391 ); + +#undef F + + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md5_process( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx, data ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * MD5 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_md5_update_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 64 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md5_update( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +/* + * MD5 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t used; + uint32_t high, low; + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if( used <= 56 ) + { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used ); + } + else + { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 56 ); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( low, ctx->buffer, 56 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( high, ctx->buffer, 60 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * Output final state + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md5_finish( mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ + +/* + * output = MD5( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_md5_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md5_context ctx; + + mbedtls_md5_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_md5_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_md5( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_ret( input, ilen, output ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * RFC 1321 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char md5_test_buf[7][81] = +{ + { "" }, + { "a" }, + { "abc" }, + { "message digest" }, + { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, + { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, + { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } +}; + +static const size_t md5_test_buflen[7] = +{ + 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 +}; + +static const unsigned char md5_test_sum[7][16] = +{ + { 0xD4, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0xD9, 0x8F, 0x00, 0xB2, 0x04, + 0xE9, 0x80, 0x09, 0x98, 0xEC, 0xF8, 0x42, 0x7E }, + { 0x0C, 0xC1, 0x75, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xF1, 0xB6, 0xA8, + 0x31, 0xC3, 0x99, 0xE2, 0x69, 0x77, 0x26, 0x61 }, + { 0x90, 0x01, 0x50, 0x98, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xB0, + 0xD6, 0x96, 0x3F, 0x7D, 0x28, 0xE1, 0x7F, 0x72 }, + { 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x7C, 0xB7, 0x93, 0x8D, + 0x52, 0x5A, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xAA, 0xF1, 0x61, 0xD0 }, + { 0xC3, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0xD7, 0x61, 0x92, 0xE4, 0x00, + 0x7D, 0xFB, 0x49, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0x67, 0xE1, 0x3B }, + { 0xD1, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x98, 0xD2, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xF5, + 0xA5, 0x61, 0x1C, 0x2C, 0x9F, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x9F }, + { 0x57, 0xED, 0xF4, 0xA2, 0x2B, 0xE3, 0xC9, 0x55, + 0xAC, 0x49, 0xDA, 0x2E, 0x21, 0x07, 0xB6, 0x7A } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_md5_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char md5sum[16]; + + for( i = 0; i < 7; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MD5 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md5_ret( md5_test_buf[i], md5_test_buflen[i], md5sum ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( md5sum, md5_test_sum[i], 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cc62324b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,744 @@ +/* + * Buffer-based memory allocator + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" + +/* No need for the header guard as MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + is dependent upon MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#define MAGIC1 0xFF00AA55 +#define MAGIC2 0xEE119966 +#define MAX_BT 20 + +typedef struct _memory_header memory_header; +struct _memory_header +{ + size_t magic1; + size_t size; + size_t alloc; + memory_header *prev; + memory_header *next; + memory_header *prev_free; + memory_header *next_free; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + char **trace; + size_t trace_count; +#endif + size_t magic2; +}; + +typedef struct +{ + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + memory_header *first; + memory_header *first_free; + int verify; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + size_t alloc_count; + size_t free_count; + size_t total_used; + size_t maximum_used; + size_t header_count; + size_t maximum_header_count; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; +#endif +} +buffer_alloc_ctx; + +static buffer_alloc_ctx heap; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) +static void debug_header( memory_header *hdr ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + size_t i; +#endif + + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "HDR: PTR(%10zu), PREV(%10zu), NEXT(%10zu), " + "ALLOC(%zu), SIZE(%10zu)\n", + (size_t) hdr, (size_t) hdr->prev, (size_t) hdr->next, + hdr->alloc, hdr->size ); + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, " FPREV(%10zu), FNEXT(%10zu)\n", + (size_t) hdr->prev_free, (size_t) hdr->next_free ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "TRACE: \n" ); + for( i = 0; i < hdr->trace_count; i++ ) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "%s\n", hdr->trace[i] ); + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "\n" ); +#endif +} + +static void debug_chain( void ) +{ + memory_header *cur = heap.first; + + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "\nBlock list\n" ); + while( cur != NULL ) + { + debug_header( cur ); + cur = cur->next; + } + + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Free list\n" ); + cur = heap.first_free; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + debug_header( cur ); + cur = cur->next_free; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ + +static int verify_header( memory_header *hdr ) +{ + if( hdr->magic1 != MAGIC1 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: MAGIC1 mismatch\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + if( hdr->magic2 != MAGIC2 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: MAGIC2 mismatch\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + if( hdr->alloc > 1 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: alloc has illegal value\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + if( hdr->prev != NULL && hdr->prev == hdr->next ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: prev == next\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + if( hdr->prev_free != NULL && hdr->prev_free == hdr->next_free ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: prev_free == next_free\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int verify_chain( void ) +{ + memory_header *prv = heap.first, *cur; + + if( prv == NULL || verify_header( prv ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: verification of first header " + "failed\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + if( heap.first->prev != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: verification failed: " + "first->prev != NULL\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + cur = heap.first->next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( verify_header( cur ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: verification of header " + "failed\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + if( cur->prev != prv ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: verification failed: " + "cur->prev != prv\n" ); +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + + prv = cur; + cur = cur->next; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void *buffer_alloc_calloc( size_t n, size_t size ) +{ + memory_header *new, *cur = heap.first_free; + unsigned char *p; + void *ret; + size_t original_len, len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + void *trace_buffer[MAX_BT]; + size_t trace_cnt; +#endif + + if( heap.buf == NULL || heap.first == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + original_len = len = n * size; + + if( n == 0 || size == 0 || len / n != size ) + return( NULL ); + else if( len > (size_t)-MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE ) + return( NULL ); + + if( len % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE ) + { + len -= len % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; + len += MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; + } + + // Find block that fits + // + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( cur->size >= len ) + break; + + cur = cur->next_free; + } + + if( cur == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + if( cur->alloc != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: block in free_list but allocated " + "data\n" ); +#endif + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.alloc_count++; +#endif + + // Found location, split block if > memory_header + 4 room left + // + if( cur->size - len < sizeof(memory_header) + + MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE ) + { + cur->alloc = 1; + + // Remove from free_list + // + if( cur->prev_free != NULL ) + cur->prev_free->next_free = cur->next_free; + else + heap.first_free = cur->next_free; + + if( cur->next_free != NULL ) + cur->next_free->prev_free = cur->prev_free; + + cur->prev_free = NULL; + cur->next_free = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.total_used += cur->size; + if( heap.total_used > heap.maximum_used ) + heap.maximum_used = heap.total_used; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + trace_cnt = backtrace( trace_buffer, MAX_BT ); + cur->trace = backtrace_symbols( trace_buffer, trace_cnt ); + cur->trace_count = trace_cnt; +#endif + + if( ( heap.verify & MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC ) && verify_chain() != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + + ret = (unsigned char *) cur + sizeof( memory_header ); + memset( ret, 0, original_len ); + + return( ret ); + } + + p = ( (unsigned char *) cur ) + sizeof(memory_header) + len; + new = (memory_header *) p; + + new->size = cur->size - len - sizeof(memory_header); + new->alloc = 0; + new->prev = cur; + new->next = cur->next; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + new->trace = NULL; + new->trace_count = 0; +#endif + new->magic1 = MAGIC1; + new->magic2 = MAGIC2; + + if( new->next != NULL ) + new->next->prev = new; + + // Replace cur with new in free_list + // + new->prev_free = cur->prev_free; + new->next_free = cur->next_free; + if( new->prev_free != NULL ) + new->prev_free->next_free = new; + else + heap.first_free = new; + + if( new->next_free != NULL ) + new->next_free->prev_free = new; + + cur->alloc = 1; + cur->size = len; + cur->next = new; + cur->prev_free = NULL; + cur->next_free = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.header_count++; + if( heap.header_count > heap.maximum_header_count ) + heap.maximum_header_count = heap.header_count; + heap.total_used += cur->size; + if( heap.total_used > heap.maximum_used ) + heap.maximum_used = heap.total_used; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + trace_cnt = backtrace( trace_buffer, MAX_BT ); + cur->trace = backtrace_symbols( trace_buffer, trace_cnt ); + cur->trace_count = trace_cnt; +#endif + + if( ( heap.verify & MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC ) && verify_chain() != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + + ret = (unsigned char *) cur + sizeof( memory_header ); + memset( ret, 0, original_len ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static void buffer_alloc_free( void *ptr ) +{ + memory_header *hdr, *old = NULL; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) ptr; + + if( ptr == NULL || heap.buf == NULL || heap.first == NULL ) + return; + + if( p < heap.buf || p >= heap.buf + heap.len ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: mbedtls_free() outside of managed " + "space\n" ); +#endif + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + } + + p -= sizeof(memory_header); + hdr = (memory_header *) p; + + if( verify_header( hdr ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + + if( hdr->alloc != 1 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "FATAL: mbedtls_free() on unallocated " + "data\n" ); +#endif + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); + } + + hdr->alloc = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.free_count++; + heap.total_used -= hdr->size; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + free( hdr->trace ); + hdr->trace = NULL; + hdr->trace_count = 0; +#endif + + // Regroup with block before + // + if( hdr->prev != NULL && hdr->prev->alloc == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.header_count--; +#endif + hdr->prev->size += sizeof(memory_header) + hdr->size; + hdr->prev->next = hdr->next; + old = hdr; + hdr = hdr->prev; + + if( hdr->next != NULL ) + hdr->next->prev = hdr; + + memset( old, 0, sizeof(memory_header) ); + } + + // Regroup with block after + // + if( hdr->next != NULL && hdr->next->alloc == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.header_count--; +#endif + hdr->size += sizeof(memory_header) + hdr->next->size; + old = hdr->next; + hdr->next = hdr->next->next; + + if( hdr->prev_free != NULL || hdr->next_free != NULL ) + { + if( hdr->prev_free != NULL ) + hdr->prev_free->next_free = hdr->next_free; + else + heap.first_free = hdr->next_free; + + if( hdr->next_free != NULL ) + hdr->next_free->prev_free = hdr->prev_free; + } + + hdr->prev_free = old->prev_free; + hdr->next_free = old->next_free; + + if( hdr->prev_free != NULL ) + hdr->prev_free->next_free = hdr; + else + heap.first_free = hdr; + + if( hdr->next_free != NULL ) + hdr->next_free->prev_free = hdr; + + if( hdr->next != NULL ) + hdr->next->prev = hdr; + + memset( old, 0, sizeof(memory_header) ); + } + + // Prepend to free_list if we have not merged + // (Does not have to stay in same order as prev / next list) + // + if( old == NULL ) + { + hdr->next_free = heap.first_free; + if( heap.first_free != NULL ) + heap.first_free->prev_free = hdr; + heap.first_free = hdr; + } + + if( ( heap.verify & MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE ) && verify_chain() != 0 ) + mbedtls_exit( 1 ); +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify( int verify ) +{ + heap.verify = verify; +} + +int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify( void ) +{ + return verify_chain(); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status( void ) +{ + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, + "Current use: %zu blocks / %zu bytes, max: %zu blocks / " + "%zu bytes (total %zu bytes), alloc / free: %zu / %zu\n", + heap.header_count, heap.total_used, + heap.maximum_header_count, heap.maximum_used, + heap.maximum_header_count * sizeof( memory_header ) + + heap.maximum_used, + heap.alloc_count, heap.free_count ); + + if( heap.first->next == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "All memory de-allocated in stack buffer\n" ); + } + else + { + mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Memory currently allocated:\n" ); + debug_chain(); + } +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get( size_t *max_used, size_t *max_blocks ) +{ + *max_used = heap.maximum_used; + *max_blocks = heap.maximum_header_count; +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset( void ) +{ + heap.maximum_used = 0; + heap.maximum_header_count = 0; +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get( size_t *cur_used, size_t *cur_blocks ) +{ + *cur_used = heap.total_used; + *cur_blocks = heap.header_count; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +static void *buffer_alloc_calloc_mutexed( size_t n, size_t size ) +{ + void *buf; + if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &heap.mutex ) != 0 ) + return( NULL ); + buf = buffer_alloc_calloc( n, size ); + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &heap.mutex ) ) + return( NULL ); + return( buf ); +} + +static void buffer_alloc_free_mutexed( void *ptr ) +{ + /* We have no good option here, but corrupting the heap seems + * worse than losing memory. */ + if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &heap.mutex ) ) + return; + buffer_alloc_free( ptr ); + (void) mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &heap.mutex ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + memset( &heap, 0, sizeof( buffer_alloc_ctx ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &heap.mutex ); + mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( buffer_alloc_calloc_mutexed, + buffer_alloc_free_mutexed ); +#else + mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( buffer_alloc_calloc, buffer_alloc_free ); +#endif + + if( len < sizeof( memory_header ) + MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE ) + return; + else if( (size_t)buf % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE ) + { + /* Adjust len first since buf is used in the computation */ + len -= MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE + - (size_t)buf % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; + buf += MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE + - (size_t)buf % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; + } + + memset( buf, 0, len ); + + heap.buf = buf; + heap.len = len; + + heap.first = (memory_header *)buf; + heap.first->size = len - sizeof( memory_header ); + heap.first->magic1 = MAGIC1; + heap.first->magic2 = MAGIC2; + heap.first_free = heap.first; +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &heap.mutex ); +#endif + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &heap, sizeof(buffer_alloc_ctx) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +static int check_pointer( void *p ) +{ + if( p == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( (size_t) p % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int check_all_free( void ) +{ + if( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.total_used != 0 || +#endif + heap.first != heap.first_free || + (void *) heap.first != (void *) heap.buf ) + { + return( -1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define TEST_ASSERT( condition ) \ + if( ! (condition) ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \ + \ + ret = 1; \ + goto cleanup; \ + } + +int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + unsigned char buf[1024]; + unsigned char *p, *q, *r, *end; + int ret = 0; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MBA test #1 (basic alloc-free cycle): " ); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 ); + q = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 128 ); + r = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 16 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( p ) == 0 && + check_pointer( q ) == 0 && + check_pointer( r ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_free( r ); + mbedtls_free( q ); + mbedtls_free( p ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_all_free( ) == 0 ); + + /* Memorize end to compare with the next test */ + end = heap.buf + heap.len; + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MBA test #2 (buf not aligned): " ); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( buf + 1, sizeof( buf ) - 1 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( heap.buf + heap.len == end ); + + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 ); + q = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 128 ); + r = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 16 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( p ) == 0 && + check_pointer( q ) == 0 && + check_pointer( r ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_free( r ); + mbedtls_free( q ); + mbedtls_free( p ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_all_free( ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " MBA test #3 (full): " ); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( buf ) - sizeof( memory_header ) ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( p ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 ) == NULL ); + + mbedtls_free( p ); + + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( buf ) - 2 * sizeof( memory_header ) - 16 ); + q = mbedtls_calloc( 1, 16 ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_pointer( p ) == 0 && check_pointer( q ) == 0 ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_calloc( 1, 1 ) == NULL ); + + mbedtls_free( q ); + + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_calloc( 1, 17 ) == NULL ); + + mbedtls_free( p ); + + TEST_ASSERT( check_all_free( ) == 0 ); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free( ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_common.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..668876cc --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_common.h + * + * \brief Common functions and macros used by MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H + +#include "mps_error.h" + +#include + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS Configuration + * + * \{ + */ + +/*! This flag controls whether the MPS-internal components + * (reader, writer, Layer 1-3) perform validation of the + * expected abstract state at the entry of API calls. + * + * Context: All MPS API functions impose assumptions/preconditions on the + * context on which they operate. For example, every structure has a notion of + * state integrity which is established by `xxx_init()` and preserved by any + * calls to the MPS API which satisfy their preconditions and either succeed, + * or fail with an error code which is explicitly documented to not corrupt + * structure integrity (such as WANT_READ and WANT_WRITE); + * apart from `xxx_init()` any function assumes state integrity as a + * precondition (but usually more). If any of the preconditions is violated, + * the function's behavior is entirely undefined. + * In addition to state integrity, all MPS structures have a more refined + * notion of abstract state that the API operates on. For example, all layers + * have a notion of 'abstract read state' which indicates if incoming data has + * been passed to the user, e.g. through mps_l2_read_start() for Layer 2 + * or mps_l3_read() in Layer 3. After such a call, it doesn't make sense to + * call these reading functions again until the incoming data has been + * explicitly 'consumed', e.g. through mps_l2_read_consume() for Layer 2 or + * mps_l3_read_consume() on Layer 3. However, even if it doesn't make sense, + * it's a design choice whether the API should fail gracefully on such + * non-sensical calls or not, and that's what this option is about: + * + * This option determines whether the expected abstract state + * is part of the API preconditions or not: If the option is set, + * then the abstract state is not part of the precondition and is + * thus required to be validated by the implementation. If an unexpected + * abstract state is encountered, the implementation must fail gracefully + * with error #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED. + * Conversely, if this option is not set, then the expected abstract state + * is included in the preconditions of the respective API calls, and + * an implementation's behaviour is undefined if the abstract state is + * not as expected. + * + * For example: Enabling this makes mps_l2_read_done() fail if + * no incoming record is currently open; disabling this would + * lead to undefined behavior in this case. + * + * Comment this to remove state validation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION + +/*! This flag enables/disables assertions on the internal state of MPS. + * + * Assertions are sanity checks that should never trigger when MPS + * is used within the bounds of its API and preconditions. + * + * Enabling this increases security by limiting the scope of + * potential bugs, but comes at the cost of increased code size. + * + * Note: So far, there is no guiding principle as to what + * expected conditions merit an assertion, and which don't. + * + * Comment this to disable assertions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + +/*! This flag controls whether tracing for MPS should be enabled. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( cond, string ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, string ); \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( cond, string ) \ + do \ + { \ + ( cond ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ASSERT_RAW( cond, string ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( !(cond) ) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, string ); \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_INTERNAL_ERROR ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ASSERT_RAW( cond, string ) do {} while( 0 ) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS Configuration */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Common types + * + * Various common types used throughout MPS. + * \{ + */ + +/** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in MPS structures. + * + * This is an unsigned integer type that should be large enough to + * hold the length of any buffer or message processed by MPS. + * + * The reason to pick a value as small as possible here is + * to reduce the size of MPS structures. + * + * \warning Care has to be taken when using a narrower type + * than ::mbedtls_mps_size_t here because of + * potential truncation during conversion. + * + * \warning Handshake messages in TLS may be up to 2^24 ~ 16Mb in size. + * If mbedtls_mps_[opt_]stored_size_t is smaller than that, the + * maximum handshake message is restricted accordingly. + * + * For now, we use the default type of size_t throughout, and the use of + * smaller types or different types for ::mbedtls_mps_size_t and + * ::mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t is not yet supported. + * + */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t; +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX ( (mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t) -1 ) + +/** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in the MPS API + * and implementation. + * + * This must be at least as wide as ::mbedtls_stored_size_t but + * may be chosen to be strictly larger if more suitable for the + * target architecture. + * + * For example, in a test build for ARM Thumb, using uint_fast16_t + * instead of uint16_t reduced the code size from 1060 Byte to 962 Byte, + * so almost 10%. + */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_size_t; +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX ( (mbedtls_mps_size_t) -1 ) + +#if MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX > MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX +#error "Misconfiguration of mbedtls_mps_size_t and mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t." +#endif + +/* \} SECTION: Common types */ + + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_error.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_error.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f78d9a05 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_error.h @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_error.h + * + * \brief Error codes used by MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H + + +/* TODO: The error code allocation needs to be revisited: + * + * - Should we make (some of) the MPS Reader error codes public? + * If so, we need to adjust MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR() to hit + * a gap in the Mbed TLS public error space. + * If not, we have to make sure we don't forward those errors + * at the level of the public API -- no risk at the moment as + * long as MPS is an experimental component not accessible from + * public API. + */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS general error codes + * + * \{ + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE ( 0 ) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR(code) \ + ( -( MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE | (code) ) ) + +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR( 0x1 ) +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR( 0x2 ) + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS general error codes */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS Reader error codes + * + * \{ + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE ( 1 << 8 ) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(code) \ + ( -( MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE | (code) ) ) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because + * the user hasn't yet read and committed all of it. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x1 ) + +/*! An invalid argument was passed to the reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x2 ) + +/*! An attempt to move a reader to consuming mode through mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() + * after pausing failed because the provided data is not sufficient to serve the + * read requests that led to the pausing. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x3 ) + +/*! A get request failed because not enough data is available in the reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x4 ) + +/*!< A get request after pausing and reactivating the reader failed because + * the request is not in line with the request made prior to pausing. The user + * must not change it's 'strategy' after pausing and reactivating a reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x5 ) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because the reader + * has no accumulator it can use to backup the data that hasn't been processed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x6 ) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because the + * accumulator passed to the reader is not large enough to hold both the + * data that hasn't been processed and the excess of the last read-request. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR( 0x7 ) + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS Reader error codes */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_reader.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_reader.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0c30a75d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_reader.c @@ -0,0 +1,559 @@ +/* + * Message Processing Stack, Reader implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +#include "mps_reader.h" +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_trace.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) +static int mbedtls_mps_trace_id = MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */ + +/* + * GENERAL NOTE ON CODING STYLE + * + * The following code intentionally separates memory loads + * and stores from other operations (arithmetic or branches). + * This leads to the introduction of many local variables + * and significantly increases the C-code line count, but + * should not increase the size of generated assembly. + * + * The reason for this is twofold: + * (1) It will ease verification efforts using the VST + * (Verified Software Toolchain) + * whose program logic cannot directly reason + * about instructions containing a load or store in + * addition to other operations (e.g. *p = *q or + * tmp = *p + 42). + * (2) Operating on local variables and writing the results + * back to the target contexts on success only + * allows to maintain structure invariants even + * on failure - this in turn has two benefits: + * (2.a) If for some reason an error code is not caught + * and operation continues, functions are nonetheless + * called with sane contexts, reducing the risk + * of dangerous behavior. + * (2.b) Randomized testing is easier if structures + * remain intact even in the face of failing + * and/or non-sensical calls. + * Moreover, it might even reduce code-size because + * the compiler need not write back temporary results + * to memory in case of failure. + * + */ + +static inline int mps_reader_is_accumulating( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_remaining; + if( rd->acc == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + acc_remaining = rd->acc_share.acc_remaining; + return( acc_remaining > 0 ); +} + +static inline int mps_reader_is_producing( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + unsigned char *frag = rd->frag; + return( frag == NULL ); +} + +static inline int mps_reader_is_consuming( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + return( !mps_reader_is_producing( rd ) ); +} + +static inline mbedtls_mps_size_t mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + unsigned char *acc = rd->acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_offset; + + if( acc == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + frag_offset = rd->acc_share.frag_offset; + return( frag_offset ); +} + +static inline mbedtls_mps_size_t mps_reader_serving_from_accumulator( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_offset, end; + + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( rd ); + end = rd->end; + + return( end < frag_offset ); +} + +static inline void mps_reader_zero( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd ) +{ + /* A plain memset() would likely be more efficient, + * but the current way of zeroing makes it harder + * to overlook fields which should not be zero-initialized. + * It's also more suitable for FV efforts since it + * doesn't require reasoning about structs being + * interpreted as unstructured binary blobs. */ + static mbedtls_mps_reader const zero = + { .frag = NULL, + .frag_len = 0, + .commit = 0, + .end = 0, + .pending = 0, + .acc = NULL, + .acc_len = 0, + .acc_available = 0, + .acc_share = { .acc_remaining = 0 } + }; + *rd = zero; +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_init( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + unsigned char *acc, + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len ) +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_init" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Accumulator size: %u bytes", (unsigned) acc_len ); + mps_reader_zero( rd ); + rd->acc = acc; + rd->acc_len = acc_len; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_free( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd ) +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_free" ); + mps_reader_zero( rd ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + unsigned char *new_frag, + mbedtls_mps_size_t new_frag_len ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t copy_to_acc; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_feed" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Fragment length: %u bytes", (unsigned) new_frag_len ); + + if( new_frag == NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG ); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_producing( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() requires reader to be in producing mode" ); + + if( mps_reader_is_accumulating( rd ) ) + { + unsigned char *acc = rd->acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_remaining = rd->acc_share.acc_remaining; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_available = rd->acc_available; + + /* Skip over parts of the accumulator that have already been filled. */ + acc += acc_available; + + copy_to_acc = acc_remaining; + if( copy_to_acc > new_frag_len ) + copy_to_acc = new_frag_len; + + /* Copy new contents to accumulator. */ + memcpy( acc, new_frag, copy_to_acc ); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Copy new data of size %u of %u into accumulator at offset %u", + (unsigned) copy_to_acc, (unsigned) new_frag_len, (unsigned) acc_available ); + + /* Check if, with the new fragment, we have enough data. */ + acc_remaining -= copy_to_acc; + if( acc_remaining > 0 ) + { + /* We need to accumulate more data. Stay in producing mode. */ + acc_available += copy_to_acc; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = acc_remaining; + rd->acc_available = acc_available; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE ); + } + + /* We have filled the accumulator: Move to consuming mode. */ + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Enough data available to serve user request" ); + + /* Remember overlap of accumulator and fragment. */ + rd->acc_share.frag_offset = acc_available; + acc_available += copy_to_acc; + rd->acc_available = acc_available; + } + else /* Not accumulating */ + { + rd->acc_share.frag_offset = 0; + } + + rd->frag = new_frag; + rd->frag_len = new_frag_len; + rd->commit = 0; + rd->end = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_get( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + mbedtls_mps_size_t desired, + unsigned char **buffer, + mbedtls_mps_size_t *buflen ) +{ + unsigned char *frag; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_len, frag_offset, end, frag_fetched, frag_remaining; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_get" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Bytes requested: %u", (unsigned) desired ); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_consuming( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_get() requires reader to be in consuming mode" ); + + end = rd->end; + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( rd ); + + /* Check if we're still serving from the accumulator. */ + if( mps_reader_serving_from_accumulator( rd ) ) + { + /* Illustration of supported and unsupported cases: + * + * - Allowed #1 + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +-----v-------v-------------+ + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * - Allowed #2 + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +----------v----------------v + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * - Not allowed #1 (could be served, but we don't actually use it): + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +------v-------------v------+ + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * + * - Not allowed #2 (can't be served with a contiguous buffer): + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end + desired + * | | + * +------v--------------------+ v + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * In case of Allowed #2 we're switching to serve from + * `frag` starting from the next call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + */ + + unsigned char *acc; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Serve the request from the accumulator" ); + if( frag_offset - end < desired ) + { + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_available; + acc_available = rd->acc_available; + if( acc_available - end != desired ) + { + /* It might be possible to serve some of these situations by + * making additional space in the accumulator, removing those + * parts that have already been committed. + * On the other hand, this brings additional complexity and + * enlarges the code size, while there doesn't seem to be a use + * case where we don't attempt exactly the same `get` calls when + * resuming on a reader than what we tried before pausing it. + * If we believe we adhere to this restricted usage throughout + * the library, this check is a good opportunity to + * validate this. */ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS ); + } + } + + acc = rd->acc; + acc += end; + + *buffer = acc; + if( buflen != NULL ) + *buflen = desired; + + end += desired; + rd->end = end; + rd->pending = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); + } + + /* Attempt to serve the request from the current fragment */ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Serve the request from the current fragment." ); + + frag_len = rd->frag_len; + frag_fetched = end - frag_offset; /* The amount of data from the current + * fragment that has already been passed + * to the user. */ + frag_remaining = frag_len - frag_fetched; /* Remaining data in fragment */ + + /* Check if we can serve the read request from the fragment. */ + if( frag_remaining < desired ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There's not enough data in the current fragment " + "to serve the request." ); + /* There's not enough data in the current fragment, + * so either just RETURN what we have or fail. */ + if( buflen == NULL ) + { + if( frag_remaining > 0 ) + { + rd->pending = desired - frag_remaining; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Remember to collect %u bytes before re-opening", + (unsigned) rd->pending ); + } + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA ); + } + + desired = frag_remaining; + } + + /* There's enough data in the current fragment to serve the + * (potentially modified) read request. */ + + frag = rd->frag; + frag += frag_fetched; + + *buffer = frag; + if( buflen != NULL ) + *buflen = desired; + + end += desired; + rd->end = end; + rd->pending = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd ) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t end; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_commit" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_consuming( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_commit() requires reader to be in consuming mode" ); + + end = rd->end; + rd->commit = end; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + int *paused ) +{ + unsigned char *frag, *acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t pending, commit; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len, frag_offset, frag_len; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( "mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim" ); + + if( paused != NULL ) + *paused = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW( mps_reader_is_consuming( rd ), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() requires reader to be in consuming mode" ); + + frag = rd->frag; + acc = rd->acc; + pending = rd->pending; + commit = rd->commit; + frag_len = rd->frag_len; + + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( rd ); + + if( pending == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "No unsatisfied read-request has been logged." ); + + /* Check if there's data left to be consumed. */ + if( commit < frag_offset || commit - frag_offset < frag_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There is data left to be consumed." ); + rd->end = commit; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT ); + } + + rd->acc_available = 0; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Fragment has been fully processed and committed." ); + } + else + { + int overflow; + + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_backup_offset; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_backup_len; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_backup_offset; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_backup_len; + + mbedtls_mps_size_t backup_len; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len_needed; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There has been an unsatisfied read with %u bytes overhead.", + (unsigned) pending ); + + if( acc == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "No accumulator present" ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR ); + } + acc_len = rd->acc_len; + + /* Check if the upper layer has already fetched + * and committed the contents of the accumulator. */ + if( commit < frag_offset ) + { + /* No, accumulator is still being processed. */ + frag_backup_offset = 0; + frag_backup_len = frag_len; + acc_backup_offset = commit; + acc_backup_len = frag_offset - commit; + } + else + { + /* Yes, the accumulator is already processed. */ + frag_backup_offset = commit - frag_offset; + frag_backup_len = frag_len - frag_backup_offset; + acc_backup_offset = 0; + acc_backup_len = 0; + } + + backup_len = acc_backup_len + frag_backup_len; + acc_len_needed = backup_len + pending; + + overflow = 0; + overflow |= ( backup_len < acc_backup_len ); + overflow |= ( acc_len_needed < backup_len ); + + if( overflow || acc_len < acc_len_needed ) + { + /* Except for the different return code, we behave as if + * there hadn't been a call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * since the last commit. */ + rd->end = commit; + rd->pending = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "The accumulator is too small to handle the backup." ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "* Size: %u", (unsigned) acc_len ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "* Needed: %u (%u + %u)", + (unsigned) acc_len_needed, + (unsigned) backup_len, (unsigned) pending ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Fragment backup: %u", (unsigned) frag_backup_len ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Accumulator backup: %u", (unsigned) acc_backup_len ); + + /* Move uncommitted parts from the accumulator to the front + * of the accumulator. */ + memmove( acc, acc + acc_backup_offset, acc_backup_len ); + + /* Copy uncommitted parts of the current fragment to the + * accumulator. */ + memcpy( acc + acc_backup_len, + frag + frag_backup_offset, frag_backup_len ); + + rd->acc_available = backup_len; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = pending; + + if( paused != NULL ) + *paused = 1; + } + + rd->frag = NULL; + rd->frag_len = 0; + + rd->commit = 0; + rd->end = 0; + rd->pending = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Final state: aa %u, al %u, ar %u", + (unsigned) rd->acc_available, (unsigned) rd->acc_len, + (unsigned) rd->acc_share.acc_remaining ); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_reader.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_reader.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..427c1bd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_reader.h @@ -0,0 +1,382 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_reader.h + * + * \brief This file defines reader objects, which together with their + * sibling writer objects form the basis for the communication + * between the various layers of the Mbed TLS messaging stack, + * as well as the communication between the messaging stack and + * the (D)TLS handshake protocol implementation. + * + * Readers provide a means of transferring incoming data from + * a 'producer' providing it in chunks of arbitrary size, to + * a 'consumer' which fetches and processes it in chunks of + * again arbitrary, and potentially different, size. + * + * Readers can thus be seen as datagram-to-stream converters, + * and they abstract away the following two tasks from the user: + * 1. The pointer arithmetic of stepping through a producer- + * provided chunk in smaller chunks. + * 2. The merging of incoming data chunks in case the + * consumer requests data in larger chunks than what the + * producer provides. + * + * The basic abstract flow of operation is the following: + * - Initially, the reader is in 'producing mode'. + * - The producer hands an incoming data buffer to the reader, + * moving it from 'producing' to 'consuming' mode. + * - The consumer subsequently fetches and processes the buffer + * content. Once that's done -- or partially done and a consumer's + * request can't be fulfilled -- the producer revokes the reader's + * access to the incoming data buffer, putting the reader back to + * producing mode. + * - The producer subsequently gathers more incoming data and hands + * it to the reader until it switches back to consuming mode + * if enough data is available for the last consumer request to + * be satisfiable. + * - Repeat the above. + * + * The abstract states of the reader from the producer's and + * consumer's perspective are as follows: + * + * - From the perspective of the consumer, the state of the + * reader consists of the following: + * - A byte stream representing (concatenation of) the data + * received through calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), + * - A marker within that byte stream indicating which data + * can be considered processed, and hence need not be retained, + * when the reader is passed back to the producer via + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * The marker is set via mbedtls_mps_reader_commit() + * which places it at the end of the current byte stream. + * The consumer need not be aware of the distinction between consumer + * and producer mode, because it only interfaces with the reader + * when the latter is in consuming mode. + * + * - From the perspective of the producer, the reader's state is one of: + * - Attached: The reader is in consuming mode. + * - Unset: No incoming data buffer is currently managed by the reader, + * and all previously handed incoming data buffers have been + * fully processed. More data needs to be fed into the reader + * via mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * + * - Accumulating: No incoming data buffer is currently managed by the + * reader, but some data from the previous incoming data + * buffer hasn't been processed yet and is internally + * held back. + * The Attached state belongs to consuming mode, while the Unset and + * Accumulating states belong to producing mode. + * + * Transitioning from the Unset or Accumulating state to Attached is + * done via successful calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(), while + * transitioning from Attached to either Unset or Accumulating (depending + * on what has been processed) is done via mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * + * The following diagram depicts the producer-state progression: + * + * +------------------+ reclaim + * | Unset +<-------------------------------------+ get + * +--------|---------+ | +------+ + * | | | | + * | | | | + * | feed +---------+---+--+ | + * +--------------------------------------> <---+ + * | Attached | + * +--------------------------------------> <---+ + * | feed, enough data available +---------+---+--+ | + * | to serve previous consumer request | | | + * | | | | + * +--------+---------+ | +------+ + * +----> Accumulating |<-------------------------------------+ commit + * | +---+--------------+ reclaim, previous read request + * | | couldn't be fulfilled + * | | + * +--------+ + * feed, need more data to serve + * previous consumer request + * | + * | + * producing mode | consuming mode + * | + * + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_READER_H +#define MBEDTLS_READER_H + +#include + +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_error.h" + +struct mbedtls_mps_reader; +typedef struct mbedtls_mps_reader mbedtls_mps_reader; + +/* + * Structure definitions + */ + +struct mbedtls_mps_reader +{ + unsigned char *frag; /*!< The fragment of incoming data managed by + * the reader; it is provided to the reader + * through mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). The reader + * does not own the fragment and does not + * perform any allocation operations on it, + * but does have read and write access to it. + * + * The reader is in consuming mode if + * and only if \c frag is not \c NULL. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t frag_len; + /*!< The length of the current fragment. + * Must be 0 if \c frag == \c NULL. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t commit; + /*!< The offset of the last commit, relative + * to the first byte in the fragment, if + * no accumulator is present. If an accumulator + * is present, it is viewed as a prefix to the + * current fragment, and this variable contains + * an offset from the beginning of the accumulator. + * + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t end; + /*!< The offset of the end of the last chunk + * passed to the user through a call to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), relative to the first + * byte in the fragment, if no accumulator is + * present. If an accumulator is present, it is + * viewed as a prefix to the current fragment, and + * this variable contains an offset from the + * beginning of the accumulator. + * + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t pending; + /*!< The amount of incoming data missing on the + * last call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + * In particular, it is \c 0 if the last call + * was successful. + * If a reader is reclaimed after an + * unsuccessful call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), + * this variable is used to have the reader + * remember how much data should be accumulated + * so that the call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * succeeds next time. + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + + /* The accumulator is only needed if we need to be able to pause + * the reader. A few bytes could be saved by moving this to a + * separate struct and using a pointer here. */ + + unsigned char *acc; /*!< The accumulator is used to gather incoming + * data if a read-request via mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * cannot be served from the current fragment. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_len; + /*!< The total size of the accumulator. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_available; + /*!< The number of bytes currently gathered in + * the accumulator. This is both used in + * producing and in consuming mode: + * While producing, it is increased until + * it reaches the value of \c acc_remaining below. + * While consuming, it is used to judge if a + * get request can be served from the + * accumulator or not. + * Must not be larger than \c acc_len. */ + union + { + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_remaining; + /*!< This indicates the amount of data still + * to be gathered in the accumulator. It is + * only used in producing mode. + * Must be at most acc_len - acc_available. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t frag_offset; + /*!< If an accumulator is present and in use, this + * field indicates the offset of the current + * fragment from the beginning of the + * accumulator. If no accumulator is present + * or the accumulator is not in use, this is \c 0. + * It is only used in consuming mode. + * Must not be larger than \c acc_available. */ + } acc_share; +}; + +/* + * API organization: + * A reader object is usually prepared and maintained + * by some lower layer and passed for usage to an upper + * layer, and the API naturally splits according to which + * layer is supposed to use the respective functions. + */ + +/* + * Maintenance API (Lower layer) + */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a reader object + * + * \param reader The reader to be initialized. + * \param acc The buffer to be used as a temporary accumulator + * in case get requests through mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * exceed the buffer provided by mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * This buffer is owned by the caller and exclusive use + * for reading and writing is given to the reader for the + * duration of the reader's lifetime. It is thus the caller's + * responsibility to maintain (and not touch) the buffer for + * the lifetime of the reader, and to properly zeroize and + * free the memory after the reader has been destroyed. + * \param acc_len The size in Bytes of \p acc. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_init( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + unsigned char *acc, + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len ); + +/** + * \brief Free a reader object + * + * \param reader The reader to be freed. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_free( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader ); + +/** + * \brief Pass chunk of data for the reader to manage. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must be + * in producing mode. + * \param buf The buffer to be managed by the reader. + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the reader will be + * moved to consuming mode and obtains read access + * of \p buf until mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() + * is called. It is the responsibility of the caller + * to ensure that the \p buf persists and is not changed + * between successful calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() + * and mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE if more input data is + * required to fulfill a previous request to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + * In this case, the reader remains in producing mode and + * takes no ownership of the provided buffer (an internal copy + * is made instead). + * \return Another negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on + * different kinds of failures. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_feed( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + unsigned char *buf, + mbedtls_mps_size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Reclaim reader's access to the current input buffer. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must be + * in consuming mode. + * \param paused If not \c NULL, the integer at address \p paused will be + * modified to indicate whether the reader has been paused + * (value \c 1) or not (value \c 0). Pausing happens if there + * is uncommitted data and a previous request to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get() has exceeded the bounds of the + * input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + int *paused ); + +/* + * Usage API (Upper layer) + */ + +/** + * \brief Request data from the reader. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must + * be in consuming mode. + * \param desired The desired amount of data to be read, in Bytes. + * \param buffer The address to store the buffer pointer in. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buflen The address to store the actual buffer + * length in, or \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *buf holds the + * address of a buffer of size \c *buflen + * (if \c buflen != \c NULL) or \c desired + * (if \c buflen == \c NULL). The user has read access + * to the buffer and guarantee of stability of the data + * until the next call to mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA if there is not enough + * data available to serve the get request. In this case, the + * reader remains intact and in consuming mode, and the consumer + * should retry the call after a successful cycle of + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() and mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * If, after such a cycle, the consumer requests a different + * amount of data, the result is implementation-defined; + * progress is guaranteed only if the same amount of data + * is requested after a mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() and + * mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() cycle. + * \return Another negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error + * code for different kinds of failure. + * + * \note Passing \c NULL as \p buflen is a convenient way to + * indicate that fragmentation is not tolerated. + * It's functionally equivalent to passing a valid + * address as buflen and checking \c *buflen == \c desired + * afterwards. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_get( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + mbedtls_mps_size_t desired, + unsigned char **buffer, + mbedtls_mps_size_t *buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Mark data obtained from mbedtls_mps_reader_get() as processed. + * + * This call indicates that all data received from prior calls to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get() has been or will have been + * processed when mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called, + * and thus need not be backed up. + * + * This function has no user observable effect until + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called. In particular, + * buffers received from mbedtls_mps_reader_get() remain + * valid until mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_commit( mbedtls_mps_reader *reader ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_READER_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_trace.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_trace.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6026a071 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_trace.c @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* + * Message Processing Stack, Trace module + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +#include "mps_common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) + +#include "mps_trace.h" +#include + +static int trace_depth = 0; + +#define color_default "\x1B[0m" +#define color_red "\x1B[1;31m" +#define color_green "\x1B[1;32m" +#define color_yellow "\x1B[1;33m" +#define color_blue "\x1B[1;34m" +#define color_magenta "\x1B[1;35m" +#define color_cyan "\x1B[1;36m" +#define color_white "\x1B[1;37m" + +static char const * colors[] = +{ + color_default, + color_green, + color_yellow, + color_magenta, + color_cyan, + color_blue, + color_white +}; + +#define MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE 100 + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg( int id, int line, const char *format, ... ) +{ + int ret; + char str[MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE]; + va_list argp; + va_start( argp, format ); + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( str, MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE, format, argp ); + va_end( argp ); + + if( ret >= 0 && ret < MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE ) + { + str[ret] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf( "[%d|L%d]: %s\n", id, line, str ); + } +} + +int mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth() +{ + return trace_depth; +} +void mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth() +{ + trace_depth--; +} +void mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth() +{ + trace_depth++; +} + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_color( int id ) +{ + if( id > (int) ( sizeof( colors ) / sizeof( *colors ) ) ) + return; + printf( "%s", colors[ id ] ); +} + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent( int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty ) +{ + if( level > 0 ) + { + while( --level ) + printf( "| " ); + + printf( "| " ); + } + + switch( ty ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT: + mbedtls_printf( "@ " ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL: + mbedtls_printf( "+--> " ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR: + mbedtls_printf( "E " ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN: + mbedtls_printf( "< " ); + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_trace.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_trace.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..820a1b66 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/mps_trace.h @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +/** + * \file mps_trace.h + * + * \brief Tracing module for MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_trace.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) + +/* + * Adapt this to enable/disable tracing output + * from the various layers of the MPS. + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_1 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_2 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_3 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_4 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_READER +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_WRITER + +/* + * To use the existing trace module, only change + * MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_XXX above, but don't modify the + * rest of this file. + */ + +typedef enum +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN +} mbedtls_mps_trace_type; + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_1 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_2 2 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_3 3 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_4 4 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_WRITER 5 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER 6 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_1) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_1 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_2) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_2 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_3) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_3 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_4) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_4 ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_READER) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_WRITER) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_WRITER ) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER ) + +/* We have to avoid globals because E-ACSL chokes on them... + * Wrap everything in stub functions. */ +int mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth( void ); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth( void ); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth( void ); + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_color( int id ); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent( int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty ); + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg( int id, int line, const char *format, ... ); + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( type, ... ) \ + do { \ + if( ! ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & ( 1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id ) ) ) \ + break; \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_indent( mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth(), type ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_color( mbedtls_mps_trace_id ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg( mbedtls_mps_trace_id, __LINE__, __VA_ARGS__ ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_color( 0 ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( ... ) \ + do { \ + if( ! ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & ( 1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id ) ) ) \ + break; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL, __VA_ARGS__ ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth(); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END( val ) \ + do { \ + if( ! ( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & ( 1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id ) ) ) \ + break; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN, "%d (-%#04x)", \ + (int) (val), -((unsigned)(val)) ); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth(); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( val ) \ + do { \ + /* Breaks tail recursion. */ \ + int ret__ = val; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END( ret__ ); \ + return( ret__ ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE( type, ... ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT( ... ) do { } while( 0 ) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END do { } while( 0 ) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( val ) return( val ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/net_sockets.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/net_sockets.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b2cab503 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/net_sockets.c @@ -0,0 +1,711 @@ +/* + * TCP/IP or UDP/IP networking functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* Enable definition of getaddrinfo() even when compiling with -std=c99. Must + * be set before config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly. + * Harmless on other platforms. */ +#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L +#endif +#ifndef _XOPEN_SOURCE +#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 600 /* sockaddr_storage */ +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) + +#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ + !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) +#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NET_C in config.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + +#define IS_EINTR( ret ) ( ( ret ) == WSAEINTR ) + +#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) +/* Enables getaddrinfo() & Co */ +#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0501 +#endif + +#include + +#include +#include +#if (_WIN32_WINNT < 0x0501) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#if defined(_WIN32_WCE) +#pragma comment( lib, "ws2.lib" ) +#else +#pragma comment( lib, "ws2_32.lib" ) +#endif +#endif /* _MSC_VER */ + +#define read(fd,buf,len) recv( fd, (char*)( buf ), (int)( len ), 0 ) +#define write(fd,buf,len) send( fd, (char*)( buf ), (int)( len ), 0 ) +#define close(fd) closesocket(fd) + +static int wsa_init_done = 0; + +#else /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define IS_EINTR( ret ) ( ( ret ) == EINTR ) + +#endif /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* Some MS functions want int and MSVC warns if we pass size_t, + * but the standard functions use socklen_t, so cast only for MSVC */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#define MSVC_INT_CAST (int) +#else +#define MSVC_INT_CAST +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include +#endif + +#include + +/* + * Prepare for using the sockets interface + */ +static int net_prepare( void ) +{ +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + WSADATA wsaData; + + if( wsa_init_done == 0 ) + { + if( WSAStartup( MAKEWORD(2,0), &wsaData ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED ); + + wsa_init_done = 1; + } +#else +#if !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + signal( SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN ); +#endif +#endif + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Return 0 if the file descriptor is valid, an error otherwise. + * If for_select != 0, check whether the file descriptor is within the range + * allowed for fd_set used for the FD_xxx macros and the select() function. + */ +static int check_fd( int fd, int for_select ) +{ + if( fd < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT ); + +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + (void) for_select; +#else + /* A limitation of select() is that it only works with file descriptors + * that are strictly less than FD_SETSIZE. This is a limitation of the + * fd_set type. Error out early, because attempting to call FD_SET on a + * large file descriptor is a buffer overflow on typical platforms. */ + if( for_select && fd >= FD_SETSIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED ); +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Initialize a context + */ +void mbedtls_net_init( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +/* + * Initiate a TCP connection with host:port and the given protocol + */ +int mbedtls_net_connect( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host, + const char *port, int proto ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur; + + if( ( ret = net_prepare() ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Do name resolution with both IPv6 and IPv4 */ + memset( &hints, 0, sizeof( hints ) ); + hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; + + if( getaddrinfo( host, port, &hints, &addr_list ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST ); + + /* Try the sockaddrs until a connection succeeds */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST; + for( cur = addr_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->ai_next ) + { + ctx->fd = (int) socket( cur->ai_family, cur->ai_socktype, + cur->ai_protocol ); + if( ctx->fd < 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + continue; + } + + if( connect( ctx->fd, cur->ai_addr, MSVC_INT_CAST cur->ai_addrlen ) == 0 ) + { + ret = 0; + break; + } + + close( ctx->fd ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED; + } + + freeaddrinfo( addr_list ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Create a listening socket on bind_ip:port + */ +int mbedtls_net_bind( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *port, int proto ) +{ + int n, ret; + struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur; + + if( ( ret = net_prepare() ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Bind to IPv6 and/or IPv4, but only in the desired protocol */ + memset( &hints, 0, sizeof( hints ) ); + hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; + if( bind_ip == NULL ) + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + + if( getaddrinfo( bind_ip, port, &hints, &addr_list ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST ); + + /* Try the sockaddrs until a binding succeeds */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST; + for( cur = addr_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->ai_next ) + { + ctx->fd = (int) socket( cur->ai_family, cur->ai_socktype, + cur->ai_protocol ); + if( ctx->fd < 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + continue; + } + + n = 1; + if( setsockopt( ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (const char *) &n, sizeof( n ) ) != 0 ) + { + close( ctx->fd ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + continue; + } + + if( bind( ctx->fd, cur->ai_addr, MSVC_INT_CAST cur->ai_addrlen ) != 0 ) + { + close( ctx->fd ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED; + continue; + } + + /* Listen only makes sense for TCP */ + if( proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP ) + { + if( listen( ctx->fd, MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG ) != 0 ) + { + close( ctx->fd ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED; + continue; + } + } + + /* Bind was successful */ + ret = 0; + break; + } + + freeaddrinfo( addr_list ); + + return( ret ); + +} + +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) +/* + * Check if the requested operation would be blocking on a non-blocking socket + * and thus 'failed' with a negative return value. + */ +static int net_would_block( const mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + return( WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK ); +} +#else +/* + * Check if the requested operation would be blocking on a non-blocking socket + * and thus 'failed' with a negative return value. + * + * Note: on a blocking socket this function always returns 0! + */ +static int net_would_block( const mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + int err = errno; + + /* + * Never return 'WOULD BLOCK' on a blocking socket + */ + if( ( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL ) & O_NONBLOCK ) != O_NONBLOCK ) + { + errno = err; + return( 0 ); + } + + switch( errno = err ) + { +#if defined EAGAIN + case EAGAIN: +#endif +#if defined EWOULDBLOCK && EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN + case EWOULDBLOCK: +#endif + return( 1 ); + } + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* + * Accept a connection from a remote client + */ +int mbedtls_net_accept( mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, + mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, + void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int type; + + struct sockaddr_storage client_addr; + +#if defined(__socklen_t_defined) || defined(_SOCKLEN_T) || \ + defined(_SOCKLEN_T_DECLARED) || defined(__DEFINED_socklen_t) || \ + defined(socklen_t) || (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L) + socklen_t n = (socklen_t) sizeof( client_addr ); + socklen_t type_len = (socklen_t) sizeof( type ); +#else + int n = (int) sizeof( client_addr ); + int type_len = (int) sizeof( type ); +#endif + + /* Is this a TCP or UDP socket? */ + if( getsockopt( bind_ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TYPE, + (void *) &type, &type_len ) != 0 || + ( type != SOCK_STREAM && type != SOCK_DGRAM ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED ); + } + + if( type == SOCK_STREAM ) + { + /* TCP: actual accept() */ + ret = client_ctx->fd = (int) accept( bind_ctx->fd, + (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, &n ); + } + else + { + /* UDP: wait for a message, but keep it in the queue */ + char buf[1] = { 0 }; + + ret = (int) recvfrom( bind_ctx->fd, buf, sizeof( buf ), MSG_PEEK, + (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, &n ); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + if( ret == SOCKET_ERROR && + WSAGetLastError() == WSAEMSGSIZE ) + { + /* We know buf is too small, thanks, just peeking here */ + ret = 0; + } +#endif + } + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + if( net_would_block( bind_ctx ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED ); + } + + /* UDP: hijack the listening socket to communicate with the client, + * then bind a new socket to accept new connections */ + if( type != SOCK_STREAM ) + { + struct sockaddr_storage local_addr; + int one = 1; + + if( connect( bind_ctx->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, n ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED ); + + client_ctx->fd = bind_ctx->fd; + bind_ctx->fd = -1; /* In case we exit early */ + + n = sizeof( struct sockaddr_storage ); + if( getsockname( client_ctx->fd, + (struct sockaddr *) &local_addr, &n ) != 0 || + ( bind_ctx->fd = (int) socket( local_addr.ss_family, + SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP ) ) < 0 || + setsockopt( bind_ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (const char *) &one, sizeof( one ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED ); + } + + if( bind( bind_ctx->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &local_addr, n ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED ); + } + } + + if( client_ip != NULL ) + { + if( client_addr.ss_family == AF_INET ) + { + struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *) &client_addr; + *ip_len = sizeof( addr4->sin_addr.s_addr ); + + if( buf_size < *ip_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( client_ip, &addr4->sin_addr.s_addr, *ip_len ); + } + else + { + struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &client_addr; + *ip_len = sizeof( addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr ); + + if( buf_size < *ip_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + memcpy( client_ip, &addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, *ip_len); + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Set the socket blocking or non-blocking + */ +int mbedtls_net_set_block( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + u_long n = 0; + return( ioctlsocket( ctx->fd, FIONBIO, &n ) ); +#else + return( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_SETFL, fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL ) & ~O_NONBLOCK ) ); +#endif +} + +int mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + u_long n = 1; + return( ioctlsocket( ctx->fd, FIONBIO, &n ) ); +#else + return( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_SETFL, fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL ) | O_NONBLOCK ) ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Check if data is available on the socket + */ + +int mbedtls_net_poll( mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + struct timeval tv; + + fd_set read_fds; + fd_set write_fds; + + int fd = ctx->fd; + + ret = check_fd( fd, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) + /* Ensure that memory sanitizers consider read_fds and write_fds as + * initialized even on platforms such as Glibc/x86_64 where FD_ZERO + * is implemented in assembly. */ + memset( &read_fds, 0, sizeof( read_fds ) ); + memset( &write_fds, 0, sizeof( write_fds ) ); +#endif +#endif + + FD_ZERO( &read_fds ); + if( rw & MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ ) + { + rw &= ~MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ; + FD_SET( fd, &read_fds ); + } + + FD_ZERO( &write_fds ); + if( rw & MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE ) + { + rw &= ~MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE; + FD_SET( fd, &write_fds ); + } + + if( rw != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = ( timeout % 1000 ) * 1000; + + do + { + ret = select( fd + 1, &read_fds, &write_fds, NULL, + timeout == (uint32_t) -1 ? NULL : &tv ); + } + while( IS_EINTR( ret ) ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED ); + + ret = 0; + if( FD_ISSET( fd, &read_fds ) ) + ret |= MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ; + if( FD_ISSET( fd, &write_fds ) ) + ret |= MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE; + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Portable usleep helper + */ +void mbedtls_net_usleep( unsigned long usec ) +{ +#if defined(_WIN32) + Sleep( ( usec + 999 ) / 1000 ); +#else + struct timeval tv; + tv.tv_sec = usec / 1000000; +#if defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || \ + ( defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__) ) + tv.tv_usec = (suseconds_t) usec % 1000000; +#else + tv.tv_usec = usec % 1000000; +#endif + select( 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &tv ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Read at most 'len' characters + */ +int mbedtls_net_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; + + ret = check_fd( fd, 0 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = (int) read( fd, buf, len ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + if( net_would_block( ctx ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + if( WSAGetLastError() == WSAECONNRESET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ); +#else + if( errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ); + + if( errno == EINTR ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); +#endif + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Read at most 'len' characters, blocking for at most 'timeout' ms + */ +int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, uint32_t timeout ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + struct timeval tv; + fd_set read_fds; + int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; + + ret = check_fd( fd, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + FD_ZERO( &read_fds ); + FD_SET( fd, &read_fds ); + + tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = ( timeout % 1000 ) * 1000; + + ret = select( fd + 1, &read_fds, NULL, NULL, timeout == 0 ? NULL : &tv ); + + /* Zero fds ready means we timed out */ + if( ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + if( WSAGetLastError() == WSAEINTR ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); +#else + if( errno == EINTR ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); +#endif + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED ); + } + + /* This call will not block */ + return( mbedtls_net_recv( ctx, buf, len ) ); +} + +/* + * Write at most 'len' characters + */ +int mbedtls_net_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; + + ret = check_fd( fd, 0 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = (int) write( fd, buf, len ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + if( net_would_block( ctx ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); + +#if ( defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) ) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + if( WSAGetLastError() == WSAECONNRESET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ); +#else + if( errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET ); + + if( errno == EINTR ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); +#endif + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED ); + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Close the connection + */ +void mbedtls_net_close( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx->fd == -1 ) + return; + + close( ctx->fd ); + + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +/* + * Gracefully close the connection + */ +void mbedtls_net_free( mbedtls_net_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx->fd == -1 ) + return; + + shutdown( ctx->fd, 2 ); + close( ctx->fd ); + + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/nist_kw.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/nist_kw.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..495c23d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/nist_kw.c @@ -0,0 +1,706 @@ +/* + * Implementation of NIST SP 800-38F key wrapping, supporting KW and KWP modes + * only + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * Definition of Key Wrapping: + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf + * RFC 3394 "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm" + * RFC 5649 "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm" + * + * Note: RFC 3394 defines different methodology for intermediate operations for + * the wrapping and unwrapping operation than the definition in NIST SP 800-38F. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) + +#define KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH 8 +#define MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT 3 + +/*! The 64-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KW mode. */ +static const unsigned char NIST_KW_ICV1[] = {0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6}; +/*! The 32-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KWP mode. */ +static const unsigned char NIST_KW_ICV2[] = {0xA6, 0x59, 0x59, 0xA6}; + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_init( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_nist_kw_context ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits, + const int is_wrap ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, + keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( cipher_info->block_size != 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * SP 800-38F currently defines AES cipher as the only block cipher allowed: + * "For KW and KWP, the underlying block cipher shall be approved, and the + * block size shall be 128 bits. Currently, the AES block cipher, with key + * lengths of 128, 192, or 256 bits, is the only block cipher that fits + * this profile." + * Currently we don't support other 128 bit block ciphers for key wrapping, + * such as Camellia and Aria. + */ + if( cipher != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits, + is_wrap ? MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT : + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) + ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_free( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_nist_kw_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Helper function for Xoring the uint64_t "t" with the encrypted A. + * Defined in NIST SP 800-38F section 6.1 + */ +static void calc_a_xor_t( unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], uint64_t t ) +{ + size_t i = 0; + for( i = 0; i < sizeof( t ); i++ ) + { + A[i] ^= ( t >> ( ( sizeof( t ) - 1 - i ) * 8 ) ) & 0xff; + } +} + +/* + * KW-AE as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.2 + * KWP-AE as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.3 + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t semiblocks = 0; + size_t s; + size_t olen, padlen = 0; + uint64_t t = 0; + unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + + *out_len = 0; + /* + * Generate the String to work on + */ + if( mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW ) + { + if( out_size < in_len + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the plaintext length for KW + * must be between 2 to 2^54-1 semiblocks inclusive. + */ + if( in_len < 16 || +#if SIZE_MAX > 0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFF8 + in_len > 0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFF8 || +#endif + in_len % KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memcpy( output, NIST_KW_ICV1, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + memmove( output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, input, in_len ); + } + else + { + if( in_len % 8 != 0 ) + { + padlen = ( 8 - ( in_len % 8 ) ); + } + + if( out_size < in_len + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + padlen ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the plaintext length for KWP + * must be between 1 and 2^32-1 octets inclusive. + */ + if( in_len < 1 +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF + || in_len > 0xFFFFFFFF +#endif + ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memcpy( output, NIST_KW_ICV2, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ( in_len & 0xffffffff ), output, + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); + + memcpy( output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, input, in_len ); + memset( output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + in_len, 0, padlen ); + } + semiblocks = ( ( in_len + padlen ) / KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ) + 1; + + s = 6 * ( semiblocks - 1 ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP + && in_len <= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ) + { + memcpy( inbuff, output, 16 ); + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, + inbuff, 16, output, &olen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + unsigned char *R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + unsigned char *A = output; + + /* + * Do the wrapping function W, as defined in RFC 3394 section 2.2.1 + */ + if( semiblocks < MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Calculate intermediate values */ + for( t = 1; t <= s; t++ ) + { + memcpy( inbuff, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + memcpy( inbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, R2, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, + inbuff, 16, outbuff, &olen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + memcpy( A, outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + calc_a_xor_t( A, t ); + + memcpy( R2, outbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + R2 += KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + if( R2 >= output + ( semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ) ) + R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + } + } + + *out_len = semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + +cleanup: + + if( ret != 0) + { + memset( output, 0, semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( inbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2 ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2 ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * W-1 function as defined in RFC 3394 section 2.2.2 + * This function assumes the following: + * 1. Output buffer is at least of size ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH. + * 2. The input buffer is of size semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH. + * 3. Minimal number of semiblocks is 3. + * 4. A is a buffer to hold the first semiblock of the input buffer. + */ +static int unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t semiblocks, + unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], + unsigned char *output, size_t* out_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + const size_t s = 6 * ( semiblocks - 1 ); + size_t olen; + uint64_t t = 0; + unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + unsigned char *R = NULL; + *out_len = 0; + + if( semiblocks < MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memcpy( A, input, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + memmove( output, input + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + R = output + ( semiblocks - 2 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + + /* Calculate intermediate values */ + for( t = s; t >= 1; t-- ) + { + calc_a_xor_t( A, t ); + + memcpy( inbuff, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + memcpy( inbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, R, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, + inbuff, 16, outbuff, &olen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + memcpy( A, outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + + /* Set R as LSB64 of outbuff */ + memcpy( R, outbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + + if( R == output ) + R = output + ( semiblocks - 2 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + else + R -= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + } + + *out_len = ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0) + memset( output, 0, ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( inbuff, sizeof( inbuff ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( outbuff, sizeof( outbuff ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * KW-AD as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.2 + * KWP-AD as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.3 + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i, olen; + unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH]; + unsigned char diff, bad_padding = 0; + + *out_len = 0; + if( out_size < in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW ) + { + /* + * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the ciphertext length for KW + * must be between 3 to 2^54 semiblocks inclusive. + */ + if( in_len < 24 || +#if SIZE_MAX > 0x200000000000000 + in_len > 0x200000000000000 || +#endif + in_len % KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + ret = unwrap( ctx, input, in_len / KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, + A, output, out_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */ + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + } + else if( mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP ) + { + size_t padlen = 0; + uint32_t Plen; + /* + * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the ciphertext length for KWP + * must be between 2 to 2^29 semiblocks inclusive. + */ + if( in_len < KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2 || +#if SIZE_MAX > 0x100000000 + in_len > 0x100000000 || +#endif + in_len % KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( in_len == KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2 ) + { + unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &ctx->cipher_ctx, + input, 16, outbuff, &olen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + memcpy( A, outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + memcpy( output, outbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( outbuff, sizeof( outbuff ) ); + *out_len = KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + } + else + { + /* in_len >= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 3 */ + ret = unwrap( ctx, input, in_len / KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, + A, output, out_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */ + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + Plen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2 ); + + /* + * Plen is the length of the plaintext, when the input is valid. + * If Plen is larger than the plaintext and padding, padlen will be + * larger than 8, because of the type wrap around. + */ + padlen = in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - Plen; + if ( padlen > 7 ) + { + padlen &= 7; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + /* Check padding in "constant-time" */ + for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; i++ ) + { + if( i >= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - padlen ) + diff |= output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + i]; + else + bad_padding |= output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + i]; + } + + if( diff != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + memset( output + Plen, 0, padlen ); + *out_len = Plen; + } + else + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 ) + { + memset( output, 0, *out_len ); + *out_len = 0; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &bad_padding, sizeof( bad_padding) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &diff, sizeof( diff ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( A, sizeof( A ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + +#define KW_TESTS 3 + +/* + * Test vectors taken from NIST + * https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/CAVP-TESTING-BLOCK-CIPHER-MODES#KW + */ +static const unsigned int key_len[KW_TESTS] = { 16, 24, 32 }; + +static const unsigned char kw_key[KW_TESTS][32] = { + { 0x75, 0x75, 0xda, 0x3a, 0x93, 0x60, 0x7c, 0xc2, + 0xbf, 0xd8, 0xce, 0xc7, 0xaa, 0xdf, 0xd9, 0xa6 }, + { 0x2d, 0x85, 0x26, 0x08, 0x1d, 0x02, 0xfb, 0x5b, + 0x85, 0xf6, 0x9a, 0xc2, 0x86, 0xec, 0xd5, 0x7d, + 0x40, 0xdf, 0x5d, 0xf3, 0x49, 0x47, 0x44, 0xd3 }, + { 0x11, 0x2a, 0xd4, 0x1b, 0x48, 0x56, 0xc7, 0x25, + 0x4a, 0x98, 0x48, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xdd, 0x78, 0x33, + 0x5b, 0x03, 0x9a, 0x48, 0xa8, 0x96, 0x2c, 0x4d, + 0x1c, 0xb7, 0x8e, 0xab, 0xd5, 0xda, 0xd7, 0x88 } +}; + +static const unsigned char kw_msg[KW_TESTS][40] = { + { 0x42, 0x13, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0x38, 0x4a, 0x3e, 0xea, + 0xc9, 0x5a, 0x06, 0x6f, 0xd2, 0x8f, 0xed, 0x3f }, + { 0x95, 0xc1, 0x1b, 0xf5, 0x35, 0x3a, 0xfe, 0xdb, + 0x98, 0xfd, 0xd6, 0xc8, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xdb, 0x6d, + 0xa5, 0x4b, 0x74, 0xb4, 0x99, 0x0f, 0xdc, 0x45, + 0xc0, 0x9d, 0x15, 0x8f, 0x51, 0xce, 0x62, 0x9d, + 0xe2, 0xaf, 0x26, 0xe3, 0x25, 0x0e, 0x6b, 0x4c }, + { 0x1b, 0x20, 0xbf, 0x19, 0x90, 0xb0, 0x65, 0xd7, + 0x98, 0xe1, 0xb3, 0x22, 0x64, 0xad, 0x50, 0xa8, + 0x74, 0x74, 0x92, 0xba, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x4d, 0xd1 } +}; + +static const size_t kw_msg_len[KW_TESTS] = { 16, 40, 24 }; +static const size_t kw_out_len[KW_TESTS] = { 24, 48, 32 }; +static const unsigned char kw_res[KW_TESTS][48] = { + { 0x03, 0x1f, 0x6b, 0xd7, 0xe6, 0x1e, 0x64, 0x3d, + 0xf6, 0x85, 0x94, 0x81, 0x6f, 0x64, 0xca, 0xa3, + 0xf5, 0x6f, 0xab, 0xea, 0x25, 0x48, 0xf5, 0xfb }, + { 0x44, 0x3c, 0x6f, 0x15, 0x09, 0x83, 0x71, 0x91, + 0x3e, 0x5c, 0x81, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0xa0, 0x42, 0xec, + 0x68, 0x2f, 0x7b, 0x13, 0x6d, 0x24, 0x3a, 0x4d, + 0x6c, 0x42, 0x6f, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x15, 0x63, 0xe8, + 0xa1, 0x4a, 0x55, 0x8e, 0x09, 0x64, 0x16, 0x19, + 0xbf, 0x03, 0xfc, 0xaf, 0x90, 0xb1, 0xfc, 0x2d }, + { 0xba, 0x8a, 0x25, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x7d, + 0xd5, 0xd5, 0x40, 0xec, 0x25, 0xd4, 0x3d, 0x87, + 0x20, 0x0f, 0xda, 0xdc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x05, 0xd9, + 0x16, 0x58, 0x4f, 0xa9, 0xf6, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0x12 } +}; + +static const unsigned char kwp_key[KW_TESTS][32] = { + { 0x78, 0x65, 0xe2, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x21, 0x65, 0x9a, + 0xb4, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x62, 0x9c, 0xdf, 0x3c, 0xc4 }, + { 0xf5, 0xf8, 0x96, 0xa3, 0xbd, 0x2f, 0x4a, 0x98, + 0x23, 0xef, 0x16, 0x2b, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x05, 0xd7, + 0xde, 0x1e, 0xa4, 0x66, 0x26, 0x96, 0xa2, 0x58 }, + { 0x95, 0xda, 0x27, 0x00, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xd9, 0xa5, + 0x25, 0x54, 0xee, 0x2a, 0x8d, 0xf1, 0x38, 0x6f, + 0x5b, 0x94, 0xa1, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xd8, 0xa4, 0xae, + 0xf6, 0x0a, 0x8d, 0x61, 0xab, 0x5f, 0x22, 0x5a } +}; + +static const unsigned char kwp_msg[KW_TESTS][31] = { + { 0xbd, 0x68, 0x43, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x37, 0x8d, 0xc8, + 0x96 }, + { 0x6c, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x85, 0x18, 0x40, 0x97, 0xeb, + 0xd5, 0xc3, 0xaf, 0x3e, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x19, + 0x14, 0x7b, 0x4d, 0x99, 0x5f, 0x96, 0x43, 0x66, + 0x91, 0x56, 0x75, 0x8c, 0x13, 0x16, 0x8f }, + { 0xd1 } +}; +static const size_t kwp_msg_len[KW_TESTS] = { 9, 31, 1 }; + +static const unsigned char kwp_res[KW_TESTS][48] = { + { 0x41, 0xec, 0xa9, 0x56, 0xd4, 0xaa, 0x04, 0x7e, + 0xb5, 0xcf, 0x4e, 0xfe, 0x65, 0x96, 0x61, 0xe7, + 0x4d, 0xb6, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x64, 0xe2, 0x35, 0x00 }, + { 0x4e, 0x9b, 0xc2, 0xbc, 0xbc, 0x6c, 0x1e, 0x13, + 0xd3, 0x35, 0xbc, 0xc0, 0xf7, 0x73, 0x6a, 0x88, + 0xfa, 0x87, 0x53, 0x66, 0x15, 0xbb, 0x8e, 0x63, + 0x8b, 0xcc, 0x81, 0x66, 0x84, 0x68, 0x17, 0x90, + 0x67, 0xcf, 0xa9, 0x8a, 0x9d, 0x0e, 0x33, 0x26 }, + { 0x06, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xe6, 0xf3, 0x24, 0x8c, 0xfd, + 0xcf, 0x26, 0x75, 0x07, 0xfa, 0x00, 0x1b, 0xc4 } +}; +static const size_t kwp_out_len[KW_TESTS] = { 24, 40, 16 }; + +int mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_nist_kw_context ctx; + unsigned char out[48]; + size_t olen; + int i; + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_nist_kw_init( &ctx ); + + for( i = 0; i < KW_TESTS; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " KW-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8 ); + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " KW: setup failed " ); + + goto end; + } + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( &ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, kw_msg[i], + kw_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof( out ) ); + if( ret != 0 || kw_out_len[i] != olen || + memcmp( out, kw_res[i], kw_out_len[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed. "); + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0 ) ) + != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " KW: setup failed "); + + goto end; + } + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( &ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, + out, olen, out, &olen, sizeof( out ) ); + + if( ret != 0 || olen != kw_msg_len[i] || + memcmp( out, kw_msg[i], kw_msg_len[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " passed\n" ); + } + + for( i = 0; i < KW_TESTS; i++ ) + { + olen = sizeof( out ); + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " KWP-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8 ); + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kwp_key[i], + key_len[i] * 8, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " KWP: setup failed " ); + + goto end; + } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( &ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, kwp_msg[i], + kwp_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof( out ) ); + + if( ret != 0 || kwp_out_len[i] != olen || + memcmp( out, kwp_res[i], kwp_out_len[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed. "); + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey( &ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kwp_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0 ) ) + != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " KWP: setup failed "); + + goto end; + } + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap( &ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, out, + olen, out, &olen, sizeof( out ) ); + + if( ret != 0 || olen != kwp_msg_len[i] || + memcmp( out, kwp_msg[i], kwp_msg_len[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed. "); + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " passed\n" ); + } +end: + mbedtls_nist_kw_free( &ctx ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/oid.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/oid.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..53e5350e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/oid.c @@ -0,0 +1,763 @@ +/** + * \file oid.c + * + * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) + +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* + * Macro to automatically add the size of #define'd OIDs + */ +#define ADD_LEN(s) s, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(s) + +/* + * Macro to generate an internal function for oid_XXX_from_asn1() (used by + * the other functions) + */ +#define FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1( TYPE_T, NAME, LIST ) \ + static const TYPE_T * oid_ ## NAME ## _from_asn1( \ + const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ) \ + { \ + const TYPE_T *p = (LIST); \ + const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *cur = \ + (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \ + if( p == NULL || oid == NULL ) return( NULL ); \ + while( cur->asn1 != NULL ) { \ + if( cur->asn1_len == oid->len && \ + memcmp( cur->asn1, oid->p, oid->len ) == 0 ) { \ + return( p ); \ + } \ + p++; \ + cur = (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \ + } \ + return( NULL ); \ + } + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from the + * descriptor of an mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ +int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1 ) \ +{ \ + const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1( oid ); \ + if( data == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ + *ATTR1 = data->descriptor.ATTR1; \ + return( 0 ); \ +} + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from an + * mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ +int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1 ) \ +{ \ + const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1( oid ); \ + if( data == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ + *ATTR1 = data->ATTR1; \ + return( 0 ); \ +} + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving two attributes from an + * mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1, \ + ATTR2_TYPE, ATTR2) \ +int FN_NAME( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1, \ + ATTR2_TYPE * ATTR2 ) \ +{ \ + const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1( oid ); \ + if( data == NULL ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ + *(ATTR1) = data->ATTR1; \ + *(ATTR2) = data->ATTR2; \ + return( 0 ); \ +} + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving the OID based on a single + * attribute from a mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, LIST, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ +int FN_NAME( ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, const char **oid, size_t *olen ) \ +{ \ + const TYPE_T *cur = (LIST); \ + while( cur->descriptor.asn1 != NULL ) { \ + if( cur->ATTR1 == (ATTR1) ) { \ + *oid = cur->descriptor.asn1; \ + *olen = cur->descriptor.asn1_len; \ + return( 0 ); \ + } \ + cur++; \ + } \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ +} + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving the OID based on two + * attributes from a mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, LIST, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1, \ + ATTR2_TYPE, ATTR2) \ +int FN_NAME( ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, ATTR2_TYPE ATTR2, const char **oid , \ + size_t *olen ) \ +{ \ + const TYPE_T *cur = (LIST); \ + while( cur->descriptor.asn1 != NULL ) { \ + if( cur->ATTR1 == (ATTR1) && cur->ATTR2 == (ATTR2) ) { \ + *oid = cur->descriptor.asn1; \ + *olen = cur->descriptor.asn1_len; \ + return( 0 ); \ + } \ + cur++; \ + } \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ); \ +} + +/* + * For X520 attribute types + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + const char *short_name; +} oid_x520_attr_t; + +static const oid_x520_attr_t oid_x520_attr_type[] = +{ + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN ), "id-at-commonName", "Common Name" }, + "CN", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY ), "id-at-countryName", "Country" }, + "C", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY ), "id-at-locality", "Locality" }, + "L", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE ), "id-at-state", "State" }, + "ST", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION ),"id-at-organizationName", "Organization" }, + "O", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT ), "id-at-organizationalUnitName", "Org Unit" }, + "OU", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL ), "emailAddress", "E-mail address" }, + "emailAddress", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER ),"id-at-serialNumber", "Serial number" }, + "serialNumber", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS ),"id-at-postalAddress", "Postal address" }, + "postalAddress", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE ), "id-at-postalCode", "Postal code" }, + "postalCode", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME ), "id-at-surName", "Surname" }, + "SN", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME ), "id-at-givenName", "Given name" }, + "GN", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS ), "id-at-initials", "Initials" }, + "initials", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER ), "id-at-generationQualifier", "Generation qualifier" }, + "generationQualifier", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE ), "id-at-title", "Title" }, + "title", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER ),"id-at-dnQualifier", "Distinguished Name qualifier" }, + "dnQualifier", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM ), "id-at-pseudonym", "Pseudonym" }, + "pseudonym", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT ), "id-domainComponent", "Domain component" }, + "DC", + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER ), "id-at-uniqueIdentifier", "Unique Identifier" }, + "uniqueIdentifier", + }, + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL, + } +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x520_attr_t, x520_attr, oid_x520_attr_type) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name, oid_x520_attr_t, x520_attr, const char *, short_name) + +/* + * For X509 extensions + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + int ext_type; +} oid_x509_ext_t; + +static const oid_x509_ext_t oid_x509_ext[] = +{ + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ), "id-ce-basicConstraints", "Basic Constraints" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ), "id-ce-extKeyUsage", "Extended Key Usage" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ), "id-ce-subjectAltName", "Subject Alt Name" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), "id-netscape-certtype", "Netscape Certificate Type" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES ), "id-ce-certificatePolicies", "Certificate Policies" }, + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, + }, + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + 0, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, oid_x509_ext) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type, oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, int, ext_type) + +static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_ext_key_usage[] = +{ + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH ), "id-kp-serverAuth", "TLS Web Server Authentication" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH ), "id-kp-clientAuth", "TLS Web Client Authentication" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING ), "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION ), "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING ), "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING ), "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing" }, + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN ), "id-kp-wisun-fan-device", "Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)" }, + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, oid_ext_key_usage) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage, mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, const char *, description) + +static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_certificate_policies[] = +{ + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY ), "anyPolicy", "Any Policy" }, + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, oid_certificate_policies) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies, mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, const char *, description) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +/* + * For SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +} oid_sig_alg_t; + +static const oid_sig_alg_t oid_sig_alg[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 ), "md2WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD2" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 ), "md4WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD4" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 ), "md5WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD5" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 ), "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 ), "sha224WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-224" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 ), "sha256WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-256" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 ), "sha384WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-384" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 ), "sha512WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-512" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS ), "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ECDSA with SHA1" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ECDSA with SHA224" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ECDSA with SHA256" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ECDSA with SHA384" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 ), "ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ECDSA with SHA512" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS ), "RSASSA-PSS", "RSASSA-PSS" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, oid_sig_alg) +FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc, oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, const char *, description) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg, oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg, oid_sig_alg_t, oid_sig_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +/* + * For PublicKeyInfo (PKCS1, RFC 5480) + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +} oid_pk_alg_t; + +static const oid_pk_alg_t oid_pk_alg[] = +{ + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA ), "rsaEncryption", "RSA" }, + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED ), "id-ecPublicKey", "Generic EC key" }, + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH ), "id-ecDH", "EC key for ECDH" }, + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, + }, + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_pk_alg_t, pk_alg, oid_pk_alg) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg, oid_pk_alg_t, pk_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg, oid_pk_alg_t, oid_pk_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * For namedCurve (RFC 5480) + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; +} oid_ecp_grp_t; + +static const oid_ecp_grp_t oid_ecp_grp[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 ), "secp192r1", "secp192r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 ), "secp224r1", "secp224r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 ), "secp256r1", "secp256r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 ), "secp384r1", "secp384r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 ), "secp521r1", "secp521r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 ), "secp192k1", "secp192k1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 ), "secp224k1", "secp224k1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 ), "secp256k1", "secp256k1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 ), "brainpoolP256r1","brainpool256r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 ), "brainpoolP384r1","brainpool384r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 ), "brainpoolP512r1","brainpool512r1" }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_ecp_grp_t, grp_id, oid_ecp_grp) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp, oid_ecp_grp_t, grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_group_id, grp_id) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp, oid_ecp_grp_t, oid_ecp_grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id, grp_id) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +/* + * For PKCS#5 PBES2 encryption algorithm + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; +} oid_cipher_alg_t; + +static const oid_cipher_alg_t oid_cipher_alg[] = +{ + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC ), "desCBC", "DES-CBC" }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC ), "des-ede3-cbc", "DES-EDE3-CBC" }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, + }, + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_cipher_alg_t, cipher_alg, oid_cipher_alg) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg, oid_cipher_alg_t, cipher_alg, mbedtls_cipher_type_t, cipher_alg) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +/* + * For digestAlgorithm + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; +} oid_md_alg_t; + +static const oid_md_alg_t oid_md_alg[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 ), "id-md2", "MD2" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 ), "id-md4", "MD4" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 ), "id-md5", "MD5" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 ), "id-sha1", "SHA-1" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 ), "id-sha224", "SHA-224" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 ), "id-sha256", "SHA-256" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 ), "id-sha384", "SHA-384" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 ), "id-sha512", "SHA-512" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160 ), "id-ripemd160", "RIPEMD-160" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_alg_t, md_alg, oid_md_alg) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg, oid_md_alg_t, md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md, oid_md_alg_t, oid_md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) + +/* + * For HMAC digestAlgorithm + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_hmac; +} oid_md_hmac_t; + +static const oid_md_hmac_t oid_md_hmac[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 ), "hmacSHA1", "HMAC-SHA-1" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224 ), "hmacSHA224", "HMAC-SHA-224" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256 ), "hmacSHA256", "HMAC-SHA-256" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384 ), "hmacSHA384", "HMAC-SHA-384" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512 ), "hmacSHA512", "HMAC-SHA-512" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, oid_md_hmac) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac, oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_hmac) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +/* + * For PKCS#12 PBEs + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; +} oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t; + +static const oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg[] = +{ + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC ), "pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", "PBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, + }, + { + { ADD_LEN( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC ), "pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", "PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DES" }, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, + }, + { + { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t, pkcs12_pbe_alg, oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg, oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t, pkcs12_pbe_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg, mbedtls_cipher_type_t, cipher_alg) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ + +#define OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF \ + do { \ + if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= n ) \ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); \ + \ + n -= (size_t) ret; \ + p += (size_t) ret; \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* Return the x.y.z.... style numeric string for the given OID */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( char *buf, size_t size, + const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, n; + unsigned int value; + char *p; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + /* First byte contains first two dots */ + if( oid->len > 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%d.%d", oid->p[0] / 40, oid->p[0] % 40 ); + OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + value = 0; + for( i = 1; i < oid->len; i++ ) + { + /* Prevent overflow in value. */ + if( ( ( value << 7 ) >> 7 ) != value ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + value <<= 7; + value += oid->p[i] & 0x7F; + + if( !( oid->p[i] & 0x80 ) ) + { + /* Last byte */ + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ".%u", value ); + OID_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + value = 0; + } + } + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/padlock.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/padlock.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..83733741 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/padlock.c @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +/* + * VIA PadLock support functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * This implementation is based on the VIA PadLock Programming Guide: + * + * http://www.via.com.tw/en/downloads/whitepapers/initiatives/padlock/ + * programming_guide.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) + +#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" + +#include + +#ifndef asm +#define asm __asm +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) + +/* + * PadLock detection routine + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_has_support( int feature ) +{ + static int flags = -1; + int ebx = 0, edx = 0; + + if( flags == -1 ) + { + asm( "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" + "movl $0xC0000000, %%eax \n\t" + "cpuid \n\t" + "cmpl $0xC0000001, %%eax \n\t" + "movl $0, %%edx \n\t" + "jb 1f \n\t" + "movl $0xC0000001, %%eax \n\t" + "cpuid \n\t" + "1: \n\t" + "movl %%edx, %1 \n\t" + "movl %2, %%ebx \n\t" + : "=m" (ebx), "=m" (edx) + : "m" (ebx) + : "eax", "ecx", "edx" ); + + flags = edx; + } + + return( flags & feature ); +} + +/* + * PadLock AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16] ) +{ + int ebx = 0; + uint32_t *rk; + uint32_t *blk; + uint32_t *ctrl; + unsigned char buf[256]; + + rk = ctx->rk; + blk = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16( buf ); + memcpy( blk, input, 16 ); + + ctrl = blk + 4; + *ctrl = 0x80 | ctx->nr | ( ( ctx->nr + ( mode^1 ) - 10 ) << 9 ); + + asm( "pushfl \n\t" + "popfl \n\t" + "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" + "movl $1, %%ecx \n\t" + "movl %2, %%edx \n\t" + "movl %3, %%ebx \n\t" + "movl %4, %%esi \n\t" + "movl %4, %%edi \n\t" + ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8 \n\t" + "movl %1, %%ebx \n\t" + : "=m" (ebx) + : "m" (ebx), "m" (ctrl), "m" (rk), "m" (blk) + : "memory", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" ); + + memcpy( output, blk, 16 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ebx = 0; + size_t count; + uint32_t *rk; + uint32_t *iw; + uint32_t *ctrl; + unsigned char buf[256]; + + if( ( (long) input & 15 ) != 0 || + ( (long) output & 15 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED ); + + rk = ctx->rk; + iw = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16( buf ); + memcpy( iw, iv, 16 ); + + ctrl = iw + 4; + *ctrl = 0x80 | ctx->nr | ( ( ctx->nr + ( mode ^ 1 ) - 10 ) << 9 ); + + count = ( length + 15 ) >> 4; + + asm( "pushfl \n\t" + "popfl \n\t" + "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" + "movl %2, %%ecx \n\t" + "movl %3, %%edx \n\t" + "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" + "movl %5, %%esi \n\t" + "movl %6, %%edi \n\t" + "movl %7, %%eax \n\t" + ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xd0 \n\t" + "movl %1, %%ebx \n\t" + : "=m" (ebx) + : "m" (ebx), "m" (count), "m" (ctrl), + "m" (rk), "m" (input), "m" (output), "m" (iw) + : "memory", "eax", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" ); + + memcpy( iv, iw, 16 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pem.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pem.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cb1c82b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pem.c @@ -0,0 +1,483 @@ +/* + * Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) decoding + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_pem_init( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_pem_context ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) ) +/* + * Read a 16-byte hex string and convert it to binary + */ +static int pem_get_iv( const unsigned char *s, unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len ) +{ + size_t i, j, k; + + memset( iv, 0, iv_len ); + + for( i = 0; i < iv_len * 2; i++, s++ ) + { + if( *s >= '0' && *s <= '9' ) j = *s - '0'; else + if( *s >= 'A' && *s <= 'F' ) j = *s - '7'; else + if( *s >= 'a' && *s <= 'f' ) j = *s - 'W'; else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV ); + + k = ( ( i & 1 ) != 0 ) ? j : j << 4; + + iv[i >> 1] = (unsigned char)( iv[i >> 1] | k ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int pem_pbkdf1( unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_context md5_ctx; + unsigned char md5sum[16]; + size_t use_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md5_init( &md5_ctx ); + + /* + * key[ 0..15] = MD5(pwd || IV) + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, iv, 8 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5_ctx, md5sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( keylen <= 16 ) + { + memcpy( key, md5sum, keylen ); + goto exit; + } + + memcpy( key, md5sum, 16 ); + + /* + * key[16..23] = MD5(key[ 0..15] || pwd || IV]) + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, md5sum, 16 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5_ctx, iv, 8 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5_ctx, md5sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + use_len = 16; + if( keylen < 32 ) + use_len = keylen - 16; + + memcpy( key + 16, md5sum, use_len ); + +exit: + mbedtls_md5_free( &md5_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( md5sum, 16 ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +/* + * Decrypt with DES-CBC, using PBKDF1 for key derivation + */ +static int pem_des_decrypt( unsigned char des_iv[8], + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + mbedtls_des_context des_ctx; + unsigned char des_key[8]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_des_init( &des_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = pem_pbkdf1( des_key, 8, des_iv, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec( &des_ctx, des_key ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc( &des_ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT, buflen, + des_iv, buf, buf ); + +exit: + mbedtls_des_free( &des_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( des_key, 8 ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Decrypt with 3DES-CBC, using PBKDF1 for key derivation + */ +static int pem_des3_decrypt( unsigned char des3_iv[8], + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + mbedtls_des3_context des3_ctx; + unsigned char des3_key[24]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_des3_init( &des3_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = pem_pbkdf1( des3_key, 24, des3_iv, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec( &des3_ctx, des3_key ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc( &des3_ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT, buflen, + des3_iv, buf, buf ); + +exit: + mbedtls_des3_free( &des3_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( des3_key, 24 ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* + * Decrypt with AES-XXX-CBC, using PBKDF1 for key derivation + */ +static int pem_aes_decrypt( unsigned char aes_iv[16], unsigned int keylen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; + unsigned char aes_key[32]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_aes_init( &aes_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = pem_pbkdf1( aes_key, keylen, aes_iv, pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec( &aes_ctx, aes_key, keylen * 8 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( &aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, buflen, + aes_iv, buf, buf ); + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free( &aes_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( aes_key, keylen ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && + ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + +int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer, + const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *pwd, + size_t pwdlen, size_t *use_len ) +{ + int ret, enc; + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + const unsigned char *s1, *s2, *end; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) ) + unsigned char pem_iv[16]; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; +#else + ((void) pwd); + ((void) pwdlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && + ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + + if( ctx == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + s1 = (unsigned char *) strstr( (const char *) data, header ); + + if( s1 == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ); + + s2 = (unsigned char *) strstr( (const char *) data, footer ); + + if( s2 == NULL || s2 <= s1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ); + + s1 += strlen( header ); + if( *s1 == ' ' ) s1++; + if( *s1 == '\r' ) s1++; + if( *s1 == '\n' ) s1++; + else return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ); + + end = s2; + end += strlen( footer ); + if( *end == ' ' ) end++; + if( *end == '\r' ) end++; + if( *end == '\n' ) end++; + *use_len = end - data; + + enc = 0; + + if( s2 - s1 >= 22 && memcmp( s1, "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED", 22 ) == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) ) + enc++; + + s1 += 22; + if( *s1 == '\r' ) s1++; + if( *s1 == '\n' ) s1++; + else return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA ); + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + if( s2 - s1 >= 23 && memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,", 23 ) == 0 ) + { + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC; + + s1 += 23; + if( s2 - s1 < 16 || pem_get_iv( s1, pem_iv, 8 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV ); + + s1 += 16; + } + else if( s2 - s1 >= 18 && memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: DES-CBC,", 18 ) == 0 ) + { + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC; + + s1 += 18; + if( s2 - s1 < 16 || pem_get_iv( s1, pem_iv, 8) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV ); + + s1 += 16; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if( s2 - s1 >= 14 && memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-", 14 ) == 0 ) + { + if( s2 - s1 < 22 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG ); + else if( memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,", 22 ) == 0 ) + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC; + else if( memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-192-CBC,", 22 ) == 0 ) + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC; + else if( memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,", 22 ) == 0 ) + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC; + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG ); + + s1 += 22; + if( s2 - s1 < 32 || pem_get_iv( s1, pem_iv, 16 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV ); + + s1 += 32; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + + if( enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG ); + + if( *s1 == '\r' ) s1++; + if( *s1 == '\n' ) s1++; + else return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && + ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + } + + if( s1 >= s2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA ); + + ret = mbedtls_base64_decode( NULL, 0, &len, s1, s2 - s1 ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret ) ); + + if( ( buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_base64_decode( buf, len, &len, s1, s2 - s1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, len ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret ) ); + } + + if( enc != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) ) + if( pwd == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, len ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ); + } + + ret = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + if( enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC ) + ret = pem_des3_decrypt( pem_iv, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen ); + else if( enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC ) + ret = pem_des_decrypt( pem_iv, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if( enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC ) + ret = pem_aes_decrypt( pem_iv, 16, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen ); + else if( enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC ) + ret = pem_aes_decrypt( pem_iv, 24, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen ); + else if( enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC ) + ret = pem_aes_decrypt( pem_iv, 32, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( buf ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * The result will be ASN.1 starting with a SEQUENCE tag, with 1 to 3 + * length bytes (allow 4 to be sure) in all known use cases. + * + * Use that as a heuristic to try to detect password mismatches. + */ + if( len <= 2 || buf[0] != 0x30 || buf[1] > 0x83 ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, len ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + } +#else + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, len ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && + ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + } + + ctx->buf = buf; + ctx->buflen = len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_pem_free( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx ) +{ + if ( ctx->buf != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->buf, ctx->buflen ); + mbedtls_free( ctx->buf ); + } + mbedtls_free( ctx->info ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_pem_context ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( const char *header, const char *footer, + const unsigned char *der_data, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *encode_buf = NULL, *c, *p = buf; + size_t len = 0, use_len, add_len = 0; + + mbedtls_base64_encode( NULL, 0, &use_len, der_data, der_len ); + add_len = strlen( header ) + strlen( footer ) + ( use_len / 64 ) + 1; + + if( use_len + add_len > buf_len ) + { + *olen = use_len + add_len; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + if( use_len != 0 && + ( ( encode_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, use_len ) ) == NULL ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_base64_encode( encode_buf, use_len, &use_len, der_data, + der_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( encode_buf ); + return( ret ); + } + + memcpy( p, header, strlen( header ) ); + p += strlen( header ); + c = encode_buf; + + while( use_len ) + { + len = ( use_len > 64 ) ? 64 : use_len; + memcpy( p, c, len ); + use_len -= len; + p += len; + c += len; + *p++ = '\n'; + } + + memcpy( p, footer, strlen( footer ) ); + p += strlen( footer ); + + *p++ = '\0'; + *olen = p - buf; + + /* Clean any remaining data previously written to the buffer */ + memset( buf + *olen, 0, buf_len - *olen ); + + mbedtls_free( encode_buf ); + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pk.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pk.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..05cc2134 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pk.c @@ -0,0 +1,642 @@ +/* + * Public Key abstraction layer + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define PK_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define PK_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +/* + * Initialise a mbedtls_pk_context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_init( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + ctx->pk_info = NULL; + ctx->pk_ctx = NULL; +} + +/* + * Free (the components of) a mbedtls_pk_context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + if ( ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + ctx->pk_info->ctx_free_func( ctx->pk_ctx ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_pk_context ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_init( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + ctx->pk_info = NULL; + ctx->rs_ctx = NULL; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_free( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL || + ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func == NULL ) + { + return; + } + + ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func( ctx->rs_ctx ); + + ctx->pk_info = NULL; + ctx->rs_ctx = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * Get pk_info structure from type + */ +const mbedtls_pk_info_t * mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type ) +{ + switch( pk_type ) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( &mbedtls_rsa_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + return( &mbedtls_eckey_info ); + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + return( &mbedtls_eckeydh_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return( &mbedtls_ecdsa_info ); +#endif + /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT omitted on purpose */ + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} + +/* + * Initialise context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( info == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * Initialise a PSA-wrapping context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const psa_key_id_t key ) +{ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t * const info = &mbedtls_pk_opaque_info; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t *pk_ctx; + psa_key_type_t type; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( key, &attributes ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + /* Current implementation of can_do() relies on this. */ + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) ; + + if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + pk_ctx = (psa_key_id_t *) ctx->pk_ctx; + *pk_ctx = key; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/* + * Initialize an RSA-alt context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void * key, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info = &mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx->pk_ctx; + + rsa_alt->key = key; + rsa_alt->decrypt_func = decrypt_func; + rsa_alt->sign_func = sign_func; + rsa_alt->key_len_func = key_len_func; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Tell if a PK can do the operations of the given type + */ +int mbedtls_pk_can_do( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + /* A context with null pk_info is not set up yet and can't do anything. + * For backward compatibility, also accept NULL instead of a context + * pointer. */ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->can_do( type ) ); +} + +/* + * Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify + */ +static inline int pk_hashlen_helper( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len ) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + if( *hash_len != 0 && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if ( *hash_len != 0 && *hash_len != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + return ( -1 ); + + *hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Helper to set up a restart context if needed + */ +static int pk_restart_setup( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx, + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info ) +{ + /* Don't do anything if already set up or invalid */ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Should never happen when we're called */ + if( info->rs_alloc_func == NULL || info->rs_free_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ctx->rs_ctx = info->rs_alloc_func() ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * Verify a signature (restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL || + pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && + mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && + ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func != NULL ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = pk_restart_setup( rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func( ctx->pk_ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx->rs_ctx ); + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( rs_ctx ); + + return( ret ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if( ctx->pk_info->verify_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->verify_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Verify a signature + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Verify a signature with options + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, + mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx, type ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + if( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + + if( options == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) options; + + if( sig_len < mbedtls_pk_get_len( ctx ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ), + NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, + pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id, + pss_opts->expected_salt_len, + sig ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len( ctx ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); + + return( 0 ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + } + + /* General case: no options */ + if( options != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_pk_verify( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) ); +} + +/* + * Make a signature (restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL || + pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && + mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && + ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func != NULL ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = pk_restart_setup( rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx->rs_ctx ); + + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( rs_ctx ); + + return( ret ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if( ctx->pk_info->sign_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->sign_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Make a signature + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + return( mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Decrypt message + */ +int mbedtls_pk_decrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL || ilen == 0 ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL || osize == 0 ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func( ctx->pk_ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Encrypt message + */ +int mbedtls_pk_encrypt( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL || ilen == 0 ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL || osize == 0 ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func( ctx->pk_ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +/* + * Check public-private key pair + */ +int mbedtls_pk_check_pair( const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL ); + + if( pub->pk_info == NULL || + prv->pk_info == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( prv->pk_info->type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT ) + { + if( pub->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + else + { + if( pub->pk_info != prv->pk_info ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + + return( prv->pk_info->check_pair_func( pub->pk_ctx, prv->pk_ctx ) ); +} + +/* + * Get key size in bits + */ +size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + /* For backward compatibility, accept NULL or a context that + * isn't set up yet, and return a fake value that should be safe. */ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->get_bitlen( ctx->pk_ctx ) ); +} + +/* + * Export debug information + */ +int mbedtls_pk_debug( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ) +{ + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx->pk_info->debug_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + ctx->pk_info->debug_func( ctx->pk_ctx, items ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Access the PK type name + */ +const char *mbedtls_pk_get_name( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( "invalid PK" ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->name ); +} + +/* + * Access the PK type + */ +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type( const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); + + return( ctx->pk_info->type ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * Load the key to a PSA key slot, + * then turn the PK context into a wrapper for that key slot. + * + * Currently only works for EC private keys. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_id_t *key, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + ((void) pk); + ((void) key); + ((void) hash_alg); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); +#else + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec; + unsigned char d[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t d_len; + psa_ecc_family_t curve_id; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + size_t bits; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* export the private key material in the format PSA wants */ + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + + ec = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ); + d_len = ( ec->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ec->d, d, d_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + curve_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( ec->grp.id, &bits ); + key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( curve_id ); + + /* prepare the key attributes */ + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, key_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, bits ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) ); + + /* import private key into PSA */ + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_import_key( &attributes, d, d_len, key ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + /* make PK context wrap the key slot */ + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); + + return( mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque( pk, *key ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pk_wrap.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pk_wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f35abf21 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,1063 @@ +/* + * Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +/* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */ +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static int rsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ); +} + +static size_t rsa_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + const mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + return( 8 * mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ); +} + +static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + + if( sig_len < rsa_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa, NULL, NULL, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* The buffer contains a valid signature followed by extra data. + * We have a special error code for that so that so that callers can + * use mbedtls_pk_verify() to check "Does the buffer start with a + * valid signature?" and not just "Does the buffer contain a valid + * signature?". */ + if( sig_len > rsa_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int rsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + + *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ); +} + +static int rsa_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + + if( ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize ) ); +} + +static int rsa_encrypt_wrap( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context * rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + *olen = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + + if( *olen > osize ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE ); + + return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + ilen, input, output ) ); +} + +static int rsa_check_pair_wrap( const void *pub, const void *prv ) +{ + return( mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub, + (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv ) ); +} + +static void *rsa_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_rsa_init( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, 0, 0 ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void rsa_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_free( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static void rsa_debug( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ) +{ + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; + items->name = "rsa.N"; + items->value = &( ((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->N ); + + items++; + + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; + items->name = "rsa.E"; + items->value = &( ((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->E ); +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + "RSA", + rsa_get_bitlen, + rsa_can_do, + rsa_verify_wrap, + rsa_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + rsa_decrypt_wrap, + rsa_encrypt_wrap, + rsa_check_pair_wrap, + rsa_alloc_wrap, + rsa_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + rsa_debug, +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Generic EC key + */ +static int eckey_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +} + +static size_t eckey_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + return( ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->grp.pbits ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +/* Forward declarations */ +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ); + +static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ); + +static int eckey_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &ecdsa, ctx ) ) == 0 ) + ret = ecdsa_verify_wrap( &ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ); + + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ecdsa ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static int eckey_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &ecdsa ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &ecdsa, ctx ) ) == 0 ) + ret = ecdsa_sign_wrap( &ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng ); + + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &ecdsa ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* Forward declarations */ +static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx ); + +static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx ); + +/* + * Restart context for ECDSA operations with ECKEY context + * + * We need to store an actual ECDSA context, as we need to pass the same to + * the underlying ecdsa function, so we can't create it on the fly every time. + */ +typedef struct +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ecdsa_rs; + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_ctx; +} eckey_restart_ctx; + +static void *eckey_rs_alloc( void ) +{ + eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx; + + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( eckey_restart_ctx ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + { + rs_ctx = ctx; + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs ); + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx ); + } + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void eckey_rs_free( void *ctx ) +{ + eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx; + + if( ctx == NULL) + return; + + rs_ctx = ctx; + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs ); + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx ); + + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; + + /* Should never happen */ + if( rs == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ + if( rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len, &rs->ecdsa_rs ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} + +static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; + + /* Should never happen */ + if( rs == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ + if( rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs ) ); + +cleanup: + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +static int eckey_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub, + (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv ) ); +} + +static void *eckey_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_keypair ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void eckey_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static void eckey_debug( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items ) +{ + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP; + items->name = "eckey.Q"; + items->value = &( ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->Q ); +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + "EC", + eckey_get_bitlen, + eckey_can_do, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + eckey_verify_wrap, + eckey_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + eckey_verify_rs_wrap, + eckey_sign_rs_wrap, +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + NULL, + NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + NULL, + NULL, + eckey_check_pair, + eckey_alloc_wrap, + eckey_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + eckey_rs_alloc, + eckey_rs_free, +#endif + eckey_debug, +}; + +/* + * EC key restricted to ECDH + */ +static int eckeydh_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ); +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, + "EC_DH", + eckey_get_bitlen, /* Same underlying key structure */ + eckeydh_can_do, + NULL, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + NULL, + NULL, + eckey_check_pair, + eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ + eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +static int ecdsa_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of + * those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA. + */ +static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int( unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *to, size_t to_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t unpadded_len, padding_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( from, end, &unpadded_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + while( unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00 ) + { + ( *from )++; + unpadded_len--; + } + + if( unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len; + memset( to, 0x00, padding_len ); + memcpy( to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len ); + ( *from ) += unpadded_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers + * to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least + * twice as big as int_size. + */ +static int extract_ecdsa_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t tmp_size; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &tmp_size, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Extract r */ + if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig, int_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + /* Extract s */ + if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int( p, end, sig + int_size, int_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx = ctx_arg; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_id_t key_id = 0; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_pk_context key; + int key_len; + /* see ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES in pkwrite.c */ + unsigned char buf[30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p; + mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info; + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits ); + const size_t signature_part_size = ( ctx->grp.nbits + 7 ) / 8; + ((void) md_alg); + + if( curve == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context; + * re-construct one to make it happy */ + key.pk_info = &pk_info; + key.pk_ctx = ctx; + p = buf + sizeof( buf ); + key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &p, buf, &key ); + if( key_len <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( curve ) ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &attributes, psa_sig_md ); + + status = psa_import_key( &attributes, + buf + sizeof( buf ) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ret = mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* We don't need the exported key anymore and can + * reuse its buffer for signature extraction. */ + if( 2 * signature_part_size > sizeof( buf ) ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + p = (unsigned char*) sig; + if( ( ret = extract_ecdsa_sig( &p, sig + sig_len, buf, + signature_part_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + + if( psa_verify_hash( key_id, psa_sig_md, + hash, hash_len, + buf, 2 * signature_part_size ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( p != sig + sig_len ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + goto cleanup; + } + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + psa_destroy_key( key_id ); + return( ret ); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ((void) md_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ((void) md_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( + (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, + (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( + (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, + (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx ) ); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_ecdsa_init( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void ecdsa_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_free( (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +static void *ecdsa_rs_alloc( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( ctx ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void ecdsa_rs_free( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( ctx ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + "ECDSA", + eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */ + ecdsa_can_do, + ecdsa_verify_wrap, + ecdsa_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap, + ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap, +#endif + NULL, + NULL, + eckey_check_pair, /* Compatible key structures */ + ecdsa_alloc_wrap, + ecdsa_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + ecdsa_rs_alloc, + ecdsa_rs_free, +#endif + eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/* + * Support for alternative RSA-private implementations + */ + +static int rsa_alt_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); +} + +static size_t rsa_alt_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + + return( 8 * rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ) ); +} + +static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( UINT_MAX < hash_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ + + *sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ); + if( *sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( rsa_alt->sign_func( rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig ) ); +} + +static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + if( ilen != rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( rsa_alt->decrypt_func( rsa_alt->key, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static int rsa_alt_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv ) +{ + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char hash[32]; + size_t sig_len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( rsa_alt_get_bitlen( prv ) != rsa_get_bitlen( pub ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + + memset( hash, 0x2a, sizeof( hash ) ); + + if( ( ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap( (void *) prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + hash, sizeof( hash ), + sig, &sig_len, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( rsa_verify_wrap( (void *) pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + hash, sizeof( hash ), sig, sig_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +static void *rsa_alt_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) ); + + if( ctx != NULL ) + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) ); + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void rsa_alt_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_alt_context ) ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, + "RSA-alt", + rsa_alt_get_bitlen, + rsa_alt_can_do, + NULL, + rsa_alt_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + rsa_alt_check_pair, +#else + NULL, +#endif + rsa_alt_alloc_wrap, + rsa_alt_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, + NULL, +#endif + NULL, +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +static void *pk_opaque_alloc_wrap( void ) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( psa_key_id_t ) ); + + /* no _init() function to call, as calloc() already zeroized */ + + return( ctx ); +} + +static void pk_opaque_free_wrap( void *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( psa_key_id_t ) ); + mbedtls_free( ctx ); +} + +static size_t pk_opaque_get_bitlen( const void *ctx ) +{ + const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx; + size_t bits; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( *key, &attributes ) ) + return( 0 ); + + bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + return( bits ); +} + +static int pk_opaque_can_do( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + /* For now opaque PSA keys can only wrap ECC keypairs, + * as checked by setup_psa(). + * Also, ECKEY_DH does not really make sense with the current API. */ + return( type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + +/* + * Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer + * to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer. + * See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(). + * + * p: pointer to the end of the output buffer + * start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end + * n_len: length of the mpi to read from start + */ +static int asn1_write_mpibuf( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + size_t n_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if( (size_t)( *p - start ) < n_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + len = n_len; + *p -= len; + memmove( *p, start, len ); + + /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. + * Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect + * that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */ + while( len > 0 && **p == 0x00 ) + { + ++(*p); + --len; + } + + /* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + /* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. + * Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */ + if( **p & 0x80 ) + { + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = 0x00; + len += 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence. + * See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of + * MPIs, and in-place. + * + * [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding + * [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding + * [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer + */ +static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + size_t buf_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2; + unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig + rs_len, rs_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, asn1_write_mpibuf( &p, sig, rs_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &p, sig, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &p, sig, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + memmove( sig, p, len ); + *sig_len = len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +static int pk_opaque_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + ((void) ctx); + ((void) md_alg); + ((void) hash); + ((void) hash_len); + ((void) sig); + ((void) sig_len); + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA( mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg ) ); + size_t buf_len; + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA has its own RNG */ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + + /* PSA needs an output buffer of known size, but our API doesn't provide + * that information. Assume that the buffer is large enough for a + * maximal-length signature with that key (otherwise the application is + * buggy anyway). */ + status = psa_get_key_attributes( *key, &attributes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) ); + buf_len = MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN( psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ) ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + if( buf_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* make the signature */ + status = psa_sign_hash( *key, alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, buf_len, sig_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk( status ) ); + + /* transcode it to ASN.1 sequence */ + return( pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa( sig, sig_len, buf_len ) ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info = { + MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, + "Opaque", + pk_opaque_get_bitlen, + pk_opaque_can_do, + NULL, /* verify - will be done later */ + pk_opaque_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, /* restartable verify - not relevant */ + NULL, /* restartable sign - not relevant */ +#endif + NULL, /* decrypt - will be done later */ + NULL, /* encrypt - will be done later */ + NULL, /* check_pair - could be done later or left NULL */ + pk_opaque_alloc_wrap, + pk_opaque_free_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + NULL, /* restart alloc - not relevant */ + NULL, /* restart free - not relevant */ +#endif + NULL, /* debug - could be done later, or even left NULL */ +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkcs11.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkcs11.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a7207cfc --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkcs11.c @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs11.c + * + * \brief Wrapper for PKCS#11 library libpkcs11-helper + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "mbedtls/pkcs11.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include + +void mbedtls_pkcs11_init( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_pkcs11_context ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind( mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert ) +{ + int ret = 1; + unsigned char *cert_blob = NULL; + size_t cert_blob_size = 0; + + if( cert == NULL ) + { + ret = 2; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( pkcs11h_certificate_getCertificateBlob( pkcs11_cert, NULL, + &cert_blob_size ) != CKR_OK ) + { + ret = 3; + goto cleanup; + } + + cert_blob = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cert_blob_size ); + if( NULL == cert_blob ) + { + ret = 4; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( pkcs11h_certificate_getCertificateBlob( pkcs11_cert, cert_blob, + &cert_blob_size ) != CKR_OK ) + { + ret = 5; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( 0 != mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( cert, cert_blob, cert_blob_size ) ) + { + ret = 6; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + if( NULL != cert_blob ) + mbedtls_free( cert_blob ); + + return( ret ); +} + + +int mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key, + pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert ) +{ + int ret = 1; + mbedtls_x509_crt cert; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cert ); + + if( priv_key == NULL ) + goto cleanup; + + if( 0 != mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind( &cert, pkcs11_cert ) ) + goto cleanup; + + priv_key->len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( &cert.pk ); + priv_key->pkcs11h_cert = pkcs11_cert; + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cert ); + + return( ret ); +} + +void mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key ) +{ + if( NULL != priv_key ) + pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificate( priv_key->pkcs11h_cert ); +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, + int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ) +{ + size_t input_len, output_len; + + if( NULL == ctx ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE != mode ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + output_len = input_len = ctx->len; + + if( input_len < 16 || input_len > output_max_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Determine size of output buffer */ + if( pkcs11h_certificate_decryptAny( ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, input, + input_len, NULL, &output_len ) != CKR_OK ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( output_len > output_max_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE ); + + if( pkcs11h_certificate_decryptAny( ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, input, + input_len, output, &output_len ) != CKR_OK ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + *olen = output_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs11_sign( mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + size_t sig_len = 0, asn_len = 0, oid_size = 0; + unsigned char *p = sig; + const char *oid; + + if( NULL == ctx ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE != mode ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( md_alg, &oid, &oid_size ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + asn_len = 10 + oid_size; + } + + sig_len = ctx->len; + if( hashlen > sig_len || asn_len > sig_len || + hashlen + asn_len > sig_len ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + /* + * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, + * digest Digest } + * + * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * + * Digest ::= OCTET STRING + */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + *p++ = (unsigned char) ( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + *p++ = (unsigned char) ( 0x04 + oid_size ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + *p++ = oid_size & 0xFF; + memcpy( p, oid, oid_size ); + p += oid_size; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL; + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + *p++ = hashlen; + } + + memcpy( p, hash, hashlen ); + + if( pkcs11h_certificate_signAny( ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, sig, + asn_len + hashlen, sig, &sig_len ) != CKR_OK ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkcs12.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkcs12.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cacf7dba --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkcs12.c @@ -0,0 +1,404 @@ +/* + * PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The PKCS #12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard v1.1 + * + * http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pkcs/files/h11301-wp-pkcs-12v1-1-personal-information-exchange-syntax.pdf + * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1-1.asn + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + +static int pkcs12_parse_pbe_params( mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char **p = ¶ms->p; + const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len; + + /* + * pkcs-12PbeParams ::= SEQUENCE { + * salt OCTET STRING, + * iterations INTEGER + * } + * + */ + if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &salt->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + salt->p = *p; + *p += salt->len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, iterations ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN 128 + +static int pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen ) +{ + int ret, iterations = 0; + mbedtls_asn1_buf salt; + size_t i; + unsigned char unipwd[PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN * 2 + 2]; + + if( pwdlen > PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( &salt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); + memset( &unipwd, 0, sizeof(unipwd) ); + + if( ( ret = pkcs12_parse_pbe_params( pbe_params, &salt, + &iterations ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + for( i = 0; i < pwdlen; i++ ) + unipwd[i * 2 + 1] = pwd[i]; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( key, keylen, unipwd, pwdlen * 2 + 2, + salt.p, salt.len, md_type, + MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY, iterations ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( iv == NULL || ivlen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( iv, ivlen, unipwd, pwdlen * 2 + 2, + salt.p, salt.len, md_type, + MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV, iterations ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +#undef PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN + +int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len, + unsigned char *output ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + ((void) pbe_params); + ((void) mode); + ((void) pwd); + ((void) pwdlen); + ((void) data); + ((void) len); + ((void) output); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char key[16]; + mbedtls_arc4_context ctx; + ((void) mode); + + mbedtls_arc4_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv( pbe_params, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + pwd, pwdlen, + key, 16, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + mbedtls_arc4_setup( &ctx, key, 16 ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_arc4_crypt( &ctx, len, data, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); + mbedtls_arc4_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe( mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret, keylen = 0; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char iv[16]; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; + size_t olen = 0; + + if( pwd == NULL && pwdlen != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_type ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + + if( ( ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv( pbe_params, md_type, pwd, pwdlen, + key, keylen, + iv, cipher_info->iv_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &cipher_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, (mbedtls_operation_t) mode ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &cipher_ctx, iv, cipher_info->iv_size ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset( &cipher_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_update( &cipher_ctx, data, len, + output, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish( &cipher_ctx, output + olen, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( iv, sizeof( iv ) ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &cipher_ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +static void pkcs12_fill_buffer( unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + const unsigned char *filler, size_t fill_len ) +{ + unsigned char *p = data; + size_t use_len; + + if( filler != NULL && fill_len != 0 ) + { + while( data_len > 0 ) + { + use_len = ( data_len > fill_len ) ? fill_len : data_len; + memcpy( p, filler, use_len ); + p += use_len; + data_len -= use_len; + } + } + else + { + /* If either of the above are not true then clearly there is nothing + * that this function can do. The function should *not* be called + * under either of those circumstances, as you could end up with an + * incorrect output but for safety's sake, leaving the check in as + * otherwise we could end up with memory corruption.*/ + } +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation( unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, int id, int iterations ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int j; + + unsigned char diversifier[128]; + unsigned char salt_block[128], pwd_block[128], hash_block[128]; + unsigned char hash_output[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char c; + int use_password = 0; + int use_salt = 0; + + size_t hlen, use_len, v, i; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + + // This version only allows max of 64 bytes of password or salt + if( datalen > 128 || pwdlen > 64 || saltlen > 64 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( pwd == NULL && pwdlen != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( salt == NULL && saltlen != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + use_password = ( pwd && pwdlen != 0 ); + use_salt = ( salt && saltlen != 0 ); + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + if( hlen <= 32 ) + v = 64; + else + v = 128; + + memset( diversifier, (unsigned char) id, v ); + + if( use_salt != 0 ) + { + pkcs12_fill_buffer( salt_block, v, salt, saltlen ); + } + + if( use_password != 0 ) + { + pkcs12_fill_buffer( pwd_block, v, pwd, pwdlen ); + } + + p = data; + while( datalen > 0 ) + { + // Calculate hash( diversifier || salt_block || pwd_block ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, diversifier, v ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( use_salt != 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, salt_block, v )) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + if( use_password != 0) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, pwd_block, v )) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, hash_output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + // Perform remaining ( iterations - 1 ) recursive hash calculations + for( i = 1; i < (size_t) iterations; i++ ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, hash_output, hlen, hash_output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + + use_len = ( datalen > hlen ) ? hlen : datalen; + memcpy( p, hash_output, use_len ); + datalen -= use_len; + p += use_len; + + if( datalen == 0 ) + break; + + // Concatenating copies of hash_output into hash_block (B) + pkcs12_fill_buffer( hash_block, v, hash_output, hlen ); + + // B += 1 + for( i = v; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++hash_block[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + if( use_salt != 0 ) + { + // salt_block += B + c = 0; + for( i = v; i > 0; i-- ) + { + j = salt_block[i - 1] + hash_block[i - 1] + c; + c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( j ); + salt_block[i - 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( j ); + } + } + + if( use_password != 0 ) + { + // pwd_block += B + c = 0; + for( i = v; i > 0; i-- ) + { + j = pwd_block[i - 1] + hash_block[i - 1] + c; + c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( j ); + pwd_block[i - 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( j ); + } + } + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( salt_block, sizeof( salt_block ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( pwd_block, sizeof( pwd_block ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hash_block, sizeof( hash_block ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hash_output, sizeof( hash_output ) ); + + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkcs5.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkcs5.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f9d01371 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkcs5.c @@ -0,0 +1,415 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs5.c + * + * \brief PKCS#5 functions + * + * \author Mathias Olsson + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * PKCS#5 includes PBKDF2 and more + * + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2898 (Specification) + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6070 (Test vectors) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations, + int *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_asn1_buf prf_alg_oid; + unsigned char *p = params->p; + const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len; + + if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + /* + * PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE { + * salt OCTET STRING, + * iterationCount INTEGER, + * keyLength INTEGER OPTIONAL + * prf AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT algid-hmacWithSHA1 + * } + * + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &salt->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + salt->p = p; + p += salt->len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, iterations ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, keylen ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( &p, end, &prf_alg_oid ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac( &prf_alg_oid, md_type ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret, iterations = 0, keylen = 0; + unsigned char *p, *end; + mbedtls_asn1_buf kdf_alg_oid, enc_scheme_oid, kdf_alg_params, enc_scheme_params; + mbedtls_asn1_buf salt; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + unsigned char key[32], iv[32]; + size_t olen = 0; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; + + p = pbe_params->p; + end = p + pbe_params->len; + + /* + * PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE { + * keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-KDFs}}, + * encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-Encs}} + * } + */ + if( pbe_params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &kdf_alg_oid, + &kdf_alg_params ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + // Only PBKDF2 supported at the moment + // + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2, &kdf_alg_oid ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ( ret = pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params( &kdf_alg_params, + &salt, &iterations, &keylen, + &md_type ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &enc_scheme_oid, + &enc_scheme_params ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg( &enc_scheme_oid, &cipher_alg ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher_alg ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + /* + * The value of keylen from pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params() is ignored + * since it is optional and we don't know if it was set or not + */ + keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + + if( enc_scheme_params.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING || + enc_scheme_params.len != cipher_info->iv_size ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + mbedtls_cipher_init( &cipher_ctx ); + + memcpy( iv, enc_scheme_params.p, enc_scheme_params.len ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( &md_ctx, pwd, pwdlen, salt.p, salt.len, + iterations, keylen, key ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &cipher_ctx, cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, + (mbedtls_operation_t) mode ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &cipher_ctx, iv, enc_scheme_params.len, + data, datalen, output, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &cipher_ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int j; + unsigned int i; + unsigned char md1[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char work[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info ); + size_t use_len; + unsigned char *out_p = output; + unsigned char counter[4]; + + memset( counter, 0, 4 ); + counter[3] = 1; + +#if UINT_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF + if( iteration_count > 0xFFFFFFFF ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( ctx, password, plen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + while( key_length ) + { + // U1 ends up in work + // + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, counter, 4 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( ctx, work ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + memcpy( md1, work, md_size ); + + for( i = 1; i < iteration_count; i++ ) + { + // U2 ends up in md1 + // + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( ctx, md1, md_size ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( ctx, md1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + // U1 xor U2 + // + for( j = 0; j < md_size; j++ ) + work[j] ^= md1[j]; + } + + use_len = ( key_length < md_size ) ? key_length : md_size; + memcpy( out_p, work, use_len ); + + key_length -= (uint32_t) use_len; + out_p += use_len; + + for( i = 4; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++counter[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + } + +cleanup: + /* Zeroise buffers to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( work, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( md1, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " PBKDF2 (SHA1): skipped\n\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#else + +#define MAX_TESTS 6 + +static const size_t plen_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 8, 8, 8, 24, 9 }; + +static const unsigned char password_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = +{ + "password", + "password", + "password", + "passwordPASSWORDpassword", + "pass\0word", +}; + +static const size_t slen_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 4, 4, 4, 36, 5 }; + +static const unsigned char salt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][40] = +{ + "salt", + "salt", + "salt", + "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt", + "sa\0lt", +}; + +static const uint32_t it_cnt_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 1, 2, 4096, 4096, 4096 }; + +static const uint32_t key_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = + { 20, 20, 20, 25, 16 }; + +static const unsigned char result_key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = +{ + { 0x0c, 0x60, 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x96, 0x1f, 0x0e, 0x71, + 0xf3, 0xa9, 0xb5, 0x24, 0xaf, 0x60, 0x12, 0x06, + 0x2f, 0xe0, 0x37, 0xa6 }, + { 0xea, 0x6c, 0x01, 0x4d, 0xc7, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x8c, + 0xcd, 0x1e, 0xd9, 0x2a, 0xce, 0x1d, 0x41, 0xf0, + 0xd8, 0xde, 0x89, 0x57 }, + { 0x4b, 0x00, 0x79, 0x01, 0xb7, 0x65, 0x48, 0x9a, + 0xbe, 0xad, 0x49, 0xd9, 0x26, 0xf7, 0x21, 0xd0, + 0x65, 0xa4, 0x29, 0xc1 }, + { 0x3d, 0x2e, 0xec, 0x4f, 0xe4, 0x1c, 0x84, 0x9b, + 0x80, 0xc8, 0xd8, 0x36, 0x62, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x4a, + 0x8b, 0x29, 0x1a, 0x96, 0x4c, 0xf2, 0xf0, 0x70, + 0x38 }, + { 0x56, 0xfa, 0x6a, 0xa7, 0x55, 0x48, 0x09, 0x9d, + 0xcc, 0x37, 0xd7, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xc3 }, +}; + +int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t sha1_ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *info_sha1; + int ret, i; + unsigned char key[64]; + + mbedtls_md_init( &sha1_ctx ); + + info_sha1 = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); + if( info_sha1 == NULL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &sha1_ctx, info_sha1, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + for( i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " PBKDF2 (SHA1) #%d: ", i ); + + ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac( &sha1_ctx, password_test_data[i], + plen_test_data[i], salt_test_data[i], + slen_test_data[i], it_cnt_test_data[i], + key_len_test_data[i], key ); + if( ret != 0 || + memcmp( result_key_test_data[i], key, key_len_test_data[i] ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &sha1_ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkparse.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkparse.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6170d6d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkparse.c @@ -0,0 +1,1539 @@ +/* + * Public Key layer for parsing key files and structures + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define PK_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define PK_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. + * + * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. + * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced + * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_load_file( const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n ) +{ + FILE *f; + long size; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( n != NULL ); + + if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END ); + if( ( size = ftell( f ) ) == -1 ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET ); + + *n = (size_t) size; + + if( *n + 1 == 0 || + ( *buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *n + 1 ) ) == NULL ) + { + fclose( f ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + if( fread( *buf, 1, *n, f ) != *n ) + { + fclose( f ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( *buf, *n ); + mbedtls_free( *buf ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + } + + fclose( f ); + + (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; + + if( strstr( (const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN " ) != NULL ) + ++*n; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Load and parse a private key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const char *path, const char *pwd ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( pwd == NULL ) + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( ctx, buf, n, NULL, 0 ); + else + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( ctx, buf, n, + (const unsigned char *) pwd, strlen( pwd ) ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Load and parse a public key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( path != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( ctx, buf, n ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* Minimally parse an ECParameters buffer to and mbedtls_asn1_buf + * + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } + * -- implicitCurve NULL + * } + */ +static int pk_get_ecparams( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ( end - *p < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + /* Tag may be either OID or SEQUENCE */ + params->tag = **p; + if( params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) + && params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) +#endif + ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, ¶ms->len, params->tag ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + params->p = *p; + *p += params->len; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) +/* + * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and (mostly) fill the group with it. + * WARNING: the resulting group should only be used with + * pk_group_id_from_specified(), since its base point may not be set correctly + * if it was encoded compressed. + * + * SpecifiedECDomain ::= SEQUENCE { + * version SpecifiedECDomainVersion(ecdpVer1 | ecdpVer2 | ecdpVer3, ...), + * fieldID FieldID {{FieldTypes}}, + * curve Curve, + * base ECPoint, + * order INTEGER, + * cofactor INTEGER OPTIONAL, + * hash HashAlgorithm OPTIONAL, + * ... + * } + * + * We only support prime-field as field type, and ignore hash and cofactor. + */ +static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = params->p; + const unsigned char * const end = params->p + params->len; + const unsigned char *end_field, *end_curve; + size_t len; + int ver; + + /* SpecifiedECDomainVersion ::= INTEGER { 1, 2, 3 } */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &ver ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( ver < 1 || ver > 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + /* + * FieldID { FIELD-ID:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE { -- Finite field + * fieldType FIELD-ID.&id({IOSet}), + * parameters FIELD-ID.&Type({IOSet}{@fieldType}) + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + end_field = p + len; + + /* + * FIELD-ID ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER + * FieldTypes FIELD-ID ::= { + * { Prime-p IDENTIFIED BY prime-field } | + * { Characteristic-two IDENTIFIED BY characteristic-two-field } + * } + * prime-field OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-fieldType 1 } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_field, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( len != MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD ) || + memcmp( p, MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD, len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + p += len; + + /* Prime-p ::= INTEGER -- Field of size p. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end_field, &grp->P ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->P ); + + if( p != end_field ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * Curve ::= SEQUENCE { + * a FieldElement, + * b FieldElement, + * seed BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * -- Shall be present if used in SpecifiedECDomain + * -- with version equal to ecdpVer2 or ecdpVer3 + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + end_curve = p + len; + + /* + * FieldElement ::= OCTET STRING + * containing an integer in the case of a prime field + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->A, p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + p += len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->B, p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + p += len; + + /* Ignore seed BIT STRING OPTIONAL */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ) == 0 ) + p += len; + + if( p != end_curve ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( grp, &grp->G, + ( const unsigned char *) p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* + * If we can't read the point because it's compressed, cheat by + * reading only the X coordinate and the parity bit of Y. + */ + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE || + ( p[0] != 0x02 && p[0] != 0x03 ) || + len != mbedtls_mpi_size( &grp->P ) + 1 || + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &grp->G.X, p + 1, len - 1 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Y, p[0] - 2 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_lset( &grp->G.Z, 1 ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + } + + p += len; + + /* + * order INTEGER + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &grp->N ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &grp->N ); + + /* + * Allow optional elements by purposefully not enforcing p == end here. + */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Find the group id associated with an (almost filled) group as generated by + * pk_group_from_specified(), or return an error if unknown. + */ +static int pk_group_id_from_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ecp_group ref; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *id; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &ref ); + + for( id = mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(); *id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; id++ ) + { + /* Load the group associated to that id */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ref ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ref, *id ) ); + + /* Compare to the group we were given, starting with easy tests */ + if( grp->pbits == ref.pbits && grp->nbits == ref.nbits && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->P, &ref.P ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->A, &ref.A ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->B, &ref.B ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->N, &ref.N ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->G.X, &ref.G.X ) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &grp->G.Z, &ref.G.Z ) == 0 && + /* For Y we may only know the parity bit, so compare only that */ + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &grp->G.Y, 0 ) == mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ref.G.Y, 0 ) ) + { + break; + } + + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ref ); + + *grp_id = *id; + + if( ret == 0 && *id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and find the associated group ID + */ +static int pk_group_id_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp ); + + if( ( ret = pk_group_from_specified( params, &grp ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = pk_group_id_from_group( &grp, grp_id ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &grp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ + +/* + * Use EC parameters to initialise an EC group + * + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } + * -- implicitCurve NULL + */ +static int pk_use_ecparams( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + + if( params->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) + { + if( mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp( params, &grp_id ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE ); + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) + if( ( ret = pk_group_id_from_specified( params, &grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); +#endif + } + + /* + * grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match + */ + if( grp->id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE && grp->id != grp_id ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( grp, grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * EC public key is an EC point + * + * The caller is responsible for clearing the structure upon failure if + * desired. Take care to pass along the possible ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + * return code of mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary() and leave p in a usable state. + */ +static int pk_get_ecpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &key->grp, &key->Q, + (const unsigned char *) *p, end - *p ) ) == 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &key->grp, &key->Q ); + } + + /* + * We know mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary consumed all bytes or failed + */ + *p = (unsigned char *) end; + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ +static int pk_get_rsapubkey( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* Import N */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY ); + + *p += len; + + /* Import E */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, *p, len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY ); + + *p += len; + + if( mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( rsa ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY ); + } + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +/* Get a PK algorithm identifier + * + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } + */ +static int pk_get_pk_alg( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_oid; + + memset( params, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, &alg_oid, params ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg( &alg_oid, pk_alg ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + /* + * No parameters with RSA (only for EC) + */ + if( *pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA && + ( ( params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && params->tag != 0 ) || + params->len != 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_params; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( *p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( end != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( pk != NULL ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = pk_get_pk_alg( p, end, &pk_alg, &alg_params ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( pk_alg ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + ret = pk_get_rsapubkey( p, end, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ) ); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + ret = pk_use_ecparams( &alg_params, &mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp ); + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = pk_get_ecpubkey( p, end, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ) ); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; + + if( ret == 0 && *p != end ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. + * + * The value zero is: + * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter + * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). + * + * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to + * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. + */ +static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X ) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( p, end, X ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key + */ +static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; + + mbedtls_mpi T; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + p = (unsigned char *) key; + end = p + keylen; + + /* + * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( version != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION ); + } + + /* Import N */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import E */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import D */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &T, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import P */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import Q */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* + * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in + * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by + * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid + * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading + * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which + * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q + * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a + * description of one such attack. + */ + + /* Import DP */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DP, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import DQ */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DQ, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Import QP */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->QP, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +#else + /* Verify existence of the CRT params */ + if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; +#endif + + /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default + * implementation but is still called: + * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to + * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) + * - as is also sanity-checks the key + * + * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with + * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( rsa ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + + if( p != end ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* Wrap error code if it's coming from a lower level */ + if( ( ret & 0xff80 ) == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ); + else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Parse a SEC1 encoded private EC key + */ +static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int version, pubkey_done; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *end = p + keylen; + unsigned char *end2; + + /* + * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 + * + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1), + * privateKey OCTET STRING, + * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL, + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( version != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &eck->d, p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + p += len; + + pubkey_done = 0; + if( p != end ) + { + /* + * Is 'parameters' present? + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_get_ecparams( &p, p + len, ¶ms) ) != 0 || + ( ret = pk_use_ecparams( ¶ms, &eck->grp ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + } + + if( p != end ) + { + /* + * Is 'publickey' present? If not, or if we can't read it (eg because it + * is compressed), create it from the private key. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1 ) ) == 0 ) + { + end2 = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( &p, end2, &len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( p + len != end2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + if( ( ret = pk_get_ecpubkey( &p, end2, eck ) ) == 0 ) + pubkey_done = 1; + else + { + /* + * The only acceptable failure mode of pk_get_ecpubkey() above + * is if the point format is not recognized. + */ + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + } + + if( ! pubkey_done && + ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul( &eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G, + NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( &eck->grp, &eck->d ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( eck ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* + * Parse an unencrypted PKCS#8 encoded private key + * + * Notes: + * + * - This function does not own the key buffer. It is the + * responsibility of the caller to take care of zeroizing + * and freeing it after use. + * + * - The function is responsible for freeing the provided + * PK context on failure. + * + */ +static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char* key, + size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *end = p + keylen; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; + + /* + * This function parses the PrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8 v1.2 = RFC 5208) + * + * PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier, + * privateKey PrivateKey, + * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL } + * + * Version ::= INTEGER + * PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING + * + * The PrivateKey OCTET STRING is a SEC1 ECPrivateKey + */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end, &version ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( version != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = pk_get_pk_alg( &p, end, &pk_alg, ¶ms ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( len < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( pk_alg ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + return( ret ); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_use_ecparams( ¶ms, &mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), p, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + return( ret ); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse an encrypted PKCS#8 encoded private key + * + * To save space, the decryption happens in-place on the given key buffer. + * Also, while this function may modify the keybuffer, it doesn't own it, + * and instead it is the responsibility of the caller to zeroize and properly + * free it after use. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + int ret, decrypted = 0; + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p, *end; + mbedtls_asn1_buf pbe_alg_oid, pbe_params; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; +#endif + + p = key; + end = p + keylen; + + if( pwdlen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ); + + /* + * This function parses the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8) + * + * EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * encryptionAlgorithm EncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, + * encryptedData EncryptedData + * } + * + * EncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * + * EncryptedData ::= OCTET STRING + * + * The EncryptedData OCTET STRING is a PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo + * + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( &p, end, &pbe_alg_oid, &pbe_params ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + + buf = p; + + /* + * Decrypt EncryptedData with appropriate PBE + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + if( mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg( &pbe_alg_oid, &md_alg, &cipher_alg ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe( &pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, + cipher_alg, md_alg, + pwd, pwdlen, p, len, buf ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + + return( ret ); + } + + decrypted = 1; + } + else if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128, &pbe_alg_oid ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128( &pbe_params, + MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, + pwd, pwdlen, + p, len, buf ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + // Best guess for password mismatch when using RC4. If first tag is + // not MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE + // + if( *buf != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + + decrypted = 1; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2, &pbe_alg_oid ) == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2( &pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, pwd, pwdlen, + p, len, buf ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + + return( ret ); + } + + decrypted = 1; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + { + ((void) pwd); + } + + if( decrypted == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + return( pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, buf, len ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + +/* + * Parse a private key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + size_t len; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( pk != NULL ); + if( keylen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", + key, pwd, pwdlen, &len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), + pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ); + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----", + "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----", + key, pwd, pwdlen, &len ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), + pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ); + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED ); + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----", + "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----", + key, NULL, 0, &len ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, + pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----", + "-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----", + key, NULL, 0, &len ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( pk, + pem.buf, pem.buflen, + pwd, pwdlen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +#else + ((void) pwd); + ((void) pwdlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * At this point we only know it's not a PEM formatted key. Could be any + * of the known DER encoded private key formats + * + * We try the different DER format parsers to see if one passes without + * error + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + { + unsigned char *key_copy; + + if( ( key_copy = mbedtls_calloc( 1, keylen ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( key_copy, key, keylen ); + + ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( pk, key_copy, keylen, + pwd, pwdlen ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key_copy, keylen ); + mbedtls_free( key_copy ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + + ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( pk, key, keylen ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 && + pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), key, keylen ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); + mbedtls_pk_init( pk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ); + if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 && + pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ), + key, keylen ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + mbedtls_pk_free( pk ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + + /* If MBEDTLS_RSA_C is defined but MBEDTLS_ECP_C isn't, + * it is ok to leave the PK context initialized but not + * freed: It is the caller's responsibility to call pk_init() + * before calling this function, and to call pk_free() + * when it fails. If MBEDTLS_ECP_C is defined but MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * isn't, this leads to mbedtls_pk_free() being called + * twice, once here and once by the caller, but this is + * also ok and in line with the mbedtls_pk_free() calls + * on failed PEM parsing attempts. */ + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); +} + +/* + * Parse a public key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + size_t len; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + if( keylen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL || keylen == 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----", + "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----", + key, NULL, 0, &len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + p = pem.buf; + if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( ctx, pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + + if ( ( ret = pk_get_rsapubkey( &p, p + pem.buflen, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ) ) ) != 0 ) + mbedtls_pk_free( ctx ); + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( key[keylen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----", + "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----", + key, NULL, 0, &len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + p = pem.buf; + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, p + pem.buflen, ctx ); + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( ( pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( ctx, pk_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p = (unsigned char *)key; + ret = pk_get_rsapubkey( &p, p + keylen, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *ctx ) ); + if( ret == 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + mbedtls_pk_free( ctx ); + if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + p = (unsigned char *) key; + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, p + keylen, ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkwrite.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkwrite.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c1ce0e3f --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/pkwrite.c @@ -0,0 +1,617 @@ +/* + * Public Key layer for writing key files and structures + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ +#define PK_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define PK_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ +static int pk_write_rsa_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_mpi T; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + /* Export E */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( p, start, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( p, start, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * EC public key is an EC point + */ +static int pk_write_ec_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN]; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &ec->grp, &ec->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &len, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *p -= len; + memcpy( *p, buf, len ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * } + */ +static int pk_write_ec_param( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + const char *oid; + size_t oid_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp( ec->grp.id, &oid, &oid_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( p, start, oid, oid_len ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* + * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8) + */ +static int pk_write_ec_private( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t byte_length = ( ec->grp.pbits + 7 ) / 8; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key( ec, tmp, byte_length ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( p, start, tmp, byte_length ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, byte_length ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( *p != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( start != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_rsa_pubkey( p, start, mbedtls_pk_rsa( *key ) ) ); + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_pubkey( p, start, mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ) ) ); + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE ) + { + size_t buffer_size; + psa_key_id_t* key_id = (psa_key_id_t*) key->pk_ctx; + + if ( *p < start ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + buffer_size = (size_t)( *p - start ); + if ( psa_export_public_key( *key_id, start, buffer_size, &len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + else + { + *p -= len; + memmove( *p, start, len ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *c; + size_t len = 0, par_len = 0, oid_len; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; + const char *oid; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + if( size == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + c = buf + size; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, key ) ); + + if( c - buf < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } + */ + *--c = 0; + len += 1; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ); + + pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, pk_write_ec_param( &c, buf, mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ) ) ); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE ) + { + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_id_t key_id; + psa_ecc_family_t curve; + size_t bits; + + key_id = *((psa_key_id_t*) key->pk_ctx ); + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes( key_id, &attributes ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + key_type = psa_get_key_type( &attributes ); + bits = psa_get_key_bits( &attributes ); + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + + curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( key_type ); + if( curve == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + ret = mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id( curve, bits, &oid, &oid_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + /* Write EC algorithm parameters; that's akin + * to pk_write_ec_param() above. */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( &c, buf, + oid, oid_len ) ); + + /* The rest of the function works as for legacy EC contexts. */ + pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg( pk_type, &oid, + &oid_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( &c, buf, oid, oid_len, + par_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *c; + size_t len = 0; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + if( size == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL ); + + c = buf + size; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( *key ); + + /* + * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + /* Export QP */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( rsa, NULL, NULL, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export DQ */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( rsa, NULL, &T, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export DP */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( rsa, &T, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export Q */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, NULL, + &T, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export P */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, &T, + NULL, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export D */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &T, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export E */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, &T ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, &T, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &T ) ) < 0 ) + goto end_of_export; + len += ret; + + end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, 0 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, + buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec( *key ); + size_t pub_len = 0, par_len = 0; + + /* + * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 + * + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1), + * privateKey OCTET STRING, + * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL, + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * } + */ + + /* publicKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, pk_write_ec_pubkey( &c, buf, ec ) ); + + if( c - buf < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + *--c = 0; + pub_len += 1; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, pub_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, pub_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1 ) ); + len += pub_len; + + /* parameters */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, pk_write_ec_param( &c, buf, ec ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, par_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ); + len += par_len; + + /* privateKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_private( &c, buf, ec ) ); + + /* version */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + +#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n" +#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n" + +/* + * Max sizes of key per types. Shown as tag + len (+ content). + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * RSA public keys: + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) + * + 1 + 1 + 9 (rsa oid) + * + 1 + 1 (params null) + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } 1 + 3 + (1 + below) + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * modulus INTEGER, -- n 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * } + */ +#define RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ( 38 + 2 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) + +/* + * RSA private keys: + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * version Version, 1 + 1 + 1 + * modulus INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * publicExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * privateExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * prime1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * prime2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * exponent1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * exponent2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * coefficient INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL 0 (not supported) + * } + */ +#define MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 ( MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE / 2 + \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE % 2 ) +#define RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ( 47 + 3 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE \ + + 5 * MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#define RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 +#define RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * EC public keys: + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) + * + 1 + 1 + 7 (ec oid) + * + 1 + 1 + 9 (namedCurve oid) + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING 1 + 2 + 1 [1] + * + 1 (point format) [1] + * + 2 * ECP_MAX (coords) [1] + * } + */ +#define ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ( 30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) + +/* + * EC private keys: + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 + * version INTEGER , 1 + 1 + 1 + * privateKey OCTET STRING, 1 + 1 + ECP_MAX + * parameters [0] ECParameters OPTIONAL, 1 + 1 + (1 + 1 + 9) + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL 1 + 2 + [1] above + * } + */ +#define ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ( 29 + 3 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#define ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 +#define ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#define PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ( RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ + RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ) +#define PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ( RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ + RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ) + +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char output_buf[PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t olen = 0; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || size == 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( key, output_buf, + sizeof(output_buf) ) ) < 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY, + output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - ret, + ret, buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char output_buf[PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + const char *begin, *end; + size_t olen = 0; + + PK_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + PK_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || size == 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( key, output_buf, sizeof(output_buf) ) ) < 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( key ) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) + { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC; + } + else +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( begin, end, + output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - ret, + ret, buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/platform.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/platform.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e742fde7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/platform.c @@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +/* + * Platform abstraction layer + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +/* The compile time configuration of memory allocation via the macros + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO takes precedence over the runtime + * configuration via mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(). So, omit everything + * related to the latter if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO are defined. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) +static void *platform_calloc_uninit( size_t n, size_t size ) +{ + ((void) n); + ((void) size); + return( NULL ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC platform_calloc_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) +static void platform_free_uninit( void *ptr ) +{ + ((void) ptr); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE platform_free_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE */ + +static void * (*mbedtls_calloc_func)( size_t, size_t ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC; +static void (*mbedtls_free_func)( void * ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE; + +void * mbedtls_calloc( size_t nmemb, size_t size ) +{ + return (*mbedtls_calloc_func)( nmemb, size ); +} + +void mbedtls_free( void * ptr ) +{ + (*mbedtls_free_func)( ptr ); +} + +int mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( void * (*calloc_func)( size_t, size_t ), + void (*free_func)( void * ) ) +{ + mbedtls_calloc_func = calloc_func; + mbedtls_free_func = free_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY && + !( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) ) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) +#include +int mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ... ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + va_list argp; + + va_start( argp, fmt ); + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, argp ); + va_end( argp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_snprintf_uninit( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, ... ) +{ + ((void) s); + ((void) n); + ((void) format); + return( 0 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF platform_snprintf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_snprintf)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, + ... ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf( int (*snprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, + ... ) ) +{ + mbedtls_snprintf = snprintf_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) +#include +int mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf( char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list arg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Avoid calling the invalid parameter handler by checking ourselves */ + if( s == NULL || n == 0 || fmt == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(_TRUNCATE) + ret = vsnprintf_s( s, n, _TRUNCATE, fmt, arg ); +#else + ret = vsnprintf( s, n, fmt, arg ); + if( ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == n ) + { + s[n-1] = '\0'; + ret = -1; + } +#endif + + return( ret ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_vsnprintf_uninit( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, va_list arg ) +{ + ((void) s); + ((void) n); + ((void) format); + ((void) arg); + return( -1 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF platform_vsnprintf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_vsnprintf)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, + va_list arg ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf( int (*vsnprintf_func)( char * s, size_t n, + const char * format, + va_list arg ) ) +{ + mbedtls_vsnprintf = vsnprintf_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_printf_uninit( const char *format, ... ) +{ + ((void) format); + return( 0 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF platform_printf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_printf)( const char *, ... ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_printf( int (*printf_func)( const char *, ... ) ) +{ + mbedtls_printf = printf_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_fprintf_uninit( FILE *stream, const char *format, ... ) +{ + ((void) stream); + ((void) format); + return( 0 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF platform_fprintf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_fprintf)( FILE *, const char *, ... ) = + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf( int (*fprintf_func)( FILE *, const char *, ... ) ) +{ + mbedtls_fprintf = fprintf_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static void platform_exit_uninit( int status ) +{ + ((void) status); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT platform_exit_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT */ + +void (*mbedtls_exit)( int status ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_exit( void (*exit_func)( int status ) ) +{ + mbedtls_exit = exit_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static mbedtls_time_t platform_time_uninit( mbedtls_time_t* timer ) +{ + ((void) timer); + return( 0 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME platform_time_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME */ + +mbedtls_time_t (*mbedtls_time)( mbedtls_time_t* timer ) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_time( mbedtls_time_t (*time_func)( mbedtls_time_t* timer ) ) +{ + mbedtls_time = time_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* Default implementations for the platform independent seed functions use + * standard libc file functions to read from and write to a pre-defined filename + */ +int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + FILE *file; + size_t n; + + if( ( file = fopen( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( n = fread( buf, 1, buf_len, file ) ) != buf_len ) + { + fclose( file ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, buf_len ); + return( -1 ); + } + + fclose( file ); + return( (int)n ); +} + +int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + FILE *file; + size_t n; + + if( ( file = fopen( MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE, "w" ) ) == NULL ) + return -1; + + if( ( n = fwrite( buf, 1, buf_len, file ) ) != buf_len ) + { + fclose( file ); + return -1; + } + + fclose( file ); + return( (int)n ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_nv_seed_read_uninit( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + ((void) buf); + ((void) buf_len); + return( -1 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ platform_nv_seed_read_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_nv_seed_write_uninit( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) +{ + ((void) buf); + ((void) buf_len); + return( -1 ); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE platform_nv_seed_write_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE */ + +int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_read)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) = + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ; +int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_write)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) = + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( + int (*nv_seed_read_func)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ), + int (*nv_seed_write_func)( unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len ) ) +{ + mbedtls_nv_seed_read = nv_seed_read_func; + mbedtls_nv_seed_write = nv_seed_write_func; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) +/* + * Placeholder platform setup that does nothing by default + */ +int mbedtls_platform_setup( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ) +{ + (void)ctx; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Placeholder platform teardown that does nothing by default + */ +void mbedtls_platform_teardown( mbedtls_platform_context *ctx ) +{ + (void)ctx; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/platform_util.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/platform_util.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..98fe5deb --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/platform_util.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* + * Common and shared functions used by multiple modules in the Mbed TLS + * library. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before + * config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. + */ +#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" + +#include +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) +/* + * This implementation should never be optimized out by the compiler + * + * This implementation for mbedtls_platform_zeroize() was inspired from Colin + * Percival's blog article at: + * + * http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-04-how-to-zero-a-buffer.html + * + * It uses a volatile function pointer to the standard memset(). Because the + * pointer is volatile the compiler expects it to change at + * any time and will not optimize out the call that could potentially perform + * other operations on the input buffer instead of just setting it to 0. + * Nevertheless, as pointed out by davidtgoldblatt on Hacker News + * (refer to http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-05-erratum.html for + * details), optimizations of the following form are still possible: + * + * if( memset_func != memset ) + * memset_func( buf, 0, len ); + * + * Note that it is extremely difficult to guarantee that + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized out by aggressive compilers + * in a portable way. For this reason, Mbed TLS also provides the configuration + * option MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT, which allows users to configure + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for their + * platform and needs. + */ +static void * (* const volatile memset_func)( void *, int, size_t ) = memset; + +void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len ) +{ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( len == 0 || buf != NULL ); + + if( len > 0 ) + memset_func( buf, 0, len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) +#include +#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ + defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ + defined(__MACH__))) +#include +#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || + * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */ + +#if !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) +/* + * This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long + * preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in + * platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and + * threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so + * we keep it private by only defining it in this file + */ +#if ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) +#define PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME +#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */ + +#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) */ + +struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( const mbedtls_time_t *tt, + struct tm *tm_buf ) +{ +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + return( ( gmtime_s( tm_buf, tt ) == 0 ) ? tm_buf : NULL ); +#elif !defined(PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME) + return( gmtime_r( tt, tm_buf ) ); +#else + struct tm *lt; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ) != 0 ) + return( NULL ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + lt = gmtime( tt ); + + if( lt != NULL ) + { + memcpy( tm_buf, lt, sizeof( struct tm ) ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ) != 0 ) + return( NULL ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + return( ( lt == NULL ) ? NULL : tm_buf ); +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/poly1305.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/poly1305.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a1c5b19d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/poly1305.c @@ -0,0 +1,526 @@ +/** + * \file poly1305.c + * + * \brief Poly1305 authentication algorithm. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define POLY1305_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ( 16U ) + +/* + * Our implementation is tuned for 32-bit platforms with a 64-bit multiplier. + * However we provided an alternative for platforms without such a multiplier. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION) +static uint64_t mul64( uint32_t a, uint32_t b ) +{ + /* a = al + 2**16 ah, b = bl + 2**16 bh */ + const uint16_t al = (uint16_t) a; + const uint16_t bl = (uint16_t) b; + const uint16_t ah = a >> 16; + const uint16_t bh = b >> 16; + + /* ab = al*bl + 2**16 (ah*bl + bl*bh) + 2**32 ah*bh */ + const uint32_t lo = (uint32_t) al * bl; + const uint64_t me = (uint64_t)( (uint32_t) ah * bl ) + (uint32_t) al * bh; + const uint32_t hi = (uint32_t) ah * bh; + + return( lo + ( me << 16 ) + ( (uint64_t) hi << 32 ) ); +} +#else +static inline uint64_t mul64( uint32_t a, uint32_t b ) +{ + return( (uint64_t) a * b ); +} +#endif + + +/** + * \brief Process blocks with Poly1305. + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context. + * \param nblocks Number of blocks to process. Note that this + * function only processes full blocks. + * \param input Buffer containing the input block(s). + * \param needs_padding Set to 0 if the padding bit has already been + * applied to the input data before calling this + * function. Otherwise, set this parameter to 1. + */ +static void poly1305_process( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + size_t nblocks, + const unsigned char *input, + uint32_t needs_padding ) +{ + uint64_t d0, d1, d2, d3; + uint32_t acc0, acc1, acc2, acc3, acc4; + uint32_t r0, r1, r2, r3; + uint32_t rs1, rs2, rs3; + size_t offset = 0U; + size_t i; + + r0 = ctx->r[0]; + r1 = ctx->r[1]; + r2 = ctx->r[2]; + r3 = ctx->r[3]; + + rs1 = r1 + ( r1 >> 2U ); + rs2 = r2 + ( r2 >> 2U ); + rs3 = r3 + ( r3 >> 2U ); + + acc0 = ctx->acc[0]; + acc1 = ctx->acc[1]; + acc2 = ctx->acc[2]; + acc3 = ctx->acc[3]; + acc4 = ctx->acc[4]; + + /* Process full blocks */ + for( i = 0U; i < nblocks; i++ ) + { + /* The input block is treated as a 128-bit little-endian integer */ + d0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, offset + 0 ); + d1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, offset + 4 ); + d2 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, offset + 8 ); + d3 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( input, offset + 12 ); + + /* Compute: acc += (padded) block as a 130-bit integer */ + d0 += (uint64_t) acc0; + d1 += (uint64_t) acc1 + ( d0 >> 32U ); + d2 += (uint64_t) acc2 + ( d1 >> 32U ); + d3 += (uint64_t) acc3 + ( d2 >> 32U ); + acc0 = (uint32_t) d0; + acc1 = (uint32_t) d1; + acc2 = (uint32_t) d2; + acc3 = (uint32_t) d3; + acc4 += (uint32_t) ( d3 >> 32U ) + needs_padding; + + /* Compute: acc *= r */ + d0 = mul64( acc0, r0 ) + + mul64( acc1, rs3 ) + + mul64( acc2, rs2 ) + + mul64( acc3, rs1 ); + d1 = mul64( acc0, r1 ) + + mul64( acc1, r0 ) + + mul64( acc2, rs3 ) + + mul64( acc3, rs2 ) + + mul64( acc4, rs1 ); + d2 = mul64( acc0, r2 ) + + mul64( acc1, r1 ) + + mul64( acc2, r0 ) + + mul64( acc3, rs3 ) + + mul64( acc4, rs2 ); + d3 = mul64( acc0, r3 ) + + mul64( acc1, r2 ) + + mul64( acc2, r1 ) + + mul64( acc3, r0 ) + + mul64( acc4, rs3 ); + acc4 *= r0; + + /* Compute: acc %= (2^130 - 5) (partial remainder) */ + d1 += ( d0 >> 32 ); + d2 += ( d1 >> 32 ); + d3 += ( d2 >> 32 ); + acc0 = (uint32_t) d0; + acc1 = (uint32_t) d1; + acc2 = (uint32_t) d2; + acc3 = (uint32_t) d3; + acc4 = (uint32_t) ( d3 >> 32 ) + acc4; + + d0 = (uint64_t) acc0 + ( acc4 >> 2 ) + ( acc4 & 0xFFFFFFFCU ); + acc4 &= 3U; + acc0 = (uint32_t) d0; + d0 = (uint64_t) acc1 + ( d0 >> 32U ); + acc1 = (uint32_t) d0; + d0 = (uint64_t) acc2 + ( d0 >> 32U ); + acc2 = (uint32_t) d0; + d0 = (uint64_t) acc3 + ( d0 >> 32U ); + acc3 = (uint32_t) d0; + d0 = (uint64_t) acc4 + ( d0 >> 32U ); + acc4 = (uint32_t) d0; + + offset += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + } + + ctx->acc[0] = acc0; + ctx->acc[1] = acc1; + ctx->acc[2] = acc2; + ctx->acc[3] = acc3; + ctx->acc[4] = acc4; +} + +/** + * \brief Compute the Poly1305 MAC + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context. + * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. Must be + * big enough to contain the 16-byte MAC. + */ +static void poly1305_compute_mac( const mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16] ) +{ + uint64_t d; + uint32_t g0, g1, g2, g3, g4; + uint32_t acc0, acc1, acc2, acc3, acc4; + uint32_t mask; + uint32_t mask_inv; + + acc0 = ctx->acc[0]; + acc1 = ctx->acc[1]; + acc2 = ctx->acc[2]; + acc3 = ctx->acc[3]; + acc4 = ctx->acc[4]; + + /* Before adding 's' we ensure that the accumulator is mod 2^130 - 5. + * We do this by calculating acc - (2^130 - 5), then checking if + * the 131st bit is set. If it is, then reduce: acc -= (2^130 - 5) + */ + + /* Calculate acc + -(2^130 - 5) */ + d = ( (uint64_t) acc0 + 5U ); + g0 = (uint32_t) d; + d = ( (uint64_t) acc1 + ( d >> 32 ) ); + g1 = (uint32_t) d; + d = ( (uint64_t) acc2 + ( d >> 32 ) ); + g2 = (uint32_t) d; + d = ( (uint64_t) acc3 + ( d >> 32 ) ); + g3 = (uint32_t) d; + g4 = acc4 + (uint32_t) ( d >> 32U ); + + /* mask == 0xFFFFFFFF if 131st bit is set, otherwise mask == 0 */ + mask = (uint32_t) 0U - ( g4 >> 2U ); + mask_inv = ~mask; + + /* If 131st bit is set then acc=g, otherwise, acc is unmodified */ + acc0 = ( acc0 & mask_inv ) | ( g0 & mask ); + acc1 = ( acc1 & mask_inv ) | ( g1 & mask ); + acc2 = ( acc2 & mask_inv ) | ( g2 & mask ); + acc3 = ( acc3 & mask_inv ) | ( g3 & mask ); + + /* Add 's' */ + d = (uint64_t) acc0 + ctx->s[0]; + acc0 = (uint32_t) d; + d = (uint64_t) acc1 + ctx->s[1] + ( d >> 32U ); + acc1 = (uint32_t) d; + d = (uint64_t) acc2 + ctx->s[2] + ( d >> 32U ); + acc2 = (uint32_t) d; + acc3 += ctx->s[3] + (uint32_t) ( d >> 32U ); + + /* Compute MAC (128 least significant bits of the accumulator) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( acc0, mac, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( acc1, mac, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( acc2, mac, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( acc3, mac, 12 ); +} + +void mbedtls_poly1305_init( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ) +{ + POLY1305_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_poly1305_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_poly1305_free( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_poly1305_context ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_poly1305_starts( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32] ) +{ + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + + /* r &= 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */ + ctx->r[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 0 ) & 0x0FFFFFFFU; + ctx->r[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 4 ) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; + ctx->r[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 8 ) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; + ctx->r[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 12 ) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; + + ctx->s[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 16 ); + ctx->s[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 20 ); + ctx->s[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 24 ); + ctx->s[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( key, 28 ); + + /* Initial accumulator state */ + ctx->acc[0] = 0U; + ctx->acc[1] = 0U; + ctx->acc[2] = 0U; + ctx->acc[3] = 0U; + ctx->acc[4] = 0U; + + /* Queue initially empty */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx->queue, sizeof( ctx->queue ) ); + ctx->queue_len = 0U; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_poly1305_update( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + size_t offset = 0U; + size_t remaining = ilen; + size_t queue_free_len; + size_t nblocks; + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( ( remaining > 0U ) && ( ctx->queue_len > 0U ) ) + { + queue_free_len = ( POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES - ctx->queue_len ); + + if( ilen < queue_free_len ) + { + /* Not enough data to complete the block. + * Store this data with the other leftovers. + */ + memcpy( &ctx->queue[ctx->queue_len], + input, + ilen ); + + ctx->queue_len += ilen; + + remaining = 0U; + } + else + { + /* Enough data to produce a complete block */ + memcpy( &ctx->queue[ctx->queue_len], + input, + queue_free_len ); + + ctx->queue_len = 0U; + + poly1305_process( ctx, 1U, ctx->queue, 1U ); /* add padding bit */ + + offset += queue_free_len; + remaining -= queue_free_len; + } + } + + if( remaining >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES ) + { + nblocks = remaining / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + + poly1305_process( ctx, nblocks, &input[offset], 1U ); + + offset += nblocks * POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + remaining %= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + } + + if( remaining > 0U ) + { + /* Store partial block */ + ctx->queue_len = remaining; + memcpy( ctx->queue, &input[offset], remaining ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_poly1305_finish( mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16] ) +{ + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( mac != NULL ); + + /* Process any leftover data */ + if( ctx->queue_len > 0U ) + { + /* Add padding bit */ + ctx->queue[ctx->queue_len] = 1U; + ctx->queue_len++; + + /* Pad with zeroes */ + memset( &ctx->queue[ctx->queue_len], + 0, + POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES - ctx->queue_len ); + + poly1305_process( ctx, 1U, /* Process 1 block */ + ctx->queue, 0U ); /* Already padded above */ + } + + poly1305_compute_mac( ctx, mac ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_poly1305_mac( const unsigned char key[32], + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char mac[16] ) +{ + mbedtls_poly1305_context ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( mac != NULL ); + POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + mbedtls_poly1305_init( &ctx ); + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_starts( &ctx, key ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update( &ctx, input, ilen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_finish( &ctx, mac ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_poly1305_free( &ctx ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char test_keys[2][32] = +{ + { + 0x85, 0xd6, 0xbe, 0x78, 0x57, 0x55, 0x6d, 0x33, + 0x7f, 0x44, 0x52, 0xfe, 0x42, 0xd5, 0x06, 0xa8, + 0x01, 0x03, 0x80, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0x0d, 0xb2, 0xfd, + 0x4a, 0xbf, 0xf6, 0xaf, 0x41, 0x49, 0xf5, 0x1b + }, + { + 0x1c, 0x92, 0x40, 0xa5, 0xeb, 0x55, 0xd3, 0x8a, + 0xf3, 0x33, 0x88, 0x86, 0x04, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xf0, + 0x47, 0x39, 0x17, 0xc1, 0x40, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x09, + 0x9d, 0xca, 0x5c, 0xbc, 0x20, 0x70, 0x75, 0xc0 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_data[2][127] = +{ + { + 0x43, 0x72, 0x79, 0x70, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x67, 0x72, + 0x61, 0x70, 0x68, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x46, 0x6f, + 0x72, 0x75, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x52, 0x65, 0x73, 0x65, + 0x61, 0x72, 0x63, 0x68, 0x20, 0x47, 0x72, 0x6f, + 0x75, 0x70 + }, + { + 0x27, 0x54, 0x77, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20, 0x62, 0x72, + 0x69, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x67, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, + 0x6c, 0x69, 0x74, 0x68, 0x79, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f, + 0x76, 0x65, 0x73, 0x0a, 0x44, 0x69, 0x64, 0x20, + 0x67, 0x79, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, + 0x20, 0x67, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x62, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x69, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x77, + 0x61, 0x62, 0x65, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x41, 0x6c, 0x6c, + 0x20, 0x6d, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x73, 0x79, 0x20, 0x77, + 0x65, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x62, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x67, 0x6f, 0x76, 0x65, + 0x73, 0x2c, 0x0a, 0x41, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, + 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x75, + 0x74, 0x67, 0x72, 0x61, 0x62, 0x65, 0x2e + } +}; + +static const size_t test_data_len[2] = +{ + 34U, + 127U +}; + +static const unsigned char test_mac[2][16] = +{ + { + 0xa8, 0x06, 0x1d, 0xc1, 0x30, 0x51, 0x36, 0xc6, + 0xc2, 0x2b, 0x8b, 0xaf, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x27, 0xa9 + }, + { + 0x45, 0x41, 0x66, 0x9a, 0x7e, 0xaa, 0xee, 0x61, + 0xe7, 0x08, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0xbc, 0xc5, 0xeb, 0x62 + } +}; + +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + +#define ASSERT( cond, args ) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ! ( cond ) ) \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + mbedtls_printf args; \ + \ + return( -1 ); \ + } \ + } \ + while( 0 ) + +int mbedtls_poly1305_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + unsigned char mac[16]; + unsigned i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + for( i = 0U; i < 2U; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " Poly1305 test %u ", i ); + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_mac( test_keys[i], + test_data[i], + test_data_len[i], + mac ); + ASSERT( 0 == ret, ( "error code: %i\n", ret ) ); + + ASSERT( 0 == memcmp( mac, test_mac[i], 16U ), ( "failed (mac)\n" ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f129733c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,5498 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#include "check_crypto_config.h" +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_invasive.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +/* Include internal declarations that are useful for implementing persistently + * stored keys. */ +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/md2.h" +#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" + +#define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) ( sizeof( array ) / sizeof( *( array ) ) ) + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Global data, support functions and library management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static int key_type_is_raw_bytes( psa_key_type_t type ) +{ + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED( type ) ); +} + +/* Values for psa_global_data_t::rng_state */ +#define RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED 0 +#define RNG_INITIALIZED 1 +#define RNG_SEEDED 2 + +typedef struct +{ + unsigned initialized : 1; + unsigned rng_state : 2; + mbedtls_psa_random_context_t rng; +} psa_global_data_t; + +static psa_global_data_t global_data; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state = + &global_data.rng.drbg; +#endif + +#define GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED \ + if( global_data.initialized == 0 ) \ + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error( int ret ) +{ + /* Mbed TLS error codes can combine a high-level error code and a + * low-level error code. The low-level error usually reflects the + * root cause better, so dispatch on that preferably. */ + int low_level_ret = - ( -ret & 0x007f ); + switch( low_level_ret != 0 ? low_level_ret : ret ) + { + case 0: + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA: +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT: + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + +#if !( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) ) + /* Only check CTR_DRBG error codes if underlying mbedtls_xxx + * functions are passed a CTR_DRBG instance. */ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) + /* Only check HMAC_DRBG error codes if underlying mbedtls_xxx + * functions are passed a HMAC_DRBG instance. */ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return( PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ); + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ); + } +} + + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( psa_ecc_family_t curve, + size_t bits, + int bits_is_sloppy ) +{ + switch( curve ) + { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) + case 192: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) + case 224: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + case 256: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + case 384: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + case 521: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ); + case 528: + if( bits_is_sloppy ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ); + break; +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) + case 256: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) + case 384: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) + case 512: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 ); +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) + case 255: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ); + case 256: + if( bits_is_sloppy ) + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) + case 448: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 ); +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch( bits ) + { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) + case 192: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) + case 224: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) + case 256: + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 ); +#endif + } + break; + } + + (void) bits_is_sloppy; + return( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) */ + +static psa_status_t validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( psa_key_type_t type, + size_t bits ) +{ + /* Check that the bit size is acceptable for the key type */ + switch( type ) + { + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE: + break; +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: + if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA: + if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA: + if( bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: + if( bits != 64 && bits != 128 && bits != 192 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4: + if( bits < 8 || bits > 2048 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: + if( bits != 256 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + if( bits % 8 != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Check whether a given key type is valid for use with a given MAC algorithm + * + * Upon successful return of this function, the behavior of #PSA_MAC_LENGTH + * when called with the validated \p algorithm and \p key_type is well-defined. + * + * \param[in] algorithm The specific MAC algorithm (can be wildcard). + * \param[in] key_type The key type of the key to be used with the + * \p algorithm. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The \p key_type is valid for use with the \p algorithm + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The \p key_type is not valid for use with the \p algorithm + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_key_type_t key_type ) +{ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( algorithm ) ) + { + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC( algorithm ) ) + { + /* Check that we're calling PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH with a cipher + * key. */ + if( ( key_type & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ) == + PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ) + { + /* PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH returns 1 for stream ciphers and + * the block length (larger than 1) for block ciphers. */ + if( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) > 1 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t buffer_length ) +{ + if( slot->key.data != NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + + slot->key.data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buffer_length ); + if( slot->key.data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + slot->key.bytes = buffer_length; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const uint8_t* data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, + data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + memcpy( slot->key.data, data, data_length ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + + /* zero-length keys are never supported. */ + if( data_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) ) + { + *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length ); + + /* Ensure that the bytes-to-bits conversion hasn't overflown. */ + if( data_length > SIZE_MAX / 8 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Enforce a size limit, and in particular ensure that the bit + * size fits in its representation type. */ + if( ( *bits ) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + status = validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( type, *bits ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Copy the key material. */ + memcpy( key_buffer, data, data_length ); + *key_buffer_length = data_length; + (void)key_buffer_size; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( type ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) + { + return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits ) ); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) ) + { + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits ) ); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +/** Calculate the intersection of two algorithm usage policies. + * + * Return 0 (which allows no operation) on incompatibility. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t alg1, + psa_algorithm_t alg2 ) +{ + /* Common case: both sides actually specify the same policy. */ + if( alg1 == alg2 ) + return( alg1 ); + /* If the policies are from the same hash-and-sign family, check + * if one is a wildcard. If so the other has the specific algorithm. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg1 ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg2 ) && + ( alg1 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) == ( alg2 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg1 ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) + return( alg2 ); + if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg2 ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) + return( alg1 ); + } + /* If the policies are from the same AEAD family, check whether + * one of them is a minimum-tag-length wildcard. Calculate the most + * restrictive tag length. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg1 ) && PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg2 ) && + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg1, 0 ) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg2, 0 ) ) ) + { + size_t alg1_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg1 ); + size_t alg2_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg2 ); + size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; + + /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ + if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( + alg1, restricted_len ) ); + } + /* If only one is a wildcard, return specific algorithm if compatible. */ + if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( alg1_len <= alg2_len ) ) + { + return( alg2 ); + } + if( ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( alg2_len <= alg1_len ) ) + { + return( alg1 ); + } + } + /* If the policies are from the same MAC family, check whether one + * of them is a minimum-MAC-length policy. Calculate the most + * restrictive tag length. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg1 ) && PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg2 ) && + ( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg1 ) == + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg2 ) ) ) + { + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the base + * algorithm of alg1 and alg2 are the same, we only need this once. */ + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do( alg1, key_type ) ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Get the (exact or at-least) output lengths for both sides of the + * requested intersection. None of the currently supported algorithms + * have an output length dependent on the actual key size, so setting it + * to a bogus value of 0 is currently OK. + * + * Note that for at-least-this-length wildcard algorithms, the output + * length is set to the shortest allowed length, which allows us to + * calculate the most restrictive tag length for the intersection. */ + size_t alg1_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, 0, alg1 ); + size_t alg2_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, 0, alg2 ); + size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; + + /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ + if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg1, restricted_len ) ); + } + + /* If only one is an at-least-this-length policy, the intersection would + * be the other (fixed-length) policy as long as said fixed length is + * equal to or larger than the shortest allowed length. */ + if( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) + { + return( ( alg1_len <= alg2_len ) ? alg2 : 0 ); + } + if( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) + { + return( ( alg2_len <= alg1_len ) ? alg1 : 0 ); + } + + /* If none of them are wildcards, check whether they define the same tag + * length. This is still possible here when one is default-length and + * the other specific-length. Ensure to always return the + * specific-length version for the intersection. */ + if( alg1_len == alg2_len ) + return( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg1, alg1_len ) ); + } + /* If the policies are incompatible, allow nothing. */ + return( 0 ); +} + +static int psa_key_algorithm_permits( psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t policy_alg, + psa_algorithm_t requested_alg ) +{ + /* Common case: the policy only allows requested_alg. */ + if( requested_alg == policy_alg ) + return( 1 ); + /* If policy_alg is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash, + * and requested_alg is the same hash-and-sign family with any hash, + * then requested_alg is compliant with policy_alg. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( requested_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( policy_alg ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) + { + return( ( policy_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) == + ( requested_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) ); + } + /* If policy_alg is a wildcard AEAD algorithm of the same base as + * the requested algorithm, check the requested tag length to be + * equal-length or longer than the wildcard-specified length. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( policy_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( requested_alg ) && + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( policy_alg, 0 ) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( requested_alg, 0 ) ) && + ( ( policy_alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( policy_alg ) <= + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( requested_alg ) ); + } + /* If policy_alg is a MAC algorithm of the same base as the requested + * algorithm, check whether their MAC lengths are compatible. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( policy_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( requested_alg ) && + ( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg ) == + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( requested_alg ) ) ) + { + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the policy + * and requested algorithms are the same, we only need this once. */ + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do( policy_alg, key_type ) ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Get both the requested output length for the algorithm which is to be + * verified, and the default output length for the base algorithm. + * Note that none of the currently supported algorithms have an output + * length dependent on actual key size, so setting it to a bogus value + * of 0 is currently OK. */ + size_t requested_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + key_type, 0, requested_alg ); + size_t default_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + key_type, 0, + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( requested_alg ) ); + + /* If the policy is default-length, only allow an algorithm with + * a declared exact-length matching the default. */ + if( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) == 0 ) + return( requested_output_length == default_output_length ); + + /* If the requested algorithm is default-length, allow it if the policy + * length exactly matches the default length. */ + if( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( requested_alg ) == 0 && + PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) == default_output_length ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + + /* If policy_alg is an at-least-this-length wildcard MAC algorithm, + * check for the requested MAC length to be equal to or longer than the + * minimum allowed length. */ + if( ( policy_alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) + { + return( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) <= + requested_output_length ); + } + } + /* If policy_alg is a generic key agreement operation, then using it for + * a key derivation with that key agreement should also be allowed. This + * behaviour is expected to be defined in a future specification version. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT( policy_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( requested_alg ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( requested_alg ) == + policy_alg ); + } + /* If it isn't explicitly permitted, it's forbidden. */ + return( 0 ); +} + +/** Test whether a policy permits an algorithm. + * + * The caller must test usage flags separately. + * + * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is + * being validated, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) + * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is + * combined with. + * + * \retval PSA_SUCCESS When \p alg is a specific algorithm + * allowed by the \p policy. + * \retval PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT When \p alg is not a specific algorithm + * \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED When \p alg is a specific algorithm, but + * the \p policy does not allow it. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_policy_permits( const psa_key_policy_t *policy, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + /* '0' is not a valid algorithm */ + if( alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* A requested algorithm cannot be a wildcard. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( psa_key_algorithm_permits( key_type, policy->alg, alg ) || + psa_key_algorithm_permits( key_type, policy->alg2, alg ) ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); +} + +/** Restrict a key policy based on a constraint. + * + * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is + * being restricted, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) + * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is + * combined with. + * + * \param[in] key_type The key type for which to restrict the policy + * \param[in,out] policy The policy to restrict. + * \param[in] constraint The policy constraint to apply. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \c *policy contains the intersection of the original value of + * \c *policy and \c *constraint. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c key_type, \c *policy and \c *constraint are incompatible. + * \c *policy is unchanged. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy( + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_key_policy_t *policy, + const psa_key_policy_t *constraint ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg = + psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( key_type, policy->alg, + constraint->alg ); + psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg2 = + psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( key_type, policy->alg2, + constraint->alg2 ); + if( intersection_alg == 0 && policy->alg != 0 && constraint->alg != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + if( intersection_alg2 == 0 && policy->alg2 != 0 && constraint->alg2 != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + policy->usage &= constraint->usage; + policy->alg = intersection_alg; + policy->alg2 = intersection_alg2; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints + * and lock it. + * + * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is + * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is + * zero, the algorithm is not checked. + * + * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key + * into a key slot if not already done. + * + * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of + * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( key, p_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + slot = *p_slot; + + /* Enforce that usage policy for the key slot contains all the flags + * required by the usage parameter. There is one exception: public + * keys can always be exported, so we treat public key objects as + * if they had the export flag. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) ) + usage &= ~PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; + + if( ( slot->attr.policy.usage & usage ) != usage ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + goto error; + } + + /* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algorithm. */ + if( alg != 0 ) + { + status = psa_key_policy_permits( &slot->attr.policy, + slot->attr.type, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto error; + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +error: + *p_slot = NULL; + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( status ); +} + +/** Get a key slot containing a transparent key and lock it. + * + * A transparent key is a key for which the key material is directly + * available, as opposed to a key in a secure element and/or to be used + * by a secure element. + * + * This is a temporary function that may be used instead of + * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() when there is no opaque key support + * for a cryptographic operation. + * + * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the + * caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, p_slot, + usage, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( (*p_slot)->attr.lifetime ) ) + { + psa_unlock_key_slot( *p_slot ); + *p_slot = NULL; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + /* Data pointer will always be either a valid pointer or NULL in an + * initialized slot, so we can just free it. */ + if( slot->key.data != NULL ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes); + + mbedtls_free( slot->key.data ); + slot->key.data = NULL; + slot->key.bytes = 0; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. + * Persistent storage is not affected. */ +psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot ); + + /* + * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, + * do our best to report an unexpected lock counter: if available + * call MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED that may terminate execution (if called as + * part of the execution of a test suite this will stop the test suite + * execution). + */ + if( slot->lock_count != 1 ) + { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( slot->lock_count == 1 ); +#endif + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* Multipart operations may still be using the key. This is safe + * because all multipart operation objects are independent from + * the key slot: if they need to access the key after the setup + * phase, they have a copy of the key. Note that this means that + * key material can linger until all operations are completed. */ + /* At this point, key material and other type-specific content has + * been wiped. Clear remaining metadata. We can call memset and not + * zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive. */ + memset( slot, 0, sizeof( *slot ) ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + psa_status_t status; /* status of the last operation */ + psa_status_t overall_status = PSA_SUCCESS; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( key ) ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + /* + * Get the description of the key in a key slot. In case of a persistent + * key, this will load the key description from persistent memory if not + * done yet. We cannot avoid this loading as without it we don't know if + * the key is operated by an SE or not and this information is needed by + * the current implementation. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( key, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* + * If the key slot containing the key description is under access by the + * library (apart from the present access), the key cannot be destroyed + * yet. For the time being, just return in error. Eventually (to be + * implemented), the key should be destroyed when all accesses have + * stopped. + */ + if( slot->lock_count > 1 ) + { + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + return( PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ); + } + + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { + /* Refuse the destruction of a read-only key (which may or may not work + * if we attempt it, depending on whether the key is merely read-only + * by policy or actually physically read-only). + * Just do the best we can, which is to wipe the copy in memory + * (done in this function's cleanup code). */ + overall_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry( slot->attr.lifetime ); + if( driver != NULL ) + { + /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things: + * remove the key file in internal storage, destroy the + * key inside the secure element, and update the driver's + * persistent data. Start a transaction that will encompass these + * three actions. */ + psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY ); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.id = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_crypto_save_transaction( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + /* We should still try to destroy the key in the secure + * element and the key metadata in storage. This is especially + * important if the error is that the storage is full. + * But how to do it exactly without risking an inconsistent + * state after a reset? + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/215 + */ + overall_status = status; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_destroy_se_key( driver, + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ) ); + if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { + status = psa_destroy_persistent_key( slot->attr.id ); + if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + + /* TODO: other slots may have a copy of the same key. We should + * invalidate them. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/214 + */ + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( driver != NULL ) + { + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); + if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + if( overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +exit: + status = psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ); + /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from wiping over a storage error */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + overall_status = status; + return( overall_status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +static psa_status_t psa_get_rsa_public_exponent( + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi mpi; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t *buffer = NULL; + size_t buflen; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &mpi ); + + ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &mpi ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &mpi, 65537 ) == 0 ) + { + /* It's the default value, which is reported as an empty string, + * so there's nothing to do. */ + goto exit; + } + + buflen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &mpi ); + buffer = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buflen ); + if( buffer == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &mpi, buffer, buflen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + attributes->domain_parameters = buffer; + attributes->domain_parameters_size = buflen; + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &mpi ); + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_free( buffer ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +/** Retrieve all the publicly-accessible attributes of a key. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + psa_reset_key_attributes( attributes ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, 0, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + attributes->core = slot->attr; + attributes->core.flags &= ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY | + MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( psa_get_se_driver_entry( slot->attr.lifetime ) != NULL ) + psa_set_key_slot_number( attributes, + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( slot->attr.type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY: + /* TODO: reporting the public exponent for opaque keys + * is not yet implemented. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/216 + */ + if( ! psa_key_lifetime_is_external( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + break; + + status = psa_get_rsa_public_exponent( rsa, + attributes ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + } + break; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + default: + /* Nothing else to do. */ + break; + } + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_reset_key_attributes( attributes ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ) +{ + if( attributes->core.flags & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER ) + { + *slot_number = attributes->slot_number; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +static psa_status_t psa_export_key_buffer_internal( const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + if( key_buffer_size > data_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + memcpy( data, key_buffer, key_buffer_size ); + memset( data + key_buffer_size, 0, + data_size - key_buffer_size ); + *data_length = key_buffer_size; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + + if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) + { + return( psa_export_key_buffer_internal( + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } + else + { + /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but + it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit + support for exporting certain key types. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a + * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid + * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ + if( data_size == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Set the key to empty now, so that even when there are errors, we always + * set data_length to a value between 0 and data_size. On error, setting + * the key to empty is a good choice because an empty key representation is + * unlikely to be accepted anywhere. */ + *data_length = 0; + + /* Export requires the EXPORT flag. There is an exception for public keys, + * which don't require any flag, but + * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() takes care of this. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( &attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + data, data_size, data_length ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) || PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) ) + { + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) + { + /* Exporting public -> public */ + return( psa_export_key_buffer_internal( + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); +#else + /* We don't know how to convert a private RSA key to public. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); +#else + /* We don't know how to convert a private ECC key to public */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } + } + else + { + /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but + it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit + support for exporting certain key types. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a + * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid + * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ + if( data_size == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Set the key to empty now, so that even when there are errors, we always + * set data_length to a value between 0 and data_size. On error, setting + * the key to empty is a good choice because an empty key representation is + * unlikely to be accepted anywhere. */ + *data_length = 0; + + /* Exporting a public key doesn't require a usage flag. */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, 0, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + data, data_size, data_length ); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +#if defined(static_assert) +static_assert( ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ) == 0, + "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both external-only and dual-use" ); +static_assert( ( PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ) == 0, + "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both internal-only and dual-use" ); +static_assert( ( PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY ) == 0, + "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both internal-only and external-only" ); +#endif + +/** Validate that a key policy is internally well-formed. + * + * This function only rejects invalid policies. It does not validate the + * consistency of the policy with respect to other attributes of the key + * such as the key type. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_policy( const psa_key_policy_t *policy ) +{ + if( ( policy->usage & ~( PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Validate the internal consistency of key attributes. + * + * This function only rejects invalid attribute values. If does not + * validate the consistency of the attributes with any key data that may + * be involved in the creation of the key. + * + * Call this function early in the key creation process. + * + * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] p_drv On any return, the driver for the key, if any. + * NULL for a transparent key. + * + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_attributes( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = psa_get_key_id( attributes ); + + status = psa_validate_key_location( lifetime, p_drv ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_validate_key_persistence( lifetime ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + if( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + else + { + if( !psa_is_valid_key_id( psa_get_key_id( attributes ), 0 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + status = psa_validate_key_policy( &attributes->core.policy ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Refuse to create overly large keys. + * Note that this doesn't trigger on import if the attributes don't + * explicitly specify a size (so psa_get_key_bits returns 0), so + * psa_import_key() needs its own checks. */ + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Reject invalid flags. These should not be reachable through the API. */ + if( attributes->core.flags & ~ ( MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY | + MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Prepare a key slot to receive key material. + * + * This function allocates a key slot and sets its metadata. + * + * If this function fails, call psa_fail_key_creation(). + * + * This function is intended to be used as follows: + * -# Call psa_start_key_creation() to allocate a key slot, prepare + * it with the specified attributes, and in case of a volatile key assign it + * a volatile key identifier. + * -# Populate the slot with the key material. + * -# Call psa_finish_key_creation() to finalize the creation of the slot. + * In case of failure at any step, stop the sequence and call + * psa_fail_key_creation(). + * + * On success, the key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the caller + * to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * + * \param method An identification of the calling function. + * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the prepared slot. + * \param[out] p_drv On any return, the driver for the key, if any. + * NULL for a transparent key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key slot is ready to receive key material. + * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. + * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + (void) method; + *p_drv = NULL; + + status = psa_validate_key_attributes( attributes, p_drv ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_get_empty_key_slot( &volatile_key_id, p_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + slot = *p_slot; + + /* We're storing the declared bit-size of the key. It's up to each + * creation mechanism to verify that this information is correct. + * It's automatically correct for mechanisms that use the bit-size as + * an input (generate, device) but not for those where the bit-size + * is optional (import, copy). In case of a volatile key, assign it the + * volatile key identifier associated to the slot returned to contain its + * definition. */ + + slot->attr = attributes->core; + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + slot->attr.id = volatile_key_id; +#else + slot->attr.id.key_id = volatile_key_id; +#endif + } + + /* Erase external-only flags from the internal copy. To access + * external-only flags, query `attributes`. Thanks to the check + * in psa_validate_key_attributes(), this leaves the dual-use + * flags and any internal flag that psa_get_empty_key_slot() + * may have set. */ + slot->attr.flags &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things + * when creating or registering a persistent key: + * create the key file in internal storage, create the + * key inside the secure element, and update the driver's + * persistent data. This is done by starting a transaction that will + * encompass these three actions. + * For registering a volatile key, we just need to find an appropriate + * slot number inside the SE. Since the key is designated volatile, creating + * a transaction is not required. */ + /* The first thing to do is to find a slot number for the new key. + * We save the slot number in persistent storage as part of the + * transaction data. It will be needed to recover if the power + * fails during the key creation process, to clean up on the secure + * element side after restarting. Obtaining a slot number from the + * secure element driver updates its persistent state, but we do not yet + * save the driver's persistent state, so that if the power fails, + * we can roll back to a state where the key doesn't exist. */ + if( *p_drv != NULL ) + { + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; + status = psa_find_se_slot_for_key( attributes, method, *p_drv, + &slot_number ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( attributes->core.lifetime ) ) + { + psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = slot_number; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.id = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_crypto_save_transaction( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + return( status ); + } + } + + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( + slot, (uint8_t *)( &slot_number ), sizeof( slot_number ) ); + } + + if( *p_drv == NULL && method == PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER ) + { + /* Key registration only makes sense with a secure element. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Finalize the creation of a key once its key material has been set. + * + * This entails writing the key to persistent storage. + * + * If this function fails, call psa_fail_key_creation(). + * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use + * of this function. + * + * If the finalization succeeds, the function unlocks the key slot (it was + * locked by psa_start_key_creation()) and the key slot cannot be accessed + * anymore as part of the key creation process. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. + * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, + * or NULL for a transparent key. + * \param[out] key On success, identifier of the key. Note that the + * key identifier is also stored in the key slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully created. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * + * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. + * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + (void) slot; + (void) driver; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( driver != NULL ) + { + psa_se_key_data_storage_t data; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number = + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( slot ) ; + +#if defined(static_assert) + static_assert( sizeof( slot_number ) == + sizeof( data.slot_number ), + "Slot number size does not match psa_se_key_data_storage_t" ); +#endif + memcpy( &data.slot_number, &slot_number, sizeof( slot_number ) ); + status = psa_save_persistent_key( &slot->attr, + (uint8_t*) &data, + sizeof( data ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + { + /* Key material is saved in export representation in the slot, so + * just pass the slot buffer for storage. */ + status = psa_save_persistent_key( &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes ); + } + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Finish the transaction for a key creation. This does not + * happen when registering an existing key. Detect this case + * by checking whether a transaction is in progress (actual + * creation of a persistent key in a secure element requires a transaction, + * but registration or volatile key creation doesn't use one). */ + if( driver != NULL && + psa_crypto_transaction.unknown.type == PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ) + { + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_destroy_persistent_key( slot->attr.id ); + return( status ); + } + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + *key = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + + return( status ); +} + +/** Abort the creation of a key. + * + * You may call this function after calling psa_start_key_creation(), + * or after psa_finish_key_creation() fails. In other circumstances, this + * function may not clean up persistent storage. + * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use + * of this function. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. + * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, + * or NULL for a transparent key. + */ +static void psa_fail_key_creation( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + (void) driver; + + if( slot == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* TODO: If the key has already been created in the secure + * element, and the failure happened later (when saving metadata + * to internal storage), we need to destroy the key in the secure + * element. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/217 + */ + + /* Abort the ongoing transaction if any (there may not be one if + * the creation process failed before starting one, or if the + * key creation is a registration of a key in a secure element). + * Earlier functions must already have done what it takes to undo any + * partial creation. All that's left is to update the transaction data + * itself. */ + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ); +} + +/** Validate optional attributes during key creation. + * + * Some key attributes are optional during key creation. If they are + * specified in the attributes structure, check that they are consistent + * with the data in the slot. + * + * This function should be called near the end of key creation, after + * the slot in memory is fully populated but before saving persistent data. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_optional_attributes( + const psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + if( attributes->core.type != 0 ) + { + if( attributes->core.type != slot->attr.type ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + if( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + mbedtls_mpi actual, required; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &actual ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &required ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &actual ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto rsa_exit; + ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &required, + attributes->domain_parameters, + attributes->domain_parameters_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto rsa_exit; + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &actual, &required ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + rsa_exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &actual ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &required ); + if( ret != 0) + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + + if( attributes->core.bits != 0 ) + { + if( attributes->core.bits != slot->attr.bits ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_import_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t bits; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject zero-length symmetric keys (including raw data key objects). + * This also rejects any key which might be encoded as an empty string, + * which is never valid. */ + if( data_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, attributes, + &slot, &driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local + * storage (thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element + * or cryptoprocessor with storage), we have to allocate a buffer to + * hold the generated key material. */ + if( slot->key.data == NULL ) + { + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + bits = slot->attr.bits; + status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( attributes, + data, data_length, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes, &bits ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( slot->attr.bits == 0 ) + slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + else if( bits != slot->attr.bits ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_validate_optional_attributes( slot, attributes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, key ); +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); + + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Leaving attributes unspecified is not currently supported. + * It could make sense to query the key type and size from the + * secure element, but not all secure elements support this + * and the driver HAL doesn't currently support it. */ + if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER, attributes, + &slot, &driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, &key ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); + + /* Registration doesn't keep the key in RAM. */ + psa_close_key( key ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +static psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material( const psa_key_slot_t *source, + psa_key_slot_t *target ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( target, + source->key.data, + source->key.bytes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + target->attr.type = source->attr.type; + target->attr.bits = source->attr.bits; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_copy_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, + const psa_key_attributes_t *specified_attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *source_slot = NULL; + psa_key_slot_t *target_slot = NULL; + psa_key_attributes_t actual_attributes = *specified_attributes; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + + *target_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + source_key, &source_slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_validate_optional_attributes( source_slot, + specified_attributes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_restrict_key_policy( source_slot->attr.type, + &actual_attributes.core.policy, + &source_slot->attr.policy ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY, &actual_attributes, + &target_slot, &driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( driver != NULL ) + { + /* Copying to a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( actual_attributes.core.lifetime ) ) + { + /* + * Copying through an opaque driver is not implemented yet, consider + * a lifetime with an external location as an invalid parameter for + * now. + */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_copy_key_material( source_slot, target_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_finish_key_creation( target_slot, driver, target_key ); +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( target_slot, driver ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( source_slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Message digests */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_hash_abort( psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */ + if( operation->id == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( operation ); + operation->id = 0; + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_setup( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->id != 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Ensure all of the context is zeroized, since PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT only + * directly zeroes the int-sized dummy member of the context union. */ + memset( &operation->ctx, 0, sizeof( operation->ctx ) ); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( operation, alg ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_hash_abort( operation ); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_update( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a + * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ + if( input_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( operation, input, input_length ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_hash_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_finish( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + *hash_length = 0; + if( operation->id == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + psa_hash_abort( operation ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_verify( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length ) +{ + uint8_t actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_hash_length; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_finish( + operation, + actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ), + &actual_hash_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( actual_hash_length != hash_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length ) != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_hash_abort(operation); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_compute( psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + *hash_length = 0; + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_compare( psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length ) +{ + uint8_t actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_hash_length; + + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, + actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash), + &actual_hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + if( actual_hash_length != hash_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length ) != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_hash, sizeof( actual_hash ) ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_clone( const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + if( source_operation->id == 0 || + target_operation->id != 0 ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( source_operation, + target_operation ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_hash_abort( target_operation ); + + return( status ); +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* MAC */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_mac_abort( psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */ + if( operation->id == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( operation ); + operation->mac_size = 0; + operation->is_sign = 0; + operation->id = 0; + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *mac_size ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type( attributes ); + size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( attributes ); + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm */ + status = psa_mac_key_can_do( alg, key_type ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Get the output length for the algorithm and key combination */ + *mac_size = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, alg ); + + if( *mac_size < 4 ) + { + /* A very short MAC is too short for security since it can be + * brute-forced. Ancient protocols with 32-bit MACs do exist, + * so we make this our minimum, even though 32 bits is still + * too small for security. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + if( *mac_size > PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) ) ) + { + /* It's impossible to "truncate" to a larger length than the full length + * of the algorithm. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + if( *mac_size > PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE ) + { + /* PSA_MAC_LENGTH returns the correct length even for a MAC algorithm + * that is disabled in the compile-time configuration. The result can + * therefore be larger than PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, which does take the + * configuration into account. In this case, force a return of + * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED here. Otherwise psa_mac_verify(), or + * psa_mac_compute(mac_size=PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE), would return + * PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL for an unsupported algorithm whose MAC size + * is larger than PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, which is misleading and which breaks + * systematically generated tests. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + int is_sign ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->id != 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, + &slot, + is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( alg, &attributes, + &operation->mac_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + operation->is_sign = is_sign; + /* Dispatch the MAC setup call with validated input */ + if( is_sign ) + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( operation, + &attributes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg ); + } + else + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( operation, + &attributes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg ); + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_mac_setup( operation, key, alg, 1 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_mac_setup( operation, key, alg, 0 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_update( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + if( operation->id == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a + * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ + if( input_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( operation, + input, input_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( ! operation->is_sign ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* Sanity check. This will guarantee that mac_size != 0 (and so mac != NULL) + * once all the error checks are done. */ + if( operation->mac_size == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( mac_size < operation->mac_size ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( operation, + mac, operation->mac_size, + mac_length ); + +exit: + /* In case of success, set the potential excess room in the output buffer + * to an invalid value, to avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. + * In case of error, set the output length and content to a safe default, + * such that in case the caller misses an error check, the output would be + * an unachievable MAC. + */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + *mac_length = mac_size; + operation->mac_size = 0; + } + + if( mac_size > operation->mac_size ) + memset( &mac[operation->mac_size], '!', + mac_size - operation->mac_size ); + + abort_status = psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->is_sign ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->mac_size != mac_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( operation, + mac, mac_length ); + +exit: + abort_status = psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_compute_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length, + int is_sign ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + uint8_t operation_mac_size = 0; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, + &slot, + is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( alg, &attributes, + &operation_mac_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( mac_size < operation_mac_size ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + &attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + input, input_length, + mac, operation_mac_size, mac_length ); + +exit: + /* In case of success, set the potential excess room in the output buffer + * to an invalid value, to avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. + * In case of error, set the output length and content to a safe default, + * such that in case the caller misses an error check, the output would be + * an unachievable MAC. + */ + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + *mac_length = mac_size; + operation_mac_size = 0; + } + if( mac_size > operation_mac_size ) + memset( &mac[operation_mac_size], '!', mac_size - operation_mac_size ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_compute( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length) +{ + return( psa_mac_compute_internal( key, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length, 1 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_mac_length; + + status = psa_mac_compute_internal( key, alg, + input, input_length, + actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ), + &actual_mac_length, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( mac_length != actual_mac_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( mac, actual_mac, actual_mac_length ) != 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ) ); + + return ( status ); +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Asymmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_sign_verify_check_alg( int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + if( input_is_message ) + { + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) + { + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + else + { + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t * signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + *signature_length = 0; + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg( input_is_message, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + /* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees + * that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the input + * buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have + * to be a hash.) */ + if( signature_size == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, + input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH, + alg ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + if( input_is_message ) + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); + } + else + { + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); + } + + +exit: + /* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error, + * the trailing part on success) with something that isn't a valid signature + * (barring an attack on the signature and deliberately-crafted input), + * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + memset( signature + *signature_length, '!', + signature_size - *signature_length ); + else + memset( signature, '!', signature_size ); + /* If signature_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not call + * memset because signature may be NULL in this case. */ + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg( input_is_message, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, + input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + alg ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + if( input_is_message ) + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length ); + } + else + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length ); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); + +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) + { + size_t hash_length; + uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), + input, input_length, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + return psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t * signature_length ) +{ + return psa_sign_internal( + key, 1, alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH( alg ) ) + { + size_t hash_length; + uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ), + input, input_length, + hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return status; + + return psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ); + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t * input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t * signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + return psa_verify_internal( + key, 1, alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + if( attributes->core.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)hash; + (void)hash_length; + (void)signature; + (void)signature_size; + (void)signature_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + return psa_sign_internal( + key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + else if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + if( PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + return( mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + } + + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)hash; + (void)hash_length; + (void)signature; + (void)signature_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + return psa_verify_internal( + key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +static void psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode( psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH( alg ); + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg ); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info ); + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + *output_length = 0; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) && salt_length != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + if( ! ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( slot->attr.type ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto rsa_exit; + + if( output_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto rsa_exit; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + if( alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + input_length, + input, + output ) ); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + } + else + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode( alg, rsa ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + salt, salt_length, + input_length, + input, + output ) ); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + } + else + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +rsa_exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *output_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + } + else + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + *output_length = 0; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) && salt_length != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if( slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( input_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto rsa_exit; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + + if( alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + output_length, + input, + output, + output_size ) ); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + } + else + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode( alg, rsa ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + salt, salt_length, + output_length, + input, + output, + output_size ) ); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + } + else + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +rsa_exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + } + else + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Symmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_key_usage_t usage = ( cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ? + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ); + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->id != 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, usage, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Initialize the operation struct members, except for id. The id member + * is used to indicate to psa_cipher_abort that there are resources to free, + * so we only set it (in the driver wrapper) after resources have been + * allocated/initialized. */ + operation->iv_set = 0; + if( alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ) + operation->iv_required = 0; + else if( slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 ) + operation->iv_required = 0; + else + operation->iv_required = 1; + operation->default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, alg ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + /* Try doing the operation through a driver before using software fallback. */ + if( cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( operation, + &attributes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg ); + else + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( operation, + &attributes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_size, + size_t *iv_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t default_iv_length; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->iv_set || ! operation->iv_required ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + default_iv_length = operation->default_iv_length; + if( iv_size < default_iv_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + if( default_iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_generate_random( local_iv, default_iv_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( operation, + local_iv, default_iv_length ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + memcpy( iv, local_iv, default_iv_length ); + *iv_length = default_iv_length; + operation->iv_set = 1; + } + else + { + *iv_length = 0; + psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + } + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->iv_set || ! operation->iv_required ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( operation, + iv, + iv_length ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->iv_set = 1; + else + psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_update( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->iv_required && ! operation->iv_set ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( operation, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->iv_required && ! operation->iv_set ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( operation, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( psa_cipher_abort( operation ) ); + else + { + *output_length = 0; + (void) psa_cipher_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + if( operation->id == 0 ) + { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( operation ); + + operation->id = 0; + operation->iv_set = 0; + operation->iv_required = 0; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t default_iv_length = 0; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, alg ); + if( default_iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + if( default_iv_length > 0 ) + { + if( output_size < default_iv_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_generate_random( local_iv, default_iv_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, local_iv, default_iv_length, input, input_length, + mbedtls_buffer_offset( output, default_iv_length ), + output_size - default_iv_length, output_length ); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = unlock_status; + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( default_iv_length > 0 ) + memcpy( output, local_iv, default_iv_length ); + *output_length += default_iv_length; + } + else + *output_length = 0; + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + if( input_length < PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = unlock_status; + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + *output_length = 0; + + return( status ); +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* AEAD */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + *ciphertext_length = 0; + + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS && ciphertext_size != 0 ) + memset( ciphertext, 0, ciphertext_size ); + + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + *plaintext_length = 0; + + if( !PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS && plaintext_size != 0 ) + memset( plaintext, 0, plaintext_size ); + + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( status ); +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Generators */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#define AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF +#endif /* At least one builtin KDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const uint8_t *hmac_key, + size_t hmac_key_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ); + psa_set_key_bits( &attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( hmac_key_length ) ); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ); + + operation->is_sign = 1; + operation->mac_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( operation, + &attributes, + hmac_key, hmac_key_length, + PSA_ALG_HMAC( hash_alg ) ); + + psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* KDF algorithms reliant on HMAC */ + +#define HKDF_STATE_INIT 0 /* no input yet */ +#define HKDF_STATE_STARTED 1 /* got salt */ +#define HKDF_STATE_KEYED 2 /* got key */ +#define HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT 3 /* output started */ + +static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( + const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation ) +{ + if ( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( operation->alg ) ) + return( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( operation->alg ) ); + else + return( operation->alg ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( operation ); + if( kdf_alg == 0 ) + { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + } + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.hkdf.info ); + status = psa_mac_abort( &operation->ctx.hkdf.hmac ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) || + /* TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS KDF uses the same core as TLS-1.2 PRF */ + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + { + if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret_length ); + mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret ); + } + + if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed_length ); + mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed ); + } + + if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label_length ); + mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label ); + } + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + + /* We leave the fields Ai and output_block to be erased safely by the + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() in the end of this function. */ + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation, sizeof( *operation ) ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t *capacity) +{ + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + { + /* This is a blank key derivation operation. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + *capacity = operation->capacity; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t capacity ) +{ + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + if( capacity > operation->capacity ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + operation->capacity = capacity; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) +/* Read some bytes from an HKDF-based operation. This performs a chunk + * of the expand phase of the HKDF algorithm. */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length ) +{ + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + size_t hmac_output_length; + psa_status_t status; + + if( hkdf->state < HKDF_STATE_KEYED || ! hkdf->info_set ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT; + + while( output_length != 0 ) + { + /* Copy what remains of the current block */ + uint8_t n = hash_length - hkdf->offset_in_block; + if( n > output_length ) + n = (uint8_t) output_length; + memcpy( output, hkdf->output_block + hkdf->offset_in_block, n ); + output += n; + output_length -= n; + hkdf->offset_in_block += n; + if( output_length == 0 ) + break; + /* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise + * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have + * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation + * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly + * inside the library. */ + if( hkdf->block_number == 0xff ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* We need a new block */ + ++hkdf->block_number; + hkdf->offset_in_block = 0; + + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + hkdf->prk, + hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( hkdf->block_number != 1 ) + { + status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->output_block, + hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->info, + hkdf->info_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac, + &hkdf->block_number, 1 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->output_block, + sizeof( hkdf->output_block ), + &hmac_output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( alg ); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + psa_mac_operation_t hmac = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hmac_output_length; + psa_status_t status, cleanup_status; + + /* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise + * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have + * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation + * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly + * inside the library. */ + if( tls12_prf->block_number == 0xff ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + /* We need a new block */ + ++tls12_prf->block_number; + tls12_prf->left_in_block = hash_length; + + /* Recall the definition of the TLS-1.2-PRF from RFC 5246: + * + * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_(secret, label + seed) + * + * P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) + + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... + * + * A(0) = seed + * A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) + * + * The `psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation` structure saves the block + * `HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + seed)` from which the output + * is currently extracted as `output_block` and where i is + * `block_number`. + */ + + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hmac, + hash_alg, + tls12_prf->secret, + tls12_prf->secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Calculate A(i) where i = tls12_prf->block_number. */ + if( tls12_prf->block_number == 1 ) + { + /* A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(0)), where A(0) = seed. (The RFC overloads + * the variable seed and in this instance means it in the context of the + * P_hash function, where seed = label + seed.) */ + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, + tls12_prf->label, + tls12_prf->label_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, + tls12_prf->seed, + tls12_prf->seed_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + } + else + { + /* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */ + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hmac, + tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length, + &hmac_output_length ); + if( hmac_output_length != hash_length ) + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Calculate HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + label + seed). */ + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hmac, + hash_alg, + tls12_prf->secret, + tls12_prf->secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->label, tls12_prf->label_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->seed, tls12_prf->seed_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hmac, + tls12_prf->output_block, hash_length, + &hmac_output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + +cleanup: + cleanup_status = psa_mac_abort( &hmac ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS && cleanup_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = cleanup_status; + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH( alg ); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t offset, length; + + switch( tls12_prf->state ) + { + case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET: + tls12_prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT; + break; + case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT: + break; + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + while( output_length != 0 ) + { + /* Check if we have fully processed the current block. */ + if( tls12_prf->left_in_block == 0 ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block( tls12_prf, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + continue; + } + + if( tls12_prf->left_in_block > output_length ) + length = (uint8_t) output_length; + else + length = tls12_prf->left_in_block; + + offset = hash_length - tls12_prf->left_in_block; + memcpy( output, tls12_prf->output_block + offset, length ); + output += length; + output_length -= length; + tls12_prf->left_in_block -= length; + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( operation ); + + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + { + /* This is a blank operation. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + if( output_length > operation->capacity ) + { + operation->capacity = 0; + /* Go through the error path to wipe all confidential data now + * that the operation object is useless. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + if( output_length == 0 && operation->capacity == 0 ) + { + /* Edge case: this is a finished operation, and 0 bytes + * were requested. The right error in this case could + * be either INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY or BAD_STATE. Return + * INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY, which is right for a finished + * operation, for consistency with the case when + * output_length > 0. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ); + } + operation->capacity -= output_length; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ); + status = psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read( &operation->ctx.hkdf, hash_alg, + output, output_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + kdf_alg, output, + output_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + { + (void) kdf_alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* Preserve the algorithm upon errors, but clear all sensitive state. + * This allows us to differentiate between exhausted operations and + * blank operations, so we can return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE on blank + * operations. */ + psa_algorithm_t alg = operation->alg; + psa_key_derivation_abort( operation ); + operation->alg = alg; + memset( output, '!', output_length ); + } + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) +static void psa_des_set_key_parity( uint8_t *data, size_t data_size ) +{ + if( data_size >= 8 ) + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( data ); + if( data_size >= 16 ) + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( data + 8 ); + if( data_size >= 24 ) + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity( data + 16 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_key_internal( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation ) +{ + uint8_t *data = NULL; + size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ); + psa_status_t status; + + if( ! key_type_is_raw_bytes( slot->attr.type ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + if( bits % 8 != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, bytes ); + if( data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( operation, data, bytes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if( slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ) + psa_des_set_key_parity( data, bytes ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, bytes ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { + .core = slot->attr + }; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( &attributes, + data, bytes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes, &bits ); + if( bits != slot->attr.bits ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + +exit: + mbedtls_free( data ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject any attempt to create a zero-length key so that we don't + * risk tripping up later, e.g. on a malloc(0) that returns NULL. */ + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( ! operation->can_output_key ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, attributes, + &slot, &driver ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if( driver != NULL ) + { + /* Deriving a key in a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + status = psa_generate_derived_key_internal( slot, + attributes->core.bits, + operation ); + } + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); + + return( status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key derivation */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) +static int is_kdf_alg_supported( psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + return( 0 ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hash_try_support( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ); + psa_hash_abort( &operation ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg ) +{ + /* Make sure that operation->ctx is properly zero-initialised. (Macro + * initialisers for this union leave some bytes unspecified.) */ + memset( &operation->ctx, 0, sizeof( operation->ctx ) ); + + /* Make sure that kdf_alg is a supported key derivation algorithm. */ + if( ! is_kdf_alg_supported( kdf_alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* All currently supported key derivation algorithms are based on a + * hash algorithm. */ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ); + size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + if( hash_size == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise + * we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially + * risk-prone. */ + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_try_support( hash_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( ( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) && + ! ( hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_try_support( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if( alg == PSA_ALG_ECDH ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#endif + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if( operation->alg != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg ); + psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( alg ); + status = psa_key_agreement_try_support( ka_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( operation, kdf_alg ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + } + else if( PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) + status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( operation, alg ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + } + else + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->alg = alg; + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) +static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + switch( step ) + { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: + if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + else + { + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + data, data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + /* If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. */ + if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( &hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + NULL, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; + } + if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_STARTED ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + status = psa_mac_update( &hkdf->hmac, + data, data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->prk, + sizeof( hkdf->prk ), + &data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + hkdf->block_number = 0; + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: + if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + if( hkdf->info_set ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + hkdf->info_length = data_length; + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + hkdf->info = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( hkdf->info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + memcpy( hkdf->info, data, data_length ); + } + hkdf->info_set = 1; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_seed( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + if( prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + prf->seed = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( prf->seed == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + memcpy( prf->seed, data, data_length ); + prf->seed_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_key( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + if( prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + prf->secret = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( prf->secret == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + memcpy( prf->secret, data, data_length ); + prf->secret_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_label( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + if( prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + prf->label = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( prf->label == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + memcpy( prf->label, data, data_length ); + prf->label_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + switch( step ) + { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: + return( psa_tls12_prf_set_seed( prf, data, data_length ) ); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + return( psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, data, data_length ) ); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: + return( psa_tls12_prf_set_label( prf, data, data_length ) ); + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t pms[ 4 + 2 * PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE ]; + uint8_t *cur = pms; + + if( data_length > PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* Quoting RFC 4279, Section 2: + * + * The premaster secret is formed as follows: if the PSK is N octets + * long, concatenate a uint16 with the value N, N zero octets, a second + * uint16 with the value N, and the PSK itself. + */ + + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( data_length ); + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( data_length ); + memset( cur, 0, data_length ); + cur += data_length; + *cur++ = pms[0]; + *cur++ = pms[1]; + memcpy( cur, data, data_length ); + cur += data_length; + + status = psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, pms, cur - pms ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( pms, sizeof( pms ) ); + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + if( step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ) + { + return( psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( prf, + data, data_length ) ); + } + + return( psa_tls12_prf_input( prf, step, data, data_length ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +/** Check whether the given key type is acceptable for the given + * input step of a key derivation. + * + * Secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE. + * Non-secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + * Both secret and non-secret inputs can alternatively have the type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, which is never the type of a key object, meaning + * that the input was passed as a buffer rather than via a key object. + */ +static int psa_key_derivation_check_input_type( + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_type_t key_type ) +{ + switch( step ) + { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + break; + } + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_internal( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( operation ); + + status = psa_key_derivation_check_input_type( step, key_type ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + status = psa_hkdf_input( &operation->ctx.hkdf, + PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ), + step, data, data_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) ) + { + status = psa_tls12_prf_input( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + step, data, data_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) ) + { + status = psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + step, data, data_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + { + /* This can't happen unless the operation object was not initialized */ + (void) data; + (void) data_length; + (void) kdf_alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_key_derivation_abort( operation ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + return( psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation, step, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, + data, data_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( operation ); + return( status ); + } + + /* Passing a key object as a SECRET input unlocks the permission + * to output to a key object. */ + if( step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ) + operation->can_output_key = 1; + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation, + step, slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes ); + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key agreement */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_ecdh( const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *our_key, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *their_key = NULL; + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh; + psa_status_t status; + size_t bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( our_key->grp.id, &bits ); + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &ecdh ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve), + bits, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + &their_key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ecdh, our_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ecdh, + shared_secret_length, + shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + if( PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( bits ) != *shared_secret_length ) + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( shared_secret, shared_secret_size ); + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &ecdh ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( their_key ); + mbedtls_free( their_key ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + +#define PSA_KEY_AGREEMENT_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_internal( psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_slot_t *private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length ) +{ + switch( alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) + case PSA_ALG_ECDH: + if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR( private_key->attr.type ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + private_key->attr.type, + private_key->attr.bits, + private_key->key.data, + private_key->key.bytes, + &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_key_agreement_ecdh( peer_key, peer_key_length, + ecp, + shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + default: + (void) private_key; + (void) peer_key; + (void) peer_key_length; + (void) shared_secret; + (void) shared_secret_size; + (void) shared_secret_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +} + +/* Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort() + * to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_internal( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_slot_t *private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t shared_secret[PSA_KEY_AGREEMENT_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_SIZE]; + size_t shared_secret_length = 0; + psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( operation->alg ); + + /* Step 1: run the secret agreement algorithm to generate the shared + * secret. */ + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal( ka_alg, + private_key, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + sizeof( shared_secret ), + &shared_secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Step 2: set up the key derivation to generate key material from + * the shared secret. A shared secret is permitted wherever a key + * of type DERIVE is permitted. */ + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation, step, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_length ); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( shared_secret, shared_secret_length ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( operation->alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_key_agreement_internal( operation, step, + slot, + peer_key, peer_key_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_key_derivation_abort( operation ); + else + { + /* If a private key has been added as SECRET, we allow the derived + * key material to be used as a key in PSA Crypto. */ + if( step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ) + operation->can_output_key = 1; + } + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement( psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT( alg ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is in general an upper bound + * for the output size. The PSA specification only guarantees that this + * function works if output_size >= PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(...), + * but it might be nice to allow smaller buffers if the output fits. + * At the time of writing this comment, with only ECDH implemented, + * PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is exact so the point is moot. + * If FFDH is implemented, PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() can easily + * be exact for it as well. */ + size_t expected_length = + PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE( slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits ); + if( output_size < expected_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal( alg, slot, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + output, output_size, + output_length ); + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* If an error happens and is not handled properly, the output + * may be used as a key to protect sensitive data. Arrange for such + * a key to be random, which is likely to result in decryption or + * verification errors. This is better than filling the buffer with + * some constant data such as zeros, which would result in the data + * being protected with a reproducible, easily knowable key. + */ + psa_generate_random( output, output_size ); + *output_length = output_size; + } + + unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + + return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Random generation */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/** Initialize the PSA random generator. + */ +static void mbedtls_psa_random_init( mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + memset( rng, 0, sizeof( *rng ) ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + /* Set default configuration if + * mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources() hasn't been called. */ + if( rng->entropy_init == NULL ) + rng->entropy_init = mbedtls_entropy_init; + if( rng->entropy_free == NULL ) + rng->entropy_free = mbedtls_entropy_free; + + rng->entropy_init( &rng->entropy ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) + /* The PSA entropy injection feature depends on using NV seed as an entropy + * source. Add NV seed as an entropy source for PSA entropy injection. */ + mbedtls_entropy_add_source( &rng->entropy, + mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG ); +#endif + + mbedtls_psa_drbg_init( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/** Deinitialize the PSA random generator. + */ +static void mbedtls_psa_random_free( mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + memset( rng, 0, sizeof( *rng ) ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + mbedtls_psa_drbg_free( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ); + rng->entropy_free( &rng->entropy ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/** Seed the PSA random generator. + */ +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_random_seed( mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + /* Do nothing: the external RNG seeds itself. */ + (void) rng; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + const unsigned char drbg_seed[] = "PSA"; + int ret = mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed( &rng->entropy, + drbg_seed, sizeof( drbg_seed ) - 1 ); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_random( uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size ) +{ + GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + + size_t output_length = 0; + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( &global_data.rng, + output, output_size, + &output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + /* Breaking up a request into smaller chunks is currently not supported + * for the external RNG interface. */ + if( output_length != output_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + while( output_size > 0 ) + { + size_t request_size = + ( output_size > MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST ? + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST : + output_size ); + int ret = mbedtls_psa_get_random( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + output, request_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + output_size -= request_size; + output += request_size; + } + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/* Wrapper function allowing the classic API to use the PSA RNG. + * + * `mbedtls_psa_get_random(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, ...)` calls + * `psa_generate_random(...)`. The state parameter is ignored since the + * PSA API doesn't support passing an explicit state. + * + * In the non-external case, psa_generate_random() calls an + * `mbedtls_xxx_drbg_random` function which has exactly the same signature + * and semantics as mbedtls_psa_get_random(). As an optimization, + * instead of doing this back-and-forth between the PSA API and the + * classic API, psa_crypto_random_impl.h defines `mbedtls_psa_get_random` + * as a constant function pointer to `mbedtls_xxx_drbg_random`. + */ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +int mbedtls_psa_get_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size ) +{ + /* This function takes a pointer to the RNG state because that's what + * classic mbedtls functions using an RNG expect. The PSA RNG manages + * its own state internally and doesn't let the caller access that state. + * So we just ignore the state parameter, and in practice we'll pass + * NULL. */ + (void) p_rng; + psa_status_t status = psa_generate_random( output, output_size ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( 0 ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy( const uint8_t *seed, + size_t seed_size ) +{ + if( global_data.initialized ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + + if( ( ( seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM ) || + ( seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE ) ) || + ( seed_size > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy( seed, seed_size ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +/** Validate the key type and size for key generation + * + * \param type The key type + * \param bits The number of bits of the key + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key type and size are valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in bits of the key is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) ) + { + status = validate_unstructured_key_bit_size( type, bits ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + else +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA( type ) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + { + if( bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Accept only byte-aligned keys, for the same reasons as + * in psa_import_rsa_key(). */ + if( bits % 8 != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + { + /* To avoid empty block, return successfully here. */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + + if( ( attributes->domain_parameters == NULL ) && + ( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( key_type_is_raw_bytes( type ) ) + { + status = psa_generate_random( key_buffer, key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ) + psa_des_set_key_parity( key_buffer, key_buffer_size ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + } + else + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + if ( type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ) + { + return( mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) + * defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) + if ( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( type ) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + { + return( mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ + { + (void)key_buffer_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t key_buffer_size; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject any attempt to create a zero-length key so that we don't + * risk tripping up later, e.g. on a malloc(0) that returns NULL. */ + if( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* Reject any attempt to create a public key. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(attributes->core.type) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_start_key_creation( PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, attributes, + &slot, &driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local + * storage (thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element + * or cryptoprocessor with storage), we have to allocate a buffer to + * hold the generated key material. */ + if( slot->key.data == NULL ) + { + if ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ) == + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ) + { + status = psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( + attributes->core.type, attributes->core.bits ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + key_buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( + attributes->core.type, + attributes->core.bits ); + } + else + { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + attributes, &key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, &slot->key.bytes ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = psa_finish_key_creation( slot, driver, key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_fail_key_creation( slot, driver ); + + return( status ); +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Module setup */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + void (* entropy_init )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ), + void (* entropy_free )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) ) +{ + if( global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + global_data.rng.entropy_init = entropy_init; + global_data.rng.entropy_free = entropy_free; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( void ) +{ + psa_wipe_all_key_slots( ); + if( global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED ) + { + mbedtls_psa_random_free( &global_data.rng ); + } + /* Wipe all remaining data, including configuration. + * In particular, this sets all state indicator to the value + * indicating "uninitialized". */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &global_data, sizeof( global_data ) ); + + /* Terminate drivers */ + psa_driver_wrapper_free( ); +} + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) +/** Recover a transaction that was interrupted by a power failure. + * + * This function is called during initialization, before psa_crypto_init() + * returns. If this function returns a failure status, the initialization + * fails. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_recover_transaction( + const psa_crypto_transaction_t *transaction ) +{ + switch( transaction->unknown.type ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY: + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY: + /* TODO - fall through to the failure case until this + * is implemented. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/218 + */ + default: + /* We found an unsupported transaction in the storage. + * We don't know what state the storage is in. Give up. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + } +} +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_init( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + /* Double initialization is explicitly allowed. */ + if( global_data.initialized != 0 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + /* Initialize and seed the random generator. */ + mbedtls_psa_random_init( &global_data.rng ); + global_data.rng_state = RNG_INITIALIZED; + status = mbedtls_psa_random_seed( &global_data.rng ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + global_data.rng_state = RNG_SEEDED; + + status = psa_initialize_key_slots( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Init drivers */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + status = psa_crypto_load_transaction( ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + status = psa_crypto_recover_transaction( &psa_crypto_transaction ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction( ); + } + else if( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + { + /* There's no transaction to complete. It's all good. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + + /* All done. */ + global_data.initialized = 1; + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free( ); + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_aead.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_aead.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2b07a687 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_aead.c @@ -0,0 +1,398 @@ +/* + * PSA AEAD entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" + +typedef struct +{ + psa_algorithm_t core_alg; + uint8_t tag_length; + union + { + unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + mbedtls_ccm_context ccm; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + mbedtls_gcm_context gcm; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + mbedtls_chachapoly_context chachapoly; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + } ctx; +} aead_operation_t; + +#define AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0, 0, {0}} + +static void psa_aead_abort_internal( aead_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->core_alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_CCM: + mbedtls_ccm_free( &operation->ctx.ccm ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_GCM: + mbedtls_gcm_free( &operation->ctx.gcm ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + mbedtls_chachapoly_free( &operation->ctx.chachapoly ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + } +} + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup( + aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t key_bits; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id; + size_t full_tag_length = 0; + + key_bits = attributes->core.bits; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( alg, + attributes->core.type, key_bits, + &cipher_id ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + switch( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, 0 ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 0 ): + operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_CCM; + full_tag_length = 16; + /* CCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16. + * The call to mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag or + * mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt will validate the tag length. */ + if( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( attributes->core.type ) != 16 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + mbedtls_ccm_init( &operation->ctx.ccm ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_setkey( &operation->ctx.ccm, cipher_id, + key_buffer, (unsigned int) key_bits ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 0 ): + operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + full_tag_length = 16; + /* GCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. + * The call to mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag or + * mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt will validate the tag length. */ + if( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( attributes->core.type ) != 16 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + mbedtls_gcm_init( &operation->ctx.gcm ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &operation->ctx.gcm, cipher_id, + key_buffer, (unsigned int) key_bits ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0 ): + operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305; + full_tag_length = 16; + /* We only support the default tag length. */ + if( alg != PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init( &operation->ctx.chachapoly ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey( &operation->ctx.chachapoly, + key_buffer ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + + default: + (void) status; + (void) key_buffer; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + if( PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( attributes->core.type, + key_bits, alg ) + > full_tag_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + operation->tag_length = PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH( attributes->core.type, + key_bits, + alg ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + aead_operation_t operation = AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + uint8_t *tag; + (void) key_buffer_size; + + status = psa_aead_setup( &operation, attributes, key_buffer, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* For all currently supported modes, the tag is at the end of the + * ciphertext. */ + if( ciphertext_size < ( plaintext_length + operation.tag_length ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + tag = ciphertext + plaintext_length; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &operation.ctx.ccm, + plaintext_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + plaintext, ciphertext, + tag, operation.tag_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &operation.ctx.gcm, + MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + plaintext_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, ciphertext, + operation.tag_length, tag ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + { + if( nonce_length != 12 ) + { + if( nonce_length == 8 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + else + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation.tag_length != 16 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag( &operation.ctx.chachapoly, + plaintext_length, + nonce, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + plaintext, + ciphertext, + tag ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) tag; + (void) nonce; + (void) nonce_length; + (void) additional_data; + (void) additional_data_length; + (void) plaintext; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *ciphertext_length = plaintext_length + operation.tag_length; + +exit: + psa_aead_abort_internal( &operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +/* Locate the tag in a ciphertext buffer containing the encrypted data + * followed by the tag. Return the length of the part preceding the tag in + * *plaintext_length. This is the size of the plaintext in modes where + * the encrypted data has the same size as the plaintext, such as + * CCM and GCM. */ +static psa_status_t psa_aead_unpadded_locate_tag( size_t tag_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + size_t plaintext_size, + const uint8_t **p_tag ) +{ + size_t payload_length; + if( tag_length > ciphertext_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + payload_length = ciphertext_length - tag_length; + if( payload_length > plaintext_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + *p_tag = ciphertext + payload_length; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + aead_operation_t operation = AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + const uint8_t *tag = NULL; + (void) key_buffer_size; + + status = psa_aead_setup( &operation, attributes, key_buffer, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_aead_unpadded_locate_tag( operation.tag_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext_size, &tag ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &operation.ctx.ccm, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + ciphertext, plaintext, + tag, operation.tag_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &operation.ctx.gcm, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + tag, operation.tag_length, + ciphertext, plaintext ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if( operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ) + { + if( nonce_length != 12 ) + { + if( nonce_length == 8 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + else + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation.tag_length != 16 ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt( &operation.ctx.chachapoly, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + tag, + ciphertext, + plaintext ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) nonce; + (void) nonce_length; + (void) additional_data; + (void) additional_data_length; + (void) plaintext; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length; + +exit: + psa_aead_abort_internal( &operation ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length; + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_aead.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_aead.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aab0f835 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_aead.h @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * PSA AEAD driver entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H + +#include + +/** + * \brief Process an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_encrypt entry point. This function behaves as an aead_encrypt + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute. + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must + * be appropriate for the selected algorithm. + * The default nonce size is + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where + * key_type is the type of key. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be authenticated and encrypted. + * \param plaintext_length Size of plaintext in bytes. + * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is not + * part of this output. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag are + * defined as separate outputs, the + * authentication tag is appended to the + * encrypted data. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the ciphertext buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected algorithm + * and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, + * plaintext_length) where key_type is the type + * of key. + * - PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( + * plaintext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * ciphertext size of any supported AEAD + * encryption. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in the + * ciphertext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * ciphertext_size is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ); + +/** + * \brief Process an authenticated decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_decrypt entry point. This function behaves as an aead_decrypt + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute. + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must + * be appropriate for the selected algorithm. + * The default nonce size is + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where + * key_type is the type of key. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. For algorithms where the encrypted + * data and the authentication tag are defined + * as separate inputs, the buffer contains + * encrypted data followed by the authentication + * tag. + * \param ciphertext_length Size of ciphertext in bytes. + * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the plaintext buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected algorithm + * and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, + * ciphertext_length) where key_type is the + * type of key. + * - PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( + * ciphertext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * plaintext size of any supported AEAD + * decryption. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in the + * plaintext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The cipher is not authentic. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * plaintext_size is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..13006fa4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,593 @@ +/* + * PSA cipher driver entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t* cipher_id ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id_tmp; + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ) + alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, 0 ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg ) ) + { + switch( alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) + case PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) + case PSA_ALG_CTR: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) + case PSA_ALG_CFB: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) + case PSA_ALG_OFB: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) + case PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) + case PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7: + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 0 ): + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 0 ): + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0 ): + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY; + break; +#endif + default: + return( NULL ); + } + } + else if( alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; + else + return( NULL ); + + switch( key_type ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: + /* key_bits is 64 for Single-DES, 128 for two-key Triple-DES, + * and 192 for three-key Triple-DES. */ + if( key_bits == 64 ) + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES; + else + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES; + /* mbedtls doesn't recognize two-key Triple-DES as an algorithm, + * but two-key Triple-DES is functionally three-key Triple-DES + * with K1=K3, so that's how we present it to mbedtls. */ + if( key_bits == 128 ) + key_bits = 192; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20; + break; +#endif + default: + return( NULL ); + } + if( cipher_id != NULL ) + *cipher_id = cipher_id_tmp; + + return( mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher_id_tmp, + (int) key_bits, mode ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t key_bits; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info = NULL; + psa_key_type_t key_type = attributes->core.type; + + (void)key_buffer_size; + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &operation->ctx.cipher ); + + operation->alg = alg; + key_bits = attributes->core.bits; + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( alg, key_type, + key_bits, NULL ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &operation->ctx.cipher, cipher_info ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES && key_bits == 128 ) + { + /* Two-key Triple-DES is 3-key Triple-DES with K1=K3 */ + uint8_t keys[24]; + memcpy( keys, key_buffer, 16 ); + memcpy( keys + 16, key_buffer, 8 ); + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &operation->ctx.cipher, + keys, + 192, cipher_operation ); + } + else +#endif + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &operation->ctx.cipher, key_buffer, + (int) key_bits, cipher_operation ); + } + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + switch( alg ) + { + case PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING: + ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &operation->ctx.cipher, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ); + break; + case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7: + ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &operation->ctx.cipher, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 ); + break; + default: + /* The algorithm doesn't involve padding. */ + ret = 0; + break; + } + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */ + + operation->block_length = ( PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER( alg ) ? 1 : + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) ); + operation->iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH( key_type, alg ); + +exit: + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length ) +{ + if( iv_length != operation->iv_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( &operation->ctx.cipher, + iv, iv_length ) ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) +/** Process input for which the algorithm is set to ECB mode. + * + * This requires manual processing, since the PSA API is defined as being + * able to process arbitrary-length calls to psa_cipher_update() with ECB mode, + * but the underlying mbedtls_cipher_update only takes full blocks. + * + * \param ctx The mbedtls cipher context to use. It must have been + * set up for ECB. + * \param[in] input The input plaintext or ciphertext to process. + * \param input_length The number of bytes to process from \p input. + * This does not need to be aligned to a block boundary. + * If there is a partial block at the end of the input, + * it is stored in \p ctx for future processing. + * \param output The buffer where the output is written. It must be + * at least `BS * floor((p + input_length) / BS)` bytes + * long, where `p` is the number of bytes in the + * unprocessed partial block in \p ctx (with + * `0 <= p <= BS - 1`) and `BS` is the block size. + * \param output_length On success, the number of bytes written to \p output. + * \c 0 on error. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS or an error from a hardware accelerator + */ +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_update_ecb( + mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + size_t internal_output_length = 0; + *output_length = 0; + + if( input_length == 0 ) + { + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + goto exit; + } + + if( ctx->unprocessed_len > 0 ) + { + /* Fill up to block size, and run the block if there's a full one. */ + size_t bytes_to_copy = block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len; + + if( input_length < bytes_to_copy ) + bytes_to_copy = input_length; + + memcpy( &( ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len] ), + input, bytes_to_copy ); + input_length -= bytes_to_copy; + input += bytes_to_copy; + ctx->unprocessed_len += bytes_to_copy; + + if( ctx->unprocessed_len == block_size ) + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, + ctx->unprocessed_data, + block_size, + output, &internal_output_length ) ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + output += internal_output_length; + *output_length += internal_output_length; + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + } + } + + while( input_length >= block_size ) + { + /* Run all full blocks we have, one by one */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update( ctx, input, + block_size, + output, &internal_output_length ) ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + input_length -= block_size; + input += block_size; + + output += internal_output_length; + *output_length += internal_output_length; + } + + if( input_length > 0 ) + { + /* Save unprocessed bytes for later processing */ + memcpy( &( ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len] ), + input, input_length ); + ctx->unprocessed_len += input_length; + } + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_output_size; + + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER( operation->alg ) ) + { + /* Take the unprocessed partial block left over from previous + * update calls, if any, plus the input to this call. Remove + * the last partial block, if any. You get the data that will be + * output in this call. */ + expected_output_size = + ( operation->ctx.cipher.unprocessed_len + input_length ) + / operation->block_length * operation->block_length; + } + else + { + expected_output_size = input_length; + } + + if( output_size < expected_output_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) + if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ) + { + /* mbedtls_cipher_update has an API inconsistency: it will only + * process a single block at a time in ECB mode. Abstract away that + * inconsistency here to match the PSA API behaviour. */ + status = psa_cipher_update_ecb( &operation->ctx.cipher, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_length ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING */ + { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update( &operation->ctx.cipher, input, + input_length, output, output_length ) ); + + if( *output_length > output_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + } + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + uint8_t temp_output_buffer[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + + if( operation->ctx.cipher.unprocessed_len != 0 ) + { + if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING || + operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_finish( &operation->ctx.cipher, + temp_output_buffer, + output_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( *output_length == 0 ) + ; /* Nothing to copy. Note that output may be NULL in this case. */ + else if( output_size >= *output_length ) + memcpy( output, temp_output_buffer, *output_length ); + else + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( temp_output_buffer, + sizeof( temp_output_buffer ) ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + /* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should + * always have been initialized to a valid value). */ + if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER( operation->alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &operation->ctx.cipher ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t update_output_length, finish_output_length; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( iv_length > 0 ) + { + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, iv, iv_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( &operation, input, input_length, + output, output_size, &update_output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + &operation, + mbedtls_buffer_offset( output, update_output_length ), + output_size - update_output_length, &finish_output_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + *output_length = update_output_length + finish_output_length; + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + else + mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t olength, accumulated_length; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( operation.iv_length > 0 ) + { + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation, + input, operation.iv_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + &operation, + mbedtls_buffer_offset_const( input, operation.iv_length ), + input_length - operation.iv_length, + output, output_size, &olength ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + accumulated_length = olength; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + &operation, + mbedtls_buffer_offset( output, accumulated_length ), + output_size - accumulated_length, &olength ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + *output_length = accumulated_length + olength; + +exit: + if ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + else + mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3bd5360c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/* + * PSA cipher driver entry points and associated auxiliary functions + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H + +#include +#include + +/** Get Mbed TLS cipher information given the cipher algorithm PSA identifier + * as well as the PSA type and size of the key to be used with the cipher + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg PSA cipher algorithm identifier + * \param key_type PSA key type + * \param key_bits Size of the key in bits + * \param[out] cipher_id Mbed TLS cipher algorithm identifier + * + * \return The Mbed TLS cipher information of the cipher algorithm. + * \c NULL if the PSA cipher algorithm is not supported. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id ); + +/** + * \brief Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_encrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_encrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It has been + * initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +/** + * \brief Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_decrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_decrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It has been + * initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +/** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_set_iv entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_set_iv entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV to use. + * \param[in] iv_length Size of the IV in bytes. It is guaranteed by + * the core to be less or equal to + * PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length ); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_update entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_update entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ); + +/** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_finish entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_finish entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ); + +/** Abort a cipher operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_abort entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_abort entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized cipher operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ); + +/** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_encrypt entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_encrypt entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV for encryption. The + * IV has been generated by the core. + * \param[in] iv_length Size of the \p iv in bytes. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to encrypt. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in,out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output. Initialized to zero + * by the core. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size \p iv_length is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +/** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_decrypt entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_decrypt entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the iv and the ciphertext. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output. Initialized to zero + * by the core. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_client.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ab790863 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto client code + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +void psa_reset_key_attributes( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes ) +{ + mbedtls_free( attributes->domain_parameters ); + memset( attributes, 0, sizeof( *attributes ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + uint8_t *copy = NULL; + + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + copy = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length ); + if( copy == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + memcpy( copy, data, data_length ); + } + /* After this point, this function is guaranteed to succeed, so it + * can start modifying `*attributes`. */ + + if( attributes->domain_parameters != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( attributes->domain_parameters ); + attributes->domain_parameters = NULL; + attributes->domain_parameters_size = 0; + } + + attributes->domain_parameters = copy; + attributes->domain_parameters_size = data_length; + attributes->core.type = type; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + if( attributes->domain_parameters_size > data_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + *data_length = attributes->domain_parameters_size; + if( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) + memcpy( data, attributes->domain_parameters, + attributes->domain_parameters_size ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_core.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d8f71f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -0,0 +1,519 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto core internal interfaces + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +/** Constant-time buffer comparison + * + * \param[in] a Left-hand buffer for comparison. + * \param[in] b Right-hand buffer for comparison. + * \param n Amount of bytes to compare. + * + * \return 0 if the buffer contents are equal, non-zero otherwise + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( + const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t n ) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned char diff = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + diff |= a[i] ^ b[i]; + + return( diff ); +} + +/** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material + * and metadata for one key. + */ +typedef struct +{ + psa_core_key_attributes_t attr; + + /* + * Number of locks on the key slot held by the library. + * + * This counter is incremented by one each time a library function + * retrieves through one of the dedicated internal API a pointer to the + * key slot. + * + * This counter is decremented by one each time a library function stops + * accessing the key slot and states it by calling the + * psa_unlock_key_slot() API. + * + * This counter is used to prevent resetting the key slot while the library + * may access it. For example, such control is needed in the following + * scenarios: + * . In case of key slot starvation, all key slots contain the description + * of a key, and the library asks for the description of a persistent + * key not present in the key slots, the key slots currently accessed by + * the library cannot be reclaimed to free a key slot to load the + * persistent key. + * . In case of a multi-threaded application where one thread asks to close + * or purge or destroy a key while it is in used by the library through + * another thread. + */ + size_t lock_count; + + /* Dynamically allocated key data buffer. + * Format as specified in psa_export_key(). */ + struct key_data + { + uint8_t *data; + size_t bytes; + } key; +} psa_key_slot_t; + +/* A mask of key attribute flags used only internally. + * Currently there aren't any. */ +#define PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY ( \ + 0 ) + +/** Test whether a key slot is occupied. + * + * A key slot is occupied iff the key type is nonzero. This works because + * no valid key can have 0 as its key type. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. + * + * \return 1 if the slot is occupied, 0 otherwise. + */ +static inline int psa_is_key_slot_occupied( const psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + return( slot->attr.type != 0 ); +} + +/** Test whether a key slot is locked. + * + * A key slot is locked iff its lock counter is strictly greater than 0. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. + * + * \return 1 if the slot is locked, 0 otherwise. + */ +static inline int psa_is_key_slot_locked( const psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + return( slot->lock_count > 0 ); +} + +/** Retrieve flags from psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to query. + * \param mask The mask of bits to extract. + * + * \return The key attribute flags in the given slot, + * bitwise-anded with \p mask. + */ +static inline uint16_t psa_key_slot_get_flags( const psa_key_slot_t *slot, + uint16_t mask ) +{ + return( slot->attr.flags & mask ); +} + +/** Set flags in psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to modify. + * \param mask The mask of bits to modify. + * \param value The new value of the selected bits. + */ +static inline void psa_key_slot_set_flags( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + uint16_t mask, + uint16_t value ) +{ + slot->attr.flags = ( ( ~mask & slot->attr.flags ) | + ( mask & value ) ); +} + +/** Turn on flags in psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to modify. + * \param mask The mask of bits to set. + */ +static inline void psa_key_slot_set_bits_in_flags( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + uint16_t mask ) +{ + slot->attr.flags |= mask; +} + +/** Turn off flags in psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to modify. + * \param mask The mask of bits to clear. + */ +static inline void psa_key_slot_clear_bits( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + uint16_t mask ) +{ + slot->attr.flags &= ~mask; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/** Get the SE slot number of a key from the key slot storing its description. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to query. This must be a key slot storing + * the description of a key of a dynamically registered + * secure element, otherwise the behaviour is undefined. + */ +static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( + const psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + return( *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)( slot->key.data ) ) ); +} +#endif + +/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. + * + * Persistent storage is not affected. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to wipe. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. This includes the case of a key slot that was + * already fully wiped. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ); + +/** Try to allocate a buffer to an empty key slot. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Key slot to attach buffer to. + * \param[in] buffer_length Requested size of the buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The buffer has been successfully allocated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Not enough memory was available for allocation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * Trying to allocate a buffer to a non-empty key slot. + */ +psa_status_t psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t buffer_length ); + +/** Wipe key data from a slot. Preserves metadata such as the policy. */ +psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( psa_key_slot_t *slot ); + +/** Copy key data (in export format) into an empty key slot. + * + * This function assumes that the slot does not contain + * any key material yet. On failure, the slot content is unchanged. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Key slot to copy the key into. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key material. + * \param data_length Size of the key buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key has been copied successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Not enough memory was available for allocation of the + * copy buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There was other key material already present in the slot. + */ +psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ); + +/** Convert an mbed TLS error code to a PSA error code + * + * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of + * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \param ret An mbed TLS-thrown error code + * + * \return The corresponding PSA error code + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error( int ret ); + +/** Import a key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer to contain the key data in output + * format upon successful return. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +/** Export a key in binary format + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver export_key + * entry point. This function behaves as an export_key entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +/** Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Generate a key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was generated successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key size in bits or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +/** Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms, + * this includes the hashing step. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_message entry point. This function behaves as a sign_message + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note This function will call the driver for psa_sign_hash + * and go through driver dispatch again. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] input The input message to sign. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +/** Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using + * a hash-and-sign verification algorithm. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_message entry point. This function behaves as a verify_message + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note This function will call the driver for psa_verify_hash + * and go through driver dispatch again. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with a private key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c455ecb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c @@ -0,0 +1,1865 @@ +/* + * Functions to delegate cryptographic operations to an available + * and appropriate accelerator. + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) + +/* Include test driver definition when running tests */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +/* Repeat above block for each JSON-declared driver during autogeneration */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ + +/* Auto-generated values depending on which drivers are registered. + * ID 0 is reserved for unallocated operations. + * ID 1 is reserved for the Mbed TLS software driver. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID (1) + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID (2) +#define PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID (3) +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +/* Support the 'old' SE interface when asked to */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT is defined when either a new-style or old-style + * SE driver is present, to avoid unused argument errors at compile time. */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_init( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + status = psa_init_all_se_drivers( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); +#endif + + (void) status; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +void psa_driver_wrapper_free( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Unregister all secure element drivers, so that we restart from + * a pristine state. */ + psa_unregister_all_se_drivers( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_test_transparent_free( ); + mbedtls_test_opaque_free( ); +#endif +} + +/* Start delegation functions */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + break; + } + + return( psa_sign_message_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + break; + } + + return( psa_verify_message_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->asymmetric == NULL || + drv->asymmetric->p_sign == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->asymmetric->p_sign( + drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_sign_hash_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->asymmetric == NULL || + drv->asymmetric->p_verify == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->asymmetric->p_verify( + drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + return( psa_verify_hash_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +/** Get the key buffer size required to store the key material of a key + * associated with an opaque driver without storage. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_size Minimum buffer size to contain the key material + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The minimum size for a buffer to contain the key material has been + * returned successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in bits of the key is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t *key_buffer_size ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + psa_key_type_t key_type = attributes->core.type; + size_t key_bits = attributes->core.bits; + + *key_buffer_size = 0; + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + /* Emulate property 'builtin_key_size' */ + if( psa_key_id_is_builtin( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( + psa_get_key_id( attributes ) ) ) ) + { + *key_buffer_size = sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_size_function( key_type, key_bits ); + return( ( *key_buffer_size != 0 ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + + default: + (void)key_type; + (void)key_bits; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + size_t pubkey_length = 0; /* We don't support this feature yet */ + if( drv->key_management == NULL || + drv->key_management->p_generate == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined as being in SE, but we have no way to generate it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->key_management->p_generate( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + attributes, NULL, 0, &pubkey_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + /* Transparent drivers are limited to generating asymmetric keys */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( attributes->core.type ) ) + { + /* Cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_generate_key( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Software fallback */ + status = psa_generate_key_internal( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ); + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_generate_key( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->key_management == NULL || + drv->key_management->p_import == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* The driver should set the number of key bits, however in + * case it doesn't, we initialize bits to an invalid value. */ + *bits = PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS + 1; + status = drv->key_management->p_import( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + attributes, data, data_length, bits ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( (*bits) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_import_key( + attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_import_key_into_slot( attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); + + default: + /* Importing a key with external storage in not yet supported. + * Return in error indicating that the lifetime is not valid. */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) + +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( ( drv->key_management == NULL ) || + ( drv->key_management->p_export == NULL ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( drv->key_management->p_export( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + return( psa_export_key_internal( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_export_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + return( status ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) + +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( ( drv->key_management == NULL ) || + ( drv->key_management->p_export_public == NULL ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( drv->key_management->p_export_public( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_export_public_key( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_export_public_key_internal( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_export_public_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + return( status ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + default: + (void) slot_number; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) key_buffer_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } +} + +/* + * Cipher functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)iv; + (void)iv_length; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)operation; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)operation; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + iv, + iv_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_set_iv( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + iv, iv_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_set_iv( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + iv, iv_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)iv; + (void)iv_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_update( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + sizeof( operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + return( status ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_abort( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + sizeof( operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) ); + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +/* + * Hashing functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Try accelerators first */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + (void) status; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Try setup on accelerators first */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_setup( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + /* Nothing left to try if we fall through here */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( + const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + switch( source_operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + target_operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( &source_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + &target_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + target_operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_clone( + &source_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + &target_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) target_operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_update( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_finish( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_abort( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + + +/* + * MAC functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + (void) status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( attributes->core.lifetime ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_update( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); + + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) mac; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_abort( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7cb88a0b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h @@ -0,0 +1,268 @@ +/* + * Function signatures for functionality that can be provided by + * cryptographic accelerators. + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* + * Initialization and termination functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_init( void ); +void psa_driver_wrapper_free( void ); + +/* + * Signature functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +/* + * Key handling functions + */ + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t *key_buffer_size ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +/* + * Cipher functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ); + +/* + * Hashing functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( + const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation ); + +/* + * AEAD functions + */ + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ); + +/* + * MAC functions + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H */ + +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..144d7fd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -0,0 +1,468 @@ +/* + * PSA ECP layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t curve_bits, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp ) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + size_t curve_bytes = data_length; + int explicit_bits = ( curve_bits != 0 ); + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( type ) != PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) + { + /* A Weierstrass public key is represented as: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian. + * So its data length is 2m+1 where m is the curve size in bits. + */ + if( ( data_length & 1 ) == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + curve_bytes = data_length / 2; + + /* Montgomery public keys are represented in compressed format, meaning + * their curve_bytes is equal to the amount of input. */ + + /* Private keys are represented in uncompressed private random integer + * format, meaning their curve_bytes is equal to the amount of input. */ + } + + if( explicit_bits ) + { + /* With an explicit bit-size, the data must have the matching length. */ + if( curve_bytes != PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( curve_bits ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + else + { + /* We need to infer the bit-size from the data. Since the only + * information we have is the length in bytes, the value of curve_bits + * at this stage is rounded up to the nearest multiple of 8. */ + curve_bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( curve_bytes ); + } + + /* Allocate and initialize a key representation. */ + ecp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecp_keypair ) ); + if( ecp == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( ecp ); + + /* Load the group. */ + grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( type ), + curve_bits, !explicit_bits ); + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + { + /* We can't distinguish between a nonsensical family/size combination + * (which would warrant PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT) and a + * well-regarded curve that Mbed TLS just doesn't know about (which + * would warrant PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED). For uniformity with how + * curves that Mbed TLS knows about but for which support is disabled + * at build time, return NOT_SUPPORTED. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ecp->grp, grp_id ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Load the key material. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) + { + /* Load the public value. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + data, + data_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Check that the point is on the curve. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + else + { + /* Load and validate the secret value. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_read_key( ecp->grp.id, + ecp, + data, + data_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + *p_ecp = ecp; +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + } + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + + /* Parse input */ + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + attributes->core.bits, + data, + data_length, + &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( attributes->core.type ) == + PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ) + *bits = ecp->grp.nbits + 1; + else + *bits = ecp->grp.nbits; + + /* Re-export the data to PSA export format. There is currently no support + * for other input formats then the export format, so this is a 1-1 + * copy operation. */ + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( attributes->core.type, + ecp, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); +exit: + /* Always free the PK object (will also free contained ECP context) */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( type ) ) + { + /* Check whether the public part is loaded */ + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &ecp->Q ) ) + { + /* Calculate the public key */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + data_length, + data, + data_size ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + memset( data, 0, data_size ); + + return( status ); + } + else + { + if( data_size < PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.nbits ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_write_key( ecp, + data, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.nbits ) ) ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *data_length = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.nbits ); + else + memset( data, 0, data_size ); + + return( status ); + } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + attributes->core.type, attributes->core.bits, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( attributes->core.type ) ), + ecp, data, data_size, data_length ); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( + attributes->core.type ); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = + mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa( curve, attributes->core.bits, 0 ); + + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp; + + if( attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + if( grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || curve_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init( &ecp ); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_gen_key( grp_id, &ecp, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &ecp ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_write_key( &ecp, key_buffer, key_buffer_size ) ); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( &ecp ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *key_buffer_length = key_buffer_size; + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* ECDSA sign/verify */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t curve_bytes; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + attributes->core.bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.pbits ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + + if( signature_size < 2 * curve_bytes ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC( alg ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ); + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg ); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( + &ecp->grp, &r, &s, + &ecp->d, hash, + hash_length, md_alg, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); +#else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } + else + { + (void) alg; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ecp->grp, &r, &s, &ecp->d, + hash, hash_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &r, + signature, + curve_bytes ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &s, + signature + curve_bytes, + curve_bytes ) ); +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + if( ret == 0 ) + *signature_length = 2 * curve_bytes; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t curve_bytes; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + + (void)alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + attributes->core.bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( ecp->grp.pbits ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &s ); + + if( signature_length != 2 * curve_bytes ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &r, + signature, + curve_bytes ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &s, + signature + curve_bytes, + curve_bytes ) ); + + /* Check whether the public part is loaded. If not, load it. */ + if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &ecp->Q ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_ecp_mul( &ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE ) ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ecp->grp, hash, hash_length, + &ecp->Q, &r, &s ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &r ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &s ); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ecp ); + mbedtls_free( ecp ); + + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..feddd8a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +/* + * PSA ECP layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H + +#include +#include + +/** Load the contents of a key buffer into an internal ECP representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key contained in \p data. + * \param[in] curve_bits The nominal bit-size of the curve. + * It must be consistent with the representation + * passed in \p data. + * This can be 0, in which case the bit-size + * is inferred from \p data_length (which is possible + * for all key types and representation formats + * formats that are currently supported or will + * be in the foreseeable future). + * \param[in] data The buffer from which to load the representation. + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of \p data. + * \param[out] p_ecp Returns a pointer to an ECP context on success. + * The caller is responsible for freeing both the + * contents of the context and the context itself + * when done. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( psa_key_type_t type, + size_t curve_bits, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp ); + +/** Import an ECP key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The ECP key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +/** Export an ECP key to export representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key (public/private) to export + * \param[in] ecp The internal ECP representation from which to export + * \param[out] data The buffer to export to + * \param[in] data_size The length of the buffer to export to + * \param[out] data_length The amount of bytes written to \p data + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ); + +/** Export an ECP public key or the public part of an ECP key pair in binary + * format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The ECP public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Generate an ECP key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the ECP key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully generated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key length or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with ECDSA. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the ECC key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the ECC key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg Randomized or deterministic ECDSA algorithm. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits, + * \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the ECC key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +/** + * \brief Verify an ECDSA hash or short message signature. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the ECC key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the ECC key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg Randomized or deterministic ECDSA algorithm. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_hash.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_hash.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..337e557b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,489 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + switch( alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + case PSA_ALG_MD2: + return( &mbedtls_md2_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + case PSA_ALG_MD4: + return( &mbedtls_md4_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + return( &mbedtls_md5_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + return( &mbedtls_ripemd160_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + return( &mbedtls_sha1_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + return( &mbedtls_sha224_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + return( &mbedtls_sha256_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + return( &mbedtls_sha384_info ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + return( &mbedtls_sha512_info ); +#endif + default: + return( NULL ); + } +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->alg ) + { + case 0: + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) + case PSA_ALG_MD2: + mbedtls_md2_free( &operation->ctx.md2 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) + case PSA_ALG_MD4: + mbedtls_md4_free( &operation->ctx.md4 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_free( &operation->ctx.md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free( &operation->ctx.ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_free( &operation->ctx.sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_free( &operation->ctx.sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_free( &operation->ctx.sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_free( &operation->ctx.sha512 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_free( &operation->ctx.sha512 ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + operation->alg = 0; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->alg != 0 ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + switch( alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) + case PSA_ALG_MD2: + mbedtls_md2_init( &operation->ctx.md2 ); + ret = mbedtls_md2_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.md2 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) + case PSA_ALG_MD4: + mbedtls_md4_init( &operation->ctx.md4 ); + ret = mbedtls_md4_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.md4 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_init( &operation->ctx.md5 ); + ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_init( &operation->ctx.ripemd160 ); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_init( &operation->ctx.sha1 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_init( &operation->ctx.sha256 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.sha256, 1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_init( &operation->ctx.sha256 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.sha256, 0 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_init( &operation->ctx.sha512 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.sha512, 1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_init( &operation->ctx.sha512 ); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &operation->ctx.sha512, 0 ); + break; +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( alg ) ? + PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED : + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + if( ret == 0 ) + operation->alg = alg; + else + mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( operation ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + switch( source_operation->alg ) + { + case 0: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) + case PSA_ALG_MD2: + mbedtls_md2_clone( &target_operation->ctx.md2, + &source_operation->ctx.md2 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) + case PSA_ALG_MD4: + mbedtls_md4_clone( &target_operation->ctx.md4, + &source_operation->ctx.md4 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_clone( &target_operation->ctx.md5, + &source_operation->ctx.md5 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( &target_operation->ctx.ripemd160, + &source_operation->ctx.ripemd160 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha1, + &source_operation->ctx.sha1 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha256, + &source_operation->ctx.sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha256, + &source_operation->ctx.sha256 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha512, + &source_operation->ctx.sha512 ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_clone( &target_operation->ctx.sha512, + &source_operation->ctx.sha512 ); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) source_operation; + (void) target_operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + target_operation->alg = source_operation->alg; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch( operation->alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) + case PSA_ALG_MD2: + ret = mbedtls_md2_update_ret( &operation->ctx.md2, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) + case PSA_ALG_MD4: + ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret( &operation->ctx.md4, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &operation->ctx.md5, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( &operation->ctx.ripemd160, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &operation->ctx.sha1, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &operation->ctx.sha256, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &operation->ctx.sha256, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &operation->ctx.sha512, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &operation->ctx.sha512, + input, input_length ); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t actual_hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( operation->alg ); + + /* Fill the output buffer with something that isn't a valid hash + * (barring an attack on the hash and deliberately-crafted input), + * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */ + *hash_length = hash_size; + /* If hash_size is 0 then hash may be NULL and then the + * call to memset would have undefined behavior. */ + if( hash_size != 0 ) + memset( hash, '!', hash_size ); + + if( hash_size < actual_hash_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + switch( operation->alg ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) + case PSA_ALG_MD2: + ret = mbedtls_md2_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.md2, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) + case PSA_ALG_MD4: + ret = mbedtls_md4_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.md4, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.md5, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.ripemd160, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.sha1, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.sha256, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.sha256, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.sha512, hash ); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &operation->ctx.sha512, hash ); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) hash; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); + +exit: + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *hash_length = actual_hash_length; + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *hash_length = hash_size; + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_update( &operation, input, input_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( &operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +exit: + abort_status = mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( &operation ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( abort_status ); + else + return( status ); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_hash.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_hash.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b99b9428 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,234 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H + +#include + +#include + +/** Get Mbed TLS MD information of a hash algorithm given its PSA identifier + * + * \param[in] alg PSA hash algorithm identifier + * + * \return The Mbed TLS MD information of the hash algorithm. \c NULL if the + * PSA hash algorithm is not supported. + */ +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message using Mbed TLS routines. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_compute + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_compute entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\p alg). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p hash_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Set up a multipart hash operation using Mbed TLS routines. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). The + * core may call mbedtls_psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(), the core must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to mbedtls_psa_hash_finish() or mbedtls_psa_hash_verify(). + * - A call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized to all-zero and not yet be in use. + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + +/** Clone an Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_clone + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_clone entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to + * a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent + * to calling mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() on \p target_operation with the same + * algorithm that \p source_operation was set up for, then + * mbedtls_psa_hash_update() on \p target_operation with the same input that + * that was passed to \p source_operation. After this function returns, the + * two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of + * the objects do not affect the other object. + * + * \param[in] source_operation The active hash operation to clone. + * \param[in,out] target_operation The operation object to set up. + * It must be initialized but not active. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_update + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_update entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The application must call mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +/** Finish the calculation of the Mbed TLS-calculated hash of a message. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_finish + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_finish entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The application must call mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_hash_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is the + * hash algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) + * where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ); + +/** Abort an Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_abort + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_abort entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_hash_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(), mbedtls_psa_hash_finish() or + * mbedtls_psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1e5a4071 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_invasive.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: invasive interfaces for test only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They MUST NOT be made available to clients over IPC in integrations + * with isolation, and they SHOULD NOT be made available in library + * integrations except when building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#else +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** \brief Configure entropy sources. + * + * This function may only be called before a call to psa_crypto_init(), + * or after a call to mbedtls_psa_crypto_free() and before any + * subsequent call to psa_crypto_init(). + * + * This function is only intended for test purposes. The functionality + * it provides is also useful for system integrators, but + * system integrators should configure entropy drivers instead of + * breaking through to the Mbed TLS API. + * + * \param entropy_init Function to initialize the entropy context + * and set up the desired entropy sources. + * It is called by psa_crypto_init(). + * By default this is mbedtls_entropy_init(). + * This function cannot report failures directly. + * To indicate a failure, set the entropy context + * to a state where mbedtls_entropy_func() will + * return an error. + * \param entropy_free Function to free the entropy context + * and associated resources. + * It is called by mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + * By default this is mbedtls_entropy_free(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller does not have the permission to configure + * entropy sources. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has already been initialized. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + void (* entropy_init )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ), + void (* entropy_free )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) ); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_key_type_t key_type ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_its.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_its.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3a3f49a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_its.h @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +/** \file psa_crypto_its.h + * \brief Interface of trusted storage that crypto is built on. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** \brief Flags used when creating a data entry + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_storage_create_flags_t; + +/** \brief A type for UIDs used for identifying data + */ +typedef uint64_t psa_storage_uid_t; + +#define PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_NONE 0 /**< No flags to pass */ +#define PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_WRITE_ONCE (1 << 0) /**< The data associated with the uid will not be able to be modified or deleted. Intended to be used to set bits in `psa_storage_create_flags_t`*/ + +/** + * \brief A container for metadata associated with a specific uid + */ +struct psa_storage_info_t +{ + uint32_t size; /**< The size of the data associated with a uid **/ + psa_storage_create_flags_t flags; /**< The flags set when the uid was created **/ +}; + +/** Flag indicating that \ref psa_storage_create and \ref psa_storage_set_extended are supported */ +#define PSA_STORAGE_SUPPORT_SET_EXTENDED (1 << 0) + +/** \brief PSA storage specific error codes + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ((psa_status_t)-149) +#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ((psa_status_t)-152) + +#define PSA_ITS_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1 /**< The major version number of the PSA ITS API. It will be incremented on significant updates that may include breaking changes */ +#define PSA_ITS_API_VERSION_MINOR 1 /**< The minor version number of the PSA ITS API. It will be incremented in small updates that are unlikely to include breaking changes */ + +/** + * \brief create a new or modify an existing uid/value pair + * + * \param[in] uid the identifier for the data + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of the data in `p_data` + * \param[in] p_data A buffer containing the data + * \param[in] create_flags The flags that the data will be stored with + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The operation failed because the provided `uid` value was already created with PSA_STORAGE_WRITE_ONCE_FLAG + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The operation failed because one or more of the flags provided in `create_flags` is not supported or is not valid + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE The operation failed because there was insufficient space on the storage medium + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_data`) + * is invalid, for example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_set(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_length, + const void *p_data, + psa_storage_create_flags_t create_flags); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the value associated with a provided uid + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * \param[in] data_offset The starting offset of the data requested + * \param[in] data_length the amount of data requested (and the minimum allocated size of the `p_data` buffer) + * \param[out] p_data The buffer where the data will be placed upon successful completion + * \param[out] p_data_length The amount of data returned in the p_data buffer + * + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided `uid` value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT The operation failed because stored data has been corrupted + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_data`, `p_data_length`) + * is invalid. For example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access. + * In addition, this can also happen if an invalid offset was provided. + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_get(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_offset, + uint32_t data_length, + void *p_data, + size_t *p_data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the metadata about the provided uid + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * \param[out] p_info A pointer to the `psa_storage_info_t` struct that will be populated with the metadata + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided uid value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT The operation failed because stored data has been corrupted + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_info`) + * is invalid, for example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_get_info(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info); + +/** + * \brief Remove the provided key and its associated data from the storage + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided key value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The operation failed because the provided key value was created with PSA_STORAGE_WRITE_ONCE_FLAG + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_remove(psa_storage_uid_t uid); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_mac.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_mac.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d771e23e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_mac.c @@ -0,0 +1,500 @@ +/* + * PSA MAC layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_abort_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac ) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hmac->opad, sizeof( hmac->opad ) ); + return( psa_hash_abort( &hmac->hash_ctx ) ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_setup_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg ) +{ + uint8_t ipad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t i; + size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + psa_status_t status; + + hmac->alg = hash_alg; + + /* Sanity checks on block_size, to guarantee that there won't be a buffer + * overflow below. This should never trigger if the hash algorithm + * is implemented correctly. */ + /* The size checks against the ipad and opad buffers cannot be written + * `block_size > sizeof( ipad ) || block_size > sizeof( hmac->opad )` + * because that triggers -Wlogical-op on GCC 7.3. */ + if( block_size > sizeof( ipad ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( block_size > sizeof( hmac->opad ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( block_size < hash_size ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + if( key_length > block_size ) + { + status = psa_hash_compute( hash_alg, key, key_length, + ipad, sizeof( ipad ), &key_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + } + /* A 0-length key is not commonly used in HMAC when used as a MAC, + * but it is permitted. It is common when HMAC is used in HKDF, for + * example. Don't call `memcpy` in the 0-length because `key` could be + * an invalid pointer which would make the behavior undefined. */ + else if( key_length != 0 ) + memcpy( ipad, key, key_length ); + + /* ipad contains the key followed by garbage. Xor and fill with 0x36 + * to create the ipad value. */ + for( i = 0; i < key_length; i++ ) + ipad[i] ^= 0x36; + memset( ipad + key_length, 0x36, block_size - key_length ); + + /* Copy the key material from ipad to opad, flipping the requisite bits, + * and filling the rest of opad with the requisite constant. */ + for( i = 0; i < key_length; i++ ) + hmac->opad[i] = ipad[i] ^ 0x36 ^ 0x5C; + memset( hmac->opad + key_length, 0x5C, block_size - key_length ); + + status = psa_hash_setup( &hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, ipad, block_size ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ipad, sizeof( ipad ) ); + + return( status ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_update_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + return( psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, data, data_length ) ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_finish_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size ) +{ + uint8_t tmp[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = hmac->alg; + size_t hash_size = 0; + size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH( hash_alg ); + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_hash_finish( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + /* From here on, tmp needs to be wiped. */ + + status = psa_hash_setup( &hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, hmac->opad, block_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_hash_update( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_hash_finish( &hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + memcpy( mac, tmp, mac_size ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, hash_size ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) +static psa_status_t cmac_setup( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + /* Mbed TLS CMAC does not accept 3DES with only two keys, nor does it accept + * to do CMAC with pure DES, so return NOT_SUPPORTED here. */ + if( psa_get_key_type( attributes ) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES && + ( psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 64 || + psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) == 128 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif + + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t * cipher_info = + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + PSA_ALG_CMAC, + psa_get_key_type( attributes ), + psa_get_key_bits( attributes ), + NULL ); + + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &operation->ctx.cmac, cipher_info ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &operation->ctx.cmac, + key_buffer, + psa_get_key_bits( attributes ) ); +exit: + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + +/* Initialize this driver's MAC operation structure. Once this function has been + * called, mbedtls_psa_mac_abort can run and will do the right thing. */ +static psa_status_t mac_init( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + operation->alg = alg; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_init( &operation->ctx.cmac ); + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) ) + { + /* We'll set up the hash operation later in psa_hmac_setup_internal. */ + operation->ctx.hmac.alg = 0; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + (void) operation; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + mbedtls_cipher_free( &operation->ctx.cmac ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) ) + { + psa_hmac_abort_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should + * always have been initialized to a valid value). */ + goto bad_state; + } + + operation->alg = 0; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +bad_state: + /* If abort is called on an uninitialized object, we can't trust + * anything. Wipe the object in case it contains confidential data. + * This may result in a memory leak if a pointer gets overwritten, + * but it's too late to do anything about this. */ + memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) ); + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if( operation->alg != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + status = mac_init( operation, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + /* Key buffer size for CMAC is dictated by the key bits set on the + * attributes, and previously validated by the core on key import. */ + (void) key_buffer_size; + status = cmac_setup( operation, attributes, key_buffer ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( alg ) ) + { + status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( alg ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_mac_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + return( psa_mac_setup( operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg ) ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &operation->ctx.cmac, + input, input_length ) ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) ) + { + return( psa_hmac_update_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac, + input, input_length ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by + * a setup function. */ + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_finish_internal( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, size_t mac_size ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( operation->alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + { + uint8_t tmp[PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &operation->ctx.cmac, tmp ); + if( ret == 0 ) + memcpy( mac, tmp, mac_size ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) ) + { + return( psa_hmac_finish_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac, + mac, mac_size ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by + * a setup function. */ + (void) operation; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + status = psa_mac_finish_internal( operation, mac, mac_size ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *mac_length = mac_size; + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( operation->alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* Consistency check: requested MAC length fits our local buffer */ + if( mac_length > sizeof( actual_mac ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + status = psa_mac_finish_internal( operation, actual_mac, mac_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto cleanup; + + if( mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( mac, actual_mac, mac_length ) != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ) ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + + status = psa_mac_setup( &operation, + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( input_length > 0 ) + { + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_update( &operation, input, input_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_finish_internal( &operation, mac, mac_size ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *mac_length = mac_size; + +exit: + mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( &operation ); + + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC || MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_mac.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_mac.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a821e741 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_mac.h @@ -0,0 +1,276 @@ +/* + * PSA MAC layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H + +#include + +/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_compute + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_compute entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p mac_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_sign_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_sign_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_verify_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_verify_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_update + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_update entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core aborts the + * operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to + * the MAC calculation. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_sign_finish + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_sign_finish entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_mac_update(). + * + * Whether this function returns successfully or not, the PSA core subsequently + * aborts the operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Output size requested for the MAC algorithm. The PSA + * core guarantees this is a valid MAC length for the + * algorithm and key combination passed to + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup(). It also guarantees the + * \p mac buffer is large enough to contain the + * requested output size. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes output to buffer + * \p mac, which will be equal to the requested length + * \p mac_size. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign + * operation). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. A sufficient buffer size + * can be determined by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with + * an expected value using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * mac_verify_finish entry point. This function behaves as a + * mac_verify_finish entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this + * function. This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by + * concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * mbedtls_psa_mac_update(). It then compares the calculated MAC with the + * expected MAC passed as a parameter to this function. + * + * Whether this function returns successfully or not, the PSA core subsequently + * aborts the operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Length in bytes of the expected MAC value. The PSA + * core guarantees that this length is a valid MAC + * length for the algorithm and key combination passed + * to mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected MAC. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify + * operation). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ); + +/** Abort a MAC operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() or mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() again. + * + * The PSA core may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in + * #mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(), + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish() or mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and + * has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3c4c09a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +/** \file psa_crypto_random_impl.h + * + * \brief PSA crypto random generator implementation abstraction. + * + * The definitions here need to be consistent with the declarations + * in include/mbedtls/psa_util.h. This file contains some redundant + * declarations to increase the chance that a compiler will detect + * inconsistencies if one file is changed without updating the other, + * but not all potential inconsistencies can be enforced, so make sure + * to check the public declarations and contracts in + * include/mbedtls/psa_util.h if you modify this file. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + +#include +#include // only for error codes +#include + +typedef mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; + +/* Trivial wrapper around psa_generate_random(). */ +int mbedtls_psa_get_random( void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size ); + +/* The PSA RNG API doesn't need any externally maintained state. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +/* Choose a DRBG based on configuration and availability */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#include +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffff +/* Looks like a 64-bit system, so prefer SHA-512. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#else +/* Looks like a 32-bit system, so prefer SHA-256. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#endif +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#else +#error "No hash algorithm available for HMAC_DBRG." +#endif + +#else +#error "No DRBG module available for the psa_crypto module." +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +/** Initialize the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param p_rng Pointer to the Mbed TLS DRBG state. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_psa_drbg_init( mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *p_rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( p_rng ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( p_rng ); +#endif +} + +/** Deinitialize the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param p_rng Pointer to the Mbed TLS DRBG state. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_psa_drbg_free( mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *p_rng ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( p_rng ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( p_rng ); +#endif +} + +/** The type of the PSA random generator context. + * + * The random generator context is composed of an entropy context and + * a DRBG context. + */ +typedef struct +{ + void (* entropy_init )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); + void (* entropy_free )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ); + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t drbg; +} mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; + +/* Defined in include/mbedtls/psa_util.h so that it's visible to + * application code. The declaration here is redundant, but included + * as a safety net to make it more likely that a future change that + * accidentally causes the implementation to diverge from the interface + * will be noticed. */ +/* Do not include the declaration under MSVC because it doesn't accept it + * ("error C2370: 'mbedtls_psa_get_random' : redefinition; different storage class"). + * Observed with Visual Studio 2013. A known bug apparently: + * https://stackoverflow.com/questions/8146541/duplicate-external-static-declarations-not-allowed-in-visual-studio + */ +#if !defined(_MSC_VER) +static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random; +#endif + +/** The maximum number of bytes that mbedtls_psa_get_random() is expected to + * return. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#endif + +/** A pointer to the PSA DRBG state. + * + * This variable is only intended to be used through the macro + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE. + */ +/* psa_crypto.c sets this variable to a pointer to the DRBG state in the + * global PSA crypto state. */ +/* The type `mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t` is defined in + * include/mbedtls/psa_util.h so that `mbedtls_psa_random_state` can be + * declared there and be visible to application code. */ +extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state; + +/** A pointer to the PSA DRBG state. + * + * This macro expands to an expression that is suitable as the \c p_rng + * parameter to pass to mbedtls_psa_get_random(). + * + * This macro exists in all configurations where the psa_crypto module is + * enabled. Its expansion depends on the configuration. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE mbedtls_psa_random_state + +/** Seed the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param entropy An entropy context to read the seed from. + * \param custom The personalization string. + * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization + * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. + * \param len The length of the personalization string. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An Mbed TLS error code (\c MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx) on failure. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed( + mbedtls_entropy_context *entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + mbedtls_entropy_func, + entropy, + custom, len ) ); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE ); + return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + md_info, + mbedtls_entropy_func, + entropy, + custom, len ) ); +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d07cdcea --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,526 @@ +/* + * PSA RSA layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +/* Mbed TLS doesn't support non-byte-aligned key sizes (i.e. key sizes + * that are not a multiple of 8) well. For example, there is only + * mbedtls_rsa_get_len(), which returns a number of bytes, and no + * way to return the exact bit size of a key. + * To keep things simple, reject non-byte-aligned key sizes. */ +static psa_status_t psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned( + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi n; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &n ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_export( rsa, &n, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &n ) % 8 != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + mbedtls_mpi_free( &n ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + psa_key_type_t type, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_pk_context ctx; + size_t bits; + mbedtls_pk_init( &ctx ); + + /* Parse the data. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &ctx, data, data_length, NULL, 0 ) ); + else + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key( &ctx, data, data_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* We have something that the pkparse module recognizes. If it is a + * valid RSA key, store it. */ + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( &ctx ) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* The size of an RSA key doesn't have to be a multiple of 8. Mbed TLS + * supports non-byte-aligned key sizes, but not well. For example, + * mbedtls_rsa_get_len() returns the key size in bytes, not in bits. */ + bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ) ) ); + if( bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned( mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ) ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Copy out the pointer to the RSA context, and reset the PK context + * such that pk_free doesn't free the RSA context we just grabbed. */ + *p_rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa( ctx ); + ctx.pk_info = NULL; + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free( &ctx ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + /* Parse input */ + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + data, + data_length, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + *bits = (psa_key_bits_t) PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ); + + /* Re-export the data to PSA export format, such that we can store export + * representation in the key slot. Export representation in case of RSA is + * the smallest representation that's allowed as input, so a straight-up + * allocation of the same size as the input buffer will be large enough. */ + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( attributes->core.type, + rsa, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); +exit: + /* Always free the RSA object */ + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) + int ret; + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + uint8_t *pos = data + data_size; + + mbedtls_pk_init( &pk ); + pk.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info; + pk.pk_ctx = rsa; + + /* PSA Crypto API defines the format of an RSA key as a DER-encoded + * representation of the non-encrypted PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey for a + * private key and of the RFC3279 RSAPublicKey for a public key. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( type ) ) + ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( &pk, data, data_size ); + else + ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &pos, data, &pk ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + /* Clean up in case pk_write failed halfway through. */ + memset( data, 0, data_size ); + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + } + + /* The mbedtls_pk_xxx functions write to the end of the buffer. + * Move the data to the beginning and erase remaining data + * at the original location. */ + if( 2 * (size_t) ret <= data_size ) + { + memcpy( data, data + data_size - ret, ret ); + memset( data + data_size - ret, 0, ret ); + } + else if( (size_t) ret < data_size ) + { + memmove( data, data + data_size - ret, ret ); + memset( data + ret, 0, data_size - ret ); + } + + *data_length = ret; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#else + (void) type; + (void) rsa; + (void) data; + (void) data_size; + (void) data_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + attributes->core.type, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY, + rsa, + data, + data_size, + data_length ); + + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) +static psa_status_t psa_rsa_read_exponent( const uint8_t *domain_parameters, + size_t domain_parameters_size, + int *exponent ) +{ + size_t i; + uint32_t acc = 0; + + if( domain_parameters_size == 0 ) + { + *exponent = 65537; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + /* Mbed TLS encodes the public exponent as an int. For simplicity, only + * support values that fit in a 32-bit integer, which is larger than + * int on just about every platform anyway. */ + if( domain_parameters_size > sizeof( acc ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + for( i = 0; i < domain_parameters_size; i++ ) + acc = ( acc << 8 ) | domain_parameters[i]; + if( acc > INT_MAX ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + *exponent = acc; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int exponent; + + status = psa_rsa_read_exponent( attributes->domain_parameters, + attributes->domain_parameters_size, + &exponent ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( &rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + (unsigned int)attributes->core.bits, + exponent ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( attributes->core.type, + &rsa, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); + + return( status ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) + * defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Sign/verify hashes */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + +/* Decode the hash algorithm from alg and store the mbedtls encoding in + * md_alg. Verify that the hash length is acceptable. */ +static psa_status_t psa_rsa_decode_md_type( psa_algorithm_t alg, + size_t hash_length, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg ) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ); + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa( hash_alg ); + *md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_info ); + + /* The Mbed TLS RSA module uses an unsigned int for hash length + * parameters. Validate that it fits so that we don't risk an + * overflow later. */ +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if( hash_length > UINT_MAX ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +#endif + + /* For signatures using a hash, the hash length must be correct. */ + if( alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW ) + { + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + if( mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) != hash_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type( alg, hash_length, &md_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( signature_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + *signature_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) +static int rsa_pss_expected_salt_len( psa_algorithm_t alg, + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + size_t hash_length ) +{ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT( alg ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY ); + /* Otherwise: standard salt length, i.e. largest possible salt length + * up to the hash length. */ + int klen = (int) mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ); // known to fit + int hlen = (int) hash_length; // known to fit + int room = klen - 2 - hlen; + if( room < 0 ) + return( 0 ); // there is no valid signature in this case anyway + else if( room > hlen ) + return( hlen ); + else + return( room ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( attributes->core.type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type( alg, hash_length, &md_alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + if( signature_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len( rsa ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( alg ) ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS( alg ) ) + { + int slen = rsa_pss_expected_salt_len( alg, rsa, hash_length ); + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg ); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + md_alg, + slen, + signature ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Mbed TLS distinguishes "invalid padding" from "valid padding but + * the rest of the signature is invalid". This has little use in + * practice and PSA doesn't report this distinction. */ + status = ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ) ? + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE : + mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free( rsa ); + mbedtls_free( rsa ); + + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b76613e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +/* + * PSA RSA layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H + +#include +#include + +/** Load the contents of a key buffer into an internal RSA representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key contained in \p data. + * \param[in] data The buffer from which to load the representation. + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of \p data. + * \param[out] p_rsa Returns a pointer to an RSA context on success. + * The caller is responsible for freeing both the + * contents of the context and the context itself + * when done. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa ); + +/** Import an RSA key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The RSA key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits ); + +/** Export an RSA key to export representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key (public/private) to export + * \param[in] rsa The internal RSA representation from which to export + * \param[out] data The buffer to export to + * \param[in] data_size The length of the buffer to export to + * \param[out] data_length The amount of bytes written to \p data + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key( psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length ); + +/** Export a public RSA key or the public part of an RSA key pair in binary + * format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The RSA public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Generate an RSA key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the RSA key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully generated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key length or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with an RSA private key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the RSA key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the RSA key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * an RSA key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits, + * \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the RSA key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public RSA key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the RSA key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the RSA key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * an RSA key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_se.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_se.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..87d2634e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_se.c @@ -0,0 +1,379 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto support for secure element drivers + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" +#else /* Native ITS implementation */ +#include "psa/error.h" +#include "psa/internal_trusted_storage.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Driver lookup */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* This structure is identical to psa_drv_se_context_t declared in + * `crypto_se_driver.h`, except that some parts are writable here + * (non-const, or pointer to non-const). */ +typedef struct +{ + void *persistent_data; + size_t persistent_data_size; + uintptr_t transient_data; +} psa_drv_se_internal_context_t; + +struct psa_se_drv_table_entry_s +{ + psa_key_location_t location; + const psa_drv_se_t *methods; + union + { + psa_drv_se_internal_context_t internal; + psa_drv_se_context_t context; + } u; +}; + +static psa_se_drv_table_entry_t driver_table[PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS]; + +psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *psa_get_se_driver_entry( + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ) +{ + size_t i; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ); + /* In the driver table, location=0 means an entry that isn't used. + * No driver has a location of 0 because it's a reserved value + * (which designates transparent keys). Make sure we never return + * a driver entry for location 0. */ + if( location == 0 ) + return( NULL ); + for( i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++ ) + { + if( driver_table[i].location == location ) + return( &driver_table[i] ); + } + return( NULL ); +} + +const psa_drv_se_t *psa_get_se_driver_methods( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + return( driver->methods ); +} + +psa_drv_se_context_t *psa_get_se_driver_context( + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + return( &driver->u.context ); +} + +int psa_get_se_driver( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + const psa_drv_se_t **p_methods, + psa_drv_se_context_t **p_drv_context) +{ + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry( lifetime ); + if( p_methods != NULL ) + *p_methods = ( driver ? driver->methods : NULL ); + if( p_drv_context != NULL ) + *p_drv_context = ( driver ? &driver->u.context : NULL ); + return( driver != NULL ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Persistent data management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_storage_uid_t *uid ) +{ + if( driver->location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX + /* ITS file sizes are limited to 32 bits. */ + if( driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size > UINT32_MAX ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif + + /* See the documentation of PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE. */ + *uid = PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + driver->location; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_load_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + size_t length; + + status = psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid( driver, &uid ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Read the amount of persistent data that the driver requests. + * If the data in storage is larger, it is truncated. If the data + * in storage is smaller, silently keep what is already at the end + * of the output buffer. */ + /* psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid ensures that the size_t + * persistent_data_size is in range, but compilers don't know that, + * so cast to reassure them. */ + return( psa_its_get( uid, 0, + (uint32_t) driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + &length ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_save_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + + status = psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid( driver, &uid ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid ensures that the size_t + * persistent_data_size is in range, but compilers don't know that, + * so cast to reassure them. */ + return( psa_its_set( uid, + (uint32_t) driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + 0 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_persistent_data( psa_key_location_t location ) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + if( location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + uid = PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + location; + return( psa_its_remove( uid ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_find_se_slot_for_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_location_t key_location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* If the location is wrong, it's a bug in the library. */ + if( driver->location != key_location ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + /* If the driver doesn't support key creation in any way, give up now. */ + if( driver->methods->key_management == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + if( psa_get_key_slot_number( attributes, slot_number ) == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* The application wants to use a specific slot. Allow it if + * the driver supports it. On a system with isolation, + * the crypto service must check that the application is + * permitted to request this slot. */ + psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t p_validate_slot_number = + driver->methods->key_management->p_validate_slot_number; + if( p_validate_slot_number == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + status = p_validate_slot_number( &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + attributes, method, + *slot_number ); + } + else if( method == PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER ) + { + /* The application didn't specify a slot number. This doesn't + * make sense when registering a slot. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + else + { + /* The application didn't tell us which slot to use. Let the driver + * choose. This is the normal case. */ + psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t p_allocate = + driver->methods->key_management->p_allocate; + if( p_allocate == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + status = p_allocate( &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + attributes, method, + slot_number ); + } + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_key( psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t storage_status; + /* Normally a missing method would mean that the action is not + * supported. But psa_destroy_key() is not supposed to return + * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: if you can create a key, you should + * be able to destroy it. The only use case for a driver that + * does not have a way to destroy keys at all is if the keys are + * locked in a read-only state: we can use the keys but not + * destroy them. Hence, if the driver doesn't support destroying + * keys, it's really a lack of permission. */ + if( driver->methods->key_management == NULL || + driver->methods->key_management->p_destroy == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + status = driver->methods->key_management->p_destroy( + &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + slot_number ); + storage_status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); + return( status == PSA_SUCCESS ? storage_status : status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_init_all_se_drivers( void ) +{ + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++ ) + { + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = &driver_table[i]; + if( driver->location == 0 ) + continue; /* skipping unused entry */ + const psa_drv_se_t *methods = psa_get_se_driver_methods( driver ); + if( methods->p_init != NULL ) + { + psa_status_t status = methods->p_init( + &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + driver->location ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data( driver ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + } + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Driver registration */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_register_se_driver( + psa_key_location_t location, + const psa_drv_se_t *methods) +{ + size_t i; + psa_status_t status; + + if( methods->hal_version != PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + /* Driver table entries are 0-initialized. 0 is not a valid driver + * location because it means a transparent key. */ +#if defined(static_assert) + static_assert( PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE == 0, + "Secure element support requires 0 to mean a local key" ); +#endif + if( location == PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + if( location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + for( i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++ ) + { + if( driver_table[i].location == 0 ) + break; + /* Check that location isn't already in use up to the first free + * entry. Since entries are created in order and never deleted, + * there can't be a used entry after the first free entry. */ + if( driver_table[i].location == location ) + return( PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + } + if( i == PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + driver_table[i].location = location; + driver_table[i].methods = methods; + driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data_size = + methods->persistent_data_size; + + if( methods->persistent_data_size != 0 ) + { + driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, methods->persistent_data_size ); + if( driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data == NULL ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + /* Load the driver's persistent data. On first use, the persistent + * data does not exist in storage, and is initialized to + * all-bits-zero by the calloc call just above. */ + status = psa_load_se_persistent_data( &driver_table[i] ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS && status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + goto error; + } + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + +error: + memset( &driver_table[i], 0, sizeof( driver_table[i] ) ); + return( status ); +} + +void psa_unregister_all_se_drivers( void ) +{ + size_t i; + for( i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++ ) + { + if( driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data != NULL ) + mbedtls_free( driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data ); + } + memset( driver_table, 0, sizeof( driver_table ) ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* The end */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_se.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_se.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d965ee1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_se.h @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto support for secure element drivers + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +/** The maximum location value that this implementation supports + * for a secure element. + * + * This is not a characteristic that each PSA implementation has, but a + * limitation of the current implementation due to the constraints imposed + * by storage. See #PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE. + * + * The minimum location value for a secure element is 1, like on any + * PSA implementation (0 means a transparent key). + */ +#define PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION 255 + +/** The base of the range of ITS file identifiers for secure element + * driver persistent data. + * + * We use a slice of the implementation reserved range 0xffff0000..0xffffffff, + * specifically the range 0xfffffe00..0xfffffeff. The length of this range + * drives the value of #PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION. The identifier 0xfffffe00 is + * actually not used since it corresponds to #PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE + * which doesn't have a driver. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE ( (psa_key_id_t) 0xfffffe00 ) + +/** The maximum number of registered secure element driver locations. */ +#define PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS 4 + +/** Unregister all secure element drivers. + * + * \warning Do not call this function while the library is in the initialized + * state. This function is only intended to be called at the end + * of mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + */ +void psa_unregister_all_se_drivers( void ); + +/** Initialize all secure element drivers. + * + * Called from psa_crypto_init(). + */ +psa_status_t psa_init_all_se_drivers( void ); + +/** A structure that describes a registered secure element driver. + * + * A secure element driver table entry contains a pointer to the + * driver's method table as well as the driver context structure. + */ +typedef struct psa_se_drv_table_entry_s psa_se_drv_table_entry_t; + +/** Return the secure element driver information for a lifetime value. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query. + * \param[out] p_methods On output, if there is a driver, + * \c *methods points to its method table. + * Otherwise \c *methods is \c NULL. + * \param[out] p_drv_context On output, if there is a driver, + * \c *drv_context points to its context + * structure. + * Otherwise \c *drv_context is \c NULL. + * + * \retval 1 + * \p lifetime corresponds to a registered driver. + * \retval 0 + * \p lifetime does not correspond to a registered driver. + */ +int psa_get_se_driver( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + const psa_drv_se_t **p_methods, + psa_drv_se_context_t **p_drv_context); + +/** Return the secure element driver table entry for a lifetime value. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query. + * + * \return The driver table entry for \p lifetime, or + * \p NULL if \p lifetime does not correspond to a registered driver. + */ +psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *psa_get_se_driver_entry( + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ); + +/** Return the method table for a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to access, or \c NULL. + * + * \return The driver's method table. + * \c NULL if \p driver is \c NULL. + */ +const psa_drv_se_t *psa_get_se_driver_methods( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ); + +/** Return the context of a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to access, or \c NULL. + * + * \return A pointer to the driver context. + * \c NULL if \p driver is \c NULL. + */ +psa_drv_se_context_t *psa_get_se_driver_context( + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ); + +/** Find a free slot for a key that is to be created. + * + * This function calls the relevant method in the driver to find a suitable + * slot for a key with the given attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes Metadata about the key that is about to be created. + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to query. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, a slot number that is free in this + * secure element. + */ +psa_status_t psa_find_se_slot_for_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number ); + +/** Destroy a key in a secure element. + * + * This function calls the relevant driver method to destroy a key + * and updates the driver's persistent data. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_key( psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number ); + +/** Load the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * \param driver The driver table entry containing the persistent + * data to load from storage. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_load_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ); + +/** Save the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry containing the persistent + * data to save to storage. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_save_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver ); + +/** Destroy the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * This is currently only used for testing. + * + * \param[in] location The location identifier for the driver whose + * persistent data is to be erased. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_persistent_data( psa_key_location_t location ); + + +/** The storage representation of a key whose data is in a secure element. + */ +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t slot_number[sizeof( psa_key_slot_number_t )]; +} psa_se_key_data_storage_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3fba7364 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -0,0 +1,581 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#define ARRAY_LENGTH( array ) ( sizeof( array ) / sizeof( *( array ) ) ) + +typedef struct +{ + psa_key_slot_t key_slots[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT]; + unsigned key_slots_initialized : 1; +} psa_global_data_t; + +static psa_global_data_t global_data; + +int psa_is_valid_key_id( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok ) +{ + psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ); + + if( ( PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN <= key_id ) && + ( key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ) ) + return( 1 ); + + if( vendor_ok && + ( PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN <= key_id ) && + ( key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/** Get the description in memory of a key given its identifier and lock it. + * + * The descriptions of volatile keys and loaded persistent keys are + * stored in key slots. This function returns a pointer to the key slot + * containing the description of a key given its identifier. + * + * The function searches the key slots containing the description of the key + * with \p key identifier. The function does only read accesses to the key + * slots. The function does not load any persistent key thus does not access + * any storage. + * + * For volatile key identifiers, only one key slot is queried as a volatile + * key with identifier key_id can only be stored in slot of index + * ( key_id - #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ). + * + * On success, the function locks the key slot. It is the responsibility of + * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * + * \param key Key identifier to query. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the + * key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The pointer to the key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key was returned. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no key with key identifier \p key in the key slots. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ); + size_t slot_idx; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + if( psa_key_id_is_volatile( key_id ) ) + { + slot = &global_data.key_slots[ key_id - PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ]; + + /* + * Check if both the PSA key identifier key_id and the owner + * identifier of key match those of the key slot. + * + * Note that, if the key slot is not occupied, its PSA key identifier + * is equal to zero. This is an invalid value for a PSA key identifier + * and thus cannot be equal to the valid PSA key identifier key_id. + */ + status = mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( key, slot->attr.id ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + else + { + if ( !psa_is_valid_key_id( key, 1 ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + + for( slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++ ) + { + slot = &global_data.key_slots[ slot_idx ]; + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal( key, slot->attr.id ) ) + break; + } + status = ( slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + status = psa_lock_key_slot( slot ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + *p_slot = slot; + } + + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots( void ) +{ + /* Nothing to do: program startup and psa_wipe_all_key_slots() both + * guarantee that the key slots are initialized to all-zero, which + * means that all the key slots are in a valid, empty state. */ + global_data.key_slots_initialized = 1; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +void psa_wipe_all_key_slots( void ) +{ + size_t slot_idx; + + for( slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++ ) + { + psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[ slot_idx ]; + slot->lock_count = 1; + (void) psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ); + } + global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0; +} + +psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot( psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t slot_idx; + psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unlocked_persistent_key_slot; + + if( ! global_data.key_slots_initialized ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto error; + } + + selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot = NULL; + for( slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++ ) + { + psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[ slot_idx ]; + if( ! psa_is_key_slot_occupied( slot ) ) + { + selected_slot = slot; + break; + } + + if( ( unlocked_persistent_key_slot == NULL ) && + ( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) && + ( ! psa_is_key_slot_locked( slot ) ) ) + unlocked_persistent_key_slot = slot; + } + + /* + * If there is no unused key slot and there is at least one unlocked key + * slot containing the description of a persistent key, recycle the first + * such key slot we encountered. If we later need to operate on the + * persistent key we are evicting now, we will reload its description from + * storage. + */ + if( ( selected_slot == NULL ) && + ( unlocked_persistent_key_slot != NULL ) ) + { + selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot; + selected_slot->lock_count = 1; + psa_wipe_key_slot( selected_slot ); + } + + if( selected_slot != NULL ) + { + status = psa_lock_key_slot( selected_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto error; + + *volatile_key_id = PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + + ( (psa_key_id_t)( selected_slot - global_data.key_slots ) ); + *p_slot = selected_slot; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + +error: + *p_slot = NULL; + *volatile_key_id = 0; + + return( status ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) +static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t *key_data = NULL; + size_t key_data_length = 0; + + status = psa_load_persistent_key( &slot->attr, + &key_data, &key_data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Special handling is required for loading keys associated with a + * dynamically registered SE interface. */ + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + if( psa_get_se_driver( slot->attr.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + psa_se_key_data_storage_t *data; + + if( key_data_length != sizeof( *data ) ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + goto exit; + } + data = (psa_se_key_data_storage_t *) key_data; + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( + slot, data->slot_number, sizeof( data->slot_number ) ); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( slot, key_data, key_data_length ); + +exit: + psa_free_persistent_key_data( key_data, key_data_length ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + +static psa_status_t psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE; + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number = 0; + size_t key_buffer_size = 0; + size_t key_buffer_length = 0; + + if( ! psa_key_id_is_builtin( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( slot->attr.id ) ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } + + /* Check the platform function to see whether this key actually exists */ + status = mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key( + slot->attr.id, &lifetime, &slot_number ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Set required key attributes to ensure get_builtin_key can retrieve the + * full attributes. */ + psa_set_key_id( &attributes, slot->attr.id ); + psa_set_key_lifetime( &attributes, lifetime ); + + /* Get the full key attributes from the driver in order to be able to + * calculate the required buffer size. */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, &attributes, + NULL, 0, NULL ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) + { + /* Builtin keys cannot be defined by the attributes alone */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + return( status ); + } + + /* If the key should exist according to the platform, then ask the driver + * what its expected size is. */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( &attributes, + &key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + /* Allocate a buffer of the required size and load the builtin key directly + * into the (now properly sized) slot buffer. */ + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot( slot, key_buffer_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, &attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, &key_buffer_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Copy actual key length and core attributes into the slot on success */ + slot->key.bytes = key_buffer_length; + slot->attr = attributes.core; + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + psa_remove_key_data_from_memory( slot ); + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *p_slot = NULL; + if( ! global_data.key_slots_initialized ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + /* + * On success, the pointer to the slot is passed directly to the caller + * thus no need to unlock the key slot here. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( key, p_slot ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( status ); + + /* Loading keys from storage requires support for such a mechanism */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id; + + status = psa_get_empty_key_slot( &volatile_key_id, p_slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + (*p_slot)->attr.id = key; + (*p_slot)->attr.lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT; + + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + /* Load keys in the 'builtin' range through their own interface */ + status = psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot( *p_slot ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + status = psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot( *p_slot ); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_wipe_key_slot( *p_slot ); + if( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + else + /* Add implicit usage flags. */ + psa_extend_key_usage_flags( &(*p_slot)->attr.policy.usage ); + + return( status ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + if( slot == NULL ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + if( slot->lock_count > 0 ) + { + slot->lock_count--; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + /* + * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, + * do our best to report if the lock counter is equal to zero: if + * available call MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED that may terminate execution (if + * called as part of the execution of a unit test suite this will stop the + * test suite execution). + */ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS + MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( slot->lock_count > 0 ); +#endif + + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ) +{ + if ( psa_key_lifetime_is_external( lifetime ) ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Check whether a driver is registered against this lifetime */ + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry( lifetime ); + if( driver != NULL ) + { + if (p_drv != NULL) + *p_drv = driver; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + (void) p_drv; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) + /* Key location for external keys gets checked by the wrapper */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ + /* No support for external lifetimes at all, or dynamic interface + * did not find driver for requested lifetime. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ + } + else + /* Local/internal keys are always valid */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_persistence( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ) +{ + if ( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( lifetime ) ) + { + /* Volatile keys are always supported */ + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + else + { + /* Persistent keys require storage support */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY( lifetime ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + else + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_open_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( key, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + *handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + if( status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ) + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + + return( status ); + } + + *handle = key; + + return( psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ) ); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + (void) key; + *handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_close_key( psa_key_handle_t handle ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + if( psa_key_handle_is_null( handle ) ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( handle, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + + return( status ); + } + if( slot->lock_count <= 1 ) + return( psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ) ); + else + return( psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_purge_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( key, &slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( ( ! PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) && + ( slot->lock_count <= 1 ) ) + return( psa_wipe_key_slot( slot ) ); + else + return( psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_psa_get_stats( mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats ) +{ + size_t slot_idx; + + memset( stats, 0, sizeof( *stats ) ); + + for( slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++ ) + { + const psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[ slot_idx ]; + if( psa_is_key_slot_locked( slot ) ) + { + ++stats->locked_slots; + } + if( ! psa_is_key_slot_occupied( slot ) ) + { + ++stats->empty_slots; + continue; + } + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE( slot->attr.lifetime ) ) + ++stats->volatile_slots; + else + { + psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( slot->attr.id ); + ++stats->persistent_slots; + if( id > stats->max_open_internal_key_id ) + stats->max_open_internal_key_id = id; + } + if( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( slot->attr.lifetime ) != + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ) + { + psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( slot->attr.id ); + ++stats->external_slots; + if( id > stats->max_open_external_key_id ) + stats->max_open_external_key_id = id; + } + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d539bdd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" + +/** Range of volatile key identifiers. + * + * The last #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT identifiers of the implementation + * range of key identifiers are reserved for volatile key identifiers. + * A volatile key identifier is equal to #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN plus the + * index of the key slot containing the volatile key definition. + */ + +/** The minimum value for a volatile key identifier. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ( PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX - \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + 1 ) + +/** The maximum value for a volatile key identifier. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + +/** Test whether a key identifier is a volatile key identifier. + * + * \param key_id Key identifier to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The key identifier is a volatile key identifier. + * \retval 0 + * The key identifier is not a volatile key identifier. + */ +static inline int psa_key_id_is_volatile( psa_key_id_t key_id ) +{ + return( ( key_id >= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ) && + ( key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX ) ); +} + +/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and lock it. + * + * The descriptions of volatile keys and loaded persistent keys are stored in + * key slots. This function returns a pointer to the key slot containing the + * description of a key given its identifier. + * + * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key + * into a key slot if not already done. + * + * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of + * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * + * \param key Key identifier to query. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the + * key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p *p_slot contains a pointer to the key slot containing the + * description of the key identified by \p key. + * The key slot counter has been incremented. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been initialized. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \p key is a persistent key identifier. The implementation does not + * have sufficient resources to load the persistent key. This can be + * due to a lack of empty key slot, or available memory. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no key with key identifier \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ); + +/** Initialize the key slot structures. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Currently this function always succeeds. + */ +psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots( void ); + +/** Delete all data from key slots in memory. + * + * This does not affect persistent storage. */ +void psa_wipe_all_key_slots( void ); + +/** Find a free key slot. + * + * This function returns a key slot that is available for use and is in its + * ground state (all-bits-zero). On success, the key slot is locked. It is + * the responsibility of the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not + * access it anymore. + * + * \param[out] volatile_key_id On success, volatile key identifier + * associated to the returned slot. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot( psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot ); + +/** Lock a key slot. + * + * This function increments the key slot lock counter by one. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + The key slot lock counter was incremented. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The lock counter already reached its maximum value and was not + * increased. + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_lock_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ) +{ + if( slot->lock_count >= SIZE_MAX ) + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + + slot->lock_count++; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** Unlock a key slot. + * + * This function decrements the key slot lock counter by one. + * + * \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot + * a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns + * successfully without doing anything in that case. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p slot is NULL or the key slot lock counter has been + * decremented successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The lock counter was equal to 0. + * + */ +psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot( psa_key_slot_t *slot ); + +/** Test whether a lifetime designates a key in an external cryptoprocessor. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The lifetime designates an external key. There should be a + * registered driver for this lifetime, otherwise the key cannot + * be created or manipulated. + * \retval 0 + * The lifetime designates a key that is volatile or in internal + * storage. + */ +static inline int psa_key_lifetime_is_external( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ) +{ + return( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime ) + != PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ); +} + +/** Validate a key's location. + * + * This function checks whether the key's attributes point to a location that + * is known to the PSA Core, and returns the driver function table if the key + * is to be found in an external location. + * + * \param[in] lifetime The key lifetime attribute. + * \param[out] p_drv On success, when a key is located in external + * storage, returns a pointer to the driver table + * associated with the key's storage location. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv ); + +/** Validate the persistence of a key. + * + * \param[in] lifetime The key lifetime attribute. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The key is persistent but persistent keys + * are not supported. + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_persistence( psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime ); + +/** Validate a key identifier. + * + * \param[in] key The key identifier. + * \param[in] vendor_ok Non-zero to indicate that key identifiers in the + * vendor range are allowed, volatile key identifiers + * excepted \c 0 otherwise. + * + * \retval <> 0 if the key identifier is valid, 0 otherwise. + */ +int psa_is_valid_key_id( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok ); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_storage.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_storage.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..24bfdae1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_storage.c @@ -0,0 +1,484 @@ +/* + * PSA persistent key storage + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + +#include +#include + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" +#else /* Native ITS implementation */ +#include "psa/error.h" +#include "psa/internal_trusted_storage.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key storage */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* Determine a file name (ITS file identifier) for the given key identifier. + * The file name must be distinct from any file that is used for a purpose + * other than storing a key. Currently, the only such file is the random seed + * file whose name is PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID and whose value is + * 0xFFFFFF52. */ +static psa_storage_uid_t psa_its_identifier_of_slot( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + /* Encode the owner in the upper 32 bits. This means that if + * owner values are nonzero (as they are on a PSA platform), + * no key file will ever have a value less than 0x100000000, so + * the whole range 0..0xffffffff is available for non-key files. */ + uint32_t unsigned_owner_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID( key ); + return( ( (uint64_t) unsigned_owner_id << 32 ) | + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( key ) ); +#else + /* Use the key id directly as a file name. + * psa_is_key_id_valid() in psa_crypto_slot_management.c + * is responsible for ensuring that key identifiers do not have a + * value that is reserved for non-key files. */ + return( key ); +#endif +} + +/** + * \brief Load persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * This function reads data from a storage backend and returns the data in a + * buffer. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be loaded. This + * should be an occupied storage location. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \c data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_load( + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + size_t data_length = 0; + + status = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_its_get( data_identifier, 0, (uint32_t) data_size, data, &data_length ); + if( data_size != data_length ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + return( status ); +} + +int psa_is_key_present_in_storage( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_status_t ret; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + + if( ret == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( 0 ); + return( 1 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Store persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * This function stores the given data buffer to a persistent storage. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be stored. This + * should be an unoccupied storage location. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the data to be stored. + * \param data_length The number of bytes + * that make up the data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_store( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + if( psa_is_key_present_in_storage( key ) == 1 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ); + + status = psa_its_set( data_identifier, (uint32_t) data_length, data, 0 ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + } + + status = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + goto exit; + } + + if( data_identifier_info.size != data_length ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* Remove the file in case we managed to create it but something + * went wrong. It's ok if the file doesn't exist. If the file exists + * but the removal fails, we're already reporting an error so there's + * nothing else we can do. */ + (void) psa_its_remove( data_identifier ); + } + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ) +{ + psa_status_t ret; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( ret == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + + if( psa_its_remove( data_identifier ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + ret = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( ret != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** + * \brief Get data length for given key slot number. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier whose stored data length + * is to be obtained. + * \param[out] data_length The number of bytes that make up the data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length( + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot( key ); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + status = psa_its_get_info( data_identifier, &data_identifier_info ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + *data_length = (size_t) data_identifier_info.size; + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +/** + * Persistent key storage magic header. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER "PSA\0KEY" +#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH ( sizeof( PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER ) ) + +typedef struct { + uint8_t magic[PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH]; + uint8_t version[4]; + uint8_t lifetime[sizeof( psa_key_lifetime_t )]; + uint8_t type[2]; + uint8_t bits[2]; + uint8_t policy[sizeof( psa_key_policy_t )]; + uint8_t data_len[4]; + uint8_t key_data[]; +} psa_persistent_key_storage_format; + +void psa_format_key_data_for_storage( const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length, + const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t *storage_data ) +{ + psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format = + (psa_persistent_key_storage_format *) storage_data; + + memcpy( storage_format->magic, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( 0, storage_format->version, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( attr->lifetime, storage_format->lifetime, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( (uint16_t) attr->type, storage_format->type, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( (uint16_t) attr->bits, storage_format->bits, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( attr->policy.usage, storage_format->policy, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( attr->policy.alg, storage_format->policy, sizeof( uint32_t ) ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( attr->policy.alg2, storage_format->policy, 2 * sizeof( uint32_t ) ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( data_length, storage_format->data_len, 0 ); + memcpy( storage_format->key_data, data, data_length ); +} + +static psa_status_t check_magic_header( const uint8_t *data ) +{ + if( memcmp( data, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER, + PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( const uint8_t *storage_data, + size_t storage_data_length, + uint8_t **key_data, + size_t *key_data_length, + psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format = + (const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *)storage_data; + uint32_t version; + + if( storage_data_length < sizeof(*storage_format) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + status = check_magic_header( storage_data ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( storage_format->version, 0 ); + if( version != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + *key_data_length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( storage_format->data_len, 0 ); + if( *key_data_length > ( storage_data_length - sizeof(*storage_format) ) || + *key_data_length > PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + + if( *key_data_length == 0 ) + { + *key_data = NULL; + } + else + { + *key_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, *key_data_length ); + if( *key_data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + memcpy( *key_data, storage_format->key_data, *key_data_length ); + } + + attr->lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( storage_format->lifetime, 0 ); + attr->type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE( storage_format->type, 0 ); + attr->bits = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE( storage_format->bits, 0 ); + attr->policy.usage = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( storage_format->policy, 0 ); + attr->policy.alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( storage_format->policy, sizeof( uint32_t ) ); + attr->policy.alg2 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( storage_format->policy, 2 * sizeof( uint32_t ) ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key( const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length ) +{ + size_t storage_data_length; + uint8_t *storage_data; + psa_status_t status; + + /* All keys saved to persistent storage always have a key context */ + if( data == NULL || data_length == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( data_length > PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ); + storage_data_length = data_length + sizeof( psa_persistent_key_storage_format ); + + storage_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, storage_data_length ); + if( storage_data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + psa_format_key_data_for_storage( data, data_length, attr, storage_data ); + + status = psa_crypto_storage_store( attr->id, + storage_data, storage_data_length ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( storage_data, storage_data_length ); + mbedtls_free( storage_data ); + + return( status ); +} + +void psa_free_persistent_key_data( uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length ) +{ + if( key_data != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key_data, key_data_length ); + } + mbedtls_free( key_data ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key( psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t **data, + size_t *data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t *loaded_data; + size_t storage_data_length = 0; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = attr->id; + + status = psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length( key, &storage_data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + loaded_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, storage_data_length ); + + if( loaded_data == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + + status = psa_crypto_storage_load( key, loaded_data, storage_data_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + status = psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( loaded_data, storage_data_length, + data, data_length, attr ); + + /* All keys saved to persistent storage always have a key context */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS && + ( *data == NULL || *data_length == 0 ) ) + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( loaded_data, storage_data_length ); + mbedtls_free( loaded_data ); + return( status ); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Transactions */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + +psa_crypto_transaction_t psa_crypto_transaction; + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_save_transaction( void ) +{ + struct psa_storage_info_t p_info; + psa_status_t status; + status = psa_its_get_info( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, &p_info ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + /* This shouldn't happen: we're trying to start a transaction while + * there is still a transaction that hasn't been replayed. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + } + else if( status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ) + return( status ); + return( psa_its_set( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, + sizeof( psa_crypto_transaction ), + &psa_crypto_transaction, + 0 ) ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_load_transaction( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t length; + status = psa_its_get( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, 0, + sizeof( psa_crypto_transaction ), + &psa_crypto_transaction, &length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + if( length != sizeof( psa_crypto_transaction ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_stop_transaction( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_its_remove( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID ); + /* Whether or not updating the storage succeeded, the transaction is + * finished now. It's too late to go back, so zero out the in-memory + * data. */ + memset( &psa_crypto_transaction, 0, sizeof( psa_crypto_transaction ) ); + return( status ); +} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Random generator state */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy( const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + struct psa_storage_info_t p_info; + + status = psa_its_get_info( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID, &p_info ); + + if( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST == status ) /* No seed exists */ + { + status = psa_its_set( PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID, seed_size, seed, 0 ); + } + else if( PSA_SUCCESS == status ) + { + /* You should not be here. Seed needs to be injected only once */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + return( status ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* The end */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_storage.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_storage.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..970e1083 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_crypto_storage.h @@ -0,0 +1,399 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_storage.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS key storage + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +#include +#include + +/* Limit the maximum key size in storage. This should have no effect + * since the key size is limited in memory. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE ( PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) ) +/* Sanity check: a file size must fit in 32 bits. Allow a generous + * 64kB of metadata. */ +#if PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE > 0xffff0000 +#error PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE > 0xffff0000 +#endif + +/** The maximum permitted persistent slot number. + * + * In Mbed Crypto 0.1.0b: + * - Using the file backend, all key ids are ok except 0. + * - Using the ITS backend, all key ids are ok except 0xFFFFFF52 + * (#PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID) for which the file contains the + * device's random seed (if this feature is enabled). + * - Only key ids from 1 to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT are actually used. + * + * Since we need to preserve the random seed, avoid using that key slot. + * Reserve a whole range of key slots just in case something else comes up. + * + * This limitation will probably become moot when we implement client + * separation for key storage. + */ +#define PSA_MAX_PERSISTENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + +/** + * \brief Checks if persistent data is stored for the given key slot number + * + * This function checks if any key data or metadata exists for the key slot in + * the persistent storage. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier to check. + * + * \retval 0 + * No persistent data present for slot number + * \retval 1 + * Persistent data present for slot number + */ +int psa_is_key_present_in_storage( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ); + +/** + * \brief Format key data and metadata and save to a location for given key + * slot. + * + * This function formats the key data and metadata and saves it to a + * persistent storage backend. The storage location corresponding to the + * key slot must be empty, otherwise this function will fail. This function + * should be called after loading the key into an internal slot to ensure the + * persistent key is not saved into a storage location corresponding to an + * already occupied non-persistent key, as well as ensuring the key data is + * validated. + * + * Note: This function will only succeed for key buffers which are not + * empty. If passed a NULL pointer or zero-length, the function will fail + * with #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. + * + * \param[in] attr The attributes of the key to save. + * The key identifier field in the attributes + * determines the key's location. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param data_length The number of bytes that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key( const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Parses key data and metadata and load persistent key for given + * key slot number. + * + * This function reads from a storage backend, parses the key data and + * metadata and writes them to the appropriate output parameters. + * + * Note: This function allocates a buffer and returns a pointer to it through + * the data parameter. On successful return, the pointer is guaranteed to be + * valid and the buffer contains at least one byte of data. + * psa_free_persistent_key_data() must be called on the data buffer + * afterwards to zeroize and free this buffer. + * + * \param[in,out] attr On input, the key identifier field identifies + * the key to load. Other fields are ignored. + * On success, the attribute structure contains + * the key metadata that was loaded from storage. + * \param[out] data Pointer to an allocated key data buffer on return. + * \param[out] data_length The number of bytes that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + */ +psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key( psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t **data, + size_t *data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Remove persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to remove + * from persistent storage. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully removed, + * or the key did not exist. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key( const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key ); + +/** + * \brief Free the temporary buffer allocated by psa_load_persistent_key(). + * + * This function must be called at some point after psa_load_persistent_key() + * to zeroize and free the memory allocated to the buffer in that function. + * + * \param key_data Buffer for the key data. + * \param key_data_length Size of the key data buffer. + * + */ +void psa_free_persistent_key_data( uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length ); + +/** + * \brief Formats key data and metadata for persistent storage + * + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param data_length Length of the key data buffer. + * \param[in] attr The core attributes of the key. + * \param[out] storage_data Output buffer for the formatted data. + * + */ +void psa_format_key_data_for_storage( const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length, + const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t *storage_data ); + +/** + * \brief Parses persistent storage data into key data and metadata + * + * \param[in] storage_data Buffer for the storage data. + * \param storage_data_length Length of the storage data buffer + * \param[out] key_data On output, pointer to a newly allocated buffer + * containing the key data. This must be freed + * using psa_free_persistent_key_data() + * \param[out] key_data_length Length of the key data buffer + * \param[out] attr On success, the attribute structure is filled + * with the loaded key metadata. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + */ +psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage( const uint8_t *storage_data, + size_t storage_data_length, + uint8_t **key_data, + size_t *key_data_length, + psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/** This symbol is defined if transaction support is required. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + +/** The type of transaction that is in progress. + */ +/* This is an integer type rather than an enum for two reasons: to support + * unknown values when loading a transaction file, and to ensure that the + * type has a known size. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_crypto_transaction_type_t; + +/** No transaction is in progress. + * + * This has the value 0, so zero-initialization sets a transaction's type to + * this value. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_NONE ( (psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0000 ) + +/** A key creation transaction. + * + * This is only used for keys in an external cryptoprocessor (secure element). + * Keys in RAM or in internal storage are created atomically in storage + * (simple file creation), so they do not need a transaction mechanism. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ( (psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0001 ) + +/** A key destruction transaction. + * + * This is only used for keys in an external cryptoprocessor (secure element). + * Keys in RAM or in internal storage are destroyed atomically in storage + * (simple file deletion), so they do not need a transaction mechanism. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY ( (psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0002 ) + +/** Transaction data. + * + * This type is designed to be serialized by writing the memory representation + * and reading it back on the same device. + * + * \note The transaction mechanism is designed for a single active transaction + * at a time. The transaction object is #psa_crypto_transaction. + * + * \note If an API call starts a transaction, it must complete this transaction + * before returning to the application. + * + * The lifetime of a transaction is the following (note that only one + * transaction may be active at a time): + * + * -# Call psa_crypto_prepare_transaction() to initialize the transaction + * object in memory and declare the type of transaction that is starting. + * -# Fill in the type-specific fields of #psa_crypto_transaction. + * -# Call psa_crypto_save_transaction() to start the transaction. This + * saves the transaction data to internal storage. + * -# Perform the work of the transaction by modifying files, contacting + * external entities, or whatever needs doing. Note that the transaction + * may be interrupted by a power failure, so you need to have a way + * recover from interruptions either by undoing what has been done + * so far or by resuming where you left off. + * -# If there are intermediate stages in the transaction, update + * the fields of #psa_crypto_transaction and call + * psa_crypto_save_transaction() again when each stage is reached. + * -# When the transaction is over, call psa_crypto_stop_transaction() to + * remove the transaction data in storage and in memory. + * + * If the system crashes while a transaction is in progress, psa_crypto_init() + * calls psa_crypto_load_transaction() and takes care of completing or + * rewinding the transaction. This is done in psa_crypto_recover_transaction() + * in psa_crypto.c. If you add a new type of transaction, be + * sure to add code for it in psa_crypto_recover_transaction(). + */ +typedef union +{ + /* Each element of this union must have the following properties + * to facilitate serialization and deserialization: + * + * - The element is a struct. + * - The first field of the struct is `psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type`. + * - Elements of the struct are arranged such a way that there is + * no padding. + */ + struct psa_crypto_transaction_unknown_s + { + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type; + uint16_t unused1; + uint32_t unused2; + uint64_t unused3; + uint64_t unused4; + } unknown; + /* ::type is #PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY or + * #PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY. */ + struct psa_crypto_transaction_key_s + { + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type; + uint16_t unused1; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id; + } key; +} psa_crypto_transaction_t; + +/** The single active transaction. + */ +extern psa_crypto_transaction_t psa_crypto_transaction; + +/** Prepare for a transaction. + * + * There must not be an ongoing transaction. + * + * \param type The type of transaction to start. + */ +static inline void psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type ) +{ + psa_crypto_transaction.unknown.type = type; +} + +/** Save the transaction data to storage. + * + * You may call this function multiple times during a transaction to + * atomically update the transaction state. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_save_transaction( void ); + +/** Load the transaction data from storage, if any. + * + * This function is meant to be called from psa_crypto_init() to recover + * in case a transaction was interrupted by a system crash. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The data about the ongoing transaction has been loaded to + * #psa_crypto_transaction. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no ongoing transaction. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_load_transaction( void ); + +/** Indicate that the current transaction is finished. + * + * Call this function at the very end of transaction processing. + * This function does not "commit" or "abort" the transaction: the storage + * subsystem has no concept of "commit" and "abort", just saving and + * removing the transaction information in storage. + * + * This function erases the transaction data in storage (if any) and + * resets the transaction data in memory. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * There was transaction data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There was no transaction data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * It was impossible to determine whether there was transaction data + * in storage, or the transaction data could not be erased. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_stop_transaction( void ); + +/** The ITS file identifier for the transaction data. + * + * 0xffffffNN = special file; 0x74 = 't' for transaction. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID ( (psa_key_id_t) 0xffffff74 ) + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +/** Backend side of mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(). + * + * This function stores the supplied data into the entropy seed file. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The entropy seed file already exists. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy( const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_its_file.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_its_file.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ddd9fa97 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/psa_its_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +/* + * PSA ITS simulator over stdio files. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if !defined(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX) +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "" +#endif + +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%08x%08x" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ".psa_its" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH \ + ( sizeof( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX ) - 1 + /*prefix without terminating 0*/ \ + 16 + /*UID (64-bit number in hex)*/ \ + sizeof( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ) - 1 + /*suffix without terminating 0*/ \ + 1 /*terminating null byte*/ ) +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP \ + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "tempfile" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX + +/* The maximum value of psa_storage_info_t.size */ +#define PSA_ITS_MAX_SIZE 0xffffffff + +#define PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING "PSA\0ITS\0" +#define PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH 8 + +/* As rename fails on Windows if the new filepath already exists, + * use MoveFileExA with the MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING flag instead. + * Returns 0 on success, nonzero on failure. */ +#if defined(_WIN32) +#define rename_replace_existing( oldpath, newpath ) \ + ( ! MoveFileExA( oldpath, newpath, MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING ) ) +#else +#define rename_replace_existing( oldpath, newpath ) rename( oldpath, newpath ) +#endif + +typedef struct +{ + uint8_t magic[PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH]; + uint8_t size[sizeof( uint32_t )]; + uint8_t flags[sizeof( psa_storage_create_flags_t )]; +} psa_its_file_header_t; + +static void psa_its_fill_filename( psa_storage_uid_t uid, char *filename ) +{ + /* Break up the UID into two 32-bit pieces so as not to rely on + * long long support in snprintf. */ + mbedtls_snprintf( filename, PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH, + "%s" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%s", + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX, + (unsigned) ( uid >> 32 ), + (unsigned) ( uid & 0xffffffff ), + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_its_read_file( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info, + FILE **p_stream ) +{ + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + psa_its_file_header_t header; + size_t n; + + *p_stream = NULL; + psa_its_fill_filename( uid, filename ); + *p_stream = fopen( filename, "rb" ); + if( *p_stream == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + + n = fread( &header, 1, sizeof( header ), *p_stream ); + if( n != sizeof( header ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ); + if( memcmp( header.magic, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING, + PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ); + + p_info->size = ( header.size[0] | + header.size[1] << 8 | + header.size[2] << 16 | + header.size[3] << 24 ); + p_info->flags = ( header.flags[0] | + header.flags[1] << 8 | + header.flags[2] << 16 | + header.flags[3] << 24 ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_get_info( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + FILE *stream = NULL; + status = psa_its_read_file( uid, p_info, &stream ); + if( stream != NULL ) + fclose( stream ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_get( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_offset, + uint32_t data_length, + void *p_data, + size_t *p_data_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + FILE *stream = NULL; + size_t n; + struct psa_storage_info_t info; + + status = psa_its_read_file( uid, &info, &stream ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if( data_offset + data_length < data_offset ) + goto exit; +#if SIZE_MAX < 0xffffffff + if( data_offset + data_length > SIZE_MAX ) + goto exit; +#endif + if( data_offset + data_length > info.size ) + goto exit; + + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#if LONG_MAX < 0xffffffff + while( data_offset > LONG_MAX ) + { + if( fseek( stream, LONG_MAX, SEEK_CUR ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + data_offset -= LONG_MAX; + } +#endif + if( fseek( stream, data_offset, SEEK_CUR ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + n = fread( p_data, 1, data_length, stream ); + if( n != data_length ) + goto exit; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if( p_data_length != NULL ) + *p_data_length = n; + +exit: + if( stream != NULL ) + fclose( stream ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_set( psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_length, + const void *p_data, + psa_storage_create_flags_t create_flags ) +{ + if( uid == 0 ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ); + } + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + FILE *stream = NULL; + psa_its_file_header_t header; + size_t n; + + memcpy( header.magic, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( data_length, header.size, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( create_flags, header.flags, 0 ); + + psa_its_fill_filename( uid, filename ); + stream = fopen( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP, "wb" ); + if( stream == NULL ) + goto exit; + + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; + n = fwrite( &header, 1, sizeof( header ), stream ); + if( n != sizeof( header ) ) + goto exit; + if( data_length != 0 ) + { + n = fwrite( p_data, 1, data_length, stream ); + if( n != data_length ) + goto exit; + } + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + if( stream != NULL ) + { + int ret = fclose( stream ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; + } + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( rename_replace_existing( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP, filename ) != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + } + /* The temporary file may still exist, but only in failure cases where + * we're already reporting an error. So there's nothing we can do on + * failure. If the function succeeded, and in some error cases, the + * temporary file doesn't exist and so remove() is expected to fail. + * Thus we just ignore the return status of remove(). */ + (void) remove( PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP ); + return( status ); +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_remove( psa_storage_uid_t uid ) +{ + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + FILE *stream; + psa_its_fill_filename( uid, filename ); + stream = fopen( filename, "rb" ); + if( stream == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + fclose( stream ); + if( remove( filename ) != 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ripemd160.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ripemd160.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..55e259e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ripemd160.c @@ -0,0 +1,529 @@ +/* + * RIPE MD-160 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * The RIPEMD-160 algorithm was designed by RIPE in 1996 + * http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/mbedtls_ripemd160.html + * http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/RIPEMD-160 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) + +void mbedtls_ripemd160_init( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ripemd160_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ripemd160_free( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ripemd160_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, + const mbedtls_ripemd160_context *src ) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * RIPEMD-160 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( ctx ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) +/* + * Process one block + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + struct + { + uint32_t A, B, C, D, E, Ap, Bp, Cp, Dp, Ep, X[16]; + } local; + + local.X[ 0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 0 ); + local.X[ 1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 4 ); + local.X[ 2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 8 ); + local.X[ 3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 12 ); + local.X[ 4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 16 ); + local.X[ 5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 20 ); + local.X[ 6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 24 ); + local.X[ 7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 28 ); + local.X[ 8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 32 ); + local.X[ 9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 36 ); + local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 40 ); + local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 44 ); + local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 48 ); + local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 52 ); + local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 56 ); + local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE( data, 60 ); + + local.A = local.Ap = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = local.Bp = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = local.Cp = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = local.Dp = ctx->state[3]; + local.E = local.Ep = ctx->state[4]; + +#define F1( x, y, z ) ( (x) ^ (y) ^ (z) ) +#define F2( x, y, z ) ( ( (x) & (y) ) | ( ~(x) & (z) ) ) +#define F3( x, y, z ) ( ( (x) | ~(y) ) ^ (z) ) +#define F4( x, y, z ) ( ( (x) & (z) ) | ( (y) & ~(z) ) ) +#define F5( x, y, z ) ( (x) ^ ( (y) | ~(z) ) ) + +#define S( x, n ) ( ( (x) << (n) ) | ( (x) >> (32 - (n)) ) ) + +#define P( a, b, c, d, e, r, s, f, k ) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += f( (b), (c), (d) ) + local.X[r] + (k); \ + (a) = S( (a), (s) ) + (e); \ + (c) = S( (c), 10 ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define P2( a, b, c, d, e, r, s, rp, sp ) \ + do \ + { \ + P( (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (r), (s), F, K ); \ + P( a ## p, b ## p, c ## p, d ## p, e ## p, \ + (rp), (sp), Fp, Kp ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#define F F1 +#define K 0x00000000 +#define Fp F5 +#define Kp 0x50A28BE6 + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 11, 5, 8 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 14, 14, 9 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 2, 15, 7, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 3, 12, 0, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 4, 5, 9, 13 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 5, 8, 2, 15 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 6, 7, 11, 15 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 7, 9, 4, 5 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 11, 13, 7 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 9, 13, 6, 7 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 10, 14, 15, 8 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 11, 15, 8, 11 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 6, 1, 14 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 13, 7, 10, 14 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 9, 3, 12 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 15, 8, 12, 6 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F2 +#define K 0x5A827999 +#define Fp F4 +#define Kp 0x5C4DD124 + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 7, 7, 6, 9 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 4, 6, 11, 13 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 13, 8, 3, 15 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 1, 13, 7, 7 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 10, 11, 0, 12 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 6, 9, 13, 8 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 7, 5, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 3, 15, 10, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 7, 14, 7 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 12, 15, 7 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 15, 8, 12 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 5, 9, 12, 7 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 2, 11, 4, 6 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 7, 9, 15 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 13, 1, 13 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 12, 2, 11 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F3 +#define K 0x6ED9EBA1 +#define Fp F3 +#define Kp 0x6D703EF3 + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 11, 15, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 10, 13, 5, 7 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 6, 1, 15 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 4, 7, 3, 11 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 14, 7, 8 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 9, 14, 6 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 13, 6, 6 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 1, 15, 9, 14 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 2, 14, 11, 12 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 7, 8, 8, 13 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 13, 12, 5 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 6, 6, 2, 14 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 13, 5, 10, 13 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 12, 0, 13 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 7, 4, 7 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 5, 13, 5 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F4 +#define K 0x8F1BBCDC +#define Fp F2 +#define Kp 0x7A6D76E9 + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 1, 11, 8, 15 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 9, 12, 6, 5 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 14, 4, 8 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 10, 15, 1, 11 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 14, 3, 14 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 15, 11, 14 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 9, 15, 6 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 4, 8, 0, 14 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 9, 5, 6 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 14, 12, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 7, 5, 2, 12 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 15, 6, 13, 9 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 14, 8, 9, 12 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 6, 7, 5 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 5, 10, 15 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 2, 12, 14, 8 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F5 +#define K 0xA953FD4E +#define Fp F1 +#define Kp 0x00000000 + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 4, 9, 12, 8 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 15, 15, 5 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 5, 10, 12 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 9, 11, 4, 9 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 7, 6, 1, 12 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 8, 5, 5 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 2, 13, 8, 14 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 10, 12, 7, 6 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 14, 5, 6, 8 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 1, 12, 2, 13 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 3, 13, 13, 6 ); + P2( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 8, 14, 14, 5 ); + P2( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 11, 11, 0, 15 ); + P2( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 8, 3, 13 ); + P2( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 15, 5, 9, 11 ); + P2( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 13, 6, 11, 11 ); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + + local.C = ctx->state[1] + local.C + local.Dp; + ctx->state[1] = ctx->state[2] + local.D + local.Ep; + ctx->state[2] = ctx->state[3] + local.E + local.Ap; + ctx->state[3] = ctx->state[4] + local.A + local.Bp; + ctx->state[4] = ctx->state[0] + local.B + local.Cp; + ctx->state[0] = local.C; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ripemd160_process( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx, data ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * RIPEMD-160 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 64 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ripemd160_update( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +static const unsigned char ripemd160_padding[64] = +{ + 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +}; + +/* + * RIPEMD-160 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t last, padn; + uint32_t high, low; + unsigned char msglen[8]; + + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( low, msglen, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( high, msglen, 4 ); + + last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + padn = ( last < 56 ) ? ( 56 - last ) : ( 120 - last ); + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( ctx, ripemd160_padding, padn ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( ctx, msglen, 8 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ + +/* + * output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ripemd160_context ctx; + + mbedtls_ripemd160_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ripemd160( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( input, ilen, output ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * Test vectors from the RIPEMD-160 paper and + * http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/mbedtls_ripemd160.html#HMAC + */ +#define TESTS 8 +static const unsigned char ripemd160_test_str[TESTS][81] = +{ + { "" }, + { "a" }, + { "abc" }, + { "message digest" }, + { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, + { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, + { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" }, +}; + +static const size_t ripemd160_test_strlen[TESTS] = +{ + 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 56, 62, 80 +}; + +static const unsigned char ripemd160_test_md[TESTS][20] = +{ + { 0x9c, 0x11, 0x85, 0xa5, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0x54, 0x61, 0x28, + 0x08, 0x97, 0x7e, 0xe8, 0xf5, 0x48, 0xb2, 0x25, 0x8d, 0x31 }, + { 0x0b, 0xdc, 0x9d, 0x2d, 0x25, 0x6b, 0x3e, 0xe9, 0xda, 0xae, + 0x34, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0xf4, 0xdc, 0x83, 0x5a, 0x46, 0x7f, 0xfe }, + { 0x8e, 0xb2, 0x08, 0xf7, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0x98, 0x7a, 0x9b, 0x04, + 0x4a, 0x8e, 0x98, 0xc6, 0xb0, 0x87, 0xf1, 0x5a, 0x0b, 0xfc }, + { 0x5d, 0x06, 0x89, 0xef, 0x49, 0xd2, 0xfa, 0xe5, 0x72, 0xb8, + 0x81, 0xb1, 0x23, 0xa8, 0x5f, 0xfa, 0x21, 0x59, 0x5f, 0x36 }, + { 0xf7, 0x1c, 0x27, 0x10, 0x9c, 0x69, 0x2c, 0x1b, 0x56, 0xbb, + 0xdc, 0xeb, 0x5b, 0x9d, 0x28, 0x65, 0xb3, 0x70, 0x8d, 0xbc }, + { 0x12, 0xa0, 0x53, 0x38, 0x4a, 0x9c, 0x0c, 0x88, 0xe4, 0x05, + 0xa0, 0x6c, 0x27, 0xdc, 0xf4, 0x9a, 0xda, 0x62, 0xeb, 0x2b }, + { 0xb0, 0xe2, 0x0b, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x16, 0x64, 0x02, 0x86, 0xed, + 0x3a, 0x87, 0xa5, 0x71, 0x30, 0x79, 0xb2, 0x1f, 0x51, 0x89 }, + { 0x9b, 0x75, 0x2e, 0x45, 0x57, 0x3d, 0x4b, 0x39, 0xf4, 0xdb, + 0xd3, 0x32, 0x3c, 0xab, 0x82, 0xbf, 0x63, 0x32, 0x6b, 0xfb }, +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char output[20]; + + memset( output, 0, sizeof output ); + + for( i = 0; i < TESTS; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " RIPEMD-160 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_ret( ripemd160_test_str[i], + ripemd160_test_strlen[i], output ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( output, ripemd160_test_md[i], 20 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/rsa.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9c39fa5d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,2582 @@ +/* + * The RSA public-key cryptosystem + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation + * of the RSA algorithm: + * + * [1] A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems + * R Rivest, A Shamir, and L Adleman + * http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs.html#RSA78 + * + * [2] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 8 + * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone + * + * [3] Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks + * Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice and + * Stefan Mangard + * https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719v2 + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/* Parameter validation macros */ +#define RSA_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define RSA_VALIDATE( cond ) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->N, N ) ) != 0 ) || + ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P, P ) ) != 0 ) || + ( Q != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->Q, Q ) ) != 0 ) || + ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->D, D ) ) != 0 ) || + ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->E, E ) ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + } + + if( N != NULL ) + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len, + unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len, + unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len, + unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len, + unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( N != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->N, N, N_len ) ); + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); + } + + if( P != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->P, P, P_len ) ); + + if( Q != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->Q, Q, Q_len ) ); + + if( D != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->D, D, D_len ) ); + + if( E != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->E, E, E_len ) ); + +cleanup: + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Checks whether the context fields are set in such a way + * that the RSA primitives will be able to execute without error. + * It does *not* make guarantees for consistency of the parameters. + */ +static int rsa_check_context( mbedtls_rsa_context const *ctx, int is_priv, + int blinding_needed ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* blinding_needed is only used for NO_CRT to decide whether + * P,Q need to be present or not. */ + ((void) blinding_needed); +#endif + + if( ctx->len != mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ) || + ctx->len > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * 1. Modular exponentiation needs positive, odd moduli. + */ + + /* Modular exponentiation wrt. N is always used for + * RSA public key operations. */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->N, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* Modular exponentiation for P and Q is only + * used for private key operations and if CRT + * is used. */ + if( is_priv && + ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->Q, 0 ) == 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* + * 2. Exponents must be positive + */ + + /* Always need E for public key operations */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* For private key operations, use D or DP & DQ + * as (unblinded) exponents. */ + if( is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) <= 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#else + if( is_priv && + ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) <= 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* Blinding shouldn't make exponents negative either, + * so check that P, Q >= 1 if that hasn't yet been + * done as part of 1. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + if( is_priv && blinding_needed && + ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) <= 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif + + /* It wouldn't lead to an error if it wasn't satisfied, + * but check for QP >= 1 nonetheless. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + if( is_priv && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) <= 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) +{ + int ret = 0; + int have_N, have_P, have_Q, have_D, have_E; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + int have_DP, have_DQ, have_QP; +#endif + int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + have_N = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_P = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_Q = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_D = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_E = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0 ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + have_DP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_DQ = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) != 0 ); + have_QP = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) != 0 ); +#endif + + /* + * Check whether provided parameters are enough + * to deduce all others. The following incomplete + * parameter sets for private keys are supported: + * + * (1) P, Q missing. + * (2) D and potentially N missing. + * + */ + + n_missing = have_P && have_Q && have_D && have_E; + pq_missing = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && have_D && have_E; + d_missing = have_P && have_Q && !have_D && have_E; + is_pub = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E; + + /* These three alternatives are mutually exclusive */ + is_priv = n_missing || pq_missing || d_missing; + + if( !is_priv && !is_pub ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Step 1: Deduce N if P, Q are provided. + */ + + if( !have_N && have_P && have_Q ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, + &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + } + + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); + } + + /* + * Step 2: Deduce and verify all remaining core parameters. + */ + + if( pq_missing ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( &ctx->N, &ctx->E, &ctx->D, + &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + + } + else if( d_missing ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( &ctx->P, + &ctx->Q, + &ctx->E, + &ctx->D ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + } + } + + /* + * Step 3: Deduce all additional parameters specific + * to our current RSA implementation. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + if( is_priv && ! ( have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP ) ) + { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, + &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* + * Step 3: Basic sanity checks + */ + + return( rsa_check_context( ctx, is_priv, 1 ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + unsigned char *N, size_t N_len, + unsigned char *P, size_t P_len, + unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len, + unsigned char *D, size_t D_len, + unsigned char *E, size_t E_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + int is_priv; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + /* Check if key is private or public */ + is_priv = + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0; + + if( !is_priv ) + { + /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key, + * something must be wrong. */ + if( P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + } + + if( N != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->N, N, N_len ) ); + + if( P != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->P, P, P_len ) ); + + if( Q != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->Q, Q, Q_len ) ); + + if( D != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->D, D, D_len ) ); + + if( E != NULL ) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->E, E, E_len ) ); + +cleanup: + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q, + mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int is_priv; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + /* Check if key is private or public */ + is_priv = + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0; + + if( !is_priv ) + { + /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key, + * something must be wrong. */ + if( P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + } + + /* Export all requested core parameters. */ + + if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( N, &ctx->N ) ) != 0 ) || + ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( P, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) || + ( Q != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( Q, &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 ) || + ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( D, &ctx->D ) ) != 0 ) || + ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( E, &ctx->E ) ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Export CRT parameters + * This must also be implemented if CRT is not used, for being able to + * write DER encoded RSA keys. The helper function mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt + * can be used in this case. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int is_priv; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + /* Check if key is private or public */ + is_priv = + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) != 0; + + if( !is_priv ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* Export all requested blinding parameters. */ + if( ( DP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DP, &ctx->DP ) ) != 0 ) || + ( DQ != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DQ, &ctx->DQ ) ) != 0 ) || + ( QP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( QP, &ctx->QP ) ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + } +#else + if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, + DP, DQ, QP ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret ) ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Initialize an RSA context + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int padding, + int hash_id ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE( padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 || + padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) ); + + mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( ctx, padding, hash_id ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Set ctx->ver to nonzero to indicate that the mutex has been + * initialized and will need to be freed. */ + ctx->ver = 1; + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Set padding for an existing RSA context + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, + int hash_id ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE( padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 || + padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ); + + ctx->padding = padding; + ctx->hash_id = hash_id; +} + +/* + * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus + */ + +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) +{ + return( ctx->len ); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + +/* + * Generate an RSA keypair + * + * This generation method follows the RSA key pair generation procedure of + * FIPS 186-4 if 2^16 < exponent < 2^256 and nbits = 2048 or nbits = 3072. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + unsigned int nbits, int exponent ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi H, G, L; + int prime_quality = 0; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL ); + + /* + * If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of + * the RSA algorithm is less than or equal to 80 bits and therefore an error + * rate of 2^-80 is sufficient. + */ + if( nbits > 1024 ) + prime_quality = MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &H ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); + + if( nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * find primes P and Q with Q < P so that: + * 1. |P-Q| > 2^( nbits / 2 - 100 ) + * 2. GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 + * 3. E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) > 2^( nbits / 2 ) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->E, exponent ) ); + + do + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, nbits >> 1, + prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, nbits >> 1, + prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 step 5.4) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &H ) <= ( ( nbits >= 200 ) ? ( ( nbits >> 1 ) - 99 ) : 0 ) ) + continue; + + /* not required by any standards, but some users rely on the fact that P > Q */ + if( H.s < 0 ) + mbedtls_mpi_swap( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ); + + /* Temporarily replace P,Q by P-1, Q-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); + + /* check GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 2(a)) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E, &H ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 ) + continue; + + /* compute smallest possible D = E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(b)) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &L, NULL, &H, &G ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->D, &ctx->E, &L ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->D ) <= ( ( nbits + 1 ) / 2 ) ) // (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(a)) + continue; + + break; + } + while( 1 ); + + /* Restore P,Q */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) ); + + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* + * DP = D mod (P - 1) + * DQ = D mod (Q - 1) + * QP = Q^-1 mod P + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, + &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* Double-check */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( ctx ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &H ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &G ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_rsa_free( ctx ); + + if( ( -ret & ~0x7f ) == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED, ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ + +/* + * Check a public RSA key + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) < 128 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->E, 0 ) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->E ) < 2 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->E, &ctx->N ) >= 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Check for the consistency of all fields in an RSA private key context + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( ctx ) != 0 || + rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */ ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + if( mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, + &ctx->D, &ctx->E, NULL, NULL ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + else if( mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, + &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Check if contexts holding a public and private key match + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, + const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( pub != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( prv != NULL ); + + if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( pub ) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( prv ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->N, &prv->N ) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->E, &prv->E ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Do an RSA public key operation + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + mbedtls_mpi T; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + olen = ctx->len; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) ); + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Generate or update blinding values, see section 10 of: + * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, + * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer + * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113. + */ +static int rsa_prepare_blinding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret, count = 0; + mbedtls_mpi R; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + + if( ctx->Vf.p != NULL ) + { + /* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */ + do { + if( count++ > 10 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + + /* Compute Vf^-1 as R * (R Vf)^-1 to avoid leaks from inv_mod. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) ); + + /* At this point, Vi is invertible mod N if and only if both Vf and R + * are invertible mod N. If one of them isn't, we don't need to know + * which one, we just loop and choose new values for both of them. + * (Each iteration succeeds with overwhelming probability.) */ + ret = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ) + goto cleanup; + + } while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE ); + + /* Finish the computation of Vf^-1 = R * (R Vf)^-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) ); + + /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N + * (Vi already contains Vf^-1 at this point) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); + + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Exponent blinding supposed to prevent side-channel attacks using multiple + * traces of measurements to recover the RSA key. The more collisions are there, + * the more bits of the key can be recovered. See [3]. + * + * Collecting n collisions with m bit long blinding value requires 2^(m-m/n) + * observations on average. + * + * For example with 28 byte blinding to achieve 2 collisions the adversary has + * to make 2^112 observations on average. + * + * (With the currently (as of 2017 April) known best algorithms breaking 2048 + * bit RSA requires approximately as much time as trying out 2^112 random keys. + * Thus in this sense with 28 byte blinding the security is not reduced by + * side-channel attacks like the one in [3]) + * + * This countermeasure does not help if the key recovery is possible with a + * single trace. + */ +#define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28 + +/* + * Do an RSA private key operation + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + + /* Temporary holding the result */ + mbedtls_mpi T; + + /* Temporaries holding P-1, Q-1 and the + * exponent blinding factor, respectively. */ + mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, R; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* Temporaries holding the results mod p resp. mod q. */ + mbedtls_mpi TP, TQ; + + /* Temporaries holding the blinded exponents for + * the mod p resp. mod q computation (if used). */ + mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind; + + /* Pointers to actual exponents to be used - either the unblinded + * or the blinded ones, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ + mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP; + mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ; +#else + /* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */ + mbedtls_mpi D_blind; + + /* Pointer to actual exponent to be used - either the unblinded + * or the blinded one, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ + mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double + * checked result; should be the same in the end. */ + mbedtls_mpi I, C; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + + if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private key checks */, + f_rng != NULL /* blinding y/n */ ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + /* MPI Initialization */ + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &P1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); + + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_init( &D_blind ); +#else + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP_blind ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ_blind ); +#endif + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_init( &TP ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &TQ ); +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &I ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &C ); + + /* End of MPI initialization */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &I, &T ) ); + + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { + /* + * Blinding + * T = T * Vi mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); + + /* + * Exponent blinding + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* + * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &P1, &Q1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D ) ); + + D = &D_blind; +#else + /* + * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DP_blind, &P1, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DP_blind, &DP_blind, + &ctx->DP ) ); + + DP = &DP_blind; + + /* + * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DQ_blind, &Q1, &R ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, + &ctx->DQ ) ); + + DQ = &DQ_blind; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); +#else + /* + * Faster decryption using the CRT + * + * TP = input ^ dP mod P + * TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q + */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ ) ); + + /* + * T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &TP, &TQ ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &TP, &T, &ctx->QP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &TP, &ctx->P ) ); + + /* + * T = TQ + T * Q + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &TP, &T, &ctx->Q ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &TQ, &TP ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { + /* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vf ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); + } + + /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &C, &T, &ctx->E, + &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &C, &I ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + olen = ctx->len; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) ); + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &P1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q1 ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); + + if( f_rng != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &D_blind ); +#else + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP_blind ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ_blind ); +#endif + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &TP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &TQ ); +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &C ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &I ); + + if( ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/** + * Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer. + * + * \param dst buffer to mask + * \param dlen length of destination buffer + * \param src source of the mask generation + * \param slen length of the source buffer + * \param md_ctx message digest context to use + */ +static int mgf_mask( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, + size_t slen, mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx ) +{ + unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char counter[4]; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned int hlen; + size_t i, use_len; + int ret = 0; + + memset( mask, 0, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); + memset( counter, 0, 4 ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info ); + + /* Generate and apply dbMask */ + p = dst; + + while( dlen > 0 ) + { + use_len = hlen; + if( dlen < hlen ) + use_len = dlen; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, src, slen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, counter, 4 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, mask ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < use_len; ++i ) + *p++ ^= mask[i]; + + counter[3]++; + + dlen -= use_len; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mask, sizeof( mask ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + size_t olen; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = output; + unsigned int hlen; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + olen = ctx->len; + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* first comparison checks for overflow */ + if( ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( output, 0, olen ); + + *p++ = 0; + + /* Generate a random octet string seed */ + if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, hlen ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); + + p += hlen; + + /* Construct DB */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, label, label_len, p ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + p += hlen; + p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen; + *p++ = 1; + if( ilen != 0 ) + memcpy( p, input, ilen ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ + if( ( ret = mgf_mask( output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen, + &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed */ + if( ( ret = mgf_mask( output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, + &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + size_t nb_pad, olen; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = output; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + olen = ctx->len; + + /* first comparison checks for overflow */ + if( ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen; + + *p++ = 0; + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + { + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; + + while( nb_pad-- > 0 ) + { + int rng_dl = 100; + + do { + ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 ); + } while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 ); + + /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ + if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); + + p++; + } + } + else + { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; + + while( nb_pad-- > 0 ) + *p++ = 0xFF; + } + + *p++ = 0; + if( ilen != 0 ) + memcpy( p, input, ilen ); + + return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + switch( ctx->padding ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, ilen, + input, output ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, + ilen, input, output ); +#endif + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t ilen, i, pad_len; + unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned int hlen; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( label_len == 0 || label != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + /* + * Parameters sanity checks + */ + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ilen = ctx->len; + + if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + // checking for integer underflow + if( 2 * hlen + 2 > ilen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * RSA operation + */ + ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, input, buf ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Unmask data and generate lHash + */ + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */ + if( ( ret = mgf_mask( buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, + &md_ctx ) ) != 0 || + /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */ + ( ret = mgf_mask( buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen, + &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + /* Generate lHash */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, label, label_len, lhash ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Check contents, in "constant-time" + */ + p = buf; + bad = 0; + + bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */ + + p += hlen; /* Skip seed */ + + /* Check lHash */ + for( i = 0; i < hlen; i++ ) + bad |= lhash[i] ^ *p++; + + /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer + * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */ + pad_len = 0; + pad_done = 0; + for( i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++ ) + { + pad_done |= p[i]; + pad_len += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; + } + + p += pad_len; + bad |= *p++ ^ 0x01; + + /* + * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not + * (eg, no data is copied if it was not correct). This meets the + * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between + * the different error conditions. + */ + if( bad != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; + goto cleanup; + } + + *olen = ilen - (p - buf); + if( *olen != 0 ) + memcpy( output, p, *olen ); + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( lhash, sizeof( lhash ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t ilen; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + ilen = ctx->len; + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, input, buf ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( mode, buf, ilen, + output, output_max_len, olen ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL ); + + switch( ctx->padding ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, olen, + input, output, output_max_len ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, + olen, input, output, + output_max_len ); +#endif + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + size_t olen; + unsigned char *p = sig; + unsigned char *salt = NULL; + size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t msb; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + olen = ctx->len; + + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + /* Gather length of hash to sign */ + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) + { + /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size. + * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length + * according to FIPS 185-4 §5.5 (e) and common practice. If there is not + * enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is + * that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most + * the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */ + min_slen = hlen - 2; + if( olen < hlen + min_slen + 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + else if( olen >= hlen + hlen + 2 ) + slen = hlen; + else + slen = olen - hlen - 2; + } + else if ( (saltlen < 0) || (saltlen + hlen + 2 > olen) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + else + { + slen = (size_t) saltlen; + } + + memset( sig, 0, olen ); + + /* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */ + msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; + p += olen - hlen - slen - 2; + *p++ = 0x01; + + /* Generate salt of length slen in place in the encoded message */ + salt = p; + if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret ) ); + + p += slen; + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, 8 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, p ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ + if( msb % 8 == 0 ) + offset = 1; + + /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ + if( ( ret = mgf_mask( sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, + &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; + sig[0] &= 0xFF >> ( olen * 8 - msb ); + + p += hlen; + *p++ = 0xBC; + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) ); +} + +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function with + * the option to pass in the salt length. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig ); +} + + +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function + */ + +/* Construct a PKCS v1.5 encoding of a hashed message + * + * This is used both for signature generation and verification. + * + * Parameters: + * - md_alg: Identifies the hash algorithm used to generate the given hash; + * MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if raw data is signed. + * - hashlen: Length of hash in case hashlen is MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - hash: Buffer containing the hashed message or the raw data. + * - dst_len: Length of the encoded message. + * - dst: Buffer to hold the encoded message. + * + * Assumptions: + * - hash has size hashlen if md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - hash has size corresponding to md_alg if md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len. + * + */ +static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + size_t dst_len, + unsigned char *dst ) +{ + size_t oid_size = 0; + size_t nb_pad = dst_len; + unsigned char *p = dst; + const char *oid = NULL; + + /* Are we signing hashed or raw data? */ + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( md_alg, &oid, &oid_size ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a + * 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */ + if( 8 + hashlen + oid_size >= 0x80 || + 10 + hashlen < hashlen || + 10 + hashlen + oid_size < 10 + hashlen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Static bounds check: + * - Need 10 bytes for five tag-length pairs. + * (Insist on 1-byte length encodings to protect against variants of + * Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5 verification) + * - Need hashlen bytes for hash + * - Need oid_size bytes for hash alg OID. + */ + if( nb_pad < 10 + hashlen + oid_size ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + nb_pad -= 10 + hashlen + oid_size; + } + else + { + if( nb_pad < hashlen ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + nb_pad -= hashlen; + } + + /* Need space for signature header and padding delimiter (3 bytes), + * and 8 bytes for the minimal padding */ + if( nb_pad < 3 + 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + nb_pad -= 3; + + /* Now nb_pad is the amount of memory to be filled + * with padding, and at least 8 bytes long. */ + + /* Write signature header and padding */ + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; + memset( p, 0xFF, nb_pad ); + p += nb_pad; + *p++ = 0; + + /* Are we signing raw data? */ + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + memcpy( p, hash, hashlen ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* Signing hashed data, add corresponding ASN.1 structure + * + * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, + * digest Digest } + * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * Digest ::= OCTET STRING + * + * Schematic: + * TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-OID + LEN [ OID ] + * TAG-NULL + LEN [ NULL ] ] + * TAG-OCTET + LEN [ HASH ] ] + */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x04 + oid_size ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + *p++ = (unsigned char) oid_size; + memcpy( p, oid, oid_size ); + p += oid_size; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL; + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + *p++ = (unsigned char) hashlen; + memcpy( p, hash, hashlen ); + p += hashlen; + + /* Just a sanity-check, should be automatic + * after the initial bounds check. */ + if( p != dst + dst_len ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( dst, dst_len ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Prepare PKCS1-v1.5 encoding (padding and hash identifier) + */ + + if( ( ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( md_alg, hashlen, hash, + ctx->len, sig ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * Call respective RSA primitive + */ + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + { + /* Skip verification on a public key operation */ + return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) ); + } + + /* Private key operation + * + * In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a + * temporary buffer and check it before returning it. + */ + + sig_try = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len ); + if( sig_try == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + verif = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len ); + if( verif == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( sig_try ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) ); + + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy( sig, sig_try, ctx->len ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sig_try, ctx->len ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( verif, ctx->len ); + mbedtls_free( sig_try ); + mbedtls_free( verif ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + memset( sig, '!', ctx->len ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + + switch( ctx->padding ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); +#endif + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id, + int expected_salt_len, + const unsigned char *sig ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t siglen; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *hash_start; + unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char zeros[8]; + unsigned int hlen; + size_t observed_salt_len, msb; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + siglen = ctx->len; + + if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p = buf; + + if( buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + /* Gather length of hash to sign */ + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mgf1_hash_id ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + memset( zeros, 0, 8 ); + + /* + * Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits + */ + msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; + + if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ + if( msb % 8 == 0 ) + { + p++; + siglen -= 1; + } + + if( siglen < hlen + 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1; + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb ); + + while( p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0 ) + p++; + + if( *p++ != 0x01 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + goto exit; + } + + observed_salt_len = hash_start - p; + + if( expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY && + observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Generate H = Hash( M' ) + */ + ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, result ); + if ( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( memcmp( hash_start, result, hlen ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig ) +{ + mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + + mgf1_hash_id = ( ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + ? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id + : md_alg; + + return( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, + md_alg, hashlen, hash, + mgf1_hash_id, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, + sig ) ); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t sig_len; + unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL; + + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + + sig_len = ctx->len; + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash. + */ + + if( ( encoded = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sig_len ) ) == NULL || + ( encoded_expected = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sig_len ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( ( ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig_len, + encoded_expected ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash. + */ + + ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) + ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, encoded ) + : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, encoded ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * Compare + */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ct_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected, + sig_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + + if( encoded != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( encoded, sig_len ); + mbedtls_free( encoded ); + } + + if( encoded_expected != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( encoded_expected, sig_len ); + mbedtls_free( encoded_expected ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int mode, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig ) +{ + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || + mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + hashlen == 0 ) || + hash != NULL ); + + switch( ctx->padding ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig ); +#endif + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); + } +} + +/* + * Copy the components of an RSA key + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( dst != NULL ); + RSA_VALIDATE_RET( src != NULL ); + + dst->len = src->len; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->N, &src->N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->E, &src->E ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->D, &src->D ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->P, &src->P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Q, &src->Q ) ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->DP, &src->DP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->DQ, &src->DQ ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->QP, &src->QP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RP, &src->RP ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RQ, &src->RQ ) ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RN, &src->RN ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Vi, &src->Vi ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Vf, &src->Vf ) ); + + dst->padding = src->padding; + dst->hash_id = src->hash_id; + +cleanup: + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_rsa_free( dst ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Free the components of an RSA key + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RN ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->D ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Q ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->E ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->N ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RQ ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->QP ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DQ ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DP ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Free the mutex, but only if it hasn't been freed already. */ + if( ctx->ver != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); + ctx->ver = 0; + } +#endif +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" + +/* + * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes + */ +#define KEY_LEN 128 + +#define RSA_N "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \ + "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \ + "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \ + "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \ + "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \ + "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \ + "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \ + "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79" + +#define RSA_E "10001" + +#define RSA_D "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \ + "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \ + "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \ + "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \ + "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \ + "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \ + "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \ + "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D" + +#define RSA_P "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \ + "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \ + "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \ + "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57" + +#define RSA_Q "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \ + "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \ + "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \ + "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF" + +#define PT_LEN 24 +#define RSA_PT "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \ + "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) +{ +#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) + size_t i; + + if( rng_state != NULL ) + rng_state = NULL; + + for( i = 0; i < len; ++i ) + output[i] = rand(); +#else + if( rng_state != NULL ) + rng_state = NULL; + + arc4random_buf( output, len ); +#endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */ + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + size_t len; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN]; + unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN]; + unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + unsigned char sha1sum[20]; +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi K; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_N ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_P ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_Q ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_D ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_E ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K ) ); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &rsa ) ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " RSA key validation: " ); + + if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &rsa ) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &rsa ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 encryption : " ); + + memcpy( rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN ); + + if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext, + rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : " ); + + if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + &len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted, + sizeof(rsa_decrypted) ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( memcmp( rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " PKCS#1 data sign : " ); + + if( mbedtls_sha1_ret( rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, myrand, NULL, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, + sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: " ); + + if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, NULL, NULL, + MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, + sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + ((void) verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/rsa_internal.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/rsa_internal.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d6ba97a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/rsa_internal.c @@ -0,0 +1,486 @@ +/* + * Helper functions for the RSA module + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" + +/* + * Compute RSA prime factors from public and private exponents + * + * Summary of algorithm: + * Setting F := lcm(P-1,Q-1), the idea is as follows: + * + * (a) For any 1 <= X < N with gcd(X,N)=1, we have X^F = 1 modulo N, so X^(F/2) + * is a square root of 1 in Z/NZ. Since Z/NZ ~= Z/PZ x Z/QZ by CRT and the + * square roots of 1 in Z/PZ and Z/QZ are +1 and -1, this leaves the four + * possibilities X^(F/2) = (+-1, +-1). If it happens that X^(F/2) = (-1,+1) + * or (+1,-1), then gcd(X^(F/2) + 1, N) will be equal to one of the prime + * factors of N. + * + * (b) If we don't know F/2 but (F/2) * K for some odd (!) K, then the same + * construction still applies since (-)^K is the identity on the set of + * roots of 1 in Z/NZ. + * + * The public and private key primitives (-)^E and (-)^D are mutually inverse + * bijections on Z/NZ if and only if (-)^(DE) is the identity on Z/NZ, i.e. + * if and only if DE - 1 is a multiple of F, say DE - 1 = F * L. + * Splitting L = 2^t * K with K odd, we have + * + * DE - 1 = FL = (F/2) * (2^(t+1)) * K, + * + * so (F / 2) * K is among the numbers + * + * (DE - 1) >> 1, (DE - 1) >> 2, ..., (DE - 1) >> ord + * + * where ord is the order of 2 in (DE - 1). + * We can therefore iterate through these numbers apply the construction + * of (a) and (b) above to attempt to factor N. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( mbedtls_mpi const *N, + mbedtls_mpi const *E, mbedtls_mpi const *D, + mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + uint16_t attempt; /* Number of current attempt */ + uint16_t iter; /* Number of squares computed in the current attempt */ + + uint16_t order; /* Order of 2 in DE - 1 */ + + mbedtls_mpi T; /* Holds largest odd divisor of DE - 1 */ + mbedtls_mpi K; /* Temporary holding the current candidate */ + + const unsigned char primes[] = { 2, + 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, + 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, + 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, + 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, + 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, + 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, + 229, 233, 239, 241, 251 + }; + + const size_t num_primes = sizeof( primes ) / sizeof( *primes ); + + if( P == NULL || Q == NULL || P->p != NULL || Q->p != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( D, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( D, N ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( E, N ) >= 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * Initializations and temporary changes + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); + + /* T := DE - 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, D, E ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &T, &T, 1 ) ); + + if( ( order = (uint16_t) mbedtls_mpi_lsb( &T ) ) == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* After this operation, T holds the largest odd divisor of DE - 1. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &T, order ) ); + + /* + * Actual work + */ + + /* Skip trying 2 if N == 1 mod 8 */ + attempt = 0; + if( N->p[0] % 8 == 1 ) + attempt = 1; + + for( ; attempt < num_primes; ++attempt ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_lset( &K, primes[attempt] ); + + /* Check if gcd(K,N) = 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( P, &K, N ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( P, 1 ) != 0 ) + continue; + + /* Go through K^T + 1, K^(2T) + 1, K^(4T) + 1, ... + * and check whether they have nontrivial GCD with N. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &K, &K, &T, N, + Q /* temporarily use Q for storing Montgomery + * multiplication helper values */ ) ); + + for( iter = 1; iter <= order; ++iter ) + { + /* If we reach 1 prematurely, there's no point + * in continuing to square K */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 1 ) == 0 ) + break; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( P, &K, N ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( P, 1 ) == 1 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( P, N ) == -1 ) + { + /* + * Have found a nontrivial divisor P of N. + * Set Q := N / P. + */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( Q, NULL, N, P ) ); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, &K, &K ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, N ) ); + } + + /* + * If we get here, then either we prematurely aborted the loop because + * we reached 1, or K holds primes[attempt]^(DE - 1) mod N, which must + * be 1 if D,E,N were consistent. + * Check if that's the case and abort if not, to avoid very long, + * yet eventually failing, computations if N,D,E were not sane. + */ + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 1 ) != 0 ) + { + break; + } + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Given P, Q and the public exponent E, deduce D. + * This is essentially a modular inversion. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( mbedtls_mpi const *P, + mbedtls_mpi const *Q, + mbedtls_mpi const *E, + mbedtls_mpi *D ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_mpi K, L; + + if( D == NULL || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( D, 0 ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( P, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( Q, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 0 ) == 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); + + /* Temporarily put K := P-1 and L := Q-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &L, Q, 1 ) ); + + /* Temporarily put D := gcd(P-1, Q-1) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( D, &K, &L ) ); + + /* K := LCM(P-1, Q-1) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, &K, &L ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi( &K, NULL, &K, D ) ); + + /* Compute modular inverse of E in LCM(P-1, Q-1) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( D, E, &K ) ); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, + const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + mbedtls_mpi K, L; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); + + /* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */ + if( DP != NULL ) + { + if( P == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &L, DP, D ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &L, &L, &K ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &L, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */ + if( DQ != NULL ) + { + if( Q == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, Q, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &L, DQ, D ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &L, &L, &K ) ); + + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &L, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */ + if( QP != NULL ) + { + if( P == NULL || Q == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, QP, Q ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, P ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + +cleanup: + + /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ + if( ret != 0 && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check that core RSA parameters are sane. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_mpi K, L; + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); + + /* + * Step 1: If PRNG provided, check that P and Q are prime + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + /* + * When generating keys, the strongest security we support aims for an error + * rate of at most 2^-100 and we are aiming for the same certainty here as + * well. + */ + if( f_rng != NULL && P != NULL && + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( P, 50, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + if( f_rng != NULL && Q != NULL && + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( Q, 50, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } +#else + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ + + /* + * Step 2: Check that 1 < N = P * Q + */ + + if( P != NULL && Q != NULL && N != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, P, Q ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &K, N ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* + * Step 3: Check and 1 < D, E < N if present. + */ + + if( N != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL ) + { + if ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( D, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( D, N ) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( E, N ) >= 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* + * Step 4: Check that D, E are inverse modulo P-1 and Q-1 + */ + + if( P != NULL && Q != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( P, 1 ) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( Q, 1 ) <= 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Compute DE-1 mod P-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, D, E ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &L, P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, &L ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Compute DE-1 mod Q-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &K, D, E ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, &K, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &L, Q, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &K, &K, &L ) ); + if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &K, 0 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); + + /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ) + { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, + mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_mpi K; + mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); + + /* DP = D mod P-1 */ + if( DP != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, P, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( DP, D, &K ) ); + } + + /* DQ = D mod Q-1 */ + if( DQ != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &K, Q, 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( DQ, D, &K ) ); + } + + /* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */ + if( QP != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( QP, Q, P ) ); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/sha1.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/sha1.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7f0c8757 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/sha1.c @@ -0,0 +1,546 @@ +/* + * FIPS-180-1 compliant SHA-1 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The SHA-1 standard was published by NIST in 1993. + * + * http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#define SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + +#define SHA1_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + +void mbedtls_sha1_init( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA1_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha1_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha1_free( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha1_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha1_clone( mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha1_context *src ) +{ + SHA1_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); + + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-1 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1_starts( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( ctx ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + struct + { + uint32_t temp, W[16], A, B, C, D, E; + } local; + + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); + + local.W[ 0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 0 ); + local.W[ 1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 4 ); + local.W[ 2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 8 ); + local.W[ 3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 12 ); + local.W[ 4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 16 ); + local.W[ 5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 20 ); + local.W[ 6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 24 ); + local.W[ 7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 28 ); + local.W[ 8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 32 ); + local.W[ 9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 36 ); + local.W[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 40 ); + local.W[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 44 ); + local.W[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 48 ); + local.W[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 52 ); + local.W[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 56 ); + local.W[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 60 ); + +#define S(x,n) (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) + +#define R(t) \ + ( \ + local.temp = local.W[( (t) - 3 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[( (t) - 8 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[( (t) - 14 ) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[ (t) & 0x0F], \ + ( local.W[(t) & 0x0F] = S(local.temp,1) ) \ + ) + +#define P(a,b,c,d,e,x) \ + do \ + { \ + (e) += S((a),5) + F((b),(c),(d)) + K + (x); \ + (b) = S((b),30); \ + } while( 0 ) + + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; + local.E = ctx->state[4]; + +#define F(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) +#define K 0x5A827999 + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[0] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[1] ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[2] ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[3] ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[4] ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[5] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[6] ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[7] ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[8] ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[9] ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[10] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[11] ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[12] ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[13] ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[14] ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[15] ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(16) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(17) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(18) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(19) ); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) +#define K 0x6ED9EBA1 + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(20) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(21) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(22) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(23) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(24) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(25) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(26) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(27) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(28) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(29) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(30) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(31) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(32) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(33) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(34) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(35) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(36) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(37) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(38) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(39) ); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define K 0x8F1BBCDC + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(40) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(41) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(42) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(43) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(44) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(45) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(46) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(47) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(48) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(49) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(50) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(51) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(52) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(53) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(54) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(55) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(56) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(57) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(58) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(59) ); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x,y,z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) +#define K 0xCA62C1D6 + + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(60) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(61) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(62) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(63) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(64) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(65) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(66) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(67) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(68) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(69) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(70) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(71) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(72) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(73) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(74) ); + P( local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(75) ); + P( local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(76) ); + P( local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(77) ); + P( local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(78) ); + P( local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(79) ); + +#undef K +#undef F + + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + ctx->state[4] += local.E; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1_process( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, data ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * SHA-1 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 64 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1_update( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +/* + * SHA-1 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t used; + uint32_t high, low; + + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if( used <= 56 ) + { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used ); + } + else + { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 56 ); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 56 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 60 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * Output final state + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1_finish( mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ + +/* + * output = SHA-1( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; + + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + SHA1_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + mbedtls_sha1_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha1_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha1( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20] ) +{ + mbedtls_sha1_ret( input, ilen, output ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * FIPS-180-1 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char sha1_test_buf[3][57] = +{ + { "abc" }, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, + { "" } +}; + +static const size_t sha1_test_buflen[3] = +{ + 3, 56, 1000 +}; + +static const unsigned char sha1_test_sum[3][20] = +{ + { 0xA9, 0x99, 0x3E, 0x36, 0x47, 0x06, 0x81, 0x6A, 0xBA, 0x3E, + 0x25, 0x71, 0x78, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x9C, 0xD0, 0xD8, 0x9D }, + { 0x84, 0x98, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x1C, 0x3B, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xAE, + 0x4A, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x29, 0xE5, 0xE5, 0x46, 0x70, 0xF1 }, + { 0x34, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x3C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x1E, + 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xDB, 0xAD, 0x27, 0x31, 0x65, 0x34, 0x01, 0x6F } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, j, buflen, ret = 0; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + unsigned char sha1sum[20]; + mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; + + mbedtls_sha1_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * SHA-1 + */ + for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " SHA-1 test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( i == 2 ) + { + memset( buf, 'a', buflen = 1000 ); + + for( j = 0; j < 1000; j++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ctx, buf, buflen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ctx, sha1_test_buf[i], + sha1_test_buflen[i] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &ctx, sha1sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( sha1sum, sha1_test_sum[i], 20 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + goto exit; + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_sha1_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/sha256.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/sha256.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6f1306ee --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/sha256.c @@ -0,0 +1,575 @@ +/* + * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-256 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The SHA-256 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#define SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define SHA256_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) + +void mbedtls_sha256_init( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA256_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha256_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha256_free( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha256_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha256_clone( mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha256_context *src ) +{ + SHA256_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); + + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-256 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224 ) +{ + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 ); + + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + if( is224 == 0 ) + { + /* SHA-256 */ + ctx->state[0] = 0x6A09E667; + ctx->state[1] = 0xBB67AE85; + ctx->state[2] = 0x3C6EF372; + ctx->state[3] = 0xA54FF53A; + ctx->state[4] = 0x510E527F; + ctx->state[5] = 0x9B05688C; + ctx->state[6] = 0x1F83D9AB; + ctx->state[7] = 0x5BE0CD19; + } + else + { + /* SHA-224 */ + ctx->state[0] = 0xC1059ED8; + ctx->state[1] = 0x367CD507; + ctx->state[2] = 0x3070DD17; + ctx->state[3] = 0xF70E5939; + ctx->state[4] = 0xFFC00B31; + ctx->state[5] = 0x68581511; + ctx->state[6] = 0x64F98FA7; + ctx->state[7] = 0xBEFA4FA4; + } + + ctx->is224 = is224; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256_starts( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + int is224 ) +{ + mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( ctx, is224 ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) +static const uint32_t K[] = +{ + 0x428A2F98, 0x71374491, 0xB5C0FBCF, 0xE9B5DBA5, + 0x3956C25B, 0x59F111F1, 0x923F82A4, 0xAB1C5ED5, + 0xD807AA98, 0x12835B01, 0x243185BE, 0x550C7DC3, + 0x72BE5D74, 0x80DEB1FE, 0x9BDC06A7, 0xC19BF174, + 0xE49B69C1, 0xEFBE4786, 0x0FC19DC6, 0x240CA1CC, + 0x2DE92C6F, 0x4A7484AA, 0x5CB0A9DC, 0x76F988DA, + 0x983E5152, 0xA831C66D, 0xB00327C8, 0xBF597FC7, + 0xC6E00BF3, 0xD5A79147, 0x06CA6351, 0x14292967, + 0x27B70A85, 0x2E1B2138, 0x4D2C6DFC, 0x53380D13, + 0x650A7354, 0x766A0ABB, 0x81C2C92E, 0x92722C85, + 0xA2BFE8A1, 0xA81A664B, 0xC24B8B70, 0xC76C51A3, + 0xD192E819, 0xD6990624, 0xF40E3585, 0x106AA070, + 0x19A4C116, 0x1E376C08, 0x2748774C, 0x34B0BCB5, + 0x391C0CB3, 0x4ED8AA4A, 0x5B9CCA4F, 0x682E6FF3, + 0x748F82EE, 0x78A5636F, 0x84C87814, 0x8CC70208, + 0x90BEFFFA, 0xA4506CEB, 0xBEF9A3F7, 0xC67178F2, +}; + +#define SHR(x,n) (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (n)) +#define ROTR(x,n) (SHR(x,n) | ((x) << (32 - (n)))) + +#define S0(x) (ROTR(x, 7) ^ ROTR(x,18) ^ SHR(x, 3)) +#define S1(x) (ROTR(x,17) ^ ROTR(x,19) ^ SHR(x,10)) + +#define S2(x) (ROTR(x, 2) ^ ROTR(x,13) ^ ROTR(x,22)) +#define S3(x) (ROTR(x, 6) ^ ROTR(x,11) ^ ROTR(x,25)) + +#define F0(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define F1(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) + +#define R(t) \ + ( \ + local.W[t] = S1(local.W[(t) - 2]) + local.W[(t) - 7] + \ + S0(local.W[(t) - 15]) + local.W[(t) - 16] \ + ) + +#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ + do \ + { \ + local.temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e),(f),(g)) + (K) + (x); \ + local.temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a),(b),(c)); \ + (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ + } while( 0 ) + +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + struct + { + uint32_t temp1, temp2, W[64]; + uint32_t A[8]; + } local; + + unsigned int i; + + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) + for( i = 0; i < 64; i++ ) + { + if( i < 16 ) + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 4 * i ); + else + R( i ); + + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); + + local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; + local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; + local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; + local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; + local.A[0] = local.temp1; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( data, 4 * i ); + + for( i = 0; i < 16; i += 8 ) + { + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i+0], K[i+0] ); + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i+1], K[i+1] ); + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i+2], K[i+2] ); + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i+3], K[i+3] ); + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i+4], K[i+4] ); + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i+5], K[i+5] ); + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i+6], K[i+6] ); + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i+7], K[i+7] ); + } + + for( i = 16; i < 64; i += 8 ) + { + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], R(i+0), K[i+0] ); + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], R(i+1), K[i+1] ); + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], R(i+2), K[i+2] ); + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], R(i+3), K[i+3] ); + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], R(i+4), K[i+4] ); + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], R(i+5), K[i+5] ); + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], R(i+6), K[i+6] ); + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], R(i+7), K[i+7] ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, data ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * SHA-256 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 64 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256_update( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +/* + * SHA-256 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[32] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t used; + uint32_t high, low; + + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if( used <= 56 ) + { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used ); + } + else + { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 56 ); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 29 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( high, ctx->buffer, 56 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( low, ctx->buffer, 60 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * Output final state + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[1], output, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[2], output, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[3], output, 12 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[4], output, 16 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[5], output, 20 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[6], output, 24 ); + + if( ctx->is224 == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ctx->state[7], output, 28 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256_finish( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[32] ) +{ + mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ + +/* + * output = SHA-256( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[32], + int is224 ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; + + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx, is224 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha256( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[32], + int is224 ) +{ + mbedtls_sha256_ret( input, ilen, output, is224 ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * FIPS-180-2 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char sha256_test_buf[3][57] = +{ + { "abc" }, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, + { "" } +}; + +static const size_t sha256_test_buflen[3] = +{ + 3, 56, 1000 +}; + +static const unsigned char sha256_test_sum[6][32] = +{ + /* + * SHA-224 test vectors + */ + { 0x23, 0x09, 0x7D, 0x22, 0x34, 0x05, 0xD8, 0x22, + 0x86, 0x42, 0xA4, 0x77, 0xBD, 0xA2, 0x55, 0xB3, + 0x2A, 0xAD, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0xBD, 0xA0, 0xB3, 0xF7, + 0xE3, 0x6C, 0x9D, 0xA7 }, + { 0x75, 0x38, 0x8B, 0x16, 0x51, 0x27, 0x76, 0xCC, + 0x5D, 0xBA, 0x5D, 0xA1, 0xFD, 0x89, 0x01, 0x50, + 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x45, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0xF5, 0x8B, 0x19, + 0x52, 0x52, 0x25, 0x25 }, + { 0x20, 0x79, 0x46, 0x55, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xD8, + 0xBB, 0xB4, 0xC1, 0xEA, 0x97, 0x61, 0x8A, 0x4B, + 0xF0, 0x3F, 0x42, 0x58, 0x19, 0x48, 0xB2, 0xEE, + 0x4E, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x67 }, + + /* + * SHA-256 test vectors + */ + { 0xBA, 0x78, 0x16, 0xBF, 0x8F, 0x01, 0xCF, 0xEA, + 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xDE, 0x5D, 0xAE, 0x22, 0x23, + 0xB0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xA3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7A, 0x9C, + 0xB4, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x61, 0xF2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xAD }, + { 0x24, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0x61, 0xD2, 0x06, 0x38, 0xB8, + 0xE5, 0xC0, 0x26, 0x93, 0x0C, 0x3E, 0x60, 0x39, + 0xA3, 0x3C, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x64, 0xFF, 0x21, 0x67, + 0xF6, 0xEC, 0xED, 0xD4, 0x19, 0xDB, 0x06, 0xC1 }, + { 0xCD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0x5C, 0x99, 0x14, 0xFB, 0x92, + 0x81, 0xA1, 0xC7, 0xE2, 0x84, 0xD7, 0x3E, 0x67, + 0xF1, 0x80, 0x9A, 0x48, 0xA4, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0E, + 0x04, 0x6D, 0x39, 0xCC, 0xC7, 0x11, 0x2C, 0xD0 } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, j, k, buflen, ret = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char sha256sum[32]; + mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; + + buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1024, sizeof(unsigned char) ); + if( NULL == buf ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "Buffer allocation failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + mbedtls_sha256_init( &ctx ); + + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + j = i % 3; + k = i < 3; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " SHA-%d test #%d: ", 256 - k * 32, j + 1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ctx, k ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( j == 2 ) + { + memset( buf, 'a', buflen = 1000 ); + + for( j = 0; j < 1000; j++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx, buf, buflen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ctx, sha256_test_buf[j], + sha256_test_buflen[j] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &ctx, sha256sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + + if( memcmp( sha256sum, sha256_test_sum[i], 32 - k * 4 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + goto exit; + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/sha512.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/sha512.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1a6872c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/sha512.c @@ -0,0 +1,652 @@ +/* + * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-384/512 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The SHA-512 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__WATCOMC__) + #define UL64(x) x##ui64 +#else + #define UL64(x) x##ULL +#endif + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#define SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ + MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) +#define SHA512_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond ) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) +static void sha512_put_uint64_be( uint64_t n, unsigned char *b, uint8_t i ) +{ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(n, b, i); +} +#else +#define sha512_put_uint64_be MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ + +void mbedtls_sha512_init( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ) +{ + SHA512_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL ); + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_sha512_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha512_free( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_sha512_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_sha512_clone( mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha512_context *src ) +{ + SHA512_VALIDATE( dst != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE( src != NULL ); + + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-512 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384 ) +{ + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 ); +#else + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 ); +#endif + + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + if( is384 == 0 ) + { + /* SHA-512 */ + ctx->state[0] = UL64(0x6A09E667F3BCC908); + ctx->state[1] = UL64(0xBB67AE8584CAA73B); + ctx->state[2] = UL64(0x3C6EF372FE94F82B); + ctx->state[3] = UL64(0xA54FF53A5F1D36F1); + ctx->state[4] = UL64(0x510E527FADE682D1); + ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x9B05688C2B3E6C1F); + ctx->state[6] = UL64(0x1F83D9ABFB41BD6B); + ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x5BE0CD19137E2179); + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +#else + /* SHA-384 */ + ctx->state[0] = UL64(0xCBBB9D5DC1059ED8); + ctx->state[1] = UL64(0x629A292A367CD507); + ctx->state[2] = UL64(0x9159015A3070DD17); + ctx->state[3] = UL64(0x152FECD8F70E5939); + ctx->state[4] = UL64(0x67332667FFC00B31); + ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x8EB44A8768581511); + ctx->state[6] = UL64(0xDB0C2E0D64F98FA7); + ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x47B5481DBEFA4FA4); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + ctx->is384 = is384; +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512_starts( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + int is384 ) +{ + mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( ctx, is384 ); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) + +/* + * Round constants + */ +static const uint64_t K[80] = +{ + UL64(0x428A2F98D728AE22), UL64(0x7137449123EF65CD), + UL64(0xB5C0FBCFEC4D3B2F), UL64(0xE9B5DBA58189DBBC), + UL64(0x3956C25BF348B538), UL64(0x59F111F1B605D019), + UL64(0x923F82A4AF194F9B), UL64(0xAB1C5ED5DA6D8118), + UL64(0xD807AA98A3030242), UL64(0x12835B0145706FBE), + UL64(0x243185BE4EE4B28C), UL64(0x550C7DC3D5FFB4E2), + UL64(0x72BE5D74F27B896F), UL64(0x80DEB1FE3B1696B1), + UL64(0x9BDC06A725C71235), UL64(0xC19BF174CF692694), + UL64(0xE49B69C19EF14AD2), UL64(0xEFBE4786384F25E3), + UL64(0x0FC19DC68B8CD5B5), UL64(0x240CA1CC77AC9C65), + UL64(0x2DE92C6F592B0275), UL64(0x4A7484AA6EA6E483), + UL64(0x5CB0A9DCBD41FBD4), UL64(0x76F988DA831153B5), + UL64(0x983E5152EE66DFAB), UL64(0xA831C66D2DB43210), + UL64(0xB00327C898FB213F), UL64(0xBF597FC7BEEF0EE4), + UL64(0xC6E00BF33DA88FC2), UL64(0xD5A79147930AA725), + UL64(0x06CA6351E003826F), UL64(0x142929670A0E6E70), + UL64(0x27B70A8546D22FFC), UL64(0x2E1B21385C26C926), + UL64(0x4D2C6DFC5AC42AED), UL64(0x53380D139D95B3DF), + UL64(0x650A73548BAF63DE), UL64(0x766A0ABB3C77B2A8), + UL64(0x81C2C92E47EDAEE6), UL64(0x92722C851482353B), + UL64(0xA2BFE8A14CF10364), UL64(0xA81A664BBC423001), + UL64(0xC24B8B70D0F89791), UL64(0xC76C51A30654BE30), + UL64(0xD192E819D6EF5218), UL64(0xD69906245565A910), + UL64(0xF40E35855771202A), UL64(0x106AA07032BBD1B8), + UL64(0x19A4C116B8D2D0C8), UL64(0x1E376C085141AB53), + UL64(0x2748774CDF8EEB99), UL64(0x34B0BCB5E19B48A8), + UL64(0x391C0CB3C5C95A63), UL64(0x4ED8AA4AE3418ACB), + UL64(0x5B9CCA4F7763E373), UL64(0x682E6FF3D6B2B8A3), + UL64(0x748F82EE5DEFB2FC), UL64(0x78A5636F43172F60), + UL64(0x84C87814A1F0AB72), UL64(0x8CC702081A6439EC), + UL64(0x90BEFFFA23631E28), UL64(0xA4506CEBDE82BDE9), + UL64(0xBEF9A3F7B2C67915), UL64(0xC67178F2E372532B), + UL64(0xCA273ECEEA26619C), UL64(0xD186B8C721C0C207), + UL64(0xEADA7DD6CDE0EB1E), UL64(0xF57D4F7FEE6ED178), + UL64(0x06F067AA72176FBA), UL64(0x0A637DC5A2C898A6), + UL64(0x113F9804BEF90DAE), UL64(0x1B710B35131C471B), + UL64(0x28DB77F523047D84), UL64(0x32CAAB7B40C72493), + UL64(0x3C9EBE0A15C9BEBC), UL64(0x431D67C49C100D4C), + UL64(0x4CC5D4BECB3E42B6), UL64(0x597F299CFC657E2A), + UL64(0x5FCB6FAB3AD6FAEC), UL64(0x6C44198C4A475817) +}; + +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[128] ) +{ + int i; + struct + { + uint64_t temp1, temp2, W[80]; + uint64_t A[8]; + } local; + + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (const unsigned char *)data != NULL ); + +#define SHR(x,n) ((x) >> (n)) +#define ROTR(x,n) (SHR((x),(n)) | ((x) << (64 - (n)))) + +#define S0(x) (ROTR(x, 1) ^ ROTR(x, 8) ^ SHR(x, 7)) +#define S1(x) (ROTR(x,19) ^ ROTR(x,61) ^ SHR(x, 6)) + +#define S2(x) (ROTR(x,28) ^ ROTR(x,34) ^ ROTR(x,39)) +#define S3(x) (ROTR(x,14) ^ ROTR(x,18) ^ ROTR(x,41)) + +#define F0(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define F1(x,y,z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) + +#define P(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,x,K) \ + do \ + { \ + local.temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e),(f),(g)) + (K) + (x); \ + local.temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a),(b),(c)); \ + (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ + } while( 0 ) + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) + for( i = 0; i < 80; i++ ) + { + if( i < 16 ) + { + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, i << 3 ); + } + else + { + local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + + S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; + } + + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); + + local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; + local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; + local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; + local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; + local.A[0] = local.temp1; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ + for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) + { + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE( data, i << 3 ); + } + + for( ; i < 80; i++ ) + { + local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + + S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; + } + + i = 0; + do + { + P( local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + P( local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i], K[i] ); i++; + } + while( i < 80 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &local, sizeof( local ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512_process( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[128] ) +{ + mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, data ); +} +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * SHA-512 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + unsigned int left; + + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + + if( ilen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + left = (unsigned int) (ctx->total[0] & 0x7F); + fill = 128 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint64_t) ilen; + + if( ctx->total[0] < (uint64_t) ilen ) + ctx->total[1]++; + + if( left && ilen >= fill ) + { + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while( ilen >= 128 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, input ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + input += 128; + ilen -= 128; + } + + if( ilen > 0 ) + memcpy( (void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512_update( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen ) +{ + mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( ctx, input, ilen ); +} +#endif + +/* + * SHA-512 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[64] ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned used; + uint64_t high, low; + + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 16 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x7F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if( used <= 112 ) + { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 112 - used ); + } + else + { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset( ctx->buffer + used, 0, 128 - used ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( ctx->buffer, 0, 112 ); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = ( ctx->total[0] >> 61 ) + | ( ctx->total[1] << 3 ); + low = ( ctx->total[0] << 3 ); + + sha512_put_uint64_be( high, ctx->buffer, 112 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( low, ctx->buffer, 120 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process( ctx, ctx->buffer ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* + * Output final state + */ + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[0], output, 0 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[1], output, 8 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[2], output, 16 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[3], output, 24 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[4], output, 32 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[5], output, 40 ); + + int truncated = 0; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + truncated = ctx->is384; +#endif + if( !truncated ) + { + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[6], output, 48 ); + sha512_put_uint64_be( ctx->state[7], output, 56 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512_finish( mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[64] ) +{ + mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( ctx, output ); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ + +/* + * output = SHA-512( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_ret( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[64], + int is384 ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 || is384 == 1 ); +#else + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( is384 == 0 ); +#endif + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL ); + SHA512_VALIDATE_RET( (unsigned char *)output != NULL ); + + mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx, is384 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx, input, ilen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &ctx, output ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha512_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_sha512( const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[64], + int is384 ) +{ + mbedtls_sha512_ret( input, ilen, output, is384 ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * FIPS-180-2 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char sha512_test_buf[3][113] = +{ + { "abc" }, + { "abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmnhijklmnoijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu" }, + { "" } +}; + +static const size_t sha512_test_buflen[3] = +{ + 3, 112, 1000 +}; + +static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] = +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + /* + * SHA-384 test vectors + */ + { 0xCB, 0x00, 0x75, 0x3F, 0x45, 0xA3, 0x5E, 0x8B, + 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x3D, 0x69, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x07, + 0x27, 0x2C, 0x32, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0xDE, 0xD1, 0x63, + 0x1A, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x5A, 0x43, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xED, + 0x80, 0x86, 0x07, 0x2B, 0xA1, 0xE7, 0xCC, 0x23, + 0x58, 0xBA, 0xEC, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC8, 0x25, 0xA7 }, + { 0x09, 0x33, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xF7, 0x11, 0x47, 0xE8, + 0x3D, 0x19, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x82, 0xCD, 0x1B, 0x47, + 0x53, 0x11, 0x1B, 0x17, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x05, 0xD2, + 0x2F, 0xA0, 0x80, 0x86, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0x12, + 0xFC, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0x1A, 0x55, 0x7E, 0x2D, 0xB9, + 0x66, 0xC3, 0xE9, 0xFA, 0x91, 0x74, 0x60, 0x39 }, + { 0x9D, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x71, 0x64, 0x74, 0xCB, + 0x08, 0x6E, 0x83, 0x4E, 0x31, 0x0A, 0x4A, 0x1C, + 0xED, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF2, 0x48, 0x52, + 0x79, 0x72, 0xCE, 0xC5, 0x70, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0x5B, + 0x07, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0xDC, 0x38, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xEB, + 0xAE, 0x97, 0xDD, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x3D, 0x89, 0x85 }, +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ + + /* + * SHA-512 test vectors + */ + { 0xDD, 0xAF, 0x35, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x61, 0x7A, 0xBA, + 0xCC, 0x41, 0x73, 0x49, 0xAE, 0x20, 0x41, 0x31, + 0x12, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0x4E, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x7E, 0xA2, + 0x0A, 0x9E, 0xEE, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, + 0x21, 0x92, 0x99, 0x2A, 0x27, 0x4F, 0xC1, 0xA8, + 0x36, 0xBA, 0x3C, 0x23, 0xA3, 0xFE, 0xEB, 0xBD, + 0x45, 0x4D, 0x44, 0x23, 0x64, 0x3C, 0xE8, 0x0E, + 0x2A, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0x4F, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0xA4, 0x9F }, + { 0x8E, 0x95, 0x9B, 0x75, 0xDA, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xDA, + 0x8C, 0xF4, 0xF7, 0x28, 0x14, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x3F, + 0x8F, 0x77, 0x79, 0xC6, 0xEB, 0x9F, 0x7F, 0xA1, + 0x72, 0x99, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0xB6, 0x88, 0x90, 0x18, + 0x50, 0x1D, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x49, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xE4, + 0x33, 0x1B, 0x99, 0xDE, 0xC4, 0xB5, 0x43, 0x3A, + 0xC7, 0xD3, 0x29, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0xDD, 0x26, 0x54, + 0x5E, 0x96, 0xE5, 0x5B, 0x87, 0x4B, 0xE9, 0x09 }, + { 0xE7, 0x18, 0x48, 0x3D, 0x0C, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x64, + 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x42, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x15, 0xB4, 0x63, + 0x8E, 0x1F, 0x98, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x20, 0x44, 0x28, + 0x56, 0x32, 0xA8, 0x03, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0x73, 0xEB, + 0xDE, 0x0F, 0xF2, 0x44, 0x87, 0x7E, 0xA6, 0x0A, + 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x43, 0x2C, 0xE5, 0x77, 0xC3, 0x1B, + 0xEB, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0x49, 0xAA, 0x2E, + 0x4E, 0xAD, 0xB2, 0x17, 0xAD, 0x8C, 0xC0, 0x9B } +}; + +#define ARRAY_LENGTH( a ) ( sizeof( a ) / sizeof( ( a )[0] ) ) + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, j, k, buflen, ret = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char sha512sum[64]; + mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; + + buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1024, sizeof(unsigned char) ); + if( NULL == buf ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "Buffer allocation failed\n" ); + + return( 1 ); + } + + mbedtls_sha512_init( &ctx ); + + for( i = 0; i < (int) ARRAY_LENGTH(sha512_test_sum); i++ ) + { + j = i % 3; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + k = i < 3; +#else + k = 0; +#endif + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " SHA-%d test #%d: ", 512 - k * 128, j + 1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ctx, k ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( j == 2 ) + { + memset( buf, 'a', buflen = 1000 ); + + for( j = 0; j < 1000; j++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx, buf, buflen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ctx, sha512_test_buf[j], + sha512_test_buflen[j] ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto fail; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &ctx, sha512sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto fail; + + if( memcmp( sha512sum, sha512_test_sum[i], 64 - k * 16 ) != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + goto exit; + +fail: + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_sha512_free( &ctx ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#undef ARRAY_LENGTH + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_cache.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_cache.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7a600cad --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_cache.c @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ +/* + * SSL session cache implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * These session callbacks use a simple chained list + * to store and retrieve the session information. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" + +#include + +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ) +{ + memset( cache, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context ) ); + + cache->timeout = MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT; + cache->max_entries = MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &cache->mutex ); +#endif +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + int ret = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *entry; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + + cur = cache->chain; + entry = NULL; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + entry = cur; + cur = cur->next; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( cache->timeout != 0 && + (int) ( t - entry->timestamp ) > cache->timeout ) + continue; +#endif + + if( session->id_len != entry->session.id_len || + memcmp( session->id, entry->session.id, + entry->session.id_len ) != 0 ) + { + continue; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( session, &entry->session ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* + * Restore peer certificate (without rest of the original chain) + */ + if( entry->peer_cert.p != NULL ) + { + /* `session->peer_cert` is NULL after the call to + * mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(), because cache entries + * have the `peer_cert` field set to NULL. */ + + if( ( session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, + sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert ); + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( session->peer_cert, entry->peer_cert.p, + entry->peer_cert.len ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 ) + ret = 1; +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + int ret = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time( NULL ), oldest = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *old = NULL; +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *prv; + int count = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &cache->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + cur = cache->chain; + prv = NULL; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + count++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( cache->timeout != 0 && + (int) ( t - cur->timestamp ) > cache->timeout ) + { + cur->timestamp = t; + break; /* expired, reuse this slot, update timestamp */ + } +#endif + + if( memcmp( session->id, cur->session.id, cur->session.id_len ) == 0 ) + break; /* client reconnected, keep timestamp for session id */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( oldest == 0 || cur->timestamp < oldest ) + { + oldest = cur->timestamp; + old = cur; + } +#endif + + prv = cur; + cur = cur->next; + } + + if( cur == NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + /* + * Reuse oldest entry if max_entries reached + */ + if( count >= cache->max_entries ) + { + if( old == NULL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + cur = old; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + /* + * Reuse first entry in chain if max_entries reached, + * but move to last place + */ + if( count >= cache->max_entries ) + { + if( cache->chain == NULL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + cur = cache->chain; + cache->chain = cur->next; + cur->next = NULL; + prv->next = cur; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + else + { + /* + * max_entries not reached, create new entry + */ + cur = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry) ); + if( cur == NULL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( prv == NULL ) + cache->chain = cur; + else + prv->next = cur; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + cur->timestamp = t; +#endif + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* + * If we're reusing an entry, free its certificate first + */ + if( cur->peer_cert.p != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( cur->peer_cert.p ); + memset( &cur->peer_cert, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* Copy the entire session; this temporarily makes a copy of the + * X.509 CRT structure even though we only want to store the raw CRT. + * This inefficiency will go away as soon as we implement on-demand + * parsing of CRTs, in which case there's no need for the `peer_cert` + * field anymore in the first place, and we're done after this call. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( &cur->session, session ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* If present, free the X.509 structure and only store the raw CRT data. */ + if( cur->session.peer_cert != NULL ) + { + cur->peer_cert.p = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len ); + if( cur->peer_cert.p == NULL ) + { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + memcpy( cur->peer_cert.p, + cur->session.peer_cert->raw.p, + cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len ); + cur->peer_cert.len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( cur->session.peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( cur->session.peer_cert ); + cur->session.peer_cert = NULL; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + ret = 0; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &cache->mutex ) != 0 ) + ret = 1; +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int timeout ) +{ + if( timeout < 0 ) timeout = 0; + + cache->timeout = timeout; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int max ) +{ + if( max < 0 ) max = 0; + + cache->max_entries = max; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *prv; + + cur = cache->chain; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + prv = cur; + cur = cur->next; + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &prv->session ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_free( prv->peer_cert.p ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + mbedtls_free( prv ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &cache->mutex ); +#endif + cache->chain = NULL; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2bc8a9bb --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c @@ -0,0 +1,2369 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_ciphersuites.c + * + * \brief SSL ciphersuites for mbed TLS + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" + +#include + +#undef HAVE_SHA384 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#define HAVE_SHA384 +#endif + +/* + * Ordered from most preferred to least preferred in terms of security. + * + * Current rule (except RC4 and 3DES, weak and null which come last): + * 1. By key exchange: + * Forward-secure non-PSK > forward-secure PSK > ECJPAKE > other non-PSK > other PSK + * 2. By key length and cipher: + * ChaCha > AES-256 > Camellia-256 > ARIA-256 > AES-128 > Camellia-128 > ARIA-128 + * 3. By cipher mode when relevant GCM > CCM > CBC > CCM_8 + * 4. By hash function used when relevant + * 5. By key exchange/auth again: EC > non-EC + */ +static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES) + MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES, +#else + /* Chacha-Poly ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + + /* All AES-256 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + + /* All CAMELLIA-256 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + + /* All ARIA-256 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + /* All AES-128 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + + /* All CAMELLIA-128 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + + /* All ARIA-128 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* The PSK ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* The ECJPAKE suite */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + + /* All AES-256 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + + /* All CAMELLIA-256 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + /* All ARIA-256 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + /* All AES-128 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + + /* All CAMELLIA-128 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* All ARIA-128 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* The RSA PSK suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* The PSK suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* 3DES suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + + /* RC4 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + + /* Weak suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + + /* NULL suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, + + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES */ + 0 +}; + +static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C && + MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, "TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-MD5", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-MD5", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, + 0 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + + + { 0, "", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES) +const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void ) +{ + return( ciphersuite_preference ); +} +#else +#define MAX_CIPHERSUITES sizeof( ciphersuite_definitions ) / \ + sizeof( ciphersuite_definitions[0] ) +static int supported_ciphersuites[MAX_CIPHERSUITES]; +static int supported_init = 0; + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ciphersuite_is_removed( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info ) +{ + (void)cs_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES) + if( cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) + return( 1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES) + if( cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB || + cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC ) + { + return( 1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites( void ) +{ + /* + * On initial call filter out all ciphersuites not supported by current + * build based on presence in the ciphersuite_definitions. + */ + if( supported_init == 0 ) + { + const int *p; + int *q; + + for( p = ciphersuite_preference, q = supported_ciphersuites; + *p != 0 && q < supported_ciphersuites + MAX_CIPHERSUITES - 1; + p++ ) + { + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info; + if( ( cs_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( *p ) ) != NULL && + !ciphersuite_is_removed( cs_info ) ) + { + *(q++) = *p; + } + } + *q = 0; + + supported_init = 1; + } + + return( supported_ciphersuites ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES */ + +const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string( + const char *ciphersuite_name ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cur = ciphersuite_definitions; + + if( NULL == ciphersuite_name ) + return( NULL ); + + while( cur->id != 0 ) + { + if( 0 == strcmp( cur->name, ciphersuite_name ) ) + return( cur ); + + cur++; + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( int ciphersuite ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cur = ciphersuite_definitions; + + while( cur->id != 0 ) + { + if( cur->id == ciphersuite ) + return( cur ); + + cur++; + } + + return( NULL ); +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( const int ciphersuite_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cur; + + cur = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite_id ); + + if( cur == NULL ) + return( "unknown" ); + + return( cur->name ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( const char *ciphersuite_name ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cur; + + cur = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string( ciphersuite_name ); + + if( cur == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + return( cur->id ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ); + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); + } +} + +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); + + default: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info ) +{ + switch( info->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + return( 1 ); + + default: + return( 0 ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_cli.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_cli.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b40ddb70 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_cli.c @@ -0,0 +1,4611 @@ +/* + * SSLv3/TLSv1 client-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#include + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_has_static_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ + if( conf->psk_identity == NULL || + conf->psk_identity_len == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ + if( conf->psk_identity == NULL || + conf->psk_identity_len == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t hostname_len; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->hostname == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding server name extension: %s", + ssl->hostname ) ); + + hostname_len = strlen( ssl->hostname ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, hostname_len + 9 ); + + /* + * Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions) + * + * In order to provide any of the server names, clients MAY include an + * extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The + * "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain + * "ServerNameList" where: + * + * struct { + * NameType name_type; + * select (name_type) { + * case host_name: HostName; + * } name; + * } ServerName; + * + * enum { + * host_name(0), (255) + * } NameType; + * + * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; + * + * struct { + * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> + * } ServerNameList; + * + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( hostname_len + 5, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( hostname_len + 3, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( hostname_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + memcpy( p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len ); + + *olen = hostname_len + 9; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + /* We're always including a TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV in the + * initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation + * info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */ + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 + ssl->verify_data_len ); + + /* + * Secure renegotiation + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->verify_data_len ); + + memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); + + *olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/* + * Only if we handle at least one key exchange that needs signatures. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t sig_alg_len = 0; + const int *md; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + unsigned char *sig_alg_list = buf + 6; +#endif + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->max_minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension" ) ); + + if( ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + for( md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + sig_alg_len += 2; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + sig_alg_len += 2; +#endif + if( sig_alg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "length in bytes of sig-hash-alg extension too big" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + } + } + + /* Empty signature algorithms list, this is a configuration error. */ + if( sig_alg_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, sig_alg_len + 6 ); + + /* + * Prepare signature_algorithms extension (TLS 1.2) + */ + sig_alg_len = 0; + + for( md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++ ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( *md ); + sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( *md ); + sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; +#endif + } + + /* + * enum { + * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), + * sha512(6), (255) + * } HashAlgorithm; + * + * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) } + * SignatureAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sig_alg_len + 2, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sig_alg_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *olen = 6 + sig_alg_len; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *elliptic_curve_list = p + 6; + size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id; + + *olen = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension" ) ); + + if( ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; + *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + grp_id++ ) + { + info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); + if( info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "invalid curve in ssl configuration" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + } + elliptic_curve_len += 2; + + if( elliptic_curve_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "malformed supported_elliptic_curves extension in config" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + } + } + + /* Empty elliptic curve list, this is a configuration error. */ + if( elliptic_curve_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 + elliptic_curve_len ); + + elliptic_curve_len = 0; + + for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; + *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + grp_id++ ) + { + info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id ); + elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( info->tls_id ); + elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( info->tls_id ); + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( elliptic_curve_len + 2, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( elliptic_curve_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *olen = 6 + elliptic_curve_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + (void) ssl; /* ssl used for debugging only */ + + *olen = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 2; + + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + + *olen = 6; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t kkpp_len; + + *olen = 0; + + /* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */ + if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + /* + * We may need to send ClientHello multiple times for Hello verification. + * We don't want to compute fresh values every time (both for performance + * and consistency reasons), so cache the extension content. + */ + if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL || + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "generating new ecjpake parameters" ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , + "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc( 1, kkpp_len ); + if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "allocation failed" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, p + 2, kkpp_len ); + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = kkpp_len; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" ) ); + + kkpp_len = ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p + 2, end, kkpp_len ); + + memcpy( p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len ); + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( kkpp_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *olen = kkpp_len + 4; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + + /* + * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + + *olen = 0; + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding CID extension" ) ); + + /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) ); + + /* Add extension ID + size */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len ); + + *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 1; + + *p++ = ssl->conf->mfl_code; + + *olen = 5; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) ); + + /* The addition is safe here since the ticket length is 16 bit. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 + tlen ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( tlen, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *olen = 4; + + if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "sending session ticket of length %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, tlen ) ); + + memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen ); + + *olen += tlen; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t alpnlen = 0; + const char **cur; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding alpn extension" ) ); + + for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) + alpnlen += strlen( *cur ) + 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 + alpnlen ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + */ + + /* Skip writing extension and list length for now */ + p += 4; + + for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) + { + /* + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_alpn_protocols() checked that the length of + * protocol names is less than 255. + */ + *p = (unsigned char)strlen( *cur ); + memcpy( p + 1, *cur, *p ); + p += 1 + *p; + } + + *olen = p - buf; + + /* List length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 6, buf, 4 ); + + /* Extension length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 4, buf, 2 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t protection_profiles_index = 0, ext_len = 0; + uint16_t mki_len = 0, profile_value = 0; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + */ + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ) + { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + /* Extension length = 2 bytes for profiles length, + * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len * 2 (each profile is 2 bytes length ), + * 1 byte for srtp_mki vector length and the mki_len value + */ + ext_len = 2 + 2 * ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + 1 + mki_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" ) ); + + /* Check there is room in the buffer for the extension + 4 bytes + * - the extension tag (2 bytes) + * - the extension length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, ext_len + 4 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + /* protection profile length: 2*(ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) */ + /* micro-optimization: + * the list size is limited to MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + * which is lower than 127, so the upper byte of the length is always 0 + * For the documentation, the more generic code is left in comments + * *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + * >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + */ + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ); + + for( protection_profiles_index=0; + protection_profiles_index < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; + protection_profiles_index++ ) + { + profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] ); + if( profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext, add profile: %04x", + profile_value ) ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( profile_value, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + } + else + { + /* + * Note: we shall never arrive here as protection profiles + * is checked by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles function + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, " + "illegal DTLS-SRTP protection profile %d", + ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] + ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ); + } + } + + *p++ = mki_len & 0xFF; + + if( mki_len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len ); + /* + * Increment p to point to the current position. + */ + p += mki_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "sending mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } + + /* + * total extension length: extension type (2 bytes) + * + extension length (2 bytes) + * + protection profile length (2 bytes) + * + 2 * number of protection profiles + * + srtp_mki vector length(1 byte) + * + mki value + */ + *olen = p - buf; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +/* + * Generate random bytes for ClientHello + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->randbytes; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t; +#endif + + /* + * When responding to a verify request, MUST reuse random (RFC 6347 4.2.1) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie != NULL ) + { + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + t = mbedtls_time( NULL ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( t, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, + (long long) t ) ); +#else + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p += 4; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/** + * \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context. + * + * \param suite_info cipher suite to validate + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param min_minor_ver Minimal minor version to accept a cipher suite + * \param max_minor_ver Maximal minor version to accept a cipher suite + * + * \return 0 if valid, else 1 + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * suite_info, + const mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl, + int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver ) +{ + (void) ssl; + if( suite_info == NULL ) + return( 1 ); + + if( suite_info->min_minor_ver > max_minor_ver || + suite_info->max_minor_ver < min_minor_ver ) + return( 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && + suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && + mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) + return( 1 ); +#endif + + /* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) && + ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, n, olen, ext_len = 0; + + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p, *q; + const unsigned char *end; + + unsigned char offer_compress; + const int *ciphersuites; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + int uses_ec = 0; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client hello" ) ); + + if( ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided") ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG ); + } + + int renegotiating = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + renegotiating = 1; +#endif + if( !renegotiating ) + { + ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->min_major_ver; + ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->min_minor_ver; + } + + if( ssl->conf->max_major_ver == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "configured max major version is invalid, consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + buf = ssl->out_msg; + end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + + /* + * Check if there's enough space for the first part of the ClientHello + * consisting of the 38 bytes described below, the session identifier (at + * most 32 bytes) and its length (1 byte). + * + * Use static upper bounds instead of the actual values + * to allow the compiler to optimize this away. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 ); + + /* + * The 38 first bytes of the ClientHello: + * 0 . 0 handshake type (written later) + * 1 . 3 handshake length (written later) + * 4 . 5 highest version supported + * 6 . 9 current UNIX time + * 10 . 37 random bytes + * + * The current UNIX time (4 bytes) and following 28 random bytes are written + * by ssl_generate_random() into ssl->handshake->randbytes buffer and then + * copied from there into the output buffer. + */ + + p = buf + 4; + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, p ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, max version: [%d:%d]", + buf[4], buf[5] ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_generate_random( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_generate_random", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 32 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", p, 32 ); + p += 32; + + /* + * 38 . 38 session id length + * 39 . 39+n session id + * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) + * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie + * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. ciphersuitelist + * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) + * .. . .. compression methods + * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. extensions + */ + n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + + if( n < 16 || n > 32 || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || +#endif + ssl->handshake->resume == 0 ) + { + n = 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + /* + * RFC 5077 section 3.4: "When presenting a ticket, the client MAY + * generate and include a Session ID in the TLS ClientHello." + */ + if( !renegotiating ) + { + if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket != NULL && + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0 ) + { + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, + ssl->session_negotiate->id, 32 ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + /* + * The first check of the output buffer size above ( + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 );) + * has checked that there is enough space in the output buffer for the + * session identifier length byte and the session identifier (n <= 32). + */ + *p++ = (unsigned char) n; + + for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) + *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->id[i]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 39, n ); + + /* + * With 'n' being the length of the session identifier + * + * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) + * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie + * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. ciphersuitelist + * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) + * .. . .. compression methods + * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. extensions + */ + + /* + * DTLS cookie + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 1 ); + + if( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no verify cookie to send" ) ); + *p++ = 0; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie", + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len ); + + *p++ = ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len ); + memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len ); + p += ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Ciphersuite list + */ + ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; + + /* Skip writing ciphersuite length for now */ + n = 0; + q = p; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + p += 2; + + for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) + { + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuites[i] ); + + if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( ciphersuite_info, ssl, + ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) != 0 ) + continue; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", + (unsigned int)ciphersuites[i], ciphersuite_info->name ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( ciphersuite_info ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + + n++; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ciphersuites[i], p, 0 ); + p += 2; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) ); + + /* + * Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV + */ + if( !renegotiating ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + n++; + } + + /* Some versions of OpenSSL don't handle it correctly if not at end */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) + if( ssl->conf->fallback == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + n++; + } +#endif + + *q++ = (unsigned char)( n >> 7 ); + *q++ = (unsigned char)( n << 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + offer_compress = 1; +#else + offer_compress = 0; +#endif + + /* + * We don't support compression with DTLS right now: if many records come + * in the same datagram, uncompressing one could overwrite the next one. + * We don't want to add complexity for handling that case unless there is + * an actual need for it. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + offer_compress = 0; +#endif + + if( offer_compress ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d %d", + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 3 ); + *p++ = 2; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d", + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; + } + + /* First write extensions, then the total length */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_hostname_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_hostname_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + + /* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added + * even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_renegotiation_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( uses_ec ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; + + if( ( ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_cid_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_extended_ms_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_alpn_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if( ( ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, + end, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_session_ticket_ext", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + ext_len += olen; +#endif + + /* olen unused if all extensions are disabled */ + ((void) olen); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ext_len ) ); + + if( ext_len > 0 ) + { + /* No need to check for space here, because the extension + * writing functions already took care of that. */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2 + ext_len; + } + + ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client hello" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + { + /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ + if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 || + buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len * 2 || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1, + ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len, + ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + /* + * server should use the extension only if we did, + * and if so the server's value should match ours (and len is always 1) + */ + if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE || + len != 1 || + buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching max fragment length extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED || + len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching truncated HMAC extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t peer_cid_len; + + if( /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ + ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + /* The server must only send the CID extension if we have offered it. */ + ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension unexpected" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + if( len == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + peer_cid_len = *buf++; + len--; + + if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + if( len != peer_cid_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Server CID", buf, peer_cid_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || + len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || + len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED || + len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-matching session ticket extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t list_size; + const unsigned char *p; + + if( len == 0 || (size_t)( buf[0] + 1 ) != len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + list_size = buf[0]; + + p = buf + 1; + while( list_size > 0 ) + { + if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + list_size--; + p++; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no point format in common" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* If we got here, we no longer need our cached extension */ + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache ); + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + buf, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + size_t list_len, name_len; + const char **p; + + /* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */ + if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching ALPN extension" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + * + * the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName" + */ + + /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */ + if( len < 4 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; + if( list_len != len - 2 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + name_len = buf[2]; + if( name_len != list_len - 1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */ + for( p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++ ) + { + if( name_len == strlen( *p ) && + memcmp( buf + 3, *p, name_len ) == 0 ) + { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *p; + return( 0 ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ALPN extension: no matching protocol" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile server_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + size_t i, mki_len = 0; + uint16_t server_protection_profile_value = 0; + + /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) ) + return( 0 ); + + /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + * + */ + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ) + { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + + /* + * Length is 5 + optional mki_value : one protection profile length (2 bytes) + * + protection profile (2 bytes) + * + mki_len(1 byte) + * and optional srtp_mki + */ + if( ( len < 5 ) || ( len != ( buf[4] + 5u ) ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + + /* + * get the server protection profile + */ + + /* + * protection profile length must be 0x0002 as we must have only + * one protection profile in server Hello + */ + if( ( buf[0] != 0 ) || ( buf[1] != 2 ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + + server_protection_profile_value = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3]; + server_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( + server_protection_profile_value ); + if( server_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + server_protection ) ) ); + } + + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + + /* + * Check we have the server profile in our list + */ + for( i=0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) + { + if( server_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i] ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + server_protection ) ) ); + break; + } + } + + /* If no match was found : server problem, it shall never answer with incompatible profile */ + if( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* If server does not use mki in its reply, make sure the client won't keep + * one as negotiated */ + if( len == 5 ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = 0; + } + + /* + * RFC5764: + * If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's response + * that is different than the one the client offered, then the client + * MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an invalid_parameter alert. + */ + if( len > 5 && ( buf[4] != mki_len || + ( memcmp( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len ) ) ) ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } +#if defined (MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( len > 5 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "received mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } +#endif + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +/* + * Parse HelloVerifyRequest. Only called after verifying the HS type. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + int major_ver, minor_ver; + unsigned char cookie_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) ); + + /* Check that there is enough room for: + * - 2 bytes of version + * - 1 byte of cookie_len + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion server_version; + * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + * } HelloVerifyRequest; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 ); + mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver, ssl->conf->transport, p ); + p += 2; + + /* + * Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (TLS 1.1) + * even is lower than our min version. + */ + if( major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || + minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 || + major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver || + minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server version" ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + } + + cookie_len = *p++; + if( ( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen ) - p < cookie_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "cookie length does not match incoming message size" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len ); + + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie ); + + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cookie_len ); + if( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc failed (%d bytes)", cookie_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, p, cookie_len ); + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = cookie_len; + + /* Start over at ClientHello */ + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; + mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( ssl ); + + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse hello verify request" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +static int is_compression_bad( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char comp ) +{ + int bad_comp = 0; + + /* Suppress warnings in some configurations */ + (void) ssl; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) + bad_comp = 1; +#endif + + if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL && + comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) + bad_comp = 1; +#else /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) + bad_comp = 1; +#endif/* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + return bad_comp; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret, i; + size_t n; + size_t ext_len; + unsigned char *buf, *ext; + unsigned char comp; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int renegotiation_info_seen = 0; +#endif + int handshake_failure = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* No alert on a read error. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + buf = ssl->in_msg; + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + ssl->renego_records_seen++; + + if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 && + ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "renegotiation requested, but not honored by server" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "non-handshake message during renegotiation" ) ); + + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( buf[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received hello verify request" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) ); + return( ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( ssl ) ); + } + else + { + /* We made it through the verification process */ + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie ); + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = NULL; + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if( ssl->in_hslen < 38 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) || + buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * 0 . 1 server_version + * 2 . 33 random (maybe including 4 bytes of Unix time) + * 34 . 34 session_id length = n + * 35 . 34+n session_id + * 35+n . 36+n cipher_suite + * 37+n . 37+n compression_method + * + * 38+n . 39+n extensions length (optional) + * 40+n . .. extensions + */ + buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, version", buf + 0, 2 ); + mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, buf + 0 ); + + if( ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver || + ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver || + ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver || + ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server version out of bounds - min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]", + ssl->conf->min_major_ver, + ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, + ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->max_major_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu", + ( (unsigned long) buf[2] << 24 ) | + ( (unsigned long) buf[3] << 16 ) | + ( (unsigned long) buf[4] << 8 ) | + ( (unsigned long) buf[5] ) ) ); + + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 ); + + n = buf[34]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 ); + + if( n > 32 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + if( ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 39 + n ) + { + ext_len = ( ( buf[38 + n] << 8 ) + | ( buf[39 + n] ) ); + + if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) || + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 40 + n + ext_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + } + else if( ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 38 + n ) + { + ext_len = 0; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + /* ciphersuite (used later) */ + i = ( buf[35 + n] << 8 ) | buf[36 + n]; + + /* + * Read and check compression + */ + comp = buf[37 + n]; + + if( is_compression_bad( ssl, comp ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + /* + * Initialize update checksum functions + */ + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i ); + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", (unsigned int)i ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n ); + + /* + * Check if the session can be resumed + */ + if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 || n == 0 || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || +#endif + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != i || + ssl->session_negotiate->compression != comp || + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n || + memcmp( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n ) != 0 ) + { + ssl->state++; + ssl->handshake->resume = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#endif + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i; + ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n; + memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n ); + } + else + { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed", + ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", (unsigned) i ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d", + buf[37 + n] ) ); + + /* + * Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello. + */ + i = 0; + while( 1 ) + { + if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i] == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i++] == + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) + { + break; + } + } + + suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ); + if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( suite_info, ssl, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->minor_ver ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1; + } +#endif + + if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + && comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE +#endif + ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; + + ext = buf + 40 + n; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, + ( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ext_len ) ); + + while( ext_len ) + { + unsigned int ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 ) + | ( ext[1] ) ); + unsigned int ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 ) + | ( ext[3] ) ); + + if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + switch( ext_id ) + { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + renegotiation_info_seen = 1; +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4, + ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "found max_fragment_length extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated_hmac extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, + ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt_then_mac extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "found extended_master_secret extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session_ticket extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "found supported_point_formats extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found use_srtp extension" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id ) ); + } + + ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; + ext += 4 + ext_size; + + if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + } + + /* + * mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys() has to be called after the parsing of the + * extensions. It sets the transform data for the resumed session which in + * case of DTLS includes the server CID extracted from the CID extension. + */ + if( ssl->handshake->resume ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + /* + * Renegotiation security checks + */ + if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && + renegotiation_info_seen == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + renegotiation_info_seen == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + if( handshake_failure == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t dhm_actual_bitlen; + + /* + * Ephemeral DH parameters: + * + * struct { + * opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>; + * opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>; + * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; + * } ServerDHParams; + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, ( "mbedtls_dhm_read_params" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ); + if( dhm_actual_bitlen < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u", + dhm_actual_bitlen, + ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id; +#else + grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ + + curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id ); + if( curve_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, grp_id ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); +#else + if( ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits < 163 || + ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits > 521 ) + return( -1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end ) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + size_t ecdh_bits = 0; + uint8_t ecpoint_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* + * Parse ECC group + */ + + if( end - *p < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + /* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */ + if( *(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + /* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */ + tls_id = *(*p)++; + tls_id <<= 8; + tls_id |= *(*p)++; + + /* Check it's a curve we offered */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id( ssl, tls_id ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + /* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */ + if( ( handshake->ecdh_psa_type = + mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( tls_id, &ecdh_bits ) ) == 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + if( ecdh_bits > 0xffff ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + handshake->ecdh_bits = (uint16_t) ecdh_bits; + + /* + * Put peer's ECDH public key in the format understood by PSA. + */ + + ecpoint_len = *(*p)++; + if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < ecpoint_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + if( mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( + *p, ecpoint_len, + handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, + sizeof( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey ), + &handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + *p += ecpoint_len; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + /* + * Ephemeral ECDH parameters: + * + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + (const unsigned char **) p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_read_params" ), ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + uint16_t len; + ((void) ssl); + + /* + * PSK parameters: + * + * opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>; + */ + if( end - (*p) < 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1]; + *p += 2; + + if( end - (*p) < len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + /* + * Note: we currently ignore the PSK identity hint, as we only allow one + * PSK to be provisioned on the client. This could be changed later if + * someone needs that feature. + */ + *p += len; + ret = 0; + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) +/* + * Generate a pre-master secret and encrypt it with the server's RSA key + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t offset, size_t *olen, + size_t pms_offset ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len_bytes = ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2; + unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; + + if( offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small for encrypted pms" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + /* + * Generate (part of) the pre-master as + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion client_version; + * opaque random[46]; + * } PreMasterSecret; + */ + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver, + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, p ); + + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p + 2, 46 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_rng", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* + * Now write it out, encrypted + */ + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate key type mismatch" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( peer_pk, + p, ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->out_msg + offset + len_bytes, olen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( len_bytes == 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen, ssl->out_msg, offset ); + *olen += 2; + } +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */ + mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, + mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg ) +{ + ((void) ssl); + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + *pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + + /* Only in TLS 1.2 */ + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( (*p) + 2 > end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + + /* + * Get hash algorithm + */ + if( ( *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( (*p)[0] ) ) + == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "Server used unsupported HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + /* + * Get signature algorithm + */ + if( ( *pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( (*p)[1] ) ) + == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server used unsupported SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + /* + * Check if the hash is acceptable + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, *md_alg ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered", *(p)[0] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d", + (*p)[1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used HashAlgorithm %d", + (*p)[0] ) ); + *p += 2; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good + * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use below. */ + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + + peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( *peer_pk ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key, + MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, + * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive + * operations like ECDHE. */ + mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + ((void) p); + ((void) end); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + ((void) p); + ((void) end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing ) + { + goto start_processing; + } +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + /* + * ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server + * doesn't use a psk_identity_hint + */ + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ) + { + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + { + /* Current message is probably either + * CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */ + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "server key exchange message must not be skipped" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing; + +start_processing: +#endif + p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + { + if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } /* FALLTHROUGH */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + ; /* nothing more to do */ + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) + { + if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + { + if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + { + if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p, end - p ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + size_t sig_len, hashlen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; +#else + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +#endif + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + size_t params_len = p - params; + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; + + /* + * Handle the digitally-signed structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end, + &md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + if( pk_alg != + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); + + /* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */ + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Read signature + */ + + if( p > end - 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; + p += 2; + + if( p != end - sig_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len ); + + /* + * Compute the hash that has been signed + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + hashlen = 36; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, params, + params_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen, + params, params_len, + md_alg ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* + * Verify signature + */ + if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( peer_pk, + md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED */ + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, + * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive + * operations like ECDHE. */ + mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk ); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + +exit: + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) ); + + if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t n = 0; + size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) ); + + if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + ssl->state++; + ssl->client_auth = ( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got %s certificate request", + ssl->client_auth ? "a" : "no" ) ); + + if( ssl->client_auth == 0 ) + { + /* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */ + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + goto exit; + } + + /* + * struct { + * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; -- TLS 1.2 only + * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateRequest; + * + * Since we only support a single certificate on clients, let's just + * ignore all the information that's supposed to help us pick a + * certificate. + * + * We could check that our certificate matches the request, and bail out + * if it doesn't, but it's simpler to just send the certificate anyway, + * and give the server the opportunity to decide if it should terminate + * the connection when it doesn't like our certificate. + * + * Same goes for the hash in TLS 1.2's signature_algorithms: at this + * point we only have one hash available (see comments in + * write_certificate_verify), so let's just use what we have. + * + * However, we still minimally parse the message to check it is at least + * superficially sane. + */ + buf = ssl->in_msg; + + /* certificate_types */ + if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + } + cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )]; + n = cert_type_len; + + /* + * In the subsequent code there are two paths that read from buf: + * * the length of the signature algorithms field (if minor version of + * SSL is 3), + * * distinguished name length otherwise. + * Both reach at most the index: + * ...hdr_len + 2 + n, + * therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that + * regardless of the actual code path. + */ + if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + } + + /* supported_signature_algorithms */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + size_t sig_alg_len = + ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 ) + | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + unsigned char* sig_alg; + size_t i; +#endif + + /* + * The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below: + * sig_alg[i + 1], + * where: + * sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n, + * max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1. + * Therefore the furthest access is: + * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1], + * which reduces to: + * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len], + * which is one less than we need the buf to be. + */ + if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + + 3 + n + sig_alg_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n; + for( i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, + ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%d", + sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) ); + } +#endif + + n += 2 + sig_alg_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* certificate_authorities */ + dn_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 ) + | ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) ); + + n += dn_len; + if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); + } + +exit: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate request" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) || + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE ); + } + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello done" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + size_t header_len; + size_t content_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client key exchange" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ) + { + /* + * DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P + */ + content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( content_len, ssl->out_msg, 4 ); + header_len = 6; + + ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + unsigned char own_pubkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t own_pubkey_len; + unsigned char *own_pubkey_ecpoint; + size_t own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; + + header_len = 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) ); + + /* + * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange. + */ + + /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by + * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While + * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes + * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not + * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF. + * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation + * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */ + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH ); + psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type ); + psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits ); + + /* Generate ECDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes, + &handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA + * and convert it to ECPoint format used in ClientKeyExchange. */ + status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, sizeof( own_pubkey ), + &own_pubkey_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); + handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + if( mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint( own_pubkey, + own_pubkey_len, + &own_pubkey_ecpoint, + &own_pubkey_ecpoint_len ) != 0 ) + { + psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); + handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + /* Copy ECPoint structure to outgoing message buffer. */ + ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1, + own_pubkey_ecpoint, own_pubkey_ecpoint_len ); + content_len = own_pubkey_ecpoint_len + 1; + + /* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */ + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH, + handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ), + &ssl->handshake->pmslen ); + + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); + handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS || destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA ) + { + /* + * ECDH key exchange -- send client public value + */ + header_len = 4; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + { + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret ) + goto ecdh_calc_secret; + + mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx ); + } +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &content_len, + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], 1000, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = content_len; + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret; + } + +ecdh_calc_secret: + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + content_len = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n; +#endif + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + /* + * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; + */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK, + * and we check that the server's choice is among the + * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + header_len = 4; + content_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + + if( header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len ); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len ); + + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len, + ssl->conf->psk_identity, + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ); + header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ) + { + content_len = 0; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with RSA-PSK" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len, + &content_len, 2 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with DHE-PSK" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* + * ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P) + */ + content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; + + if( header_len + 2 + content_len > + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "psk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too short" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len ); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len ); + + ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ + if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with ECDHE-PSK" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* + * ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public; + */ + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &content_len, + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, + "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) + { + header_len = 4; + if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len, + &content_len, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + { + header_len = 4; + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + ssl->out_msg + header_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, + &content_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + { + ((void) ciphersuite_info); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->out_msglen = header_len + content_len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client key exchange" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + size_t n = 0, offset = 0; + unsigned char hash[48]; + unsigned char *hash_start = hash; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + size_t hashlen; + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign ) + { + goto sign; + } +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ssl->client_auth == 0 || mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for certificate" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + } + + /* + * Make a signature of the handshake digests + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign; + +sign: +#endif + + ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &hashlen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque md5_hash[16]; + * opaque sha_hash[20]; + * }; + * + * md5_hash + * MD5(handshake_messages); + * + * sha_hash + * SHA(handshake_messages); + */ + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + + /* + * For ECDSA, default hash is SHA-1 only + */ + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + { + hash_start += 16; + hashlen -= 16; + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length]; + * }; + * + * Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the + * PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature + * algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message. + * + * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this + * shortcut. + * + * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and + * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server + * side. + */ + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + { + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; + } + else + { + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; + } + ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) ); + + /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ + hashlen = 0; + offset = 2; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled ) + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), + md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, + ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, &n, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; +#endif + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( n, ssl->out_msg, offset + 4 ); + + ssl->out_msglen = 6 + n + offset; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate verify" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t lifetime; + size_t ticket_len; + unsigned char *ticket; + const unsigned char *msg; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse new session ticket" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + /* + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; + * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + * + * 0 . 3 ticket_lifetime_hint + * 4 . 5 ticket_len (n) + * 6 . 5+n ticket content + */ + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET || + ssl->in_hslen < 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); + } + + msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + + lifetime = ( ((uint32_t) msg[0]) << 24 ) | ( msg[1] << 16 ) | + ( msg[2] << 8 ) | ( msg[3] ); + + ticket_len = ( msg[4] << 8 ) | ( msg[5] ); + + if( ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) != ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len ) ); + + /* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */ + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + + /* + * Zero-length ticket means the server changed his mind and doesn't want + * to send a ticket after all, so just forget it + */ + if( ticket_len == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session->ticket, + ssl->session->ticket_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session->ticket ); + ssl->session->ticket = NULL; + ssl->session->ticket_len = 0; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket ); + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL; + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0; + + if( ( ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ticket_len ) ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ticket alloc failed" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + memcpy( ticket, msg + 6, ticket_len ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = ticket; + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = ticket_len; + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; + + /* + * RFC 5077 section 3.4: + * "If the client receives a session ticket from the server, then it + * discards any Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello." + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket in use, discarding session id" ) ); + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse new session ticket" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +/* + * SSL handshake -- client side -- single step + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "client state: %d", ssl->state ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used + * by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 ) + { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + } +#endif + + switch( ssl->state ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; + break; + + /* + * ==> ClientHello + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = ssl_write_client_hello( ssl ); + break; + + /* + * <== ServerHello + * Certificate + * ( ServerKeyExchange ) + * ( CertificateRequest ) + * ServerHelloDone + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = ssl_parse_server_hello( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: + ret = ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_request( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: + ret = ssl_parse_server_hello_done( ssl ); + break; + + /* + * ==> ( Certificate/Alert ) + * ClientKeyExchange + * ( CertificateVerify ) + * ChangeCipherSpec + * Finished + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + ret = ssl_write_client_key_exchange( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_write_certificate_verify( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl ); + break; + + /* + * <== ( NewSessionTicket ) + * ChangeCipherSpec + * Finished + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + ret = ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( ssl ); + break; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) ); + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl ); + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_cookie.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_cookie.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f12f28e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_cookie.c @@ -0,0 +1,253 @@ +/* + * DTLS cookie callbacks implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * These session callbacks use a simple chained list + * to store and retrieve the session information. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +/* + * If DTLS is in use, then at least one of SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 is + * available. Try SHA-256 first, 512 wastes resources since we need to stay + * with max 32 bytes of cookie for DTLS 1.0 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 +#define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 32 +#define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 28 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 +#define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 48 +#define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 28 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 +#define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 20 +#define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 20 +#else +#error "DTLS hello verify needs SHA-1 or SHA-2" +#endif + +/* + * Cookies are formed of a 4-bytes timestamp (or serial number) and + * an HMAC of timestamp and client ID. + */ +#define COOKIE_LEN ( 4 + COOKIE_HMAC_LEN ) + +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx->hmac_ctx ); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ctx->serial = 0; +#endif + ctx->timeout = MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, unsigned long delay ) +{ + ctx->timeout = delay; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx->hmac_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup( mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char key[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN]; + + if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, key, sizeof( key ) ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->hmac_ctx, mbedtls_md_info_from_type( COOKIE_MD ), 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->hmac_ctx, key, sizeof( key ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( key, sizeof( key ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Generate the HMAC part of a cookie + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_hmac( mbedtls_md_context_t *hmac_ctx, + const unsigned char time[4], + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) +{ + unsigned char hmac_out[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( *p, end, COOKIE_HMAC_LEN ); + + if( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( hmac_ctx ) != 0 || + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( hmac_ctx, time, 4 ) != 0 || + mbedtls_md_hmac_update( hmac_ctx, cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 || + mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( hmac_ctx, hmac_out ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + memcpy( *p, hmac_out, COOKIE_HMAC_LEN ); + *p += COOKIE_HMAC_LEN; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Generate cookie for DTLS ClientHello verification + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write( void *p_ctx, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx; + unsigned long t; + + if( ctx == NULL || cli_id == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( *p, end, COOKIE_LEN ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + t = (unsigned long) mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#else + t = ctx->serial++; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, *p, 0); + *p += 4; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret ) ); +#endif + + ret = ssl_cookie_hmac( &ctx->hmac_ctx, *p - 4, + p, end, cli_id, cli_id_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ) ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Check a cookie + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check( void *p_ctx, + const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) +{ + unsigned char ref_hmac[COOKIE_HMAC_LEN]; + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *p = ref_hmac; + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx; + unsigned long cur_time, cookie_time; + + if( ctx == NULL || cli_id == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( cookie_len != COOKIE_LEN ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret ) ); +#endif + + if( ssl_cookie_hmac( &ctx->hmac_ctx, cookie, + &p, p + sizeof( ref_hmac ), + cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 ) + ret = -1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); + } +#endif + + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + cur_time = (unsigned long) mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#else + cur_time = ctx->serial; +#endif + + cookie_time = ( (unsigned long) cookie[0] << 24 ) | + ( (unsigned long) cookie[1] << 16 ) | + ( (unsigned long) cookie[2] << 8 ) | + ( (unsigned long) cookie[3] ); + + if( ctx->timeout != 0 && cur_time - cookie_time > ctx->timeout ) + { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_msg.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_msg.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d7bebe04 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -0,0 +1,5986 @@ +/* + * Generic SSL/TLS messaging layer functions + * (record layer + retransmission state machine) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The SSL 3.0 specification was drafted by Netscape in 1996, + * and became an IETF standard in 1999. + * + * http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ); + +/* + * Start a timer. + * Passing millisecs = 0 cancels a running timer. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs ) +{ + if( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL ) + return; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "set_timer to %d ms", (int) millisecs ) ); + ssl->f_set_timer( ssl->p_timer, millisecs / 4, millisecs ); +} + +/* + * Return -1 is timer is expired, 0 if it isn't. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->f_get_timer == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "timer expired" ) ); + return( -1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + mbedtls_record *rec ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "record buffer", buf, buflen ); + + /* We don't support record checking in TLS because + * (a) there doesn't seem to be a usecase for it, and + * (b) In SSLv3 and TLS 1.0, CBC record decryption has state + * and we'd need to backup the transform here. + */ + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto exit; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + else + { + mbedtls_record rec; + + ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl, buf, buflen, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 3, "ssl_parse_record_header", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ssl->transform_in != NULL ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 3, "mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf", ret ); + goto exit; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +exit: + /* On success, we have decrypted the buffer in-place, so make + * sure we don't leak any plaintext data. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, buflen ); + + /* For the purpose of this API, treat messages with unexpected CID + * as well as such from future epochs as unexpected. */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ + +#define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0 +#define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +/* Forward declarations for functions related to message buffering. */ +static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint8_t slot ); +static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record const *rec ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + if( mtu != 0 && mtu < out_buf_len ) + return( mtu ); + + return( out_buf_len ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + size_t const bytes_written = ssl->out_left; + size_t const mtu = ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( ssl ); + + /* Double-check that the write-index hasn't gone + * past what we can transmit in a single datagram. */ + if( bytes_written > mtu ) + { + /* Should never happen... */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + return( (int) ( mtu - bytes_written ) ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t remaining, expansion; + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl ); + + if( max_len > mfl ) + max_len = mfl; + + /* By the standard (RFC 6066 Sect. 4), the MFL extension + * only limits the maximum record payload size, so in theory + * we would be allowed to pack multiple records of payload size + * MFL into a single datagram. However, this would mean that there's + * no way to explicitly communicate MTU restrictions to the peer. + * + * The following reduction of max_len makes sure that we never + * write datagrams larger than MFL + Record Expansion Overhead. + */ + if( max_len <= ssl->out_left ) + return( 0 ); + + max_len -= ssl->out_left; +#endif + + ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + remaining = (size_t) ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + expansion = (size_t) ret; + + if( remaining <= expansion ) + return( 0 ); + + remaining -= expansion; + if( remaining >= max_len ) + remaining = max_len; + + return( (int) remaining ); +} + +/* + * Double the retransmit timeout value, within the allowed range, + * returning -1 if the maximum value has already been reached. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + uint32_t new_timeout; + + if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout >= ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max ) + return( -1 ); + + /* Implement the final paragraph of RFC 6347 section 4.1.1.1 + * in the following way: after the initial transmission and a first + * retransmission, back off to a temporary estimated MTU of 508 bytes. + * This value is guaranteed to be deliverable (if not guaranteed to be + * delivered) of any compliant IPv4 (and IPv6) network, and should work + * on most non-IP stacks too. */ + if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min ) + { + ssl->handshake->mtu = 508; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "mtu autoreduction to %d bytes", ssl->handshake->mtu ) ); + } + + new_timeout = 2 * ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; + + /* Avoid arithmetic overflow and range overflow */ + if( new_timeout < ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout || + new_timeout > ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max ) + { + new_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max; + } + + ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = new_timeout; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs", + (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs", + (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, + size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, + size_t ivlen, + const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, + size_t maclen ) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int direction) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; +int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + +/* + * Encryption/decryption functions + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +static size_t ssl_compute_padding_length( size_t len, + size_t granularity ) +{ + return( ( granularity - ( len + 1 ) % granularity ) % granularity ); +} + +/* This functions transforms a (D)TLS plaintext fragment and a record content + * type into an instance of the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. This is used + * in DTLS 1.2 + CID and within TLS 1.3 to allow flexible padding and to protect + * a record's content type. + * + * struct { + * opaque content[DTLSPlaintext.length]; + * ContentType real_type; + * uint8 zeros[length_of_padding]; + * } (D)TLSInnerPlaintext; + * + * Input: + * - `content`: The beginning of the buffer holding the + * plaintext to be wrapped. + * - `*content_size`: The length of the plaintext in Bytes. + * - `max_len`: The number of Bytes available starting from + * `content`. This must be `>= *content_size`. + * - `rec_type`: The desired record content type. + * + * Output: + * - `content`: The beginning of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * - `*content_size`: The length of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * + * Returns: + * - `0` on success. + * - A negative error code if `max_len` didn't offer enough space + * for the expansion. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_build_inner_plaintext( unsigned char *content, + size_t *content_size, + size_t remaining, + uint8_t rec_type, + size_t pad ) +{ + size_t len = *content_size; + + /* Write real content type */ + if( remaining == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + content[ len ] = rec_type; + len++; + remaining--; + + if( remaining < pad ) + return( -1 ); + memset( content + len, 0, pad ); + len += pad; + remaining -= pad; + + *content_size = len; + return( 0 ); +} + +/* This function parses a (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for details. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( unsigned char const *content, + size_t *content_size, + uint8_t *rec_type ) +{ + size_t remaining = *content_size; + + /* Determine length of padding by skipping zeroes from the back. */ + do + { + if( remaining == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + remaining--; + } while( content[ remaining ] == 0 ); + + *content_size = remaining; + *rec_type = content[ remaining ]; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +/* `add_data` must have size 13 Bytes if the CID extension is disabled, + * and 13 + 1 + CID-length Bytes if the CID extension is enabled. */ +static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( unsigned char* add_data, + size_t *add_data_len, + mbedtls_record *rec, + unsigned minor_ver ) +{ + /* Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2): + * + * additional_data = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type + + * TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length; + * + * For the CID extension, this is extended as follows + * (quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05): + * + * additional_data = seq_num + DTLSPlaintext.type + + * DTLSPlaintext.version + + * cid + + * cid_length + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext; + * + * For TLS 1.3, the record sequence number is dropped from the AAD + * and encoded within the nonce of the AEAD operation instead. + */ + + unsigned char *cur = add_data; + + int is_tls13 = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + is_tls13 = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + if( !is_tls13 ) + { + ((void) minor_ver); + memcpy( cur, rec->ctr, sizeof( rec->ctr ) ); + cur += sizeof( rec->ctr ); + } + + *cur = rec->type; + cur++; + + memcpy( cur, rec->ver, sizeof( rec->ver ) ); + cur += sizeof( rec->ver ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( rec->cid_len != 0 ) + { + memcpy( cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len ); + cur += rec->cid_len; + + *cur = rec->cid_len; + cur++; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec->data_len, cur, 0 ); + cur += 2; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec->data_len, cur, 0 ); + cur += 2; + } + + *add_data_len = cur - add_data; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + +#define SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES 20 /* MD-5 or SHA-1 */ + +/* + * SSLv3.0 MAC functions + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx, + const unsigned char *secret, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, + const unsigned char *ctr, int type, + unsigned char out[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES] ) +{ + unsigned char header[11]; + unsigned char padding[48]; + int padlen; + int md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info ); + int md_type = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_ctx->md_info ); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Only MD5 and SHA-1 supported */ + if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ) + padlen = 48; + else + padlen = 40; + + memcpy( header, ctr, 8 ); + header[8] = (unsigned char) type; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, header, 9); + + memset( padding, 0x36, padlen ); + ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, header, 11 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, buf, len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( padding, 0x5C, padlen ); + ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, out, md_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( + mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform ) +{ + return( transform->ivlen != transform->fixed_ivlen ); +} + +/* Compute IV := ( fixed_iv || 0 ) XOR ( 0 || dynamic_IV ) + * + * Concretely, this occurs in two variants: + * + * a) Fixed and dynamic IV lengths add up to total IV length, giving + * IV = fixed_iv || dynamic_iv + * + * This variant is used in TLS 1.2 when used with GCM or CCM. + * + * b) Fixed IV lengths matches total IV length, giving + * IV = fixed_iv XOR ( 0 || dynamic_iv ) + * + * This variant occurs in TLS 1.3 and for TLS 1.2 when using ChaChaPoly. + * + * See also the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_transform. + * + * This function has the precondition that + * + * dst_iv_len >= max( fixed_iv_len, dynamic_iv_len ) + * + * which has to be ensured by the caller. If this precondition + * violated, the behavior of this function is undefined. + */ +static void ssl_build_record_nonce( unsigned char *dst_iv, + size_t dst_iv_len, + unsigned char const *fixed_iv, + size_t fixed_iv_len, + unsigned char const *dynamic_iv, + size_t dynamic_iv_len ) +{ + size_t i; + + /* Start with Fixed IV || 0 */ + memset( dst_iv, 0, dst_iv_len ); + memcpy( dst_iv, fixed_iv, fixed_iv_len ); + + dst_iv += dst_iv_len - dynamic_iv_len; + for( i = 0; i < dynamic_iv_len; i++ ) + dst_iv[i] ^= dynamic_iv[i]; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + int auth_done = 0; + unsigned char * data; + unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; + size_t add_data_len; + size_t post_avail; + + /* The SSL context is only used for debugging purposes! */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + /* The PRNG is used for dynamic IV generation that's used + * for CBC transformations in TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. */ +#if !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ) ) + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> encrypt buf" ) ); + + if( transform == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no transform provided to encrypt_buf" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + if( rec == NULL + || rec->buf == NULL + || rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset + || rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + || rec->cid_len != 0 +#endif + ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to encrypt_buf" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; + post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before encrypt: output payload", + data, rec->data_len ); + + mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + + if( rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record content %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " too large, maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->data_len, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* The following two code paths implement the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext + * structure present in TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.2 + CID. + * + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information. + * + * Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence + * `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards. + * + * Note also that the two code paths cannot occur simultaneously + * since they apply to different versions of the protocol. There + * is hence no risk of double-addition of the inner plaintext. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + size_t padding = + ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY ); + if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data, + &rec->data_len, + post_avail, + rec->type, + padding ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* + * Add CID information + */ + rec->cid_len = transform->out_cid_len; + memcpy( rec->cid, transform->out_cid, transform->out_cid_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "CID", rec->cid, rec->cid_len ); + + if( rec->cid_len != 0 ) + { + size_t padding = + ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY ); + /* + * Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information. + * + * Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence + * `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards. + */ + if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data, + &rec->data_len, + post_avail, + rec->type, + padding ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset ); + + /* + * Add MAC before if needed + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || + ( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + && transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED +#endif + ) ) + { + if( post_avail < transform->maclen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + unsigned char mac[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ret = ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_enc, transform->mac_enc, + data, rec->data_len, rec->ctr, rec->type, mac ); + if( ret == 0 ) + memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_mac", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + add_data, add_data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + data, rec->data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + + memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen ); + + hmac_failed_etm_disabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen ); + + rec->data_len += transform->maclen; + post_avail -= transform->maclen; + auth_done++; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + + /* + * Encrypt + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including %d bytes of padding", + rec->data_len, 0 ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char iv[12]; + unsigned char *dynamic_iv; + size_t dynamic_iv_len; + int dynamic_iv_is_explicit = + ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform ); + + /* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */ + if( post_avail < transform->taglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + /* + * Build nonce for AEAD encryption. + * + * Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic + * part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and + * can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not + * agree with the record sequence number. + * However, since ChaChaPoly as well as all AEAD modes + * in TLS 1.3 use the record sequence number as the + * dynamic part of the nonce, we uniformly use the + * record sequence number here in all cases. + */ + dynamic_iv = rec->ctr; + dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr ); + + ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ), + transform->iv_enc, + transform->fixed_ivlen, + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_len ); + + /* + * Build additional data for AEAD encryption. + * This depends on the TLS version. + */ + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (internal)", + iv, transform->ivlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (transmitted)", + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_is_explicit ? dynamic_iv_len : 0 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD", + add_data, add_data_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including 0 bytes of padding", + rec->data_len ) ); + + /* + * Encrypt and authenticate + */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), /* dst */ + &rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag", + data + rec->data_len - transform->taglen, + transform->taglen ); + /* Account for authentication tag. */ + post_avail -= transform->taglen; + + /* + * Prefix record content with dynamic IV in case it is explicit. + */ + if( dynamic_iv_is_explicit != 0 ) + { + if( rec->data_offset < dynamic_iv_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + memcpy( data - dynamic_iv_len, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len ); + rec->data_offset -= dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_len += dynamic_iv_len; + } + + auth_done++; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t padlen, i; + size_t olen; + + /* Currently we're always using minimal padding + * (up to 255 bytes would be allowed). */ + padlen = transform->ivlen - ( rec->data_len + 1 ) % transform->ivlen; + if( padlen == transform->ivlen ) + padlen = 0; + + /* Check there's enough space in the buffer for the padding. */ + if( post_avail < padlen + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + for( i = 0; i <= padlen; i++ ) + data[rec->data_len + i] = (unsigned char) padlen; + + rec->data_len += padlen + 1; + post_avail -= padlen + 1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up as per + * Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246) + */ + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + if( f_rng == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + /* + * Generate IV + */ + ret = f_rng( p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memcpy( data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc, + transform->ivlen ); + + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes of IV and %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes of padding", + rec->data_len, transform->ivlen, + padlen + 1 ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + transform->iv_enc, + transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) + if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + /* + * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1 + */ + memcpy( transform->iv_enc, transform->cipher_ctx_enc.iv, + transform->ivlen ); + } + else +#endif + { + data -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len += transform->ivlen; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( auth_done == 0 ) + { + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + + /* + * MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num + + * TLSCipherText.type + + * TLSCipherText.version + + * length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) + + * IV + // except for TLS 1.0 + * ENC(content + padding + padding_length)); + */ + + if( post_avail < transform->maclen) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, + rec, transform->minor_ver ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, + add_data_len ); + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data, + add_data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + data, rec->data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + + memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen ); + + rec->data_len += transform->maclen; + post_avail -= transform->maclen; + auth_done++; + + hmac_failed_etm_enabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "HMAC calculation failed", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ + if( auth_done != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= encrypt buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec ) +{ + size_t olen; + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + int ret, auth_done = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1; +#endif + unsigned char* data; + unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ]; + size_t add_data_len; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decrypt buf" ) ); + if( rec == NULL || + rec->buf == NULL || + rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset || + rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to decrypt_buf" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; + mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* + * Match record's CID with incoming CID. + */ + if( rec->cid_len != transform->in_cid_len || + memcmp( rec->cid, transform->in_cid, rec->cid_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + { + padlen = 0; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + transform->iv_dec, + transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + { + unsigned char iv[12]; + unsigned char *dynamic_iv; + size_t dynamic_iv_len; + + /* + * Extract dynamic part of nonce for AEAD decryption. + * + * Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic + * part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and + * can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not + * agree with the record sequence number. + */ + dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr ); + if( ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform ) == 1 ) + { + if( rec->data_len < dynamic_iv_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " ) < explicit_iv_len (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ", + rec->data_len, + dynamic_iv_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + dynamic_iv = data; + + data += dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_offset += dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_len -= dynamic_iv_len; + } + else + { + dynamic_iv = rec->ctr; + } + + /* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */ + if( rec->data_len < transform->taglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < taglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ", + rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + rec->data_len -= transform->taglen; + + /* + * Prepare nonce from dynamic and static parts. + */ + ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ), + transform->iv_dec, + transform->fixed_ivlen, + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_len ); + + /* + * Build additional data for AEAD encryption. + * This depends on the TLS version. + */ + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD", + add_data, add_data_len ); + + /* Because of the check above, we know that there are + * explicit_iv_len Bytes preceding data, and taglen + * bytes following data + data_len. This justifies + * the debug message and the invocation of + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() below. */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len, + transform->taglen ); + + /* + * Decrypt and authenticate + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */ + transform->taglen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + + return( ret ); + } + auth_done++; + + /* Double-check that AEAD decryption doesn't change content length. */ + if( olen != rec->data_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) + if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + size_t minlen = 0; + + /* + * Check immediate ciphertext sanity + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + /* The ciphertext is prefixed with the CBC IV. */ + minlen += transform->ivlen; + } +#endif + + /* Size considerations: + * + * - The CBC cipher text must not be empty and hence + * at least of size transform->ivlen. + * + * Together with the potential IV-prefix, this explains + * the first of the two checks below. + * + * - The record must contain a MAC, either in plain or + * encrypted, depending on whether Encrypt-then-MAC + * is used or not. + * - If it is, the message contains the IV-prefix, + * the CBC ciphertext, and the MAC. + * - If it is not, the padded plaintext, and hence + * the CBC ciphertext, has at least length maclen + 1 + * because there is at least the padding length byte. + * + * As the CBC ciphertext is not empty, both cases give the + * lower bound minlen + maclen + 1 on the record size, which + * we test for in the second check below. + */ + if( rec->data_len < minlen + transform->ivlen || + rec->data_len < minlen + transform->maclen + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < max( ivlen(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + "), maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") " + "+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", rec->data_len, + transform->ivlen, + transform->maclen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + + /* + * Authenticate before decrypt if enabled + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) + { + unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) ); + + /* Update data_len in tandem with add_data. + * + * The subtraction is safe because of the previous check + * data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1. + * + * Afterwards, we know that data + data_len is followed by at + * least maclen Bytes, which justifies the call to + * mbedtls_ct_memcmp() below. + * + * Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */ + rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + + /* Calculate expected MAC. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, + add_data_len ); + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data, + add_data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + data, rec->data_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, + transform->maclen ); + + /* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */ + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect, + transform->maclen ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + auth_done++; + + hmac_failed_etm_enabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_expect, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_hmac_xxx", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + + /* + * Check length sanity + */ + + /* We know from above that data_len > minlen >= 0, + * so the following check in particular implies that + * data_len >= minlen + ivlen ( = minlen or 2 * minlen ). */ + if( rec->data_len % transform->ivlen != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") %% ivlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") != 0", + rec->data_len, transform->ivlen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up + */ + if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + /* Safe because data_len >= minlen + ivlen = 2 * ivlen. */ + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen ); + + data += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len -= transform->ivlen; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* We still have data_len % ivlen == 0 and data_len >= ivlen here. */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, data, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Double-check that length hasn't changed during decryption. */ + if( rec->data_len != olen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) + if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + { + /* + * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1, where CBC decryption of consecutive + * records is equivalent to CBC decryption of the concatenation + * of the records; in other words, IVs are maintained across + * record decryptions. + */ + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, transform->cipher_ctx_dec.iv, + transform->ivlen ); + } +#endif + + /* Safe since data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1, so after having + * subtracted at most minlen and maclen up to this point, + * data_len > 0 (because of data_len % ivlen == 0, it's actually + * >= ivlen ). */ + padlen = data[rec->data_len - 1]; + + if( auth_done == 1 ) + { + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( + rec->data_len, + padlen + 1 ); + correct &= mask; + padlen &= mask; + } + else + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if( rec->data_len < transform->maclen + padlen + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") + padlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ")", + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen, + padlen + 1 ) ); + } +#endif + + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen + padlen + 1 ); + correct &= mask; + padlen &= mask; + } + + padlen++; + + /* Regardless of the validity of the padding, + * we have data_len >= padlen here. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + /* This is the SSL 3.0 path, we don't have to worry about Lucky + * 13, because there's a strictly worse padding attack built in + * the protocol (known as part of POODLE), so we don't care if the + * code is not constant-time, in particular branches are OK. */ + if( padlen > transform->ivlen ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding length: is %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "should be no more than %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + padlen, transform->ivlen ) ); +#endif + correct = 0; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + /* The padding check involves a series of up to 256 + * consecutive memory reads at the end of the record + * plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and + * validity of the padding, always perform exactly + * `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account + * only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + volatile unsigned char* const check = data; + + /* Index of first padding byte; it has been ensured above + * that the subtraction is safe. */ + size_t const padding_idx = rec->data_len - padlen; + size_t const num_checks = rec->data_len <= 256 ? rec->data_len : 256; + size_t const start_idx = rec->data_len - num_checks; + size_t idx; + + for( idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++ ) + { + /* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) && + * (check[idx] == padlen - 1); + */ + const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx ); + const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( check[idx], + padlen - 1 ); + pad_count += mask & equal; + } + correct &= mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) ); +#endif + padlen &= mbedtls_ct_size_mask( correct ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* If the padding was found to be invalid, padlen == 0 + * and the subtraction is safe. If the padding was found valid, + * padlen hasn't been changed and the previous assertion + * data_len >= padlen still holds. */ + rec->data_len -= padlen; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "raw buffer after decryption", + data, rec->data_len ); +#endif + + /* + * Authenticate if not done yet. + * Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + if( auth_done == 0 ) + { + unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 }; + unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 }; + + /* If the initial value of padlen was such that + * data_len < maclen + padlen + 1, then padlen + * got reset to 1, and the initial check + * data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1 + * guarantees that at this point we still + * have at least data_len >= maclen. + * + * If the initial value of padlen was such that + * data_len >= maclen + padlen + 1, then we have + * subtracted either padlen + 1 (if the padding was correct) + * or 0 (if the padding was incorrect) since then, + * hence data_len >= maclen in any case. + */ + rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->minor_ver ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + ret = ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + transform->mac_dec, + data, rec->data_len, + rec->ctr, rec->type, + mac_expect ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_mac", ret ); + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + memcpy( mac_peer, data + rec->data_len, transform->maclen ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + /* + * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of + * data_len over all padlen values. + * + * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did + * data_len -= padlen. + * + * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer + * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too. + */ + const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen; + const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0; + + ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len, + mac_expect ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ct_hmac", ret ); + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data, + rec->data_len, + min_len, max_len, + transform->maclen ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, transform->maclen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen ); +#endif + + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect, + transform->maclen ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) ); +#endif + correct = 0; + } + auth_done++; + + hmac_failed_etm_disabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_peer, transform->maclen ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( mac_expect, transform->maclen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * Finally check the correct flag + */ + if( correct == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + + /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ + if( auth_done != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + /* Remove inner padding and infer true content type. */ + ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( data, &rec->data_len, + &rec->type ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( rec->cid_len != 0 ) + { + ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( data, &rec->data_len, + &rec->type ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decrypt buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#undef MAC_NONE +#undef MAC_PLAINTEXT +#undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) +/* + * Compression/decompression functions + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_compress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->out_msg; + ptrdiff_t bytes_written = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf; + size_t len_pre = ssl->out_msglen; + unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> compress buf" ) ); + + if( len_pre == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->out_msg, len_pre ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", + ssl->out_msglen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before compression: output payload", + ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_in = msg_pre; + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_in = len_pre; + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_out = msg_post; + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out = out_buf_len - bytes_written; + + ret = deflate( &ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH ); + if( ret != Z_OK ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform compression (%d)", ret ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED ); + } + + ssl->out_msglen = out_buf_len - + ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out - bytes_written; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", + ssl->out_msglen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after compression: output payload", + ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= compress buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_decompress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->in_msg; + ptrdiff_t header_bytes = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf; + size_t len_pre = ssl->in_msglen; + unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decompress buf" ) ); + + if( len_pre == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->in_msg, len_pre ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before decompression: input payload", + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); + + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_in = msg_pre; + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_in = len_pre; + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_out = msg_post; + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out = in_buf_len - header_bytes; + + ret = inflate( &ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH ); + if( ret != Z_OK ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform decompression (%d)", ret ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED ); + } + + ssl->in_msglen = in_buf_len - + ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out - header_bytes; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after decompression: input payload", + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decompress buf" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it. + * The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left. + * + * If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are + * available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code + * is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ). + * + * With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but + * with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want, + * since we always read a whole datagram at once. + * + * For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when + * they're done reading a record. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> fetch input" ) ); + + if( ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( nb_want > in_buf_len - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "requesting more data than fits" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + uint32_t timeout; + + /* + * The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we + * sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data. + * It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the + * header) and/or some other records in the same datagram. + */ + + /* + * Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable + */ + if( ssl->next_record_offset != 0 ) + { + if( ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->in_left -= ssl->next_record_offset; + + if( ssl->in_left != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "next record in same datagram, offset: %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->next_record_offset ) ); + memmove( ssl->in_hdr, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->next_record_offset, + ssl->in_left ); + } + + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); + + /* + * Done if we already have enough data. + */ + if( nb_want <= ssl->in_left) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * A record can't be split across datagrams. If we need to read but + * are not at the beginning of a new record, the caller did something + * wrong. + */ + if( ssl->in_left != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Don't even try to read if time's out already. + * This avoids by-passing the timer when repeatedly receiving messages + * that will end up being dropped. + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timer has expired" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; + } + else + { + len = in_buf_len - ( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ); + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + timeout = ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; + else + timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "f_recv_timeout: %lu ms", (unsigned long) timeout ) ); + + if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL ) + ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len, + timeout ); + else + ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ); + } + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timeout" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + if( ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake timeout" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + } + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->in_left = ret; + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); + + while( ssl->in_left < nb_want ) + { + len = nb_want - ssl->in_left; + + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; + else + { + if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL ) + { + ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len, + ssl->conf->read_timeout ); + } + else + { + ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if ( (size_t)ret > len || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "f_recv returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " were requested", + ret, len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->in_left += ret; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Flush any data not yet written + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> flush output" ) ); + + if( ssl->f_send == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() " ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* Avoid incrementing counter if data is flushed */ + if( ssl->out_left == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + while( ssl->out_left > 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", out_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->out_msglen, ssl->out_left ) ); + + buf = ssl->out_hdr - ssl->out_left; + ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, buf, ssl->out_left ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", ret ); + + if( ret <= 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( (size_t)ret > ssl->out_left || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "f_send returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes were sent", + ret, ssl->out_left ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + ssl->out_left -= ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; + } + else +#endif + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; + } + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Functions to handle the DTLS retransmission state machine + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +/* + * Append current handshake message to current outgoing flight + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_flight_append( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *msg; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_flight_append" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message appended to flight", + ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + + /* Allocate space for current message */ + if( ( msg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed", + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + if( ( msg->p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ssl->out_msglen ) ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed", + ssl->out_msglen ) ); + mbedtls_free( msg ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + /* Copy current handshake message with headers */ + memcpy( msg->p, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + msg->len = ssl->out_msglen; + msg->type = ssl->out_msgtype; + msg->next = NULL; + + /* Append to the current flight */ + if( ssl->handshake->flight == NULL ) + ssl->handshake->flight = msg; + else + { + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = ssl->handshake->flight; + while( cur->next != NULL ) + cur = cur->next; + cur->next = msg; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_flight_append" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free the current flight of handshake messages + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = flight; + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + next = cur->next; + + mbedtls_free( cur->p ); + mbedtls_free( cur ); + + cur = next; + } +} + +/* + * Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform; + unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8]; + + if( ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip swap epochs" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "swap epochs" ) ); + + /* Swap transforms */ + tmp_transform = ssl->transform_out; + ssl->transform_out = ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out; + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform; + + /* Swap epoch + sequence_number */ + memcpy( tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, 8 ); + + /* Adjust to the newly activated transform */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) + { + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Retransmit the current flight of messages. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Transmit or retransmit the current flight of messages. + * + * Need to remember the current message in case flush_output returns + * WANT_WRITE, causing us to exit this function and come back later. + * This function must be called until state is no longer SENDING. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) ); + + if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialise flight transmission" ) ); + + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = ssl->handshake->flight; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = ssl->handshake->flight->p + 12; + ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING; + } + + while( ssl->handshake->cur_msg != NULL ) + { + size_t max_frag_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_flight_item * const cur = ssl->handshake->cur_msg; + + int const is_finished = + ( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ); + + uint8_t const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ? + SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH; + + /* Swap epochs before sending Finished: we can't do it after + * sending ChangeCipherSpec, in case write returns WANT_READ. + * Must be done before copying, may change out_msg pointer */ + if( is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == ( cur->p + 12 ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "swap epochs to send finished message" ) ); + ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + max_frag_len = (size_t) ret; + + /* CCS is copied as is, while HS messages may need fragmentation */ + if( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + if( max_frag_len == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + continue; + } + + memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, cur->len ); + ssl->out_msglen = cur->len; + ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; + + /* Update position inside current message */ + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur->len; + } + else + { + const unsigned char * const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p; + const size_t hs_len = cur->len - 12; + const size_t frag_off = p - ( cur->p + 12 ); + const size_t rem_len = hs_len - frag_off; + size_t cur_hs_frag_len, max_hs_frag_len; + + if( ( max_frag_len < 12 ) || ( max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0 ) ) + { + if( is_finished ) + { + ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + continue; + } + max_hs_frag_len = max_frag_len - 12; + + cur_hs_frag_len = rem_len > max_hs_frag_len ? + max_hs_frag_len : rem_len; + + if( frag_off == 0 && cur_hs_frag_len != hs_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "fragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)", + (unsigned) cur_hs_frag_len, + (unsigned) max_hs_frag_len ) ); + } + + /* Messages are stored with handshake headers as if not fragmented, + * copy beginning of headers then fill fragmentation fields. + * Handshake headers: type(1) len(3) seq(2) f_off(3) f_len(3) */ + memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, 6 ); + + ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( frag_off ); + ssl->out_msg[7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( frag_off ); + ssl->out_msg[8] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( frag_off ); + + ssl->out_msg[ 9] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( cur_hs_frag_len ); + ssl->out_msg[10] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( cur_hs_frag_len ); + ssl->out_msg[11] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( cur_hs_frag_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12 ); + + /* Copy the handshake message content and set records fields */ + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 12, p, cur_hs_frag_len ); + ssl->out_msglen = cur_hs_frag_len + 12; + ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; + + /* Update position inside current message */ + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur_hs_frag_len; + } + + /* If done with the current message move to the next one if any */ + if( ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p >= cur->p + cur->len ) + { + if( cur->next != NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = cur->next; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = cur->next->p + 12; + } + else + { + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = NULL; + } + } + + /* Actually send the message out */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, force_flush ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Update state and set timer */ + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + else + { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * To be called when the last message of an incoming flight is received. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* We won't need to resend that one any more */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( ssl->handshake->flight ); + ssl->handshake->flight = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; + + /* The next incoming flight will start with this msg_seq */ + ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq = ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; + + /* We don't want to remember CCS's across flight boundaries. */ + ssl->handshake->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; + + /* Clear future message buffering structure. */ + mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( ssl ); + + /* Cancel timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) + { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + } + else + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; +} + +/* + * To be called when the last message of an outgoing flight is send. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ); + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED ) + { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + } + else + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/* + * Handshake layer functions + */ + +/* + * Write (DTLS: or queue) current handshake (including CCS) message. + * + * - fill in handshake headers + * - update handshake checksum + * - DTLS: save message for resending + * - then pass to the record layer + * + * DTLS: except for HelloRequest, messages are only queued, and will only be + * actually sent when calling flight_transmit() or resend(). + * + * Inputs: + * - ssl->out_msglen: 4 + actual handshake message len + * (4 is the size of handshake headers for TLS) + * - ssl->out_msg[0]: the handshake type (ClientHello, ServerHello, etc) + * - ssl->out_msg + 4: the handshake message body + * + * Outputs, ie state before passing to flight_append() or write_record(): + * - ssl->out_msglen: the length of the record contents + * (including handshake headers but excluding record headers) + * - ssl->out_msg: the record contents (handshake headers + content) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4; + const unsigned char hs_type = ssl->out_msg[0]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write handshake message" ) ); + + /* + * Sanity checks + */ + if( ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + /* In SSLv3, the client might send a NoCertificate alert. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ! ( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && + ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) ) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + + /* Whenever we send anything different from a + * HelloRequest we should be in a handshake - double check. */ + if( ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) && + ssl->handshake == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } +#endif + + /* Double-check that we did not exceed the bounds + * of the outgoing record buffer. + * This should never fail as the various message + * writing functions must obey the bounds of the + * outgoing record buffer, but better be safe. + * + * Note: We deliberately do not check for the MTU or MFL here. + */ + if( ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record too large: " + "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->out_msglen, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Fill handshake headers + */ + if( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + ssl->out_msg[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( hs_len ); + ssl->out_msg[2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( hs_len ); + ssl->out_msg[3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( hs_len ); + + /* + * DTLS has additional fields in the Handshake layer, + * between the length field and the actual payload: + * uint16 message_seq; + * uint24 fragment_offset; + * uint24 fragment_length; + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Make room for the additional DTLS fields */ + if( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS handshake message too large: " + "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + hs_len, + (size_t) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memmove( ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, hs_len ); + ssl->out_msglen += 8; + + /* Write message_seq and update it, except for HelloRequest */ + if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq, ssl->out_msg, 4 ); + ++( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq ); + } + else + { + ssl->out_msg[4] = 0; + ssl->out_msg[5] = 0; + } + + /* Handshake hashes are computed without fragmentation, + * so set frag_offset = 0 and frag_len = hs_len for now */ + memset( ssl->out_msg + 6, 0x00, 3 ); + memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 9, ssl->out_msg + 1, 3 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */ + if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) + ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen ); + } + + /* Either send now, or just save to be sent (and resent) later */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_flight_append( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_flight_append", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write handshake message" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Record layer functions + */ + +/* + * Write current record. + * + * Uses: + * - ssl->out_msgtype: type of the message (AppData, Handshake, Alert, CCS) + * - ssl->out_msglen: length of the record content (excl headers) + * - ssl->out_msg: record content + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush ) +{ + int ret, done = 0; + size_t len = ssl->out_msglen; + uint8_t flush = force_flush; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write record" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->transform_out != NULL && + ssl->session_out->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_compress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_compress_buf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + len = ssl->out_msglen; + } +#endif /*MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write()" ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + done = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + if( !done ) + { + unsigned i; + size_t protected_record_size; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + /* Skip writing the record content type to after the encryption, + * as it may change when using the CID extension. */ + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1 ); + + memcpy( ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, ssl->out_len, 0); + + if( ssl->transform_out != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_record rec; + + rec.buf = ssl->out_iv; + rec.buf_len = out_buf_len - ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf ); + rec.data_len = ssl->out_msglen; + rec.data_offset = ssl->out_msg - rec.buf; + + memcpy( &rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, 8 ); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, rec.ver ); + rec.type = ssl->out_msgtype; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* The CID is set by mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(). */ + rec.cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_out, &rec, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_encrypt_buf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( rec.data_offset != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* Update the record content type and CID. */ + ssl->out_msgtype = rec.type; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID ) + memcpy( ssl->out_cid, rec.cid, rec.cid_len ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_msglen = len = rec.data_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec.data_len, ssl->out_len, 0 ); + } + + protected_record_size = len + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* In case of DTLS, double-check that we don't exceed + * the remaining space in the datagram. */ + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( protected_record_size > (size_t) ret ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Now write the potentially updated record content type. */ + ssl->out_hdr[0] = (unsigned char) ssl->out_msgtype; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "output record: msgtype = %u, " + "version = [%u:%u], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1], + ssl->out_hdr[2], len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network", + ssl->out_hdr, protected_record_size ); + + ssl->out_left += protected_record_size; + ssl->out_hdr += protected_record_size; + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out ); + + for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- ) + if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "outgoing message counter would wrap" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + flush == SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH ) + { + size_t remaining; + ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl ); + if( ret < 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + remaining = (size_t) ret; + if( remaining == 0 ) + { + flush = SSL_FORCE_FLUSH; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Still %u bytes available in current datagram", (unsigned) remaining ) ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if( ( flush == SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write record" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen || + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 || + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + return( ( ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 ) | + ( ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[11] ); +} + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + return( ( ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 ) | + ( ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[8] ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_hs_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len; + + msg_len = ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl ); + frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl ); + frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl ); + + if( frag_off > msg_len ) + return( -1 ); + + if( frag_len > msg_len - frag_off ) + return( -1 ); + + if( frag_len + 12 > ssl->in_msglen ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Mark bits in bitmask (used for DTLS HS reassembly) + */ +static void ssl_bitmask_set( unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len ) +{ + unsigned int start_bits, end_bits; + + start_bits = 8 - ( offset % 8 ); + if( start_bits != 8 ) + { + size_t first_byte_idx = offset / 8; + + /* Special case */ + if( len <= start_bits ) + { + for( ; len != 0; len-- ) + mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - len ); + + /* Avoid potential issues with offset or len becoming invalid */ + return; + } + + offset += start_bits; /* Now offset % 8 == 0 */ + len -= start_bits; + + for( ; start_bits != 0; start_bits-- ) + mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - 1 ); + } + + end_bits = len % 8; + if( end_bits != 0 ) + { + size_t last_byte_idx = ( offset + len ) / 8; + + len -= end_bits; /* Now len % 8 == 0 */ + + for( ; end_bits != 0; end_bits-- ) + mask[last_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( 8 - end_bits ); + } + + memset( mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8 ); +} + +/* + * Check that bitmask is full + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_bitmask_check( unsigned char *mask, size_t len ) +{ + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < len / 8; i++ ) + if( mask[i] != 0xFF ) + return( -1 ); + + for( i = 0; i < len % 8; i++ ) + if( ( mask[len / 8] & ( 1 << ( 7 - i ) ) ) == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* msg_len does not include the handshake header */ +static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( size_t msg_len, + unsigned add_bitmap ) +{ + size_t alloc_len; + + alloc_len = 12; /* Handshake header */ + alloc_len += msg_len; /* Content buffer */ + + if( add_bitmap ) + alloc_len += msg_len / 8 + ( msg_len % 8 != 0 ); /* Bitmap */ + + return( alloc_len ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + return( ( ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 ) | + ( ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[3] ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake message too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "handshake message: msglen =" + " %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", type = %u, hslen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_hslen ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5]; + + if( ssl_check_hs_header( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid handshake header" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && + ( ( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) || + ( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) ) ) + { + if( recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } + + /* Retransmit only on last message from previous flight, to avoid + * too many retransmissions. + * Besides, No sane server ever retransmits HelloVerifyRequest */ + if( recv_msg_seq == ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq - 1 && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received message from last flight, " + "message_seq = %u, start_of_flight = %u", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "dropping out-of-sequence message: " + "message_seq = %u, expected = %u", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); + } + /* Wait until message completion to increment in_msg_seq */ + + /* Message reassembly is handled alongside buffering of future + * messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and + * future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the + * handshake logic layer. */ + if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + /* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */ + if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLS handshake fragmentation not supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && hs != NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen ); + } + + /* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake != NULL ) + { + unsigned offset; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; + + /* Increment handshake sequence number */ + hs->in_msg_seq++; + + /* + * Clear up handshake buffering and reassembly structure. + */ + + /* Free first entry */ + ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, 0 ); + + /* Shift all other entries */ + for( offset = 0, hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; + offset + 1 < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; + offset++, hs_buf++ ) + { + *hs_buf = *(hs_buf + 1); + } + + /* Create a fresh last entry */ + memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) ); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * DTLS anti-replay: RFC 6347 4.1.2.6 + * + * in_window is a field of bits numbered from 0 (lsb) to 63 (msb). + * Bit n is set iff record number in_window_top - n has been seen. + * + * Usually, in_window_top is the last record number seen and the lsb of + * in_window is set. The only exception is the initial state (record number 0 + * not seen yet). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + ssl->in_window_top = 0; + ssl->in_window = 0; +} + +static inline uint64_t ssl_load_six_bytes( unsigned char *buf ) +{ + return( ( (uint64_t) buf[0] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[1] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[2] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[3] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[4] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) buf[5] ) ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t *record_in_ctr ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *original_in_ctr; + + // save original in_ctr + original_in_ctr = ssl->in_ctr; + + // use counter from record + ssl->in_ctr = record_in_ctr; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( (mbedtls_ssl_context const *) ssl ); + + // restore the counter + ssl->in_ctr = original_in_ctr; + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return 0 if sequence number is acceptable, -1 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 ); + uint64_t bit; + + if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED ) + return( 0 ); + + if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top ) + return( 0 ); + + bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; + + if( bit >= 64 ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( ssl->in_window & ( (uint64_t) 1 << bit ) ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Update replay window on new validated record + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 ); + + if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED ) + return; + + if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top ) + { + /* Update window_top and the contents of the window */ + uint64_t shift = rec_seqnum - ssl->in_window_top; + + if( shift >= 64 ) + ssl->in_window = 1; + else + { + ssl->in_window <<= shift; + ssl->in_window |= 1; + } + + ssl->in_window_top = rec_seqnum; + } + else + { + /* Mark that number as seen in the current window */ + uint64_t bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; + + if( bit < 64 ) /* Always true, but be extra sure */ + ssl->in_window |= (uint64_t) 1 << bit; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* + * Check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie, + * and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message. + * Both input and output include full DTLS headers. + * + * - if cookie is valid, return 0 + * - if ClientHello looks superficially valid but cookie is not, + * fill obuf and set olen, then + * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED + * - otherwise return a specific error code + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen ) +{ + size_t sid_len, cookie_len; + unsigned char *p; + + /* + * Structure of ClientHello with record and handshake headers, + * and expected values. We don't need to check a lot, more checks will be + * done when actually parsing the ClientHello - skipping those checks + * avoids code duplication and does not make cookie forging any easier. + * + * 0-0 ContentType type; copied, must be handshake + * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied + * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied, must be 0 + * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied + * 11-12 uint16 length; (ignored) + * + * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; (ignored) + * 14-16 uint24 length; (ignored) + * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied + * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied, must be 0 + * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; (ignored) + * + * 25-26 ProtocolVersion client_version; (ignored) + * 27-58 Random random; (ignored) + * 59-xx SessionID session_id; 1 byte len + sid_len content + * 60+ opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; 1 byte len + content + * ... + * + * Minimum length is 61 bytes. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: in_len=%u", + (unsigned) in_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "cli_id", cli_id, cli_id_len ); + if( in_len < 61 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: record too short" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + if( in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || + in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 || + in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: not a good ClientHello" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( " type=%u epoch=%u fragment_offset=%u", + in[0], + (unsigned) in[3] << 8 | in[4], + (unsigned) in[19] << 16 | in[20] << 8 | in[21] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + sid_len = in[59]; + if( 59 + 1 + sid_len + 1 > in_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: sid_len=%u > %u", + (unsigned) sid_len, + (unsigned) in_len - 61 ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "sid received from network", + in + 60, sid_len ); + + cookie_len = in[60 + sid_len]; + if( 59 + 1 + sid_len + 1 + cookie_len > in_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: cookie_len=%u > %u", + (unsigned) cookie_len, + (unsigned) ( in_len - sid_len - 61 ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "cookie received from network", + in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len ); + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check( ssl->conf->p_cookie, + in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len, + cli_id, cli_id_len ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "check cookie: valid" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * If we get here, we've got an invalid cookie, let's prepare HVR. + * + * 0-0 ContentType type; copied + * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied + * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied + * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied + * 11-12 uint16 length; olen - 13 + * + * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; hello_verify_request + * 14-16 uint24 length; olen - 25 + * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied + * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied + * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; olen - 25 + * + * 25-26 ProtocolVersion server_version; 0xfe 0xff + * 27-27 opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; cookie_len = olen - 27, cookie + * + * Minimum length is 28. + */ + if( buf_len < 28 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + /* Copy most fields and adapt others */ + memcpy( obuf, in, 25 ); + obuf[13] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + obuf[25] = 0xfe; + obuf[26] = 0xff; + + /* Generate and write actual cookie */ + p = obuf + 28; + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write( ssl->conf->p_cookie, + &p, obuf + buf_len, + cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + *olen = p - obuf; + + /* Go back and fill length fields */ + obuf[27] = (unsigned char)( *olen - 28 ); + + obuf[14] = obuf[22] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *olen - 25 ); + obuf[15] = obuf[23] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *olen - 25 ); + obuf[16] = obuf[24] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *olen - 25 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 13, obuf, 11 ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); +} + +/* + * Handle possible client reconnect with the same UDP quadruplet + * (RFC 6347 Section 4.2.8). + * + * Called by ssl_parse_record_header() in case we receive an epoch 0 record + * that looks like a ClientHello. + * + * - if the input looks like a ClientHello without cookies, + * send back HelloVerifyRequest, then return 0 + * - if the input looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie, + * reset the session of the current context, and + * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT + * - if anything goes wrong, return a specific error code + * + * This function is called (through ssl_check_client_reconnect()) when an + * unexpected record is found in ssl_get_next_record(), which will discard the + * record if we return 0, and bubble up the return value otherwise (this + * includes the case of MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT and of unexpected + * errors, and is the right thing to do in both cases). + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL || + ssl->conf->f_cookie_check == NULL ) + { + /* If we can't use cookies to verify reachability of the peer, + * drop the record. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no cookie callbacks, " + "can't check reconnect validity" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + ssl, + ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len, + ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left, + ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) + { + int send_ret; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sending HelloVerifyRequest" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network", + ssl->out_buf, len ); + /* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here. + * If the error is permanent we'll catch it later, + * if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */ + send_ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", send_ret ); + (void) send_ret; + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cookie is valid, resetting context" ) ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_record_type( uint8_t record_type ) +{ + if( record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * ContentType type; + * ProtocolVersion version; + * uint16 epoch; // DTLS only + * uint48 sequence_number; // DTLS only + * uint16 length; + * + * Return 0 if header looks sane (and, for DTLS, the record is expected) + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the header looks bad, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD (DTLS only) if sane but unexpected. + * + * With DTLS, mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will: + * 1. proceed with the record if this function returns 0 + * 2. drop only the current record if this function returns UNEXPECTED_RECORD + * 3. return CLIENT_RECONNECT if this function return that value + * 4. drop the whole datagram if this function returns anything else. + * Point 2 is needed when the peer is resending, and we have already received + * the first record from a datagram but are still waiting for the others. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + mbedtls_record *rec ) +{ + int major_ver, minor_ver; + + size_t const rec_hdr_type_offset = 0; + size_t const rec_hdr_type_len = 1; + + size_t const rec_hdr_version_offset = rec_hdr_type_offset + + rec_hdr_type_len; + size_t const rec_hdr_version_len = 2; + + size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_len = 8; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint32_t rec_epoch; + size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset + + rec_hdr_version_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + size_t const rec_hdr_cid_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + + rec_hdr_ctr_len; + size_t rec_hdr_cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + size_t rec_hdr_len_offset; /* To be determined */ + size_t const rec_hdr_len_len = 2; + + /* + * Check minimum lengths for record header. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + rec_hdr_ctr_len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset + rec_hdr_version_len; + } + + if( len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header of length %u", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned)( rec_hdr_len_len + rec_hdr_len_len ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* + * Parse and validate record content type + */ + + rec->type = buf[ rec_hdr_type_offset ]; + + /* Check record content type */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + rec->cid_len = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->conf->cid_len != 0 && + rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID ) + { + /* Shift pointers to account for record header including CID + * struct { + * ContentType special_type = tls12_cid; + * ProtocolVersion version; + * uint16 epoch; + * uint48 sequence_number; + * opaque cid[cid_length]; // Additional field compared to + * // default DTLS record format + * uint16 length; + * opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext.length]; + * } DTLSCiphertext; + */ + + /* So far, we only support static CID lengths + * fixed in the configuration. */ + rec_hdr_cid_len = ssl->conf->cid_len; + rec_hdr_len_offset += rec_hdr_cid_len; + + if( len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header including CID, length %u", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned)( rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* configured CID len is guaranteed at most 255, see + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX in check_config.h */ + rec->cid_len = (uint8_t) rec_hdr_cid_len; + memcpy( rec->cid, buf + rec_hdr_cid_offset, rec_hdr_cid_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + if( ssl_check_record_type( rec->type ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type %u", + (unsigned) rec->type ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + } + + /* + * Parse and validate record version + */ + rec->ver[0] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 0 ]; + rec->ver[1] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 1 ]; + mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, + &rec->ver[0] ); + + if( major_ver != ssl->major_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "major version mismatch: got %u, expected %u", + (unsigned) major_ver, + (unsigned) ssl->major_ver ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + if( minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "minor version mismatch: got %u, expected max %u", + (unsigned) minor_ver, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + /* + * Parse/Copy record sequence number. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Copy explicit record sequence number from input buffer. */ + memcpy( &rec->ctr[0], buf + rec_hdr_ctr_offset, + rec_hdr_ctr_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + /* Copy implicit record sequence number from SSL context structure. */ + memcpy( &rec->ctr[0], ssl->in_ctr, rec_hdr_ctr_len ); + } + + /* + * Parse record length. + */ + + rec->data_offset = rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len; + rec->data_len = ( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 0 ] << 8 ) | + ( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 1 ] << 0 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record header", buf, rec->data_offset ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "input record: msgtype = %u, " + "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->type, + major_ver, minor_ver, rec->data_len ) ); + + rec->buf = buf; + rec->buf_len = rec->data_offset + rec->data_len; + + if( rec->data_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + + /* + * DTLS-related tests. + * Check epoch before checking length constraint because + * the latter varies with the epoch. E.g., if a ChangeCipherSpec + * message gets duplicated before the corresponding Finished message, + * the second ChangeCipherSpec should be discarded because it belongs + * to an old epoch, but not because its length is shorter than + * the minimum record length for packets using the new record transform. + * Note that these two kinds of failures are handled differently, + * as an unexpected record is silently skipped but an invalid + * record leads to the entire datagram being dropped. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + rec_epoch = ( rec->ctr[0] << 8 ) | rec->ctr[1]; + + /* Check that the datagram is large enough to contain a record + * of the advertised length. */ + if( len < rec->data_offset + rec->data_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Datagram of length %u too small to contain record of advertised length %u.", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned)( rec->data_offset + rec->data_len ) ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + /* Records from other, non-matching epochs are silently discarded. + * (The case of same-port Client reconnects must be considered in + * the caller). */ + if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: " + "expected %u, received %lu", + ssl->in_epoch, (unsigned long) rec_epoch ) ); + + /* Records from the next epoch are considered for buffering + * (concretely: early Finished messages). */ + if( rec_epoch == (unsigned) ssl->in_epoch + 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Consider record for buffering" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + /* For records from the correct epoch, check whether their + * sequence number has been seen before. */ + else if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( (mbedtls_ssl_context *) ssl, + &rec->ctr[0] ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); + } +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + return( 0 ); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_client_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + unsigned int rec_epoch = ( ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_ctr[1]; + + /* + * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to + * access the first byte of record content (handshake type), as we + * have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the + * fact that the record header len is 13 instead. + */ + if( rec_epoch == 0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_left > 13 && + ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "possible client reconnect " + "from the same port" ) ); + return( ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( ssl ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * If applicable, decrypt record content + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_prepare_record_content( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record *rec ) +{ + int ret, done = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record from network", + rec->buf, rec->buf_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read()" ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + done = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + if( !done && ssl->transform_in != NULL ) + { + unsigned char const old_msg_type = rec->type; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in, + rec ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID && + ssl->conf->ignore_unexpected_cid + == MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ignoring unexpected CID" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + return( ret ); + } + + if( old_msg_type != rec->type ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "record type after decrypt (before %d): %d", + old_msg_type, rec->type ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input payload after decrypt", + rec->buf + rec->data_offset, rec->data_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* We have already checked the record content type + * in ssl_parse_record_header(), failing or silently + * dropping the record in the case of an unknown type. + * + * Since with the use of CIDs, the record content type + * might change during decryption, re-check the record + * content type, but treat a failure as fatal this time. */ + if( ssl_check_record_type( rec->type ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + if( rec->data_len == 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 + && rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + /* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + ssl->nb_zero++; + + /* + * Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack + * (excessive CPU consumption). + */ + if( ssl->nb_zero > 3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received four consecutive empty " + "messages, possible DoS attack" ) ); + /* Treat the records as if they were not properly authenticated, + * thereby failing the connection if we see more than allowed + * by the configured bad MAC threshold. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } + } + else + ssl->nb_zero = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ; /* in_ctr read from peer, not maintained internally */ + } + else +#endif + { + unsigned i; + for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- ) + if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "incoming message counter would wrap" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl ); + } +#endif + + /* Check actual (decrypted) record content length against + * configured maximum. */ + if( rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Read a record. + * + * Silently ignore non-fatal alert (and for DTLS, invalid records as well, + * RFC 6347 4.1.2.7) and continue reading until a valid record is found. + * + */ + +/* Helper functions for mbedtls_ssl_read_record(). */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned update_hs_digest ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read record" ) ); + + if( ssl->keep_current_message == 0 ) + { + do { + + ret = ssl_consume_current_message( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ssl_record_is_in_progress( ssl ) == 0 ) + { + int dtls_have_buffered = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + + /* We only check for buffered messages if the + * current datagram is fully consumed. */ + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 0 ) + { + if( ssl_load_buffered_message( ssl ) == 0 ) + dtls_have_buffered = 1; + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + if( dtls_have_buffered == 0 ) + { + ret = ssl_get_next_record( ssl ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ) + continue; + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_get_next_record" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) + { + /* Buffer future message */ + ret = ssl_buffer_message( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + } while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret || + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING == ret ); + + if( 0 != ret ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + update_hs_digest == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl ); + } + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "reuse previously read message" ) ); + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read record" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * hs_buf; + int ret = 0; + + if( hs == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_message" ) ); + + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + /* Check if we have seen a ChangeCipherSpec before. + * If yes, synthesize a CCS record. */ + if( !hs->buffering.seen_ccs ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CCS not seen in the current flight" ) ); + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Injecting buffered CCS message" ) ); + ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + ssl->in_msglen = 1; + ssl->in_msg[0] = 1; + + /* As long as they are equal, the exact value doesn't matter. */ + ssl->in_left = 0; + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + + hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + /* Debug only */ + { + unsigned offset; + for( offset = 1; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ ) + { + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[offset]; + if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Future message with sequence number %u %s buffered.", + hs->in_msg_seq + offset, + hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partially" ) ); + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + /* Check if we have buffered and/or fully reassembled the + * next handshake message. */ + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; + if( ( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) && ( hs_buf->is_complete == 1 ) ) + { + /* Synthesize a record containing the buffered HS message. */ + size_t msg_len = ( hs_buf->data[1] << 16 ) | + ( hs_buf->data[2] << 8 ) | + hs_buf->data[3]; + + /* Double-check that we haven't accidentally buffered + * a message that doesn't fit into the input buffer. */ + if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered handshake message (incl. header)", + hs_buf->data, msg_len + 12 ); + + ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->in_hslen = msg_len + 12; + ssl->in_msglen = msg_len + 12; + memcpy( ssl->in_msg, hs_buf->data, ssl->in_hslen ); + + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message %u not or only partially bufffered", + hs->in_msg_seq ) ); + } + + ret = -1; + +exit: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_message" ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_make_space( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t desired ) +{ + int offset; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes available", + (unsigned) desired ) ); + + /* Get rid of future records epoch first, if such exist. */ + ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + + /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ + if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing future epoch record" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* We don't have enough space to buffer the next expected handshake + * message. Remove buffers used for future messages to gain space, + * starting with the most distant one. */ + for( offset = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1; + offset >= 0; offset-- ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Free buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake message", + offset ) ); + + ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, (uint8_t) offset ); + + /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ + if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + } + + return( -1 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if( hs == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_buffer_message" ) ); + + switch( ssl->in_msgtype ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Remember CCS message" ) ); + + hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 1; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE: + { + unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset; + unsigned recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5]; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; + size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12; + + /* We should never receive an old handshake + * message - double-check nonetheless. */ + if( recv_msg_seq < ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + recv_msg_seq_offset = recv_msg_seq - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; + if( recv_msg_seq_offset >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS ) + { + /* Silently ignore -- message too far in the future */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, + ( "Ignore future HS message with sequence number %u, " + "buffering window %u - %u", + recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1 ) ); + + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u ", + recv_msg_seq, recv_msg_seq_offset ) ); + + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[ recv_msg_seq_offset ]; + + /* Check if the buffering for this seq nr has already commenced. */ + if( !hs_buf->is_valid ) + { + size_t reassembly_buf_sz; + + hs_buf->is_fragmented = + ( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 ); + + /* We copy the message back into the input buffer + * after reassembly, so check that it's not too large. + * This is an implementation-specific limitation + * and not one from the standard, hence it is not + * checked in ssl_check_hs_header(). */ + if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + /* Ignore message */ + goto exit; + } + + /* Check if we have enough space to buffer the message. */ + if( hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered > + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + reassembly_buf_sz = ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( msg_len, + hs_buf->is_fragmented ); + + if( reassembly_buf_sz > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + if( recv_msg_seq_offset > 0 ) + { + /* If we can't buffer a future message because + * of space limitations -- ignore. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", + msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + goto exit; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n", + msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + } + + if( ssl_buffer_make_space( ssl, reassembly_buf_sz ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reassembly of next message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " with bitmap) would exceed" + " the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- fail\n", + msg_len, + reassembly_buf_sz, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialize reassembly, total length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + msg_len ) ); + + hs_buf->data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, reassembly_buf_sz ); + if( hs_buf->data == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + hs_buf->data_len = reassembly_buf_sz; + + /* Prepare final header: copy msg_type, length and message_seq, + * then add standardised fragment_offset and fragment_length */ + memcpy( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 6 ); + memset( hs_buf->data + 6, 0, 3 ); + memcpy( hs_buf->data + 9, hs_buf->data + 1, 3 ); + + hs_buf->is_valid = 1; + + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += reassembly_buf_sz; + } + else + { + /* Make sure msg_type and length are consistent */ + if( memcmp( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 4 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Fragment header mismatch - ignore" ) ); + /* Ignore */ + goto exit; + } + } + + if( !hs_buf->is_complete ) + { + size_t frag_len, frag_off; + unsigned char * const msg = hs_buf->data + 12; + + /* + * Check and copy current fragment + */ + + /* Validation of header fields already done in + * mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(). */ + frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl ); + frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "adding fragment, offset = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + frag_off, frag_len ) ); + memcpy( msg + frag_off, ssl->in_msg + 12, frag_len ); + + if( hs_buf->is_fragmented ) + { + unsigned char * const bitmask = msg + msg_len; + ssl_bitmask_set( bitmask, frag_off, frag_len ); + hs_buf->is_complete = ( ssl_bitmask_check( bitmask, + msg_len ) == 0 ); + } + else + { + hs_buf->is_complete = 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message %scomplete", + hs_buf->is_complete ? "" : "not yet " ) ); + } + + break; + } + + default: + /* We don't buffer other types of messages. */ + break; + } + +exit: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_buffer_message" ) ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* + * Consume last content-layer message and potentially + * update in_msglen which keeps track of the contents' + * consumption state. + * + * (1) Handshake messages: + * Remove last handshake message, move content + * and adapt in_msglen. + * + * (2) Alert messages: + * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. + * + * (3) Change cipher spec: + * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. + * + * (4) Application data: + * Don't do anything - the record layer provides + * the application data as a stream transport + * and consumes through mbedtls_ssl_read only. + * + */ + + /* Case (1): Handshake messages */ + if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 ) + { + /* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data + * is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during + * ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */ + if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * Get next Handshake message in the current record + */ + + /* Notes: + * (1) in_hslen is not necessarily the size of the + * current handshake content: If DTLS handshake + * fragmentation is used, that's the fragment + * size instead. Using the total handshake message + * size here is faulty and should be changed at + * some point. + * (2) While it doesn't seem to cause problems, one + * has to be very careful not to assume that in_hslen + * is always <= in_msglen in a sensible communication. + * Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation. + * The following check is therefore mandatory, and + * should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion. + * Additionally, ssl->in_hslen might be arbitrarily out of + * bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected + * sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record. + */ + if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) + { + ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen; + memmove( ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen, + ssl->in_msglen ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "remaining content in record", + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen ); + } + else + { + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + } + + ssl->in_hslen = 0; + } + /* Case (4): Application data */ + else if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + /* Everything else (CCS & Alerts) */ + else + { + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->in_msglen > 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + if( hs == NULL ) + return; + + if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL ) + { + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= + hs->buffering.future_record.len; + + mbedtls_free( hs->buffering.future_record.data ); + hs->buffering.future_record.data = NULL; + } +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char * rec; + size_t rec_len; + unsigned rec_epoch; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( 0 ); + + if( hs == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + rec = hs->buffering.future_record.data; + rec_len = hs->buffering.future_record.len; + rec_epoch = hs->buffering.future_record.epoch; + + if( rec == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Only consider loading future records if the + * input buffer is empty. */ + if( ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 1 ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_record" ) ); + + if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffered record not from current epoch." ) ); + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" ) ); + + /* Double-check that the record is not too large */ + if( rec_len > in_buf_len - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->in_hdr, rec, rec_len ); + ssl->in_left = rec_len; + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + + ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + +exit: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_record" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record const *rec ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + /* Don't buffer future records outside handshakes. */ + if( hs == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Only buffer handshake records (we are only interested + * in Finished messages). */ + if( rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Don't buffer more than one future epoch record. */ + if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Don't buffer record if there's not enough buffering space remaining. */ + if( rec->buf_len > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future epoch record of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", + rec->buf_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* Buffer record */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffer record from epoch %u", + ssl->in_epoch + 1U ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered record", rec->buf, rec->buf_len ); + + /* ssl_parse_record_header() only considers records + * of the next epoch as candidates for buffering. */ + hs->buffering.future_record.epoch = ssl->in_epoch + 1; + hs->buffering.future_record.len = rec->buf_len; + + hs->buffering.future_record.data = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, hs->buffering.future_record.len ); + if( hs->buffering.future_record.data == NULL ) + { + /* If we run out of RAM trying to buffer a + * record from the next epoch, just ignore. */ + return( 0 ); + } + + memcpy( hs->buffering.future_record.data, rec->buf, rec->buf_len ); + + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += rec->buf_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_record rec; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* We might have buffered a future record; if so, + * and if the epoch matches now, load it. + * On success, this call will set ssl->in_left to + * the length of the buffered record, so that + * the calls to ssl_fetch_input() below will + * essentially be no-ops. */ + ret = ssl_load_buffered_record( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Ensure that we have enough space available for the default form + * of TLS / DTLS record headers (5 Bytes for TLS, 13 Bytes for DTLS, + * with no space for CIDs counted in). */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl, ssl->in_hdr, ssl->in_left, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ) + { + ret = ssl_buffer_future_record( ssl, &rec ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Fall through to handling of unexpected records */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records, + * assuming no CID and no offset between record content and + * record plaintext. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl ); + + /* Setup internal message pointers from record structure. */ + ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_len + 2; + ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len; + + ret = ssl_check_client_reconnect( ssl ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_client_reconnect", ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + /* Skip unexpected record (but not whole datagram) */ + ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding unexpected record " + "(header)" ) ); + } + else + { + /* Skip invalid record and the rest of the datagram */ + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record " + "(header)" ) ); + } + + /* Get next record */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); + } + else +#endif + { + return( ret ); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Remember offset of next record within datagram. */ + ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len; + if( ssl->next_record_offset < ssl->in_left ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "more than one record within datagram" ) ); + } + } + else +#endif + { + /* + * Fetch record contents from underlying transport. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, rec.buf_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->in_left = 0; + } + + /* + * Decrypt record contents. + */ + + if( ( ret = ssl_prepare_record_content( ssl, &rec ) ) != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Silently discard invalid records */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + { + /* Except when waiting for Finished as a bad mac here + * probably means something went wrong in the handshake + * (eg wrong psk used, mitm downgrade attempt, etc.) */ + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC ); + } +#endif + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + if( ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 && + ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "too many records with bad MAC" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ); + } +#endif + + /* As above, invalid records cause + * dismissal of the whole datagram. */ + + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record (mac)" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING ); + } + + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif + { + /* Error out (and send alert) on invalid records */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC ); + } +#endif + return( ret ); + } + } + + + /* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records, + * assuming no CID and no offset between record content and + * record plaintext. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2; + + /* The record content type may change during decryption, + * so re-read it. */ + ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type; + /* Also update the input buffer, because unfortunately + * the server-side ssl_parse_client_hello() reparses the + * record header when receiving a ClientHello initiating + * a renegotiation. */ + ssl->in_hdr[0] = rec.type; + ssl->in_msg = rec.buf + rec.data_offset; + ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec.data_len, ssl->in_len, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->transform_in != NULL && + ssl->session_in->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_decompress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decompress_buf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Check actual (decompress) record content length against + * configured maximum. */ + if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * Handle particular types of records + */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + if( ssl->in_msglen != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, content: %02x", + ssl->in_msg[0] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshake" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - remember" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE ); + } +#endif + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT ) + { + if( ssl->in_msglen != 2 ) + { + /* Note: Standard allows for more than one 2 byte alert + to be packed in a single message, but Mbed TLS doesn't + currently support this. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid alert message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got an alert message, type: [%u:%u]", + ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_msg[1] ) ); + + /* + * Ignore non-fatal alerts, except close_notify and no_renegotiation + */ + if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "is a fatal alert message (msg %d)", + ssl->in_msg[1] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a close notify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED) + if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no renegotiation alert" ) ); + /* Will be handled when trying to parse ServerHello */ + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no_cert" ) ); + /* Will be handled in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() */ + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + /* Silently ignore: fetch new message */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records, + * except at the beginning of renegotiations */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + && ! ( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO ) +#endif + ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ApplicationData" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char level, + unsigned char message ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> send alert message" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message )); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; + ssl->out_msglen = 2; + ssl->out_msg[0] = level; + ssl->out_msg[1] = message; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= send alert message" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write change cipher spec" ) ); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + ssl->out_msglen = 1; + ssl->out_msg[0] = 1; + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write change cipher spec" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse change cipher spec" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad change cipher spec message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + /* CCS records are only accepted if they have length 1 and content '1', + * so we don't need to check this here. */ + + /* + * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for inbound + * data. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for inbound data" ) ); + ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl ); +#endif + + /* Increment epoch */ + if( ++ssl->in_epoch == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) ); + /* This is highly unlikely to happen for legitimate reasons, so + treat it as an attack and don't send an alert. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse change cipher spec" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Once ssl->out_hdr as the address of the beginning of the + * next outgoing record is set, deduce the other pointers. + * + * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number + * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->out_hdr, + * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. + */ + +static size_t ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( + mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform ) +{ + if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + 8; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_cid; + if( transform != NULL ) + ssl->out_len += transform->out_cid_len; +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_len + 2; + } + else +#endif + { + ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr - 8; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_len; +#endif + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 5; + } + + ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv; + /* Adjust out_msg to make space for explicit IV, if used. */ + if( transform != NULL ) + ssl->out_msg += ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( transform ); +} + +/* Once ssl->in_hdr as the address of the beginning of the + * next incoming record is set, deduce the other pointers. + * + * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number + * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->in_hdr, + * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. + */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* This function sets the pointers to match the case + * of unprotected TLS/DTLS records, with both ssl->in_iv + * and ssl->in_msg pointing to the beginning of the record + * content. + * + * When decrypting a protected record, ssl->in_msg + * will be shifted to point to the beginning of the + * record plaintext. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* This sets the header pointers to match records + * without CID. When we receive a record containing + * a CID, the fields are shifted accordingly in + * ssl_parse_record_header(). */ + ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + 8; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid; /* Default: no CID */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2; + } + else +#endif + { + ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - 8; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_len; +#endif + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 5; + } + + /* This will be adjusted at record decryption time. */ + ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_iv; +} + +/* + * Setup an SSL context + */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* Set the incoming and outgoing record pointers. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; + ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; + ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8; + } + + /* Derive other internal pointers. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */ ); + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers ( ssl ); +} + +/* + * SSL get accessors + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* + * Case A: We're currently holding back + * a message for further processing. + */ + + if( ssl->keep_current_message == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: record held back for processing" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * Case B: Further records are pending in the current datagram. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more records within current datagram" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Case C: A handshake message is being processed. + */ + + if( ssl->in_hslen > 0 && ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current record" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * Case D: An application data message is being processed + */ + if( ssl->in_offt != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: application data record is being processed" ) ); + return( 1 ); + } + + /* + * In all other cases, the rest of the message can be dropped. + * As in ssl_get_next_record, this needs to be adapted if + * we implement support for multiple alerts in single records. + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: nothing pending" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t transform_expansion = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out; + unsigned block_size; + + size_t out_hdr_len = mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ); + + if( transform == NULL ) + return( (int) out_hdr_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->session_out->compression != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +#endif + + switch( mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ) ) + { + case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM: + transform_expansion = transform->minlen; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: + + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( + &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + + /* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */ + transform_expansion += transform->maclen; + + /* Expansion due to the addition of CBC padding; + * Theoretically up to 256 bytes, but we never use + * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */ + transform_expansion += block_size; + + /* For TLS 1.1 or higher, an explicit IV is added + * after the record header. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + transform_expansion += block_size; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if( transform->out_cid_len != 0 ) + transform_expansion += MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + return( (int)( out_hdr_len + transform_expansion ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +/* + * Check record counters and renegotiate if they're above the limit. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t ep_len = mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); + int in_ctr_cmp; + int out_ctr_cmp; + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING || + ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + in_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->in_ctr + ep_len, + ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len ); + out_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len, + ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len ); + + if( in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" ) ); + return( mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( ssl ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/* + * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is + * in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through + * if an unexpected packet is received while the client + * is waiting for the ServerHello. + * + * (There is no equivalent to the last condition on + * the server-side as it is not treated as within + * a handshake while waiting for the ClientHello + * after a renegotiation request.) + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + /* Loop as long as no application data record is available */ + while( ssl->in_offt == NULL ) + { + /* Start timer if not already running */ + if( ssl->f_get_timer != NULL && + ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == -1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->conf->read_timeout ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + /* + * OpenSSL sends empty messages to randomize the IV + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received handshake message" ) ); + + /* + * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST. + * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO. + * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) ); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + continue; + } +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not ClientHello)" ) ); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + continue; + } +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */ + if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || + ( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) ) + { + /* + * Accept renegotiation request + */ + + /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; + } +#endif + ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + /* + * Refuse renegotiation + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + /* SSLv3 does not have a "no_renegotiation" warning, so + we send a fatal alert and abort the connection. */ + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + + /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation has been + * completed or not. The cases to consider are the following: + * 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record + * has been read yet. + * 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received + * an application data record while awaiting the ServerHello. + * 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received + * a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting + * the ServerHello. + * In each of these case, looping will be the proper action: + * - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check + * if it's application data. + * - For 2), the loop condition isn't satisfied as application data + * is present, hence continue is the same as break + * - For 3), the loop condition is satisfied and read_record + * will re-deliver the message that was held back by the client + * when expecting the ServerHello. + */ + continue; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 ) + { + if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, " + "but not honored by client" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + /* Fatal and closure alerts handled by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ignoring non-fatal non-closure alert" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad application data message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; + + /* We're going to return something now, cancel timer, + * except if handshake (renegotiation) is in progress */ + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* If we requested renego but received AppData, resend HelloRequest. + * Do it now, after setting in_offt, to avoid taking this branch + * again if ssl_write_hello_request() returns WANT_WRITE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request", + ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + } + + n = ( len < ssl->in_msglen ) + ? len : ssl->in_msglen; + + memcpy( buf, ssl->in_offt, n ); + ssl->in_msglen -= n; + + /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data + from the memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_offt, n ); + + if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 ) + { + /* all bytes consumed */ + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } + else + { + /* more data available */ + ssl->in_offt += n; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) ); + + return( (int) n ); +} + +/* + * Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max + * fragment length and buffer size. + * + * According to RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1: + * + * Zero-length fragments of Application data MAY be sent as they are + * potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure. + * + * Therefore, it is possible that the input message length is 0 and the + * corresponding return code is 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( ssl ); + const size_t max_len = (size_t) ret; + + if( ret < 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( len > max_len ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "fragment larger than the (negotiated) " + "maximum fragment length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + len, max_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + else +#endif + len = max_len; + } + + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + { + /* + * The user has previously tried to send the data and + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE or the message was only partially + * written. In this case, we expect the high-level write function + * (e.g. mbedtls_ssl_write()) to be called with the same parameters + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + /* + * The user is trying to send a message the first time, so we need to + * copy the data into the internal buffers and setup the data structure + * to keep track of partial writes + */ + ssl->out_msglen = len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; + memcpy( ssl->out_msg, buf, len ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* + * Write application data, doing 1/n-1 splitting if necessary. + * + * With non-blocking I/O, ssl_write_real() may return WANT_WRITE, + * then the caller will call us again with the same arguments, so + * remember whether we already did the split or not. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_split( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl->conf->cbc_record_splitting == + MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED || + len <= 1 || + ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 || + mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc ) + != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + return( ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ) ); + } + + if( ssl->split_done == 0 ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, 1 ) ) <= 0 ) + return( ret ); + ssl->split_done = 1; + } + + if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf + 1, len - 1 ) ) <= 0 ) + return( ret ); + ssl->split_done = 0; + + return( ret + 1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ + +/* + * Write application data (public-facing wrapper) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write" ) ); + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ( ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif + + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + ret = ssl_write_split( ssl, buf, len ); +#else + ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Notify the peer that the connection is being closed + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write close notify" ) ); + + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write close notify" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ + if( transform == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + deflateEnd( &transform->ctx_deflate ); + inflateEnd( &transform->ctx_inflate ); +#endif + + mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transform, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + unsigned offset; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if( hs == NULL ) + return; + + ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl ); + + for( offset = 0; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ ) + ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, offset ); +} + +static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint8_t slot ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * const hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[slot]; + + if( slot >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS ) + return; + + if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) + { + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len ); + mbedtls_free( hs_buf->data ); + memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/* + * Convert version numbers to/from wire format + * and, for DTLS, to/from TLS equivalent. + * + * For TLS this is the identity. + * For DTLS, use 1's complement (v -> 255 - v, and then map as follows: + * 1.0 <-> 3.2 (DTLS 1.0 is based on TLS 1.1) + * 1.x <-> 3.x+1 for x != 0 (DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport, + unsigned char ver[2] ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + if( minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) + --minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ + + ver[0] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( major - 2 ) ); + ver[1] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( minor - 1 ) ); + } + else +#else + ((void) transport); +#endif + { + ver[0] = (unsigned char) major; + ver[1] = (unsigned char) minor; + } +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport, + const unsigned char ver[2] ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + *major = 255 - ver[0] + 2; + *minor = 255 - ver[1] + 1; + + if( *minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + ++*minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ + } + else +#else + ((void) transport); +#endif + { + *major = ver[0]; + *minor = ver[1]; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_srv.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_srv.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0563c0b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_srv.c @@ -0,0 +1,4861 @@ +/* + * SSLv3/TLSv1 server-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *info, + size_t ilen ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id ); + + if( ( ssl->cli_id = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ilen ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( ssl->cli_id, info, ilen ); + ssl->cli_id_len = ilen; + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, + void *p_cookie ) +{ + conf->f_cookie_write = f_cookie_write; + conf->f_cookie_check = f_cookie_check; + conf->p_cookie = p_cookie; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len; + const unsigned char *p; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "parse ServerName extension" ) ); + + if( len < 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + servername_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); + if( servername_list_size + 2 != len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + p = buf + 2; + while( servername_list_size > 2 ) + { + hostname_len = ( ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2] ); + if( hostname_len + 3 > servername_list_size ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME ) + { + ret = ssl->conf->f_sni( ssl->conf->p_sni, + ssl, p + 3, hostname_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + return( 0 ); + } + + servername_list_size -= hostname_len + 3; + p += hostname_len + 3; + } + + if( servername_list_size != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf ) +{ + if( conf->f_psk != NULL ) + return( 1 ); + + if( conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) + { + /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK, + * the static configuration is irrelevant. */ + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + { + /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ + if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len || + buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data, + ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/* + * Status of the implementation of signature-algorithms extension: + * + * Currently, we are only considering the signature-algorithm extension + * to pick a ciphersuite which allows us to send the ServerKeyExchange + * message with a signature-hash combination that the user allows. + * + * We do *not* check whether all certificates in our certificate + * chain are signed with an allowed signature-hash pair. + * This needs to be done at a later stage. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t sig_alg_list_size; + + const unsigned char *p; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_cur; + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_cur; + + if ( len < 2 ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + sig_alg_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); + if( sig_alg_list_size + 2 != len || + sig_alg_list_size % 2 != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Currently we only guarantee signing the ServerKeyExchange message according + * to the constraints specified in this extension (see above), so it suffices + * to remember only one suitable hash for each possible signature algorithm. + * + * This will change when we also consider certificate signatures, + * in which case we will need to remember the whole signature-hash + * pair list from the extension. + */ + + for( p = buf + 2; p < end; p += 2 ) + { + /* Silently ignore unknown signature or hash algorithms. */ + + if( ( sig_cur = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( p[1] ) ) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext" + " unknown sig alg encoding %d", p[1] ) ); + continue; + } + + /* Check if we support the hash the user proposes */ + md_cur = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( p[0] ); + if( md_cur == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" + " unknown hash alg encoding %d", p[0] ) ); + continue; + } + + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, md_cur ) == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_cur, md_cur ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" + " match sig %u and hash %u", + (unsigned) sig_cur, (unsigned) md_cur ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: " + "hash alg %u not supported", (unsigned) md_cur ) ); + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t list_size, our_size; + const unsigned char *p; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info, **curves; + + if ( len < 2 ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); + if( list_size + 2 != len || + list_size % 2 != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */ + if( ssl->handshake->curves != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory, + * and leave room for a final 0 */ + our_size = list_size / 2 + 1; + if( our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX ) + our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX; + + if( ( curves = mbedtls_calloc( our_size, sizeof( *curves ) ) ) == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + ssl->handshake->curves = curves; + + p = buf + 2; + while( list_size > 0 && our_size > 1 ) + { + curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1] ); + + if( curve_info != NULL ) + { + *curves++ = curve_info; + our_size--; + } + + list_size -= 2; + p += 2; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t list_size; + const unsigned char *p; + + if( len == 0 || (size_t)( buf[0] + 1 ) != len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + list_size = buf[0]; + + p = buf + 1; + while( list_size > 0 ) + { + if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + list_size--; + p++; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + buf, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */ + ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0]; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + size_t peer_cid_len; + + /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + + if( len < 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + peer_cid_len = *buf++; + len--; + + if( len != peer_cid_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */ + if( ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + /* Leave ssl->handshake->cid_in_use in its default + * value of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Client CID", buf, peer_cid_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED ) + ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED && + ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + if( len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ((void) buf); + + if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED && + ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_session session; + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session ); + + if( ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL || + ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */ + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, len ) ); + + if( len == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket rejected: renegotiating" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + /* + * Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed. + */ + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse( ssl->conf->p_ticket, &session, + buf, len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session ); + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket is not authentic" ) ); + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket is expired" ) ); + else + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to + * inform them we're accepting the ticket (RFC 5077 section 3.4) + */ + session.id_len = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + memcpy( &session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.id_len ); + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); + + /* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from ticket" ) ); + + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; + + /* Don't send a new ticket after all, this one is OK */ + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + size_t list_len, cur_len, ours_len; + const unsigned char *theirs, *start, *end; + const char **ours; + + /* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + */ + + /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */ + if( len < 4 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; + if( list_len != len - 2 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * Validate peer's list (lengths) + */ + start = buf + 2; + end = buf + len; + for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len ) + { + cur_len = *theirs++; + + /* Current identifier must fit in list */ + if( cur_len > (size_t)( end - theirs ) ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */ + if( cur_len == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + } + + /* + * Use our order of preference + */ + for( ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++ ) + { + ours_len = strlen( *ours ); + for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len ) + { + cur_len = *theirs++; + + if( cur_len == ours_len && + memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 ) + { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *ours; + return( 0 ); + } + } + } + + /* If we get there, no match was found */ + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile client_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + size_t i,j; + size_t profile_length; + uint16_t mki_length; + /*! 2 bytes for profile length and 1 byte for mki len */ + const size_t size_of_lengths = 3; + + /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) || + ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* RFC5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + */ + + /* + * Min length is 5: at least one protection profile(2 bytes) + * and length(2 bytes) + srtp_mki length(1 byte) + * Check here that we have at least 2 bytes of protection profiles length + * and one of srtp_mki length + */ + if( len < size_of_lengths ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + + /* first 2 bytes are protection profile length(in bytes) */ + profile_length = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; + buf += 2; + + /* The profile length cannot be bigger than input buffer size - lengths fields */ + if( profile_length > len - size_of_lengths || + profile_length % 2 != 0 ) /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length must be even */ + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + /* + * parse the extension list values are defined in + * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml + */ + for( j = 0; j < profile_length; j += 2 ) + { + uint16_t protection_profile_value = buf[j] << 8 | buf[j + 1]; + client_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( protection_profile_value ); + + if( client_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + client_protection ) ) ); + } + else + { + continue; + } + /* check if suggested profile is in our list */ + for( i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) + { + if( client_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i] ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + client_protection ) ) ); + break; + } + } + if( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + break; + } + buf += profile_length; /* buf points to the mki length */ + mki_length = *buf; + buf++; + + if( mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH || + mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */ + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED && + mki_length > 0 ) + { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_length; + + memcpy( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, buf, mki_length ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "using mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +/* + * Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/* + * Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_key_curve( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **crv = curves; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id; + + while( *crv != NULL ) + { + if( (*crv)->grp_id == grp_id ) + return( 0 ); + crv++; + } + + return( -1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +/* + * Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite, + * return 0 on success and -1 on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_pick_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * ciphersuite_info ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list, *fallback = NULL; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); + uint32_t flags; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL ) + list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert; + else +#endif + list = ssl->conf->key_cert; + + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + return( 0 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite requires certificate" ) ); + + if( list == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server has no certificate" ) ); + return( -1 ); + } + + for( cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { + flags = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate", + cur->cert ); + + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &cur->cert->pk, pk_alg ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: key type" ) ); + continue; + } + + /* + * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on + * keyUsage or other extensions. + * + * It also allows the user to provision different certificates for + * different uses based on keyUsage, eg if they want to avoid signing + * and decrypting with the same RSA key. + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( cur->cert, ciphersuite_info, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: " + "(extended) key usage extension" ) ); + continue; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && + ssl_check_key_curve( &cur->cert->pk, ssl->handshake->curves ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: elliptic curve" ) ); + continue; + } +#endif + + /* + * Try to select a SHA-1 certificate for pre-1.2 clients, but still + * present them a SHA-higher cert rather than failing if it's the only + * one we got that satisfies the other conditions. + */ + if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + cur->cert->sig_md != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) + { + if( fallback == NULL ) + fallback = cur; + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate not preferred: " + "sha-2 with pre-TLS 1.2 client" ) ); + continue; + } + } + + /* If we get there, we got a winner */ + break; + } + + if( cur == NULL ) + cur = fallback; + + /* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */ + if( cur != NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "selected certificate chain, certificate", + ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert ); + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/* + * Check if a given ciphersuite is suitable for use with our config/keys/etc + * Sets ciphersuite_info only if the suite matches. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **ciphersuite_info ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type; +#endif + + suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( suite_id ); + if( suite_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", + (unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name ) ); + + if( suite_info->min_minor_ver > ssl->minor_ver || + suite_info->max_minor_ver < ssl->minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: version" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS ) ) + return( 0 ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && + suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: rc4" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && + ( ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake " + "not configured or ext missing" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( suite_info ) && + ( ssl->handshake->curves == NULL || + ssl->handshake->curves[0] == NULL ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: " + "no common elliptic curve" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't + * have one, skip it now rather than failing later */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) && + ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether + * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( suite_info ); + if( sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_type ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " + "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /* + * Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a + * certificate/key of a particular type: + * - select the appropriate certificate if we have one, or + * - try the next ciphersuite if we don't + * This must be done last since we modify the key_cert list. + */ + if( ssl_pick_cert( ssl, suite_info ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: " + "no suitable certificate" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } +#endif + + *ciphersuite_info = suite_info; + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret, got_common_suite; + unsigned int i, j; + size_t n; + unsigned int ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len; + unsigned char *buf, *p; + const int *ciphersuites; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello v2" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client hello v2 illegal for renegotiation" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + buf = ssl->in_hdr; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, 5 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, message type: %d", + buf[2] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, message len.: %d", + ( ( buf[0] & 0x7F ) << 8 ) | buf[1] ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, max. version: [%d:%d]", + buf[3], buf[4] ) ); + + /* + * SSLv2 Client Hello + * + * Record layer: + * 0 . 1 message length + * + * SSL layer: + * 2 . 2 message type + * 3 . 4 protocol version + */ + if( buf[2] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO || + buf[3] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + n = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1] ) & 0x7FFF; + + if( n < 17 || n > 512 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; + ssl->minor_ver = ( buf[4] <= ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + ? buf[4] : ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; + + if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" + " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", + ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + } + + ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = buf[3]; + ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = buf[4]; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 2 + n ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf + 2, n ); + + buf = ssl->in_msg; + n = ssl->in_left - 5; + + /* + * 0 . 1 ciphersuitelist length + * 2 . 3 session id length + * 4 . 5 challenge length + * 6 . .. ciphersuitelist + * .. . .. session id + * .. . .. challenge + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record contents", buf, n ); + + ciph_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; + sess_len = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3]; + chal_len = ( buf[4] << 8 ) | buf[5]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciph_len: %u, sess_len: %u, chal_len: %u", + ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len ) ); + + /* + * Make sure each parameter length is valid + */ + if( ciph_len < 3 || ( ciph_len % 3 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + if( sess_len > 32 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + if( chal_len < 8 || chal_len > 32 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + if( n != 6 + ciph_len + sess_len + chal_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", + buf + 6, ciph_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", + buf + 6 + ciph_len, sess_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, challenge", + buf + 6 + ciph_len + sess_len, chal_len ); + + p = buf + 6 + ciph_len; + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; + memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, + sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) ); + memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, p, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); + + p += sess_len; + memset( ssl->handshake->randbytes, 0, 64 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len ); + + /* + * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV + */ + for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 ) + { + if( p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0 && p[2] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO " ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " + "during renegotiation" ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; + break; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) + for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 ) + { + if( p[0] == 0 && + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1) != MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); + + if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inapropriate fallback" ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + break; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ + + got_common_suite = 0; + ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; + ciphersuite_info = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) + for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 ) + for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) +#else + for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) + for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 ) +#endif + { + if( p[0] != 0 || + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1) != ciphersuites[i] ) + continue; + + got_common_suite = 1; + + if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i], + &ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) + goto have_ciphersuite_v2; + } + + if( got_common_suite ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, " + "but none of them usable" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); + } + +have_ciphersuite_v2: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + + /* + * SSLv2 Client Hello relevant renegotiation security checks + */ + if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->in_left = 0; + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello v2" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ + +/* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during + ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is + not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret, got_common_suite; + size_t i, j; + size_t ciph_offset, comp_offset, ext_offset; + size_t msg_len, ciph_len, sess_len, comp_len, ext_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + size_t cookie_offset, cookie_len; +#endif + unsigned char *buf, *p, *ext; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int renegotiation_info_seen = 0; +#endif + int handshake_failure = 0; + const int *ciphersuites; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + int major, minor; + + /* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present, + * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed + * signature-hash pairs. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello" ) ); + + int renegotiating = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +read_record_header: +#endif + /* + * If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), + * otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2 + * ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + renegotiating = 1; +#endif + if( !renegotiating ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 5 ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* No alert on a read error. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + buf = ssl->in_hdr; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) + int is_dtls = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + is_dtls = 1; +#endif + if( !is_dtls ) + if( ( buf[0] & 0x80 ) != 0 ) + return( ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( ssl ) ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) ); + + /* + * SSLv3/TLS Client Hello + * + * Record layer: + * 0 . 0 message type + * 1 . 2 protocol version + * 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number + * 3 . 4 message length + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, message type: %d", + buf[0] ) ); + + if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, message len.: %d", + ( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1] ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, protocol version: [%d:%d]", + buf[1], buf[2] ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major, &minor, ssl->conf->transport, buf + 1 ); + + /* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically + * "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the + * value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here + * is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */ + if( major < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence + * number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE +#endif + ) + { + /* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */ + if( ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, ssl->in_ctr + 2, 6 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record, discarding" ) ); + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + goto read_record_header; + } + + /* No MAC to check yet, so we can update right now */ + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl ); +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + msg_len = ( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + { + /* Set by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ + msg_len = ssl->in_hslen; + } + else +#endif + { + if( msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) + msg_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ); + else +#endif + ssl->in_left = 0; + } + + buf = ssl->in_msg; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record contents", buf, msg_len ); + + ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf, msg_len ); + + /* + * Handshake layer: + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 5 DTLS only: message sequence number + * 6 . 8 DTLS only: fragment offset + * 9 . 11 DTLS only: fragment length + */ + if( msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0] ) ); + + if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake len.: %d", + ( buf[1] << 16 ) | ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) ); + + if( buf[1] != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message: %u != 0", + (unsigned) buf[1] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */ + if( msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ( ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u", + (unsigned) msg_len, + (unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), + (unsigned) ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + /* + * Copy the client's handshake message_seq on initial handshakes, + * check sequence number on renego. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */ + unsigned int cli_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[5]; + + if( cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message_seq: " + "%u (expected %u)", cli_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++; + } + else +#endif + { + unsigned int cli_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | + ssl->in_msg[5]; + ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq; + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1; + } + + /* + * For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure + * fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 4, ( "fragment_offset=%u fragment_length=%u length=%u", + (unsigned) ( ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 | ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 | ssl->in_msg[8] ), + (unsigned) ( ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 | ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 | ssl->in_msg[11] ), + (unsigned) ( ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 | ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 | ssl->in_msg[3] ) ) ); + if( ssl->in_msg[6] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[7] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[8] != 0 || + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ClientHello fragmentation not supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + + /* + * ClientHello layer: + * 0 . 1 protocol version + * 2 . 33 random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time) + * 34 . 35 session id length (1 byte) + * 35 . 34+x session id + * 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) + * 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie + * .. . .. ciphersuite list length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. ciphersuite list + * .. . .. compression alg. list length (1 byte) + * .. . .. compression alg. list + * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes, optional) + * .. . .. extensions (optional) + */ + + /* + * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is + * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can + * read at least up to session id length without worrying. + */ + if( msg_len < 38 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * Check and save the protocol version + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, version", buf, 2 ); + + mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, buf ); + + ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = ssl->major_ver; + ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver; + + if( ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver || + ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" + " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", + ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + } + + if( ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver ) + { + ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->max_major_ver; + ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; + } + else if( ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; + + /* + * Save client random (inc. Unix time) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 ); + + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32 ); + + /* + * Check the session ID length and save session ID + */ + sess_len = buf[34]; + + if( sess_len > sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) || + sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len ) /* 2 for cipherlist length field */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; + memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, + sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) ); + memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); + + /* + * Check the cookie length and content + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + cookie_offset = 35 + sess_len; + cookie_len = buf[cookie_offset]; + + if( cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie", + buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check != NULL +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE +#endif + ) + { + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check( ssl->conf->p_cookie, + buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len, + ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification failed" ) ); + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 1; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification passed" ) ); + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + { + /* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */ + if( cookie_len != 0 ) + { + /* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification skipped" ) ); + } + + /* + * Check the ciphersuitelist length (will be parsed later) + */ + ciph_offset = cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len; + + ciph_len = ( buf[ciph_offset + 0] << 8 ) + | ( buf[ciph_offset + 1] ); + + if( ciph_len < 2 || + ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */ + ( ciph_len % 2 ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", + buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len ); + + /* + * Check the compression algorithms length and pick one + */ + comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len; + + comp_len = buf[comp_offset]; + + if( comp_len < 1 || + comp_len > 16 || + comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, compression", + buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + for( i = 0; i < comp_len; ++i ) + { + if( buf[comp_offset + 1 + i] == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; + break; + } + } +#endif + + /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; +#endif + + /* Do not parse the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( ( ssl->major_ver != 3 ) || ( ssl->minor_ver != 0 ) ) + { +#endif + /* + * Check the extension length + */ + ext_offset = comp_offset + 1 + comp_len; + if( msg_len > ext_offset ) + { + if( msg_len < ext_offset + 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + ext_len = ( buf[ext_offset + 0] << 8 ) + | ( buf[ext_offset + 1] ); + + if( msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + } + else + ext_len = 0; + + ext = buf + ext_offset + 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello extensions", ext, ext_len ); + + while( ext_len != 0 ) + { + unsigned int ext_id; + unsigned int ext_size; + if ( ext_len < 4 ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 ) | ( ext[1] ) ); + ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 ) | ( ext[3] ) ); + + if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + switch( ext_id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ServerName extension" ) ); + if( ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL ) + break; + + ret = ssl_parse_servername_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + renegotiation_info_seen = 1; +#endif + + ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found signature_algorithms extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported elliptic curves extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported point formats extension" ) ); + ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT; + + ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found max fragment length extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated hmac extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt then mac extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extended master secret extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session ticket extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found use_srtp extension" ) ); + + ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", + ext_id ) ); + } + + ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; + ext += 4 + ext_size; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) + for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 ) + { + if( MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); + + if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inapropriate fallback" ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + break; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + + /* + * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client + * hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations. + */ + if( sig_hash_alg_ext_present == 0 ) + { + mbedtls_md_type_t md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, md_default ) != 0 ) + md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, md_default ); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + + /* + * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV + */ + for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 ) + { + if( p[0] == 0 && p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO " ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " + "during renegotiation" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } +#endif + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; + break; + } + } + + /* + * Renegotiation security checks + */ + if( ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && + renegotiation_info_seen == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } + else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + renegotiation_info_seen == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) ); + handshake_failure = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + if( handshake_failure == 1 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); + } + + /* + * Search for a matching ciphersuite + * (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions + * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension.) + */ + got_common_suite = 0; + ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; + ciphersuite_info = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) + for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) + for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) +#else + for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) + for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) +#endif + { + if( MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i] ) + continue; + + got_common_suite = 1; + + if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i], + &ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) + goto have_ciphersuite; + } + + if( got_common_suite ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, " + "but none of them usable" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); + } + +have_ciphersuite: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( ciphersuite_info ); + if( sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + { + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, + sig_alg ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %d", + mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( md_alg ) ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " + "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg ) ); + } + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding truncated hmac extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +static void ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + + *olen = 0; + + /* Skip writing the extension if we don't want to use it or if + * the client hasn't offered it. */ + if( ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + return; + + /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding CID extension" ) ); + + /* + * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len ); + + *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = NULL; + + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; + + /* + * RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension + * from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption + * with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an + * encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client." + */ + if( ( suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) == NULL || + ( cipher = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( suite->cipher ) ) == NULL || + cipher->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; + } + + if( ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding extended master secret " + "extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0 ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding session ticket extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + { + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len * 2 + 1 ) & 0xFF; + *p++ = ssl->verify_data_len * 2 & 0xFF; + + memcpy( p, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); + p += ssl->verify_data_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); + p += ssl->verify_data_len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x01; + *p++ = 0x00; + } + + *olen = p - buf; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 1; + + *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code; + + *olen = 5; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + ((void) ssl); + + if( ( ssl->handshake->cli_exts & + MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT ) == 0 ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, supported_point_formats extension" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 2; + + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + + *olen = 6; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t kkpp_len; + + *olen = 0; + + /* Skip costly computation if not needed */ + if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + return; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); + + if( end - p < 4 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret ); + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( kkpp_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *olen = kkpp_len + 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN ) +static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) +{ + if( ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL ) + { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding alpn extension" ) ); + + /* + * 0 . 1 ext identifier + * 2 . 3 ext length + * 4 . 5 protocol list length + * 6 . 6 protocol name length + * 7 . 7+n protocol name + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, buf, 0); + + *olen = 7 + strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 4, buf, 2 ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 6, buf, 4 ); + + buf[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *olen - 7 ); + + memcpy( buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP ) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen ) +{ + size_t mki_len = 0, ext_len = 0; + uint16_t profile_value = 0; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + + *olen = 0; + + if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) || + ( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) ) + { + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding use_srtp extension" ) ); + + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED ) + { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + + /* The extension total size is 9 bytes : + * - 2 bytes for the extension tag + * - 2 bytes for the total size + * - 2 bytes for the protection profile length + * - 2 bytes for the protection profile + * - 1 byte for the mki length + * + the actual mki length + * Check we have enough room in the output buffer */ + if( (size_t)( end - buf ) < mki_len + 9 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); + return; + } + + /* extension */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, buf, 0 ); + /* + * total length 5 and mki value: only one profile(2 bytes) + * and length(2 bytes) and srtp_mki ) + */ + ext_len = 5 + mki_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, buf, 2 ); + + /* protection profile length: 2 */ + buf[4] = 0x00; + buf[5] = 0x02; + profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile ); + if( profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( profile_value, buf, 6 ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "use_srtp extension invalid profile" ) ); + return; + } + + buf[8] = mki_len & 0xFF; + memcpy( &buf[9], ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len ); + + *olen = 9 + mki_len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4; + unsigned char *cookie_len_byte; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello verify request" ) ); + + /* + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion server_version; + * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + * } HelloVerifyRequest; + */ + + /* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated + * version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */ + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, p ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 ); + p += 2; + + /* If we get here, f_cookie_check is not null */ + if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inconsistent cookie callbacks" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* Skip length byte until we know the length */ + cookie_len_byte = p++; + + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_cookie_write( ssl->conf->p_cookie, + &p, ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN, + ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_cookie_write", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + *cookie_len_byte = (unsigned char)( p - ( cookie_len_byte + 1 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte ); + + ssl->out_msglen = p - ssl->out_msg; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello verify request" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + +static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_ssl_session session_tmp; + mbedtls_ssl_session * const session = ssl->session_negotiate; + + /* Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init(). + * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). */ + if( ssl->handshake->resume == 1 ) + return; + if( session->id_len == 0 ) + return; + if( ssl->conf->f_get_cache == NULL ) + return; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) + return; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session_tmp ); + + session_tmp.id_len = session->id_len; + memcpy( session_tmp.id, session->id, session->id_len ); + + ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, + &session_tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite || + session->compression != session_tmp.compression ) + { + /* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */ + goto exit; + } + + /* Move semantics */ + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( session ); + *session = session_tmp; + memset( &session_tmp, 0, sizeof( session_tmp ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from cache" ) ); + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; + +exit: + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session_tmp ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t; +#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n; + unsigned char *buf, *p; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "client hello was not authenticated" ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) ); + + return( ssl_write_hello_verify_request( ssl ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + + if( ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided") ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG ); + } + + /* + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 5 protocol version + * 6 . 9 UNIX time() + * 10 . 37 random bytes + */ + buf = ssl->out_msg; + p = buf + 4; + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, p ); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]", + buf[4], buf[5] ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + t = mbedtls_time( NULL ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( t, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, + (long long) t ) ); +#else + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p += 4; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p += 28; + + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32 ); + + ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption( ssl ); + + if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 ) + { + /* + * New session, create a new session id, + * unless we're about to issue a session ticket + */ + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0; + memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32 ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + { + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32; + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id, + n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + /* + * Resuming a session + */ + n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + /* + * 38 . 38 session id length + * 39 . 38+n session id + * 39+n . 40+n chosen ciphersuite + * 41+n . 41+n chosen compression alg. + * 42+n . 43+n extensions length + * 44+n . 43+n+m extensions + */ + *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); + p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed", + ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->session_negotiate->compression ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X", + (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->compression ) ); + + /* Do not write the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( ( ssl->major_ver != 3 ) || ( ssl->minor_ver != 0 ) ) + { +#endif + + /* + * First write extensions, then the total length + */ + ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if ( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) ) + { + ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ext_len ) ); + + if( ext_len > 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2 + ext_len; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + } +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + uint16_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ + size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */ + unsigned char *buf, *p; + const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + int authmode; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) ); + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET ) + authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; + else +#endif + authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) || + authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + /* + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 4 cert type count + * 5 .. m-1 cert types + * m .. m+1 sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only) + * m+1 .. n-1 SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only) + * n .. n+1 length of all DNs + * n+2 .. n+3 length of DN 1 + * n+4 .. ... Distinguished Name #1 + * ... .. ... length of DN 2, etc. + */ + buf = ssl->out_msg; + p = buf + 4; + + /* + * Supported certificate types + * + * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; + * enum { (255) } ClientCertificateType; + */ + ct_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN; +#endif + + p[0] = (unsigned char) ct_len++; + p += ct_len; + + sa_len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2) + * + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm; + * enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm; + */ + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + const int *cur; + + /* + * Supported signature algorithms + */ + for( cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; cur++ ) + { + unsigned char hash = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( *cur ); + + if( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE == hash || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( ssl, hash ) ) + continue; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + p[2 + sa_len++] = hash; + p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + p[2 + sa_len++] = hash; + p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; +#endif + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sa_len, p, 0 ); + sa_len += 2; + p += sa_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* + * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; + */ + p += 2; + + total_dn_size = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED ) + { + /* NOTE: If trusted certificates are provisioned + * via a CA callback (configured through + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the + * CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL ) + crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + else +#endif + crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain; + + while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 ) + { + /* It follows from RFC 5280 A.1 that this length + * can be represented in at most 11 bits. */ + dn_size = (uint16_t) crt->subject_raw.len; + + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + (size_t) dn_size ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) ); + break; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( dn_size, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size ); + p += dn_size; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size ); + + total_dn_size += 2 + dn_size; + crt = crt->next; + } + } + + ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate request" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_context *own_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ); + + /* Check if the key is a transparent ECDH key. + * This also ensures that it is safe to call mbedtls_pk_ec(). */ + if( mbedtls_pk_get_type( own_key ) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY && + mbedtls_pk_get_type( own_key ) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + mbedtls_pk_ec( *own_key ), + MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t *signature_len ) +{ + /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the + * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange + * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange. + * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing + * ssl->out_msglen. */ + unsigned char *sig_start = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2; + size_t sig_max_len = ( ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + - sig_start ); + int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume( ssl, + sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, NULL ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ + +/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including + * calculating the signature if any, but excluding formatting the + * signature and sending the message. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t *signature_len ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ + + (void) ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + (void) signature_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + + ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */ + + /* + * + * Part 1: Provide key exchange parameters for chosen ciphersuite. + * + */ + + /* + * - ECJPAKE key exchanges + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( + &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, &len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->out_msglen += len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + + /* + * For (EC)DHE key exchanges with PSK, parameters are prefixed by support + * identity hint (RFC 4279, Sec. 3). Until someone needs this feature, + * we use empty support identity hints here. + **/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + { + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00; + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + + /* + * - DHE key exchanges + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if( ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no DH parameters set" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * Ephemeral DH parameters: + * + * struct { + * opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>; + * opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>; + * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; + * } ServerDHParams; + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_set_group( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + &ssl->conf->dhm_P, + &ssl->conf->dhm_G ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_set_group", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params( + &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen += len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED */ + + /* + * - ECDHE key exchanges + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + /* + * Ephemeral ECDH parameters: + * + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curve = NULL; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */ + for( gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++ ) + for( curve = ssl->handshake->curves; *curve != NULL; curve++ ) + if( (*curve)->grp_id == *gid ) + goto curve_matching_done; + +curve_matching_done: + if( curve == NULL || *curve == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no matching curve for ECDHE" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDHE curve: %s", (*curve)->name ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + (*curve)->grp_id ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( + &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &len, + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_params", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen += len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */ + + /* + * + * Part 2: For key exchanges involving the server signing the + * exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + size_t dig_signed_len = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed; + size_t hashlen = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; +#else + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * 2.1: Choose hash algorithm: + * A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * to choose appropriate hash. + * B: For SSL3, TLS1.0, TLS1.1 and ECDHE_ECDSA, use SHA1 + * (RFC 4492, Sec. 5.4) + * C: Otherwise, use MD5 + SHA1 (RFC 4346, Sec. 7.4.3) + */ + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + /* A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */ + if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || + ( md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, + sig_alg ) ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + /* (... because we choose a cipher suite + * only if there is a matching hash.) */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) + { + /* B: Default hash SHA1 */ + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + { + /* C: MD5 + SHA1 */ + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg ) ); + + /* + * 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + hashlen = 36; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, + dig_signed, + dig_signed_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen, + dig_signed, + dig_signed_len, + md_alg ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen ); + + /* + * 2.3: Compute and add the signature + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + /* + * For TLS 1.2, we need to specify signature and hash algorithm + * explicitly through a prefix to the signature. + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } DigitallySigned; + * + */ + + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = + mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( md_alg ); + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = + mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( sig_alg ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL ) + { + ret = ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start( ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ), + md_alg, hash, hashlen ); + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH: + /* act as if f_async_sign was null */ + break; + case 0: + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; + return( ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( ssl, signature_len ) ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS: + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ); + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_async_sign_start", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + } + + /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the + * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange + * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange. + * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing + * ssl->out_msglen. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), + md_alg, hash, hashlen, + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2, + signature_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, + ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites + * that do not include a ServerKeyExchange message, do nothing. Either + * way, if successful, move on to the next step in the SSL state + * machine. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t signature_len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server key exchange" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) + /* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange + * is not needed. */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + /* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters + * from certificate at this point. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) + if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ + + /* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use + * ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write server key exchange" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing + * signature operation, resume signing. */ + if( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "resuming signature operation" ) ); + ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( ssl, &signature_len ); + } + else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ + { + /* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */ + ret = ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( ssl, &signature_len ); + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* If we're starting to write a new message, set ssl->out_msglen + * to 0. But if we're resuming after an asynchronous message, + * out_msglen is the amount of data written so far and mst be + * preserved. */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server key exchange (pending)" ) ); + else + ssl->out_msglen = 0; + return( ret ); + } + + /* If there is a signature, write its length. + * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature + * itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + if( signature_len != 0 ) + { + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( signature_len ); + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( signature_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "my signature", + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, + signature_len ); + + /* Skip over the already-written signature */ + ssl->out_msglen += signature_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + + /* Add header and send. */ + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server key exchange" ) ); + return( 0 ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello done" ) ); + + ssl->out_msglen = 4; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE; + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello done" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t n; + + /* + * Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P + */ + if( *p + 2 > end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; + *p += 2; + + if( *p + n > end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); + } + + *p += n; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *peer_pms, + size_t *peer_pmslen, + size_t peer_pmssize ) +{ + int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume( ssl, + peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, NULL ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms", ret ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *peer_pms, + size_t *peer_pmslen, + size_t peer_pmssize ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ); + if( own_cert == NULL ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no local certificate" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE ); + } + mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &own_cert->pk; + mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ); + size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( public_key ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /* If we have already started decoding the message and there is an ongoing + * decryption operation, resume signing. */ + if( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "resuming decryption operation" ) ); + return( ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( ssl, + peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + /* + * Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + if ( p + 2 > end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + if( *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len ) || + *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + } +#endif + + if( p + len != end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + /* + * Decrypt the premaster secret + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL ) + { + ret = ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start( ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ), + p, len ); + switch( ret ) + { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH: + /* act as if f_async_decrypt_start was null */ + break; + case 0: + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; + return( ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( ssl, + peer_pms, + peer_pmslen, + peer_pmssize ) ); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS: + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ); + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_async_decrypt_start", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no RSA private key" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt( private_key, p, len, + peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + return( ret ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t pms_offset ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; + unsigned char ver[2]; + unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48]; + unsigned char mask; + size_t i, peer_pmslen; + unsigned int diff; + + /* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than + * 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't + * matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to + * ret being nonzero, and we only care whether diff is 0. + * But do initialize peer_pms and peer_pmslen for robustness anyway. This + * also makes memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory, + * even if it's an unsigned char). */ + peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0; + peer_pmslen = 0; + + ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, + peer_pms, + &peer_pmslen, + sizeof( peer_pms ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ) + return( ret ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->handshake->max_major_ver, + ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver, + ssl->conf->transport, ver ); + + /* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid + * padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type + * attacks. */ + diff = (unsigned int) ret; + diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48; + diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0]; + diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1]; + + /* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */ + mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask( diff ); + + /* + * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding + * must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a + * bad_record_mac later in the handshake. + * To protect against timing-based variants of the attack, we must + * not have any branch that depends on whether the decryption was + * successful. In particular, always generate the fake premaster secret, + * regardless of whether it will ultimately influence the output or not. + */ + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof( fake_pms ) ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* It's ok to abort on an RNG failure, since this does not reveal + * anything about the RSA decryption. */ + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if( diff != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); +#endif + + if( sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) < pms_offset || + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) - pms_offset < 48 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; + + /* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without + * data-dependent branches. */ + for( i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++ ) + pms[i] = ( mask & fake_pms[i] ) | ( (~mask) & peer_pms[i] ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end ) +{ + int ret = 0; + uint16_t n; + + if( ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb( ssl->conf ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no pre-shared key" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); + } + + /* + * Receive client pre-shared key identity name + */ + if( end - *p < 2 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; + *p += 2; + + if( n == 0 || n > end - *p ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) + { + if( ssl->conf->f_psk( ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; + } + else + { + /* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear, + * but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */ + if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; + } + } + + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY ); + } + + *p += n; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + unsigned char *p, *end; + + ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client key exchange" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) ) + if( ( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) && + ( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) ) + { + /* We've already read a record and there is an asynchronous + * operation in progress to decrypt it. So skip reading the + * record. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "will resume decryption of previously-read record" ) ); + } + else +#endif + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( p != end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + p, end - p) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( p != end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* For opaque PSKs, we perform the PSK-to-MS derivation automatically + * and skip the intermediate PMS. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) ); + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if ( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) + { + /* There is an asynchronous operation in progress to + * decrypt the encrypted premaster secret, so skip + * directly to resuming this operation. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "PSK identity already parsed" ) ); + /* Update p to skip the PSK identity. ssl_parse_encrypted_pms + * won't actually use it, but maintain p anyway for robustness. */ + p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + 2; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with RSA-PSK" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_encrypted_pms" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with DHE-PSK" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif + + if( p != end ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + p, end - p ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ + if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with ECDHE-PSK" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) + { + if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p, end - p ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client key exchange" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t i, sig_len; + unsigned char hash[48]; + unsigned char *hash_start = hash; + size_t hashlen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +#endif + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */ ); + if( 0 != ret ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_read_record" ), ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + ssl->state++; + + /* Process the message contents */ + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + + i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) + { + /* Should never happen */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* + * struct { + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } DigitallySigned; + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + hashlen = 36; + + /* For ECDSA, use SHA-1, not MD-5 + SHA-1 */ + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + { + hash_start += 16; + hashlen -= 16; + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + + /* + * Hash + */ + md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( ssl->in_msg[i] ); + + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( ssl, ssl->in_msg[i] ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" + " for verify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) + if( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg ) + hash_start += 16; +#endif + + /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ + hashlen = 0; + + i++; + + /* + * Signature + */ + if( ( pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( ssl->in_msg[i] ) ) + == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" + " for verify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + + /* + * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg + */ + if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sig_alg doesn't match cert key" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + + i++; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + + sig_len = ( ssl->in_msg[i] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[i+1]; + i += 2; + + if( i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); + } + + /* Calculate hash and verify signature */ + { + size_t dummy_hlen; + ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( peer_pk, + md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, + ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate verify" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t tlen; + uint32_t lifetime; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write new session ticket" ) ); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + + /* + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; + * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + * + * 4 . 7 ticket_lifetime_hint (0 = unspecified) + * 8 . 9 ticket_len (n) + * 10 . 9+n ticket content + */ + + if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write( ssl->conf->p_ticket, + ssl->session_negotiate, + ssl->out_msg + 10, + ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, + &tlen, &lifetime ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret ); + tlen = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( lifetime, ssl->out_msg, 4 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( tlen, ssl->out_msg, 8 ); + ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen; + + /* + * Morally equivalent to updating ssl->state, but NewSessionTicket and + * ChangeCipherSpec share the same state. + */ + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write new session ticket" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +/* + * SSL handshake -- server side -- single step + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "server state: %d", ssl->state ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + switch( ssl->state ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; + break; + + /* + * <== ClientHello + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl ); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); +#endif + + /* + * ==> ServerHello + * Certificate + * ( ServerKeyExchange ) + * ( CertificateRequest ) + * ServerHelloDone + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = ssl_write_server_hello( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: + ret = ssl_write_server_key_exchange( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_write_certificate_request( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: + ret = ssl_write_server_hello_done( ssl ); + break; + + /* + * <== ( Certificate/Alert ) + * ClientKeyExchange + * ( CertificateVerify ) + * ChangeCipherSpec + * Finished + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + ret = ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl ); + break; + + /* + * ==> ( NewSessionTicket ) + * ChangeCipherSpec + * Finished + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 ) + ret = ssl_write_new_session_ticket( ssl ); + else +#endif + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) ); + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl ); + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_ticket.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_ticket.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8a57789f --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_ticket.c @@ -0,0 +1,418 @@ +/* + * TLS server tickets callbacks implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif +} + +#define MAX_KEY_BYTES 32 /* 256 bits */ + +#define TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES 4 +#define TICKET_IV_BYTES 12 +#define TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES 2 +#define TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES 16 + +#define TICKET_MIN_LEN ( TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \ + TICKET_IV_BYTES + \ + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES + \ + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) +#define TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN ( TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \ + TICKET_IV_BYTES + \ + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES ) + +/* + * Generate/update a key + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_ticket_gen_key( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + unsigned char index ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_BYTES]; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key = ctx->keys + index; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + key->generation_time = (uint32_t) mbedtls_time( NULL ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, key->name, sizeof( key->name ) ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* With GCM and CCM, same context can encrypt & decrypt */ + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &key->ctx, buf, + mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( &key->ctx ), + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Rotate/generate keys if necessary + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_ticket_update_keys( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ((void) ctx); +#else + if( ctx->ticket_lifetime != 0 ) + { + uint32_t current_time = (uint32_t) mbedtls_time( NULL ); + uint32_t key_time = ctx->keys[ctx->active].generation_time; + + if( current_time >= key_time && + current_time - key_time < ctx->ticket_lifetime ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + ctx->active = 1 - ctx->active; + + return( ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, ctx->active ) ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Setup context for actual use + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher, + uint32_t lifetime ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + ctx->f_rng = f_rng; + ctx->p_rng = p_rng; + + ctx->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( cipher); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM && + cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( cipher_info->key_bitlen > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + int do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, + cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ); + + switch( ret ) + { + case 0: + do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 0; + break; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + /* We don't yet expect to support all ciphers through PSA, + * so allow fallback to ordinary mbedtls_cipher_setup(). */ + do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; + break; + default: + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( do_mbedtls_cipher_setup ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info ) ) + != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, + cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( ret ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( do_mbedtls_cipher_setup ) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info ) ) + != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, 0 ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key( ctx, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Create session ticket, with the following structure: + * + * struct { + * opaque key_name[4]; + * opaque iv[12]; + * opaque encrypted_state<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque tag[16]; + * } ticket; + * + * The key_name, iv, and length of encrypted_state are the additional + * authenticated data. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *tlen, + uint32_t *ticket_lifetime ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key; + unsigned char *key_name = start; + unsigned char *iv = start + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; + unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; + unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; + size_t clear_len, ciph_len; + + *tlen = 0; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* We need at least 4 bytes for key_name, 12 for IV, 2 for len 16 for tag, + * in addition to session itself, that will be checked when writing it. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( start, end, TICKET_MIN_LEN ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_ticket_update_keys( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + key = &ctx->keys[ctx->active]; + + *ticket_lifetime = ctx->ticket_lifetime; + + memcpy( key_name, key->name, TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES ); + + if( ( ret = ctx->f_rng( ctx->p_rng, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + /* Dump session state */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( session, + state, end - state, + &clear_len ) ) != 0 || + (unsigned long) clear_len > 65535 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( clear_len, state_len_bytes, 0 ); + + /* Encrypt and authenticate */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &key->ctx, + iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + state, clear_len, + state, end - state, &ciph_len, + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto cleanup; + } + if( ciph_len != clear_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + *tlen = TICKET_MIN_LEN + ciph_len - TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES; + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Select key based on name + */ +static mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *ssl_ticket_select_key( + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + const unsigned char name[4] ) +{ + unsigned char i; + + for( i = 0; i < sizeof( ctx->keys ) / sizeof( *ctx->keys ); i++ ) + if( memcmp( name, ctx->keys[i].name, 4 ) == 0 ) + return( &ctx->keys[i] ); + + return( NULL ); +} + +/* + * Load session ticket (see mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write for structure) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse( void *p_ticket, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key; + unsigned char *key_name = buf; + unsigned char *iv = buf + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; + unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; + unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; + size_t enc_len, clear_len; + + if( ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( len < TICKET_MIN_LEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_ticket_update_keys( ctx ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + enc_len = ( enc_len_p[0] << 8 ) | enc_len_p[1]; + + if( len != TICKET_MIN_LEN + enc_len ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Select key */ + if( ( key = ssl_ticket_select_key( ctx, key_name ) ) == NULL ) + { + /* We can't know for sure but this is a likely option unless we're + * under attack - this is only informative anyway */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Decrypt and authenticate */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &key->ctx, + iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + ticket, enc_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES, + ticket, enc_len, &clear_len, + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + + goto cleanup; + } + if( clear_len != enc_len ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Actually load session */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load( session, ticket, clear_len ) ) != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + { + /* Check for expiration */ + mbedtls_time_t current_time = mbedtls_time( NULL ); + + if( current_time < session->start || + (uint32_t)( current_time - session->start ) > ctx->ticket_lifetime ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED; + goto cleanup; + } + } +#endif + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->keys[0].ctx ); + mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->keys[1].ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_tls.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_tls.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..70196a48 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -0,0 +1,7773 @@ +/* + * SSLv3/TLSv1 shared functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The SSL 3.0 specification was drafted by Netscape in 1996, + * and became an IETF standard in 1999. + * + * http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +/* Top-level Connection ID API */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + size_t len, + int ignore_other_cid ) +{ + if( len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ignore_other_cid != MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL && + ignore_other_cid != MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->ignore_unexpected_cid = ignore_other_cid; + conf->cid_len = len; + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int enable, + unsigned char const *own_cid, + size_t own_cid_len ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->negotiate_cid = enable; + if( enable == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Disable use of CID extension." ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Enable use of CID extension." ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Own CID", own_cid, own_cid_len ); + + if( own_cid_len != ssl->conf->cid_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "CID length %u does not match CID length %u in config", + (unsigned) own_cid_len, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->cid_len ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->own_cid, own_cid, own_cid_len ); + /* Truncation is not an issue here because + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX at most 255. */ + ssl->own_cid_len = (uint8_t) own_cid_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ], + size_t *peer_cid_len ) +{ + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED; + + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* We report MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED in case the CID extensions + * were used, but client and server requested the empty CID. + * This is indistinguishable from not using the CID extension + * in the first place. */ + if( ssl->transform_in->in_cid_len == 0 && + ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( peer_cid_len != NULL ) + { + *peer_cid_len = ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len; + if( peer_cid != NULL ) + { + memcpy( peer_cid, ssl->transform_in->out_cid, + ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len ); + } + } + + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +/* + * Convert max_fragment_length codes to length. + * RFC 6066 says: + * enum{ + * 2^9(1), 2^10(2), 2^11(3), 2^12(4), (255) + * } MaxFragmentLength; + * and we add 0 -> extension unused + */ +static unsigned int ssl_mfl_code_to_length( int mfl ) +{ + switch( mfl ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE: + return ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512: + return 512; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024: + return 1024; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048: + return 2048; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096: + return 4096; + default: + return ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( dst ); + memcpy( dst, src, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + dst->ticket = NULL; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( src->peer_cert != NULL ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + dst->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ); + if( dst->peer_cert == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( dst->peer_cert ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( dst->peer_cert, src->peer_cert->raw.p, + src->peer_cert->raw.len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( dst->peer_cert ); + dst->peer_cert = NULL; + return( ret ); + } + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( src->peer_cert_digest != NULL ) + { + dst->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, src->peer_cert_digest_len ); + if( dst->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( dst->peer_cert_digest, src->peer_cert_digest, + src->peer_cert_digest_len ); + dst->peer_cert_digest_type = src->peer_cert_digest_type; + dst->peer_cert_digest_len = src->peer_cert_digest_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( src->ticket != NULL ) + { + dst->ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, src->ticket_len ); + if( dst->ticket == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( dst->ticket, src->ticket, src->ticket_len ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int resize_buffer( unsigned char **buffer, size_t len_new, size_t *len_old ) +{ + unsigned char* resized_buffer = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len_new ); + if( resized_buffer == NULL ) + return -1; + + /* We want to copy len_new bytes when downsizing the buffer, and + * len_old bytes when upsizing, so we choose the smaller of two sizes, + * to fit one buffer into another. Size checks, ensuring that no data is + * lost, are done outside of this function. */ + memcpy( resized_buffer, *buffer, + ( len_new < *len_old ) ? len_new : *len_old ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( *buffer, *len_old ); + mbedtls_free( *buffer ); + + *buffer = resized_buffer; + *len_old = len_new; + + return 0; +} + +static void handle_buffer_resizing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing, + size_t in_buf_new_len, + size_t out_buf_new_len ) +{ + int modified = 0; + size_t written_in = 0, iv_offset_in = 0, len_offset_in = 0; + size_t written_out = 0, iv_offset_out = 0, len_offset_out = 0; + if( ssl->in_buf != NULL ) + { + written_in = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf; + iv_offset_in = ssl->in_iv - ssl->in_buf; + len_offset_in = ssl->in_len - ssl->in_buf; + if( downsizing ? + ssl->in_buf_len > in_buf_new_len && ssl->in_left < in_buf_new_len : + ssl->in_buf_len < in_buf_new_len ) + { + if( resize_buffer( &ssl->in_buf, in_buf_new_len, &ssl->in_buf_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "input buffer resizing failed - out of memory" ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating in_buf to %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + in_buf_new_len ) ); + modified = 1; + } + } + } + + if( ssl->out_buf != NULL ) + { + written_out = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf; + iv_offset_out = ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf; + len_offset_out = ssl->out_len - ssl->out_buf; + if( downsizing ? + ssl->out_buf_len > out_buf_new_len && ssl->out_left < out_buf_new_len : + ssl->out_buf_len < out_buf_new_len ) + { + if( resize_buffer( &ssl->out_buf, out_buf_new_len, &ssl->out_buf_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "output buffer resizing failed - out of memory" ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reallocating out_buf to %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + out_buf_new_len ) ); + modified = 1; + } + } + } + if( modified ) + { + /* Update pointers here to avoid doing it twice. */ + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + /* Fields below might not be properly updated with record + * splitting or with CID, so they are manually updated here. */ + ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_buf + written_out; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_buf + len_offset_out; + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_buf + iv_offset_out; + + ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_buf + written_in; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_buf + len_offset_in; + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_buf + iv_offset_in; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ + +/* + * Key material generation + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl3_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + mbedtls_md5_context md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; + unsigned char padding[16]; + unsigned char sha1sum[20]; + ((void)label); + + mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); + + /* + * SSLv3: + * block = + * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'A' + secret + random ) ) + + * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'BB' + secret + random ) ) + + * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'CCC' + secret + random ) ) + + * ... + */ + for( i = 0; i < dlen / 16; i++ ) + { + memset( padding, (unsigned char) ('A' + i), 1 + i ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &sha1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, padding, 1 + i ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, secret, slen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, random, rlen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, sha1sum ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, secret, slen ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, sha1sum, 20 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, dstbuf + i * 16 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padding, sizeof( padding ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sha1sum, sizeof( sha1sum ) ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls1_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + size_t nb, hs; + size_t i, j, k; + const unsigned char *S1, *S2; + unsigned char *tmp; + size_t tmp_len = 0; + unsigned char h_i[20]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + + tmp_len = 20 + strlen( label ) + rlen; + tmp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, tmp_len ); + if( tmp == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + hs = ( slen + 1 ) / 2; + S1 = secret; + S2 = secret + slen - hs; + + nb = strlen( label ); + memcpy( tmp + 20, label, nb ); + memcpy( tmp + 20 + nb, random, rlen ); + nb += rlen; + + /* + * First compute P_md5(secret,label+random)[0..dlen] + */ + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, S1, hs ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + 20, nb ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, 4 + tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < dlen; i += 16 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, 4 + tmp, 16 + nb ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, h_i ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, 4 + tmp, 16 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, 4 + tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + k = ( i + 16 > dlen ) ? dlen % 16 : 16; + + for( j = 0; j < k; j++ ) + dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; + } + + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + /* + * XOR out with P_sha1(secret,label+random)[0..dlen] + */ + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, S2, hs ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + 20, nb ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < dlen; i += 20 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, 20 + nb ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, h_i ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, 20 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + k = ( i + 20 > dlen ) ? dlen % 20 : 20; + + for( j = 0; j < k; j++ ) + dstbuf[i + j] = (unsigned char)( dstbuf[i + j] ^ h_i[j] ); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, tmp_len ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) ); + + mbedtls_free( tmp ); + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +static psa_status_t setup_psa_key_derivation( psa_key_derivation_operation_t* derivation, + psa_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const unsigned char* seed, size_t seed_length, + const unsigned char* label, size_t label_length, + size_t capacity ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup( derivation, alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( alg ) || PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( alg ) ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED, + seed, seed_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( key ) ) + { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + NULL, 0 ); + } + else + { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_key( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, key ); + } + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL, + label, label_length ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + } + else + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( derivation, capacity ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_id_t master_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + else + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + + /* Normally a "secret" should be long enough to be impossible to + * find by brute force, and in particular should not be empty. But + * this PRF is also used to derive an IV, in particular in EAP-TLS, + * and for this use case it makes sense to have a 0-length "secret". + * Since the key API doesn't allow importing a key of length 0, + * keep master_key=0, which setup_psa_key_derivation() understands + * to mean a 0-length "secret" input. */ + if( slen != 0 ) + { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ); + psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, alg ); + psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ); + + status = psa_import_key( &key_attributes, secret, slen, &master_key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation( &derivation, + master_key, alg, + random, rlen, + (unsigned char const *) label, + (size_t) strlen( label ), + dlen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &derivation, dstbuf, dlen ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( master_key ) ) + status = psa_destroy_key( master_key ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + size_t nb; + size_t i, j, k, md_len; + unsigned char *tmp; + size_t tmp_len = 0; + unsigned char h_i[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); + + if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + tmp_len = md_len + strlen( label ) + rlen; + tmp = mbedtls_calloc( 1, tmp_len ); + if( tmp == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + nb = strlen( label ); + memcpy( tmp + md_len, label, nb ); + memcpy( tmp + md_len + nb, random, rlen ); + nb += rlen; + + /* + * Compute P_(secret, label + random)[0..dlen] + */ + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &md_ctx, secret, slen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp + md_len, nb ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + for( i = 0; i < dlen; i += md_len ) + { + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, md_len + nb ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, h_i ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset ( &md_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &md_ctx, tmp, md_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &md_ctx, tmp ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + k = ( i + md_len > dlen ) ? dlen % md_len : md_len; + + for( j = 0; j < k; j++ ) + dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); + + if ( tmp != NULL ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, tmp_len ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) ); + + mbedtls_free( tmp ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha256( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + return( tls_prf_generic( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, secret, slen, + label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha384( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + return( tls_prf_generic( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, secret, slen, + label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +static void ssl_update_checksum_start( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +static void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t * ); +static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +static void ssl_calc_verify_tls( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char*, size_t * ); +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); +static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( const mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char*, size_t * ); +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *,unsigned char *, int ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t ); +static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char*, size_t * ); +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int ); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_use_opaque_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) + { + /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK, + * the static configuration is irrelevant. */ + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +static mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_get_type( mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( tls_prf == ssl3_prf ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3 ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( tls_prf == tls1_prf ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1 ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( tls_prf == tls_prf_sha384 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384 ); + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( tls_prf == tls_prf_sha256 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256 ); + } + else +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf = NULL; + + switch( prf ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3: + tls_prf = ssl3_prf; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1: + tls_prf = tls1_prf; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + return( tls_prf( secret, slen, label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen ) ); +} + +/* Type for the TLS PRF */ +typedef int ssl_tls_prf_t(const unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t, + unsigned char *, size_t); + +/* + * Populate a transform structure with session keys and all the other + * necessary information. + * + * Parameters: + * - [in/out]: transform: structure to populate + * [in] must be just initialised with mbedtls_ssl_transform_init() + * [out] fully populated, ready for use by mbedtls_ssl_{en,de}crypt_buf() + * - [in] ciphersuite + * - [in] master + * - [in] encrypt_then_mac + * - [in] trunc_hmac + * - [in] compression + * - [in] tls_prf: pointer to PRF to use for key derivation + * - [in] randbytes: buffer holding ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random + * - [in] minor_ver: SSL/TLS minor version + * - [in] endpoint: client or server + * - [in] ssl: optionally used for: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL: whole context (non-const) + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS: ssl->conf->{f,p}_export_keys + * - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C: ssl->conf->{f,p}_dbg + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_populate_transform( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int ciphersuite, + const unsigned char master[48], +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + int trunc_hmac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + int compression, +#endif + ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf, + const unsigned char randbytes[64], + int minor_ver, + unsigned endpoint, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + const +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + int psa_fallthrough; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + int do_mbedtls_cipher_setup; + unsigned char keyblk[256]; + unsigned char *key1; + unsigned char *key2; + unsigned char *mac_enc; + unsigned char *mac_dec; + size_t mac_key_len = 0; + size_t iv_copy_len; + unsigned keylen; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + /* + * Some data just needs copying into the structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + transform->encrypt_then_mac = encrypt_then_mac; +#endif + transform->minor_ver = minor_ver; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + memcpy( transform->randbytes, randbytes, sizeof( transform->randbytes ) ); +#endif + + /* + * Get various info structures + */ + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite ); + if( ciphersuite_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite info for %d not found", + ciphersuite ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->cipher ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cipher info for %u not found", + ciphersuite_info->cipher ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ciphersuite_info->mac ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "mbedtls_md info for %u not found", + (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Copy own and peer's CID if the use of the CID + * extension has been negotiated. */ + if( ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Copy CIDs into SSL transform" ) ); + + transform->in_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy( transform->in_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Incoming CID", transform->in_cid, + transform->in_cid_len ); + + transform->out_cid_len = ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len; + memcpy( transform->out_cid, ssl->handshake->peer_cid, + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Outgoing CID", transform->out_cid, + transform->out_cid_len ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Compute key block using the PRF + */ + ret = tls_prf( master, 48, "key expansion", randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite = %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ciphersuite ) ) ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "master secret", master, 48 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "random bytes", randbytes, 64 ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "key block", keyblk, 256 ); + + /* + * Determine the appropriate key, IV and MAC length. + */ + + keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + { + size_t explicit_ivlen; + + transform->maclen = 0; + mac_key_len = 0; + transform->taglen = + ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; + + /* All modes haves 96-bit IVs, but the length of the static parts vary + * with mode and version: + * - For GCM and CCM in TLS 1.2, there's a static IV of 4 Bytes + * (to be concatenated with a dynamically chosen IV of 8 Bytes) + * - For ChaChaPoly in TLS 1.2, and all modes in TLS 1.3, there's + * a static IV of 12 Bytes (to be XOR'ed with the 8 Byte record + * sequence number). + */ + transform->ivlen = 12; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 ) + { + transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ + { + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY ) + transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; + else + transform->fixed_ivlen = 4; + } + + /* Minimum length of encrypted record */ + explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; + transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + transform->taglen; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || + cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + /* Initialize HMAC contexts */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &transform->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret ); + goto end; + } + + /* Get MAC length */ + mac_key_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + transform->maclen = mac_key_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + /* + * If HMAC is to be truncated, we shall keep the leftmost bytes, + * (rfc 6066 page 13 or rfc 2104 section 4), + * so we only need to adjust the length here. + */ + if( trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED ) + { + transform->maclen = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) + /* Fall back to old, non-compliant version of the truncated + * HMAC implementation which also truncates the key + * (Mbed TLS versions from 1.3 to 2.6.0) */ + mac_key_len = transform->maclen; +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + + /* IV length */ + transform->ivlen = cipher_info->iv_size; + + /* Minimum length */ + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ) + transform->minlen = transform->maclen; + else + { + /* + * GenericBlockCipher: + * 1. if EtM is in use: one block plus MAC + * otherwise: * first multiple of blocklen greater than maclen + * 2. IV except for SSL3 and TLS 1.0 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED ) + { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen + + cipher_info->block_size; + } + else +#endif + { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen + + cipher_info->block_size + - transform->maclen % cipher_info->block_size; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || + minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + ; /* No need to adjust minlen */ + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 || + minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + transform->minlen += transform->ivlen; + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "keylen: %u, minlen: %u, ivlen: %u, maclen: %u", + (unsigned) keylen, + (unsigned) transform->minlen, + (unsigned) transform->ivlen, + (unsigned) transform->maclen ) ); + + /* + * Finally setup the cipher contexts, IVs and MAC secrets. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; + + mac_enc = keyblk; + mac_dec = keyblk + mac_key_len; + + /* + * This is not used in TLS v1.1. + */ + iv_copy_len = ( transform->fixed_ivlen ) ? + transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; + memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key2 + keylen, iv_copy_len ); + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key2 + keylen + iv_copy_len, + iv_copy_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; + + mac_enc = keyblk + mac_key_len; + mac_dec = keyblk; + + /* + * This is not used in TLS v1.1. + */ + iv_copy_len = ( transform->fixed_ivlen ) ? + transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; + memcpy( transform->iv_dec, key1 + keylen, iv_copy_len ); + memcpy( transform->iv_enc, key1 + keylen + iv_copy_len, + iv_copy_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + if( mac_key_len > sizeof( transform->mac_enc ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } + + memcpy( transform->mac_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len ); + memcpy( transform->mac_dec, mac_dec, mac_key_len ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ) + { + /* For HMAC-based ciphersuites, initialize the HMAC transforms. + For AEAD-based ciphersuites, there is nothing to do here. */ + if( mac_key_len != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &transform->md_ctx_enc, + mac_enc, mac_key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto end; + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &transform->md_ctx_dec, + mac_dec, mac_key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto end; + } + } + else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init != NULL ) + { + ret = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init()" ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init( ssl, key1, key2, keylen, + transform->iv_enc, transform->iv_dec, + iv_copy_len, + mac_enc, mac_dec, + mac_key_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init", ret ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + goto end; + } + } +#else + ((void) mac_dec); + ((void) mac_enc); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + if( ssl->conf->f_export_keys != NULL ) + { + ssl->conf->f_export_keys( ssl->conf->p_export_keys, + master, keyblk, + mac_key_len, keylen, + iv_copy_len ); + } + + if( ssl->conf->f_export_keys_ext != NULL ) + { + ssl->conf->f_export_keys_ext( ssl->conf->p_export_keys, + master, keyblk, + mac_key_len, keylen, + iv_copy_len, + randbytes + 32, + randbytes, + tls_prf_get_type( tls_prf ) ); + } +#endif + + do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + + /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2. + * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where + * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates + * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based + * implementation currently doesn't. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info, transform->taglen ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context" ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 0; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record encryption - fall through to default setup." ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 1; + } + } + else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + if( psa_fallthrough == 0 ) + do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( do_mbedtls_cipher_setup && + ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret ); + goto end; + } + + do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2. + * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where + * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates + * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based + * implementation currently doesn't. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info, transform->taglen ); + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context" ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 0; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record decryption - fall through to default setup." ) ); + psa_fallthrough = 1; + } + } + else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#else + psa_fallthrough = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + if( psa_fallthrough == 0 ) + do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( do_mbedtls_cipher_setup && + ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, key1, + cipher_info->key_bitlen, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, key2, + cipher_info->key_bitlen, + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret ); + goto end; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if( cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret ); + goto end; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret ); + goto end; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + + /* Initialize Zlib contexts */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Initializing zlib states" ) ); + + memset( &transform->ctx_deflate, 0, sizeof( transform->ctx_deflate ) ); + memset( &transform->ctx_inflate, 0, sizeof( transform->ctx_inflate ) ); + + if( deflateInit( &transform->ctx_deflate, + Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION ) != Z_OK || + inflateInit( &transform->ctx_inflate ) != Z_OK ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Failed to initialize compression" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED; + goto end; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ + +end: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( keyblk, sizeof( keyblk ) ); + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS 1.0/1.1 / TLS1.2 functions + * + * Inputs: + * - SSL/TLS minor version + * - hash associated with the ciphersuite (only used by TLS 1.2) + * + * Outputs: + * - the tls_prf, calc_verify and calc_finished members of handshake structure + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_set_handshake_prfs( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + int minor_ver, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash ) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) || \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) ) + (void) hash; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = ssl3_prf; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_ssl; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_ssl; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = tls1_prf; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384; + } + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256; + } + else +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Compute master secret if needed + * + * Parameters: + * [in/out] handshake + * [in] resume, premaster, extended_ms, calc_verify, tls_prf + * (PSA-PSK) ciphersuite_info, psk_opaque + * [out] premaster (cleared) + * [out] master + * [in] ssl: optionally used for debugging, EMS and PSA-PSK + * debug: conf->f_dbg, conf->p_dbg + * EMS: passed to calc_verify (debug + (SSL3) session_negotiate) + * PSA-PSA: minor_ver, conf + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_compute_master( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + unsigned char *master, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* cf. RFC 5246, Section 8.1: + * "The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length." */ + size_t const master_secret_len = 48; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + unsigned char session_hash[48]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + + /* The label for the KDF used for key expansion. + * This is either "master secret" or "extended master secret" + * depending on whether the Extended Master Secret extension + * is used. */ + char const *lbl = "master secret"; + + /* The salt for the KDF used for key expansion. + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is not used, + * this is ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random + * (see Sect. 8.1 in RFC 5246). + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is used, + * this is the transcript of the handshake so far. + * (see Sect. 4 in RFC 7627). */ + unsigned char const *salt = handshake->randbytes; + size_t salt_len = 64; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + if( handshake->resume != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no premaster (session resumed)" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if( handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED ) + { + lbl = "extended master secret"; + salt = session_hash; + handshake->calc_verify( ssl, session_hash, &salt_len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "session hash for extended master secret", + session_hash, salt_len ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && + ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 ) + { + /* Perform PSK-to-MS expansion in a single step. */ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_id_t psk; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion" ) ); + + psk = mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( ssl ); + + if( hash_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + else + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation( &derivation, psk, alg, + salt, salt_len, + (unsigned char const *) lbl, + (size_t) strlen( lbl ), + master_secret_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( &derivation, + master, + master_secret_len ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort( &derivation ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + else +#endif + { + ret = handshake->tls_prf( handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, + lbl, salt, salt_len, + master, + master_secret_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "prf", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "premaster secret", + handshake->premaster, + handshake->pmslen ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->premaster, + sizeof(handshake->premaster) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> derive keys" ) ); + + /* Set PRF, calc_verify and calc_finished function pointers */ + ret = ssl_set_handshake_prfs( ssl->handshake, + ssl->minor_ver, + ciphersuite_info->mac ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_set_handshake_prfs", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Compute master secret if needed */ + ret = ssl_compute_master( ssl->handshake, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, + ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_compute_master", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* Swap the client and server random values: + * - MS derivation wanted client+server (RFC 5246 8.1) + * - key derivation wants server+client (RFC 5246 6.3) */ + { + unsigned char tmp[64]; + memcpy( tmp, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32 ); + memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32 ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) ); + } + + /* Populate transform structure */ + ret = ssl_populate_transform( ssl->transform_negotiate, + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + ssl->session_negotiate->compression, +#endif + ssl->handshake->tls_prf, + ssl->handshake->randbytes, + ssl->minor_ver, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_populate_transform", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* We no longer need Server/ClientHello.random values */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->randbytes, + sizeof( ssl->handshake->randbytes ) ); + + /* Allocate compression buffer */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE && + ssl->compress_buf == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Allocating compression buffer" ) ); + ssl->compress_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ); + if( ssl->compress_buf == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", + MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= derive keys" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +void ssl_calc_verify_ssl( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_context md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; + unsigned char pad_1[48]; + unsigned char pad_2[48]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify ssl" ) ); + + mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); + + memset( pad_1, 0x36, 48 ); + memset( pad_2, 0x5C, 48 ); + + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, pad_1, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash ); + + mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, pad_2, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, hash, 16 ); + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash ); + + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, pad_1, 40 ); + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 ); + + mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &sha1 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, pad_2, 40 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, hash + 16, 20 ); + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 ); + + *hlen = 36; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); + + mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); + + return; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +void ssl_calc_verify_tls( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_context md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify tls" ) ); + + mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); + + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, hash ); + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, hash + 16 ); + + *hlen = 36; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); + + mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); + + return; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> PSA calc verify sha256" ) ); + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha256_psa, hash, 32, &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + + *hlen = 32; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= PSA calc verify" ) ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; + + mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify sha256" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha256_clone( &sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256 ); + mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &sha256, hash ); + + *hlen = 32; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> PSA calc verify sha384" ) ); + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha384_psa, hash, 48, &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + + *hlen = 48; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= PSA calc verify" ) ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; + + mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc verify sha384" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha512_clone( &sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512 ); + mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &sha512, hash ); + + *hlen = 48; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc verify" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex ) +{ + unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster; + unsigned char *end = p + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ); + const unsigned char *psk = NULL; + size_t psk_len = 0; + + if( mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( ssl, &psk, &psk_len ) + == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ) + { + /* + * This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always + * checked before calling this function + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* + * PMS = struct { + * opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; + * }; + * with "other_secret" depending on the particular key exchange + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ) + { + if( end - p < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( psk_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < psk_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( p, 0, psk_len ); + p += psk_len; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + { + /* + * other_secret already set by the ClientKeyExchange message, + * and is 48 bytes long + */ + if( end - p < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 48; + p += 48; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + p + 2, end - ( p + 2 ), &len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, p, 0 ); + p += 2 + len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if( key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t zlen; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &zlen, + p + 2, end - ( p + 2 ), + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( zlen, p, 0 ); + p += 2 + zlen; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */ + if( end - p < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( psk_len, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < psk_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( p, psk, psk_len ); + p += psk_len; + + ssl->handshake->pmslen = p - ssl->handshake->premaster; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* If renegotiation is not enforced, retransmit until we would reach max + * timeout if we were using the usual handshake doubling scheme */ + if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records < 0 ) + { + uint32_t ratio = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max / ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min + 1; + unsigned char doublings = 1; + + while( ratio != 0 ) + { + ++doublings; + ratio >>= 1; + } + + if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > doublings ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "no longer retransmitting hello request" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + } + + return( ssl_write_hello_request( ssl ) ); +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void ssl_clear_peer_cert( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL ) + { + /* Zeroization is not necessary. */ + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert_digest ); + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; + session->peer_cert_digest_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = 0; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/* + * Handshake functions + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* No certificate support -> dummy functions */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +/* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t i, n; + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) ); + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + if( ssl->client_auth == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate" ) ); + ssl->state++; + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + /* + * If using SSLv3 and got no cert, send an Alert message + * (otherwise an empty Certificate message will be sent). + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL && + ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + ssl->out_msglen = 2; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING; + ssl->out_msg[1] = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got no certificate to send" ) ); + goto write_msg; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + if( mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no certificate to send" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED ); + } + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "own certificate", mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) ); + + /* + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 6 length of all certs + * 7 . 9 length of cert. 1 + * 10 . n-1 peer certificate + * n . n+2 length of cert. 2 + * n+3 . ... upper level cert, etc. + */ + i = 7; + crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ); + + while( crt != NULL ) + { + n = crt->raw.len; + if( n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 3 - i ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate too large, %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + i + 3 + n, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE ); + } + + ssl->out_msg[i ] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( n ); + ssl->out_msg[i + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( n ); + ssl->out_msg[i + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( n ); + + i += 3; memcpy( ssl->out_msg + i, crt->raw.p, n ); + i += n; crt = crt->next; + } + + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( i - 7 ); + ssl->out_msg[5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( i - 7 ); + ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( i - 7 ); + + ssl->out_msglen = i; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +write_msg: +#endif + + ssl->state++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert; + + if( peer_crt == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + if( peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len ) + return( -1 ); + + return( memcmp( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, peer_crt->raw.len ) ); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char const * const peer_cert_digest = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest; + mbedtls_md_type_t const peer_cert_digest_type = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest_type; + mbedtls_md_info_t const * const digest_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( peer_cert_digest_type ); + unsigned char tmp_digest[MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN]; + size_t digest_len; + + if( peer_cert_digest == NULL || digest_info == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( digest_info ); + if( digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN ) + return( -1 ); + + ret = mbedtls_md( digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + return( memcmp( tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/* + * Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and + * perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + int crt_cnt=0; +#endif + size_t i, n; + uint8_t alert; + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE || + ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + 3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); + + /* + * Same message structure as in mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate() + */ + n = ( ssl->in_msg[i+1] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[i+2]; + + if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 || + ssl->in_hslen != n + 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + /* Make &ssl->in_msg[i] point to the beginning of the CRT chain. */ + i += 3; + + /* Iterate through and parse the CRTs in the provided chain. */ + while( i < ssl->in_hslen ) + { + /* Check that there's room for the next CRT's length fields. */ + if ( i + 3 > ssl->in_hslen ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2**24 Bytes, but we don't support + * anything beyond 2**16 ~ 64K. */ + if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + /* Read length of the next CRT in the chain. */ + n = ( (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 1] << 8 ) + | (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 2]; + i += 3; + + if( n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + /* Check if we're handling the first CRT in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( crt_cnt++ == 0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* During client-side renegotiation, check that the server's + * end-CRTs hasn't changed compared to the initial handshake, + * mitigating the triple handshake attack. On success, reuse + * the original end-CRT instead of parsing it again. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation" ) ); + if( ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( ssl, + &ssl->in_msg[i], + n ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "new server cert during renegotiation" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ); + } + + /* Now we can safely free the original chain. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert( ssl->session ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* Parse the next certificate in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n ); +#else + /* If we don't need to store the CRT chain permanently, parse + * it in-place from the input buffer instead of making a copy. */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + switch( ret ) + { + case 0: /*ok*/ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: + /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a + prior certificate was already trusted. */ + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + default: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + crt_parse_der_failed: + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert ); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + i += n; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", chain ); + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + /* + * Check if the client sent an empty certificate + */ + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + { + if( ssl->in_msglen == 2 && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "SSLv3 client has no certificate" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE && + memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) ); + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* Check if a certificate message is expected. + * Return either + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP + * indicating whether a Certificate message is expected or not. + */ +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert( ciphersuite_info ) ) + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ); + + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ); + } + } +#else + ((void) authmode); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + void *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int have_ca_chain = 0; + + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *p_vrfy; + + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ssl->f_vrfy != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use context-specific verification callback" ) ); + f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy; + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use configuration-specific verification callback" ) ); + f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy; + } + + /* + * Main check: verify certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if( ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL ) + { + ((void) rs_ctx); + have_ca_chain = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" ) ); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( + chain, + ssl->conf->f_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->p_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + { + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL ) + { + ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl; + } + else +#endif + { + ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; + } + + if( ca_chain != NULL ) + have_ca_chain = 1; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( + chain, + ca_chain, ca_crl, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx ); + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ); +#endif + + /* + * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + { + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk; + + /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK. + * This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good + * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use here. */ + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) && + mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) ); + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( chain, + ciphersuite_info, + ! ssl->conf->endpoint, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) ); + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; + } + + /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a + * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, + * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds + * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy + * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of + * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */ + if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && + ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) ) + { + ret = 0; + } + + if( have_ca_chain == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; + } + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + uint8_t alert; + + /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. + Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send + may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED; + else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED ) + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA; + else + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN; + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + alert ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %08x", + (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + return( ret ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Remember digest of the peer's end-CRT. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN ); + if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%d bytes) failed", + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE ), + start, len, + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest ); + + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_type = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE; + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_len = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN; + + return( ret ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len ) +{ + unsigned char *end = start + len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Make a copy of the peer's raw public key. */ + mbedtls_pk_init( &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey ); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &start, end, + &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* We should have parsed the public key before. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + int crt_expected; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET + ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode + : ssl->conf->authmode; +#else + const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; +#endif + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) ); + + crt_expected = ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( ssl, authmode ); + if( crt_expected == SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify ) + { + chain = ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert; + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = NULL; + goto crt_verify; + } +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We + let it decide whether to alert. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification( ssl ) == 0 ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; + + if( authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; + + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + /* Clear existing peer CRT structure in case we tried to + * reuse a session but it failed, and allocate a new one. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert( ssl->session_negotiate ); + + chain = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + if( chain == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( chain ); + + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain( ssl, chain ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify; + +crt_verify: + if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx; +#endif + + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl, authmode, + chain, rs_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + { + unsigned char *crt_start, *pk_start; + size_t crt_len, pk_len; + + /* We parse the CRT chain without copying, so + * these pointers point into the input buffer, + * and are hence still valid after freeing the + * CRT chain. */ + + crt_start = chain->raw.p; + crt_len = chain->raw.len; + + pk_start = chain->pk_raw.p; + pk_len = chain->pk_raw.len; + + /* Free the CRT structures before computing + * digest and copying the peer's public key. */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( chain ); + mbedtls_free( chain ); + chain = NULL; + + ret = ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest( ssl, crt_start, crt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + ret = ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( ssl, pk_start, pk_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + } +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Pass ownership to session structure. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) ); + +exit: + + if( ret == 0 ) + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; + } +#endif + + if( chain != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( chain ); + mbedtls_free( chain ); + } + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info ) +{ + ((void) ciphersuite_info); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1; + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha384; + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if( ciphersuite_info->mac != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha256; + else +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); + return; + } +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa ); + psa_hash_setup( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, 0 ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa ); + psa_hash_setup( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, 1 ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +} + +static void ssl_update_checksum_start( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 , buf, len ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1, buf, len ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 , buf, len ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1, buf, len ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len ); +#endif +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_update_ret( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len ); +#endif +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) +{ + const char *sender; + mbedtls_md5_context md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; + + unsigned char padbuf[48]; + unsigned char md5sum[16]; + unsigned char sha1sum[20]; + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if( !session ) + session = ssl->session; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished ssl" ) ); + + mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); + + /* + * SSLv3: + * hash = + * MD5( master + pad2 + + * MD5( handshake + sender + master + pad1 ) ) + * + SHA1( master + pad2 + + * SHA1( handshake + sender + master + pad1 ) ) + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished md5 state", (unsigned char *) + md5.state, sizeof( md5.state ) ); +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha1 state", (unsigned char *) + sha1.state, sizeof( sha1.state ) ); +#endif + + sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) ? "CLNT" + : "SRVR"; + + memset( padbuf, 0x36, 48 ); + + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, (const unsigned char *) sender, 4 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, session->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, padbuf, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, md5sum ); + + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, (const unsigned char *) sender, 4 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, session->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, padbuf, 40 ); + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, sha1sum ); + + memset( padbuf, 0x5C, 48 ); + + mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &md5 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, session->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, padbuf, 48 ); + mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &md5, md5sum, 16 ); + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, buf ); + + mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &sha1 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, session->master, 48 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, padbuf , 40 ); + mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &sha1, sha1sum, 20 ); + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, buf + 16 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, 36 ); + + mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( md5sum, sizeof( md5sum ) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sha1sum, sizeof( sha1sum ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) +{ + int len = 12; + const char *sender; + mbedtls_md5_context md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; + unsigned char padbuf[36]; + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if( !session ) + session = ssl->session; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls" ) ); + + mbedtls_md5_init( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_md5_clone( &md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_clone( &sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1 ); + + /* + * TLSv1: + * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, + * MD5( handshake ) + SHA1( handshake ) )[0..11] + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished md5 state", (unsigned char *) + md5.state, sizeof( md5.state ) ); +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha1 state", (unsigned char *) + sha1.state, sizeof( sha1.state ) ); +#endif + + sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; + + mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &md5, padbuf ); + mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &sha1, padbuf + 16 ); + + ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, + padbuf, 36, buf, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); + + mbedtls_md5_free( &md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &sha1 ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) +{ + int len = 12; + const char *sender; + unsigned char padbuf[32]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; +#else + mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if( !session ) + session = ssl->session; + + sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc PSA finished tls sha256" ) ); + + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha256_psa, padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 32 ); +#else + + mbedtls_sha256_init( &sha256 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls sha256" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha256_clone( &sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256 ); + + /* + * TLSv1.2: + * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, + * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha2 state", (unsigned char *) + sha256.state, sizeof( sha256.state ) ); +#endif + + mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( &sha256, padbuf ); + mbedtls_sha256_free( &sha256 ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, + padbuf, 32, buf, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + +static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from ) +{ + int len = 12; + const char *sender; + unsigned char padbuf[48]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_size; + psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status; +#else + mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if( !session ) + session = ssl->session; + + sender = ( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc PSA finished tls sha384" ) ); + + status = psa_hash_clone( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash clone failed" ) ); + return; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish( &sha384_psa, padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ), &hash_size ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "PSA hash finish failed" ) ); + return; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 48 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_init( &sha512 ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> calc finished tls sha384" ) ); + + mbedtls_sha512_clone( &sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512 ); + + /* + * TLSv1.2: + * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, + * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "finished sha512 state", (unsigned char *) + sha512.state, sizeof( sha512.state ) ); +#endif + /* mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret's output parameter is declared as a + * 64-byte buffer, but since we're using SHA-384, we know that the + * output fits in 48 bytes. This is correct C, but GCC 11.1 warns + * about it. + */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 11 +#pragma GCC diagnostic push +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow" +#endif + mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret( &sha512, padbuf ); +#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 11 +#pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif + + mbedtls_sha512_free( &sha512 ); +#endif + + ssl->handshake->tls_prf( session->master, 48, sender, + padbuf, 48, buf, len ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "calc finished result", buf, len ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padbuf, sizeof( padbuf ) ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= calc finished" ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "=> handshake wrapup: final free" ) ); + + /* + * Free our handshake params + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + ssl->handshake = NULL; + + /* + * Free the previous transform and switch in the current one + */ + if( ssl->transform ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform ); + } + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "<= handshake wrapup: final free" ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int resume = ssl->handshake->resume; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "=> handshake wrapup" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE; + ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; + } +#endif + + /* + * Free the previous session and switch in the current one + */ + if( ssl->session ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + /* RFC 7366 3.1: keep the EtM state */ + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session ); + } + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + /* + * Add cache entry + */ + if( ssl->conf->f_set_cache != NULL && + ssl->session->id_len != 0 && + resume == 0 ) + { + if( ssl->conf->f_set_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, ssl->session ) != 0 ) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cache did not store session" ) ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->flight != NULL ) + { + /* Cancel handshake timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + + /* Keep last flight around in case we need to resend it: + * we need the handshake and transform structures for that */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip freeing handshake and transform" ) ); + } + else +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl ); + + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "<= handshake wrapup" ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret, hash_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write finished" ) ); + + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate ); + + ssl->handshake->calc_finished( ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint ); + + /* + * RFC 5246 7.4.9 (Page 63) says 12 is the default length and ciphersuites + * may define some other value. Currently (early 2016), no defined + * ciphersuite does this (and this is unlikely to change as activity has + * moved to TLS 1.3 now) so we can keep the hardcoded 12 here. + */ + hash_len = ( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) ? 36 : 12; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; + memcpy( ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->out_msg + 4, hash_len ); +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen = 4 + hash_len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED; + + /* + * In case of session resuming, invert the client and server + * ChangeCipherSpec messages order. + */ + if( ssl->handshake->resume != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; +#endif + } + else + ssl->state++; + + /* + * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for outbound + * data. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for outbound data" ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + unsigned char i; + + /* Remember current epoch settings for resending */ + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + + /* Set sequence_number to zero */ + memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, 0, 6 ); + + /* Increment epoch */ + for( i = 2; i > 0; i-- ) + if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 ) + break; + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if( i == 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING ); + } + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, 8 ); + + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session_negotiate; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write finished" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) +#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 36 +#else +#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 12 +#endif + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int hash_len; + unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse finished" ) ); + + /* There is currently no ciphersuite using another length with TLS 1.2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) + hash_len = 36; + else +#endif + hash_len = 12; + + ssl->handshake->calc_finished( ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto exit; + } + + if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED || + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + hash_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED; + goto exit; + } + + if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ), + buf, hash_len ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; + memcpy( ssl->peer_verify_data, buf, hash_len ); +#endif + + if( ssl->handshake->resume != 0 ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; +#endif + } + else + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse finished" ) ); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, hash_len ); + return( ret ); +} + +static void ssl_handshake_params_init( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake ) +{ + memset( handshake, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + mbedtls_md5_init( &handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &handshake->fin_sha1 ); + mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + psa_hash_setup( &handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_init( &handshake->fin_sha256 ); + mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha256, 0 ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + psa_hash_setup( &handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_init( &handshake->fin_sha512 ); + mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret( &handshake->fin_sha512, 1 ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( &handshake->hash_algs ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_init( &handshake->dhm_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + mbedtls_ecdh_init( &handshake->ecdh_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_init( &handshake->ecjpake_ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( &handshake->ecrs_ctx ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_init( &handshake->peer_pubkey ); +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform ) +{ + memset( transform, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform) ); + + mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_cipher_init( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) + mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_enc ); + mbedtls_md_init( &transform->md_ctx_dec ); +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_session_init( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + memset( session, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session) ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_handshake_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* Clear old handshake information if present */ + if( ssl->transform_negotiate ) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + if( ssl->session_negotiate ) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + if( ssl->handshake ) + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + + /* + * Either the pointers are now NULL or cleared properly and can be freed. + * Now allocate missing structures. + */ + if( ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL ) + { + ssl->transform_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform) ); + } + + if( ssl->session_negotiate == NULL ) + { + ssl->session_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session) ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) + { + ssl->handshake = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params) ); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too small - reallocate */ + + handle_buffer_resizing( ssl, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ); +#endif + + /* All pointers should exist and can be directly freed without issue */ + if( ssl->handshake == NULL || + ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL || + ssl->session_negotiate == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc() of ssl sub-contexts failed" ) ); + + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + + ssl->handshake = NULL; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + /* Initialize structures */ + mbedtls_ssl_session_init( ssl->session_negotiate ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + ssl_handshake_params_init( ssl->handshake ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; + + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; + else + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; + + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* Dummy cookie callbacks for defaults */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_write_dummy( void *ctx, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) p); + ((void) end); + ((void) cli_id); + ((void) cli_id_len); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_check_dummy( void *ctx, + const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len ) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) cookie); + ((void) cookie_len); + ((void) cli_id); + ((void) cli_id_len); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * Initialize an SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_init( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + memset( ssl, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Setup an SSL context + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_setup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; + + ssl->conf = conf; + + /* + * Prepare base structures + */ + + /* Set to NULL in case of an error condition */ + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = in_buf_len; +#endif + ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, in_buf_len ); + if( ssl->in_buf == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", in_buf_len ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->out_buf_len = out_buf_len; +#endif + ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, out_buf_len ); + if( ssl->out_buf == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", out_buf_len ) ); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + memset( &ssl->dtls_srtp_info, 0, sizeof(ssl->dtls_srtp_info) ); +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + goto error; + + return( 0 ); + +error: + mbedtls_free( ssl->in_buf ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->out_buf ); + + ssl->conf = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = 0; + ssl->out_buf_len = 0; +#endif + ssl->in_buf = NULL; + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + + ssl->in_hdr = NULL; + ssl->in_ctr = NULL; + ssl->in_len = NULL; + ssl->in_iv = NULL; + ssl->in_msg = NULL; + + ssl->out_hdr = NULL; + ssl->out_ctr = NULL; + ssl->out_len = NULL; + ssl->out_iv = NULL; + ssl->out_msg = NULL; + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining + * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. + * + * If partial is non-zero, keep data in the input buffer and client ID. + * (Use when a DTLS client reconnects from the same port.) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + ((void) partial); +#endif + + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + + /* Cancel any possibly running timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; + + ssl->verify_data_len = 0; + memset( ssl->own_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN ); + memset( ssl->peer_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN ); +#endif + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; + + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( ssl ); + + ssl->in_msgtype = 0; + ssl->in_msglen = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_epoch = 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl ); +#endif + + ssl->in_hslen = 0; + ssl->nb_zero = 0; + + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + + ssl->out_msgtype = 0; + ssl->out_msglen = 0; + ssl->out_left = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + if( ssl->split_done != MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED ) + ssl->split_done = 0; +#endif + + memset( ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof( ssl->cur_out_ctr ) ); + + ssl->transform_in = NULL; + ssl->transform_out = NULL; + + ssl->session_in = NULL; + ssl->session_out = NULL; + + memset( ssl->out_buf, 0, out_buf_len ); + + int clear_in_buf = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( partial != 0 ) + clear_in_buf = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + if( clear_in_buf ) + { + ssl->in_left = 0; + memset( ssl->in_buf, 0, in_buf_len ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset()" ) ); + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset", ret ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } +#endif + + if( ssl->transform ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform ); + ssl->transform = NULL; + } + + if( ssl->session ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session ); + ssl->session = NULL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ssl->alpn_chosen = NULL; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + int free_cli_id = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) + if( partial != 0 ) + free_cli_id = 0; +#endif + if( free_cli_id ) + { + mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id ); + ssl->cli_id = NULL; + ssl->cli_id_len = 0; + } +#endif + + if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining + * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) ); +} + +/* + * SSL set accessors + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint ) +{ + conf->endpoint = endpoint; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport ) +{ + conf->transport = transport; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode ) +{ + conf->anti_replay = mode; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit ) +{ + conf->badmac_limit = limit; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned allow_packing ) +{ + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = !allow_packing; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uint32_t min, uint32_t max ) +{ + conf->hs_timeout_min = min; + conf->hs_timeout_max = max; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode ) +{ + conf->authmode = authmode; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + conf->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + conf->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + conf->f_rng = f_rng; + conf->p_rng = p_rng; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), + void *p_dbg ) +{ + conf->f_dbg = f_dbg; + conf->p_dbg = p_dbg; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_bio, + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout ) +{ + ssl->p_bio = p_bio; + ssl->f_send = f_send; + ssl->f_recv = f_recv; + ssl->f_recv_timeout = f_recv_timeout; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu ) +{ + ssl->mtu = mtu; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout ) +{ + conf->read_timeout = timeout; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer ) +{ + ssl->p_timer = p_timer; + ssl->f_set_timer = f_set_timer; + ssl->f_get_timer = f_get_timer; + + /* Make sure we start with no timer running */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void *p_cache, + int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *), + int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *) ) +{ + conf->p_cache = p_cache; + conf->f_get_cache = f_get_cache; + conf->f_set_cache = f_set_cache; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ssl == NULL || + session == NULL || + ssl->session_negotiate == NULL || + ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( ssl->session_negotiate, + session ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *ciphersuites ) +{ + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = ciphersuites; + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = ciphersuites; + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = ciphersuites; + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = ciphersuites; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *ciphersuites, + int major, int minor ) +{ + if( major != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) + return; + + if( minor < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || minor > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + return; + + conf->ciphersuite_list[minor] = ciphersuites; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile ) +{ + conf->cert_profile = profile; +} + +/* Append a new keycert entry to a (possibly empty) list */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_append_key_cert( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert **head, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *new_cert; + + new_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert ) ); + if( new_cert == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + new_cert->cert = cert; + new_cert->key = key; + new_cert->next = NULL; + + /* Update head is the list was null, else add to the end */ + if( *head == NULL ) + { + *head = new_cert; + } + else + { + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = *head; + while( cur->next != NULL ) + cur = cur->next; + cur->next = new_cert; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ) +{ + return( ssl_append_key_cert( &conf->key_cert, own_cert, pk_key ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ) +{ + conf->ca_chain = ca_chain; + conf->ca_crl = ca_crl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->f_ca_cb = NULL; + conf->p_ca_cb = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb ) +{ + conf->f_ca_cb = f_ca_cb; + conf->p_ca_cb = p_ca_cb; + + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->ca_chain = NULL; + conf->ca_crl = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key ) +{ + return( ssl_append_key_cert( &ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert, + own_cert, pk_key ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl ) +{ + ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain = ca_chain; + ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl = ca_crl; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode ) +{ + ssl->handshake->sni_authmode = authmode; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + ssl->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + ssl->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +/* + * Set EC J-PAKE password for current handshake + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pw, + size_t pw_len ) +{ + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; + + if( ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; + else + role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; + + return( mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + role, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + pw, pw_len ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + +static void ssl_conf_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + /* Remove reference to existing PSK, if any. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) ) + { + /* The maintenance of the PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + conf->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + /* This and the following branch should never + * be taken simultaneously as we maintain the + * invariant that raw and opaque PSKs are never + * configured simultaneously. As a safeguard, + * though, `else` is omitted here. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( conf->psk != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len ); + + mbedtls_free( conf->psk ); + conf->psk = NULL; + conf->psk_len = 0; + } + + /* Remove reference to PSK identity, if any. */ + if( conf->psk_identity != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity ); + conf->psk_identity = NULL; + conf->psk_identity_len = 0; + } +} + +/* This function assumes that PSK identity in the SSL config is unset. + * It checks that the provided identity is well-formed and attempts + * to make a copy of it in the SSL config. + * On failure, the PSK identity in the config remains unset. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned char const *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len ) +{ + /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */ + if( psk_identity == NULL || + ( psk_identity_len >> 16 ) != 0 || + psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_identity_len ); + if( conf->psk_identity == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len; + memcpy( conf->psk_identity, psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Remove opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity */ + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + /* Check and set raw PSK */ + if( psk == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( psk_len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + conf->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy( conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len ); + + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( conf, psk_identity, psk_identity_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static void ssl_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) ) + { + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->handshake->psk, + ssl->handshake->psk_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->psk ); + ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0; + } +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len ) +{ + if( psk == NULL || ssl->handshake == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl_remove_psk( ssl ); + + if( ( ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc( 1, psk_len ) ) == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ssl->handshake->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy( ssl->handshake->psk, psk, ssl->handshake->psk_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + psa_key_id_t psk, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Clear opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity, if present. */ + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + /* Check and set opaque PSK */ + if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( psk ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + conf->psk_opaque = psk; + + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity( conf, psk_identity, + psk_identity_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_key_id_t psk ) +{ + if( ( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( psk ) ) || + ( ssl->handshake == NULL ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl_remove_psk( ssl ); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = psk; + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_psk ) +{ + conf->f_psk = f_psk; + conf->p_psk = p_psk; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *dhm_P, const char *dhm_G ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_P, 16, dhm_P ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_G, 16, dhm_G ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, + const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_P, dhm_P, P_len ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &conf->dhm_G, dhm_G, G_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &conf->dhm_P, &dhm_ctx->P ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &conf->dhm_G, &dhm_ctx->G ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/* + * Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned int bitlen ) +{ + conf->dhm_min_bitlen = bitlen; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Set allowed/preferred hashes for handshake signatures + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *hashes ) +{ + conf->sig_hashes = hashes; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Set the allowed elliptic curves + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list ) +{ + conf->curve_list = curve_list; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname ) +{ + /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */ + size_t hostname_len = 0; + + /* Check if new hostname is valid before + * making any change to current one */ + if( hostname != NULL ) + { + hostname_len = strlen( hostname ); + + if( hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname, + * so we can free it safely */ + + if( ssl->hostname != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->hostname, strlen( ssl->hostname ) ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->hostname ); + } + + /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */ + + if( hostname == NULL ) + { + ssl->hostname = NULL; + } + else + { + ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc( 1, hostname_len + 1 ); + if( ssl->hostname == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len ); + + ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0'; + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, + const unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_sni ) +{ + conf->f_sni = f_sni; + conf->p_sni = p_sni; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos ) +{ + size_t cur_len, tot_len; + const char **p; + + /* + * RFC 7301 3.1: "Empty strings MUST NOT be included and byte strings + * MUST NOT be truncated." + * We check lengths now rather than later. + */ + tot_len = 0; + for( p = protos; *p != NULL; p++ ) + { + cur_len = strlen( *p ); + tot_len += cur_len; + + if( ( cur_len == 0 ) || + ( cur_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN ) || + ( tot_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->alpn_list = protos; + + return( 0 ); +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return( ssl->alpn_chosen ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int support_mki_value ) +{ + conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support = support_mki_value; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *mki_value, + uint16_t mki_len ) +{ + if( mki_len > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + memcpy( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_value, mki_len ); + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_len; + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *p; + size_t list_size = 0; + + /* check the profiles list: all entry must be valid, + * its size cannot be more than the total number of supported profiles, currently 4 */ + for( p = profiles; *p != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET && + list_size <= MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH; + p++ ) + { + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( *p ) != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + list_size++; + } + else + { + /* unsupported value, stop parsing and set the size to an error value */ + list_size = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + 1; + } + } + + if( list_size > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH ) + { + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = NULL; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = 0; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = profiles; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = list_size; + + return( 0 ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info ) +{ + dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; + /* do not copy the mki value if there is no chosen profile */ + if( dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ) + { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = 0; + } + else + { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + memcpy( dtls_srtp_info->mki_value, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ) +{ + conf->max_major_ver = major; + conf->max_minor_ver = minor; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor ) +{ + conf->min_major_ver = major; + conf->min_minor_ver = minor; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback ) +{ + conf->fallback = fallback; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + char cert_req_ca_list ) +{ + conf->cert_req_ca_list = cert_req_ca_list; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm ) +{ + conf->encrypt_then_mac = etm; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems ) +{ + conf->extended_ms = ems; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char arc4 ) +{ + conf->arc4_disabled = arc4; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code ) +{ + if( mfl_code >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID || + ssl_mfl_code_to_length( mfl_code ) > MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + conf->mfl_code = mfl_code; + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int truncate ) +{ + conf->trunc_hmac = truncate; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split ) +{ + conf->cbc_record_splitting = split; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy ) +{ + conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation = allow_legacy; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation ) +{ + conf->disable_renegotiation = renegotiation; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records ) +{ + conf->renego_max_records = max_records; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char period[8] ) +{ + memcpy( conf->renego_period, period, 8 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets ) +{ + conf->session_tickets = use_tickets; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, + void *p_ticket ) +{ + conf->f_ticket_write = f_ticket_write; + conf->f_ticket_parse = f_ticket_parse; + conf->p_ticket = p_ticket; +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, + void *p_export_keys ) +{ + conf->f_export_keys = f_export_keys; + conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t *f_export_keys_ext, + void *p_export_keys ) +{ + conf->f_export_keys_ext = f_export_keys_ext; + conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign, + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt, + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume, + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel, + void *async_config_data ) +{ + conf->f_async_sign_start = f_async_sign; + conf->f_async_decrypt_start = f_async_decrypt; + conf->f_async_resume = f_async_resume; + conf->f_async_cancel = f_async_cancel; + conf->p_async_config_data = async_config_data; +} + +void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + return( conf->p_async_config_data ); +} + +void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->handshake == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + else + return( ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx ); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *ctx ) +{ + if( ssl->handshake != NULL ) + ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx = ctx; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +/* + * SSL get accessors + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl->session != NULL ) + return( ssl->session->verify_result ); + + if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL ) + return( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ); + + return( 0xFFFFFFFF ); +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + return mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session->ciphersuite ); +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + switch( ssl->minor_ver ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2: + return( "DTLSv1.0" ); + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3: + return( "DTLSv1.2" ); + + default: + return( "unknown (DTLS)" ); + } + } +#endif + + switch( ssl->minor_ver ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0: + return( "SSLv3.0" ); + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1: + return( "TLSv1.0" ); + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2: + return( "TLSv1.1" ); + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3: + return( "TLSv1.2" ); + + default: + return( "unknown" ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t read_mfl; + + /* Use the configured MFL for the client if we're past SERVER_HELLO_DONE */ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->state >= MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE ) + { + return ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->conf->mfl_code ); + } + + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if( ssl->session_out != NULL ) + { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code ); + if( read_mfl < max_len ) + { + max_len = read_mfl; + } + } + + // During a handshake, use the value being negotiated + if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL ) + { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code ); + if( read_mfl < max_len ) + { + max_len = read_mfl; + } + } + + return( max_len ); +} + +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t max_len; + + /* + * Assume mfl_code is correct since it was checked when set + */ + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->conf->mfl_code ); + + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if( ssl->session_out != NULL && + ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code ) < max_len ) + { + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_out->mfl_code ); + } + + /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ + if( ssl->session_negotiate != NULL && + ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code ) < max_len ) + { + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code ); + } + + return( max_len ); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl ); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + /* Return unlimited mtu for client hello messages to avoid fragmentation. */ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO ) ) + return ( 0 ); + + if( ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->handshake->mtu == 0 ) + return( ssl->mtu ); + + if( ssl->mtu == 0 ) + return( ssl->handshake->mtu ); + + return( ssl->mtu < ssl->handshake->mtu ? + ssl->mtu : ssl->handshake->mtu ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + (void) ssl; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl ); + + if( max_len > mfl ) + max_len = mfl; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + const size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl ); + const int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ); + const size_t overhead = (size_t) ret; + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( mtu <= overhead ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "MTU too low for record expansion" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + if( max_len > mtu - overhead ) + max_len = mtu - overhead; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + return( (int) max_len ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + return( ssl->session->peer_cert ); +#else + return( NULL ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_session *dst ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL || + dst == NULL || + ssl->session == NULL || + ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + return( mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( dst, ssl->session ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + return( ssl->session ); +} + +/* + * Define ticket header determining Mbed TLS version + * and structure of the ticket. + */ + +/* + * Define bitflag determining compile-time settings influencing + * structure of serialized SSL sessions. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT 3 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT 4 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT 5 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT 6 + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ( (uint16_t) ( \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT ) ) ) + +static unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), +}; + +/* + * Serialize a session in the following format: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch + * opaque session_format[2]; // version-specific 16-bit field determining + * // the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep + * these version+format bytes. + * + * // In this version, `session_format` determines + * // the setting of those compile-time + * // configuration options which influence + * // the structure of mbedtls_ssl_session. + * uint64 start_time; + * uint8 ciphersuite[2]; // defined by the standard + * uint8 compression; // 0 or 1 + * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32 + * opaque session_id[32]; + * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard + * uint32 verify_result; + * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert + * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard + * uint8 trunc_hmac; // 0 or 1 + * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1 + * + * The order is the same as in the definition of the structure, except + * verify_result is put before peer_cert so that all mandatory fields come + * together in one block. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + + if( !omit_header ) + { + /* + * Add version identifier + */ + + used += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ); + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ); + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ); + } + } + + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + used += 8; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + start = (uint64_t) session->start; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( start, p, 0 ); + p += 8; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + used += 2 /* ciphersuite */ + + 1 /* compression */ + + 1 /* id_len */ + + sizeof( session->id ) + + sizeof( session->master ) + + 4; /* verify_result */ + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( session->ciphersuite, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( session->compression ); + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( session->id_len ); + memcpy( p, session->id, 32 ); + p += 32; + + memcpy( p, session->master, 48 ); + p += 48; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( session->verify_result, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + } + + /* + * Peer's end-entity certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) + cert_len = 0; + else + cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; + + used += 3 + cert_len; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( cert_len ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( cert_len ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( cert_len ); + + if( session->peer_cert != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len ); + p += cert_len; + } + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if( session->peer_cert_digest != NULL ) + { + used += 1 /* type */ + 1 /* length */ + session->peer_cert_digest_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_type; + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_len; + memcpy( p, session->peer_cert_digest, + session->peer_cert_digest_len ); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + } + } + else + { + used += 2; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = (unsigned char) MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + *p++ = 0; + } + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * Session ticket if any, plus associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + used += 3 + session->ticket_len + 4; /* len + ticket + lifetime */ + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( session->ticket_len ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( session->ticket_len ); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( session->ticket_len ); + + if( session->ticket != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len ); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( session->ticket_lifetime, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Misc extension-related info + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + used += 1; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + *p++ = session->mfl_code; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + used += 1; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( session->trunc_hmac ) & 0xFF ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + used += 1; + + if( used <= buf_len ) + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( session->encrypt_then_mac ); +#endif + + /* Done */ + *olen = used; + + if( used > buf_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Public wrapper for ssl_session_save() + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_save( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + return( ssl_session_save( session, 0, buf, buf_len, olen ) ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize session, see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error, and has an extra option omit_header. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + if( !omit_header ) + { + /* + * Check version identifier + */ + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( memcmp( p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH ); + } + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_session_header ); + } + + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if( 8 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + start = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[7] ); + p += 8; + + session->start = (time_t) start; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + if( 2 + 1 + 1 + 32 + 48 + 4 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ciphersuite = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; + p += 2; + + session->compression = *p++; + + session->id_len = *p++; + memcpy( session->id, p, 32 ); + p += 32; + + memcpy( session->master, p, 48 ); + p += 48; + + session->verify_result = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; + + /* Immediately clear invalid pointer values that have been read, in case + * we exit early before we replaced them with valid ones. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + session->peer_cert = NULL; +#else + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + session->ticket = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Peer certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* Deserialize CRT from the end of the ticket. */ + if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + cert_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2]; + p += 3; + + if( cert_len != 0 ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( cert_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + + if( session->peer_cert == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( session->peer_cert, + p, cert_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert ); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + return( ret ); + } + + p += cert_len; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Deserialize CRT digest from the end of the ticket. */ + if( 2 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->peer_cert_digest_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) *p++; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = (size_t) *p++; + + if( session->peer_cert_digest_len != 0 ) + { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type( session->peer_cert_digest_type ); + if( md_info == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + if( session->peer_cert_digest_len != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( session->peer_cert_digest_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->peer_cert_digest_len ); + if( session->peer_cert_digest == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( session->peer_cert_digest, p, + session->peer_cert_digest_len ); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * Session ticket and associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ticket_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2]; + p += 3; + + if( session->ticket_len != 0 ) + { + if( session->ticket_len > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session->ticket_len ); + if( session->ticket == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len ); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + + if( 4 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->ticket_lifetime = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Misc extension-related info + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->mfl_code = *p++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->trunc_hmac = *p++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if( 1 > (size_t)( end - p ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session->encrypt_then_mac = *p++; +#endif + + /* Done, should have consumed entire buffer */ + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize session: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_load( mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = ssl_session_load( session, 0, buf, len ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( session ); + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Perform a single step of the SSL handshake + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( ssl ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( ssl ); +#endif + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Perform the SSL handshake + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* Sanity checks */ + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL || ssl->f_get_timer == NULL ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "You must use " + "mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> handshake" ) ); + + /* Main handshake loop */ + while( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( ssl ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + break; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= handshake" ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* + * Write HelloRequest to request renegotiation on server + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello request" ) ); + + ssl->out_msglen = 4; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello request" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * Actually renegotiate current connection, triggered by either: + * - any side: calling mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(), + * - client: receiving a HelloRequest during mbedtls_ssl_read(), + * - server: receiving any handshake message on server during mbedtls_ssl_read() after + * the initial handshake is completed. + * If the handshake doesn't complete due to waiting for I/O, it will continue + * during the next calls to mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() or mbedtls_ssl_read() respectively. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> renegotiate" ) ); + + if( ( ret = ssl_handshake_init( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* RFC 6347 4.2.2: "[...] the HelloRequest will have message_seq = 0 and + * the ServerHello will have message_seq = 1" */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ) + { + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = 1; + else + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = 1; + } +#endif + + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= renegotiate" ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Renegotiate current connection on client, + * or request renegotiation on server + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* On server, just send the request */ + if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; + + /* Did we already try/start sending HelloRequest? */ + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ); + + return( ssl_write_hello_request( ssl ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /* + * On client, either start the renegotiation process or, + * if already in progress, continue the handshake + */ + if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret ); + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void ssl_key_cert_free( mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = key_cert, *next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + next = cur->next; + mbedtls_free( cur ); + cur = next; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if( handshake == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if( ssl->conf->f_async_cancel != NULL && handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) + { + ssl->conf->f_async_cancel( ssl ); + handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + mbedtls_md5_free( &handshake->fin_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &handshake->fin_sha1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &handshake->fin_sha256_psa ); +#else + mbedtls_sha256_free( &handshake->fin_sha256 ); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort( &handshake->fin_sha384_psa ); +#else + mbedtls_sha512_free( &handshake->fin_sha512 ); +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_free( &handshake->dhm_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + mbedtls_ecdh_free( &handshake->ecdh_ctx ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_free( &handshake->ecjpake_ctx ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + mbedtls_free( handshake->ecjpake_cache ); + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + /* explicit void pointer cast for buggy MS compiler */ + mbedtls_free( (void *) handshake->curves ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( handshake->psk != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->psk, handshake->psk_len ); + mbedtls_free( handshake->psk ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + /* + * Free only the linked list wrapper, not the keys themselves + * since the belong to the SNI callback + */ + if( handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = handshake->sni_key_cert, *next; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + next = cur->next; + mbedtls_free( cur ); + cur = next; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( &handshake->ecrs_ctx ); + if( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert ); + mbedtls_free( handshake->ecrs_peer_cert ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_free( &handshake->peer_pubkey ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + mbedtls_free( handshake->verify_cookie ); + mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( handshake->flight ); + mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( ssl ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake, + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too big - reallocate. Because of the way Mbed TLS + * processes datagrams and the fact that a datagram is allowed to have + * several records in it, it is possible that the I/O buffers are not + * empty at this stage */ + handle_buffer_resizing( ssl, 1, mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( ssl ), + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( ssl ) ); +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_session_free( mbedtls_ssl_session *session ) +{ + if( session == NULL ) + return; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + ssl_clear_peer_cert( session ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + mbedtls_free( session->ticket ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 3 + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ( (uint32_t) ( \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT ) | \ + ( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT ) | \ + 0u ) ) + +static unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG ), +}; + +/* + * Serialize a full SSL context + * + * The format of the serialized data is: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * // header + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch + * opaque context_format[5]; // version-specific field determining + * // the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep these + * version+format bytes. (We may make their size part of the API.) + * + * // session sub-structure + * opaque session<1..2^32-1>; // see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * // transform sub-structure + * uint8 random[64]; // ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random + * uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value + * uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use + * // fields from ssl_context + * uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC + * uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num + * uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection + * uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram + * uint64 cur_out_ctr; // Record layer: outgoing sequence number + * uint16 mtu; // DTLS: path mtu (max outgoing fragment size) + * uint8 alpn_chosen<0..2^8-1> // ALPN: negotiated application protocol + * + * Note that many fields of the ssl_context or sub-structures are not + * serialized, as they fall in one of the following categories: + * + * 1. forced value (eg in_left must be 0) + * 2. pointer to dynamically-allocated memory (eg session, transform) + * 3. value can be re-derived from other data (eg session keys from MS) + * 4. value was temporary (eg content of input buffer) + * 5. value will be provided by the user again (eg I/O callbacks and context) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_save( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen ) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; + size_t session_len; + int ret = 0; + + /* + * Enforce usage restrictions, see "return BAD_INPUT_DATA" in + * this function's documentation. + * + * These are due to assumptions/limitations in the implementation. Some of + * them are likely to stay (no handshake in progress) some might go away + * (only DTLS) but are currently used to simplify the implementation. + */ + /* The initial handshake must be over */ + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Initial handshake isn't over" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + if( ssl->handshake != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Handshake isn't completed" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Double-check that sub-structures are indeed ready */ + if( ssl->transform == NULL || ssl->session == NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Serialised structures aren't ready" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* There must be no pending incoming or outgoing data */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( ssl ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "There is pending incoming data" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + if( ssl->out_left != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "There is pending outgoing data" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Protocol must be DTLS, not TLS */ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only DTLS is supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Version must be 1.2 */ + if( ssl->major_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only version 1.2 supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only version 1.2 supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* We must be using an AEAD ciphersuite */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( ssl->transform ) != 1 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Only AEAD ciphersuites supported" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + /* Renegotiation must not be enabled */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Renegotiation must not be enabled" ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } +#endif + + /* + * Version and format identifier + */ + used += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ); + + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ); + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ); + } + + /* + * Session (length + data) + */ + ret = ssl_session_save( ssl->session, 1, NULL, 0, &session_len ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) + return( ret ); + + used += 4 + session_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( session_len, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + + ret = ssl_session_save( ssl->session, 1, + p, session_len, &session_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p += session_len; + } + + /* + * Transform + */ + used += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ); + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->transform->randbytes, + sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ) ); + p += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + used += 2 + ssl->transform->in_cid_len + ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->transform->in_cid, ssl->transform->in_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + + *p++ = ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + memcpy( p, ssl->transform->out_cid, ssl->transform->out_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + used += 4; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( ssl->badmac_seen, p, 0 ); + p += 4; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + used += 16; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( ssl->in_window_top, p, 0 ); + p += 8; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE( ssl->in_window, p, 0 ); + p += 8; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 1; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = ssl->disable_datagram_packing; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + used += 8; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 ); + p += 8; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 2; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ssl->mtu, p, 0 ); + p += 2; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + { + const uint8_t alpn_len = ssl->alpn_chosen + ? (uint8_t) strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen ) + : 0; + + used += 1 + alpn_len; + if( used <= buf_len ) + { + *p++ = alpn_len; + + if( ssl->alpn_chosen != NULL ) + { + memcpy( p, ssl->alpn_chosen, alpn_len ); + p += alpn_len; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + + /* + * Done + */ + *olen = used; + + if( used > buf_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "saved context", buf, used ); + + return( mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 0 ) ); +} + +/* + * Helper to get TLS 1.2 PRF from ciphersuite + * (Duplicates bits of logic from ssl_set_handshake_prfs().) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)) +typedef int (*tls_prf_fn)( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen ); +static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs( int ciphersuite_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuite_id ); + + if( ciphersuite_info == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) + return( tls_prf_sha384 ); + else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + { + if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) + return( tls_prf_sha256 ); + } +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)) + (void) ciphersuite_info; +#endif + return( NULL ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C || + (MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) */ + +/* + * Deserialize context, see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; + size_t session_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + tls_prf_fn prf_func = NULL; + + /* + * The context should have been freshly setup or reset. + * Give the user an error in case of obvious misuse. + * (Checking session is useful because it won't be NULL if we're + * renegotiating, or if the user mistakenly loaded a session first.) + */ + if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->session != NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + /* + * We can't check that the config matches the initial one, but we can at + * least check it matches the requirements for serializing. + */ + if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->conf->max_major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || + ssl->conf->min_major_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || + ssl->conf->max_minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 || + ssl->conf->min_minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || +#endif + 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "context to load", buf, len ); + + /* + * Check version identifier + */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( memcmp( p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH ); + } + p += sizeof( ssl_serialized_context_header ); + + /* + * Session + */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + session_len = ( (size_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (size_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (size_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (size_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; + + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_in = ssl->session; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < session_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = ssl_session_load( ssl->session, 1, p, session_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + return( ret ); + } + + p += session_len; + + /* + * Transform + */ + + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; + + prf_func = ssl_tls12prf_from_cs( ssl->session->ciphersuite ); + if( prf_func == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Read random bytes and populate structure */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ret = ssl_populate_transform( ssl->transform, + ssl->session->ciphersuite, + ssl->session->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + ssl->session->trunc_hmac, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + ssl->session->compression, +#endif + prf_func, + p, /* currently pointing to randbytes */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, /* (D)TLS 1.2 is forced */ + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + p += sizeof( ssl->transform->randbytes ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Read connection IDs and store them */ + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->transform->in_cid_len = *p++; + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->transform->in_cid_len + 1u ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( ssl->transform->in_cid, p, ssl->transform->in_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + + ssl->transform->out_cid_len = *p++; + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->transform->out_cid_len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( ssl->transform->out_cid, p, ssl->transform->out_cid_len ); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->badmac_seen = ( (uint32_t) p[0] << 24 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[1] << 16 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[2] << 8 ) | + ( (uint32_t) p[3] ); + p += 4; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 16 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->in_window_top = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[7] ); + p += 8; + + ssl->in_window = ( (uint64_t) p[0] << 56 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[1] << 48 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[2] << 40 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[3] << 32 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[4] << 24 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[5] << 16 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[6] << 8 ) | + ( (uint64_t) p[7] ); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = *p++; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, p, 8 ); + p += 8; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl->mtu = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1]; + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + { + uint8_t alpn_len; + const char **cur; + + if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + alpn_len = *p++; + + if( alpn_len != 0 && ssl->conf->alpn_list != NULL ) + { + /* alpn_chosen should point to an item in the configured list */ + for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ ) + { + if( strlen( *cur ) == alpn_len && + memcmp( p, cur, alpn_len ) == 0 ) + { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *cur; + break; + } + } + } + + /* can only happen on conf mismatch */ + if( alpn_len != 0 && ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + p += alpn_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + + /* + * Forced fields from top-level ssl_context structure + * + * Most of them already set to the correct value by mbedtls_ssl_init() and + * mbedtls_ssl_reset(), so we only need to set the remaining ones. + */ + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; + + ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; + ssl->minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; + + /* Adjust pointers for header fields of outgoing records to + * the given transform, accounting for explicit IV and CID. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->in_epoch = 1; +#endif + + /* mbedtls_ssl_reset() leaves the handshake sub-structure allocated, + * which we don't want - otherwise we'd end up freeing the wrong transform + * by calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform() + * inappropriately. */ + if( ssl->handshake != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + ssl->handshake = NULL; + } + + /* + * Done - should have consumed entire buffer + */ + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Deserialize context: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *context, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len ) +{ + int ret = ssl_context_load( context, buf, len ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_free( context ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + +/* + * Free an SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) +{ + if( ssl == NULL ) + return; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> free" ) ); + + if( ssl->out_buf != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->out_buf, out_buf_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->out_buf ); + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + } + + if( ssl->in_buf != NULL ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_buf, in_buf_len ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->in_buf ); + ssl->in_buf = NULL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + if( ssl->compress_buf != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->compress_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->compress_buf ); + } +#endif + + if( ssl->transform ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform ); + } + + if( ssl->handshake ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( ssl ); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + + mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->transform_negotiate ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); + } + + if( ssl->session ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->session ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if( ssl->hostname != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->hostname, strlen( ssl->hostname ) ); + mbedtls_free( ssl->hostname ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish()" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish( ssl ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id ); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= free" ) ); + + /* Actually clear after last debug message */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_context ) ); +} + +/* + * Initialize mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_init( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ + memset( conf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_config ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#endif + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; +#endif + +static int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + 0 +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +static int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = { + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ssl_preset_suiteb_curves[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, +#endif + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE +}; +#endif + +/* + * Load default in mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int endpoint, int transport, int preset ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + + /* Use the functions here so that they are covered in tests, + * but otherwise access member directly for efficiency */ + mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint( conf, endpoint ); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport( conf, transport ); + + /* + * Things that are common to all presets + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) + { + conf->authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + conf->session_tickets = MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED; +#endif + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + conf->arc4_disabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + conf->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + conf->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + conf->cbc_record_splitting = MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->f_cookie_write = ssl_cookie_write_dummy; + conf->f_cookie_check = ssl_cookie_check_dummy; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + conf->anti_replay = MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->cert_req_ca_list = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + conf->hs_timeout_min = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN; + conf->hs_timeout_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + conf->renego_max_records = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT; + memset( conf->renego_period, 0x00, 2 ); + memset( conf->renego_period + 2, 0xFF, 6 ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if( endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + const unsigned char dhm_p[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN; + const unsigned char dhm_g[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN; + + if ( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( conf, + dhm_p, sizeof( dhm_p ), + dhm_g, sizeof( dhm_g ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Preset-specific defaults + */ + switch( preset ) + { + /* + * NSA Suite B + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB: + conf->min_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; + conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; /* TLS 1.2 */ + conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION; + conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION; + + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = + ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + conf->curve_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_curves; +#endif + break; + + /* + * Default + */ + default: + conf->min_major_ver = ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION > + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION ) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION : + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION; + conf->min_minor_ver = ( MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION > + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION ) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION : + MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION; + conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION; + conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) + conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; +#endif + + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = + conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = + mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_default_hashes; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + conf->curve_list = mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + conf->dhm_min_bitlen = 1024; +#endif + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Free mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_free( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P ); + mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if( conf->psk != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk, conf->psk_len ); + mbedtls_free( conf->psk ); + conf->psk = NULL; + conf->psk_len = 0; + } + + if( conf->psk_identity != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf->psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len ); + mbedtls_free( conf->psk_identity ); + conf->psk_identity = NULL; + conf->psk_identity_len = 0; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + ssl_key_cert_free( conf->key_cert ); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( conf, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_config ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) ) +/* + * Convert between MBEDTLS_PK_XXX and SSL_SIG_XXX + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA ); +#endif + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON ); +} + +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type ) +{ + switch( type ) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA ); + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON ); + } +} + +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig ) +{ + switch( sig ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && ( MBEDTLS_RSA_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg ) +{ + switch( sig_alg ) + { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return( set->rsa ); + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return( set->ecdsa ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + } +} + +/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + switch( sig_alg ) + { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + if( set->rsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + set->rsa = md_alg; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + if( set->ecdsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + set->ecdsa = md_alg; + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ +void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + set->rsa = md_alg; + set->ecdsa = md_alg; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Convert from MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX to MBEDTLS_MD_XXX + */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash ) +{ + switch( hash ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ); + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ); + } +} + +/* + * Convert from MBEDTLS_MD_XXX to MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md ) +{ + switch( md ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 ); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 ); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 ); +#endif + default: + return( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE ); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Check if a curve proposed by the peer is in our list. + * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; + + if( ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + for( gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++ ) + if( *gid == grp_id ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Same as mbedtls_ssl_check_curve() but takes a TLS ID for the curve. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id ) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_id ); + if( curve_info == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + return( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, curve_info->grp_id ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Check if a hash proposed by the peer is in our list. + * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_md_type_t md ) +{ + const int *cur; + + if( ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + for( cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; cur++ ) + if( *cur == (int) md ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, + int cert_endpoint, + uint32_t *flags ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + int usage = 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) + const char *ext_oid; + size_t ext_len; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) + ((void) cert); + ((void) cert_endpoint); + ((void) flags); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + if( cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + /* Server part of the key exchange */ + switch( ciphersuite->key_exchange ) + { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT; + break; + + /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */ + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + usage = 0; + } + } + else + { + /* Client auth: we only implement rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign for now */ + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + } + + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( cert, usage ) != 0 ) + { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE; + ret = -1; + } +#else + ((void) ciphersuite); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) + if( cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) + { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH ); + } + else + { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH ); + } + + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( cert, ext_oid, ext_len ) != 0 ) + { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE; + ret = -1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; + + switch( md ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls; + break; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + break; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; + } + + return 0; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + (void) ssl; + (void) md; + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_md5_context mbedtls_md5; + mbedtls_sha1_context mbedtls_sha1; + + mbedtls_md5_init( &mbedtls_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_init( &mbedtls_sha1 ); + + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque md5_hash[16]; + * opaque sha_hash[20]; + * }; + * + * md5_hash + * MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random + * + ServerParams); + * sha_hash + * SHA(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random + * + ServerParams); + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret( &mbedtls_md5 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md5_starts_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &mbedtls_md5, + ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md5_update_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret( &mbedtls_md5, data, data_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md5_update_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret( &mbedtls_md5, output ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md5_finish_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret( &mbedtls_sha1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &mbedtls_sha1, + ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha1_update_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret( &mbedtls_sha1, data, + data_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha1_update_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret( &mbedtls_sha1, + output + 16 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret", ret ); + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md5_free( &mbedtls_md5 ); + mbedtls_sha1_free( &mbedtls_sha1 ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + return( ret ); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( md_alg ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Perform PSA-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange" ) ); + + if( ( status = psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, + hash_alg ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_setup", status ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( status = psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, ssl->handshake->randbytes, + 64 ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_update", status ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( status = psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, + data, data_len ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_update", status ); + goto exit; + } + + if( ( status = psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE, + hashlen ) ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_hash_finish", status ); + goto exit; + } + +exit: + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + switch( status ) + { + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED ); + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED ); + } + } + return( 0 ); +} + +#else + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + *hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Perform mbedtls-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange" ) ); + + mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); + + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque client_random[32]; + * opaque server_random[32]; + * ServerDHParams params; + * }; + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_starts", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_update", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_update", ret ); + goto exit; + } + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_finish", ret ); + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cc68773d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c @@ -0,0 +1,353 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "psa/crypto_sizes.h" + +#include +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \ + .name = string, + +#define TLS1_3_EVOLVE_INPUT_SIZE ( PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE ) ? \ + PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE : PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE + +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels = +{ + /* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one + * character too long due to the 0-termination. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; + +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL + +/* + * This function creates a HkdfLabel structure used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * + * The HkdfLabel is specified in RFC 8446 as follows: + * + * struct HkdfLabel { + * uint16 length; // Length of expanded key material + * opaque label<7..255>; // Always prefixed by "tls13 " + * opaque context<0..255>; // Usually a communication transcript hash + * }; + * + * Parameters: + * - desired_length: Length of expanded key material + * Even though the standard allows expansion to up to + * 2**16 Bytes, TLS 1.3 never uses expansion to more than + * 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most + * 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by + * hardcoding the writing of the high bytes. + * - (label, llen): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix + * The label length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3 + * can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(). + * - (ctx, clen): context + context length + * The context length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure, + * This MUST be a writable buffer of size + * at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes. + * - dlen: Pointer at which to store the actual length of + * the HkdfLabel structure on success. + */ + +static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( label_len, context_len ) \ + ( 2 /* expansion length */ \ + + 1 /* label length */ \ + + label_len \ + + 1 /* context length */ \ + + context_len ) + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \ + SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \ + sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN ) + +static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( + size_t desired_length, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + unsigned char *dst, size_t *dlen ) +{ + size_t total_label_len = + sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + llen; + size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len = + SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( total_label_len, clen ); + + unsigned char *p = dst; + + /* Add the size of the expanded key material. + * We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use + * TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */ +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255 +#error "The implementation of ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \ + value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN" +#endif + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( desired_length ); + + /* Add label incl. prefix */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( total_label_len ); + memcpy( p, tls1_3_label_prefix, sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) ); + p += sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix); + memcpy( p, label, llen ); + p += llen; + + /* Add context value */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( clen ); + if( clen != 0 ) + memcpy( p, ctx, clen ); + + /* Return total length to the caller. */ + *dlen = total_hkdf_lbl_len; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; + unsigned char hkdf_label[ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN ]; + size_t hkdf_label_len; + + if( llen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN ) + { + /* Should never happen since this is an internal + * function, and we know statically which labels + * are allowed. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( clen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN ) + { + /* Should not happen, as above. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + if( blen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN ) + { + /* Should not happen, as above. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); + if( md == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( blen, + label, llen, + ctx, clen, + hkdf_label, + &hkdf_label_len ); + + return( mbedtls_hkdf_expand( md, + secret, slen, + hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len, + buf, blen ) ); +} + +/* + * The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs: + * + * - One secret value per sender. + * - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated + * - The desired lengths of key and IV. + * + * The expansion itself is based on HKDF: + * + * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "key", "", key_length ) + * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length ) + * + * [sender] denotes the sending side and the Secret value is provided + * by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side + * keys in a single function call. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *client_secret, + const unsigned char *server_secret, + size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys ) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + client_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ), + NULL, 0, + keys->client_write_key, key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + server_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( key ), + NULL, 0, + keys->server_write_key, key_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + client_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ), + NULL, 0, + keys->client_write_iv, iv_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + server_secret, slen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( iv ), + NULL, 0, + keys->server_write_iv, iv_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + keys->key_len = key_len; + keys->iv_len = iv_len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + int ctx_hashed, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char hashed_context[ MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ]; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; + md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); + if( md == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED ) + { + ret = mbedtls_md( md, ctx, clen, hashed_context ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + clen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + } + else + { + if( clen > sizeof(hashed_context) ) + { + /* This should never happen since this function is internal + * and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly. + * Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk + * of getting a stack overflow. */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); + } + + memcpy( hashed_context, ctx, clen ); + } + + return( mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( hash_alg, + secret, slen, + label, llen, + hashed_context, clen, + dstbuf, buflen ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret_old, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *secret_new ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + size_t hlen, ilen; + unsigned char tmp_secret[ PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE ] = { 0 }; + unsigned char tmp_input [ TLS1_3_EVOLVE_INPUT_SIZE ] = { 0 }; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; + md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_alg ); + if( md == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md ); + + /* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "") + * on the old secret. */ + if( secret_old != NULL ) + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + secret_old, hlen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( derived ), + NULL, 0, /* context */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + tmp_secret, hlen ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + } + + if( input != NULL ) + { + memcpy( tmp_input, input, input_len ); + ilen = input_len; + } + else + { + ilen = hlen; + } + + /* HKDF-Extract takes a salt and input key material. + * The salt is the old secret, and the input key material + * is the input secret (PSK / ECDHE). */ + ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract( md, + tmp_secret, hlen, + tmp_input, ilen, + secret_new ); + if( ret != 0 ) + goto cleanup; + + ret = 0; + + cleanup: + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret) ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp_input, sizeof(tmp_input) ); + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7089049c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h @@ -0,0 +1,274 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H + +/* This requires MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( idx, name, string ) to be defined at + * the point of use. See e.g. the definition of mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union + * below. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( finished , "finished" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( resumption , "resumption" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( traffic_upd , "traffic upd" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( exporter , "exporter" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( key , "key" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( iv , "iv" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_hs_traffic, "c hs traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_ap_traffic, "c ap traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( c_e_traffic , "c e traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_hs_traffic, "s hs traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_ap_traffic, "s ap traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( s_e_traffic , "s e traffic" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( e_exp_master, "e exp master" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( res_master , "res master" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( exp_master , "exp master" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( ext_binder , "ext binder" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( res_binder , "res binder" ) \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( derived , "derived" ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( name, string ) \ + const unsigned char name [ sizeof(string) - 1 ]; + +union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL + +extern const struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels; + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( LABEL ) \ + mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL, \ + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN \ + sizeof( union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union ) + +/* The maximum length of HKDF contexts used in the TLS 1.3 standard. + * Since contexts are always hashes of message transcripts, this can + * be approximated from above by the maximum hash size. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN \ + MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE + +/* Maximum desired length for expanded key material generated + * by HKDF-Expand-Label. + * + * Warning: If this ever needs to be increased, the implementation + * ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() in ssl_tls13_keys.c needs to be + * adjusted since it currently assumes that HKDF key expansion + * is never used with more than 255 Bytes of output. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN 255 + +/** + * \brief The \c HKDF-Expand-Label function from + * the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. + * + * + * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, Context, Length ) = + * HKDF-Expand( Secret, HkdfLabel, Length ) + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to use. + * \param secret The \c Secret argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * \param label The \c Label argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p llen Bytes. + * \param llen The length of \p label in Bytes. + * \param ctx The \c Context argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p clen Bytes. + * \param clen The length of \p context in Bytes. + * \param buf The destination buffer to hold the expanded secret. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \p blen Bytes. + * \param blen The desired size of the expanded secret in Bytes. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen ); + +/** + * \brief This function is part of the TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * It extracts key and IV for the actual client/server traffic + * from the client/server traffic secrets. + * + * From RFC 8446: + * + * + * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "key", "", key_length) + * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "iv", "", iv_length)* + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to be used + * for the HKDF-based expansion of the secret. + * \param client_secret The client traffic secret. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p slen Bytes + * \param server_secret The server traffic secret. + * This must be a readable buffer of size \p slen Bytes + * \param slen Length of the secrets \p client_secret and + * \p server_secret in Bytes. + * \param key_len The desired length of the key to be extracted in Bytes. + * \param iv_len The desired length of the IV to be extracted in Bytes. + * \param keys The address of the structure holding the generated + * keys and IVs. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *client_secret, + const unsigned char *server_secret, + size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys ); + + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED 1 + +/** + * \brief The \c Derive-Secret function from the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. + * + * + * Derive-Secret( Secret, Label, Messages ) = + * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, + * Hash( Messages ), + * Hash.Length ) ) + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash function used for the + * applications of HKDF. + * \param secret The \c Secret argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p slen Bytes. + * \param slen The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * \param label The \c Label argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p llen Bytes. + * \param llen The length of \p label in Bytes. + * \param ctx The hash of the \c Messages argument to the + * \c Derive-Secret function, or the \c Messages argument + * itself, depending on \p context_already_hashed. + * \param clen The length of \p hash. + * \param ctx_hashed This indicates whether the \p ctx contains the hash of + * the \c Messages argument in the application of the + * \c Derive-Secret function + * (value MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED), or whether + * it is the content of \c Messages itself, in which case + * the function takes care of the hashing + * (value MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED). + * \param dstbuf The target buffer to write the output of + * \c Derive-Secret to. This must be a writable buffer of + * size \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of \p dstbuf in Bytes. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, + int ctx_hashed, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen ); + +/** + * \brief Compute the next secret in the TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule proceeds as follows to compute + * the three main secrets during the handshake: The early + * secret for early data, the handshake secret for all + * other encrypted handshake messages, and the master + * secret for all application traffic. + * + * + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * (EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract = Handshake Secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * 0 -> HKDF-Extract = Master Secret + * + * + * Each of the three secrets in turn is the basis for further + * key derivations, such as the derivation of traffic keys and IVs; + * see e.g. mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * This function implements one step in this evolution of secrets: + * + * + * old_secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * input -> HKDF-Extract = new_secret + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash function used for the + * applications of HKDF. + * \param secret_old The address of the buffer holding the old secret + * on function entry. If not \c NULL, this must be a + * readable buffer whose size matches the output size + * of the hash function represented by \p hash_alg. + * If \c NULL, an all \c 0 array will be used instead. + * \param input The address of the buffer holding the additional + * input for the key derivation (e.g., the PSK or the + * ephemeral (EC)DH secret). If not \c NULL, this must be + * a readable buffer whose size \p input_len Bytes. + * If \c NULL, an all \c 0 array will be used instead. + * \param input_len The length of \p input in Bytes. + * \param secret_new The address of the buffer holding the new secret + * on function exit. This must be a writable buffer + * whose size matches the output size of the hash + * function represented by \p hash_alg. + * This may be the same as \p secret_old. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret_old, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *secret_new ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/threading.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/threading.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2dd8383c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/threading.c @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +/* + * Threading abstraction layer + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +/* + * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before + * config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. + */ +#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) + +#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ + defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ + defined(__MACH__))) +#include +#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || + * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */ + +#if !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) +/* + * This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long + * preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in + * platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and + * threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so + * we keep it private by only defining it in this file + */ + +#if ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) +#define THREADING_USE_GMTIME +#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */ + +#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) +static void threading_mutex_init_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + if( mutex == NULL ) + return; +#ifdef KINC_CONSOLE + mutex->is_valid = 1; +#else + /* A nonzero value of is_valid indicates a successfully initialized + * mutex. This is a workaround for not being able to return an error + * code for this function. The lock/unlock functions return an error + * if is_valid is nonzero. The Mbed TLS unit test code uses this field + * to distinguish more states of the mutex; see + * tests/src/threading_helpers for details. */ + mutex->is_valid = pthread_mutex_init( &mutex->mutex, NULL ) == 0; +#endif +} + +static void threading_mutex_free_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + if( mutex == NULL || !mutex->is_valid ) + return; + +#ifndef KINC_CONSOLE + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy( &mutex->mutex ); +#endif + mutex->is_valid = 0; +} + +static int threading_mutex_lock_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + if( mutex == NULL || ! mutex->is_valid ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#ifndef KINC_CONSOLE + if( pthread_mutex_lock( &mutex->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int threading_mutex_unlock_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + if( mutex == NULL || ! mutex->is_valid ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#ifndef KINC_CONSOLE + if( pthread_mutex_unlock( &mutex->mutex ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +void (*mbedtls_mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_init_pthread; +void (*mbedtls_mutex_free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_free_pthread; +int (*mbedtls_mutex_lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_lock_pthread; +int (*mbedtls_mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_unlock_pthread; + +/* + * With pthreads we can statically initialize mutexes + */ +#ifdef KINC_CONSOLE +#define MUTEX_INIT = { 0, 1 } +#else +#define MUTEX_INIT = { PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER, 1 } +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) +static int threading_mutex_fail( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + ((void) mutex ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} +static void threading_mutex_dummy( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex ) +{ + ((void) mutex ); + return; +} + +void (*mbedtls_mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_dummy; +void (*mbedtls_mutex_free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_dummy; +int (*mbedtls_mutex_lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_fail; +int (*mbedtls_mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) = threading_mutex_fail; + +/* + * Set functions pointers and initialize global mutexes + */ +void mbedtls_threading_set_alt( void (*mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), + void (*mutex_free)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), + int (*mutex_lock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ), + int (*mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t * ) ) +{ + mbedtls_mutex_init = mutex_init; + mbedtls_mutex_free = mutex_free; + mbedtls_mutex_lock = mutex_lock; + mbedtls_mutex_unlock = mutex_unlock; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ); +#endif +#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) + mbedtls_mutex_init( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ); +#endif +} + +/* + * Free global mutexes + */ +void mbedtls_threading_free_alt( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ); +#endif +#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) + mbedtls_mutex_free( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ); +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ + +/* + * Define global mutexes + */ +#ifndef MUTEX_INIT +#define MUTEX_INIT +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +#endif +#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/timing.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/timing.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c8ece44a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/timing.c @@ -0,0 +1,531 @@ +/* + * Portable interface to the CPU cycle counter + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) + +#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ + !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) +//#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_TIMING_C in config.h" +#define unix +#endif + +#ifndef asm +#define asm __asm +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +#include +#include + +struct _hr_time +{ + LARGE_INTEGER start; +}; + +#else + +#include +#include +#ifndef KINC_CONSOLE +#include +#endif +/* time.h should be included independently of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME. If the + * platform matches the ifdefs above, it will be used. */ +#include +#include +struct _hr_time +{ + struct timeval start; +}; +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + ( defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86) ) || defined(__WATCOMC__) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long tsc; + __asm rdtsc + __asm mov [tsc], eax + return( tsc ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + ( _MSC_VER && _M_IX86 ) || __WATCOMC__ */ + +/* some versions of mingw-64 have 32-bit longs even on x84_64 */ +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__i386__) || ( \ + ( defined(__amd64__) || defined( __x86_64__) ) && __SIZEOF_LONG__ == 4 ) ) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long lo, hi; + asm volatile( "rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) ); + return( lo ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && __i386__ */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) ) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long lo, hi; + asm volatile( "rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) ); + return( lo | ( hi << 32 ) ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && ( __amd64__ || __x86_64__ ) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && ( defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) ) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long tbl, tbu0, tbu1; + + do + { + asm volatile( "mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu0) ); + asm volatile( "mftb %0" : "=r" (tbl ) ); + asm volatile( "mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu1) ); + } + while( tbu0 != tbu1 ); + + return( tbl ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && ( __powerpc__ || __ppc__ ) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc64__) + +#if defined(__OpenBSD__) +#warning OpenBSD does not allow access to tick register using software version instead +#else +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long tick; + asm volatile( "rdpr %%tick, %0;" : "=&r" (tick) ); + return( tick ); +} +#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */ +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && __sparc64__ */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc__) && !defined(__sparc64__) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long tick; + asm volatile( ".byte 0x83, 0x41, 0x00, 0x00" ); + asm volatile( "mov %%g1, %0" : "=r" (tick) ); + return( tick ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && __sparc__ && !__sparc64__ */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__alpha__) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long cc; + asm volatile( "rpcc %0" : "=r" (cc) ); + return( cc & 0xFFFFFFFF ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && __alpha__ */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64__) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + unsigned long itc; + asm volatile( "mov %0 = ar.itc" : "=r" (itc) ); + return( itc ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && + __GNUC__ && __ia64__ */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(_MSC_VER) && \ + !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + LARGE_INTEGER offset; + + QueryPerformanceCounter( &offset ); + + return( (unsigned long)( offset.QuadPart ) ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && _MSC_VER && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) + +#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK + +static int hardclock_init = 0; +static struct timeval tv_init; + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock( void ) +{ + struct timeval tv_cur; + + if( hardclock_init == 0 ) + { + gettimeofday( &tv_init, NULL ); + hardclock_init = 1; + } + + gettimeofday( &tv_cur, NULL ); + return( ( tv_cur.tv_sec - tv_init.tv_sec ) * 1000000 + + ( tv_cur.tv_usec - tv_init.tv_usec ) ); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK */ + +volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; + +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset ) +{ + struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; + + if( reset ) + { + QueryPerformanceCounter( &t->start ); + return( 0 ); + } + else + { + unsigned long delta; + LARGE_INTEGER now, hfreq; + QueryPerformanceCounter( &now ); + QueryPerformanceFrequency( &hfreq ); + delta = (unsigned long)( ( now.QuadPart - t->start.QuadPart ) * 1000ul + / hfreq.QuadPart ); + return( delta ); + } +} + +/* It's OK to use a global because alarm() is supposed to be global anyway */ +static DWORD alarmMs; + +static void TimerProc( void *TimerContext ) +{ + (void) TimerContext; + Sleep( alarmMs ); + mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; + /* _endthread will be called implicitly on return + * That ensures execution of thread function's epilogue */ +} + +void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds ) +{ + if( seconds == 0 ) + { + /* No need to create a thread for this simple case. + * Also, this shorcut is more reliable at least on MinGW32 */ + mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; + return; + } + + mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; + alarmMs = seconds * 1000; + (void) _beginthread( TimerProc, 0, NULL ); +} + +#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset ) +{ +#ifdef KINC_CONSOLE + return 0; +#else + //unsigned long delta; + //struct timeval offset; + struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; + + if( reset ) + { + gettimeofday( &t->start, NULL ); + return( 0 ); + } + else + { + unsigned long delta; + struct timeval now; + gettimeofday( &now, NULL ); + delta = ( now.tv_sec - t->start.tv_sec ) * 1000ul + + ( now.tv_usec - t->start.tv_usec ) / 1000; + return( delta ); + } +#endif +} + +#ifndef KINC_CONSOLE +static void sighandler( int signum ) +{ + mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; + signal(signum, sighandler); +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds ) +{ + mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; +#ifndef KINC_CONSOLE + signal( SIGALRM, sighandler ); + alarm( seconds ); +#endif +} + +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* + * Set delays to watch + */ +void mbedtls_timing_set_delay( void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms ) +{ + mbedtls_timing_delay_context *ctx = (mbedtls_timing_delay_context *) data; + + ctx->int_ms = int_ms; + ctx->fin_ms = fin_ms; + + if( fin_ms != 0 ) + (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &ctx->timer, 1 ); +} + +/* + * Get number of delays expired + */ +int mbedtls_timing_get_delay( void *data ) +{ + mbedtls_timing_delay_context *ctx = (mbedtls_timing_delay_context *) data; + unsigned long elapsed_ms; + + if( ctx->fin_ms == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + elapsed_ms = mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &ctx->timer, 0 ); + + if( elapsed_ms >= ctx->fin_ms ) + return( 2 ); + + if( elapsed_ms >= ctx->int_ms ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * Busy-waits for the given number of milliseconds. + * Used for testing mbedtls_timing_hardclock. + */ +static void busy_msleep( unsigned long msec ) +{ + struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires; + unsigned long i = 0; /* for busy-waiting */ + volatile unsigned long j; /* to prevent optimisation */ + + (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 1 ); + + while( mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 0 ) < msec ) + i++; + + j = i; + (void) j; +} + +#define FAIL do \ + { \ + if( verbose != 0 ) \ + { \ + mbedtls_printf( "failed at line %d\n", __LINE__ ); \ + mbedtls_printf( " cycles=%lu ratio=%lu millisecs=%lu secs=%lu hardfail=%d a=%lu b=%lu\n", \ + cycles, ratio, millisecs, secs, hardfail, \ + (unsigned long) a, (unsigned long) b ); \ + mbedtls_printf( " elapsed(hires)=%lu elapsed(ctx)=%lu status(ctx)=%d\n", \ + mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 0 ), \ + mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &ctx.timer, 0 ), \ + mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) ); \ + } \ + return( 1 ); \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * Checkup routine + * + * Warning: this is work in progress, some tests may not be reliable enough + * yet! False positives may happen. + */ +int mbedtls_timing_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + unsigned long cycles = 0, ratio = 0; + unsigned long millisecs = 0, secs = 0; + int hardfail = 0; + struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires; + uint32_t a = 0, b = 0; + mbedtls_timing_delay_context ctx; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " TIMING tests note: will take some time!\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " TIMING test #1 (set_alarm / get_timer): " ); + + { + secs = 1; + + (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 1 ); + + mbedtls_set_alarm( (int) secs ); + while( !mbedtls_timing_alarmed ) + ; + + millisecs = mbedtls_timing_get_timer( &hires, 0 ); + + /* For some reason on Windows it looks like alarm has an extra delay + * (maybe related to creating a new thread). Allow some room here. */ + if( millisecs < 800 * secs || millisecs > 1200 * secs + 300 ) + FAIL; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " TIMING test #2 (set/get_delay ): " ); + + { + a = 800; + b = 400; + mbedtls_timing_set_delay( &ctx, a, a + b ); /* T = 0 */ + + busy_msleep( a - a / 4 ); /* T = a - a/4 */ + if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != 0 ) + FAIL; + + busy_msleep( a / 4 + b / 4 ); /* T = a + b/4 */ + if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != 1 ) + FAIL; + + busy_msleep( b ); /* T = a + b + b/4 */ + if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != 2 ) + FAIL; + } + + mbedtls_timing_set_delay( &ctx, 0, 0 ); + busy_msleep( 200 ); + if( mbedtls_timing_get_delay( &ctx ) != -1 ) + FAIL; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " TIMING test #3 (hardclock / get_timer): " ); + + /* + * Allow one failure for possible counter wrapping. + * On a 4Ghz 32-bit machine the cycle counter wraps about once per second; + * since the whole test is about 10ms, it shouldn't happen twice in a row. + */ + +hard_test: + if( hardfail > 1 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed (ignored)\n" ); + + goto hard_test_done; + } + + /* Get a reference ratio cycles/ms */ + millisecs = 1; + cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); + busy_msleep( millisecs ); + cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - cycles; + ratio = cycles / millisecs; + + /* Check that the ratio is mostly constant */ + for( millisecs = 2; millisecs <= 4; millisecs++ ) + { + cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); + busy_msleep( millisecs ); + cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - cycles; + + /* Allow variation up to 20% */ + if( cycles / millisecs < ratio - ratio / 5 || + cycles / millisecs > ratio + ratio / 5 ) + { + hardfail++; + goto hard_test; + } + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + +hard_test_done: + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/version.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/version.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..32a0d7d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/version.c @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* + * Version information + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include + +unsigned int mbedtls_version_get_number( void ) +{ + return( MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER ); +} + +void mbedtls_version_get_string( char *string ) +{ + memcpy( string, MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING, + sizeof( MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_version_get_string_full( char *string ) +{ + memcpy( string, MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL, + sizeof( MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/version_features.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/version_features.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..40c95201 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/version_features.c @@ -0,0 +1,872 @@ +/* + * Version feature information + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + +#include "mbedtls/version.h" + +#include + +static const char * const features[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) + "MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + "MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION) + "MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) + "MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) + "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) + "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) + "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) + "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_AES_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_DES_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) + "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + "MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + "MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY) + "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING) + "MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) + "MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES) + "MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES) + "MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + "MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) + "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) + "MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + "MBEDTLS_GENPRIME", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + "MBEDTLS_FS_IO", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) + "MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + "MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + "MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + "MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + "MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) + "MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) + "MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) + "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) + "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + "MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) + "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) + "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) + "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) + "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) + "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + "MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) + "MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) + "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + "MBEDTLS_AES_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) + "MBEDTLS_ARC4_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + "MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) + "MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + "MBEDTLS_BASE64_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + "MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) + "MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + "MBEDTLS_ARIA_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + "MBEDTLS_CCM_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) + "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + "MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + "MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + "MBEDTLS_DES_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + "MBEDTLS_DHM_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) + "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + "MBEDTLS_ECP_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + "MBEDTLS_ERROR_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + "MBEDTLS_GCM_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) + "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) + "MBEDTLS_HKDF_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + "MBEDTLS_MD_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) + "MBEDTLS_MD2_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) + "MBEDTLS_MD4_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + "MBEDTLS_MD5_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) + "MBEDTLS_NET_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) + "MBEDTLS_OID_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) + "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) + "MBEDTLS_PK_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) + "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + "MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + "MBEDTLS_RSA_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + "MBEDTLS_SHA1_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + "MBEDTLS_SHA512_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + "MBEDTLS_TIMING_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + "MBEDTLS_VERSION_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) + "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) + "MBEDTLS_XTEA_C", +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ + NULL +}; + +int mbedtls_version_check_feature( const char *feature ) +{ + const char * const *idx = features; + + if( *idx == NULL ) + return( -2 ); + + if( feature == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + while( *idx != NULL ) + { + if( !strcmp( *idx, feature ) ) + return( 0 ); + idx++; + } + return( -1 ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..54c8666d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509.c @@ -0,0 +1,1098 @@ +/* + * X.509 common functions for parsing and verification + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) + * + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include +#endif + +#define CHECK(code) if( ( ret = ( code ) ) != 0 ){ return( ret ); } +#define CHECK_RANGE(min, max, val) \ + do \ + { \ + if( ( val ) < ( min ) || ( val ) > ( max ) ) \ + { \ + return( ret ); \ + } \ + } while( 0 ) + +/* + * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + if( **p != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE | 2 ) && + **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + serial->tag = *(*p)++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &serial->len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, ret ) ); + + serial->p = *p; + *p += serial->len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* Get an algorithm identifier without parameters (eg for signatures) + * + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( p, end, alg ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse an algorithm identifier with (optional) parameters + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, alg, params ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) +/* + * HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } + * + * For HashAlgorithm, parameters MUST be NULL or absent. + */ +static int x509_get_hash_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p; + const unsigned char *end; + mbedtls_x509_buf md_oid; + size_t len; + + /* Make sure we got a SEQUENCE and setup bounds */ + if( alg->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + p = alg->p; + end = p + alg->len; + + if( p >= end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + /* Parse md_oid */ + md_oid.tag = *p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &md_oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + md_oid.p = p; + p += md_oid.len; + + /* Get md_alg from md_oid */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &md_oid, md_alg ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + /* Make sure params is absent of NULL */ + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL ) ) != 0 || len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE { + * hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm DEFAULT sha1Identifier, + * maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm DEFAULT mgf1SHA1Identifier, + * saltLength [2] INTEGER DEFAULT 20, + * trailerField [3] INTEGER DEFAULT 1 } + * -- Note that the tags in this Sequence are explicit. + * + * RFC 4055 (which defines use of RSASSA-PSS in PKIX) states that the value + * of trailerField MUST be 1, and PKCS#1 v2.2 doesn't even define any other + * option. Enforce this at parsing time. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, + int *salt_len ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p; + const unsigned char *end, *end2; + size_t len; + mbedtls_x509_buf alg_id, alg_params; + + /* First set everything to defaults */ + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + *mgf_md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + *salt_len = 20; + + /* Make sure params is a SEQUENCE and setup bounds */ + if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + p = (unsigned char *) params->p; + end = p + params->len; + + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * HashAlgorithm + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) == 0 ) + { + end2 = p + len; + + /* HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier (without parameters) */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( &p, end2, &alg_id ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &alg_id, md_alg ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p != end2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * MaskGenAlgorithm + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1 ) ) == 0 ) + { + end2 = p + len; + + /* MaskGenAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier (params = HashAlgorithm) */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end2, &alg_id, &alg_params ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + /* Only MFG1 is recognised for now */ + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1, &alg_id ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ) ); + + /* Parse HashAlgorithm */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_hash_alg( &alg_params, mgf_md ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( p != end2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * salt_len + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 2 ) ) == 0 ) + { + end2 = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end2, salt_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p != end2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * trailer_field (if present, must be 1) + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 3 ) ) == 0 ) + { + int trailer_field; + + end2 = p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end2, &trailer_field ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p != end2 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + if( trailer_field != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) ); + + if( p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + * type AttributeType, + * value AttributeValue } + * + * AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType + */ +static int x509_get_attr_type_value( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_name *cur ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + mbedtls_x509_buf *oid; + mbedtls_x509_buf *val; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); + + end = *p + len; + + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + oid = &cur->oid; + oid->tag = **p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &oid->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); + + oid->p = *p; + *p += oid->len; + + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + if( **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING && + **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING && + **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING && + **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + val = &cur->val; + val->tag = *(*p)++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &val->len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) ); + + val->p = *p; + *p += val->len; + + if( *p != end ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + cur->next = NULL; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Name ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now -- + * rdnSequence RDNSequence } + * + * RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName + * + * RelativeDistinguishedName ::= + * SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue + * + * AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + * type AttributeType, + * value AttributeValue } + * + * AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType + * + * The data structure is optimized for the common case where each RDN has only + * one element, which is represented as a list of AttributeTypeAndValue. + * For the general case we still use a flat list, but we mark elements of the + * same set so that they are "merged" together in the functions that consume + * this list, eg mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(). + * + * On success, this function may allocate a linked list starting at cur->next + * that must later be free'd by the caller using mbedtls_free(). In error + * cases, this function frees all allocated memory internally and the caller + * has no freeing responsibilities. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_name *cur ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t set_len; + const unsigned char *end_set; + mbedtls_x509_name *head = cur; + mbedtls_x509_name *prev, *allocated; + + /* don't use recursion, we'd risk stack overflow if not optimized */ + while( 1 ) + { + /* + * parse SET + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &set_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) ) != 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ); + goto error; + } + + end_set = *p + set_len; + + while( 1 ) + { + if( ( ret = x509_get_attr_type_value( p, end_set, cur ) ) != 0 ) + goto error; + + if( *p == end_set ) + break; + + /* Mark this item as being no the only one in a set */ + cur->next_merged = 1; + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + /* + * continue until end of SEQUENCE is reached + */ + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + +error: + /* Skip the first element as we did not allocate it */ + allocated = head->next; + + while( allocated != NULL ) + { + prev = allocated; + allocated = allocated->next; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( prev, sizeof( *prev ) ); + mbedtls_free( prev ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( head, sizeof( *head ) ); + + return( ret ); +} + +static int x509_parse_int( unsigned char **p, size_t n, int *res ) +{ + *res = 0; + + for( ; n > 0; --n ) + { + if( ( **p < '0') || ( **p > '9' ) ) + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE ); + + *res *= 10; + *res += ( *(*p)++ - '0' ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_date_is_valid(const mbedtls_x509_time *t ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; + int month_len; + + CHECK_RANGE( 0, 9999, t->year ); + CHECK_RANGE( 0, 23, t->hour ); + CHECK_RANGE( 0, 59, t->min ); + CHECK_RANGE( 0, 59, t->sec ); + + switch( t->mon ) + { + case 1: case 3: case 5: case 7: case 8: case 10: case 12: + month_len = 31; + break; + case 4: case 6: case 9: case 11: + month_len = 30; + break; + case 2: + if( ( !( t->year % 4 ) && t->year % 100 ) || + !( t->year % 400 ) ) + month_len = 29; + else + month_len = 28; + break; + default: + return( ret ); + } + CHECK_RANGE( 1, month_len, t->day ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse an ASN1_UTC_TIME (yearlen=2) or ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME (yearlen=4) + * field. + */ +static int x509_parse_time( unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen, + mbedtls_x509_time *tm ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * Minimum length is 10 or 12 depending on yearlen + */ + if ( len < yearlen + 8 ) + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE ); + len -= yearlen + 8; + + /* + * Parse year, month, day, hour, minute + */ + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, yearlen, &tm->year ) ); + if ( 2 == yearlen ) + { + if ( tm->year < 50 ) + tm->year += 100; + + tm->year += 1900; + } + + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->mon ) ); + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->day ) ); + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->hour ) ); + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->min ) ); + + /* + * Parse seconds if present + */ + if ( len >= 2 ) + { + CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->sec ) ); + len -= 2; + } + else + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE ); + + /* + * Parse trailing 'Z' if present + */ + if ( 1 == len && 'Z' == **p ) + { + (*p)++; + len--; + } + + /* + * We should have parsed all characters at this point + */ + if ( 0 != len ) + return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE ); + + CHECK( x509_date_is_valid( tm ) ); + + return ( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Time ::= CHOICE { + * utcTime UTCTime, + * generalTime GeneralizedTime } + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *tm ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len, year_len; + unsigned char tag; + + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + tag = **p; + + if( tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME ) + year_len = 2; + else if( tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME ) + year_len = 4; + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + + (*p)++; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &len ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret ) ); + + return x509_parse_time( p, len, year_len, tm ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + int tag_type; + + if( ( end - *p ) < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ); + + tag_type = **p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE, ret ) ); + + sig->tag = tag_type; + sig->len = len; + sig->p = *p; + + *p += len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Get signature algorithm from alg OID and optional parameters + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, + void **sig_opts ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( *sig_opts != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg( sig_oid, md_alg, pk_alg ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG, ret ) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if( *pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) + { + mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; + + pss_opts = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options ) ); + if( pss_opts == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( sig_params, + md_alg, + &pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id, + &pss_opts->expected_salt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_free( pss_opts ); + return( ret ); + } + + *sig_opts = (void *) pss_opts; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + { + /* Make sure parameters are absent or NULL */ + if( ( sig_params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && sig_params->tag != 0 ) || + sig_params->len != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * X.509 Extensions (No parsing of extensions, pointer should + * be either manually updated or extensions should be parsed!) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Extension structure use EXPLICIT tagging. That is, the actual + * `Extensions` structure is wrapped by a tag-length pair using + * the respective context-specific tag. */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &ext->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + ext->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag; + ext->p = *p; + end = *p + ext->len; + + /* + * Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( end != *p + len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Store the name in printable form into buf; no more + * than size characters will be written + */ +int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j, n; + unsigned char c, merge = 0; + const mbedtls_x509_name *name; + const char *short_name = NULL; + char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE], *p; + + memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) ); + + name = dn; + p = buf; + n = size; + + while( name != NULL ) + { + if( !name->oid.p ) + { + name = name->next; + continue; + } + + if( name != dn ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, merge ? " + " : ", " ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name( &name->oid, &short_name ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s=", short_name ); + else + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\?\?=" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + for( i = 0, j = 0; i < name->val.len; i++, j++ ) + { + if( j >= sizeof( s ) - 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + + c = name->val.p[i]; + // Special characters requiring escaping, RFC 1779 + if( c && strchr( ",=+<>#;\"\\", c ) ) + { + if( j + 1 >= sizeof( s ) - 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + s[j++] = '\\'; + } + if( c < 32 || c >= 127 ) + s[j] = '?'; + else s[j] = c; + } + s[j] = '\0'; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s", s ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + merge = name->next_merged; + name = name->next; + } + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +/* + * Store the serial in printable form into buf; no more + * than size characters will be written + */ +int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, n, nr; + char *p; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + nr = ( serial->len <= 32 ) + ? serial->len : 28; + + for( i = 0; i < nr; i++ ) + { + if( i == 0 && nr > 1 && serial->p[i] == 0x0 ) + continue; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%02X%s", + serial->p[i], ( i < nr - 1 ) ? ":" : "" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + if( nr != serial->len ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "...." ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +/* + * Helper for writing signature algorithms + */ +int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const void *sig_opts ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + char *p = buf; + size_t n = size; + const char *desc = NULL; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc( sig_oid, &desc ); + if( ret != 0 ) + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "???" ); + else + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s", desc ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) + { + const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, *mgf_md_info; + + pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) sig_opts; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); + mgf_md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id ); + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, " (%s, MGF1-%s, 0x%02X)", + md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name( md_info ) : "???", + mgf_md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name( mgf_md_info ) : "???", + (unsigned int) pss_opts->expected_salt_len ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } +#else + ((void) pk_alg); + ((void) md_alg); + ((void) sig_opts); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + + return( (int)( size - n ) ); +} + +/* + * Helper for writing "RSA key size", "EC key size", etc + */ +int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name ) +{ + char *p = buf; + size_t n = buf_size; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s key size", name ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +/* + * Set the time structure to the current time. + * Return 0 on success, non-zero on failure. + */ +static int x509_get_current_time( mbedtls_x509_time *now ) +{ + struct tm *lt, tm_buf; + mbedtls_time_t tt; + int ret = 0; + + tt = mbedtls_time( NULL ); + lt = mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( &tt, &tm_buf ); + + if( lt == NULL ) + ret = -1; + else + { + now->year = lt->tm_year + 1900; + now->mon = lt->tm_mon + 1; + now->day = lt->tm_mday; + now->hour = lt->tm_hour; + now->min = lt->tm_min; + now->sec = lt->tm_sec; + } + + return( ret ); +} + +/* + * Return 0 if before <= after, 1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_check_time( const mbedtls_x509_time *before, const mbedtls_x509_time *after ) +{ + if( before->year > after->year ) + return( 1 ); + + if( before->year == after->year && + before->mon > after->mon ) + return( 1 ); + + if( before->year == after->year && + before->mon == after->mon && + before->day > after->day ) + return( 1 ); + + if( before->year == after->year && + before->mon == after->mon && + before->day == after->day && + before->hour > after->hour ) + return( 1 ); + + if( before->year == after->year && + before->mon == after->mon && + before->day == after->day && + before->hour == after->hour && + before->min > after->min ) + return( 1 ); + + if( before->year == after->year && + before->mon == after->mon && + before->day == after->day && + before->hour == after->hour && + before->min == after->min && + before->sec > after->sec ) + return( 1 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_time now; + + if( x509_get_current_time( &now ) != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( x509_check_time( &now, to ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_time now; + + if( x509_get_current_time( &now ) != 0 ) + return( 1 ); + + return( x509_check_time( from, &now ) ); +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to ) +{ + ((void) to); + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from ) +{ + ((void) from); + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/certs.h" + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_x509_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + uint32_t flags; + mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; + mbedtls_x509_crt clicert; + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " X.509 certificate load: " ); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cacert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &clicert ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &clicert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_crt, + mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &cacert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_ca_crt, + mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n X.509 signature verify: "); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( &clicert, &cacert, NULL, NULL, &flags, NULL, NULL ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + goto cleanup; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n\n"); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &clicert ); +#else + ((void) verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509_create.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509_create.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..056bbaa7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509_create.c @@ -0,0 +1,374 @@ +/* + * X.509 base functions for creating certificates / CSRs + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" + +#include + +/* Structure linking OIDs for X.509 DN AttributeTypes to their + * string representations and default string encodings used by Mbed TLS. */ +typedef struct { + const char *name; /* String representation of AttributeType, e.g. + * "CN" or "emailAddress". */ + size_t name_len; /* Length of 'name', without trailing 0 byte. */ + const char *oid; /* String representation of OID of AttributeType, + * as per RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */ + int default_tag; /* The default character encoding used for the + * given attribute type, e.g. + * MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING for UTF-8. */ +} x509_attr_descriptor_t; + +#define ADD_STRLEN( s ) s, sizeof( s ) - 1 + +/* X.509 DN attributes from RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */ +static const x509_attr_descriptor_t x509_attrs[] = +{ + { ADD_STRLEN( "CN" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "commonName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "C" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "countryName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "O" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "organizationName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "L" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "locality" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "R" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "OU" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "organizationalUnitName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "ST" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "stateOrProvinceName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "emailAddress" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "serialNumber" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "postalAddress" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "postalCode" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "dnQualifier" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "title" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "surName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "SN" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "givenName" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "GN" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "initials" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "pseudonym" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "generationQualifier" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "domainComponent" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN( "DC" ), + MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { NULL, 0, NULL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL } +}; + +static const x509_attr_descriptor_t *x509_attr_descr_from_name( const char *name, size_t name_len ) +{ + const x509_attr_descriptor_t *cur; + + for( cur = x509_attrs; cur->name != NULL; cur++ ) + if( cur->name_len == name_len && + strncmp( cur->name, name, name_len ) == 0 ) + break; + + if ( cur->name == NULL ) + return( NULL ); + + return( cur ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name ) +{ + int ret = 0; + const char *s = name, *c = s; + const char *end = s + strlen( s ); + const char *oid = NULL; + const x509_attr_descriptor_t* attr_descr = NULL; + int in_tag = 1; + char data[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE]; + char *d = data; + + /* Clear existing chain if present */ + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( head ); + + while( c <= end ) + { + if( in_tag && *c == '=' ) + { + if( ( attr_descr = x509_attr_descr_from_name( s, c - s ) ) == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID; + goto exit; + } + + oid = attr_descr->oid; + s = c + 1; + in_tag = 0; + d = data; + } + + if( !in_tag && *c == '\\' && c != end ) + { + c++; + + /* Check for valid escaped characters */ + if( c == end || *c != ',' ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + goto exit; + } + } + else if( !in_tag && ( *c == ',' || c == end ) ) + { + mbedtls_asn1_named_data* cur = + mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( head, oid, strlen( oid ), + (unsigned char *) data, + d - data ); + + if(cur == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + // set tagType + cur->val.tag = attr_descr->default_tag; + + while( c < end && *(c + 1) == ' ' ) + c++; + + s = c + 1; + in_tag = 1; + } + + if( !in_tag && s != c + 1 ) + { + *(d++) = *c; + + if( d - data == MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + goto exit; + } + } + + c++; + } + +exit: + + return( ret ); +} + +/* The first byte of the value in the mbedtls_asn1_named_data structure is reserved + * to store the critical boolean for us + */ +int mbedtls_x509_set_extension( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; + + if( ( cur = mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( head, oid, oid_len, + NULL, val_len + 1 ) ) == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + cur->val.p[0] = critical; + memcpy( cur->val.p + 1, val, val_len ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * RelativeDistinguishedName ::= + * SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue + * + * AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + * type AttributeType, + * value AttributeValue } + * + * AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType + */ +static int x509_write_name( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data* cur_name) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + const char *oid = (const char*)cur_name->oid.p; + size_t oid_len = cur_name->oid.len; + const unsigned char *name = cur_name->val.p; + size_t name_len = cur_name->val.len; + + // Write correct string tag and value + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( p, start, + cur_name->val.tag, + (const char *) name, + name_len ) ); + // Write OID + // + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( p, start, oid, + oid_len ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_write_names( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur = first; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, x509_write_name( p, start, cur ) ); + cur = cur->next; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_write_sig( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if( *p < start || (size_t)( *p - start ) < size ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + len = size; + (*p) -= len; + memcpy( *p, sig, len ); + + if( *p - start < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ); + + *--(*p) = 0; + len += 1; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING ) ); + + // Write OID + // + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( p, start, oid, + oid_len, 0 ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +static int x509_write_extension( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *ext ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, ext->val.p + 1, + ext->val.len - 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, ext->val.len - 1 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ); + + if( ext->val.p[0] != 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( p, start, 1 ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, ext->oid.p, + ext->oid.len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, ext->oid.len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +/* + * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { + * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * extnValue OCTET STRING + * -- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value + * -- corresponding to the extension type identified + * -- by extnID + * } + */ +int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur_ext = first; + + while( cur_ext != NULL ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, x509_write_extension( p, start, cur_ext ) ); + cur_ext = cur_ext->next; + } + + return( (int) len ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509_crl.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509_crl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b943a8d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509_crl.c @@ -0,0 +1,762 @@ +/* + * X.509 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) parsing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) + * + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) +#include +#endif + +/* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1) } + */ +static int x509_crl_get_version( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ver ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + *ver = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * X.509 CRL v2 extensions + * + * We currently don't parse any extension's content, but we do check that the + * list of extensions is well-formed and abort on critical extensions (that + * are unsupported as we don't support any extension so far) + */ +static int x509_get_crl_ext( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * crlExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- if present, version MUST be v2 + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext( p, end, ext, 0 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + end = ext->p + ext->len; + + while( *p < end ) + { + /* + * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { + * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * extnValue OCTET STRING } + */ + int is_critical = 0; + const unsigned char *end_ext_data; + size_t len; + + /* Get enclosing sequence tag */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + end_ext_data = *p + len; + + /* Get OID (currently ignored) */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + } + *p += len; + + /* Get optional critical */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end_ext_data, + &is_critical ) ) != 0 && + ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + } + + /* Data should be octet string type */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + /* Ignore data so far and just check its length */ + *p += len; + if( *p != end_ext_data ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* Abort on (unsupported) critical extensions */ + if( is_critical ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + } + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * X.509 CRL v2 entry extensions (no extensions parsed yet.) + */ +static int x509_get_crl_entry_ext( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + /* OPTIONAL */ + if( end <= *p ) + return( 0 ); + + ext->tag = **p; + ext->p = *p; + + /* + * Get CRL-entry extension sequence header + * crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL -- if present, MUST be v2 + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &ext->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + ext->p = NULL; + return( 0 ); + } + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + } + + end = *p + ext->len; + + if( end != *p + ext->len ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + *p += len; + } + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * X.509 CRL Entries + */ +static int x509_get_entries( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t entry_len; + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur_entry = entry; + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &entry_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( 0 ); + + return( ret ); + } + + end = *p + entry_len; + + while( *p < end ) + { + size_t len2; + const unsigned char *end2; + + cur_entry->raw.tag = **p; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len2, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + cur_entry->raw.p = *p; + cur_entry->raw.len = len2; + end2 = *p + len2; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial( p, end2, &cur_entry->serial ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end2, + &cur_entry->revocation_date ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = x509_get_crl_entry_ext( p, end2, + &cur_entry->entry_ext ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( *p < end ) + { + cur_entry->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crl_entry ) ); + + if( cur_entry->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + cur_entry = cur_entry->next; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse one CRLs in DER format and append it to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl = chain; + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( crl == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( &sig_params1, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + memset( &sig_params2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + memset( &sig_oid2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + + /* + * Add new CRL on the end of the chain if needed. + */ + while( crl->version != 0 && crl->next != NULL ) + crl = crl->next; + + if( crl->version != 0 && crl->next == NULL ) + { + crl->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crl ) ); + + if( crl->next == NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + mbedtls_x509_crl_init( crl->next ); + crl = crl->next; + } + + /* + * Copy raw DER-encoded CRL + */ + if( buflen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buflen ); + if( p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( p, buf, buflen ); + + crl->raw.p = p; + crl->raw.len = buflen; + + end = p + buflen; + + /* + * CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE { + * tbsCertList TBSCertList, + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + + if( len != (size_t) ( end - p ) ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + /* + * TBSCertList ::= SEQUENCE { + */ + crl->tbs.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + crl->tbs.len = end - crl->tbs.p; + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER OPTIONAL { v1(0), v2(1) } + * -- if present, MUST be v2 + * + * signature AlgorithmIdentifier + */ + if( ( ret = x509_crl_get_version( &p, end, &crl->version ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &crl->sig_oid, &sig_params1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( crl->version < 0 || crl->version > 1 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION ); + } + + crl->version++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &crl->sig_oid, &sig_params1, + &crl->sig_md, &crl->sig_pk, + &crl->sig_opts ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG ); + } + + /* + * issuer Name + */ + crl->issuer_raw.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crl->issuer ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + + crl->issuer_raw.len = p - crl->issuer_raw.p; + + /* + * thisUpdate Time + * nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( &p, end, &crl->this_update ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( &p, end, &crl->next_update ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) && + ret != ( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) ) ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + /* + * revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + * userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, + * revocationDate Time, + * crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- if present, MUST be v2 + * } OPTIONAL + */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_entries( &p, end, &crl->entry ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * crlExtensions EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- if present, MUST be v2 + */ + if( crl->version == 2 ) + { + ret = x509_get_crl_ext( &p, end, &crl->crl_ext ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + end = crl->raw.p + crl->raw.len; + + /* + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( crl->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len || + memcmp( crl->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crl->sig_oid.len ) != 0 || + sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len || + ( sig_params1.len != 0 && + memcmp( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig( &p, end, &crl->sig ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse one or more CRLs and add them to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t use_len = 0; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; + int is_pem = 0; + + if( chain == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + do + { + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + + // Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated + // string + if( buflen == 0 || buf[buflen - 1] != '\0' ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + else + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----", + "-----END X509 CRL-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + is_pem = 1; + + buflen -= use_len; + buf += use_len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( chain, + pem.buf, pem.buflen ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + } + else if( is_pem ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + return( ret ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + } + /* In the PEM case, buflen is 1 at the end, for the terminated NULL byte. + * And a valid CRL cannot be less than 1 byte anyway. */ + while( is_pem && buflen > 1 ); + + if( is_pem ) + return( 0 ); + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + return( mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load one or more CRLs and add them to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( chain, buf, n ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/* + * Return an informational string about the certificate. + */ +#define BEFORE_COLON 14 +#define BC "14" +/* + * Return an informational string about the CRL. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + char *p; + const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sCRL version : %d", + prefix, crl->version ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crl->issuer ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sthis update : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crl->this_update.year, crl->this_update.mon, + crl->this_update.day, crl->this_update.hour, + crl->this_update.min, crl->this_update.sec ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%snext update : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crl->next_update.year, crl->next_update.mon, + crl->next_update.day, crl->next_update.hour, + crl->next_update.min, crl->next_update.sec ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + entry = &crl->entry; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sRevoked certificates:", + prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + while( entry != NULL && entry->raw.len != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sserial number: ", + prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( p, n, &entry->serial ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, " revocation date: " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", + entry->revocation_date.year, entry->revocation_date.mon, + entry->revocation_date.day, entry->revocation_date.hour, + entry->revocation_date.min, entry->revocation_date.sec ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + entry = entry->next; + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( p, n, &crl->sig_oid, crl->sig_pk, crl->sig_md, + crl->sig_opts ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +/* + * Initialize a CRL chain + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crl_init( mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) +{ + memset( crl, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate all CRL data + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crl_free( mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_cur = crl; + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_prv; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry_cur; + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry_prv; + + if( crl == NULL ) + return; + + do + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + mbedtls_free( crl_cur->sig_opts ); +#endif + + name_cur = crl_cur->issuer.next; + while( name_cur != NULL ) + { + name_prv = name_cur; + name_cur = name_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) ); + mbedtls_free( name_prv ); + } + + entry_cur = crl_cur->entry.next; + while( entry_cur != NULL ) + { + entry_prv = entry_cur; + entry_cur = entry_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( entry_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crl_entry ) ); + mbedtls_free( entry_prv ); + } + + if( crl_cur->raw.p != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( crl_cur->raw.p, crl_cur->raw.len ); + mbedtls_free( crl_cur->raw.p ); + } + + crl_cur = crl_cur->next; + } + while( crl_cur != NULL ); + + crl_cur = crl; + do + { + crl_prv = crl_cur; + crl_cur = crl_cur->next; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( crl_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crl ) ); + if( crl_prv != crl ) + mbedtls_free( crl_prv ); + } + while( crl_cur != NULL ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509_crt.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509_crt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b7de9ef1 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509_crt.c @@ -0,0 +1,3405 @@ +/* + * X.509 certificate parsing and verification + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) + * + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf + * + * [SIRO] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Chunghwatelecom201503cabforumV4.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) +#include +#include +#ifndef KINC_CONSOLE +#include +#endif +#include +#endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */ +#endif + +/* + * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + uint32_t flags; +} x509_crt_verify_chain_item; + +/* + * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root + */ +#define X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 ) + +/* Default profile. Do not remove items unless there are serious security + * concerns. */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default = +{ + /* Only SHA-2 hashes */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ), + 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ + 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */ + 2048, +}; + +/* + * Next-default profile + */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next = +{ + /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ), + 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 ), +#else + 0, +#endif + 2048, +}; + +/* + * NSA Suite B Profile + */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb = +{ + /* Only SHA-256 and 384 */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ), + /* Only ECDSA */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ), +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + /* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ), +#else + 0, +#endif + 0, +}; + +/* + * Check md_alg against profile + * Return 0 if md_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_profile_check_md_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( profile->allowed_mds & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( md_alg ) ) != 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Check pk_alg against profile + * Return 0 if pk_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg ) +{ + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( profile->allowed_pks & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( pk_alg ) ) != 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Check key against profile + * Return 0 if pk is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_profile_check_key( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk ) +{ + const mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS ) + { + if( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( pk ) >= profile->rsa_min_bitlen ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA || + pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ) + { + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id; + + if( gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ) + return( -1 ); + + if( ( profile->allowed_curves & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( gid ) ) != 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + return( -1 ); + } +#endif + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different + */ +static int x509_memcasecmp( const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len ) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned char diff; + const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2; + + for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) + { + diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i]; + + if( diff == 0 ) + continue; + + if( diff == 32 && + ( ( n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z' ) || + ( n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z' ) ) ) + { + continue; + } + + return( -1 ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_check_wildcard( const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name ) +{ + size_t i; + size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen( cn ); + + /* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */ + if( name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.' ) + return( -1 ); + + for( i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i ) + { + if( cn[i] == '.' ) + { + cn_idx = i; + break; + } + } + + if( cn_idx == 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + if( cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 && + x509_memcasecmp( name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1 ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding + * variations (but not all). + * + * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise. + */ +static int x509_string_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b ) +{ + if( a->tag == b->tag && + a->len == b->len && + memcmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( ( a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) && + ( b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) && + a->len == b->len && + x509_memcasecmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence). + * + * See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm: + * we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal, + * but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation + * or space folding.) + * + * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise. + */ +static int x509_name_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b ) +{ + /* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */ + while( a != NULL || b != NULL ) + { + if( a == NULL || b == NULL ) + return( -1 ); + + /* type */ + if( a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag || + a->oid.len != b->oid.len || + memcmp( a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len ) != 0 ) + { + return( -1 ); + } + + /* value */ + if( x509_string_cmp( &a->val, &b->val ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + /* structure of the list of sets */ + if( a->next_merged != b->next_merged ) + return( -1 ); + + a = a->next; + b = b->next; + } + + /* a == NULL == b */ + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain + */ +static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain ) +{ + size_t i; + + for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++ ) + { + ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL; + ver_chain->items[i].flags = (uint32_t) -1; + } + + ver_chain->len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} + +/* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + */ +static int x509_get_version( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ver ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + *ver = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + * notBefore Time, + * notAfter Time } + */ +static int x509_get_dates( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *from, + mbedtls_x509_time *to ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret ) ); + + end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, from ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, to ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * X.509 v2/v3 unique identifier (not parsed) + */ +static int x509_get_uid( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + uid->tag = **p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &uid->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | n ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + return( 0 ); + + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + uid->p = *p; + *p += uid->len; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_get_basic_constraints( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ca_istrue, + int *max_pathlen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* + * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { + * cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } + */ + *ca_istrue = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ + *max_pathlen = 0; /* endless */ + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end, ca_istrue ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ca_istrue ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *ca_istrue != 0 ) + *ca_istrue = 1; + } + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, max_pathlen ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* Do not accept max_pathlen equal to INT_MAX to avoid a signed integer + * overflow, which is an undefined behavior. */ + if( *max_pathlen == INT_MAX ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); + + (*max_pathlen)++; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_get_ns_cert_type( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *ns_cert_type) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( bs.len != 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + *ns_cert_type = *bs.p; + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_get_key_usage( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned int *key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( bs.len < 1 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + *key_usage = 0; + for( i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof( unsigned int ); i++ ) + { + *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId + * + * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + */ +static int x509_get_ext_key_usage( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */ + if( ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames + * + * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName + * + * GeneralName ::= CHOICE { + * otherName [0] OtherName, + * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, + * dNSName [2] IA5String, + * x400Address [3] ORAddress, + * directoryName [4] Name, + * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, + * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, + * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, + * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } + * + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { + * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, + * partyName [1] DirectoryString } + * + * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName + * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point. + */ +static int x509_get_subject_alt_name( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len, tag_len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; + unsigned char tag; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name dummy_san_buf; + memset( &dummy_san_buf, 0, sizeof( dummy_san_buf ) ); + + tag = **p; + (*p)++; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &tag_len ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( ( tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK ) != + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + } + + /* + * Check that the SAN is structured correctly. + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &(cur->buf), &dummy_san_buf ); + /* + * In case the extension is malformed, return an error, + * and clear the allocated sequences. + */ + if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur = subject_alt_name->next; + mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv; + while( seq_cur != NULL ) + { + seq_prv = seq_cur; + seq_cur = seq_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); + } + subject_alt_name->next = NULL; + return( ret ); + } + + /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ + if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) + { + if( cur->next != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ) ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + + buf = &(cur->buf); + buf->tag = tag; + buf->p = *p; + buf->len = tag_len; + *p += buf->len; + } + + /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ + cur->next = NULL; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } + * + * anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } + * + * certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation + * + * PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { + * policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, + * policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + * PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } + * + * CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId, + * qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId } + * + * -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers + * + * id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 } + * id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } + * id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } + * + * PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice ) + * + * Qualifier ::= CHOICE { + * cPSuri CPSuri, + * userNotice UserNotice } + * + * CPSuri ::= IA5String + * + * UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE { + * noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, + * explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL } + * + * NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE { + * organization DisplayText, + * noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } + * + * DisplayText ::= CHOICE { + * ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)), + * visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), + * bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), + * utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } + * + * NOTE: we only parse and use anyPolicy without qualifiers at this point + * as defined in RFC 5280. + */ +static int x509_get_certificate_policies( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies ) +{ + int ret, parse_ret = 0; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( *p + len != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * Cannot be an empty sequence. + */ + if( len == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + while( *p < end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_buf policy_oid; + const unsigned char *policy_end; + + /* + * Get the policy sequence + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + policy_end = *p + len; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + policy_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + policy_oid.len = len; + policy_oid.p = *p; + + /* + * Only AnyPolicy is currently supported when enforcing policy. + */ + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid ) != 0 ) + { + /* + * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this + * extension is critical and MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION + * is configured. + */ + parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ + if( cur->buf.p != NULL ) + { + if( cur->next != NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) ); + + if( cur->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED ) ); + + cur = cur->next; + } + + buf = &( cur->buf ); + buf->tag = policy_oid.tag; + buf->p = policy_oid.p; + buf->len = policy_oid.len; + + *p += len; + + /* + * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end + * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end. + */ + if( *p < policy_end ) + { + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + /* + * Skip the optional policy qualifiers. + */ + *p += len; + } + + if( *p != policy_end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ + cur->next = NULL; + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( parse_ret ); +} + +/* + * X.509 v3 extensions + * + */ +static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *end_ext_data, *start_ext_octet, *end_ext_octet; + + if( *p == end ) + return( 0 ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext( p, end, &crt->v3_ext, 3 ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + end = crt->v3_ext.p + crt->v3_ext.len; + while( *p < end ) + { + /* + * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { + * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * extnValue OCTET STRING } + */ + mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = {0, 0, NULL}; + int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ + int ext_type = 0; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + end_ext_data = *p + len; + + /* Get extension ID */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + extn_oid.p = *p; + *p += extn_oid.len; + + /* Get optional critical */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end_ext_data, &is_critical ) ) != 0 && + ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + /* Data should be octet string type */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + start_ext_octet = *p; + end_ext_octet = *p + len; + + if( end_ext_octet != end_ext_data ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + /* + * Detect supported extensions + */ + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( &extn_oid, &ext_type ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */ + if( cb != NULL ) + { + ret = cb( p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, *p, end_ext_octet ); + if( ret != 0 && is_critical ) + return( ret ); + *p = end_ext_octet; + continue; + } + + /* No parser found, skip extension */ + *p = end_ext_octet; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) + if( is_critical ) + { + /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) ); + } +#endif + continue; + } + + /* Forbid repeated extensions */ + if( ( crt->ext_types & ext_type ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS ); + + crt->ext_types |= ext_type; + + switch( ext_type ) + { + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: + /* Parse basic constraints */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_basic_constraints( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE: + /* Parse key usage */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE: + /* Parse extended key usage */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME: + /* Parse subject alt name */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_subject_alt_name( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->subject_alt_names ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE: + /* Parse netscape certificate type */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_ns_cert_type( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES: + /* Parse certificate policies type */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_certificate_policies( p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 ) + { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension + * if it contains unsupported policies */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && cb != NULL && + cb( p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, + start_ext_octet, end_ext_octet ) == 0 ) + break; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) + if( is_critical ) + return( ret ); + else +#endif + /* + * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we + * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to + * the user to choose how to enforce the policies, + * unless the extension is critical. + */ + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + return( ret ); + } + break; + + default: + /* + * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer + * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it, + * skip the extension. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) + if( is_critical ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + else +#endif + *p = end_ext_octet; + } + } + + if( *p != end ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format + */ +static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; + + memset( &sig_params1, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + memset( &sig_params2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + memset( &sig_oid2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */ + p = (unsigned char*) buf; + len = buflen; + end = p + len; + + /* + * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { + * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + + end = crt_end = p + len; + crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf; + if( make_copy != 0 ) + { + /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */ + crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len ); + if( crt->raw.p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len ); + crt->own_buffer = 1; + + p += crt->raw.len - len; + end = crt_end = p + len; + } + else + { + crt->raw.p = (unsigned char*) buf; + crt->own_buffer = 0; + } + + /* + * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { + */ + crt->tbs.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + crt->tbs.len = end - crt->tbs.p; + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + * + * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER + * + * signature AlgorithmIdentifier + */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_version( &p, end, &crt->version ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial( &p, end, &crt->serial ) ) != 0 || + ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &crt->sig_oid, + &sig_params1 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->version < 0 || crt->version > 2 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION ); + } + + crt->version++; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1, + &crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk, + &crt->sig_opts ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * issuer Name + */ + crt->issuer_raw.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->issuer ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + crt->issuer_raw.len = p - crt->issuer_raw.p; + + /* + * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + * notBefore Time, + * notAfter Time } + * + */ + if( ( ret = x509_get_dates( &p, end, &crt->valid_from, + &crt->valid_to ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * subject Name + */ + crt->subject_raw.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( len && ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->subject ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + crt->subject_raw.len = p - crt->subject_raw.p; + + /* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo + */ + crt->pk_raw.p = p; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, end, &crt->pk ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + crt->pk_raw.len = p - crt->pk_raw.p; + + /* + * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, + * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 + * subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, + * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 + * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- If present, version shall be v3 + */ + if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 ) + { + ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->issuer_id, 1 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 ) + { + ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->subject_id, 2 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + int extensions_allowed = 1; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) + if( crt->version != 3 ) + extensions_allowed = 0; +#endif + if( extensions_allowed ) + { + ret = x509_get_crt_ext( &p, end, crt, cb, p_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + } + + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + end = crt_end; + + /* + * } + * -- end of TBSCertificate + * + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2 ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len || + memcmp( crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len ) != 0 || + sig_params1.tag != sig_params2.tag || + sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len || + ( sig_params1.len != 0 && + memcmp( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig( &p, end, &crt->sig ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a + * chained list + */ +static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL; + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + while( crt->version != 0 && crt->next != NULL ) + { + prev = crt; + crt = crt->next; + } + + /* + * Add new certificate on the end of the chain if needed. + */ + if( crt->version != 0 && crt->next == NULL ) + { + crt->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + + if( crt->next == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + prev = crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt_init( crt->next ); + crt = crt->next; + } + + ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx ); + if( ret != 0 ) + { + if( prev ) + prev->next = NULL; + + if( crt != chain ) + mbedtls_free( crt ); + + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 0, NULL, NULL ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 1, NULL, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained + * list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0; + int buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER; +#endif + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( chain == NULL || buf == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + /* + * Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or + * one or more PEM certificates. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + if( buflen != 0 && buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' && + strstr( (const char *) buf, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" ) != NULL ) + { + buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM; + } + + if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER ) + return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen ); +#else + return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen ); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM ) + { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; + + /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */ + while( buflen > 1 ) + { + size_t use_len; + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + + /* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */ + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----", + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + buflen -= use_len; + buf += use_len; + } + else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA ) + { + return( ret ); + } + else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + { + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + + /* + * PEM header and footer were found + */ + buflen -= use_len; + buf += use_len; + + if( first_error == 0 ) + first_error = ret; + + total_failed++; + continue; + } + else + break; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, pem.buf, pem.buflen ); + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + /* + * Quit parsing on a memory error + */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ) + return( ret ); + + if( first_error == 0 ) + first_error = ret; + + total_failed++; + continue; + } + + success = 1; + } + } + + if( success ) + return( total_failed ); + else if( first_error ) + return( first_error ); + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load one or more certificates and add them to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( chain, buf, n ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) && !defined(KINC_CONSOLE) && !defined(KINC_WINDOWSAPP) + int w_ret; + WCHAR szDir[MAX_PATH]; + char filename[MAX_PATH]; + char *p; + size_t len = strlen( path ); + + WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data; + HANDLE hFind; + + if( len > MAX_PATH - 3 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + memset( szDir, 0, sizeof(szDir) ); + memset( filename, 0, MAX_PATH ); + memcpy( filename, path, len ); + filename[len++] = '\\'; + p = filename + len; + filename[len++] = '*'; + + w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir, + MAX_PATH - 3 ); + if( w_ret == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + hFind = FindFirstFileW( szDir, &file_data ); + if( hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + + len = MAX_PATH - len; + do + { + memset( p, 0, len ); + + if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY ) + continue; + + w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName, + lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ), + p, (int) len - 1, + NULL, NULL ); + if( w_ret == 0 ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + w_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, filename ); + if( w_ret < 0 ) + ret++; + else + ret += w_ret; + } + while( FindNextFileW( hFind, &file_data ) != 0 ); + + if( GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + +cleanup: + FindClose( hFind ); +#elif !defined(KINC_CONSOLE) && !defined(KINC_WINDOWSAPP) /* _WIN32 */ + int t_ret; + int snp_ret; + struct stat sb; + struct dirent *entry; + char entry_name[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN]; + DIR *dir = opendir( path ); + + if( dir == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) ) != 0 ) + { + closedir( dir ); + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + memset( &sb, 0, sizeof( sb ) ); + + while( ( entry = readdir( dir ) ) != NULL ) + { + snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf( entry_name, sizeof entry_name, + "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name ); + + if( snp_ret < 0 || (size_t)snp_ret >= sizeof entry_name ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + else if( stat( entry_name, &sb ) == -1 ) + { + if( errno == ENOENT ) + { + /* Broken symbolic link - ignore this entry. + stat(2) will return this error for either (a) a dangling + symlink or (b) a missing file. + Given that we have just obtained the filename from readdir, + assume that it does exist and therefore treat this as a + dangling symlink. */ + continue; + } + else + { + /* Some other file error; report the error. */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + if( !S_ISREG( sb.st_mode ) ) + continue; + + // Ignore parse errors + // + t_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, entry_name ); + if( t_ret < 0 ) + ret++; + else + ret += t_ret; + } + +cleanup: + closedir( dir ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) != 0 ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +#endif /* _WIN32 */ + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/* + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { + * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } + * + * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName, + * as defined in RFC 4108. + */ +static int x509_get_other_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name, + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name ) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p; + const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len; + mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid; + + if( ( subject_alt_name->tag & + ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) ) != + ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ) ) + { + /* + * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername". + */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + cur_oid.p = p; + cur_oid.len = len; + + /* + * Only HwModuleName is currently supported. + */ + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid ) != 0 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + + if( p + len >= end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( *other_name ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + p += len; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len; + + if( p + len >= end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( *other_name ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + p += len; + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) ); + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len; + p += len; + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, + sizeof( *other_name ) ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_info_subject_alt_name( char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence + *subject_alt_name, + const char *prefix ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san; + int parse_ret; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + memset( &san, 0, sizeof( san ) ); + parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &cur->buf, &san ); + if( parse_ret != 0 ) + { + if( parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + else + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + cur = cur->next; + continue; + } + + switch( san.type ) + { + /* + * otherName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME: + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, + &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid ) != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( p, n, &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + for( i = 0; i < other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; i++ ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%02X", other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p[i] ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */ + } + break; + + /* + * dNSName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s dNSName : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if( san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n ) + { + *p = '\0'; + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); + } + + memcpy( p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len ); + p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; + n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; + } + break; + + /* + * Type not supported, skip item. + */ + default: + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + break; + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + *p = '\0'; + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + switch( san_buf->tag & + ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) ) + { + /* + * otherName + */ + case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ): + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; + + ret = x509_get_other_name( san_buf, &other_name ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) ); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME; + memcpy( &san->san.other_name, + &other_name, sizeof( other_name ) ); + + } + break; + + /* + * dNSName + */ + case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ): + { + memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) ); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME; + + memcpy( &san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof( *san_buf ) ); + + } + break; + + /* + * Type not supported + */ + default: + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + } + return( 0 ); +} + +#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ + { \ + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s" i, sep ); \ + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ + sep = ", "; \ + } + +#define CERT_TYPE(type,name) \ + if( ns_cert_type & (type) ) \ + PRINT_ITEM( name ); + +static int x509_info_cert_type( char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned char ns_cert_type ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const char *sep = ""; + + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA" ); + CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA" ); + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +#define KEY_USAGE(code,name) \ + if( key_usage & (code) ) \ + PRINT_ITEM( name ); + +static int x509_info_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned int key_usage ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const char *sep = ""; + + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only" ); + KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only" ); + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_info_ext_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *desc; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = extended_key_usage; + const char *sep = ""; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 ) + desc = "???"; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + sep = ", "; + + cur = cur->next; + } + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_info_cert_policies( char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *desc; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; + const char *sep = ""; + + while( cur != NULL ) + { + if( mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 ) + desc = "???"; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + sep = ", "; + + cur = cur->next; + } + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Return an informational string about the certificate. + */ +#define BEFORE_COLON 18 +#define BC "18" +int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + char *p; + char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + if( NULL == crt ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\nCertificate is uninitialised!\n" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%scert. version : %d\n", + prefix, crt->version ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sserial number : ", + prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( p, n, &crt->serial ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->issuer ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->subject ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissued on : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crt->valid_from.year, crt->valid_from.mon, + crt->valid_from.day, crt->valid_from.hour, + crt->valid_from.min, crt->valid_from.sec ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sexpires on : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crt->valid_to.year, crt->valid_to.mon, + crt->valid_to.day, crt->valid_to.hour, + crt->valid_to.min, crt->valid_to.sec ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( p, n, &crt->sig_oid, crt->sig_pk, + crt->sig_md, crt->sig_opts ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + /* Key size */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON, + mbedtls_pk_get_name( &crt->pk ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits", prefix, key_size_str, + (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &crt->pk ) ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + /* + * Optional extensions + */ + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sbasic constraints : CA=%s", prefix, + crt->ca_istrue ? "true" : "false" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( crt->max_pathlen > 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ", max_pathlen=%d", crt->max_pathlen - 1 ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_subject_alt_name( &p, &n, + &crt->subject_alt_names, + prefix ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_type( &p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_key_usage( &p, &n, crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sext key usage : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_ext_key_usage( &p, &n, + &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scertificate policies : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_policies( &p, &n, + &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n" ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +struct x509_crt_verify_string { + int code; + const char *string; +}; + +static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = { + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, "The certificate validity has expired" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED, "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH, "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED, "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED, "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED, "The CRL is expired" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING, "Certificate was missing" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY, "Certificate verification was skipped" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER, "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE, "The certificate validity starts in the future" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE, "The CRL is from the future" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE, "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension" }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash." }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash." }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." }, + { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + uint32_t flags ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur; + char *p = buf; + size_t n = size; + + for( cur = x509_crt_verify_strings; cur->string != NULL ; cur++ ) + { + if( ( flags & cur->code ) == 0 ) + continue; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s\n", prefix, cur->string ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + flags ^= cur->code; + } + + if( flags != 0 ) + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sUnknown reason " + "(this should not happen)\n", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) +int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + unsigned int usage ) +{ + unsigned int usage_must, usage_may; + unsigned int may_mask = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY + | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY; + + if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + usage_must = usage & ~may_mask; + + if( ( ( crt->key_usage & ~may_mask ) & usage_must ) != usage_must ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + usage_may = usage & may_mask; + + if( ( ( crt->key_usage & may_mask ) | usage_may ) != usage_may ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) +int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const char *usage_oid, + size_t usage_len ) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur; + + /* Extension is not mandatory, absent means no restriction */ + if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + + /* + * Look for the requested usage (or wildcard ANY) in our list + */ + for( cur = &crt->ext_key_usage; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { + const mbedtls_x509_buf *cur_oid = &cur->buf; + + if( cur_oid->len == usage_len && + memcmp( cur_oid->p, usage_oid, usage_len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, cur_oid ) == 0 ) + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) +/* + * Return 1 if the certificate is revoked, or 0 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl ) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur = &crl->entry; + + while( cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0 ) + { + if( crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len && + memcmp( crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL. + * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present. + */ +static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile ) +{ + int flags = 0; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + if( ca == NULL ) + return( flags ); + + while( crl_list != NULL ) + { + if( crl_list->version == 0 || + x509_name_cmp( &crl_list->issuer, &ca->subject ) != 0 ) + { + crl_list = crl_list->next; + continue; + } + + /* + * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( ca, + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN ) != 0 ) + { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } +#endif + + /* + * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA + */ + if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_md ) != 0 ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD; + + if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_pk ) != 0 ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( crl_list->sig_md ); + if( mbedtls_md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 ) + { + /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } + + if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &ca->pk ) != 0 ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + + if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk, + crl_list->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ), + crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len ) != 0 ) + { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } + + /* + * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out) + */ + if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &crl_list->next_update ) ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED; + + if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &crl_list->this_update ) ) + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE; + + /* + * Check if certificate is revoked + */ + if( mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( crt, crl_list ) ) + { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED; + break; + } + + crl_list = crl_list->next; + } + + return( flags ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ + +/* + * Check the signature of a certificate by its parent + */ +static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t hash_len; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md ); + hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); + + /* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */ + if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); +#else + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( child->sig_md ); + + if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( -1 ); + + if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( -1 ); + } + + if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( -1 ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */ + if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) + { + return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &parent->pk, + child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, + child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk ) ); + } +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + + return( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk, + child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, + child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) ); +} + +/* + * Check if 'parent' is a suitable parent (signing CA) for 'child'. + * Return 0 if yes, -1 if not. + * + * top means parent is a locally-trusted certificate + */ +static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, + int top ) +{ + int need_ca_bit; + + /* Parent must be the issuer */ + if( x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &parent->subject ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + /* Parent must have the basicConstraints CA bit set as a general rule */ + need_ca_bit = 1; + + /* Exception: v1/v2 certificates that are locally trusted. */ + if( top && parent->version < 3 ) + need_ca_bit = 0; + + if( need_ca_bit && ! parent->ca_istrue ) + return( -1 ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) + if( need_ca_bit && + mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN ) != 0 ) + { + return( -1 ); + } +#endif + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Find a suitable parent for child in candidates, or return NULL. + * + * Here suitable is defined as: + * 1. subject name matches child's issuer + * 2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs + * 3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct + * (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported) + * 4. pathlen constraints are satisfied + * + * If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first + * such. Otherwise, return the first suitable candidate (or NULL if there is + * none). + * + * The rationale for this rule is that someone could have a list of trusted + * roots with two versions on the same root with different validity periods. + * (At least one user reported having such a list and wanted it to just work.) + * The reason we don't just require time-validity is that generally there is + * only one version, and if it's expired we want the flags to state that + * rather than NOT_TRUSTED, as would be the case if we required it here. + * + * The rationale for rule 3 (signature for trusted roots) is that users might + * have two versions of the same CA with different keys in their list, and the + * way we select the correct one is by checking the signature (as we don't + * rely on key identifier extensions). (This is one way users might choose to + * handle key rollover, another relies on self-issued certs, see [SIRO].) + * + * Arguments: + * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent + * - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents + * - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL) + * - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0 + * - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top + * of the chain, 0 otherwise + * - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far + * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far + * (will never be greater than path_cnt) + * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations + * + * Return value: + * - 0 on success + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise + */ +static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( + mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates, + mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent, + int *r_signature_is_good, + int top, + unsigned path_cnt, + unsigned self_cnt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent; + int signature_is_good = 0, fallback_signature_is_good; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* did we have something in progress? */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent != NULL ) + { + /* restore saved state */ + parent = rs_ctx->parent; + fallback_parent = rs_ctx->fallback_parent; + fallback_signature_is_good = rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good; + + /* clear saved state */ + rs_ctx->parent = NULL; + rs_ctx->fallback_parent = NULL; + rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0; + + /* resume where we left */ + goto check_signature; + } +#endif + + fallback_parent = NULL; + fallback_signature_is_good = 0; + + for( parent = candidates; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next ) + { + /* basic parenting skills (name, CA bit, key usage) */ + if( x509_crt_check_parent( child, parent, top ) != 0 ) + continue; + + /* +1 because stored max_pathlen is 1 higher that the actual value */ + if( parent->max_pathlen > 0 && + (size_t) parent->max_pathlen < 1 + path_cnt - self_cnt ) + { + continue; + } + + /* Signature */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +check_signature: +#endif + ret = x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent, rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* save state */ + rs_ctx->parent = parent; + rs_ctx->fallback_parent = fallback_parent; + rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good; + + return( ret ); + } +#else + (void) ret; +#endif + + signature_is_good = ret == 0; + if( top && ! signature_is_good ) + continue; + + /* optional time check */ + if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &parent->valid_to ) || + mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &parent->valid_from ) ) + { + if( fallback_parent == NULL ) + { + fallback_parent = parent; + fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; + } + + continue; + } + + *r_parent = parent; + *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; + + break; + } + + if( parent == NULL ) + { + *r_parent = fallback_parent; + *r_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Find a parent in trusted CAs or the provided chain, or return NULL. + * + * Searches in trusted CAs first, and return the first suitable parent found + * (see find_parent_in() for definition of suitable). + * + * Arguments: + * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed + * by a chain of possible intermediates + * - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates + * - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL) + * - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0 + * - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0 + * - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child) + * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far + * (will always be no greater than path_cnt) + * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations + * + * Return value: + * - 0 on success + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise + */ +static int x509_crt_find_parent( + mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crt **parent, + int *parent_is_trusted, + int *signature_is_good, + unsigned path_cnt, + unsigned self_cnt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list; + + *parent_is_trusted = 1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted != -1 ) + { + *parent_is_trusted = rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted; + rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1; + } +#endif + + while( 1 ) { + search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next; + + ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, search_list, + parent, signature_is_good, + *parent_is_trusted, + path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* save state */ + rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = *parent_is_trusted; + return( ret ); + } +#else + (void) ret; +#endif + + /* stop here if found or already in second iteration */ + if( *parent != NULL || *parent_is_trusted == 0 ) + break; + + /* prepare second iteration */ + *parent_is_trusted = 0; + } + + /* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */ + if( *parent == NULL ) + { + *parent_is_trusted = 0; + *signature_is_good = 0; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Check if an end-entity certificate is locally trusted + * + * Currently we require such certificates to be self-signed (actually only + * check for self-issued as self-signatures are not checked) + */ +static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt *cur; + + /* must be self-issued */ + if( x509_name_cmp( &crt->issuer, &crt->subject ) != 0 ) + return( -1 ); + + /* look for an exact match with trusted cert */ + for( cur = trust_ca; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { + if( crt->raw.len == cur->raw.len && + memcmp( crt->raw.p, cur->raw.p, crt->raw.len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + } + + /* too bad */ + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Build and verify a certificate chain + * + * Given a peer-provided list of certificates EE, C1, ..., Cn and + * a list of trusted certs R1, ... Rp, try to build and verify a chain + * EE, Ci1, ... Ciq [, Rj] + * such that every cert in the chain is a child of the next one, + * jumping to a trusted root as early as possible. + * + * Verify that chain and return it with flags for all issues found. + * + * Special cases: + * - EE == Rj -> return a one-element list containing it + * - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root + * -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq + * + * Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least: + * - trusted EE + * - EE -> trusted root + * - EE -> intermediate CA -> trusted root + * - if relevant: EE untrusted + * - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted + * with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root). + * For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is + * enough (but length 1 is not in general). + * + * Arguments: + * - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn + * - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp + * - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile() + * - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain + * Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise! + * Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume. + * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations + * + * Return value: + * - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined + * - 0 is the chain was successfully built and examined, + * even if it was found to be invalid + */ +static int x509_crt_verify_chain( + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + /* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can + * catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t *flags; + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; + mbedtls_x509_crt *child; + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; + int parent_is_trusted; + int child_is_trusted; + int signature_is_good; + unsigned self_cnt; + mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* resume if we had an operation in progress */ + if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->in_progress == x509_crt_rs_find_parent ) + { + /* restore saved state */ + *ver_chain = rs_ctx->ver_chain; /* struct copy */ + self_cnt = rs_ctx->self_cnt; + + /* restore derived state */ + cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1]; + child = cur->crt; + flags = &cur->flags; + + goto find_parent; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + child = crt; + self_cnt = 0; + parent_is_trusted = 0; + child_is_trusted = 0; + + while( 1 ) { + /* Add certificate to the verification chain */ + cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len]; + cur->crt = child; + cur->flags = 0; + ver_chain->len++; + flags = &cur->flags; + + /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */ + if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED; + + if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE; + + /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */ + if( child_is_trusted ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */ + if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD; + + if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, child->sig_pk ) != 0 ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; + + /* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */ + if( ver_chain->len == 1 && + x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +find_parent: +#endif + + /* Obtain list of potential trusted signers from CA callback, + * or use statically provided list. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if( f_ca_cb != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); + mbedtls_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); + ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; + + ret = f_ca_cb( p_ca_cb, child, &ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + + cur_trust_ca = ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result; + } + else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + { + ((void) f_ca_cb); + ((void) p_ca_cb); + cur_trust_ca = trust_ca; + } + + /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */ + ret = x509_crt_find_parent( child, cur_trust_ca, &parent, + &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good, + ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + { + /* save state */ + rs_ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_find_parent; + rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt; + rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */ + + return( ret ); + } +#else + (void) ret; +#endif + + /* No parent? We're done here */ + if( parent == NULL ) + { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; + return( 0 ); + } + + /* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs. + * These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO], + * and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */ + if( ver_chain->len != 1 && + x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 ) + { + self_cnt++; + } + + /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA, + * and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */ + if( ! parent_is_trusted && + ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA ) + { + /* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */ + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + } + + /* signature was checked while searching parent */ + if( ! signature_is_good ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; + + /* check size of signing key */ + if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &parent->pk ) != 0 ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */ + *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl( child, parent, ca_crl, profile ); +#else + (void) ca_crl; +#endif + + /* prepare for next iteration */ + child = parent; + parent = NULL; + child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted; + signature_is_good = 0; + } +} + +/* + * Check for CN match + */ +static int x509_crt_check_cn( const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len ) +{ + /* try exact match */ + if( name->len == cn_len && + x509_memcasecmp( cn, name->p, cn_len ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* try wildcard match */ + if( x509_check_wildcard( cn, name ) == 0 ) + { + return( 0 ); + } + + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Check for SAN match, see RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6 + */ +static int x509_crt_check_san( const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len ) +{ + const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) name->tag & + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; + + /* dNSName */ + if( san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ) + return( x509_crt_check_cn( name, cn, cn_len ) ); + + /* (We may handle other types here later.) */ + + /* Unrecognized type */ + return( -1 ); +} + +/* + * Verify the requested CN - only call this if cn is not NULL! + */ +static void x509_crt_verify_name( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const char *cn, + uint32_t *flags ) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_name *name; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur; + size_t cn_len = strlen( cn ); + + if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME ) + { + for( cur = &crt->subject_alt_names; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) + { + if( x509_crt_check_san( &cur->buf, cn, cn_len ) == 0 ) + break; + } + + if( cur == NULL ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; + } + else + { + for( name = &crt->subject; name != NULL; name = name->next ) + { + if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid ) == 0 && + x509_crt_check_cn( &name->val, cn, cn_len ) == 0 ) + { + break; + } + } + + if( name == NULL ) + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; + } +} + +/* + * Merge the flags for all certs in the chain, after calling callback + */ +static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( + uint32_t *flags, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned i; + uint32_t cur_flags; + const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; + + for( i = ver_chain->len; i != 0; --i ) + { + cur = &ver_chain->items[i-1]; + cur_flags = cur->flags; + + if( NULL != f_vrfy ) + if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, cur->crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + *flags |= cur_flags; + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version + * + * This function: + * - checks the requested CN (if any) + * - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key, + * as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently + * - builds and verifies the chain + * - then calls the callback and merges the flags + * + * The parameters pairs `trust_ca`, `ca_crl` and `f_ca_cb`, `p_ca_cb` + * are mutually exclusive: If `f_ca_cb != NULL`, it will be used by the + * verification routine to search for trusted signers, and CRLs will + * be disabled. Otherwise, `trust_ca` will be used as the static list + * of trusted signers, and `ca_crl` will be use as the static list + * of CRLs. + */ +static int x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain; + uint32_t ee_flags; + + *flags = 0; + ee_flags = 0; + x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ver_chain ); + + if( profile == NULL ) + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + + /* check name if requested */ + if( cn != NULL ) + x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, &ee_flags ); + + /* Check the type and size of the key */ + pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk ); + + if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 ) + ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; + + if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &crt->pk ) != 0 ) + ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + + /* Check the chain */ + ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, profile, + &ver_chain, rs_ctx ); + + if( ret != 0 ) + goto exit; + + /* Merge end-entity flags */ + ver_chain.items[0].flags |= ee_flags; + + /* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */ + ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); + +exit: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result ); + mbedtls_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result ); + ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( rs_ctx ); +#endif + + /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by + * the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the + * callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */ + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ) + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; + + if( ret != 0 ) + { + *flags = (uint32_t) -1; + return( ret ); + } + + if( *flags != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ); + + return( 0 ); +} + + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, + cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); +} + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, CA callback, + * not restartable). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, NULL, NULL, + f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx ) +{ + return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx ) ); +} + + +/* + * Initialize a certificate chain + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_init( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) +{ + memset( crt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate all certificate data + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_cur = crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_prv; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; + mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur; + mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv; + + if( crt == NULL ) + return; + + do + { + mbedtls_pk_free( &cert_cur->pk ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + mbedtls_free( cert_cur->sig_opts ); +#endif + + name_cur = cert_cur->issuer.next; + while( name_cur != NULL ) + { + name_prv = name_cur; + name_cur = name_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) ); + mbedtls_free( name_prv ); + } + + name_cur = cert_cur->subject.next; + while( name_cur != NULL ) + { + name_prv = name_cur; + name_cur = name_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) ); + mbedtls_free( name_prv ); + } + + seq_cur = cert_cur->ext_key_usage.next; + while( seq_cur != NULL ) + { + seq_prv = seq_cur; + seq_cur = seq_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); + } + + seq_cur = cert_cur->subject_alt_names.next; + while( seq_cur != NULL ) + { + seq_prv = seq_cur; + seq_cur = seq_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); + } + + seq_cur = cert_cur->certificate_policies.next; + while( seq_cur != NULL ) + { + seq_prv = seq_cur; + seq_cur = seq_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv, + sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) ); + mbedtls_free( seq_prv ); + } + + if( cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len ); + mbedtls_free( cert_cur->raw.p ); + } + + cert_cur = cert_cur->next; + } + while( cert_cur != NULL ); + + cert_cur = crt; + do + { + cert_prv = cert_cur; + cert_cur = cert_cur->next; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cert_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ); + if( cert_prv != crt ) + mbedtls_free( cert_prv ); + } + while( cert_cur != NULL ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_pk_restart_init( &ctx->pk ); + + ctx->parent = NULL; + ctx->fallback_parent = NULL; + ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0; + + ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1; + + ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_none; + ctx->self_cnt = 0; + x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ctx->ver_chain ); +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_pk_restart_free( &ctx->pk ); + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( ctx ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509_csr.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509_csr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1a22b770 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509_csr.c @@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ +/* + * X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) + * + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) +#include +#endif + +/* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } + */ +static int x509_csr_get_version( unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ver ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 ) + { + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) + { + *ver = 0; + return( 0 ); + } + + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse a CSR in DER format + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params; + + memset( &sig_params, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) ); + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( csr == NULL || buf == NULL || buflen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + mbedtls_x509_csr_init( csr ); + + /* + * first copy the raw DER data + */ + p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len = buflen ); + + if( p == NULL ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + + memcpy( p, buf, buflen ); + + csr->raw.p = p; + csr->raw.len = len; + end = p + len; + + /* + * CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + * certificationRequestInfo CertificationRequestInfo, + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signature BIT STRING + * } + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); + } + + if( len != (size_t) ( end - p ) ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + /* + * CertificationRequestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + */ + csr->cri.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + end = p + len; + csr->cri.len = end - csr->cri.p; + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } + */ + if( ( ret = x509_csr_get_version( &p, end, &csr->version ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( csr->version != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION ); + } + + csr->version++; + + /* + * subject Name + */ + csr->subject_raw.p = p; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &csr->subject ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( ret ); + } + + csr->subject_raw.len = p - csr->subject_raw.p; + + /* + * subjectPKInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, end, &csr->pk ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * attributes [0] Attributes + * + * The list of possible attributes is open-ended, though RFC 2985 + * (PKCS#9) defines a few in section 5.4. We currently don't support any, + * so we just ignore them. This is a safe thing to do as the worst thing + * that could happen is that we issue a certificate that does not match + * the requester's expectations - this cannot cause a violation of our + * signature policies. + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret ) ); + } + + p += len; + + end = csr->raw.p + csr->raw.len; + + /* + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signature BIT STRING + */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &csr->sig_oid, &sig_params ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &csr->sig_oid, &sig_params, + &csr->sig_md, &csr->sig_pk, + &csr->sig_opts ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig( &p, end, &csr->sig ) ) != 0 ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( ret ); + } + + if( p != end ) + { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free( csr ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} + +/* + * Parse a CSR, allowing for PEM or raw DER encoding + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t use_len; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if( csr == NULL || buf == NULL || buflen == 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if( buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' ) + { + mbedtls_pem_init( &pem ); + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + "-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); + if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + { + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem, + "-----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + "-----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len ); + } + + if( ret == 0 ) + { + /* + * Was PEM encoded, parse the result + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( csr, pem.buf, pem.buflen ); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free( &pem ); + if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT ) + return( ret ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + return( mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der( csr, buf, buflen ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load a CSR into the structure + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse( csr, buf, n ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n ); + mbedtls_free( buf ); + + return( ret ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#define BEFORE_COLON 14 +#define BC "14" +/* + * Return an informational string about the CSR. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + char *p; + char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sCSR version : %d", + prefix, csr->version ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &csr->subject ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( p, n, &csr->sig_oid, csr->sig_pk, csr->sig_md, + csr->sig_opts ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON, + mbedtls_pk_get_name( &csr->pk ) ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits\n", prefix, key_size_str, + (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &csr->pk ) ); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return( (int) ( size - n ) ); +} + +/* + * Initialize a CSR + */ +void mbedtls_x509_csr_init( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ) +{ + memset( csr, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_csr) ); +} + +/* + * Unallocate all CSR data + */ +void mbedtls_x509_csr_free( mbedtls_x509_csr *csr ) +{ + mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; + + if( csr == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_pk_free( &csr->pk ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + mbedtls_free( csr->sig_opts ); +#endif + + name_cur = csr->subject.next; + while( name_cur != NULL ) + { + name_prv = name_cur; + name_cur = name_cur->next; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) ); + mbedtls_free( name_prv ); + } + + if( csr->raw.p != NULL ) + { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( csr->raw.p, csr->raw.len ); + mbedtls_free( csr->raw.p ); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( csr, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_csr ) ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509write_crt.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509write_crt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0c5e9918 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509write_crt.c @@ -0,0 +1,543 @@ +/* + * X.509 certificate writing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * References: + * - certificates: RFC 5280, updated by RFC 6818 + * - CSRs: PKCS#10 v1.7 aka RFC 2986 + * - attributes: PKCS#9 v2.0 aka RFC 2985 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_cert ) ); + + mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->serial ); + ctx->version = MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->serial ); + + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->subject ); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->issuer ); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->extensions ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_cert ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + int version ) +{ + ctx->version = version; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + ctx->md_alg = md_alg; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +{ + ctx->subject_key = key; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +{ + ctx->issuer_key = key; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *subject_name ) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( &ctx->subject, subject_name ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *issuer_name ) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( &ctx->issuer, issuer_name ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *serial ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->serial, serial ) ) != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *not_before, + const char *not_after ) +{ + if( strlen( not_before ) != MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1 || + strlen( not_after ) != MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1 ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + } + strncpy( ctx->not_before, not_before, MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN ); + strncpy( ctx->not_after , not_after , MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN ); + ctx->not_before[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1] = 'Z'; + ctx->not_after[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1] = 'Z'; + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, + const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ) +{ + return( mbedtls_x509_set_extension( &ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len, + critical, val, val_len ) ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + int is_ca, int max_pathlen ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[9]; + unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); + size_t len = 0; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof(buf) ); + + if( is_ca && max_pathlen > 127 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); + + if( is_ca ) + { + if( max_pathlen >= 0 ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, + max_pathlen ) ); + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( &c, buf, 1 ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS ), + is_ca, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len ) ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ + unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); + size_t len = 0; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof(buf) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, ctx->subject_key ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_sha1_ret( buf + sizeof( buf ) - len, len, + buf + sizeof( buf ) - 20 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + c = buf + sizeof( buf ) - 20; + len = 20; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ); + + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, + MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER ), + 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ + unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof( buf ); + size_t len = 0; + + memset( buf, 0, sizeof(buf) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( &c, buf, ctx->issuer_key ) ); + + ret = mbedtls_sha1_ret( buf + sizeof( buf ) - len, len, + buf + sizeof( buf ) - 20 ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + c = buf + sizeof( buf ) - 20; + len = 20; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( + ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER ), + 0, buf + sizeof( buf ) - len, len ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned int key_usage ) +{ + unsigned char buf[5] = {0}, ku[2] = {0}; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned int allowed_bits = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY; + + /* Check that nothing other than the allowed flags is set */ + if( ( key_usage & ~allowed_bits ) != 0 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); + + c = buf + 5; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE( key_usage, ku, 0 ); + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, ku, 9 ); + + if( ret < 0 ) + return( ret ); + else if( ret < 3 || ret > 5 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), + 1, c, (size_t)ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char ns_cert_type ) +{ + unsigned char buf[4] = {0}; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + c = buf + 4; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 ); + if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), + 0, c, (size_t)ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509_write_time( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *t, size_t size ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + /* + * write MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME if year < 2050 (2 bytes shorter) + */ + if( t[0] < '2' || ( t[0] == '2' && t[1] == '0' && t[2] < '5' ) ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, + (const unsigned char *) t + 2, + size - 2 ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME ) ); + } + else + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start, + (const unsigned char *) t, + size ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME ) ); + } + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *sig_oid; + size_t sig_oid_len = 0; + unsigned char *c, *c2; + unsigned char hash[64]; + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t sub_len = 0, pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; + + /* + * Prepare data to be signed at the end of the target buffer + */ + c = buf + size; + + /* Signature algorithm needed in TBS, and later for actual signature */ + + /* There's no direct way of extracting a signature algorithm + * (represented as an element of mbedtls_pk_type_t) from a PK instance. */ + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx->issuer_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + else if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx->issuer_key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg( pk_alg, ctx->md_alg, + &sig_oid, &sig_oid_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension + */ + + /* Only for v3 */ + if( ctx->version == MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( &c, + buf, ctx->extensions ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 3 ) ); + } + + /* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( ctx->subject_key, + buf, c - buf ) ); + c -= pub_len; + len += pub_len; + + /* + * Subject ::= Name + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, buf, + ctx->subject ) ); + + /* + * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + * notBefore Time, + * notAfter Time } + */ + sub_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sub_len, + x509_write_time( &c, buf, ctx->not_after, + MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sub_len, + x509_write_time( &c, buf, ctx->not_before, + MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN ) ); + + len += sub_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, sub_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + /* + * Issuer ::= Name + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, buf, + ctx->issuer ) ); + + /* + * Signature ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( &c, buf, + sig_oid, strlen( sig_oid ), 0 ) ); + + /* + * Serial ::= INTEGER + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, + &ctx->serial ) ); + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + */ + + /* Can be omitted for v1 */ + if( ctx->version != MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 ) + { + sub_len = 0; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sub_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, ctx->version ) ); + len += sub_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, sub_len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + /* + * Make signature + */ + + /* Compute hash of CRT. */ + if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, + len, hash ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->issuer_key, ctx->md_alg, + hash, 0, sig, &sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* Move CRT to the front of the buffer to have space + * for the signature. */ + memmove( buf, c, len ); + c = buf + len; + + /* Add signature at the end of the buffer, + * making sure that it doesn't underflow + * into the CRT buffer. */ + c2 = buf + size; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sig_and_oid_len, mbedtls_x509_write_sig( &c2, c, + sig_oid, sig_oid_len, sig, sig_len ) ); + + /* + * Memory layout after this step: + * + * buf c=buf+len c2 buf+size + * [CRT0,...,CRTn, UNUSED, ..., UNUSED, SIG0, ..., SIGm] + */ + + /* Move raw CRT to just before the signature. */ + c = c2 - len; + memmove( c, buf, len ); + + len += sig_and_oid_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +#define PEM_BEGIN_CRT "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" +#define PEM_END_CRT "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem( mbedtls_x509write_cert *crt, + unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( crt, buf, size, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) < 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( PEM_BEGIN_CRT, PEM_END_CRT, + buf + size - ret, ret, + buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509write_csr.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509write_csr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..707dd001 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/x509write_csr.c @@ -0,0 +1,335 @@ +/* + * X.509 Certificate Signing Request writing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +/* + * References: + * - CSRs: PKCS#10 v1.7 aka RFC 2986 + * - attributes: PKCS#9 v2.0 aka RFC 2985 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_csr ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_free( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx ) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->subject ); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list( &ctx->extensions ); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_csr ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg ) +{ + ctx->md_alg = md_alg; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key ) +{ + ctx->key = key; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const char *subject_name ) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( &ctx->subject, subject_name ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len ) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_set_extension( &ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len, + 0, val, val_len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage ) +{ + unsigned char buf[4] = {0}; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + c = buf + 4; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &key_usage, 8 ); + if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ), + c, (size_t)ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + unsigned char ns_cert_type ) +{ + unsigned char buf[4] = {0}; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + c = buf + 4; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring( &c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8 ); + if( ret < 3 || ret > 4 ) + return( ret ); + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ), + c, (size_t)ret ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +static int x509write_csr_der_internal( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t size, + unsigned char *sig, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *sig_oid; + size_t sig_oid_len = 0; + unsigned char *c, *c2; + unsigned char hash[64]; + size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_len; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( ctx->md_alg ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* Write the CSR backwards starting from the end of buf */ + c = buf + size; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_extensions( &c, buf, + ctx->extensions ) ); + + if( len ) + { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( + &c, buf, MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ ) ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( pub_len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der( ctx->key, + buf, c - buf ) ); + c -= pub_len; + len += pub_len; + + /* + * Subject ::= Name + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_x509_write_names( &c, buf, + ctx->subject ) ); + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, 0 ) ); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + /* + * Sign the written CSR data into the sig buffer + * Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + + if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, c, len ) != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + + if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len ) + != PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR ); + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + ret = mbedtls_md( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( ctx->md_alg ), c, len, hash ); + if( ret != 0 ) + return( ret ); +#endif + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx->key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + else if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( ctx->key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + else + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG ); + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg( pk_alg, ctx->md_alg, + &sig_oid, &sig_oid_len ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + /* + * Move the written CSR data to the start of buf to create space for + * writing the signature into buf. + */ + memmove( buf, c, len ); + + /* + * Write sig and its OID into buf backwards from the end of buf. + * Note: mbedtls_x509_write_sig will check for c2 - ( buf + len ) < sig_len + * and return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL if needed. + */ + c2 = buf + size; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( sig_and_oid_len, + mbedtls_x509_write_sig( &c2, buf + len, sig_oid, sig_oid_len, + sig, sig_len ) ); + + /* + * Compact the space between the CSR data and signature by moving the + * CSR data to the start of the signature. + */ + c2 -= len; + memmove( c2, buf, len ); + + /* ASN encode the total size and tag the CSR data with it. */ + len += sig_and_oid_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( &c2, buf, len ) ); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c2, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ); + + /* Zero the unused bytes at the start of buf */ + memset( buf, 0, c2 - buf); + + return( (int) len ); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, + size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char *sig; + + if( ( sig = mbedtls_calloc( 1, MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ) ) == NULL ) + { + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED ); + } + + ret = x509write_csr_der_internal( ctx, buf, size, sig, f_rng, p_rng ); + + mbedtls_free( sig ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#define PEM_BEGIN_CSR "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n" +#define PEM_END_CSR "-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng ) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen = 0; + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( ctx, buf, size, + f_rng, p_rng ) ) < 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + if( ( ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer( PEM_BEGIN_CSR, PEM_END_CSR, + buf + size - ret, + ret, buf, size, &olen ) ) != 0 ) + { + return( ret ); + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/xtea.c b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/xtea.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..28e6972a --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/mbedtls-2.28.2/library/xtea.c @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +/* + * A 32-bit implementation of the XTEA algorithm + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) + +void mbedtls_xtea_init( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ) +{ + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_xtea_context ) ); +} + +void mbedtls_xtea_free( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx ) +{ + if( ctx == NULL ) + return; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_xtea_context ) ); +} + +/* + * XTEA key schedule + */ +void mbedtls_xtea_setup( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[16] ) +{ + int i; + + memset( ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_xtea_context) ); + + for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) + { + ctx->k[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( key, i << 2 ); + } +} + +/* + * XTEA encrypt function + */ +int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, + const unsigned char input[8], unsigned char output[8]) +{ + uint32_t *k, v0, v1, i; + + k = ctx->k; + + v0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 0 ); + v1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE( input, 4 ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT ) + { + uint32_t sum = 0, delta = 0x9E3779B9; + + for( i = 0; i < 32; i++ ) + { + v0 += (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]); + sum += delta; + v1 += (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + k[(sum>>11) & 3]); + } + } + else /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT */ + { + uint32_t delta = 0x9E3779B9, sum = delta * 32; + + for( i = 0; i < 32; i++ ) + { + v1 -= (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + k[(sum>>11) & 3]); + sum -= delta; + v0 -= (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( v0, output, 0 ); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( v1, output, 4 ); + + return( 0 ); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * XTEA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int i; + unsigned char temp[8]; + + if( length % 8 ) + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH ); + + if( mode == MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT ) + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + memcpy( temp, input, 8 ); + mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, input, output ); + + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( output[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + memcpy( iv, temp, 8 ); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + else + { + while( length > 0 ) + { + for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ ) + output[i] = (unsigned char)( input[i] ^ iv[i] ); + + mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( ctx, mode, output, output ); + memcpy( iv, output, 8 ); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + + return( 0 ); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * XTEA tests vectors (non-official) + */ + +static const unsigned char xtea_test_key[6][16] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, + 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, + 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, + 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } +}; + +static const unsigned char xtea_test_pt[6][8] = +{ + { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48 }, + { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, + { 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x6e, 0x27, 0x89, 0x48, 0xd7, 0x7f }, + { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48 }, + { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, + { 0x70, 0xe1, 0x22, 0x5d, 0x6e, 0x4e, 0x76, 0x55 } +}; + +static const unsigned char xtea_test_ct[6][8] = +{ + { 0x49, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0xd0, 0x72, 0x61, 0x2c, 0xb5 }, + { 0xe7, 0x8f, 0x2d, 0x13, 0x74, 0x43, 0x41, 0xd8 }, + { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, + { 0xa0, 0x39, 0x05, 0x89, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0xef, 0xa5 }, + { 0xed, 0x23, 0x37, 0x5a, 0x82, 0x1a, 0x8c, 0x2d }, + { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_xtea_self_test( int verbose ) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char buf[8]; + mbedtls_xtea_context ctx; + + mbedtls_xtea_init( &ctx ); + for( i = 0; i < 6; i++ ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( " XTEA test #%d: ", i + 1 ); + + memcpy( buf, xtea_test_pt[i], 8 ); + + mbedtls_xtea_setup( &ctx, xtea_test_key[i] ); + mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb( &ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT, buf, buf ); + + if( memcmp( buf, xtea_test_ct[i], 8 ) != 0 ) + { + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); + } + + if( verbose != 0 ) + mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); + +exit: + mbedtls_xtea_free( &ctx ); + + return( ret ); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.bazelrc b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.bazelrc new file mode 100644 index 00000000..29223e4d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.bazelrc @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +common --experimental_enable_bzlmod +build --incompatible_enable_cc_toolchain_resolution +build --incompatible_strict_action_env diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.github/workflows/build.yml b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.github/workflows/build.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ae2602d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.github/workflows/build.yml @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ + +name: Build +on: [push, pull_request] + +jobs: + linux: + name: Linux + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v3 + + - name: Autogen + run: ./autogen.sh + + - name: Configure + run: ./configure CPPFLAGS='-Wall -Wextra' --enable-jit --enable-pcre2-8 --enable-pcre2-16 --enable-pcre2-32 + + - name: Build + run: make + + - name: Test (main test script) + run: ./RunTest + + - name: Test (JIT test program) + run: ./pcre2_jit_test + + - name: Test (pcre2grep test script) + run: ./RunGrepTest + + alpine: + name: alpine + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + container: alpine + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v3 + + - name: Setup + run: apk add --no-cache automake autoconf gcc libtool make musl-dev + + - name: Autogen + run: ./autogen.sh + + - name: Configure + run: ./configure CPPFLAGS='-Wall -Wextra' --enable-jit --enable-pcre2-8 --enable-pcre2-16 --enable-pcre2-32 + + - name: Build + run: make + + - name: Test (main test script) + run: ./RunTest + + - name: Test (JIT test program) + run: ./pcre2_jit_test + + - name: Test (pcre2grep test script) + run: ./RunGrepTest + + macos: + name: macOS universal + runs-on: macos-latest + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v3 + + - name: Configure + run: cmake -DPCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT=ON -DPCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16=ON -DPCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32=ON -DCMAKE_OSX_ARCHITECTURES='arm64;x86_64' -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS='-Wall -Wextra' -B build + + - name: Build + run: cmake --build build + + - name: Test (main test script) + run: | + cd build + ../RunTest + + - name: Test (JIT test program) + run: | + cd build + ./pcre2_jit_test + + - name: Test (pcre2grep test script) + run: | + cd build + ../RunGrepTest + + windows: + name: 32bit Windows + runs-on: windows-latest + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v3 + + - name: Configure + run: cmake -DPCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT=ON -DPCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16=ON -DPCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32=ON -DCMAKE_IGNORE_PREFIX_PATH=C:/Strawberry/c -B build -A Win32 + + - name: Build + run: cmake --build build + + - name: Test + run: | + cd build\Debug + ..\..\RunTest.bat + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.github/workflows/cifuzz.yml b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.github/workflows/cifuzz.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8ac7dc25 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.github/workflows/cifuzz.yml @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +name: CIFuzz +on: [pull_request] +jobs: + Fuzzing: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - name: Build Fuzzers + id: build + uses: google/oss-fuzz/infra/cifuzz/actions/build_fuzzers@master + with: + oss-fuzz-project-name: 'pcre2' + dry-run: false + - name: Run Fuzzers + uses: google/oss-fuzz/infra/cifuzz/actions/run_fuzzers@master + with: + oss-fuzz-project-name: 'pcre2' + fuzz-seconds: 300 + dry-run: false + - name: Upload Crash + uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3 + if: failure() && steps.build.outcome == 'success' + with: + name: artifacts + path: ./out/artifacts diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.github/workflows/codeql.yml b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.github/workflows/codeql.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3d0e8910 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.github/workflows/codeql.yml @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +# For most projects, this workflow file will not need changing; you simply need +# to commit it to your repository. +# +# You may wish to alter this file to override the set of languages analyzed, +# or to provide custom queries or build logic. +# +# ******** NOTE ******** +# We have attempted to detect the languages in your repository. Please check +# the `language` matrix defined below to confirm you have the correct set of +# supported CodeQL languages. +# +name: "CodeQL" + +on: + push: + branches: [ master ] + pull_request: + # The branches below must be a subset of the branches above + branches: [ master ] + schedule: + - cron: '27 6 * * 4' + +# Declare default permissions as read only. +permissions: read-all + +jobs: + analyze: + name: Analyze + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + permissions: + actions: read + contents: read + security-events: write + + strategy: + fail-fast: false + matrix: + language: [ 'cpp', 'python' ] + # CodeQL supports [ 'cpp', 'csharp', 'go', 'java', 'javascript', 'python', 'ruby' ] + # Learn more about CodeQL language support at https://git.io/codeql-language-support + + steps: + - name: Checkout repository + uses: actions/checkout@v3 + + # Initializes the CodeQL tools for scanning. + - name: Initialize CodeQL + uses: github/codeql-action/init@v2 + with: + languages: ${{ matrix.language }} + # If you wish to specify custom queries, you can do so here or in a config file. + # By default, queries listed here will override any specified in a config file. + # Prefix the list here with "+" to use these queries and those in the config file. + # queries: ./path/to/local/query, your-org/your-repo/queries@main + + # Autobuild attempts to build any compiled languages (C/C++, C#, or Java). + # If this step fails, then you should remove it and run the build manually (see below) + - name: Autobuild + uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@v2 + + # ℹ️ Command-line programs to run using the OS shell. + # 📚 https://git.io/JvXDl + + # ✏️ If the Autobuild fails above, remove it and uncomment the following three lines + # and modify them (or add more) to build your code if your project + # uses a compiled language + + #- run: | + # make bootstrap + # make release + + - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis + uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v2 diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.github/workflows/scorecards.yml b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.github/workflows/scorecards.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..690f1915 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/.github/workflows/scorecards.yml @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +name: Scorecards supply-chain security +on: + # Only the default branch is supported. + branch_protection_rule: + schedule: + - cron: '23 17 * * 1' + push: + branches: [ master ] + +# Declare default permissions as read only. +permissions: read-all + +jobs: + analysis: + name: Scorecards analysis + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + permissions: + # Needed to upload the results to code-scanning dashboard. + security-events: write + actions: read + contents: read + + steps: + - name: "Checkout code" + uses: actions/checkout@v3 + with: + persist-credentials: false + + - name: "Run analysis" + uses: ossf/scorecard-action@c1aec4ac820532bab364f02a81873c555a0ba3a1 # v1.0.4 + with: + results_file: results.sarif + results_format: sarif + # Read-only PAT token. To create it, + # follow the steps in https://github.com/ossf/scorecard-action#pat-token-creation. + repo_token: ${{ secrets.SCORECARD_READ_TOKEN }} + # Publish the results to enable scorecard badges. For more details, see + # https://github.com/ossf/scorecard-action#publishing-results. + # For private repositories, `publish_results` will automatically be set to `false`, + # regardless of the value entered here. + publish_results: true + + # Upload the results as artifacts (optional). + - name: "Upload artifact" + uses: actions/upload-artifact@82c141cc518b40d92cc801eee768e7aafc9c2fa2 # v2.3.1 + with: + name: SARIF file + path: results.sarif + retention-days: 5 + + # Upload the results to GitHub's code scanning dashboard. + - name: "Upload to code-scanning" + uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@5f532563584d71fdef14ee64d17bafb34f751ce5 # v1.0.26 + with: + sarif_file: results.sarif diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/132html b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/132html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..30c02fe8 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/132html @@ -0,0 +1,314 @@ +#! /usr/bin/perl -w + +# Script to turn PCRE2 man pages into HTML + + +# Subroutine to handle font changes and other escapes + +sub do_line { +my($s) = $_[0]; + +$s =~ s/ +$s =~ s/>/>/g; +$s =~ s"\\fI(.*?)\\f[RP]"$1"g; +$s =~ s"\\fB(.*?)\\f[RP]"$1"g; +$s =~ s"\\e"\\"g; +$s =~ s/(?<=Copyright )\(c\)/©/g; +$s; +} + +# Subroutine to ensure not in a paragraph + +sub end_para { +if ($inpara) + { + print TEMP "\n" if ($inpre); + print TEMP "

\n"; + } +$inpara = $inpre = 0; +$wrotetext = 0; +} + +# Subroutine to start a new paragraph + +sub new_para { +&end_para(); +print TEMP "

\n"; +$inpara = 1; +} + + +# Main program + +$innf = 0; +$inpara = 0; +$inpre = 0; +$wrotetext = 0; +$toc = 0; +$ref = 1; + +while ($#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[0] =~ /^-/) + { + $toc = 1 if $ARGV[0] eq "-toc"; + shift; + } + +# Initial output to STDOUT + +print < + +$ARGV[0] specification + + +

$ARGV[0] man page

+

+Return to the PCRE2 index page. +

+

+This page is part of the PCRE2 HTML documentation. It was generated +automatically from the original man page. If there is any nonsense in it, +please consult the man page, in case the conversion went wrong. +
+End + +print "

    \n" if ($toc); + +open(TEMP, ">/tmp/$$") || die "Can't open /tmp/$$ for output\n"; + +while () + { + # Handle lines beginning with a dot + + if (/^\./) + { + # Some of the PCRE2 man pages used to contain instances of .br. However, + # they should have all been removed because they cause trouble in some + # (other) automated systems that translate man pages to HTML. Complain if + # we find .br or .in (another macro that is deprecated). + + if (/^\.br/ || /^\.in/) + { + print STDERR "\n*** Deprecated macro encountered - rewrite needed\n"; + print STDERR "*** $_\n"; + die "*** Processing abandoned\n"; + } + + # Instead of .br, relevant "literal" sections are enclosed in .nf/.fi. + + elsif (/^\.nf/) + { + $innf = 1; + } + + elsif (/^\.fi/) + { + $innf = 0; + } + + # Handling .sp is subtle. If it is inside a literal section, do nothing if + # the next line is a non literal text line; similarly, if not inside a + # literal section, do nothing if a literal follows, unless we are inside + # a .nf/.fi section or about to enter one. The point being that the
    +    # and 
    that delimit literal sections will do the spacing. Always skip + # if no previous output. + + elsif (/^\.sp/) + { + if ($wrotetext) + { + $_ = ; + if ($inpre) + { + print TEMP "\n" if (/^[\s.]/); + } + else + { + print TEMP "
    \n
    \n" if ($innf || /^\.nf/ || !/^[\s.]/); + } + redo; # Now process the lookahead line we just read + } + } + elsif (/^\.TP/ || /^\.PP/ || /^\.P/) + { + &new_para(); + } + elsif (/^\.SH\s*("?)(.*)\1/) + { + # Ignore the NAME section + if ($2 =~ /^NAME\b/) + { + ; + next; + } + + &end_para(); + my($title) = &do_line($2); + if ($toc) + { + printf("
  • $title\n", + $ref, $ref); + printf TEMP ("
    $title
    \n", + $ref); + $ref++; + } + else + { + print TEMP "
    \n$title\n
    \n"; + } + } + elsif (/^\.SS\s*("?)(.*)\1/) + { + &end_para(); + my($title) = &do_line($2); + print TEMP "
    \n$title\n
    \n"; + } + elsif (/^\.B\s*(.*)/) + { + &new_para() if (!$inpara); + $_ = &do_line($1); + s/"(.*?)"/$1/g; + print TEMP "$_\n"; + $wrotetext = 1; + } + elsif (/^\.I\s*(.*)/) + { + &new_para() if (!$inpara); + $_ = &do_line($1); + s/"(.*?)"/$1/g; + print TEMP "$_\n"; + $wrotetext = 1; + } + + # A comment that starts "HREF" takes the next line as a name that + # is turned into a hyperlink, using the text given, which might be + # in a special font. If it ends in () or (digits) or punctuation, they + # aren't part of the link. + + elsif (/^\.\\"\s*HREF/) + { + $_=; + chomp; + $_ = &do_line($_); + $_ =~ s/\s+$//; + $_ =~ /^(?:<.>)?([^<(]+)(?:\(\))?(?:<\/.>)?(?:\(\d+\))?[.,;:]?$/; + print TEMP "$_\n"; + } + + # A comment that starts "HTML" inserts literal HTML + + elsif (/^\.\\"\s*HTML\s*(.*)/) + { + print TEMP $1; + } + + # A comment that starts < inserts that HTML at the end of the + # *next* input line - so as not to get a newline between them. + + elsif (/^\.\\"\s*(<.*>)/) + { + my($markup) = $1; + $_=; + chomp; + $_ = &do_line($_); + $_ =~ s/\s+$//; + print TEMP "$_$markup\n"; + } + + # A comment that starts JOIN joins the next two lines together, with one + # space between them. Then that line is processed. This is used in some + # displays where two lines are needed for the "man" version. JOINSH works + # the same, except that it assumes this is a shell command, so removes + # continuation backslashes. + + elsif (/^\.\\"\s*JOIN(SH)?/) + { + my($one,$two); + $one = ; + $two = ; + $one =~ s/\s*\\e\s*$// if (defined($1)); + chomp($one); + $two =~ s/^\s+//; + $_ = "$one $two"; + redo; # Process the joined lines + } + + # .EX/.EE are used in the pcre2demo page to bracket the entire program, + # which is unmodified except for turning backslash into "\e". + + elsif (/^\.EX\s*$/) + { + print TEMP "
    \n";
    +      while ()
    +        {
    +        last if /^\.EE\s*$/;
    +        s/\\e/\\/g;
    +        s/&/&/g;
    +        s//>/g;
    +        print TEMP;
    +        }
    +      }
    +
    +    # Ignore anything not recognized
    +
    +    next;
    +    }
    +
    +  # Line does not begin with a dot. Replace blank lines with new paragraphs
    +
    +  if (/^\s*$/)
    +    {
    +    &end_para() if ($wrotetext);
    +    next;
    +    }
    +
    +  # Convert fonts changes and output an ordinary line. Ensure that indented
    +  # lines are marked as literal.
    +
    +  $_ = &do_line($_);
    +  &new_para() if (!$inpara);
    +
    +  if (/^\s/)
    +    {
    +    if (!$inpre)
    +      {
    +      print TEMP "
    \n";
    +      $inpre = 1;
    +      }
    +    }
    +  elsif ($inpre)
    +    {
    +    print TEMP "
    \n"; + $inpre = 0; + } + + # Add
    to the end of a non-literal line if we are within .nf/.fi + + $_ .= "
    \n" if (!$inpre && $innf); + + print TEMP; + $wrotetext = 1; + } + +# The TOC, if present, will have been written - terminate it + +print "
\n" if ($toc); + +# Copy the remainder to the standard output + +close(TEMP); +open(TEMP, "/tmp/$$") || die "Can't open /tmp/$$ for input\n"; + +print while (); + +print < +Return to the PCRE2 index page. +

+End + +close(TEMP); +unlink("/tmp/$$"); + +# End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/AUTHORS b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/AUTHORS new file mode 100644 index 00000000..11ef898b --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/AUTHORS @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +THE MAIN PCRE2 LIBRARY CODE +--------------------------- + +Written by: Philip Hazel +Email local part: Philip.Hazel +Email domain: gmail.com + +Retired from University of Cambridge Computing Service, +Cambridge, England. + +Copyright (c) 1997-2022 University of Cambridge +All rights reserved + + +PCRE2 JUST-IN-TIME COMPILATION SUPPORT +-------------------------------------- + +Written by: Zoltan Herczeg +Email local part: hzmester +Emain domain: freemail.hu + +Copyright(c) 2010-2022 Zoltan Herczeg +All rights reserved. + + +STACK-LESS JUST-IN-TIME COMPILER +-------------------------------- + +Written by: Zoltan Herczeg +Email local part: hzmester +Emain domain: freemail.hu + +Copyright(c) 2009-2022 Zoltan Herczeg +All rights reserved. + +#### diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/BUILD.bazel b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/BUILD.bazel new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1bd314ef --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/BUILD.bazel @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +load("@rules_cc//cc:defs.bzl", "cc_library", "cc_test") +load("@bazel_skylib//rules:copy_file.bzl", "copy_file") + +copy_file( + name = "config_h_generic", + src = "src/config.h.generic", + out = "src/config.h", +) + +copy_file( + name = "pcre2_h_generic", + src = "src/pcre2.h.generic", + out = "src/pcre2.h", +) + +copy_file( + name = "pcre2_chartables_c", + src = "src/pcre2_chartables.c.dist", + out = "src/pcre2_chartables.c", +) + +cc_library( + name = "pcre2", + srcs = [ + "src/pcre2_auto_possess.c", + "src/pcre2_compile.c", + "src/pcre2_config.c", + "src/pcre2_context.c", + "src/pcre2_convert.c", + "src/pcre2_dfa_match.c", + "src/pcre2_error.c", + "src/pcre2_extuni.c", + "src/pcre2_find_bracket.c", + "src/pcre2_maketables.c", + "src/pcre2_match.c", + "src/pcre2_match_data.c", + "src/pcre2_newline.c", + "src/pcre2_ord2utf.c", + "src/pcre2_pattern_info.c", + "src/pcre2_script_run.c", + "src/pcre2_serialize.c", + "src/pcre2_string_utils.c", + "src/pcre2_study.c", + "src/pcre2_substitute.c", + "src/pcre2_substring.c", + "src/pcre2_tables.c", + "src/pcre2_ucd.c", + "src/pcre2_ucptables.c", + "src/pcre2_valid_utf.c", + "src/pcre2_xclass.c", + ":pcre2_chartables_c", + ], + hdrs = glob(["src/*.h"]) + [ + ":config_h_generic", + ":pcre2_h_generic", + ], + defines = [ + "HAVE_CONFIG_H", + "PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=8", + "PCRE2_STATIC", + ], + includes = ["src"], + strip_include_prefix = "src", + visibility = ["//visibility:public"], +) + +cc_binary( + name = "pcre2demo", + srcs = ["src/pcre2demo.c"], + visibility = ["//visibility:public"], + deps = [":pcre2"], +) diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/CMakeLists.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cec7dfb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1201 @@ +# CMakeLists.txt +# +# This file enables PCRE2 to be built with the CMake configuration and build +# tool. Download CMake in source or binary form from http://www.cmake.org/ +# Converted to support PCRE2 from the original PCRE file, August 2014. +# +# Original listfile by Christian Ehrlicher +# Refined and expanded by Daniel Richard G. +# 2007-09-14 mod by Sheri so 7.4 supported configuration options can be entered +# 2007-09-19 Adjusted by PH to retain previous default settings +# 2007-12-26 (a) On UNIX, use names libpcre instead of just pcre +# (b) Ensure pcretest and pcregrep link with the local library, +# not a previously-installed one. +# (c) Add PCRE_SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE, PCRE_SUPPORT_LIBZ, and +# PCRE_SUPPORT_LIBBZ2. +# 2008-01-20 Brought up to date to include several new features by Christian +# Ehrlicher. +# 2008-01-22 Sheri added options for backward compatibility of library names +# when building with minGW: +# if "ON", NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX causes shared libraries to +# be built without "lib" as prefix. (The libraries will be named +# pcre.dll, pcreposix.dll and pcrecpp.dll). +# if "ON", NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX causes shared libraries to +# be built with suffix of "-0.dll". (The libraries will be named +# libpcre-0.dll, libpcreposix-0.dll and libpcrecpp-0.dll - same names +# built by default with Configure and Make. +# 2008-01-23 PH removed the automatic build of pcredemo. +# 2008-04-22 PH modified READLINE support so it finds NCURSES when needed. +# 2008-07-03 PH updated for revised UCP property support (change of files) +# 2009-03-23 PH applied Steven Van Ingelgem's patch to change the name +# CMAKE_BINARY_DIR to PROJECT_BINARY_DIR so that it works when PCRE +# is included within another project. +# 2009-03-23 PH applied a modified version of Steven Van Ingelgem's patches to +# add options to stop the building of pcregrep and the tests, and +# to disable the final configuration report. +# 2009-04-11 PH applied Christian Ehrlicher's patch to show compiler flags that +# are set by specifying a release type. +# 2010-01-02 PH added test for stdint.h +# 2010-03-02 PH added test for inttypes.h +# 2011-08-01 PH added PCREGREP_BUFSIZE +# 2011-08-22 PH added PCRE_SUPPORT_JIT +# 2011-09-06 PH modified WIN32 ADD_TEST line as suggested by Sergey Cherepanov +# 2011-09-06 PH added PCRE_SUPPORT_PCREGREP_JIT +# 2011-10-04 Sheri added support for including coff data in windows shared libraries +# compiled with MINGW if pcre.rc and/or pcreposix.rc are placed in +# the source dir by the user prior to building +# 2011-10-04 Sheri changed various add_test's to use exes' location built instead +# of DEBUG location only (likely only matters in MSVC) +# 2011-10-04 Sheri added scripts to provide needed variables to RunTest and +# RunGrepTest (used for UNIX and Msys) +# 2011-10-04 Sheri added scripts to provide needed variables and to execute +# RunTest.bat in Win32 (for effortless testing with "make test") +# 2011-10-04 Sheri Increased minimum required cmake version +# 2012-01-06 PH removed pcre_info.c and added pcre_string_utils.c +# 2012-01-10 Zoltan Herczeg added libpcre16 support +# 2012-01-13 Stephen Kelly added out of source build support +# 2012-01-17 PH applied Stephen Kelly's patch to parse the version data out +# of the configure.ac file +# 2012-02-26 PH added support for libedit +# 2012-09-06 PH added support for PCRE_EBCDIC_NL25 +# 2012-09-08 ChPe added PCRE32 support +# 2012-10-23 PH added support for VALGRIND and GCOV +# 2012-12-08 PH added patch from Daniel Richard G to quash some MSVC warnings +# 2013-07-01 PH realized that the "support" for GCOV was a total nonsense and +# so it has been removed. +# 2013-10-08 PH got rid of the "source" command, which is a bash-ism (use ".") +# 2013-11-05 PH added support for PARENS_NEST_LIMIT +# 2014-08-29 PH converted the file for PCRE2 (which has no C++). +# 2015-04-24 PH added support for PCRE2_DEBUG +# 2015-07-16 PH updated for new pcre2_find_bracket source module +# 2015-08-24 PH correct C_FLAGS setting (patch from Roy Ivy III) +# 2015-10=16 PH added support for never-backslash-C +# 2016-03-01 PH applied Chris Wilson's patch for MSVC static +# 2016-06-24 PH applied Chris Wilson's second patch, putting the first under +# a new option instead of being unconditional. +# 2016-10-05 PH fixed a typo (PCRE should be PCRE2) in above patch +# fix by David Gaussmann +# 2016-10-07 PH added PCREGREP_MAX_BUFSIZE +# 2017-03-11 PH turned HEAP_MATCH_RECURSE into a NO-OP for 10.30 +# 2017-04-08 PH added HEAP_LIMIT +# 2017-06-15 ZH added SUPPORT_JIT_SEALLOC support +# 2018-06-19 PH added checks for stdint.h and inttypes.h (later removed) +# 2018-06-27 PH added Daniel's patch to increase the stack for MSVC +# 2018-11-14 PH removed unnecessary checks for stdint.h and inttypes.h +# 2018-11-16 PH added PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_CALLOUT_FORK support and tidied +# 2019-02-16 PH hacked to avoid CMP0026 policy issue (see comments below) +# 2020-03-16 PH renamed dftables as pcre2_dftables (as elsewhere) +# 2020-03-24 PH changed CMAKE_MODULE_PATH definition to add, not replace +# 2020-04-08 Carlo added function check for secure_getenv, fixed strerror +# 2020-04-16 enh added check for __attribute__((uninitialized)) +# 2020-04-25 PH applied patches from Uwe Korn to support pkg-config and +# library versioning. +# 2020-04-25 Carlo added function check for mkostemp used in ProtExecAllocator +# 2020-04-28 PH added function check for memfd_create based on Carlo's patch +# 2020-05-25 PH added a check for Intel CET +# 2020-12-03 PH altered the definition of pcre2test as suggested by Daniel +# 2021-06-29 JWSB added the option to build static library with PIC. +# 2021-07-05 JWSB modified such both the static and shared library can be +# build in one go. +# 2021-08-28 PH increased minimum version +# 2021-08-28 PH added test for realpath() +# 2022-12-10 PH added support for pcre2posix_test + +# Increased minimum to 2.8.5 to support GNUInstallDirs. +# Increased minimum to 3.1 to support imported targets. +CMAKE_MINIMUM_REQUIRED(VERSION 3.1) +PROJECT(PCRE2 C) + +# Set policy CMP0026 to avoid warnings for the use of LOCATION in +# GET_TARGET_PROPERTY. This should no longer be required. +# CMAKE_POLICY(SET CMP0026 OLD) + +# With a recent cmake, you can provide a rootdir to look for non +# standard installed library dependencies, but to do so, the policy +# needs to be set to new (by uncommenting the following) +# CMAKE_POLICY(SET CMP0074 NEW) + +# For FindReadline.cmake. This was changed to allow setting CMAKE_MODULE_PATH +# on the command line. +# SET(CMAKE_MODULE_PATH ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake) + +LIST(APPEND CMAKE_MODULE_PATH ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake) + +INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/src) + +# external packages +FIND_PACKAGE( BZip2 ) +FIND_PACKAGE( ZLIB ) +FIND_PACKAGE( Readline ) +FIND_PACKAGE( Editline ) + +# Configuration checks + +INCLUDE(CheckCSourceCompiles) +INCLUDE(CheckFunctionExists) +INCLUDE(CheckSymbolExists) +INCLUDE(CheckIncludeFile) +INCLUDE(CheckTypeSize) +INCLUDE(GNUInstallDirs) # for CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR + +CHECK_INCLUDE_FILE(dirent.h HAVE_DIRENT_H) +CHECK_INCLUDE_FILE(sys/stat.h HAVE_SYS_STAT_H) +CHECK_INCLUDE_FILE(sys/types.h HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H) +CHECK_INCLUDE_FILE(unistd.h HAVE_UNISTD_H) +CHECK_INCLUDE_FILE(windows.h HAVE_WINDOWS_H) + +CHECK_SYMBOL_EXISTS(bcopy "strings.h" HAVE_BCOPY) +CHECK_SYMBOL_EXISTS(memfd_create "sys/mman.h" HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE) +CHECK_SYMBOL_EXISTS(memmove "string.h" HAVE_MEMMOVE) +CHECK_SYMBOL_EXISTS(secure_getenv "stdlib.h" HAVE_SECURE_GETENV) +CHECK_SYMBOL_EXISTS(strerror "string.h" HAVE_STRERROR) + +CHECK_C_SOURCE_COMPILES( + "#include + #include + int main(int c, char *v[]) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; realpath(v[1], buf); return 0; }" + HAVE_REALPATH +) + +set(ORIG_CMAKE_REQUIRED_FLAGS ${CMAKE_REQUIRED_FLAGS}) +set(CMAKE_REQUIRED_FLAGS "${CMAKE_REQUIRED_FLAGS} -Werror") +CHECK_C_SOURCE_COMPILES( + "int main() { char buf[128] __attribute__((uninitialized)); (void)buf; return 0; }" + HAVE_ATTRIBUTE_UNINITIALIZED +) +set(CMAKE_REQUIRED_FLAGS ${ORIG_CMAKE_REQUIRED_FLAGS}) + +# Check whether Intel CET is enabled, and if so, adjust compiler flags. This +# code was written by PH, trying to imitate the logic from the autotools +# configuration. + +CHECK_C_SOURCE_COMPILES( + "#ifndef __CET__ + #error CET is not enabled + #endif + int main() { return 0; }" + INTEL_CET_ENABLED +) + +IF (INTEL_CET_ENABLED) + SET(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -mshstk") +ENDIF(INTEL_CET_ENABLED) + + + +# User-configurable options +# +# Note: CMakeSetup displays these in alphabetical order, regardless of +# the order we use here. + +SET(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS OFF CACHE BOOL "Build shared libraries.") + +OPTION(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS "Build static libraries." ON) + +OPTION(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8 "Build 8 bit PCRE2 library" ON) + +OPTION(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16 "Build 16 bit PCRE2 library" OFF) + +OPTION(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32 "Build 32 bit PCRE2 library" OFF) + +OPTION(PCRE2_STATIC_PIC "Build the static library with the option position independent code enabled." OFF) + +OPTION(PCRE2_DEBUG "Include debugging code" OFF) + +OPTION(PCRE2_DISABLE_PERCENT_ZT "Disable the use of %zu and %td (rarely needed)" OFF) + +SET(PCRE2_EBCDIC OFF CACHE BOOL + "Use EBCDIC coding instead of ASCII. (This is rarely used outside of mainframe systems.)") + +SET(PCRE2_EBCDIC_NL25 OFF CACHE BOOL + "Use 0x25 as EBCDIC NL character instead of 0x15; implies EBCDIC.") + +SET(PCRE2_LINK_SIZE "2" CACHE STRING + "Internal link size (2, 3 or 4 allowed). See LINK_SIZE in config.h.in for details.") + +SET(PCRE2_PARENS_NEST_LIMIT "250" CACHE STRING + "Default nested parentheses limit. See PARENS_NEST_LIMIT in config.h.in for details.") + +SET(PCRE2_HEAP_LIMIT "20000000" CACHE STRING + "Default limit on heap memory (kibibytes). See HEAP_LIMIT in config.h.in for details.") + +SET(PCRE2_MATCH_LIMIT "10000000" CACHE STRING + "Default limit on internal looping. See MATCH_LIMIT in config.h.in for details.") + +SET(PCRE2_MATCH_LIMIT_DEPTH "MATCH_LIMIT" CACHE STRING + "Default limit on internal depth of search. See MATCH_LIMIT_DEPTH in config.h.in for details.") + +SET(PCRE2GREP_BUFSIZE "20480" CACHE STRING + "Buffer starting size parameter for pcre2grep. See PCRE2GREP_BUFSIZE in config.h.in for details.") + +SET(PCRE2GREP_MAX_BUFSIZE "1048576" CACHE STRING + "Buffer maximum size parameter for pcre2grep. See PCRE2GREP_MAX_BUFSIZE in config.h.in for details.") + +SET(PCRE2_NEWLINE "LF" CACHE STRING + "What to recognize as a newline (one of CR, LF, CRLF, ANY, ANYCRLF, NUL).") + +SET(PCRE2_HEAP_MATCH_RECURSE OFF CACHE BOOL + "Obsolete option: do not use") + +SET(PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT OFF CACHE BOOL + "Enable support for Just-in-time compiling.") + +IF(${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME} MATCHES Linux|NetBSD) + SET(PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT_SEALLOC OFF CACHE BOOL + "Enable SELinux compatible execmem allocator in JIT (experimental).") +ELSE(${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME} MATCHES Linux|NetBSD) + SET(PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT_SEALLOC IGNORE) +ENDIF(${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME} MATCHES Linux|NetBSD) + +SET(PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_JIT ON CACHE BOOL + "Enable use of Just-in-time compiling in pcre2grep.") + +SET(PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_CALLOUT ON CACHE BOOL + "Enable callout string support in pcre2grep.") + +SET(PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_CALLOUT_FORK ON CACHE BOOL + "Enable callout string fork support in pcre2grep.") + +SET(PCRE2_SUPPORT_UNICODE ON CACHE BOOL + "Enable support for Unicode and UTF-8/UTF-16/UTF-32 encoding.") + +SET(PCRE2_SUPPORT_BSR_ANYCRLF OFF CACHE BOOL + "ON=Backslash-R matches only LF CR and CRLF, OFF=Backslash-R matches all Unicode Linebreaks") + +SET(PCRE2_NEVER_BACKSLASH_C OFF CACHE BOOL + "If ON, backslash-C (upper case C) is locked out.") + +SET(PCRE2_SUPPORT_VALGRIND OFF CACHE BOOL + "Enable Valgrind support.") + +OPTION(PCRE2_SHOW_REPORT "Show the final configuration report" ON) +OPTION(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP "Build pcre2grep" ON) +OPTION(PCRE2_BUILD_TESTS "Build the tests" ON) + +IF (MINGW) + OPTION(NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX + "ON=Shared libraries built in mingw will be named pcre2.dll, etc., instead of libpcre2.dll, etc." + OFF) + + OPTION(NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX + "ON=Shared libraries built in mingw will be named libpcre2-0.dll, etc., instead of libpcre2.dll, etc." + OFF) +ENDIF(MINGW) + +IF(MSVC) + OPTION(PCRE2_STATIC_RUNTIME + "ON=Compile against the static runtime (/MT)." + OFF) + OPTION(INSTALL_MSVC_PDB + "ON=Install .pdb files built by MSVC, if generated" + OFF) +ENDIF(MSVC) + +# bzip2 lib +IF(BZIP2_FOUND) + OPTION (PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBBZ2 "Enable support for linking pcre2grep with libbz2." ON) +ENDIF(BZIP2_FOUND) +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBBZ2) + INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(${BZIP2_INCLUDE_DIR}) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBBZ2) + +# zlib +IF(ZLIB_FOUND) + OPTION (PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBZ "Enable support for linking pcre2grep with libz." ON) +ENDIF(ZLIB_FOUND) +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBZ) + INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(${ZLIB_INCLUDE_DIR}) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBZ) + +# editline lib +IF(EDITLINE_FOUND) + OPTION (PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBEDIT "Enable support for linking pcre2test with libedit." OFF) +ENDIF(EDITLINE_FOUND) +IF(EDITLINE_FOUND) + IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBEDIT) + INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(${EDITLINE_INCLUDE_DIR}) + ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBEDIT) +ELSE(EDITLINE_FOUND) + IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBEDIT) + MESSAGE(FATAL_ERROR + " libedit not found, set EDITLINE_INCLUDE_DIR to a compatible header\n" + " or set Editline_ROOT to a full libedit installed tree, as needed\n" + " Might need to enable policy CMP0074 in CMakeLists.txt" + ) + ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBEDIT) +ENDIF(EDITLINE_FOUND) + +# readline lib +IF(READLINE_FOUND) + OPTION (PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE "Enable support for linking pcre2test with libreadline." ON) +ENDIF(READLINE_FOUND) +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE) + INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(${READLINE_INCLUDE_DIR}) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE) + +# Prepare build configuration + +IF(NOT BUILD_SHARED_LIBS AND NOT BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + MESSAGE(FATAL_ERROR "At least one of BUILD_SHARED_LIBS or BUILD_STATIC_LIBS must be enabled.") +ENDIF(NOT BUILD_SHARED_LIBS AND NOT BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + +IF(NOT PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8 AND NOT PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16 AND NOT PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32) + MESSAGE(FATAL_ERROR "At least one of PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8, PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16 or PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32 must be enabled") +ENDIF(NOT PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8 AND NOT PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16 AND NOT PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32) + +IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + SET(SUPPORT_PCRE2_8 1) +ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + +IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16) + SET(SUPPORT_PCRE2_16 1) +ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16) + +IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32) + SET(SUPPORT_PCRE2_32 1) +ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32) + +IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP AND NOT PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + MESSAGE(STATUS "** PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8 must be enabled for the pcre2grep program") + SET(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP OFF) +ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP AND NOT PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE AND PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBEDIT) + IF(READLINE_FOUND) + MESSAGE(FATAL_ERROR + " Only one of the readline compatible libraries can be enabled.\n" + " Disable libreadline with -DPCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE=OFF" + ) + ENDIF(READLINE_FOUND) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE AND PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBEDIT) + +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_BSR_ANYCRLF) + SET(BSR_ANYCRLF 1) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_BSR_ANYCRLF) + +IF(PCRE2_NEVER_BACKSLASH_C) + SET(NEVER_BACKSLASH_C 1) +ENDIF(PCRE2_NEVER_BACKSLASH_C) + +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_UNICODE) + SET(SUPPORT_UNICODE 1) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_UNICODE) + +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT) + SET(SUPPORT_JIT 1) + IF(UNIX) + FIND_PACKAGE(Threads REQUIRED) + IF(CMAKE_USE_PTHREADS_INIT) + SET(REQUIRE_PTHREAD 1) + ENDIF(CMAKE_USE_PTHREADS_INIT) + ENDIF(UNIX) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT) + +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT_SEALLOC) + SET(CMAKE_REQUIRED_DEFINITIONS -D_GNU_SOURCE) + CHECK_SYMBOL_EXISTS(mkostemp stdlib.h REQUIRED) + UNSET(CMAKE_REQUIRED_DEFINITIONS) + IF(${REQUIRED}) + IF(${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME} MATCHES Linux|NetBSD) + ADD_DEFINITIONS(-D_GNU_SOURCE) + SET(SLJIT_PROT_EXECUTABLE_ALLOCATOR 1) + ELSE(${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME} MATCHES Linux|NetBSD) + MESSAGE(FATAL_ERROR "Your configuration is not supported") + ENDIF(${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME} MATCHES Linux|NetBSD) + ELSE(${REQUIRED}) + SET(PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT_SEALLOC OFF) + ENDIF(${REQUIRED}) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT_SEALLOC) + +IF(PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_JIT) + SET(SUPPORT_PCRE2GREP_JIT 1) +ENDIF(PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_JIT) + +IF(PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_CALLOUT) + SET(SUPPORT_PCRE2GREP_CALLOUT 1) + IF(PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_CALLOUT_FORK) + SET(SUPPORT_PCRE2GREP_CALLOUT_FORK 1) + ENDIF(PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_CALLOUT_FORK) +ENDIF(PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_CALLOUT) + +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_VALGRIND) + SET(SUPPORT_VALGRIND 1) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_VALGRIND) + +IF(PCRE2_DISABLE_PERCENT_ZT) + SET(DISABLE_PERCENT_ZT 1) +ENDIF(PCRE2_DISABLE_PERCENT_ZT) + +# This next one used to reference ${READLINE_LIBRARY}) +# but I was advised to add the NCURSES test as well, along with +# some modifications to cmake/FindReadline.cmake which should +# make it possible to override the default if necessary. PH + +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE) + SET(SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE 1) + SET(PCRE2TEST_LIBS ${READLINE_LIBRARY} ${NCURSES_LIBRARY}) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE) + +# libedit is a plug-compatible alternative to libreadline + +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBEDIT) + SET(SUPPORT_LIBEDIT 1) + SET(PCRE2TEST_LIBS ${EDITLINE_LIBRARY} ${NCURSES_LIBRARY}) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBEDIT) + +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBZ) + SET(SUPPORT_LIBZ 1) + SET(PCRE2GREP_LIBS ${PCRE2GREP_LIBS} ${ZLIB_LIBRARIES}) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBZ) + +IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBBZ2) + SET(SUPPORT_LIBBZ2 1) + SET(PCRE2GREP_LIBS ${PCRE2GREP_LIBS} ${BZIP2_LIBRARIES}) +ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBBZ2) + +SET(NEWLINE_DEFAULT "") + +IF(PCRE2_NEWLINE STREQUAL "CR") + SET(NEWLINE_DEFAULT "1") +ENDIF(PCRE2_NEWLINE STREQUAL "CR") +IF(PCRE2_NEWLINE STREQUAL "LF") + SET(NEWLINE_DEFAULT "2") +ENDIF(PCRE2_NEWLINE STREQUAL "LF") +IF(PCRE2_NEWLINE STREQUAL "CRLF") + SET(NEWLINE_DEFAULT "3") +ENDIF(PCRE2_NEWLINE STREQUAL "CRLF") +IF(PCRE2_NEWLINE STREQUAL "ANY") + SET(NEWLINE_DEFAULT "4") +ENDIF(PCRE2_NEWLINE STREQUAL "ANY") +IF(PCRE2_NEWLINE STREQUAL "ANYCRLF") + SET(NEWLINE_DEFAULT "5") +ENDIF(PCRE2_NEWLINE STREQUAL "ANYCRLF") +IF(PCRE2_NEWLINE STREQUAL "NUL") + SET(NEWLINE_DEFAULT "6") +ENDIF(PCRE2_NEWLINE STREQUAL "NUL") + +IF(NEWLINE_DEFAULT STREQUAL "") + MESSAGE(FATAL_ERROR "The PCRE2_NEWLINE variable must be set to one of the following values: \"LF\", \"CR\", \"CRLF\", \"ANY\", \"ANYCRLF\".") +ENDIF(NEWLINE_DEFAULT STREQUAL "") + +IF(PCRE2_EBCDIC) + SET(EBCDIC 1) +ENDIF(PCRE2_EBCDIC) + +IF(PCRE2_EBCDIC_NL25) + SET(EBCDIC 1) + SET(EBCDIC_NL25 1) +ENDIF(PCRE2_EBCDIC_NL25) + +# Output files + +CONFIGURE_FILE(config-cmake.h.in + ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/config.h + @ONLY) + +# Parse version numbers and date out of configure.ac + +file(STRINGS ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/configure.ac + configure_lines + LIMIT_COUNT 50 # Read only the first 50 lines of the file +) + +set(SEARCHED_VARIABLES "pcre2_major" "pcre2_minor" "pcre2_prerelease" "pcre2_date" + "libpcre2_posix_version" "libpcre2_8_version" "libpcre2_16_version" "libpcre2_32_version") +foreach(configure_line ${configure_lines}) + foreach(_substitution_variable ${SEARCHED_VARIABLES}) + string(TOUPPER ${_substitution_variable} _substitution_variable_upper) + if (NOT ${_substitution_variable_upper}) + string(REGEX MATCH "m4_define\\(${_substitution_variable}, *\\[(.*)\\]" MATCHED_STRING ${configure_line}) + if (CMAKE_MATCH_1) + set(${_substitution_variable_upper} ${CMAKE_MATCH_1}) + endif() + endif() + endforeach() +endforeach() + +macro(PARSE_LIB_VERSION VARIABLE_PREFIX) + string(REPLACE ":" ";" ${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_LIST ${${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION}) + list(GET ${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_LIST 0 ${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_CURRENT) + list(GET ${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_LIST 1 ${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_REVISION) + list(GET ${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_LIST 2 ${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_AGE) + + math(EXPR ${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_SOVERSION "${${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_CURRENT} - ${${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_AGE}") + math(EXPR ${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION "${${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_CURRENT} + 1") + math(EXPR ${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION "${${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_CURRENT} + 1") + set(${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION "${${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION}.${${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_REVISION}}") + set(${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION "${${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_SOVERSION}.${${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_AGE}.${${VARIABLE_PREFIX}_VERSION_REVISION}") +endmacro() + +PARSE_LIB_VERSION(LIBPCRE2_POSIX) +PARSE_LIB_VERSION(LIBPCRE2_8) +PARSE_LIB_VERSION(LIBPCRE2_16) +PARSE_LIB_VERSION(LIBPCRE2_32) + +CONFIGURE_FILE(src/pcre2.h.in + ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2.h + @ONLY) + +# Make sure to not link debug libs +# against release libs and vice versa +IF(WIN32) + SET(CMAKE_DEBUG_POSTFIX "d") +ENDIF(WIN32) + +# Generate pkg-config files + +SET(PACKAGE_VERSION "${PCRE2_MAJOR}.${PCRE2_MINOR}") +SET(prefix ${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}) + +SET(exec_prefix "\${prefix}") +SET(libdir "\${exec_prefix}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}") +SET(includedir "\${prefix}/include") +IF(WIN32 AND (CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE MATCHES Debug)) + SET(LIB_POSTFIX ${CMAKE_DEBUG_POSTFIX}) +ENDIF() +CONFIGURE_FILE(libpcre2-posix.pc.in libpcre2-posix.pc @ONLY) +SET(pkg_config_files ${pkg_config_files} "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/libpcre2-posix.pc") + +IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + CONFIGURE_FILE(libpcre2-8.pc.in libpcre2-8.pc @ONLY) + SET(pkg_config_files ${pkg_config_files} "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/libpcre2-8.pc") + SET(enable_pcre2_8 "yes") +ELSE() + SET(enable_pcre2_8 "no") +ENDIF() + +IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16) + CONFIGURE_FILE(libpcre2-16.pc.in libpcre2-16.pc @ONLY) + SET(pkg_config_files ${pkg_config_files} "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/libpcre2-16.pc") + SET(enable_pcre2_16 "yes") +ELSE() + SET(enable_pcre2_16 "no") +ENDIF() + +IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32) + CONFIGURE_FILE(libpcre2-32.pc.in libpcre2-32.pc @ONLY) + SET(pkg_config_files ${pkg_config_files} "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/libpcre2-32.pc") + SET(enable_pcre2_32 "yes") +ELSE() + SET(enable_pcre2_32 "no") +ENDIF() + +CONFIGURE_FILE(pcre2-config.in pcre2-config @ONLY) + +# Character table generation + +OPTION(PCRE2_REBUILD_CHARTABLES "Rebuild char tables" OFF) +IF(PCRE2_REBUILD_CHARTABLES) + ADD_EXECUTABLE(pcre2_dftables src/pcre2_dftables.c) + ADD_CUSTOM_COMMAND( + COMMENT "Generating character tables (pcre2_chartables.c) for current locale" + DEPENDS pcre2_dftables + COMMAND pcre2_dftables + ARGS ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2_chartables.c + OUTPUT ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2_chartables.c + ) +ELSE(PCRE2_REBUILD_CHARTABLES) + CONFIGURE_FILE(${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/src/pcre2_chartables.c.dist + ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2_chartables.c + COPYONLY) +ENDIF(PCRE2_REBUILD_CHARTABLES) + +# Source code + +SET(PCRE2_HEADERS ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2.h) + +SET(PCRE2_SOURCES + src/pcre2_auto_possess.c + ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2_chartables.c + src/pcre2_compile.c + src/pcre2_config.c + src/pcre2_context.c + src/pcre2_convert.c + src/pcre2_dfa_match.c + src/pcre2_error.c + src/pcre2_extuni.c + src/pcre2_find_bracket.c + src/pcre2_jit_compile.c + src/pcre2_maketables.c + src/pcre2_match.c + src/pcre2_match_data.c + src/pcre2_newline.c + src/pcre2_ord2utf.c + src/pcre2_pattern_info.c + src/pcre2_script_run.c + src/pcre2_serialize.c + src/pcre2_string_utils.c + src/pcre2_study.c + src/pcre2_substitute.c + src/pcre2_substring.c + src/pcre2_tables.c + src/pcre2_ucd.c + src/pcre2_valid_utf.c + src/pcre2_xclass.c +) + +SET(PCRE2POSIX_HEADERS src/pcre2posix.h) +SET(PCRE2POSIX_SOURCES src/pcre2posix.c) + +IF(MINGW AND BUILD_SHARED_LIBS) + IF (EXISTS ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/pcre2.rc) + ADD_CUSTOM_COMMAND(OUTPUT ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/pcre2.o + PRE-LINK + COMMAND windres ARGS pcre2.rc pcre2.o + WORKING_DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR} + COMMENT Using pcre2 coff info in mingw build) + SET(PCRE2_SOURCES ${PCRE2_SOURCES} ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/pcre2.o) + ENDIF(EXISTS ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/pcre2.rc) + + IF (EXISTS ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/pcre2posix.rc) + ADD_CUSTOM_COMMAND(OUTPUT ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/pcre2posix.o + PRE-LINK + COMMAND windres ARGS pcre2posix.rc pcre2posix.o + WORKING_DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR} + COMMENT Using pcre2posix coff info in mingw build) + SET(PCRE2POSIX_SOURCES ${PCRE2POSIX_SOURCES} ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/pcre2posix.o) + ENDIF(EXISTS ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/pcre2posix.rc) +ENDIF(MINGW AND BUILD_SHARED_LIBS) + +IF(MSVC AND BUILD_SHARED_LIBS) + SET(dll_pdb_files ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2-posix.pdb ${dll_pdb_files}) + SET(dll_pdb_debug_files ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2-posixd.pdb ${dll_pdb_debug_files}) + IF (EXISTS ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/pcre2.rc) + SET(PCRE2_SOURCES ${PCRE2_SOURCES} pcre2.rc) + ENDIF(EXISTS ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/pcre2.rc) + + IF (EXISTS ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/pcre2posix.rc) + SET(PCRE2POSIX_SOURCES ${PCRE2POSIX_SOURCES} pcre2posix.rc) + ENDIF (EXISTS ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/pcre2posix.rc) +ENDIF(MSVC AND BUILD_SHARED_LIBS) + +# Fix static compilation with MSVC: https://bugs.exim.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1681 +# This code was taken from the CMake wiki, not from WebM. + +IF(MSVC AND PCRE2_STATIC_RUNTIME) + MESSAGE(STATUS "** MSVC and PCRE2_STATIC_RUNTIME: modifying compiler flags to use static runtime library") + foreach(flag_var + CMAKE_C_FLAGS CMAKE_C_FLAGS_DEBUG CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE + CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MINSIZEREL CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO) + string(REGEX REPLACE "/MD" "/MT" ${flag_var} "${${flag_var}}") + endforeach() +ENDIF(MSVC AND PCRE2_STATIC_RUNTIME) + +# Build setup + +ADD_DEFINITIONS(-DHAVE_CONFIG_H) + +IF(MSVC) + ADD_DEFINITIONS(-D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS) +ENDIF(MSVC) + +SET(CMAKE_INCLUDE_CURRENT_DIR 1) + +SET(targets) + +# 8-bit library + +IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + IF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-8-static STATIC ${PCRE2_HEADERS} ${PCRE2_SOURCES} ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/config.h) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-8-static PROPERTIES + COMPILE_DEFINITIONS PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=8 + MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_8_MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION}" + MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_8_MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION}" + VERSION ${LIBPCRE2_8_VERSION} + SOVERSION ${LIBPCRE2_8_SOVERSION}) + TARGET_COMPILE_DEFINITIONS(pcre2-8-static PUBLIC PCRE2_STATIC) + TARGET_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(pcre2-8-static PUBLIC ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}) + IF(REQUIRE_PTHREAD) + TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(pcre2-8-static Threads::Threads) + ENDIF(REQUIRE_PTHREAD) + SET(targets ${targets} pcre2-8-static) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-posix-static STATIC ${PCRE2POSIX_HEADERS} ${PCRE2POSIX_SOURCES}) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-posix-static PROPERTIES + COMPILE_DEFINITIONS PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=8 + MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_POSIX_MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION}" + MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_POSIX_MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION}" + VERSION ${LIBPCRE2_POSIX_VERSION} + SOVERSION ${LIBPCRE2_POSIX_SOVERSION}) + TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(pcre2-posix-static pcre2-8-static) + TARGET_COMPILE_DEFINITIONS(pcre2-posix-static PUBLIC PCRE2_STATIC) + TARGET_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(pcre2-posix-static PUBLIC ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}) + SET(targets ${targets} pcre2-posix-static) + + IF(MSVC) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-8-static PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME pcre2-8-static) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-posix-static PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME pcre2-posix-static) + ELSE(MSVC) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-8-static PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME pcre2-8) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-posix-static PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME pcre2-posix) + ENDIF(MSVC) + IF(PCRE2_STATIC_PIC) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-8-static pcre2-posix-static PROPERTIES POSITION_INDEPENDENT_CODE 1) + ENDIF(PCRE2_STATIC_PIC) + ENDIF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + + IF(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-8-shared SHARED ${PCRE2_HEADERS} ${PCRE2_SOURCES} ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/config.h) + TARGET_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(pcre2-8-shared PUBLIC ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-8-shared PROPERTIES + COMPILE_DEFINITIONS PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=8 + MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_8_MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION}" + MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_8_MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION}" + VERSION ${LIBPCRE2_8_VERSION} + SOVERSION ${LIBPCRE2_8_SOVERSION} + OUTPUT_NAME pcre2-8) + IF(REQUIRE_PTHREAD) + TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(pcre2-8-shared Threads::Threads) + ENDIF(REQUIRE_PTHREAD) + SET(targets ${targets} pcre2-8-shared) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-posix-shared SHARED ${PCRE2POSIX_HEADERS} ${PCRE2POSIX_SOURCES}) + TARGET_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(pcre2-posix-shared PUBLIC ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-posix-shared PROPERTIES + COMPILE_DEFINITIONS PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=8 + MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_POSIX_MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION}" + MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_POSIX_MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION}" + VERSION ${LIBPCRE2_POSIX_VERSION} + SOVERSION ${LIBPCRE2_POSIX_SOVERSION} + OUTPUT_NAME pcre2-posix) + TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(pcre2-posix-shared pcre2-8-shared) + SET(targets ${targets} pcre2-posix-shared) + SET(dll_pdb_files ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2-8.pdb ${dll_pdb_files}) + SET(dll_pdb_debug_files ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2-8d.pdb ${dll_pdb_debug_files}) + + IF(MINGW) + IF(NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-8-shared pcre2-posix-shared PROPERTIES PREFIX "") + ENDIF(NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX) + IF(NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-8-shared pcre2-posix-shared PROPERTIES SUFFIX "-0.dll") + ENDIF(NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX) + ENDIF(MINGW) + ENDIF(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS) + + IF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-8 ALIAS pcre2-8-static) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-posix ALIAS pcre2-posix-static) + ELSE(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-8 ALIAS pcre2-8-shared) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-posix ALIAS pcre2-posix-shared) + ENDIF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) +ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + +# 16-bit library + +IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16) + IF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-16-static STATIC ${PCRE2_HEADERS} ${PCRE2_SOURCES} ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/config.h) + TARGET_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(pcre2-16-static PUBLIC ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-16-static PROPERTIES + COMPILE_DEFINITIONS PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=16 + MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_32_MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION}" + MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_32_MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION}" + VERSION ${LIBPCRE2_16_VERSION} + SOVERSION ${LIBPCRE2_16_SOVERSION}) + TARGET_COMPILE_DEFINITIONS(pcre2-16-static PUBLIC PCRE2_STATIC) + IF(REQUIRE_PTHREAD) + TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(pcre2-16-static Threads::Threads) + ENDIF(REQUIRE_PTHREAD) + SET(targets ${targets} pcre2-16-static) + + IF(MSVC) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-16-static PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME pcre2-16-static) + ELSE(MSVC) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-16-static PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME pcre2-16) + ENDIF(MSVC) + IF(PCRE2_STATIC_PIC) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-16-static PROPERTIES POSITION_INDEPENDENT_CODE 1) + ENDIF(PCRE2_STATIC_PIC) + ENDIF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + + IF(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-16-shared SHARED ${PCRE2_HEADERS} ${PCRE2_SOURCES} ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/config.h) + TARGET_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(pcre2-16-shared PUBLIC ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-16-shared PROPERTIES + COMPILE_DEFINITIONS PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=16 + MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_32_MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION}" + MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_32_MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION}" + VERSION ${LIBPCRE2_16_VERSION} + SOVERSION ${LIBPCRE2_16_SOVERSION} + OUTPUT_NAME pcre2-16) + IF(REQUIRE_PTHREAD) + TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(pcre2-16-shared Threads::Threads) + ENDIF(REQUIRE_PTHREAD) + SET(targets ${targets} pcre2-16-shared) + SET(dll_pdb_files ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2-16.pdb ${dll_pdb_files}) + SET(dll_pdb_debug_files ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2-16d.pdb ${dll_pdb_debug_files}) + + IF(MINGW) + IF(NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-16-shared PROPERTIES PREFIX "") + ENDIF(NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX) + IF(NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-16-shared PROPERTIES SUFFIX "-0.dll") + ENDIF(NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX) + ENDIF(MINGW) + ENDIF(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS) + + IF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-16 ALIAS pcre2-16-static) + ELSE(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-16 ALIAS pcre2-16-shared) + ENDIF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) +ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16) + +# 32-bit library + +IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32) + IF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-32-static STATIC ${PCRE2_HEADERS} ${PCRE2_SOURCES} ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/config.h) + TARGET_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(pcre2-32-static PUBLIC ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-32-static PROPERTIES + COMPILE_DEFINITIONS PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=32 + MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_32_MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION}" + MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_32_MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION}" + VERSION ${LIBPCRE2_32_VERSION} + SOVERSION ${LIBPCRE2_32_SOVERSION}) + TARGET_COMPILE_DEFINITIONS(pcre2-32-static PUBLIC PCRE2_STATIC) + IF(REQUIRE_PTHREAD) + TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(pcre2-32-static Threads::Threads) + ENDIF(REQUIRE_PTHREAD) + SET(targets ${targets} pcre2-32-static) + + IF(MSVC) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-32-static PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME pcre2-32-static) + ELSE(MSVC) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-32-static PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME pcre2-32) + ENDIF(MSVC) + IF(PCRE2_STATIC_PIC) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-32-static PROPERTIES POSITION_INDEPENDENT_CODE 1) + ENDIF(PCRE2_STATIC_PIC) + ENDIF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + + IF(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-32-shared SHARED ${PCRE2_HEADERS} ${PCRE2_SOURCES} ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/config.h) + TARGET_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES(pcre2-32-shared PUBLIC ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-32-shared PROPERTIES + COMPILE_DEFINITIONS PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=32 + MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_32_MACHO_COMPATIBILITY_VERSION}" + MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION "${LIBPCRE2_32_MACHO_CURRENT_VERSION}" + VERSION ${LIBPCRE2_32_VERSION} + SOVERSION ${LIBPCRE2_32_SOVERSION} + OUTPUT_NAME pcre2-32) + IF(REQUIRE_PTHREAD) + TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(pcre2-32-shared Threads::Threads) + ENDIF(REQUIRE_PTHREAD) + SET(targets ${targets} pcre2-32-shared) + SET(dll_pdb_files ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2-32.pdb ${dll_pdb_files}) + SET(dll_pdb_debug_files ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2-32d.pdb ${dll_pdb_debug_files}) + + IF(MINGW) + IF(NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-32-shared PROPERTIES PREFIX "") + ENDIF(NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX) + IF(NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX) + SET_TARGET_PROPERTIES(pcre2-32-shared PROPERTIES SUFFIX "-0.dll") + ENDIF(NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX) + ENDIF(MINGW) + ENDIF(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS) + + IF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-32 ALIAS pcre2-32-static) + ELSE(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + ADD_LIBRARY(pcre2-32 ALIAS pcre2-32-shared) + ENDIF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) +ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32) + +# Executables + +IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP) + ADD_EXECUTABLE(pcre2grep src/pcre2grep.c) + SET_PROPERTY(TARGET pcre2grep + PROPERTY COMPILE_DEFINITIONS PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=8) + SET(targets ${targets} pcre2grep) + TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(pcre2grep pcre2-posix ${PCRE2GREP_LIBS}) +ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP) + +# Testing + +IF(PCRE2_BUILD_TESTS) + ENABLE_TESTING() + + SET(PCRE2TEST_SOURCES src/pcre2test.c) + + IF(MSVC) + # This is needed to avoid a stack overflow error in the standard tests. The + # flag should be indicated with a forward-slash instead of a hyphen, but + # then CMake treats it as a file path. + SET(PCRE2TEST_LINKER_FLAGS -STACK:2500000) + ENDIF(MSVC) + + ADD_EXECUTABLE(pcre2test ${PCRE2TEST_SOURCES}) + SET(targets ${targets} pcre2test) + IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + LIST(APPEND PCRE2TEST_LIBS pcre2-posix pcre2-8) + ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16) + LIST(APPEND PCRE2TEST_LIBS pcre2-16) + ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16) + IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32) + LIST(APPEND PCRE2TEST_LIBS pcre2-32) + ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32) + TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(pcre2test ${PCRE2TEST_LIBS} ${PCRE2TEST_LINKER_FLAGS}) + + IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + ADD_EXECUTABLE(pcre2posix_test src/pcre2posix_test.c) + SET(targets ${targets} pcre2posix_test) + TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(pcre2posix_test pcre2-posix pcre2-8) + ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + + IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT) + ADD_EXECUTABLE(pcre2_jit_test src/pcre2_jit_test.c) + SET(targets ${targets} pcre2_jit_test) + SET(PCRE2_JIT_TEST_LIBS) + IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + LIST(APPEND PCRE2_JIT_TEST_LIBS pcre2-8) + ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16) + LIST(APPEND PCRE2_JIT_TEST_LIBS pcre2-16) + ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16) + IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32) + LIST(APPEND PCRE2_JIT_TEST_LIBS pcre2-32) + ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32) + TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(pcre2_jit_test ${PCRE2_JIT_TEST_LIBS}) + ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT) + + # exes in Debug location tested by the RunTest and RunGrepTest shell scripts + # via "make test" + + # The commented out code below provokes a warning about future removal + # of the facility, and requires policy CMP0026 to be set to "OLD". I have + # got fed-up with the warnings, but my plea for help on the mailing list + # produced no response. So, I've hacked. The new code below seems to work on + # Linux. + +# IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP) +# GET_TARGET_PROPERTY(PCRE2GREP_EXE pcre2grep DEBUG_LOCATION) +# ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP) +# +# GET_TARGET_PROPERTY(PCRE2TEST_EXE pcre2test DEBUG_LOCATION) + + IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP) + SET(PCRE2GREP_EXE $) + ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP) + + SET(PCRE2TEST_EXE $) + + +# ================================================= + # Write out a CTest configuration file + # + FILE(WRITE ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/CTestCustom.ctest + "# This is a generated file. +MESSAGE(\"When testing is complete, review test output in the +\\\"${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/Testing/Temporary\\\" folder.\") +MESSAGE(\" \") +") + + FILE(WRITE ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2_test.sh + "#! /bin/sh +# This is a generated file. +. ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/RunTest +if test \"$?\" != \"0\"; then exit 1; fi +# End +") + + IF(UNIX) + ADD_TEST(pcre2_test sh ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2_test.sh) + ENDIF(UNIX) + + IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP) + FILE(WRITE ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2_grep_test.sh + "#! /bin/sh +# This is a generated file. +. ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/RunGrepTest +if test \"$?\" != \"0\"; then exit 1; fi +# End +") + + IF(UNIX) + ADD_TEST(pcre2_grep_test sh ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2_grep_test.sh) + ENDIF(UNIX) + ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP) + + IF(WIN32) + # Provide environment for executing the bat file version of RunTest + FILE(TO_NATIVE_PATH ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR} winsrc) + FILE(TO_NATIVE_PATH ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR} winbin) + FILE(TO_NATIVE_PATH ${PCRE2TEST_EXE} winexe) + + FILE(WRITE ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2_test.bat + "\@REM This is a generated file. +\@echo off +setlocal +SET srcdir=\"${winsrc}\" +# The next line was replaced by the following one after a user comment. +# SET pcre2test=\"${winexe}\" +SET pcre2test=\"${winbin}\\pcre2test.exe\" +if not [%CMAKE_CONFIG_TYPE%]==[] SET pcre2test=\"${winbin}\\%CMAKE_CONFIG_TYPE%\\pcre2test.exe\" +call %srcdir%\\RunTest.Bat +if errorlevel 1 exit /b 1 +echo RunTest.bat tests successfully completed +") + + ADD_TEST(NAME pcre2_test_bat + COMMAND pcre2_test.bat) + SET_TESTS_PROPERTIES(pcre2_test_bat PROPERTIES + PASS_REGULAR_EXPRESSION "RunTest\\.bat tests successfully completed") + + IF("$ENV{OSTYPE}" STREQUAL "msys") + # Both the sh and bat file versions of RunTest are run if make test is used + # in msys + ADD_TEST(pcre2_test_sh sh.exe ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2_test.sh) + IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP) + ADD_TEST(pcre2_grep_test sh.exe ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2_grep_test.sh) + ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP) + ENDIF("$ENV{OSTYPE}" STREQUAL "msys") + ENDIF(WIN32) + + # Changed to accommodate testing whichever location was just built + + IF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT) + ADD_TEST(pcre2_jit_test pcre2_jit_test) + ENDIF(PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT) + + IF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + ADD_TEST(pcre2posix_test pcre2posix_test) + ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8) + + +ENDIF(PCRE2_BUILD_TESTS) + +# Installation + +SET(CMAKE_INSTALL_ALWAYS 1) + +INSTALL(TARGETS ${targets} + RUNTIME DESTINATION bin + LIBRARY DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR} + ARCHIVE DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}) +INSTALL(FILES ${pkg_config_files} DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}/pkgconfig) +INSTALL(FILES "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/pcre2-config" + DESTINATION bin + # Set 0755 permissions + PERMISSIONS OWNER_WRITE OWNER_READ OWNER_EXECUTE GROUP_READ GROUP_EXECUTE WORLD_READ WORLD_EXECUTE) + +INSTALL(FILES ${PCRE2_HEADERS} ${PCRE2POSIX_HEADERS} DESTINATION include) + +# CMake config files. +set(PCRE2_CONFIG_IN ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake/pcre2-config.cmake.in) +set(PCRE2_CONFIG_OUT ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/cmake/pcre2-config.cmake) +configure_file(${PCRE2_CONFIG_IN} ${PCRE2_CONFIG_OUT} @ONLY) +set(PCRE2_CONFIG_VERSION_IN ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake/pcre2-config-version.cmake.in) +set(PCRE2_CONFIG_VERSION_OUT ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/cmake/pcre2-config-version.cmake) +configure_file(${PCRE2_CONFIG_VERSION_IN} ${PCRE2_CONFIG_VERSION_OUT} @ONLY) +install(FILES ${PCRE2_CONFIG_OUT} ${PCRE2_CONFIG_VERSION_OUT} DESTINATION cmake) + +FILE(GLOB html ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/doc/html/*.html) +FILE(GLOB man1 ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/doc/*.1) +FILE(GLOB man3 ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/doc/*.3) + +INSTALL(FILES ${man1} DESTINATION man/man1) +INSTALL(FILES ${man3} DESTINATION man/man3) +INSTALL(FILES ${html} DESTINATION share/doc/pcre2/html) + +IF(MSVC AND INSTALL_MSVC_PDB) + INSTALL(FILES ${dll_pdb_files} DESTINATION bin CONFIGURATIONS RelWithDebInfo) + INSTALL(FILES ${dll_pdb_debug_files} DESTINATION bin CONFIGURATIONS Debug) +ENDIF(MSVC AND INSTALL_MSVC_PDB) + +# Help, only for nice output +IF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + SET(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS ON) +ELSE(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + SET(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS OFF) +ENDIF(BUILD_STATIC_LIBS) + +IF(PCRE2_HEAP_MATCH_RECURSE) + MESSAGE(WARNING "HEAP_MATCH_RECURSE is obsolete and does nothing.") +ENDIF(PCRE2_HEAP_MATCH_RECURSE) + +IF(PCRE2_SHOW_REPORT) + STRING(TOUPPER "${CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE}" buildtype) + IF (CMAKE_C_FLAGS) + SET(cfsp " ") + ENDIF(CMAKE_C_FLAGS) + MESSAGE(STATUS "") + MESSAGE(STATUS "") + MESSAGE(STATUS "PCRE2-${PCRE2_MAJOR}.${PCRE2_MINOR} configuration summary:") + MESSAGE(STATUS "") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Install prefix .................. : ${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " C compiler ...................... : ${CMAKE_C_COMPILER}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " C compiler flags ................ : ${CMAKE_C_FLAGS}${cfsp}${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_${buildtype}}") + MESSAGE(STATUS "") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Build 8 bit PCRE2 library ....... : ${PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_8}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Build 16 bit PCRE2 library ...... : ${PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_16}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Build 32 bit PCRE2 library ...... : ${PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2_32}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Enable JIT compiling support .... : ${PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Use SELinux allocator in JIT .... : ${PCRE2_SUPPORT_JIT_SEALLOC}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Enable Unicode support .......... : ${PCRE2_SUPPORT_UNICODE}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Newline char/sequence ........... : ${PCRE2_NEWLINE}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " \\R matches only ANYCRLF ......... : ${PCRE2_SUPPORT_BSR_ANYCRLF}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " \\C is disabled .................. : ${PCRE2_NEVER_BACKSLASH_C}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " EBCDIC coding ................... : ${PCRE2_EBCDIC}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " EBCDIC coding with NL=0x25 ...... : ${PCRE2_EBCDIC_NL25}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Rebuild char tables ............. : ${PCRE2_REBUILD_CHARTABLES}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Internal link size .............. : ${PCRE2_LINK_SIZE}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Parentheses nest limit .......... : ${PCRE2_PARENS_NEST_LIMIT}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Heap limit ...................... : ${PCRE2_HEAP_LIMIT}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Match limit ..................... : ${PCRE2_MATCH_LIMIT}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Match depth limit ............... : ${PCRE2_MATCH_LIMIT_DEPTH}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Build shared libs ............... : ${BUILD_SHARED_LIBS}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Build static libs ............... : ${BUILD_STATIC_LIBS}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " with PIC enabled ............. : ${PCRE2_STATIC_PIC}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Build pcre2grep ................. : ${PCRE2_BUILD_PCRE2GREP}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Enable JIT in pcre2grep ......... : ${PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_JIT}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Enable callouts in pcre2grep .... : ${PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_CALLOUT}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Enable callout fork in pcre2grep. : ${PCRE2GREP_SUPPORT_CALLOUT_FORK}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Buffer size for pcre2grep ....... : ${PCRE2GREP_BUFSIZE}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Build tests (implies pcre2test .. : ${PCRE2_BUILD_TESTS}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " and pcre2grep)") + IF(ZLIB_FOUND) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Link pcre2grep with libz ........ : ${PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBZ}") + ELSE(ZLIB_FOUND) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Link pcre2grep with libz ........ : Library not found" ) + ENDIF(ZLIB_FOUND) + IF(BZIP2_FOUND) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Link pcre2grep with libbz2 ...... : ${PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBBZ2}") + ELSE(BZIP2_FOUND) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Link pcre2grep with libbz2 ...... : Library not found" ) + ENDIF(BZIP2_FOUND) + IF(EDITLINE_FOUND) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Link pcre2test with libeditline . : ${PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBEDIT}") + ELSE(EDITLINE_FOUND) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Link pcre2test with libeditline . : Library not found" ) + ENDIF(EDITLINE_FOUND) + IF(READLINE_FOUND) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Link pcre2test with libreadline . : ${PCRE2_SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE}") + ELSE(READLINE_FOUND) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Link pcre2test with libreadline . : Library not found" ) + ENDIF(READLINE_FOUND) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Support Valgrind .................: ${PCRE2_SUPPORT_VALGRIND}") + IF(PCRE2_DISABLE_PERCENT_ZT) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Use %zu and %td ..................: OFF" ) + ELSE(PCRE2_DISABLE_PERCENT_ZT) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Use %zu and %td ..................: AUTO" ) + ENDIF(PCRE2_DISABLE_PERCENT_ZT) + + IF(MINGW AND BUILD_SHARED_LIBS) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Non-standard dll names (prefix) . : ${NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX}") + MESSAGE(STATUS " Non-standard dll names (suffix) . : ${NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX}") + ENDIF(MINGW AND BUILD_SHARED_LIBS) + + IF(MSVC) + MESSAGE(STATUS " Install MSVC .pdb files ..........: ${INSTALL_MSVC_PDB}") + ENDIF(MSVC) + + MESSAGE(STATUS "") +ENDIF(PCRE2_SHOW_REPORT) + +# end CMakeLists.txt diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/COPYING b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/COPYING new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c233950f --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/COPYING @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +PCRE2 LICENCE + +Please see the file LICENCE in the PCRE2 distribution for licensing details. + +End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/ChangeLog b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2b100361 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,2827 @@ +Change Log for PCRE2 - see also the Git log +------------------------------------------- + + +Version 10.42 11-December-2022 +------------------------------ + +1. Change 19 of 10.41 wasn't quite right; it put the definition of a default, +empty value for PCRE2_CALL_CONVENTION in src/pcre2posix.c instead of +src/pcre2posix.h, which meant that programs that included pcre2posix.h but not +pcre2.h failed to compile. + +2. To catch similar issues to the above in future, a new small test program +that includes pcre2posix.h but not pcre2.h has been added to the test suite. + +3. When the -S option of pcre2test was used to set a stack size greater than +the allowed maximum, the error message displayed the hard limit incorrectly. +This was pointed out on GitHub pull request #171, but the suggested patch +didn't cope with all cases. Some further modification was required. + +4. Supplying an ovector count of more than 65535 to pcre2_match_data_create() +caused a crash because the field in the match data block is only 16 bits. A +maximum of 65535 is now silently applied. + +5. Merged @carenas patch #175 which fixes #86 - segfault on aarch64 (ARM), + + +Version 10.41 06-December-2022 +------------------------------ + +1. Add fflush() before and after a fork callout in pcre2grep to get its output +to be the same on all systems. (There were previously ordering differences in +Alpine Linux). + +2. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #110) for pthreads support in CMake. + +3. SSF scorecards grumbled about possible overflow in an expression in +pcre2test. It never would have overflowed in practice, but some casts have been +added and at the some time there's been some tidying of fprints that output +size_t values. + +4. PR #94 showed up an unused enum in pcre2_convert.c, which is now removed. + +5. Minor code re-arrangement to remove gcc warning about realloc() in +pcre2test. + +6. Change a number of int variables that hold buffer and line lengths in +pcre2grep to PCRE2_SIZE (aka size_t). + +7. Added an #ifdef to cut out a call to PRIV(jit_free) when JIT is not +supported (even though that function would do nothing in that case) at the +request of a user who doesn't even want to link with pcre_jit_compile.o. Also +tidied up an untidy #ifdef arrangement in pcre2test. + +8. Fixed an issue in the backtracking optimization of character repeats in +JIT. Furthermore optimize star repetitions, not just plus repetitions. + +9. Removed the use of an initial backtracking frames vector on the system stack +in pcre2_match() so that it now always uses the heap. (In a multi-thread +environment with very small stacks there had been an issue.) This also is +tidier for JIT matching, which didn't need that vector. The heap vector is now +remembered in the match data block and re-used if that block itself is re-used. +It is freed with the match data block. + +10. Adjusted the find_limits code in pcre2test to work with change 9 above. + +11. Added find_limits_noheap to pcre2test, because the heap limits are now +different in different environments and so cannot be included in the standard +tests. + +12. Created a test for pcre2_match() heap processing that is not part of the +tests run by 'make check', but can be run manually. The current output is from +a 64-bit system. + +13. Implemented -Z aka --null in pcre2grep. + +14. A minor change to pcre2test and the addition of several new pcre2grep tests +have improved LCOV coverage statistics. At the same time, code in pcre2grep and +elsewhere that can never be obeyed in normal testing has been excluded from +coverage. + +15. Fixed a bug in pcre2grep that could cause an extra newline to be written +after output generaed by --output. + +16. If a file has a .bz2 extension but is not in fact compressed, pcre2grep +should process it as a plain text file. A bug stopped this happening; now fixed +and added to the tests. + +17. When pcre2grep was running not in UTF mode, if a string specified by +--output or obtained from a callout in a pattern contained a character (byte) +greater than 127, it was incorrectly output in UTF-8 format. + +18. Added some casts after warnings from Clang sanitize. + +19. Merged patch from cbouc (GitHub #139): 4 function prototypes were missing +PCRE2_CALL_CONVENTION in src/pcre2posix.h. All function prototypes returning +pointers had out of place PCRE2_CALL_CONVENTION in src/pcre2.h.*. These +produced errors when building for Windows with #define PCRE2_CALL_CONVENTION +__stdcall. + +20. A negative repeat value in a pcre2test subject line was not being +diagnosed, leading to infinite looping. + +21. Updated RunGrepTest to discard the warning that Bash now gives when setting +LC_CTYPE to a bad value (because older versions didn't). + +22. Updated pcre2grep so that it behaves like GNU grep when matching more than +one pattern and a later pattern matches at an earlier point in the subject when +the matched substrings are being identified by colour or by offsets. + +23. Updated the PrepareRelease script so that the man page that it makes for +the pcre2demo demonstration program is more standard and does not cause errors +when processed by lexgrog or mandb -c (GitHub issue #160). + +24. The JIT compiler was updated. + + +Version 10.40 15-April-2022 +--------------------------- + +1. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #35, 7db87842) to fix pcre2grep incorrect +handling of multiple passes. + +2. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #36, dae47509) to fix portability issue +in pcre2grep with buffered fseek(stdin). + +3. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #37, acc520924) to fix tests when -S is +not supported. + +4. Revert an unintended change in JIT repeat detection. + +5. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #52, b037bfa1) to fix build on GNU Hurd. + +6. Merged documentation and comments patches from @carenas (GitHub #47). + +7. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #49) to remove obsolete JFriedl test code +from pcre2grep. + +8. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #48) to fix CMake install issue #46. + +9. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #53) fixing NULL checks in matching and +substituting. + +10. Add null_subject and null_replacement modifiers to pcre2test. + +11. Add check for NULL subject to POSIX regexec() function. + +12. Add check for NULL replacement to pcre2_substitute(). + +13. For the subject arguments of pcre2_match(), pcre2_dfa_match(), and +pcre2_substitute(), and the replacement argument of the latter, if the pointer +is NULL and the length is zero, treat as an empty string. Apparently a number +of applications treat NULL/0 in this way. + +14. Added support for Bidi_Class and a number of binary Unicode properties, +including Bidi_Control. + +15. Fix some minor issues raised by clang sanitize. + +16. Very minor code speed up for maximizing character property matches. + +17. A number of changes to script matching for \p and \P: + + (a) Script extensions for a character are now coded as a bitmap instead of + a list of script numbers, which should be faster and does not need a + loop. + + (b) Added the syntax \p{script:xxx} and \p{script_extensions:xxx} (synonyms + sc and scx). + + (c) Changed \p{scriptname} from being the same as \p{sc:scriptname} to being + the same as \p{scx:scriptname} because this change happened in Perl at + release 5.26. + + (d) The standard Unicode 4-letter abbreviations for script names are now + recognized. + + (e) In accordance with Unicode and Perl's "loose matching" rules, spaces, + hyphens, and underscores are ignored in property names, which are then + matched independent of case. + +18. The Python scripts in the maint directory have been refactored. There are +now three scripts that generate pcre2_ucd.c, pcre2_ucp.h, and pcre2_ucptables.c +(which is #included by pcre2_tables.c). The data lists that used to be +duplicated are now held in a single common Python module. + +19. On CHERI, and thus Arm's Morello prototype, pointers are represented as +hardware capabilities, which consist of both an integer address and additional +metadata, meaning they are twice the size of the platform's size_t type, i.e. +16 bytes on a 64-bit system. The ovector member of heapframe happens to only be +8 byte aligned, and so computing frame_size ended up with a multiple of 8 but +not 16. Whilst the first frame was always suitably aligned, this then +misaligned the frame that follows, resulting in an alignment fault when storing +a pointer to Fecode at the start of match. Patch to fix this issue by Jessica +Clarke PR#72. + +20. Added -LP and -LS listing options to pcre2test. + +21. A user discovered that the library names in CMakeLists.txt for MSVC +debugger (PDB) files were incorrect - perhaps never tried for PCRE2? + +22. An item such as [Aa] is optimized into a caseless single character match. +When this was quantified (e.g. [Aa]{2}) and was also the last literal item in a +pattern, the optimizing "must be present for a match" character check was not +being flagged as caseless, causing some matches that should have succeeded to +fail. + +23. Fixed a unicode property matching issue in JIT. The character was not +fully read in caseless matching. + +24. Fixed an issue affecting recursions in JIT caused by duplicated data +transfers. + +25. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #96) which fixes some problems with +pcre2test and readline/readedit: + + * Use the right header for libedit in FreeBSD with autoconf + * Really allow libedit with cmake + * Avoid using readline headers with libedit + + +Version 10.39 29-October-2021 +----------------------------- + +1. Fix incorrect detection of alternatives in first character search in JIT. + +2. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #28): + + Visual Studio 2013 includes support for %zu and %td, so let newer + versions of it avoid the fallback, and while at it, make sure that + the first check is for DISABLE_PERCENT_ZT so it will be always + honoured if chosen. + + prtdiff_t is signed, so use a signed type instead, and make sure + that an appropriate width is chosen if pointers are 64bit wide and + long is not (ex: Windows 64bit). + + IMHO removing the cast (and therefore the possibilty of truncation) + make the code cleaner and the fallback is likely portable enough + with all 64-bit POSIX systems doing LP64 except for Windows. + +3. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #29) to update to Unicode 14.0.0. + +4. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #30): + + * Cleanup: remove references to no longer used stdint.h + + Since 19c50b9d (Unconditionally use inttypes.h instead of trying for stdint.h + (simplification) and remove the now unnecessary inclusion in + pcre2_internal.h., 2018-11-14), stdint.h is no longer used. + + Remove checks for it in autotools and CMake and document better the expected + build failures for systems that might have stdint.h (C99) and not inttypes.h + (from POSIX), like old Windows. + + * Cleanup: remove detection for inttypes.h which is a hard dependency + + CMake checks for standard headers are not meant to be used for hard + dependencies, so will prevent a possible fallback to work. + + Alternatively, the header could be checked to make the configuration fail + instead of breaking the build, but that was punted, as it was missing anyway + from autotools. + +5. Merged patch from @carenas (GitHub #32): + + * jit: allow building with ancient MSVC versions + + Visual Studio older than 2013 fails to build with JIT enabled, because it is + unable to parse non C89 compatible syntax, with mixed declarations and code. + While most recent compilers wouldn't even report this as a warning since it + is valid C99, it could be also made visible by adding to gcc/clang the + -Wdeclaration-after-statement flag at build time. + + Move the code below the affected definitions. + + * pcre2grep: avoid mixing declarations with code + + Since d5a61ee8 (Patch to detect (and ignore) symlink loops in pcre2grep, + 2021-08-28), code will fail to build in a strict C89 compiler. + + Reformat slightly to make it C89 compatible again. + + +Version 10.38 01-October-2021 +----------------------------- + +1. Fix invalid single character repetition issues in JIT when the repetition +is inside a capturing bracket and the bracket is preceded by character +literals. + +2. Installed revised CMake configuration files provided by Jan-Willem Blokland. +This extends the CMake build system to build both static and shared libraries +in one go, builds the static library with PIC, and exposes PCRE2 libraries +using the CMake config files. JWB provided these notes: + +- Introduced CMake variable BUILD_STATIC_LIBS to build the static library. + +- Make a small modification to config-cmake.h.in by removing the PCRE2_STATIC + variable. Added PCRE2_STATIC variable to the static build using the + target_compile_definitions() function. + +- Extended the CMake config files. + + - Introduced CMake variable PCRE2_USE_STATIC_LIBS to easily switch between + the static and shared libraries. + + - Added the PCRE_STATIC variable to the target compile definitions for the + import of the static library. + +Building static and shared libraries using MSVC results in a name clash of +the libraries. Both static and shared library builds create, for example, the +file pcre2-8.lib. Therefore, I decided to change the static library names by +adding "-static". For example, pcre2-8.lib has become pcre2-8-static.lib. +[Comment by PH: this is MSVC-specific. It doesn't happen on Linux.] + +3. Increased the minimum release number for CMake to 3.0.0 because older than +2.8.12 is deprecated (it was set to 2.8.5) and causes warnings. Even 3.0.0 is +quite old; it was released in 2014. + +4. Implemented a modified version of Thomas Tempelmann's pcre2grep patch for +detecting symlink loops. This is dependent on the availability of realpath(), +which is now tested for in ./configure and CMakeLists.txt. + +5. Implemented a modified version of Thomas Tempelmann's patch for faster +case-independent "first code unit" searches for unanchored patterns in 8-bit +mode in the interpreters. Instead of just remembering whether one case matched +or not, it remembers the position of a previous match so as to avoid +unnecessary repeated searching. + +6. Perl now locks out \K in lookarounds, so PCRE2 now does the same by default. +However, just in case anybody was relying on the old behaviour, there is an +option called PCRE2_EXTRA_ALLOW_LOOKAROUND_BSK that enables the old behaviour. +An option has also been added to pcre2grep to enable this. + +7. Re-enable a JIT optimization which was unintentionally disabled in 10.35. + +8. There is a loop counter to catch excessively crazy patterns when checking +the lengths of lookbehinds at compile time. This was incorrectly getting reset +whenever a lookahead was processed, leading to some fuzzer-generated patterns +taking a very long time to compile when (?|) was present in the pattern, +because (?|) disables caching of group lengths. + + +Version 10.37 26-May-2021 +------------------------- + +1. Change RunGrepTest to use tr instead of sed when testing with binary +zero bytes, because sed varies a lot from system to system and has problems +with binary zeros. This is from Bugzilla #2681. Patch from Jeremie +Courreges-Anglas via Nam Nguyen. This fixes RunGrepTest for OpenBSD. Later: +it broke it for at least one version of Solaris, where tr can't handle binary +zeros. However, that system had /usr/xpg4/bin/tr installed, which works OK, so +RunGrepTest now checks for that command and uses it if found. + +2. Compiling with gcc 10.2's -fanalyzer option showed up a hypothetical problem +with a NULL dereference. I don't think this case could ever occur in practice, +but I have put in a check in order to get rid of the compiler error. + +3. An alternative patch for CMakeLists.txt because 10.36 #4 breaks CMake on +Windows. Patch from email@cs-ware.de fixes bugzilla #2688. + +4. Two bugs related to over-large numbers have been fixed so the behaviour is +now the same as Perl. + + (a) A pattern such as /\214748364/ gave an overflow error instead of being + treated as the octal number \214 followed by literal digits. + + (b) A sequence such as {65536 that has no terminating } so is not a + quantifier was nevertheless complaining that a quantifier number was too big. + +5. A run of autoconf suggested that configure.ac was out-of-date with respect +to the lastest autoconf. Running autoupdate made some valid changes, some valid +suggestions, and also some invalid changes, which were fixed by hand. Autoconf +now runs clean and the resulting "configure" seems to work, so I hope nothing +is broken. Later: the requirement for autoconf 2.70 broke some automatic test +robots. It doesn't seem to be necessary: trying a reduction to 2.60. + +6. The pattern /a\K.(?0)*/ when matched against "abac" by the interpreter gave +the answer "bac", whereas Perl and JIT both yield "c". This was because the +effect of \K was not propagating back from the full pattern recursion. Other +recursions such as /(a\K.(?1)*)/ did not have this problem. + +7. Restore single character repetition optimization in JIT. Currently fewer +character repetitions are optimized than in 10.34. + +8. When the names of the functions in the POSIX wrapper were changed to +pcre2_regcomp() etc. (see change 10.33 #4 below), functions with the original +names were left in the library so that pre-compiled programs would still work. +However, this has proved troublesome when programs link with several libraries, +some of which use PCRE2 via the POSIX interface while others use a native POSIX +library. For this reason, the POSIX function names are removed in this release. +The macros in pcre2posix.h should ensure that re-compiling fixes any programs +that haven't been compiled since before 10.33. + + +Version 10.36 04-December-2020 +------------------------------ + +1. Add CET_CFLAGS so that when Intel CET is enabled, pass -mshstk to +compiler. This fixes https://bugs.exim.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2578. Patch for +Makefile.am and configure.ac by H.J. Lu. Equivalent patch for CMakeLists.txt +invented by PH. + +2. Fix inifinite loop when a single byte newline is searched in JIT when +invalid utf8 mode is enabled. + +3. Updated CMakeLists.txt with patch from Wolfgang Stöggl (Bugzilla #2584): + + - Include GNUInstallDirs and use ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR} instead of hardcoded + lib. This allows differentiation between lib and lib64. + CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR is used for installation of libraries and also for + pkgconfig file generation. + + - Add the version of PCRE2 to the configuration summary like ./configure + does. + + - Fix typo: MACTHED_STRING->MATCHED_STRING + +4. Updated CMakeLists.txt with another patch from Wolfgang Stöggl (Bugzilla +#2588): + + - Add escaped double quotes around include directory in CMakeLists.txt to + allow spaces in directory names. + + - This fixes a cmake error, if the path of the pcre2 source contains a space. + +5. Updated CMakeLists.txt with a patch from B. Scott Michel: CMake's +documentation suggests using CHECK_SYMBOL_EXISTS over CHECK_FUNCTION_EXIST. +Moreover, these functions come from specific header files, which need to be +specified (and, thankfully, are the same on both the Linux and WinXX +platforms.) + +6. Added a (uint32_t) cast to prevent a compiler warning in pcre2_compile.c. + +7. Applied a patch from Wolfgang Stöggl (Bugzilla #2600) to fix postfix for +debug Windows builds using CMake. This also updated configure so that it +generates *.pc files and pcre2-config with the same content, as in the past. + +8. If a pattern ended with (?(VERSION=n.d where n is any number but d is just a +single digit, the code unit beyond d was being read (i.e. there was a read +buffer overflow). Fixes ClusterFuzz 23779. + +9. After the rework in r1235, certain character ranges were incorrectly +handled by an optimization in JIT. Furthermore a wrong offset was used to +read a value from a buffer which could lead to memory overread. + +10. Unnoticed for many years was the fact that delimiters other than / in the +testinput1 and testinput4 files could cause incorrect behaviour when these +files were processed by perltest.sh. There were several tests that used quotes +as delimiters, and it was just luck that they didn't go wrong with perltest.sh. +All the patterns in testinput1 and testinput4 now use / as their delimiter. +This fixes Bugzilla #2641. + +11. Perl has started to give an error for \K within lookarounds (though there +are cases where it doesn't). PCRE2 still allows this, so the tests that include +this case have been moved from test 1 to test 2. + +12. Further to 10 above, pcre2test has been updated to detect and grumble if a +delimiter other than / is used after #perltest. + +13. Fixed a bug with PCRE2_MATCH_INVALID_UTF in 8-bit mode when PCRE2_CASELESS +was set and PCRE2_NO_START_OPTIMIZE was not set. The optimization for finding +the start of a match was not resetting correctly after a failed match on the +first valid fragment of the subject, possibly causing incorrect "no match" +returns on subsequent fragments. For example, the pattern /A/ failed to match +the subject \xe5A. Fixes Bugzilla #2642. + +14. Fixed a bug in character set matching when JIT is enabled and both unicode +scripts and unicode classes are present at the same time. + +15. Added GNU grep's -m (aka --max-count) option to pcre2grep. + +16. Refactored substitution processing in pcre2grep strings, both for the -O +option and when dealing with callouts. There is now a single function that +handles $ expansion in all cases (instead of multiple copies of almost +identical code). This means that the same escape sequences are available +everywhere, which was not previously the case. At the same time, the escape +sequences $x{...} and $o{...} have been introduced, to allow for characters +whose code points are greater than 255 in Unicode mode. + +17. Applied the patch from Bugzilla #2628 to RunGrepTest. This does an explicit +test for a version of sed that can handle binary zero, instead of assuming that +any Linux version will work. Later: replaced $(...) by `...` because not all +shells recognize the former. + +18. Fixed a word boundary check bug in JIT when partial matching is enabled. + +19. Fix ARM64 compilation warning in JIT. Patch by Carlo. + +20. A bug in the RunTest script meant that if the first part of test 2 failed, +the failure was not reported. + +21. Test 2 was failing when run from a directory other than the source +directory. This failure was previously missed in RunTest because of 20 above. +Fixes added to both RunTest and RunTest.bat. + +22. Patch to CMakeLists.txt from Daniel to fix problem with testing under +Windows. + + +Version 10.35 09-May-2020 +--------------------------- + +1. Use PCRE2_MATCH_EMPTY flag to detect empty matches in JIT. + +2. Fix ARMv5 JIT improper handling of labels right after a constant pool. + +3. A JIT bug is fixed which allowed to read the fields of the compiled +pattern before its existence is checked. + +4. Back in the PCRE1 day, capturing groups that contained recursive back +references to themselves were made atomic (version 8.01, change 18) because +after the end a repeated group, the captured substrings had their values from +the final repetition, not from an earlier repetition that might be the +destination of a backtrack. This feature was documented, and was carried over +into PCRE2. However, it has now been realized that the major refactoring that +was done for 10.30 has made this atomicizing unnecessary, and it is confusing +when users are unaware of it, making some patterns appear not to be working as +expected. Capture values of recursive back references in repeated groups are +now correctly backtracked, so this unnecessary restriction has been removed. + +5. Added PCRE2_SUBSTITUTE_LITERAL. + +6. Avoid some VS compiler warnings. + +7. Added PCRE2_SUBSTITUTE_MATCHED. + +8. Added (?* and (?<* as synonyms for (*napla: and (*naplb: to match another +regex engine. The Perl regex folks are aware of this usage and have made a note +about it. + +9. When an assertion is repeated, PCRE2 used to limit the maximum repetition to +1, believing that repeating an assertion is pointless. However, if a positive +assertion contains capturing groups, repetition can be useful. In any case, an +assertion could always be wrapped in a repeated group. The only restriction +that is now imposed is that an unlimited maximum is changed to one more than +the minimum. + +10. Fix *THEN verbs in lookahead assertions in JIT. + +11. Added PCRE2_SUBSTITUTE_REPLACEMENT_ONLY. + +12. The JIT stack should be freed when the low-level stack allocation fails. + +13. In pcre2grep, if the final line in a scanned file is output but does not +end with a newline sequence, add a newline according to the --newline setting. + +14. (?(DEFINE)...) groups were not being handled correctly when checking for +the fixed length of a lookbehind assertion. Such a group within a lookbehind +should be skipped, as it does not contribute to the length of the group. +Instead, the (DEFINE) group was being processed, and if at the end of the +lookbehind, that end was not correctly recognized. Errors such as "lookbehind +assertion is not fixed length" and also "internal error: bad code value in +parsed_skip()" could result. + +15. Put a limit of 1000 on recursive calls in pcre2_study() when searching +nested groups for starting code units, in order to avoid stack overflow issues. +If the limit is reached, it just gives up trying for this optimization. + +16. The control verb chain list must always be restored when exiting from a +recurse function in JIT. + +17. Fix a crash which occurs when the character type of an invalid UTF +character is decoded in JIT. + +18. Changes in many areas of the code so that when Unicode is supported and +PCRE2_UCP is set without PCRE2_UTF, Unicode character properties are used for +upper/lower case computations on characters whose code points are greater than +127. + +19. The function for checking UTF-16 validity was returning an incorrect offset +for the start of the error when a high surrogate was not followed by a valid +low surrogate. This caused incorrect behaviour, for example when +PCRE2_MATCH_INVALID_UTF was set and a match started immediately following the +invalid high surrogate, such as /aa/ matching "\x{d800}aa". + +20. If a DEFINE group immediately preceded a lookbehind assertion, the pattern +could be mis-compiled and therefore not match correctly. This is the example +that found this: /(?(DEFINE)(?bar))(? has been raised to +50, (b) the new --om-capture option changes the limit, (c) an error is raised +if -o asks for a group that is above the limit. + +12. The quantifier {1} was always being ignored, but this is incorrect when it +is made possessive and applied to an item in parentheses, because a +parenthesized item may contain multiple branches or other backtracking points, +for example /(a|ab){1}+c/ or /(a+){1}+a/. + +13. For partial matches, pcre2test was always showing the maximum lookbehind +characters, flagged with "<", which is misleading when the lookbehind didn't +actually look behind the start (because it was later in the pattern). Showing +all consulted preceding characters for partial matches is now controlled by the +existing "allusedtext" modifier and, as for complete matches, this facility is +available only for non-JIT matching, because JIT does not maintain the first +and last consulted characters. + +14. DFA matching (using pcre2_dfa_match()) was not recognising a partial match +if the end of the subject was encountered in a lookahead (conditional or +otherwise), an atomic group, or a recursion. + +15. Give error if pcre2test -t, -T, -tm or -TM is given an argument of zero. + +16. Check for integer overflow when computing lookbehind lengths. Fixes +Clusterfuzz issue 15636. + +17. Implemented non-atomic positive lookaround assertions. + +18. If a lookbehind contained a lookahead that contained another lookbehind +within it, the nested lookbehind was not correctly processed. For example, if +/(?<=(?=(?<=a)))b/ was matched to "ab" it gave no match instead of matching +"b". + +19. Implemented pcre2_get_match_data_size(). + +20. Two alterations to partial matching: + + (a) The definition of a partial match is slightly changed: if a pattern + contains any lookbehinds, an empty partial match may be given, because this + is another situation where adding characters to the current subject can + lead to a full match. Example: /c*+(?<=[bc])/ with subject "ab". + + (b) Similarly, if a pattern could match an empty string, an empty partial + match may be given. Example: /(?![ab]).*/ with subject "ab". This case + applies only to PCRE2_PARTIAL_HARD. + + (c) An empty string partial hard match can be returned for \z and \Z as it + is documented that they shouldn't match. + +21. A branch that started with (*ACCEPT) was not being recognized as one that +could match an empty string. + +22. Corrected pcre2_set_character_tables() tables data type: was const unsigned +char * instead of const uint8_t *, as generated by pcre2_maketables(). + +23. Upgraded to Unicode 12.1.0. + +24. Add -jitfast command line option to pcre2test (to make all the jit options +available directly). + +25. Make pcre2test -C show if libreadline or libedit is supported. + +26. If the length of one branch of a group exceeded 65535 (the maximum value +that is remembered as a minimum length), the whole group's length was +incorrectly recorded as 65535, leading to incorrect "no match" when start-up +optimizations were in force. + +27. The "rightmost consulted character" value was not always correct; in +particular, if a pattern ended with a negative lookahead, characters that were +inspected in that lookahead were not included. + +28. Add the pcre2_maketables_free() function. + +29. The start-up optimization that looks for a unique initial matching +code unit in the interpretive engines uses memchr() in 8-bit mode. When the +search is caseless, it was doing so inefficiently, which ended up slowing down +the match drastically when the subject was very long. The revised code (a) +remembers if one case is not found, so it never repeats the search for that +case after a bumpalong and (b) when one case has been found, it searches only +up to that position for an earlier occurrence of the other case. This fix +applies to both interpretive pcre2_match() and to pcre2_dfa_match(). + +30. While scanning to find the minimum length of a group, if any branch has +minimum length zero, there is no need to scan any subsequent branches (a small +compile-time performance improvement). + +31. Installed a .gitignore file on a user's suggestion. When using the svn +repository with git (through git svn) this helps keep it tidy. + +32. Add underflow check in JIT which may occur when the value of subject +string pointer is close to 0. + +33. Arrange for classes such as [Aa] which contain just the two cases of the +same character, to be treated as a single caseless character. This causes the +first and required code unit optimizations to kick in where relevant. + +34. Improve the bitmap of starting bytes for positive classes that include wide +characters, but no property types, in UTF-8 mode. Previously, on encountering +such a class, the bits for all bytes greater than \xc4 were set, thus +specifying any character with codepoint >= 0x100. Now the only bits that are +set are for the relevant bytes that start the wide characters. This can give a +noticeable performance improvement. + +35. If the bitmap of starting code units contains only 1 or 2 bits, replace it +with a single starting code unit (1 bit) or a caseless single starting code +unit if the two relevant characters are case-partners. This is particularly +relevant to the 8-bit library, though it applies to all. It can give a +performance boost for patterns such as [Ww]ord and (word|WORD). However, this +optimization doesn't happen if there is a "required" code unit of the same +value (because the search for a "required" code unit starts at the match start +for non-unique first code unit patterns, but after a unique first code unit, +and patterns such as a*a need the former action). + +36. Small patch to pcre2posix.c to set the erroroffset field to -1 immediately +after a successful compile, instead of at the start of matching to avoid a +sanitizer complaint (regexec is supposed to be thread safe). + +37. Add NEON vectorization to JIT to speed up matching of first character and +pairs of characters on ARM64 CPUs. + +38. If a non-ASCII character was the first in a starting assertion in a +caseless match, the "first code unit" optimization did not get the casing +right, and the assertion failed to match a character in the other case if it +did not start with the same code unit. + +39. Fixed the incorrect computation of jump sizes on x86 CPUs in JIT. A masking +operation was incorrectly removed in r1136. Reported by Ralf Junker. + + +Version 10.33 16-April-2019 +--------------------------- + +1. Added "allvector" to pcre2test to make it easy to check the part of the +ovector that shouldn't be changed, in particular after substitute and failed or +partial matches. + +2. Fix subject buffer overread in JIT when UTF is disabled and \X or \R has +a greater than 1 fixed quantifier. This issue was found by Yunho Kim. + +3. Added support for callouts from pcre2_substitute(). After 10.33-RC1, but +prior to release, fixed a bug that caused a crash if pcre2_substitute() was +called with a NULL match context. + +4. The POSIX functions are now all called pcre2_regcomp() etc., with wrapper +functions that use the standard POSIX names. However, in pcre2posix.h the POSIX +names are defined as macros. This should help avoid linking with the wrong +library in some environments while still exporting the POSIX names for +pre-existing programs that use them. (The Debian alternative names are also +defined as macros, but not documented.) + +5. Fix an xclass matching issue in JIT. + +6. Implement PCRE2_EXTRA_ESCAPED_CR_IS_LF (see Bugzilla 2315). + +7. Implement the Perl 5.28 experimental alphabetic names for atomic groups and +lookaround assertions, for example, (*pla:...) and (*atomic:...). These are +characterized by a lower case letter following (* and to simplify coding for +this, the character tables created by pcre2_maketables() were updated to add a +new "is lower case letter" bit. At the same time, the now unused "is +hexadecimal digit" bit was removed. The default tables in +src/pcre2_chartables.c.dist are updated. + +8. Implement the new Perl "script run" features (*script_run:...) and +(*atomic_script_run:...) aka (*sr:...) and (*asr:...). + +9. Fixed two typos in change 22 for 10.21, which added special handling for +ranges such as a-z in EBCDIC environments. The original code probably never +worked, though there were no bug reports. + +10. Implement PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT for pcre2_match() (including JIT via +pcre2_match()) and pcre2_dfa_match(), but *not* the pcre2_jit_match() fast +path. Also, when a match fails, set the subject field in the match data to NULL +for tidiness - none of the substring extractors should reference this after +match failure. + +11. If a pattern started with a subroutine call that had a quantifier with a +minimum of zero, an incorrect "match must start with this character" could be +recorded. Example: /(?&xxx)*ABC(?XYZ)/ would (incorrectly) expect 'A' to +be the first character of a match. + +12. The heap limit checking code in pcre2_dfa_match() could suffer from +overflow if the heap limit was set very large. This could cause incorrect "heap +limit exceeded" errors. + +13. Add "kibibytes" to the heap limit output from pcre2test -C to make the +units clear. + +14. Add a call to pcre2_jit_free_unused_memory() in pcre2grep, for tidiness. + +15. Updated the VMS-specific code in pcre2test on the advice of a VMS user. + +16. Removed the unnecessary inclusion of stdint.h (or inttypes.h) from +pcre2_internal.h as it is now included by pcre2.h. Also, change 17 for 10.32 +below was unnecessarily complicated, as inttypes.h is a Standard C header, +which is defined to be a superset of stdint.h. Instead of conditionally +including stdint.h or inttypes.h, pcre2.h now unconditionally includes +inttypes.h. This supports environments that do not have stdint.h but do have +inttypes.h, which are known to exist. A note in the autotools documentation +says (November 2018) that there are none known that are the other way round. + +17. Added --disable-percent-zt to "configure" (and equivalent to CMake) to +forcibly disable the use of %zu and %td in formatting strings because there is +at least one version of VMS that claims to be C99 but does not support these +modifiers. + +18. Added --disable-pcre2grep-callout-fork, which restricts the callout support +in pcre2grep to the inbuilt echo facility. This may be useful in environments +that do not support fork(). + +19. Fix two instances of <= 0 being applied to unsigned integers (the VMS +compiler complains). + +20. Added "fork" support for VMS to pcre2grep, for running an external program +via a string callout. + +21. Improve MAP_JIT flag usage on MacOS. Patch by Rich Siegel. + +22. If a pattern started with (*MARK), (*COMMIT), (*PRUNE), (*SKIP), or (*THEN) +followed by ^ it was not recognized as anchored. + +23. The RunGrepTest script used to cut out the test of NUL characters for +Solaris and MacOS as printf and sed can't handle them. It seems that the *BSD +systems can't either. I've inverted the test so that only those OS that are +known to work (currently only Linux) try to run this test. + +24. Some tests in RunGrepTest appended to testtrygrep from two different file +descriptors instead of redirecting stderr to stdout. This worked on Linux, but +it was reported not to on other systems, causing the tests to fail. + +25. In the RunTest script, make the test for stack setting use the same value +for the stack as it needs for -bigstack. + +26. Insert a cast in pcre2_dfa_match.c to suppress a compiler warning. + +26. With PCRE2_EXTRA_BAD_ESCAPE_IS_LITERAL set, escape sequences such as \s +which are valid in character classes, but not as the end of ranges, were being +treated as literals. An example is [_-\s] (but not [\s-_] because that gave an +error at the *start* of a range). Now an "invalid range" error is given +independently of PCRE2_EXTRA_BAD_ESCAPE_IS_LITERAL. + +27. Related to 26 above, PCRE2_BAD_ESCAPE_IS_LITERAL was affecting known escape +sequences such as \eX when they appeared invalidly in a character class. Now +the option applies only to unrecognized or malformed escape sequences. + +28. Fix word boundary in JIT compiler. Patch by Mike Munday. + +29. The pcre2_dfa_match() function was incorrectly handling conditional version +tests such as (?(VERSION>=0)...) when the version test was true. Incorrect +processing or a crash could result. + +30. When PCRE2_UTF is set, allow non-ASCII letters and decimal digits in group +names, as Perl does. There was a small bug in this new code, found by +ClusterFuzz 12950, fixed before release. + +31. Implemented PCRE2_EXTRA_ALT_BSUX to support ECMAScript 6's \u{hhh} +construct. + +32. Compile \p{Any} to be the same as . in DOTALL mode, so that it benefits +from auto-anchoring if \p{Any}* starts a pattern. + +33. Compile invalid UTF check in JIT test when only pcre32 is enabled. + +34. For some time now, CMake has been warning about the setting of policy +CMP0026 to "OLD" in CmakeLists.txt, and hinting that the feature might be +removed in a future version. A request for CMake expertise on the list produced +no result, so I have now hacked CMakeLists.txt along the lines of some changes +I found on the Internet. The new code no longer needs the policy setting, and +it appears to work fine on Linux. + +35. Setting --enable-jit=auto for an out-of-tree build failed because the +source directory wasn't in the search path for AC_TRY_COMPILE always. Patch +from Ross Burton. + +36. Disable SSE2 JIT optimizations in x86 CPUs when SSE2 is not available. +Patch by Guillem Jover. + +37. Changed expressions such as 1<<10 to 1u<<10 in many places because compiler +warnings were reported. + +38. Using the clang compiler with sanitizing options causes runtime complaints +about truncation for statements such as x = ~x when x is an 8-bit value; it +seems to compute ~x as a 32-bit value. Changing such statements to x = 255 ^ x +gets rid of the warnings. There were also two missing casts in pcre2test. + + +Version 10.32 10-September-2018 +------------------------------- + +1. When matching using the the REG_STARTEND feature of the POSIX API with a +non-zero starting offset, unset capturing groups with lower numbers than a +group that did capture something were not being correctly returned as "unset" +(that is, with offset values of -1). + +2. When matching using the POSIX API, pcre2test used to omit listing unset +groups altogether. Now it shows those that come before any actual captures as +"", as happens for non-POSIX matching. + +3. Running "pcre2test -C" always stated "\R matches CR, LF, or CRLF only", +whatever the build configuration was. It now correctly says "\R matches all +Unicode newlines" in the default case when --enable-bsr-anycrlf has not been +specified. Similarly, running "pcre2test -C bsr" never produced the result +ANY. + +4. Matching the pattern /(*UTF)\C[^\v]+\x80/ against an 8-bit string containing +multi-code-unit characters caused bad behaviour and possibly a crash. This +issue was fixed for other kinds of repeat in release 10.20 by change 19, but +repeating character classes were overlooked. + +5. pcre2grep now supports the inclusion of binary zeros in patterns that are +read from files via the -f option. + +6. A small fix to pcre2grep to avoid compiler warnings for -Wformat-overflow=2. + +7. Added --enable-jit=auto support to configure.ac. + +8. Added some dummy variables to the heapframe structure in 16-bit and 32-bit +modes for the benefit of m68k, where pointers can be 16-bit aligned. The +dummies force 32-bit alignment and this ensures that the structure is a +multiple of PCRE2_SIZE, a requirement that is tested at compile time. In other +architectures, alignment requirements take care of this automatically. + +9. When returning an error from pcre2_pattern_convert(), ensure the error +offset is set zero for early errors. + +10. A number of patches for Windows support from Daniel Richard G: + + (a) List of error numbers in Runtest.bat corrected (it was not the same as in + Runtest). + + (b) pcre2grep snprintf() workaround as used elsewhere in the tree. + + (c) Support for non-C99 snprintf() that returns -1 in the overflow case. + +11. Minor tidy of pcre2_dfa_match() code. + +12. Refactored pcre2_dfa_match() so that the internal recursive calls no longer +use the stack for local workspace and local ovectors. Instead, an initial block +of stack is reserved, but if this is insufficient, heap memory is used. The +heap limit parameter now applies to pcre2_dfa_match(). + +13. If a "find limits" test of DFA matching in pcre2test resulted in too many +matches for the ovector, no matches were displayed. + +14. Removed an occurrence of ctrl/Z from test 6 because Windows treats it as +EOF. The test looks to have come from a fuzzer. + +15. If PCRE2 was built with a default match limit a lot greater than the +default default of 10 000 000, some JIT tests of the match limit no longer +failed. All such tests now set 10 000 000 as the upper limit. + +16. Another Windows related patch for pcregrep to ensure that WIN32 is +undefined under Cygwin. + +17. Test for the presence of stdint.h and inttypes.h in configure and CMake and +include whichever exists (stdint preferred) instead of unconditionally +including stdint. This makes life easier for old and non-standard systems. + +18. Further changes to improve portability, especially to old and or non- +standard systems: + + (a) Put all printf arguments in RunGrepTest into single, not double, quotes, + and use \0 not \x00 for binary zero. + + (b) Avoid the use of C++ (i.e. BCPL) // comments. + + (c) Parameterize the use of %zu in pcre2test to make it like %td. For both of + these now, if using MSVC or a standard C before C99, %lu is used with a + cast if necessary. + +19. Applied a contributed patch to CMakeLists.txt to increase the stack size +when linking pcre2test with MSVC. This gets rid of a stack overflow error in +the standard set of tests. + +20. Output a warning in pcre2test when ignoring the "altglobal" modifier when +it is given with the "replace" modifier. + +21. In both pcre2test and pcre2_substitute(), with global matching, a pattern +that matched an empty string, but never at the starting match offset, was not +handled in a Perl-compatible way. The pattern /(a(*:1))(?>b)(*SKIP:1)x|.*/ matched against "abc", where the *SKIP +shouldn't find a MARK (because is in an atomic group), but it did. + +26. Upgraded the perltest.sh script: (1) #pattern lines can now be used to set +a list of modifiers for all subsequent patterns - only those that the script +recognizes are meaningful; (2) #subject lines can be used to set or unset a +default "mark" modifier; (3) Unsupported #command lines give a warning when +they are ignored; (4) Mark data is output only if the "mark" modifier is +present. + +27. (*ACCEPT:ARG), (*FAIL:ARG), and (*COMMIT:ARG) are now supported. + +28. A (*MARK) name was not being passed back for positive assertions that were +terminated by (*ACCEPT). + +29. Add support for \N{U+dddd}, but only in Unicode mode. + +30. Add support for (?^) for unsetting all imnsx options. + +31. The PCRE2_EXTENDED (/x) option only ever discarded space characters whose +code point was less than 256 and that were recognized by the lookup table +generated by pcre2_maketables(), which uses isspace() to identify white space. +Now, when Unicode support is compiled, PCRE2_EXTENDED also discards U+0085, +U+200E, U+200F, U+2028, and U+2029, which are additional characters defined by +Unicode as "Pattern White Space". This makes PCRE2 compatible with Perl. + +32. In certain circumstances, option settings within patterns were not being +correctly processed. For example, the pattern /((?i)A)(?m)B/ incorrectly +matched "ab". (The (?m) setting lost the fact that (?i) should be reset at the +end of its group during the parse process, but without another setting such as +(?m) the compile phase got it right.) This bug was introduced by the +refactoring in release 10.23. + +33. PCRE2 uses bcopy() if available when memmove() is not, and it used just to +define memmove() as function call to bcopy(). This hasn't been tested for a +long time because in pcre2test the result of memmove() was being used, whereas +bcopy() doesn't return a result. This feature is now refactored always to call +an emulation function when there is no memmove(). The emulation makes use of +bcopy() when available. + +34. When serializing a pattern, set the memctl, executable_jit, and tables +fields (that is, all the fields that contain pointers) to zeros so that the +result of serializing is always the same. These fields are re-set when the +pattern is deserialized. + +35. In a pattern such as /[^\x{100}-\x{ffff}]*[\x80-\xff]/ which has a repeated +negative class with no characters less than 0x100 followed by a positive class +with only characters less than 0x100, the first class was incorrectly being +auto-possessified, causing incorrect match failures. + +36. Removed the character type bit ctype_meta, which dates from PCRE1 and is +not used in PCRE2. + +37. Tidied up unnecessarily complicated macros used in the escapes table. + +38. Since 10.21, the new testoutput8-16-4 file has accidentally been omitted +from distribution tarballs, owing to a typo in Makefile.am which had +testoutput8-16-3 twice. Now fixed. + +39. If the only branch in a conditional subpattern was anchored, the whole +subpattern was treated as anchored, when it should not have been, since the +assumed empty second branch cannot be anchored. Demonstrated by test patterns +such as /(?(1)^())b/ or /(?(?=^))b/. + +40. A repeated conditional subpattern that could match an empty string was +always assumed to be unanchored. Now it it checked just like any other +repeated conditional subpattern, and can be found to be anchored if the minimum +quantifier is one or more. I can't see much use for a repeated anchored +pattern, but the behaviour is now consistent. + +41. Minor addition to pcre2_jit_compile.c to avoid static analyzer complaint +(for an event that could never occur but you had to have external information +to know that). + +42. If before the first match in a file that was being searched by pcre2grep +there was a line that was sufficiently long to cause the input buffer to be +expanded, the variable holding the location of the end of the previous match +was being adjusted incorrectly, and could cause an overflow warning from a code +sanitizer. However, as the value is used only to print pending "after" lines +when the next match is reached (and there are no such lines in this case) this +bug could do no damage. + + +Version 10.31 12-February-2018 +------------------------------ + +1. Fix typo (missing ]) in VMS code in pcre2test.c. + +2. Replace the replicated code for matching extended Unicode grapheme sequences +(which got a lot more complicated by change 10.30/49) by a single subroutine +that is called by both pcre2_match() and pcre2_dfa_match(). + +3. Add idempotent guard to pcre2_internal.h. + +4. Add new pcre2_config() options: PCRE2_CONFIG_NEVER_BACKSLASH_C and +PCRE2_CONFIG_COMPILED_WIDTHS. + +5. Cut out \C tests in the JIT regression tests when NEVER_BACKSLASH_C is +defined (e.g. by --enable-never-backslash-C). + +6. Defined public names for all the pcre2_compile() error numbers, and used +the public names in pcre2_convert.c. + +7. Fixed a small memory leak in pcre2test (convert contexts). + +8. Added two casts to compile.c and one to match.c to avoid compiler warnings. + +9. Added code to pcre2grep when compiled under VMS to set the symbol +PCRE2GREP_RC to the exit status, because VMS does not distinguish between +exit(0) and exit(1). + +10. Added the -LM (list modifiers) option to pcre2test. Also made -C complain +about a bad option only if the following argument item does not start with a +hyphen. + +11. pcre2grep was truncating components of file names to 128 characters when +processing files with the -r option, and also (some very odd code) truncating +path names to 512 characters. There is now a check on the absolute length of +full path file names, which may be up to 2047 characters long. + +12. When an assertion contained (*ACCEPT) it caused all open capturing groups +to be closed (as for a non-assertion ACCEPT), which was wrong and could lead to +misbehaviour for subsequent references to groups that started outside the +assertion. ACCEPT in an assertion now closes only those groups that were +started within that assertion. Fixes oss-fuzz issues 3852 and 3891. + +13. Multiline matching in pcre2grep was misbehaving if the pattern matched +within a line, and then matched again at the end of the line and over into +subsequent lines. Behaviour was different with and without colouring, and +sometimes context lines were incorrectly printed and/or line endings were lost. +All these issues should now be fixed. + +14. If --line-buffered was specified for pcre2grep when input was from a +compressed file (.gz or .bz2) a segfault occurred. (Line buffering should be +ignored for compressed files.) + +15. Although pcre2_jit_match checks whether the pattern is compiled +in a given mode, it was also expected that at least one mode is available. +This is fixed and pcre2_jit_match returns with PCRE2_ERROR_JIT_BADOPTION +when the pattern is not optimized by JIT at all. + +16. The line number and related variables such as match counts in pcre2grep +were all int variables, causing overflow when files with more than 2147483647 +lines were processed (assuming 32-bit ints). They have all been changed to +unsigned long ints. + +17. If a backreference with a minimum repeat count of zero was first in a +pattern, apart from assertions, an incorrect first matching character could be +recorded. For example, for the pattern /(?=(a))\1?b/, "b" was incorrectly set +as the first character of a match. + +18. Characters in a leading positive assertion are considered for recording a +first character of a match when the rest of the pattern does not provide one. +However, a character in a non-assertive group within a leading assertion such +as in the pattern /(?=(a))\1?b/ caused this process to fail. This was an +infelicity rather than an outright bug, because it did not affect the result of +a match, just its speed. (In fact, in this case, the starting 'a' was +subsequently picked up in the study.) + +19. A minor tidy in pcre2_match(): making all PCRE2_ERROR_ returns use "return" +instead of "RRETURN" saves unwinding the backtracks in these cases (only one +didn't). + +20. Allocate a single callout block on the stack at the start of pcre2_match() +and set its never-changing fields once only. Do the same for pcre2_dfa_match(). + +21. Save the extra compile options (set in the compile context) with the +compiled pattern (they were not previously saved), add PCRE2_INFO_EXTRAOPTIONS +to retrieve them, and update pcre2test to show them. + +22. Added PCRE2_CALLOUT_STARTMATCH and PCRE2_CALLOUT_BACKTRACK bits to a new +field callout_flags in callout blocks. The bits are set by pcre2_match(), but +not by JIT or pcre2_dfa_match(). Their settings are shown in pcre2test callouts +if the callout_extra subject modifier is set. These bits are provided to help +with tracking how a backtracking match is proceeding. + +23. Updated the pcre2demo.c demonstration program, which was missing the extra +code for -g that handles the case when \K in an assertion causes the match to +end at the original start point. Also arranged for it to detect when \K causes +the end of a match to be before its start. + +24. Similar to 23 above, strange things (including loops) could happen in +pcre2grep when \K was used in an assertion when --colour was used or in +multiline mode. The "end at original start point" bug is fixed, and if the end +point is found to be before the start point, they are swapped. + +25. When PCRE2_FIRSTLINE without PCRE2_NO_START_OPTIMIZE was used in non-JIT +matching (both pcre2_match() and pcre2_dfa_match()) and the matched string +started with the first code unit of a newline sequence, matching failed because +it was not tried at the newline. + +26. Code for giving up a non-partial match after failing to find a starting +code unit anywhere in the subject was missing when searching for one of a +number of code units (the bitmap case) in both pcre2_match() and +pcre2_dfa_match(). This was a missing optimization rather than a bug. + +27. Tidied up the ACROSSCHAR macro to be like FORWARDCHAR and BACKCHAR, using a +pointer argument rather than a code unit value. This should not have affected +the generated code. + +28. The JIT compiler has been updated. + +29. Avoid pointer overflow for unset captures in pcre2_substring_list_get(). +This could not actually cause a crash because it was always used in a memcpy() +call with zero length. + +30. Some internal structures have a variable-length ovector[] as their last +element. Their actual memory is obtained dynamically, giving an ovector of +appropriate length. However, they are defined in the structure as +ovector[NUMBER], where NUMBER is large so that array bound checkers don't +grumble. The value of NUMBER was 10000, but a fuzzer exceeded 5000 capturing +groups, making the ovector larger than this. The number has been increased to +131072, which allows for the maximum number of captures (65535) plus the +overall match. This fixes oss-fuzz issue 5415. + +31. Auto-possessification at the end of a capturing group was dependent on what +follows the group (e.g. /(a+)b/ would auto-possessify the a+) but this caused +incorrect behaviour when the group was called recursively from elsewhere in the +pattern where something different might follow. This bug is an unforseen +consequence of change #1 for 10.30 - the implementation of backtracking into +recursions. Iterators at the ends of capturing groups are no longer considered +for auto-possessification if the pattern contains any recursions. Fixes +Bugzilla #2232. + + +Version 10.30 14-August-2017 +---------------------------- + +1. The main interpreter, pcre2_match(), has been refactored into a new version +that does not use recursive function calls (and therefore the stack) for +remembering backtracking positions. This makes --disable-stack-for-recursion a +NOOP. The new implementation allows backtracking into recursive group calls in +patterns, making it more compatible with Perl, and also fixes some other +hard-to-do issues such as #1887 in Bugzilla. The code is also cleaner because +the old code had a number of fudges to try to reduce stack usage. It seems to +run no slower than the old code. + +A number of bugs in the refactored code were subsequently fixed during testing +before release, but after the code was made available in the repository. These +bugs were never in fully released code, but are noted here for the record. + + (a) If a pattern had fewer capturing parentheses than the ovector supplied in + the match data block, a memory error (detectable by ASAN) occurred after + a match, because the external block was being set from non-existent + internal ovector fields. Fixes oss-fuzz issue 781. + + (b) A pattern with very many capturing parentheses (when the internal frame + size was greater than the initial frame vector on the stack) caused a + crash. A vector on the heap is now set up at the start of matching if the + vector on the stack is not big enough to handle at least 10 frames. + Fixes oss-fuzz issue 783. + + (c) Handling of (*VERB)s in recursions was wrong in some cases. + + (d) Captures in negative assertions that were used as conditions were not + happening if the assertion matched via (*ACCEPT). + + (e) Mark values were not being passed out of recursions. + + (f) Refactor some code in do_callout() to avoid picky compiler warnings about + negative indices. Fixes oss-fuzz issue 1454. + + (g) Similarly refactor the way the variable length ovector is addressed for + similar reasons. Fixes oss-fuzz issue 1465. + +2. Now that pcre2_match() no longer uses recursive function calls (see above), +the "match limit recursion" value seems misnamed. It still exists, and limits +the depth of tree that is searched. To avoid future confusion, it has been +renamed as "depth limit" in all relevant places (--with-depth-limit, +(*LIMIT_DEPTH), pcre2_set_depth_limit(), etc) but the old names are still +available for backwards compatibility. + +3. Hardened pcre2test so as to reduce the number of bugs reported by fuzzers: + + (a) Check for malloc failures when getting memory for the ovector (POSIX) or + the match data block (non-POSIX). + +4. In the 32-bit library in non-UTF mode, an attempt to find a Unicode property +for a character with a code point greater than 0x10ffff (the Unicode maximum) +caused a crash. + +5. If a lookbehind assertion that contained a back reference to a group +appearing later in the pattern was compiled with the PCRE2_ANCHORED option, +undefined actions (often a segmentation fault) could occur, depending on what +other options were set. An example assertion is (?" should be ">=" in opcode check in pcre2_auto_possess.c. + (b) Added some casts to avoid "suspicious implicit sign extension". + (c) Resource leaks in pcre2test in rare error cases. + (d) Avoid warning for never-use case OP_TABLE_LENGTH which is just a fudge + for checking at compile time that tables are the right size. + (e) Add missing "fall through" comment. + +29. Implemented PCRE2_EXTENDED_MORE and related /xx and (?xx) features. + +30. Implement (?n: for PCRE2_NO_AUTO_CAPTURE, because Perl now has this. + +31. If more than one of "push", "pushcopy", or "pushtablescopy" were set in +pcre2test, a crash could occur. + +32. Make -bigstack in RunTest allocate a 64MiB stack (instead of 16MiB) so +that all the tests can run with clang's sanitizing options. + +33. Implement extra compile options in the compile context and add the first +one: PCRE2_EXTRA_ALLOW_SURROGATE_ESCAPES. + +34. Implement newline type PCRE2_NEWLINE_NUL. + +35. A lookbehind assertion that had a zero-length branch caused undefined +behaviour when processed by pcre2_dfa_match(). This is oss-fuzz issue 1859. + +36. The match limit value now also applies to pcre2_dfa_match() as there are +patterns that can use up a lot of resources without necessarily recursing very +deeply. (Compare item 10.23/36.) This should fix oss-fuzz #1761. + +37. Implement PCRE2_EXTRA_BAD_ESCAPE_IS_LITERAL. + +38. Fix returned offsets from regexec() when REG_STARTEND is used with a +starting offset greater than zero. + +39. Implement REG_PEND (GNU extension) for the POSIX wrapper. + +40. Implement the subject_literal modifier in pcre2test, and allow jitstack on +pattern lines. + +41. Implement PCRE2_LITERAL and use it to support REG_NOSPEC. + +42. Implement PCRE2_EXTRA_MATCH_LINE and PCRE2_EXTRA_MATCH_WORD for the benefit +of pcre2grep. + +43. Re-implement pcre2grep's -F, -w, and -x options using PCRE2_LITERAL, +PCRE2_EXTRA_MATCH_WORD, and PCRE2_EXTRA_MATCH_LINE. This fixes two bugs: + + (a) The -F option did not work for fixed strings containing \E. + (b) The -w option did not work for patterns with multiple branches. + +44. Added configuration options for the SELinux compatible execmem allocator in +JIT. + +45. Increased the limit for searching for a "must be present" code unit in +subjects from 1000 to 2000 for 8-bit searches, since they use memchr() and are +much faster. + +46. Arrange for anchored patterns to record and use "first code unit" data, +because this can give a fast "no match" without searching for a "required code +unit". Previously only non-anchored patterns did this. + +47. Upgraded the Unicode tables from Unicode 8.0.0 to Unicode 10.0.0. + +48. Add the callout_no_where modifier to pcre2test. + +49. Update extended grapheme breaking rules to the latest set that are in +Unicode Standard Annex #29. + +50. Added experimental foreign pattern conversion facilities +(pcre2_pattern_convert() and friends). + +51. Change the macro FWRITE, used in pcre2grep, to FWRITE_IGNORE because FWRITE +is defined in a system header in cygwin. Also modified some of the #ifdefs in +pcre2grep related to Windows and Cygwin support. + +52. Change 3(g) for 10.23 was a bit too zealous. If a hyphen that follows a +character class is the last character in the class, Perl does not give a +warning. PCRE2 now also treats this as a literal. + +53. Related to 52, though PCRE2 was throwing an error for [[:digit:]-X] it was +not doing so for [\d-X] (and similar escapes), as is documented. + +54. Fixed a MIPS issue in the JIT compiler reported by Joshua Kinard. + +55. Fixed a "maybe uninitialized" warning for class_uchardata in \p handling in +pcre2_compile() which could never actually trigger (code should have been cut +out when Unicode support is disabled). + + +Version 10.23 14-February-2017 +------------------------------ + +1. Extended pcre2test with the utf8_input modifier so that it is able to +generate all possible 16-bit and 32-bit code unit values in non-UTF modes. + +2. In any wide-character mode (8-bit UTF or any 16-bit or 32-bit mode), without +PCRE2_UCP set, a negative character type such as \D in a positive class should +cause all characters greater than 255 to match, whatever else is in the class. +There was a bug that caused this not to happen if a Unicode property item was +added to such a class, for example [\D\P{Nd}] or [\W\pL]. + +3. There has been a major re-factoring of the pcre2_compile.c file. Most syntax +checking is now done in the pre-pass that identifies capturing groups. This has +reduced the amount of duplication and made the code tidier. While doing this, +some minor bugs and Perl incompatibilities were fixed, including: + + (a) \Q\E in the middle of a quantifier such as A+\Q\E+ is now ignored instead + of giving an invalid quantifier error. + + (b) {0} can now be used after a group in a lookbehind assertion; previously + this caused an "assertion is not fixed length" error. + + (c) Perl always treats (?(DEFINE) as a "define" group, even if a group with + the name "DEFINE" exists. PCRE2 now does likewise. + + (d) A recursion condition test such as (?(R2)...) must now refer to an + existing subpattern. + + (e) A conditional recursion test such as (?(R)...) misbehaved if there was a + group whose name began with "R". + + (f) When testing zero-terminated patterns under valgrind, the terminating + zero is now marked "no access". This catches bugs that would otherwise + show up only with non-zero-terminated patterns. + + (g) A hyphen appearing immediately after a POSIX character class (for example + /[[:ascii:]-z]/) now generates an error. Perl does accept this as a + literal, but gives a warning, so it seems best to fail it in PCRE. + + (h) An empty \Q\E sequence may appear after a callout that precedes an + assertion condition (it is, of course, ignored). + +One effect of the refactoring is that some error numbers and messages have +changed, and the pattern offset given for compiling errors is not always the +right-most character that has been read. In particular, for a variable-length +lookbehind assertion it now points to the start of the assertion. Another +change is that when a callout appears before a group, the "length of next +pattern item" that is passed now just gives the length of the opening +parenthesis item, not the length of the whole group. A length of zero is now +given only for a callout at the end of the pattern. Automatic callouts are no +longer inserted before and after explicit callouts in the pattern. + +A number of bugs in the refactored code were subsequently fixed during testing +before release, but after the code was made available in the repository. Many +of the bugs were discovered by fuzzing testing. Several of them were related to +the change from assuming a zero-terminated pattern (which previously had +required non-zero terminated strings to be copied). These bugs were never in +fully released code, but are noted here for the record. + + (a) An overall recursion such as (?0) inside a lookbehind assertion was not + being diagnosed as an error. + + (b) In utf mode, the length of a *MARK (or other verb) name was being checked + in characters instead of code units, which could lead to bad code being + compiled, leading to unpredictable behaviour. + + (c) In extended /x mode, characters whose code was greater than 255 caused + a lookup outside one of the global tables. A similar bug existed for wide + characters in *VERB names. + + (d) The amount of memory needed for a compiled pattern was miscalculated if a + lookbehind contained more than one toplevel branch and the first branch + was of length zero. + + (e) In UTF-8 or UTF-16 modes with PCRE2_EXTENDED (/x) set and a non-zero- + terminated pattern, if a # comment ran on to the end of the pattern, one + or more code units past the end were being read. + + (f) An unterminated repeat at the end of a non-zero-terminated pattern (e.g. + "{2,2") could cause reading beyond the pattern. + + (g) When reading a callout string, if the end delimiter was at the end of the + pattern one further code unit was read. + + (h) An unterminated number after \g' could cause reading beyond the pattern. + + (i) An insufficient memory size was being computed for compiling with + PCRE2_AUTO_CALLOUT. + + (j) A conditional group with an assertion condition used more memory than was + allowed for it during parsing, so too many of them could therefore + overrun a buffer. + + (k) If parsing a pattern exactly filled the buffer, the internal test for + overrun did not check when the final META_END item was added. + + (l) If a lookbehind contained a subroutine call, and the called group + contained an option setting such as (?s), and the PCRE2_ANCHORED option + was set, unpredictable behaviour could occur. The underlying bug was + incorrect code and insufficient checking while searching for the end of + the called subroutine in the parsed pattern. + + (m) Quantifiers following (*VERB)s were not being diagnosed as errors. + + (n) The use of \Q...\E in a (*VERB) name when PCRE2_ALT_VERBNAMES and + PCRE2_AUTO_CALLOUT were both specified caused undetermined behaviour. + + (o) If \Q was preceded by a quantified item, and the following \E was + followed by '?' or '+', and there was at least one literal character + between them, an internal error "unexpected repeat" occurred (example: + /.+\QX\E+/). + + (p) A buffer overflow could occur while sorting the names in the group name + list (depending on the order in which the names were seen). + + (q) A conditional group that started with a callout was not doing the right + check for a following assertion, leading to compiling bad code. Example: + /(?(C'XX))?!XX/ + + (r) If a character whose code point was greater than 0xffff appeared within + a lookbehind that was within another lookbehind, the calculation of the + lookbehind length went wrong and could provoke an internal error. + + (t) The sequence \E- or \Q\E- after a POSIX class in a character class caused + an internal error. Now the hyphen is treated as a literal. + +4. Back references are now permitted in lookbehind assertions when there are +no duplicated group numbers (that is, (?| has not been used), and, if the +reference is by name, there is only one group of that name. The referenced +group must, of course be of fixed length. + +5. pcre2test has been upgraded so that, when run under valgrind with valgrind +support enabled, reading past the end of the pattern is detected, both when +compiling and during callout processing. + +6. \g{+} (e.g. \g{+2} ) is now supported. It is a "forward back +reference" and can be useful in repetitions (compare \g{-} ). Perl does +not recognize this syntax. + +7. Automatic callouts are no longer generated before and after callouts in the +pattern. + +8. When pcre2test was outputing information from a callout, the caret indicator +for the current position in the subject line was incorrect if it was after an +escape sequence for a character whose code point was greater than \x{ff}. + +9. Change 19 for 10.22 had a typo (PCRE_STATIC_RUNTIME should be +PCRE2_STATIC_RUNTIME). Fix from David Gaussmann. + +10. Added --max-buffer-size to pcre2grep, to allow for automatic buffer +expansion when long lines are encountered. Original patch by Dmitry +Cherniachenko. + +11. If pcre2grep was compiled with JIT support, but the library was compiled +without it (something that neither ./configure nor CMake allow, but it can be +done by editing config.h), pcre2grep was giving a JIT error. Now it detects +this situation and does not try to use JIT. + +12. Added some "const" qualifiers to variables in pcre2grep. + +13. Added Dmitry Cherniachenko's patch for colouring output in Windows +(untested by me). Also, look for GREP_COLOUR or GREP_COLOR if the environment +variables PCRE2GREP_COLOUR and PCRE2GREP_COLOR are not found. + +14. Add the -t (grand total) option to pcre2grep. + +15. A number of bugs have been mended relating to match start-up optimizations +when the first thing in a pattern is a positive lookahead. These all applied +only when PCRE2_NO_START_OPTIMIZE was *not* set: + + (a) A pattern such as (?=.*X)X$ was incorrectly optimized as if it needed + both an initial 'X' and a following 'X'. + (b) Some patterns starting with an assertion that started with .* were + incorrectly optimized as having to match at the start of the subject or + after a newline. There are cases where this is not true, for example, + (?=.*[A-Z])(?=.{8,16})(?!.*[\s]) matches after the start in lines that + start with spaces. Starting .* in an assertion is no longer taken as an + indication of matching at the start (or after a newline). + +16. The "offset" modifier in pcre2test was not being ignored (as documented) +when the POSIX API was in use. + +17. Added --enable-fuzz-support to "configure", causing an non-installed +library containing a test function that can be called by fuzzers to be +compiled. A non-installed binary to run the test function locally, called +pcre2fuzzcheck is also compiled. + +18. A pattern with PCRE2_DOTALL (/s) set but not PCRE2_NO_DOTSTAR_ANCHOR, and +which started with .* inside a positive lookahead was incorrectly being +compiled as implicitly anchored. + +19. Removed all instances of "register" declarations, as they are considered +obsolete these days and in any case had become very haphazard. + +20. Add strerror() to pcre2test for failed file opening. + +21. Make pcre2test -C list valgrind support when it is enabled. + +22. Add the use_length modifier to pcre2test. + +23. Fix an off-by-one bug in pcre2test for the list of names for 'get' and +'copy' modifiers. + +24. Add PCRE2_CALL_CONVENTION into the prototype declarations in pcre2.h as it +is apparently needed there as well as in the function definitions. (Why did +nobody ask for this in PCRE1?) + +25. Change the _PCRE2_H and _PCRE2_UCP_H guard macros in the header files to +PCRE2_H_IDEMPOTENT_GUARD and PCRE2_UCP_H_IDEMPOTENT_GUARD to be more standard +compliant and unique. + +26. pcre2-config --libs-posix was listing -lpcre2posix instead of +-lpcre2-posix. Also, the CMake build process was building the library with the +wrong name. + +27. In pcre2test, give some offset information for errors in hex patterns. +This uses the C99 formatting sequence %td, except for MSVC which doesn't +support it - %lu is used instead. + +28. Implemented pcre2_code_copy_with_tables(), and added pushtablescopy to +pcre2test for testing it. + +29. Fix small memory leak in pcre2test. + +30. Fix out-of-bounds read for partial matching of /./ against an empty string +when the newline type is CRLF. + +31. Fix a bug in pcre2test that caused a crash when a locale was set either in +the current pattern or a previous one and a wide character was matched. + +32. The appearance of \p, \P, or \X in a substitution string when +PCRE2_SUBSTITUTE_EXTENDED was set caused a segmentation fault (NULL +dereference). + +33. If the starting offset was specified as greater than the subject length in +a call to pcre2_substitute() an out-of-bounds memory reference could occur. + +34. When PCRE2 was compiled to use the heap instead of the stack for recursive +calls to match(), a repeated minimizing caseless back reference, or a +maximizing one where the two cases had different numbers of code units, +followed by a caseful back reference, could lose the caselessness of the first +repeated back reference (example: /(Z)(a)\2{1,2}?(?-i)\1X/i should match ZaAAZX +but didn't). + +35. When a pattern is too complicated, PCRE2 gives up trying to find a minimum +matching length and just records zero. Typically this happens when there are +too many nested or recursive back references. If the limit was reached in +certain recursive cases it failed to be triggered and an internal error could +be the result. + +36. The pcre2_dfa_match() function now takes note of the recursion limit for +the internal recursive calls that are used for lookrounds and recursions within +the pattern. + +37. More refactoring has got rid of the internal could_be_empty_branch() +function (around 400 lines of code, including comments) by keeping track of +could-be-emptiness as the pattern is compiled instead of scanning compiled +groups. (This would have been much harder before the refactoring of #3 above.) +This lifts a restriction on the number of branches in a group (more than about +1100 would give "pattern is too complicated"). + +38. Add the "-ac" command line option to pcre2test as a synonym for "-pattern +auto_callout". + +39. In a library with Unicode support, incorrect data was compiled for a +pattern with PCRE2_UCP set without PCRE2_UTF if a class required all wide +characters to match (for example, /[\s[:^ascii:]]/). + +40. The callout_error modifier has been added to pcre2test to make it possible +to return PCRE2_ERROR_CALLOUT from a callout. + +41. A minor change to pcre2grep: colour reset is now "[0m" instead of +"[00m". + +42. The limit in the auto-possessification code that was intended to catch +overly-complicated patterns and not spend too much time auto-possessifying was +being reset too often, resulting in very long compile times for some patterns. +Now such patterns are no longer completely auto-possessified. + +43. Applied Jason Hood's revised patch for RunTest.bat. + +44. Added a new Windows script RunGrepTest.bat, courtesy of Jason Hood. + +45. Minor cosmetic fix to pcre2test: move a variable that is not used under +Windows into the "not Windows" code. + +46. Applied Jason Hood's patches to upgrade pcre2grep under Windows and tidy +some of the code: + + * normalised the Windows condition by ensuring WIN32 is defined; + * enables the callout feature under Windows; + * adds globbing (Microsoft's implementation expands quoted args), + using a tweaked opendirectory; + * implements the is_*_tty functions for Windows; + * --color=always will write the ANSI sequences to file; + * add sequences 4 (underline works on Win10) and 5 (blink as bright + background, relatively standard on DOS/Win); + * remove the (char *) casts for the now-const strings; + * remove GREP_COLOUR (grep's command line allowed the 'u', but not + the environment), parsing GREP_COLORS instead; + * uses the current colour if not set, rather than black; + * add print_match for the undefined case; + * fixes a typo. + +In addition, colour settings containing anything other than digits and +semicolon are ignored, and the colour controls are no longer output for empty +strings. + +47. Detecting patterns that are too large inside the length-measuring loop +saves processing ridiculously long patterns to their end. + +48. Ignore PCRE2_CASELESS when processing \h, \H, \v, and \V in classes as it +just wastes time. In the UTF case it can also produce redundant entries in +XCLASS lists caused by characters with multiple other cases and pairs of +characters in the same "not-x" sublists. + +49. A pattern such as /(?=(a\K))/ can report the end of the match being before +its start; pcre2test was not handling this correctly when using the POSIX +interface (it was OK with the native interface). + +50. In pcre2grep, ignore all JIT compile errors. This means that pcre2grep will +continue to work, falling back to interpretation if anything goes wrong with +JIT. + +51. Applied patches from Christian Persch to configure.ac to make use of the +AC_USE_SYSTEM_EXTENSIONS macro and to test for functions used by the JIT +modules. + +52. Minor fixes to pcre2grep from Jason Hood: + * fixed some spacing; + * Windows doesn't usually use single quotes, so I've added a define + to use appropriate quotes [in an example]; + * LC_ALL was displayed as "LCC_ALL"; + * numbers 11, 12 & 13 should end in "th"; + * use double quotes in usage message. + +53. When autopossessifying, skip empty branches without recursion, to reduce +stack usage for the benefit of clang with -fsanitize-address, which uses huge +stack frames. Example pattern: /X?(R||){3335}/. Fixes oss-fuzz issue 553. + +54. A pattern with very many explicit back references to a group that is a long +way from the start of the pattern could take a long time to compile because +searching for the referenced group in order to find the minimum length was +being done repeatedly. Now up to 128 group minimum lengths are cached and the +attempt to find a minimum length is abandoned if there is a back reference to a +group whose number is greater than 128. (In that case, the pattern is so +complicated that this optimization probably isn't worth it.) This fixes +oss-fuzz issue 557. + +55. Issue 32 for 10.22 below was not correctly fixed. If pcre2grep in multiline +mode with --only-matching matched several lines, it restarted scanning at the +next line instead of moving on to the end of the matched string, which can be +several lines after the start. + +56. Applied Jason Hood's new patch for RunGrepTest.bat that updates it in line +with updates to the non-Windows version. + + + +Version 10.22 29-July-2016 +-------------------------- + +1. Applied Jason Hood's patches to RunTest.bat and testdata/wintestoutput3 +to fix problems with running the tests under Windows. + +2. Implemented a facility for quoting literal characters within hexadecimal +patterns in pcre2test, to make it easier to create patterns with just a few +non-printing characters. + +3. Binary zeros are not supported in pcre2test input files. It now detects them +and gives an error. + +4. Updated the valgrind parameters in RunTest: (a) changed smc-check=all to +smc-check=all-non-file; (b) changed obj:* in the suppression file to obj:??? so +that it matches only unknown objects. + +5. Updated the maintenance script maint/ManyConfigTests to make it easier to +select individual groups of tests. + +6. When the POSIX wrapper function regcomp() is called, the REG_NOSUB option +used to set PCRE2_NO_AUTO_CAPTURE when calling pcre2_compile(). However, this +disables the use of back references (and subroutine calls), which are supported +by other implementations of regcomp() with RE_NOSUB. Therefore, REG_NOSUB no +longer causes PCRE2_NO_AUTO_CAPTURE to be set, though it still ignores nmatch +and pmatch when regexec() is called. + +7. Because of 6 above, pcre2test has been modified with a new modifier called +posix_nosub, to call regcomp() with REG_NOSUB. Previously the no_auto_capture +modifier had this effect. That option is now ignored when the POSIX API is in +use. + +8. Minor tidies to the pcre2demo.c sample program, including more comments +about its 8-bit-ness. + +9. Detect unmatched closing parentheses and give the error in the pre-scan +instead of later. Previously the pre-scan carried on and could give a +misleading incorrect error message. For example, /(?J)(?'a'))(?'a')/ gave a +message about invalid duplicate group names. + +10. It has happened that pcre2test was accidentally linked with another POSIX +regex library instead of libpcre2-posix. In this situation, a call to regcomp() +(in the other library) may succeed, returning zero, but of course putting its +own data into the regex_t block. In one example the re_pcre2_code field was +left as NULL, which made pcre2test think it had not got a compiled POSIX regex, +so it treated the next line as another pattern line, resulting in a confusing +error message. A check has been added to pcre2test to see if the data returned +from a successful call of regcomp() are valid for PCRE2's regcomp(). If they +are not, an error message is output and the pcre2test run is abandoned. The +message points out the possibility of a mis-linking. Hopefully this will avoid +some head-scratching the next time this happens. + +11. A pattern such as /(?<=((?C)0))/, which has a callout inside a lookbehind +assertion, caused pcre2test to output a very large number of spaces when the +callout was taken, making the program appearing to loop. + +12. A pattern that included (*ACCEPT) in the middle of a sufficiently deeply +nested set of parentheses of sufficient size caused an overflow of the +compiling workspace (which was diagnosed, but of course is not desirable). + +13. Detect missing closing parentheses during the pre-pass for group +identification. + +14. Changed some integer variable types and put in a number of casts, following +a report of compiler warnings from Visual Studio 2013 and a few tests with +gcc's -Wconversion (which still throws up a lot). + +15. Implemented pcre2_code_copy(), and added pushcopy and #popcopy to pcre2test +for testing it. + +16. Change 66 for 10.21 introduced the use of snprintf() in PCRE2's version of +regerror(). When the error buffer is too small, my version of snprintf() puts a +binary zero in the final byte. Bug #1801 seems to show that other versions do +not do this, leading to bad output from pcre2test when it was checking for +buffer overflow. It no longer assumes a binary zero at the end of a too-small +regerror() buffer. + +17. Fixed typo ("&&" for "&") in pcre2_study(). Fortunately, this could not +actually affect anything, by sheer luck. + +18. Two minor fixes for MSVC compilation: (a) removal of apparently incorrect +"const" qualifiers in pcre2test and (b) defining snprintf as _snprintf for +older MSVC compilers. This has been done both in src/pcre2_internal.h for most +of the library, and also in src/pcre2posix.c, which no longer includes +pcre2_internal.h (see 24 below). + +19. Applied Chris Wilson's patch (Bugzilla #1681) to CMakeLists.txt for MSVC +static compilation. Subsequently applied Chris Wilson's second patch, putting +the first patch under a new option instead of being unconditional when +PCRE_STATIC is set. + +20. Updated pcre2grep to set stdout as binary when run under Windows, so as not +to convert \r\n at the ends of reflected lines into \r\r\n. This required +ensuring that other output that is written to stdout (e.g. file names) uses the +appropriate line terminator: \r\n for Windows, \n otherwise. + +21. When a line is too long for pcre2grep's internal buffer, show the maximum +length in the error message. + +22. Added support for string callouts to pcre2grep (Zoltan's patch with PH +additions). + +23. RunTest.bat was missing a "set type" line for test 22. + +24. The pcre2posix.c file was including pcre2_internal.h, and using some +"private" knowledge of the data structures. This is unnecessary; the code has +been re-factored and no longer includes pcre2_internal.h. + +25. A racing condition is fixed in JIT reported by Mozilla. + +26. Minor code refactor to avoid "array subscript is below array bounds" +compiler warning. + +27. Minor code refactor to avoid "left shift of negative number" warning. + +28. Add a bit more sanity checking to pcre2_serialize_decode() and document +that it expects trusted data. + +29. Fix typo in pcre2_jit_test.c + +30. Due to an oversight, pcre2grep was not making use of JIT when available. +This is now fixed. + +31. The RunGrepTest script is updated to use the valgrind suppressions file +when testing with JIT under valgrind (compare 10.21/51 below). The suppressions +file is updated so that is now the same as for PCRE1: it suppresses the +Memcheck warnings Addr16 and Cond in unknown objects (that is, JIT-compiled +code). Also changed smc-check=all to smc-check=all-non-file as was done for +RunTest (see 4 above). + +32. Implemented the PCRE2_NO_JIT option for pcre2_match(). + +33. Fix typo that gave a compiler error when JIT not supported. + +34. Fix comment describing the returns from find_fixedlength(). + +35. Fix potential negative index in pcre2test. + +36. Calls to pcre2_get_error_message() with error numbers that are never +returned by PCRE2 functions were returning empty strings. Now the error code +PCRE2_ERROR_BADDATA is returned. A facility has been added to pcre2test to +show the texts for given error numbers (i.e. to call pcre2_get_error_message() +and display what it returns) and a few representative error codes are now +checked in RunTest. + +37. Added "&& !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER)" to the test for __GNUC__ in +pcre2_match.c, in anticipation that this is needed for the same reason it was +recently added to pcrecpp.cc in PCRE1. + +38. Using -o with -M in pcre2grep could cause unnecessary repeated output when +the match extended over a line boundary, as it tried to find more matches "on +the same line" - but it was already over the end. + +39. Allow \C in lookbehinds and DFA matching in UTF-32 mode (by converting it +to the same code as '.' when PCRE2_DOTALL is set). + +40. Fix two clang compiler warnings in pcre2test when only one code unit width +is supported. + +41. Upgrade RunTest to automatically re-run test 2 with a large (64MiB) stack +if it fails when running the interpreter with a 16MiB stack (and if changing +the stack size via pcre2test is possible). This avoids having to manually set a +large stack size when testing with clang. + +42. Fix register overwite in JIT when SSE2 acceleration is enabled. + +43. Detect integer overflow in pcre2test pattern and data repetition counts. + +44. In pcre2test, ignore "allcaptures" after DFA matching. + +45. Fix unaligned accesses on x86. Patch by Marc Mutz. + +46. Fix some more clang compiler warnings. + + +Version 10.21 12-January-2016 +----------------------------- + +1. Improve matching speed of patterns starting with + or * in JIT. + +2. Use memchr() to find the first character in an unanchored match in 8-bit +mode in the interpreter. This gives a significant speed improvement. + +3. Removed a redundant copy of the opcode_possessify table in the +pcre2_auto_possessify.c source. + +4. Fix typos in dftables.c for z/OS. + +5. Change 36 for 10.20 broke the handling of [[:>:]] and [[:<:]] in that +processing them could involve a buffer overflow if the following character was +an opening parenthesis. + +6. Change 36 for 10.20 also introduced a bug in processing this pattern: +/((?x)(*:0))#(?'/. Specifically: if a setting of (?x) was followed by a (*MARK) +setting (which (*:0) is), then (?x) did not get unset at the end of its group +during the scan for named groups, and hence the external # was incorrectly +treated as a comment and the invalid (?' at the end of the pattern was not +diagnosed. This caused a buffer overflow during the real compile. This bug was +discovered by Karl Skomski with the LLVM fuzzer. + +7. Moved the pcre2_find_bracket() function from src/pcre2_compile.c into its +own source module to avoid a circular dependency between src/pcre2_compile.c +and src/pcre2_study.c + +8. A callout with a string argument containing an opening square bracket, for +example /(?C$[$)(?<]/, was incorrectly processed and could provoke a buffer +overflow. This bug was discovered by Karl Skomski with the LLVM fuzzer. + +9. The handling of callouts during the pre-pass for named group identification +has been tightened up. + +10. The quantifier {1} can be ignored, whether greedy, non-greedy, or +possessive. This is a very minor optimization. + +11. A possessively repeated conditional group that could match an empty string, +for example, /(?(R))*+/, was incorrectly compiled. + +12. The Unicode tables have been updated to Unicode 8.0.0 (thanks to Christian +Persch). + +13. An empty comment (?#) in a pattern was incorrectly processed and could +provoke a buffer overflow. This bug was discovered by Karl Skomski with the +LLVM fuzzer. + +14. Fix infinite recursion in the JIT compiler when certain patterns such as +/(?:|a|){100}x/ are analysed. + +15. Some patterns with character classes involving [: and \\ were incorrectly +compiled and could cause reading from uninitialized memory or an incorrect +error diagnosis. Examples are: /[[:\\](?<[::]/ and /[[:\\](?'abc')[a:]. The +first of these bugs was discovered by Karl Skomski with the LLVM fuzzer. + +16. Pathological patterns containing many nested occurrences of [: caused +pcre2_compile() to run for a very long time. This bug was found by the LLVM +fuzzer. + +17. A missing closing parenthesis for a callout with a string argument was not +being diagnosed, possibly leading to a buffer overflow. This bug was found by +the LLVM fuzzer. + +18. A conditional group with only one branch has an implicit empty alternative +branch and must therefore be treated as potentially matching an empty string. + +19. If (?R was followed by - or + incorrect behaviour happened instead of a +diagnostic. This bug was discovered by Karl Skomski with the LLVM fuzzer. + +20. Another bug that was introduced by change 36 for 10.20: conditional groups +whose condition was an assertion preceded by an explicit callout with a string +argument might be incorrectly processed, especially if the string contained \Q. +This bug was discovered by Karl Skomski with the LLVM fuzzer. + +21. Compiling PCRE2 with the sanitize options of clang showed up a number of +very pedantic coding infelicities and a buffer overflow while checking a UTF-8 +string if the final multi-byte UTF-8 character was truncated. + +22. For Perl compatibility in EBCDIC environments, ranges such as a-z in a +class, where both values are literal letters in the same case, omit the +non-letter EBCDIC code points within the range. + +23. Finding the minimum matching length of complex patterns with back +references and/or recursions can take a long time. There is now a cut-off that +gives up trying to find a minimum length when things get too complex. + +24. An optimization has been added that speeds up finding the minimum matching +length for patterns containing repeated capturing groups or recursions. + +25. If a pattern contained a back reference to a group whose number was +duplicated as a result of appearing in a (?|...) group, the computation of the +minimum matching length gave a wrong result, which could cause incorrect "no +match" errors. For such patterns, a minimum matching length cannot at present +be computed. + +26. Added a check for integer overflow in conditions (?() and +(?(R). This omission was discovered by Karl Skomski with the LLVM +fuzzer. + +27. Fixed an issue when \p{Any} inside an xclass did not read the current +character. + +28. If pcre2grep was given the -q option with -c or -l, or when handling a +binary file, it incorrectly wrote output to stdout. + +29. The JIT compiler did not restore the control verb head in case of *THEN +control verbs. This issue was found by Karl Skomski with a custom LLVM fuzzer. + +30. The way recursive references such as (?3) are compiled has been re-written +because the old way was the cause of many issues. Now, conversion of the group +number into a pattern offset does not happen until the pattern has been +completely compiled. This does mean that detection of all infinitely looping +recursions is postponed till match time. In the past, some easy ones were +detected at compile time. This re-writing was done in response to yet another +bug found by the LLVM fuzzer. + +31. A test for a back reference to a non-existent group was missing for items +such as \987. This caused incorrect code to be compiled. This issue was found +by Karl Skomski with a custom LLVM fuzzer. + +32. Error messages for syntax errors following \g and \k were giving inaccurate +offsets in the pattern. + +33. Improve the performance of starting single character repetitions in JIT. + +34. (*LIMIT_MATCH=) now gives an error instead of setting the value to 0. + +35. Error messages for syntax errors in *LIMIT_MATCH and *LIMIT_RECURSION now +give the right offset instead of zero. + +36. The JIT compiler should not check repeats after a {0,1} repeat byte code. +This issue was found by Karl Skomski with a custom LLVM fuzzer. + +37. The JIT compiler should restore the control chain for empty possessive +repeats. This issue was found by Karl Skomski with a custom LLVM fuzzer. + +38. A bug which was introduced by the single character repetition optimization +was fixed. + +39. Match limit check added to recursion. This issue was found by Karl Skomski +with a custom LLVM fuzzer. + +40. Arrange for the UTF check in pcre2_match() and pcre2_dfa_match() to look +only at the part of the subject that is relevant when the starting offset is +non-zero. + +41. Improve first character match in JIT with SSE2 on x86. + +42. Fix two assertion fails in JIT. These issues were found by Karl Skomski +with a custom LLVM fuzzer. + +43. Correct the setting of CMAKE_C_FLAGS in CMakeLists.txt (patch from Roy Ivy +III). + +44. Fix bug in RunTest.bat for new test 14, and adjust the script for the added +test (there are now 20 in total). + +45. Fixed a corner case of range optimization in JIT. + +46. Add the ${*MARK} facility to pcre2_substitute(). + +47. Modifier lists in pcre2test were splitting at spaces without the required +commas. + +48. Implemented PCRE2_ALT_VERBNAMES. + +49. Fixed two issues in JIT. These were found by Karl Skomski with a custom +LLVM fuzzer. + +50. The pcre2test program has been extended by adding the #newline_default +command. This has made it possible to run the standard tests when PCRE2 is +compiled with either CR or CRLF as the default newline convention. As part of +this work, the new command was added to several test files and the testing +scripts were modified. The pcre2grep tests can now also be run when there is no +LF in the default newline convention. + +51. The RunTest script has been modified so that, when JIT is used and valgrind +is specified, a valgrind suppressions file is set up to ignore "Invalid read of +size 16" errors because these are false positives when the hardware supports +the SSE2 instruction set. + +52. It is now possible to have comment lines amid the subject strings in +pcre2test (and perltest.sh) input. + +53. Implemented PCRE2_USE_OFFSET_LIMIT and pcre2_set_offset_limit(). + +54. Add the null_context modifier to pcre2test so that calling pcre2_compile() +and the matching functions with NULL contexts can be tested. + +55. Implemented PCRE2_SUBSTITUTE_EXTENDED. + +56. In a character class such as [\W\p{Any}] where both a negative-type escape +("not a word character") and a property escape were present, the property +escape was being ignored. + +57. Fixed integer overflow for patterns whose minimum matching length is very, +very large. + +58. Implemented --never-backslash-C. + +59. Change 55 above introduced a bug by which certain patterns provoked the +erroneous error "\ at end of pattern". + +60. The special sequences [[:<:]] and [[:>:]] gave rise to incorrect compiling +errors or other strange effects if compiled in UCP mode. Found with libFuzzer +and AddressSanitizer. + +61. Whitespace at the end of a pcre2test pattern line caused a spurious error +message if there were only single-character modifiers. It should be ignored. + +62. The use of PCRE2_NO_AUTO_CAPTURE could cause incorrect compilation results +or segmentation errors for some patterns. Found with libFuzzer and +AddressSanitizer. + +63. Very long names in (*MARK) or (*THEN) etc. items could provoke a buffer +overflow. + +64. Improve error message for overly-complicated patterns. + +65. Implemented an optional replication feature for patterns in pcre2test, to +make it easier to test long repetitive patterns. The tests for 63 above are +converted to use the new feature. + +66. In the POSIX wrapper, if regerror() was given too small a buffer, it could +misbehave. + +67. In pcre2_substitute() in UTF mode, the UTF validity check on the +replacement string was happening before the length setting when the replacement +string was zero-terminated. + +68. In pcre2_substitute() in UTF mode, PCRE2_NO_UTF_CHECK can be set for the +second and subsequent calls to pcre2_match(). + +69. There was no check for integer overflow for a replacement group number in +pcre2_substitute(). An added check for a number greater than the largest group +number in the pattern means this is not now needed. + +70. The PCRE2-specific VERSION condition didn't work correctly if only one +digit was given after the decimal point, or if more than two digits were given. +It now works with one or two digits, and gives a compile time error if more are +given. + +71. In pcre2_substitute() there was the possibility of reading one code unit +beyond the end of the replacement string. + +72. The code for checking a subject's UTF-32 validity for a pattern with a +lookbehind involved an out-of-bounds pointer, which could potentially cause +trouble in some environments. + +73. The maximum lookbehind length was incorrectly calculated for patterns such +as /(?<=(a)(?-1))x/ which have a recursion within a backreference. + +74. Give an error if a lookbehind assertion is longer than 65535 code units. + +75. Give an error in pcre2_substitute() if a match ends before it starts (as a +result of the use of \K). + +76. Check the length of subpattern names and the names in (*MARK:xx) etc. +dynamically to avoid the possibility of integer overflow. + +77. Implement pcre2_set_max_pattern_length() so that programs can restrict the +size of patterns that they are prepared to handle. + +78. (*NO_AUTO_POSSESS) was not working. + +79. Adding group information caching improves the speed of compiling when +checking whether a group has a fixed length and/or could match an empty string, +especially when recursion or subroutine calls are involved. However, this +cannot be used when (?| is present in the pattern because the same number may +be used for groups of different sizes. To catch runaway patterns in this +situation, counts have been introduced to the functions that scan for empty +branches or compute fixed lengths. + +80. Allow for the possibility of the size of the nest_save structure not being +a factor of the size of the compiling workspace (it currently is). + +81. Check for integer overflow in minimum length calculation and cap it at +65535. + +82. Small optimizations in code for finding the minimum matching length. + +83. Lock out configuring for EBCDIC with non-8-bit libraries. + +84. Test for error code <= 0 in regerror(). + +85. Check for too many replacements (more than INT_MAX) in pcre2_substitute(). + +86. Avoid the possibility of computing with an out-of-bounds pointer (though +not dereferencing it) while handling lookbehind assertions. + +87. Failure to get memory for the match data in regcomp() is now given as a +regcomp() error instead of waiting for regexec() to pick it up. + +88. In pcre2_substitute(), ensure that CRLF is not split when it is a valid +newline sequence. + +89. Paranoid check in regcomp() for bad error code from pcre2_compile(). + +90. Run test 8 (internal offsets and code sizes) for link sizes 3 and 4 as well +as for link size 2. + +91. Document that JIT has a limit on pattern size, and give more information +about JIT compile failures in pcre2test. + +92. Implement PCRE2_INFO_HASBACKSLASHC. + +93. Re-arrange valgrind support code in pcre2test to avoid spurious reports +with JIT (possibly caused by SSE2?). + +94. Support offset_limit in JIT. + +95. A sequence such as [[:punct:]b] that is, a POSIX character class followed +by a single ASCII character in a class item, was incorrectly compiled in UCP +mode. The POSIX class got lost, but only if the single character followed it. + +96. [:punct:] in UCP mode was matching some characters in the range 128-255 +that should not have been matched. + +97. If [:^ascii:] or [:^xdigit:] are present in a non-negated class, all +characters with code points greater than 255 are in the class. When a Unicode +property was also in the class (if PCRE2_UCP is set, escapes such as \w are +turned into Unicode properties), wide characters were not correctly handled, +and could fail to match. + +98. In pcre2test, make the "startoffset" modifier a synonym of "offset", +because it sets the "startoffset" parameter for pcre2_match(). + +99. If PCRE2_AUTO_CALLOUT was set on a pattern that had a (?# comment between +an item and its qualifier (for example, A(?#comment)?B) pcre2_compile() +misbehaved. This bug was found by the LLVM fuzzer. + +100. The error for an invalid UTF pattern string always gave the code unit +offset as zero instead of where the invalidity was found. + +101. Further to 97 above, negated classes such as [^[:^ascii:]\d] were also not +working correctly in UCP mode. + +102. Similar to 99 above, if an isolated \E was present between an item and its +qualifier when PCRE2_AUTO_CALLOUT was set, pcre2_compile() misbehaved. This bug +was found by the LLVM fuzzer. + +103. The POSIX wrapper function regexec() crashed if the option REG_STARTEND +was set when the pmatch argument was NULL. It now returns REG_INVARG. + +104. Allow for up to 32-bit numbers in the ordin() function in pcre2grep. + +105. An empty \Q\E sequence between an item and its qualifier caused +pcre2_compile() to misbehave when auto callouts were enabled. This bug +was found by the LLVM fuzzer. + +106. If both PCRE2_ALT_VERBNAMES and PCRE2_EXTENDED were set, and a (*MARK) or +other verb "name" ended with whitespace immediately before the closing +parenthesis, pcre2_compile() misbehaved. Example: /(*:abc )/, but only when +both those options were set. + +107. In a number of places pcre2_compile() was not handling NULL characters +correctly, and pcre2test with the "bincode" modifier was not always correctly +displaying fields containing NULLS: + + (a) Within /x extended #-comments + (b) Within the "name" part of (*MARK) and other *verbs + (c) Within the text argument of a callout + +108. If a pattern that was compiled with PCRE2_EXTENDED started with white +space or a #-type comment that was followed by (?-x), which turns off +PCRE2_EXTENDED, and there was no subsequent (?x) to turn it on again, +pcre2_compile() assumed that (?-x) applied to the whole pattern and +consequently mis-compiled it. This bug was found by the LLVM fuzzer. The fix +for this bug means that a setting of any of the (?imsxJU) options at the start +of a pattern is no longer transferred to the options that are returned by +PCRE2_INFO_ALLOPTIONS. In fact, this was an anachronism that should have +changed when the effects of those options were all moved to compile time. + +109. An escaped closing parenthesis in the "name" part of a (*verb) when +PCRE2_ALT_VERBNAMES was set caused pcre2_compile() to malfunction. This bug +was found by the LLVM fuzzer. + +110. Implemented PCRE2_SUBSTITUTE_UNSET_EMPTY, and updated pcre2test to make it +possible to test it. + +111. "Harden" pcre2test against ridiculously large values in modifiers and +command line arguments. + +112. Implemented PCRE2_SUBSTITUTE_UNKNOWN_UNSET and PCRE2_SUBSTITUTE_OVERFLOW_ +LENGTH. + +113. Fix printing of *MARK names that contain binary zeroes in pcre2test. + + +Version 10.20 30-June-2015 +-------------------------- + +1. Callouts with string arguments have been added. + +2. Assertion code generator in JIT has been optimized. + +3. The invalid pattern (?(?C) has a missing assertion condition at the end. The +pcre2_compile() function read past the end of the input before diagnosing an +error. This bug was discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +4. Implemented pcre2_callout_enumerate(). + +5. Fix JIT compilation of conditional blocks whose assertion is converted to +(*FAIL). E.g: /(?(?!))/. + +6. The pattern /(?(?!)^)/ caused references to random memory. This bug was +discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +7. The assertion (?!) is optimized to (*FAIL). This was not handled correctly +when this assertion was used as a condition, for example (?(?!)a|b). In +pcre2_match() it worked by luck; in pcre2_dfa_match() it gave an incorrect +error about an unsupported item. + +8. For some types of pattern, for example /Z*(|d*){216}/, the auto- +possessification code could take exponential time to complete. A recursion +depth limit of 1000 has been imposed to limit the resources used by this +optimization. This infelicity was discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +9. A pattern such as /(*UTF)[\S\V\H]/, which contains a negated special class +such as \S in non-UCP mode, explicit wide characters (> 255) can be ignored +because \S ensures they are all in the class. The code for doing this was +interacting badly with the code for computing the amount of space needed to +compile the pattern, leading to a buffer overflow. This bug was discovered by +the LLVM fuzzer. + +10. A pattern such as /((?2)+)((?1))/ which has mutual recursion nested inside +other kinds of group caused stack overflow at compile time. This bug was +discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +11. A pattern such as /(?1)(?#?'){8}(a)/ which had a parenthesized comment +between a subroutine call and its quantifier was incorrectly compiled, leading +to buffer overflow or other errors. This bug was discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +12. The illegal pattern /(?(?.*!.*)?)/ was not being diagnosed as missing an +assertion after (?(. The code was failing to check the character after (?(?< +for the ! or = that would indicate a lookbehind assertion. This bug was +discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +13. A pattern such as /X((?2)()*+){2}+/ which has a possessive quantifier with +a fixed maximum following a group that contains a subroutine reference was +incorrectly compiled and could trigger buffer overflow. This bug was discovered +by the LLVM fuzzer. + +14. Negative relative recursive references such as (?-7) to non-existent +subpatterns were not being diagnosed and could lead to unpredictable behaviour. +This bug was discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +15. The bug fixed in 14 was due to an integer variable that was unsigned when +it should have been signed. Some other "int" variables, having been checked, +have either been changed to uint32_t or commented as "must be signed". + +16. A mutual recursion within a lookbehind assertion such as (?<=((?2))((?1))) +caused a stack overflow instead of the diagnosis of a non-fixed length +lookbehind assertion. This bug was discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +17. The use of \K in a positive lookbehind assertion in a non-anchored pattern +(e.g. /(?<=\Ka)/) could make pcre2grep loop. + +18. There was a similar problem to 17 in pcre2test for global matches, though +the code there did catch the loop. + +19. If a greedy quantified \X was preceded by \C in UTF mode (e.g. \C\X*), +and a subsequent item in the pattern caused a non-match, backtracking over the +repeated \X did not stop, but carried on past the start of the subject, causing +reference to random memory and/or a segfault. There were also some other cases +where backtracking after \C could crash. This set of bugs was discovered by the +LLVM fuzzer. + +20. The function for finding the minimum length of a matching string could take +a very long time if mutual recursion was present many times in a pattern, for +example, /((?2){73}(?2))((?1))/. A better mutual recursion detection method has +been implemented. This infelicity was discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +21. Implemented PCRE2_NEVER_BACKSLASH_C. + +22. The feature for string replication in pcre2test could read from freed +memory if the replication required a buffer to be extended, and it was not +working properly in 16-bit and 32-bit modes. This issue was discovered by a +fuzzer: see http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/. + +23. Added the PCRE2_ALT_CIRCUMFLEX option. + +24. Adjust the treatment of \8 and \9 to be the same as the current Perl +behaviour. + +25. Static linking against the PCRE2 library using the pkg-config module was +failing on missing pthread symbols. + +26. If a group that contained a recursive back reference also contained a +forward reference subroutine call followed by a non-forward-reference +subroutine call, for example /.((?2)(?R)\1)()/, pcre2_compile() failed to +compile correct code, leading to undefined behaviour or an internally detected +error. This bug was discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +27. Quantification of certain items (e.g. atomic back references) could cause +incorrect code to be compiled when recursive forward references were involved. +For example, in this pattern: /(?1)()((((((\1++))\x85)+)|))/. This bug was +discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +28. A repeated conditional group whose condition was a reference by name caused +a buffer overflow if there was more than one group with the given name. This +bug was discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +29. A recursive back reference by name within a group that had the same name as +another group caused a buffer overflow. For example: /(?J)(?'d'(?'d'\g{d}))/. +This bug was discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +30. A forward reference by name to a group whose number is the same as the +current group, for example in this pattern: /(?|(\k'Pm')|(?'Pm'))/, caused a +buffer overflow at compile time. This bug was discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +31. Fix -fsanitize=undefined warnings for left shifts of 1 by 31 (it treats 1 +as an int; fixed by writing it as 1u). + +32. Fix pcre2grep compile when -std=c99 is used with gcc, though it still gives +a warning for "fileno" unless -std=gnu99 us used. + +33. A lookbehind assertion within a set of mutually recursive subpatterns could +provoke a buffer overflow. This bug was discovered by the LLVM fuzzer. + +34. Give an error for an empty subpattern name such as (?''). + +35. Make pcre2test give an error if a pattern that follows #forbud_utf contains +\P, \p, or \X. + +36. The way named subpatterns are handled has been refactored. There is now a +pre-pass over the regex which does nothing other than identify named +subpatterns and count the total captures. This means that information about +named patterns is known before the rest of the compile. In particular, it means +that forward references can be checked as they are encountered. Previously, the +code for handling forward references was contorted and led to several errors in +computing the memory requirements for some patterns, leading to buffer +overflows. + +37. There was no check for integer overflow in subroutine calls such as (?123). + +38. The table entry for \l in EBCDIC environments was incorrect, leading to its +being treated as a literal 'l' instead of causing an error. + +39. If a non-capturing group containing a conditional group that could match +an empty string was repeated, it was not identified as matching an empty string +itself. For example: /^(?:(?(1)x|)+)+$()/. + +40. In an EBCDIC environment, pcretest was mishandling the escape sequences +\a and \e in test subject lines. + +41. In an EBCDIC environment, \a in a pattern was converted to the ASCII +instead of the EBCDIC value. + +42. The handling of \c in an EBCDIC environment has been revised so that it is +now compatible with the specification in Perl's perlebcdic page. + +43. Single character repetition in JIT has been improved. 20-30% speedup +was achieved on certain patterns. + +44. The EBCDIC character 0x41 is a non-breaking space, equivalent to 0xa0 in +ASCII/Unicode. This has now been added to the list of characters that are +recognized as white space in EBCDIC. + +45. When PCRE2 was compiled without Unicode support, the use of \p and \P gave +an error (correctly) when used outside a class, but did not give an error +within a class. + +46. \h within a class was incorrectly compiled in EBCDIC environments. + +47. JIT should return with error when the compiled pattern requires +more stack space than the maximum. + +48. Fixed a memory leak in pcre2grep when a locale is set. + + +Version 10.10 06-March-2015 +--------------------------- + +1. When a pattern is compiled, it remembers the highest back reference so that +when matching, if the ovector is too small, extra memory can be obtained to +use instead. A conditional subpattern whose condition is a check on a capture +having happened, such as, for example in the pattern /^(?:(a)|b)(?(1)A|B)/, is +another kind of back reference, but it was not setting the highest +backreference number. This mattered only if pcre2_match() was called with an +ovector that was too small to hold the capture, and there was no other kind of +back reference (a situation which is probably quite rare). The effect of the +bug was that the condition was always treated as FALSE when the capture could +not be consulted, leading to a incorrect behaviour by pcre2_match(). This bug +has been fixed. + +2. Functions for serialization and deserialization of sets of compiled patterns +have been added. + +3. The value that is returned by PCRE2_INFO_SIZE has been corrected to remove +excess code units at the end of the data block that may occasionally occur if +the code for calculating the size over-estimates. This change stops the +serialization code copying uninitialized data, to which valgrind objects. The +documentation of PCRE2_INFO_SIZE was incorrect in stating that the size did not +include the general overhead. This has been corrected. + +4. All code units in every slot in the table of group names are now set, again +in order to avoid accessing uninitialized data when serializing. + +5. The (*NO_JIT) feature is implemented. + +6. If a bug that caused pcre2_compile() to use more memory than allocated was +triggered when using valgrind, the code in (3) above passed a stupidly large +value to valgrind. This caused a crash instead of an "internal error" return. + +7. A reference to a duplicated named group (either a back reference or a test +for being set in a conditional) that occurred in a part of the pattern where +PCRE2_DUPNAMES was not set caused the amount of memory needed for the pattern +to be incorrectly calculated, leading to overwriting. + +8. A mutually recursive set of back references such as (\2)(\1) caused a +segfault at compile time (while trying to find the minimum matching length). +The infinite loop is now broken (with the minimum length unset, that is, zero). + +9. If an assertion that was used as a condition was quantified with a minimum +of zero, matching went wrong. In particular, if the whole group had unlimited +repetition and could match an empty string, a segfault was likely. The pattern +(?(?=0)?)+ is an example that caused this. Perl allows assertions to be +quantified, but not if they are being used as conditions, so the above pattern +is faulted by Perl. PCRE2 has now been changed so that it also rejects such +patterns. + +10. The error message for an invalid quantifier has been changed from "nothing +to repeat" to "quantifier does not follow a repeatable item". + +11. If a bad UTF string is compiled with NO_UTF_CHECK, it may succeed, but +scanning the compiled pattern in subsequent auto-possessification can get out +of step and lead to an unknown opcode. Previously this could have caused an +infinite loop. Now it generates an "internal error" error. This is a tidyup, +not a bug fix; passing bad UTF with NO_UTF_CHECK is documented as having an +undefined outcome. + +12. A UTF pattern containing a "not" match of a non-ASCII character and a +subroutine reference could loop at compile time. Example: /[^\xff]((?1))/. + +13. The locale test (RunTest 3) has been upgraded. It now checks that a locale +that is found in the output of "locale -a" can actually be set by pcre2test +before it is accepted. Previously, in an environment where a locale was listed +but would not set (an example does exist), the test would "pass" without +actually doing anything. Also the fr_CA locale has been added to the list of +locales that can be used. + +14. Fixed a bug in pcre2_substitute(). If a replacement string ended in a +capturing group number without parentheses, the last character was incorrectly +literally included at the end of the replacement string. + +15. A possessive capturing group such as (a)*+ with a minimum repeat of zero +failed to allow the zero-repeat case if pcre2_match() was called with an +ovector too small to capture the group. + +16. Improved error message in pcre2test when setting the stack size (-S) fails. + +17. Fixed two bugs in CMakeLists.txt: (1) Some lines had got lost in the +transfer from PCRE1, meaning that CMake configuration failed if "build tests" +was selected. (2) The file src/pcre2_serialize.c had not been added to the list +of PCRE2 sources, which caused a failure to build pcre2test. + +18. Fixed typo in pcre2_serialize.c (DECL instead of DEFN) that causes problems +only on Windows. + +19. Use binary input when reading back saved serialized patterns in pcre2test. + +20. Added RunTest.bat for running the tests under Windows. + +21. "make distclean" was not removing config.h, a file that may be created for +use with CMake. + +22. A pattern such as "((?2){0,1999}())?", which has a group containing a +forward reference repeated a large (but limited) number of times within a +repeated outer group that has a zero minimum quantifier, caused incorrect code +to be compiled, leading to the error "internal error: previously-checked +referenced subpattern not found" when an incorrect memory address was read. +This bug was reported as "heap overflow", discovered by Kai Lu of Fortinet's +FortiGuard Labs. (Added 24-March-2015: CVE-2015-2325 was given to this.) + +23. A pattern such as "((?+1)(\1))/" containing a forward reference subroutine +call within a group that also contained a recursive back reference caused +incorrect code to be compiled. This bug was reported as "heap overflow", +discovered by Kai Lu of Fortinet's FortiGuard Labs. (Added 24-March-2015: +CVE-2015-2326 was given to this.) + +24. Computing the size of the JIT read-only data in advance has been a source +of various issues, and new ones are still appear unfortunately. To fix +existing and future issues, size computation is eliminated from the code, +and replaced by on-demand memory allocation. + +25. A pattern such as /(?i)[A-`]/, where characters in the other case are +adjacent to the end of the range, and the range contained characters with more +than one other case, caused incorrect behaviour when compiled in UTF mode. In +that example, the range a-j was left out of the class. + + +Version 10.00 05-January-2015 +----------------------------- + +Version 10.00 is the first release of PCRE2, a revised API for the PCRE +library. Changes prior to 10.00 are logged in the ChangeLog file for the old +API, up to item 20 for release 8.36. + +The code of the library was heavily revised as part of the new API +implementation. Details of each and every modification were not individually +logged. In addition to the API changes, the following changes were made. They +are either new functionality, or bug fixes and other noticeable changes of +behaviour that were implemented after the code had been forked. + +1. Including Unicode support at build time is now enabled by default, but it +can optionally be disabled. It is not enabled by default at run time (no +change). + +2. The test program, now called pcre2test, was re-specified and almost +completely re-written. Its input is not compatible with input for pcretest. + +3. Patterns may start with (*NOTEMPTY) or (*NOTEMPTY_ATSTART) to set the +PCRE2_NOTEMPTY or PCRE2_NOTEMPTY_ATSTART options for every subject line that is +matched by that pattern. + +4. For the benefit of those who use PCRE2 via some other application, that is, +not writing the function calls themselves, it is possible to check the PCRE2 +version by matching a pattern such as /(?(VERSION>=10)yes|no)/ against a +string such as "yesno". + +5. There are case-equivalent Unicode characters whose encodings use different +numbers of code units in UTF-8. U+023A and U+2C65 are one example. (It is +theoretically possible for this to happen in UTF-16 too.) If a backreference to +a group containing one of these characters was greedily repeated, and during +the match a backtrack occurred, the subject might be backtracked by the wrong +number of code units. For example, if /^(\x{23a})\1*(.)/ is matched caselessly +(and in UTF-8 mode) against "\x{23a}\x{2c65}\x{2c65}\x{2c65}", group 2 should +capture the final character, which is the three bytes E2, B1, and A5 in UTF-8. +Incorrect backtracking meant that group 2 captured only the last two bytes. +This bug has been fixed; the new code is slower, but it is used only when the +strings matched by the repetition are not all the same length. + +6. A pattern such as /()a/ was not setting the "first character must be 'a'" +information. This applied to any pattern with a group that matched no +characters, for example: /(?:(?=.)|(? 0) + { + $line = 0; + $file = shift @ARGV; + + open (IN, $file) || die "Failed to open $file\n"; + + while () + { + $count = 0; + $line++; + if (/^\s*$/) + { + printf "Empty line $line of $file\n"; + $yield = 1; + } + elsif (/^\./) + { + if (!/^\.\s*$| + ^\.B\s+\S| + ^\.TH\s\S| + ^\.SH\s\S| + ^\.SS\s\S| + ^\.TP(?:\s?\d+)?\s*$| + ^\.SM\s*$| + ^\.br\s*$| + ^\.rs\s*$| + ^\.sp\s*$| + ^\.nf\s*$| + ^\.fi\s*$| + ^\.P\s*$| + ^\.PP\s*$| + ^\.\\"(?:\ HREF)?\s*$| + ^\.\\"\sHTML\s\s*$| + ^\.\\"\sHTML\s<\/a>\s*$| + ^\.\\"\s<\/a>\s*$| + ^\.\\"\sJOINSH\s*$| + ^\.\\"\sJOIN\s*$/x + ) + { + printf "Bad control line $line of $file\n"; + $yield = 1; + } + } + elsif (/\\[^ef]|\\f[^IBP]/) + { + printf "Bad backslash in line $line of $file\n"; + $yield = 1; + } + while (/\\f[BI]/g) + { + $count++; + } + while (/\\fP/g) + { + $count--; + } + if ($count != 0) + { + printf "Mismatching formatting in line $line of $file\n"; + $yield = 1; + } + } + + close(IN); + } + +exit $yield; +# End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/CleanTxt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/CleanTxt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1f42519c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/CleanTxt @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +#! /usr/bin/perl -w + +# Script to take the output of nroff -man and remove all the backspacing and +# the page footers and the screen commands etc so that it is more usefully +# readable online. In fact, in the latest nroff, intermediate footers don't +# seem to be generated any more. + +$blankcount = 0; +$lastwascut = 0; +$firstheader = 1; + +# Input on STDIN; output to STDOUT. + +while () + { + s/\x1b\[\d+m//g; # Remove screen controls "ESC [ number m" + s/.\x8//g; # Remove "char, backspace" + + # Handle header lines. Retain only the first one we encounter, but remove + # the blank line that follows. Any others (e.g. at end of document) and the + # following blank line are dropped. + + if (/^PCRE(\w*)\(([13])\)\s+PCRE\1\(\2\)$/) + { + if ($firstheader) + { + $firstheader = 0; + print; + $lastprinted = $_; + $lastwascut = 0; + } + $_=; # Remove a blank that follows + next; + } + + # Count runs of empty lines + + if (/^\s*$/) + { + $blankcount++; + $lastwascut = 0; + next; + } + + # If a chunk of lines has been cut out (page footer) and the next line + # has a different indentation, put back one blank line. + + if ($lastwascut && $blankcount < 1 && defined($lastprinted)) + { + ($a) = $lastprinted =~ /^(\s*)/; + ($b) = $_ =~ /^(\s*)/; + $blankcount++ if ($a ne $b); + } + + # We get here only when we have a non-blank line in hand. If it was preceded + # by 3 or more blank lines, read the next 3 lines and see if they are blank. + # If so, remove all 7 lines, and remember that we have just done a cut. + + if ($blankcount >= 3) + { + for ($i = 0; $i < 3; $i++) + { + $next[$i] = ; + $next[$i] = "" if !defined $next[$i]; + $next[$i] =~ s/\x1b\[\d+m//g; # Remove screen controls "ESC [ number m" + $next[$i] =~ s/.\x8//g; # Remove "char, backspace" + } + + # Cut out chunks of the form <3 blanks><3 blanks> + + if ($next[0] =~ /^\s*$/ && + $next[1] =~ /^\s*$/ && + $next[2] =~ /^\s*$/) + { + $blankcount -= 3; + $lastwascut = 1; + } + + # Otherwise output the saved blanks, the current, and the next three + # lines. Remember the last printed line. + + else + { + for ($i = 0; $i < $blankcount; $i++) { print "\n"; } + print; + for ($i = 0; $i < 3; $i++) + { + $next[$i] =~ s/.\x8//g; + print $next[$i]; + $lastprinted = $_; + } + $lastwascut = 0; + $blankcount = 0; + } + } + + # This non-blank line is not preceded by 3 or more blank lines. Output + # any blanks there are, and the line. Remember it. Force two blank lines + # before headings. + + else + { + $blankcount = 2 if /^\S/ && !/^Last updated/ && !/^Copyright/ && + defined($lastprinted); + for ($i = 0; $i < $blankcount; $i++) { print "\n"; } + print; + $lastprinted = $_; + $lastwascut = 0; + $blankcount = 0; + } + } + +# End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/Detrail b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/Detrail new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1c5c7e9c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/Detrail @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +#!/usr/bin/perl + +# This is a script for removing trailing whitespace from lines in files that +# are listed on the command line. + +# This subroutine does the work for one file. + +sub detrail { +my($file) = $_[0]; +my($changed) = 0; +open(IN, "$file") || die "Can't open $file for input"; +@lines = ; +close(IN); +foreach (@lines) + { + if (/\s+\n$/) + { + s/\s+\n$/\n/; + $changed = 1; + } + } +if ($changed) + { + open(OUT, ">$file") || die "Can't open $file for output"; + print OUT @lines; + close(OUT); + } +} + +# This is the main program + +$, = ""; # Output field separator +for ($i = 0; $i < @ARGV; $i++) { &detrail($ARGV[$i]); } + +# End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/HACKING b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/HACKING new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2f194db0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/HACKING @@ -0,0 +1,830 @@ +Technical Notes about PCRE2 +--------------------------- + +These are very rough technical notes that record potentially useful information +about PCRE2 internals. PCRE2 is a library based on the original PCRE library, +but with a revised (and incompatible) API. To avoid confusion, the original +library is referred to as PCRE1 below. For information about testing PCRE2, see +the pcre2test documentation and the comment at the head of the RunTest file. + +PCRE1 releases were up to 8.3x when PCRE2 was developed, and later bug fix +releases carried on the 8.xx series, up to the final 8.45 release. PCRE2 +releases started at 10.00 to avoid confusion with PCRE1. + + +Historical note 1 +----------------- + +Many years ago I implemented some regular expression functions to an algorithm +suggested by Martin Richards. The rather simple patterns were not Unix-like in +form, and were quite restricted in what they could do by comparison with Perl. +The interesting part about the algorithm was that the amount of space required +to hold the compiled form of an expression was known in advance. The code to +apply an expression did not operate by backtracking, as the original Henry +Spencer code and current PCRE2 and Perl code does, but instead checked all +possibilities simultaneously by keeping a list of current states and checking +all of them as it advanced through the subject string. In the terminology of +Jeffrey Friedl's book, it was a "DFA algorithm", though it was not a +traditional Finite State Machine (FSM). When the pattern was all used up, all +remaining states were possible matches, and the one matching the longest subset +of the subject string was chosen. This did not necessarily maximize the +individual wild portions of the pattern, as is expected in Unix and Perl-style +regular expressions. + + +Historical note 2 +----------------- + +By contrast, the code originally written by Henry Spencer (which was +subsequently heavily modified for Perl) compiles the expression twice: once in +a dummy mode in order to find out how much store will be needed, and then for +real. (The Perl version may or may not still do this; I'm talking about the +original library.) The execution function operates by backtracking and +maximizing (or, optionally, minimizing, in Perl) the amount of the subject that +matches individual wild portions of the pattern. This is an "NFA algorithm" in +Friedl's terminology. + + +OK, here's the real stuff +------------------------- + +For the set of functions that formed the original PCRE1 library in 1997 (which +are unrelated to those mentioned above), I tried at first to invent an +algorithm that used an amount of store bounded by a multiple of the number of +characters in the pattern, to save on compiling time. However, because of the +greater complexity in Perl regular expressions, I couldn't do this, even though +the then current Perl 5.004 patterns were much simpler than those supported +nowadays. In any case, a first pass through the pattern is helpful for other +reasons. + + +Support for 16-bit and 32-bit data strings +------------------------------------------- + +The PCRE2 library can be compiled in any combination of 8-bit, 16-bit or 32-bit +modes, creating up to three different libraries. In the description that +follows, the word "short" is used for a 16-bit data quantity, and the phrase +"code unit" is used for a quantity that is a byte in 8-bit mode, a short in +16-bit mode and a 32-bit word in 32-bit mode. The names of PCRE2 functions are +given in generic form, without the _8, _16, or _32 suffix. + + +Computing the memory requirement: how it was +-------------------------------------------- + +Up to and including release 6.7, PCRE1 worked by running a very degenerate +first pass to calculate a maximum memory requirement, and then a second pass to +do the real compile - which might use a bit less than the predicted amount of +memory. The idea was that this would turn out faster than the Henry Spencer +code because the first pass is degenerate and the second pass can just store +stuff straight into memory, which it knows is big enough. + + +Computing the memory requirement: how it is +------------------------------------------- + +By the time I was working on a potential 6.8 release, the degenerate first pass +had become very complicated and hard to maintain. Indeed one of the early +things I did for 6.8 was to fix Yet Another Bug in the memory computation. Then +I had a flash of inspiration as to how I could run the real compile function in +a "fake" mode that enables it to compute how much memory it would need, while +in most cases only ever using a small amount of working memory, and without too +many tests of the mode that might slow it down. So I refactored the compiling +functions to work this way. This got rid of about 600 lines of source and made +further maintenance and development easier. As this was such a major change, I +never released 6.8, instead upping the number to 7.0 (other quite major changes +were also present in the 7.0 release). + +A side effect of this work was that the previous limit of 200 on the nesting +depth of parentheses was removed. However, there was a downside: compiling ran +more slowly than before (30% or more, depending on the pattern) because it now +did a full analysis of the pattern. My hope was that this would not be a big +issue, and in the event, nobody has commented on it. + +At release 8.34, a limit on the nesting depth of parentheses was re-introduced +(default 250, settable at build time) so as to put a limit on the amount of +system stack used by the compile function, which uses recursive function calls +for nested parenthesized groups. This is a safety feature for environments with +small stacks where the patterns are provided by users. + + +Yet another pattern scan +------------------------ + +History repeated itself for PCRE2 release 10.20. A number of bugs relating to +named subpatterns had been discovered by fuzzers. Most of these were related to +the handling of forward references when it was not known if the named group was +unique. (References to non-unique names use a different opcode and more +memory.) The use of duplicate group numbers (the (?| facility) also caused +issues. + +To get around these problems I adopted a new approach by adding a third pass +over the pattern (really a "pre-pass"), which did nothing other than identify +all the named subpatterns and their corresponding group numbers. This means +that the actual compile (both the memory-computing dummy run and the real +compile) has full knowledge of group names and numbers throughout. Several +dozen lines of messy code were eliminated, though the new pre-pass was not +short. In particular, parsing and skipping over [] classes is complicated. + +While working on 10.22 I realized that I could simplify yet again by moving +more of the parsing into the pre-pass, thus avoiding doing it in two places, so +after 10.22 was released, the code underwent yet another big refactoring. This +is how it is from 10.23 onwards: + +The function called parse_regex() scans the pattern characters, parsing them +into literal data and meta characters. It converts escapes such as \x{123} +into literals, handles \Q...\E, and skips over comments and non-significant +white space. The result of the scanning is put into a vector of 32-bit unsigned +integers. Values less than 0x80000000 are literal data. Higher values represent +meta-characters. The top 16-bits of such values identify the meta-character, +and these are given names such as META_CAPTURE. The lower 16-bits are available +for data, for example, the capturing group number. The only situation in which +literal data values greater than 0x7fffffff can appear is when the 32-bit +library is running in non-UTF mode. This is handled by having a special +meta-character that is followed by the 32-bit data value. + +The size of the parsed pattern vector, when auto-callouts are not enabled, is +bounded by the length of the pattern (with one exception). The code is written +so that each item in the pattern uses no more vector elements than the number +of code units in the item itself. The exception is the aforementioned large +32-bit number handling. For this reason, 32-bit non-UTF patterns are scanned in +advance to check for such values. When auto-callouts are enabled, the generous +assumption is made that there will be a callout for each pattern code unit +(which of course is only actually true if all code units are literals) plus one +at the end. A default parsed pattern vector is defined on the system stack, to +minimize memory handling, but if this is not big enough, heap memory is used. + +As before, the actual compiling function is run twice, the first time to +determine the amount of memory needed for the final compiled pattern. It +now processes the parsed pattern vector, not the pattern itself, although some +of the parsed items refer to strings in the pattern - for example, group +names. As escapes and comments have already been processed, the code is a bit +simpler than before. + +Most errors can be diagnosed during the parsing scan. For those that cannot +(for example, "lookbehind assertion is not fixed length"), the parsed code +contains offsets into the pattern so that the actual compiling code can +report where errors are. + + +The elements of the parsed pattern vector +----------------------------------------- + +The word "offset" below means a code unit offset into the pattern. When +PCRE2_SIZE (which is usually size_t) is no bigger than uint32_t, an offset is +stored in a single parsed pattern element. Otherwise (typically on 64-bit +systems) it occupies two elements. The following meta items occupy just one +element, with no data: + +META_ACCEPT (*ACCEPT) +META_ASTERISK * +META_ASTERISK_PLUS *+ +META_ASTERISK_QUERY *? +META_ATOMIC (?> start of atomic group +META_CIRCUMFLEX ^ metacharacter +META_CLASS [ start of non-empty class +META_CLASS_EMPTY [] empty class - only with PCRE2_ALLOW_EMPTY_CLASS +META_CLASS_EMPTY_NOT [^] negative empty class - ditto +META_CLASS_END ] end of non-empty class +META_CLASS_NOT [^ start non-empty negative class +META_COMMIT (*COMMIT) - no argument (see below for with argument) +META_COND_ASSERT (?(?assertion) +META_DOLLAR $ metacharacter +META_DOT . metacharacter +META_END End of pattern (this value is 0x80000000) +META_FAIL (*FAIL) +META_KET ) closing parenthesis +META_LOOKAHEAD (?= start of lookahead +META_LOOKAHEAD_NA (*napla: start of non-atomic lookahead +META_LOOKAHEADNOT (?! start of negative lookahead +META_NOCAPTURE (?: no capture parens +META_PLUS + +META_PLUS_PLUS ++ +META_PLUS_QUERY +? +META_PRUNE (*PRUNE) - no argument (see below for with argument) +META_QUERY ? +META_QUERY_PLUS ?+ +META_QUERY_QUERY ?? +META_RANGE_ESCAPED hyphen in class range with at least one escape +META_RANGE_LITERAL hyphen in class range defined literally +META_SKIP (*SKIP) - no argument (see below for with argument) +META_THEN (*THEN) - no argument (see below for with argument) + +The two RANGE values occur only in character classes. They are positioned +between two literals that define the start and end of the range. In an EBCDIC +environment it is necessary to know whether either of the range values was +specified as an escape. In an ASCII/Unicode environment the distinction is not +relevant. + +The following have data in the lower 16 bits, and may be followed by other data +elements: + +META_ALT | alternation +META_BACKREF back reference +META_CAPTURE start of capturing group +META_ESCAPE non-literal escape sequence +META_RECURSE recursion call + +If the data for META_ALT is non-zero, it is inside a lookbehind, and the data +is the length of its branch, for which OP_REVERSE must be generated. + +META_BACKREF, META_CAPTURE, and META_RECURSE have the capture group number as +their data in the lower 16 bits of the element. META_RECURSE is followed by an +offset, for use in error messages. + +META_BACKREF is followed by an offset if the back reference group number is 10 +or more. The offsets of the first occurrences of references to groups whose +numbers are less than 10 are put in cb->small_ref_offset[] (only the first +occurrence is useful). On 64-bit systems this avoids using more than two parsed +pattern elements for items such as \3. The offset is used when an error occurs +because the reference is to a non-existent group. + +META_ESCAPE has an ESC_xxx value as its data. For ESC_P and ESC_p, the next +element contains the 16-bit type and data property values, packed together. +ESC_g and ESC_k are used only for named references - numerical ones are turned +into META_RECURSE or META_BACKREF as appropriate. ESC_g and ESC_k are followed +by a length and an offset into the pattern to specify the name. + +The following have one data item that follows in the next vector element: + +META_BIGVALUE Next is a literal >= META_END +META_OPTIONS (?i) and friends (data is new option bits) +META_POSIX POSIX class item (data identifies the class) +META_POSIX_NEG negative POSIX class item (ditto) + +The following are followed by a length element, then a number of character code +values (which should match with the length): + +META_MARK (*MARK:xxxx) +META_COMMIT_ARG )*COMMIT:xxxx) +META_PRUNE_ARG (*PRUNE:xxx) +META_SKIP_ARG (*SKIP:xxxx) +META_THEN_ARG (*THEN:xxxx) + +The following are followed by a length element, then an offset in the pattern +that identifies the name: + +META_COND_NAME (?() or (?('name') or (?(name) +META_COND_RNAME (?(R&name) +META_COND_RNUMBER (?(Rdigits) +META_RECURSE_BYNAME (?&name) +META_BACKREF_BYNAME \k'name' + +META_COND_RNUMBER is used for names that start with R and continue with digits, +because this is an ambiguous case. It could be a back reference to a group with +that name, or it could be a recursion test on a numbered group. + +This one is followed by an offset, for use in error messages, then a number: + +META_COND_NUMBER (?([+-]digits) + +The following is followed just by an offset, for use in error messages: + +META_COND_DEFINE (?(DEFINE) + +The following are also followed just by an offset, but also the lower 16 bits +of the main word contain the length of the first branch of the lookbehind +group; this is used when generating OP_REVERSE for that branch. + +META_LOOKBEHIND (?<= start of lookbehind +META_LOOKBEHIND_NA (*naplb: start of non-atomic lookbehind +META_LOOKBEHINDNOT (?' and 1 for '>='; +the next two are the major and minor numbers: + +META_COND_VERSION (?(VERSIONx.y) + +Callouts are converted into one of two items: + +META_CALLOUT_NUMBER (?C with numerical argument +META_CALLOUT_STRING (?C with string argument + +In both cases, the next two elements contain the offset and length of the next +item in the pattern. Then there is either one callout number, or a length and +an offset for the string argument. The length includes both delimiters. + + +Traditional matching function +----------------------------- + +The "traditional", and original, matching function is called pcre2_match(), and +it implements an NFA algorithm, similar to the original Henry Spencer algorithm +and the way that Perl works. This is not surprising, since it is intended to be +as compatible with Perl as possible. This is the function most users of PCRE2 +will use most of the time. If PCRE2 is compiled with just-in-time (JIT) +support, and studying a compiled pattern with JIT is successful, the JIT code +is run instead of the normal pcre2_match() code, but the result is the same. + + +Supplementary matching function +------------------------------- + +There is also a supplementary matching function called pcre2_dfa_match(). This +implements a DFA matching algorithm that searches simultaneously for all +possible matches that start at one point in the subject string. (Going back to +my roots: see Historical Note 1 above.) This function intreprets the same +compiled pattern data as pcre2_match(); however, not all the facilities are +available, and those that are do not always work in quite the same way. See the +user documentation for details. + +The algorithm that is used for pcre2_dfa_match() is not a traditional FSM, +because it may have a number of states active at one time. More work would be +needed at compile time to produce a traditional FSM where only one state is +ever active at once. I believe some other regex matchers work this way. JIT +support is not available for this kind of matching. + + +Changeable options +------------------ + +The /i, /m, or /s options (PCRE2_CASELESS, PCRE2_MULTILINE, PCRE2_DOTALL) and +some others may be changed in the middle of patterns by items such as (?i). +Their processing is handled entirely at compile time by generating different +opcodes for the different settings. The runtime functions do not need to keep +track of an option's state. + +PCRE2_DUPNAMES, PCRE2_EXTENDED, PCRE2_EXTENDED_MORE, and PCRE2_NO_AUTO_CAPTURE +are tracked and processed during the parsing pre-pass. The others are handled +from META_OPTIONS items during the main compile phase. + + +Format of compiled patterns +--------------------------- + +The compiled form of a pattern is a vector of unsigned code units (bytes in +8-bit mode, shorts in 16-bit mode, 32-bit words in 32-bit mode), containing +items of variable length. The first code unit in an item contains an opcode, +and the length of the item is either implicit in the opcode or contained in the +data that follows it. + +In many cases listed below, LINK_SIZE data values are specified for offsets +within the compiled pattern. LINK_SIZE always specifies a number of bytes. The +default value for LINK_SIZE is 2, except for the 32-bit library, where it can +only be 4. The 8-bit library can be compiled to used 3-byte or 4-byte values, +and the 16-bit library can be compiled to use 4-byte values, though this +impairs performance. Specifying a LINK_SIZE larger than 2 for these libraries is +necessary only when patterns whose compiled length is greater than 65535 code +units are going to be processed. When a LINK_SIZE value uses more than one code +unit, the most significant unit is first. + +In this description, we assume the "normal" compilation options. Data values +that are counts (e.g. quantifiers) are always two bytes long in 8-bit mode +(most significant byte first), and one code unit in 16-bit and 32-bit modes. + + +Opcodes with no following data +------------------------------ + +These items are all just one unit long: + + OP_END end of pattern + OP_ANY match any one character other than newline + OP_ALLANY match any one character, including newline + OP_ANYBYTE match any single code unit, even in UTF-8/16 mode + OP_SOD match start of data: \A + OP_SOM, start of match (subject + offset): \G + OP_SET_SOM, set start of match (\K) + OP_CIRC ^ (start of data) + OP_CIRCM ^ multiline mode (start of data or after newline) + OP_NOT_WORD_BOUNDARY \W + OP_WORD_BOUNDARY \w + OP_NOT_DIGIT \D + OP_DIGIT \d + OP_NOT_HSPACE \H + OP_HSPACE \h + OP_NOT_WHITESPACE \S + OP_WHITESPACE \s + OP_NOT_VSPACE \V + OP_VSPACE \v + OP_NOT_WORDCHAR \W + OP_WORDCHAR \w + OP_EODN match end of data or newline at end: \Z + OP_EOD match end of data: \z + OP_DOLL $ (end of data, or before final newline) + OP_DOLLM $ multiline mode (end of data or before newline) + OP_EXTUNI match an extended Unicode grapheme cluster + OP_ANYNL match any Unicode newline sequence + + OP_ASSERT_ACCEPT ) + OP_ACCEPT ) These are Perl 5.10's "backtracking control + OP_COMMIT ) verbs". If OP_ACCEPT is inside capturing + OP_FAIL ) parentheses, it may be preceded by one or more + OP_PRUNE ) OP_CLOSE, each followed by a number that + OP_SKIP ) indicates which parentheses must be closed. + OP_THEN ) + +OP_ASSERT_ACCEPT is used when (*ACCEPT) is encountered within an assertion. +This ends the assertion, not the entire pattern match. The assertion (?!) is +always optimized to OP_FAIL. + +OP_ALLANY is used for '.' when PCRE2_DOTALL is set. It is also used for \C in +non-UTF modes and in UTF-32 mode (since one code unit still equals one +character). Another use is for [^] when empty classes are permitted +(PCRE2_ALLOW_EMPTY_CLASS is set). + + +Backtracking control verbs +-------------------------- + +Verbs with no arguments generate opcodes with no following data (as listed +in the section above). + +(*MARK:NAME) generates OP_MARK followed by the mark name, preceded by a +length in one code unit, and followed by a binary zero. The name length is +limited by the size of the code unit. + +(*ACCEPT:NAME) and (*FAIL:NAME) are compiled as (*MARK:NAME)(*ACCEPT) and +(*MARK:NAME)(*FAIL) respectively. + +For (*COMMIT:NAME), (*PRUNE:NAME), (*SKIP:NAME), and (*THEN:NAME), the opcodes +OP_COMMIT_ARG, OP_PRUNE_ARG, OP_SKIP_ARG, and OP_THEN_ARG are used, with the +name following in the same format as for OP_MARK. + + +Matching literal characters +--------------------------- + +The OP_CHAR opcode is followed by a single character that is to be matched +casefully. For caseless matching of characters that have at most two +case-equivalent code points, OP_CHARI is used. In UTF-8 or UTF-16 modes, the +character may be more than one code unit long. In UTF-32 mode, characters are +always exactly one code unit long. + +If there is only one character in a character class, OP_CHAR or OP_CHARI is +used for a positive class, and OP_NOT or OP_NOTI for a negative one (that is, +for something like [^a]). + +Caseless matching (positive or negative) of characters that have more than two +case-equivalent code points (which is possible only in UTF mode) is handled by +compiling a Unicode property item (see below), with the pseudo-property +PT_CLIST. The value of this property is an offset in a vector called +"ucd_caseless_sets" which identifies the start of a short list of case +equivalent characters, terminated by the value NOTACHAR (0xffffffff). + + +Repeating single characters +--------------------------- + +The common repeats (*, +, ?), when applied to a single character, use the +following opcodes, which come in caseful and caseless versions: + + Caseful Caseless + OP_STAR OP_STARI + OP_MINSTAR OP_MINSTARI + OP_POSSTAR OP_POSSTARI + OP_PLUS OP_PLUSI + OP_MINPLUS OP_MINPLUSI + OP_POSPLUS OP_POSPLUSI + OP_QUERY OP_QUERYI + OP_MINQUERY OP_MINQUERYI + OP_POSQUERY OP_POSQUERYI + +Each opcode is followed by the character that is to be repeated. In ASCII or +UTF-32 modes, these are two-code-unit items; in UTF-8 or UTF-16 modes, the +length is variable. Those with "MIN" in their names are the minimizing +versions. Those with "POS" in their names are possessive versions. Other kinds +of repeat make use of these opcodes: + + Caseful Caseless + OP_UPTO OP_UPTOI + OP_MINUPTO OP_MINUPTOI + OP_POSUPTO OP_POSUPTOI + OP_EXACT OP_EXACTI + +Each of these is followed by a count and then the repeated character. The count +is two bytes long in 8-bit mode (most significant byte first), or one code unit +in 16-bit and 32-bit modes. + +OP_UPTO matches from 0 to the given number. A repeat with a non-zero minimum +and a fixed maximum is coded as an OP_EXACT followed by an OP_UPTO (or +OP_MINUPTO or OPT_POSUPTO). + +Another set of matching repeating opcodes (called OP_NOTSTAR, OP_NOTSTARI, +etc.) are used for repeated, negated, single-character classes such as [^a]*. +The normal single-character opcodes (OP_STAR, etc.) are used for repeated +positive single-character classes. + + +Repeating character types +------------------------- + +Repeats of things like \d are done exactly as for single characters, except +that instead of a character, the opcode for the type (e.g. OP_DIGIT) is stored +in the next code unit. The opcodes are: + + OP_TYPESTAR + OP_TYPEMINSTAR + OP_TYPEPOSSTAR + OP_TYPEPLUS + OP_TYPEMINPLUS + OP_TYPEPOSPLUS + OP_TYPEQUERY + OP_TYPEMINQUERY + OP_TYPEPOSQUERY + OP_TYPEUPTO + OP_TYPEMINUPTO + OP_TYPEPOSUPTO + OP_TYPEEXACT + + +Match by Unicode property +------------------------- + +OP_PROP and OP_NOTPROP are used for positive and negative matches of a +character by testing its Unicode property (the \p and \P escape sequences). +Each is followed by two code units that encode the desired property as a type +and a value. The types are a set of #defines of the form PT_xxx, and the values +are enumerations of the form ucp_xx, defined in the pcre2_ucp.h source file. +The value is relevant only for PT_GC (General Category), PT_PC (Particular +Category), PT_SC (Script), PT_BIDICL (Bidi Class), PT_BOOL (Boolean property), +and the pseudo-property PT_CLIST, which is used to identify a list of +case-equivalent characters when there are three or more (see above). + +Repeats of these items use the OP_TYPESTAR etc. set of opcodes, followed by +three code units: OP_PROP or OP_NOTPROP, and then the desired property type and +value. + + +Character classes +----------------- + +If there is only one character in a class, OP_CHAR or OP_CHARI is used for a +positive class, and OP_NOT or OP_NOTI for a negative one (that is, for +something like [^a]), except when caselessly matching a character that has more +than two case-equivalent code points (which can happen only in UTF mode). In +this case a Unicode property item is used, as described above in "Matching +literal characters". + +A set of repeating opcodes (called OP_NOTSTAR etc.) are used for repeated, +negated, single-character classes. The normal single-character opcodes +(OP_STAR, etc.) are used for repeated positive single-character classes. + +When there is more than one character in a class, and all the code points are +less than 256, OP_CLASS is used for a positive class, and OP_NCLASS for a +negative one. In either case, the opcode is followed by a 32-byte (16-short, +8-word) bit map containing a 1 bit for every character that is acceptable. The +bits are counted from the least significant end of each unit. In caseless mode, +bits for both cases are set. + +The reason for having both OP_CLASS and OP_NCLASS is so that, in UTF-8 and +16-bit and 32-bit modes, subject characters with values greater than 255 can be +handled correctly. For OP_CLASS they do not match, whereas for OP_NCLASS they +do. + +For classes containing characters with values greater than 255 or that contain +\p or \P, OP_XCLASS is used. It optionally uses a bit map if any acceptable +code points are less than 256, followed by a list of pairs (for a range) and/or +single characters and/or properties. In caseless mode, all equivalent +characters are explicitly listed. + +OP_XCLASS is followed by a LINK_SIZE value containing the total length of the +opcode and its data. This is followed by a code unit containing flag bits: +XCL_NOT indicates that this is a negative class, and XCL_MAP indicates that a +bit map is present. There follows the bit map, if XCL_MAP is set, and then a +sequence of items coded as follows: + + XCL_END marks the end of the list + XCL_SINGLE one character follows + XCL_RANGE two characters follow + XCL_PROP a Unicode property (type, value) follows + XCL_NOTPROP a Unicode property (type, value) follows + +If a range starts with a code point less than 256 and ends with one greater +than 255, it is split into two ranges, with characters less than 256 being +indicated in the bit map, and the rest with XCL_RANGE. + +When XCL_NOT is set, the bit map, if present, contains bits for characters that +are allowed (exactly as for OP_NCLASS), but the list of items that follow it +specifies characters and properties that are not allowed. + + +Back references +--------------- + +OP_REF (caseful) or OP_REFI (caseless) is followed by a count containing the +reference number when the reference is to a unique capturing group (either by +number or by name). When named groups are used, there may be more than one +group with the same name. In this case, a reference to such a group by name +generates OP_DNREF or OP_DNREFI. These are followed by two counts: the index +(not the byte offset) in the group name table of the first entry for the +required name, followed by the number of groups with the same name. The +matching code can then search for the first one that is set. + + +Repeating character classes and back references +----------------------------------------------- + +Single-character classes are handled specially (see above). This section +applies to other classes and also to back references. In both cases, the repeat +information follows the base item. The matching code looks at the following +opcode to see if it is one of these: + + OP_CRSTAR + OP_CRMINSTAR + OP_CRPOSSTAR + OP_CRPLUS + OP_CRMINPLUS + OP_CRPOSPLUS + OP_CRQUERY + OP_CRMINQUERY + OP_CRPOSQUERY + OP_CRRANGE + OP_CRMINRANGE + OP_CRPOSRANGE + +All but the last three are single-code-unit items, with no data. The range +opcodes are followed by the minimum and maximum repeat counts. + + +Brackets and alternation +------------------------ + +A pair of non-capturing round brackets is wrapped round each expression at +compile time, so alternation always happens in the context of brackets. + +[Note for North Americans: "bracket" to some English speakers, including +myself, can be round, square, curly, or pointy. Hence this usage rather than +"parentheses".] + +Non-capturing brackets use the opcode OP_BRA, capturing brackets use OP_CBRA. A +bracket opcode is followed by a LINK_SIZE value which gives the offset to the +next alternative OP_ALT or, if there aren't any branches, to the terminating +opcode. Each OP_ALT is followed by a LINK_SIZE value giving the offset to the +next one, or to the final opcode. For capturing brackets, the bracket number is +a count that immediately follows the offset. + +There are several opcodes that mark the end of a subpattern group. OP_KET is +used for subpatterns that do not repeat indefinitely, OP_KETRMIN and +OP_KETRMAX are used for indefinite repetitions, minimally or maximally +respectively, and OP_KETRPOS for possessive repetitions (see below for more +details). All four are followed by a LINK_SIZE value giving (as a positive +number) the offset back to the matching opening bracket opcode. + +If a subpattern is quantified such that it is permitted to match zero times, it +is preceded by one of OP_BRAZERO, OP_BRAMINZERO, or OP_SKIPZERO. These are +single-unit opcodes that tell the matcher that skipping the following +subpattern entirely is a valid match. In the case of the first two, not +skipping the pattern is also valid (greedy and non-greedy). The third is used +when a pattern has the quantifier {0,0}. It cannot be entirely discarded, +because it may be called as a subroutine from elsewhere in the pattern. + +A subpattern with an indefinite maximum repetition is replicated in the +compiled data its minimum number of times (or once with OP_BRAZERO if the +minimum is zero), with the final copy terminating with OP_KETRMIN or OP_KETRMAX +as appropriate. + +A subpattern with a bounded maximum repetition is replicated in a nested +fashion up to the maximum number of times, with OP_BRAZERO or OP_BRAMINZERO +before each replication after the minimum, so that, for example, (abc){2,5} is +compiled as (abc)(abc)((abc)((abc)(abc)?)?)?, except that each bracketed group +has the same number. + +When a repeated subpattern has an unbounded upper limit, it is checked to see +whether it could match an empty string. If this is the case, the opcode in the +final replication is changed to OP_SBRA or OP_SCBRA. This tells the matcher +that it needs to check for matching an empty string when it hits OP_KETRMIN or +OP_KETRMAX, and if so, to break the loop. + + +Possessive brackets +------------------- + +When a repeated group (capturing or non-capturing) is marked as possessive by +the "+" notation, e.g. (abc)++, different opcodes are used. Their names all +have POS on the end, e.g. OP_BRAPOS instead of OP_BRA and OP_SCBRAPOS instead +of OP_SCBRA. The end of such a group is marked by OP_KETRPOS. If the minimum +repetition is zero, the group is preceded by OP_BRAPOSZERO. + + +Once-only (atomic) groups +------------------------- + +These are just like other subpatterns, but they start with the opcode OP_ONCE. +The check for matching an empty string in an unbounded repeat is handled +entirely at runtime, so there is just this one opcode for atomic groups. + + +Assertions +---------- + +Forward assertions are also just like other subpatterns, but starting with one +of the opcodes OP_ASSERT, OP_ASSERT_NA (non-atomic assertion), or +OP_ASSERT_NOT. Backward assertions use the opcodes OP_ASSERTBACK, +OP_ASSERTBACK_NA, and OP_ASSERTBACK_NOT, and the first opcode inside the +assertion is OP_REVERSE, followed by a count of the number of characters to +move back the pointer in the subject string. In ASCII or UTF-32 mode, the count +is also the number of code units, but in UTF-8/16 mode each character may +occupy more than one code unit. A separate count is present in each alternative +of a lookbehind assertion, allowing each branch to have a different (but fixed) +length. + + +Conditional subpatterns +----------------------- + +These are like other subpatterns, but they start with the opcode OP_COND, or +OP_SCOND for one that might match an empty string in an unbounded repeat. + +If the condition is a back reference, this is stored at the start of the +subpattern using the opcode OP_CREF followed by a count containing the +reference number, provided that the reference is to a unique capturing group. +If the reference was by name and there is more than one group with that name, +OP_DNCREF is used instead. It is followed by two counts: the index in the group +names table, and the number of groups with the same name. The allows the +matcher to check if any group with the given name is set. + +If the condition is "in recursion" (coded as "(?(R)"), or "in recursion of +group x" (coded as "(?(Rx)"), the group number is stored at the start of the +subpattern using the opcode OP_RREF (with a value of RREF_ANY (0xffff) for "the +whole pattern") or OP_DNRREF (with data as for OP_DNCREF). + +For a DEFINE condition, OP_FALSE is used (with no associated data). During +compilation, however, a DEFINE condition is coded as OP_DEFINE so that, when +the conditional group is complete, there can be a check to ensure that it +contains only one top-level branch. Once this has happened, the opcode is +changed to OP_FALSE, so the matcher never sees OP_DEFINE. + +There is a special PCRE2-specific condition of the form (VERSION[>]=x.y), which +tests the PCRE2 version number. This compiles into one of the opcodes OP_TRUE +or OP_FALSE. + +If a condition is not a back reference, recursion test, DEFINE, or VERSION, it +must start with a parenthesized atomic assertion, whose opcode normally +immediately follows OP_COND or OP_SCOND. However, if automatic callouts are +enabled, a callout is inserted immediately before the assertion. It is also +possible to insert a manual callout at this point. Only assertion conditions +may have callouts preceding the condition. + +A condition that is the negative assertion (?!) is optimized to OP_FAIL in all +parts of the pattern, so this is another opcode that may appear as a condition. +It is treated the same as OP_FALSE. + + +Recursion +--------- + +Recursion either matches the current pattern, or some subexpression. The opcode +OP_RECURSE is followed by a LINK_SIZE value that is the offset to the starting +bracket from the start of the whole pattern. OP_RECURSE is also used for +"subroutine" calls, even though they are not strictly a recursion. Up till +release 10.30 recursions were treated as atomic groups, making them +incompatible with Perl (but PCRE had them well before Perl did). From 10.30, +backtracking into recursions is supported. + +Repeated recursions used to be wrapped inside OP_ONCE brackets, which not only +forced no backtracking, but also allowed repetition to be handled as for other +bracketed groups. From 10.30 onwards, repeated recursions are duplicated for +their minimum repetitions, and then wrapped in non-capturing brackets for the +remainder. For example, (?1){3} is treated as (?1)(?1)(?1), and (?1){2,4} is +treated as (?1)(?1)(?:(?1)){0,2}. + + +Callouts +-------- + +A callout may have either a numerical argument or a string argument. These use +OP_CALLOUT or OP_CALLOUT_STR, respectively. In each case these are followed by +two LINK_SIZE values giving the offset in the pattern string to the start of +the following item, and another count giving the length of this item. These +values make it possible for pcre2test to output useful tracing information +using callouts. + +In the case of a numeric callout, after these two values there is a single code +unit containing the callout number, in the range 0-255, with 255 being used for +callouts that are automatically inserted as a result of the PCRE2_AUTO_CALLOUT +option. Thus, this opcode item is of fixed length: + + [OP_CALLOUT] [PATTERN_OFFSET] [PATTERN_LENGTH] [NUMBER] + +For callouts with string arguments, OP_CALLOUT_STR has three more data items: +a LINK_SIZE value giving the complete length of the entire opcode item, a +LINK_SIZE item containing the offset within the pattern string to the start of +the string argument, and the string itself, preceded by its starting delimiter +and followed by a binary zero. When a callout function is called, a pointer to +the actual string is passed, but the delimiter can be accessed as string[-1] if +the application needs it. In the 8-bit library, the callout in /X(?C'abc')Y/ is +compiled as the following bytes (decimal numbers represent binary values): + + [OP_CALLOUT_STR] [0] [10] [0] [1] [0] [14] [0] [5] ['] [a] [b] [c] [0] + -------- ------- -------- ------- + | | | | + ------- LINK_SIZE items ------ + +Opcode table checking +--------------------- + +The last opcode that is defined in pcre2_internal.h is OP_TABLE_LENGTH. This is +not a real opcode, but is used to check at compile time that tables indexed by +opcode are the correct length, in order to catch updating errors. + +Philip Hazel +April 2022 diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/LICENCE b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/LICENCE new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2f3cd5ca --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/LICENCE @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +PCRE2 LICENCE +------------- + +PCRE2 is a library of functions to support regular expressions whose syntax +and semantics are as close as possible to those of the Perl 5 language. + +Releases 10.00 and above of PCRE2 are distributed under the terms of the "BSD" +licence, as specified below, with one exemption for certain binary +redistributions. The documentation for PCRE2, supplied in the "doc" directory, +is distributed under the same terms as the software itself. The data in the +testdata directory is not copyrighted and is in the public domain. + +The basic library functions are written in C and are freestanding. Also +included in the distribution is a just-in-time compiler that can be used to +optimize pattern matching. This is an optional feature that can be omitted when +the library is built. + + +THE BASIC LIBRARY FUNCTIONS +--------------------------- + +Written by: Philip Hazel +Email local part: Philip.Hazel +Email domain: gmail.com + +Retired from University of Cambridge Computing Service, +Cambridge, England. + +Copyright (c) 1997-2022 University of Cambridge +All rights reserved. + + +PCRE2 JUST-IN-TIME COMPILATION SUPPORT +-------------------------------------- + +Written by: Zoltan Herczeg +Email local part: hzmester +Email domain: freemail.hu + +Copyright(c) 2010-2022 Zoltan Herczeg +All rights reserved. + + +STACK-LESS JUST-IN-TIME COMPILER +-------------------------------- + +Written by: Zoltan Herczeg +Email local part: hzmester +Email domain: freemail.hu + +Copyright(c) 2009-2022 Zoltan Herczeg +All rights reserved. + + +THE "BSD" LICENCE +----------------- + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + + * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notices, + this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + + * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notices, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + + * Neither the name of the University of Cambridge nor the names of any + contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this + software without specific prior written permission. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" +AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE +LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR +CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF +SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN +CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) +ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE +POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + + +EXEMPTION FOR BINARY LIBRARY-LIKE PACKAGES +------------------------------------------ + +The second condition in the BSD licence (covering binary redistributions) does +not apply all the way down a chain of software. If binary package A includes +PCRE2, it must respect the condition, but if package B is software that +includes package A, the condition is not imposed on package B unless it uses +PCRE2 independently. + +End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/MODULE.bazel b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/MODULE.bazel new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e058d5ed --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/MODULE.bazel @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +module( + name = "pcre2", + version = "10.40", + compatibility_level = 1, +) + +bazel_dep(name = "rules_cc", version = "0.0.1") +bazel_dep(name = "bazel_skylib", version = "1.2.1") diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/Makefile.am b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1a15d115 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,900 @@ +## Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in. + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = subdir-objects +ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I m4 + +## This seems to have become necessary for building in non-source directory. + +AM_CPPFLAGS="-I$(srcdir)/src" + +## Specify the documentation files that are distributed. + +dist_doc_DATA = \ + AUTHORS \ + COPYING \ + ChangeLog \ + LICENCE \ + NEWS \ + README \ + doc/pcre2.txt \ + doc/pcre2-config.txt \ + doc/pcre2grep.txt \ + doc/pcre2test.txt + +dist_html_DATA = \ + doc/html/NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD.txt \ + doc/html/README.txt \ + doc/html/index.html \ + doc/html/pcre2-config.html \ + doc/html/pcre2.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_callout_enumerate.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_code_copy.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_code_copy_with_tables.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_code_free.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_compile.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_compile_context_copy.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_compile_context_create.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_compile_context_free.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_config.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_convert_context_copy.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_convert_context_create.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_convert_context_free.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_converted_pattern_free.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_dfa_match.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_general_context_copy.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_general_context_create.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_general_context_free.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_get_error_message.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_get_mark.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_get_match_data_size.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_get_ovector_count.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_get_ovector_pointer.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_get_startchar.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_jit_compile.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_jit_free_unused_memory.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_jit_match.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_jit_stack_assign.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_jit_stack_create.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_jit_stack_free.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_maketables.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_maketables_free.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_match.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_match_context_copy.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_match_context_create.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_match_context_free.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_match_data_create.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_match_data_create_from_pattern.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_match_data_free.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_pattern_convert.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_pattern_info.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_serialize_decode.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_serialize_encode.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_serialize_free.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_serialize_get_number_of_codes.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_bsr.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_callout.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_character_tables.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_compile_extra_options.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_compile_recursion_guard.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_depth_limit.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_glob_escape.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_glob_separator.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_heap_limit.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_match_limit.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_max_pattern_length.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_offset_limit.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_newline.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_parens_nest_limit.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_recursion_limit.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_recursion_memory_management.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_set_substitute_callout.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_substitute.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_substring_copy_byname.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_substring_copy_bynumber.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_substring_free.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_substring_get_byname.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_substring_get_bynumber.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_substring_length_byname.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_substring_length_bynumber.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_substring_list_free.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_substring_list_get.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_substring_nametable_scan.html \ + doc/html/pcre2_substring_number_from_name.html \ + doc/html/pcre2api.html \ + doc/html/pcre2build.html \ + doc/html/pcre2callout.html \ + doc/html/pcre2compat.html \ + doc/html/pcre2convert.html \ + doc/html/pcre2demo.html \ + doc/html/pcre2grep.html \ + doc/html/pcre2jit.html \ + doc/html/pcre2limits.html \ + doc/html/pcre2matching.html \ + doc/html/pcre2partial.html \ + doc/html/pcre2pattern.html \ + doc/html/pcre2perform.html \ + doc/html/pcre2posix.html \ + doc/html/pcre2sample.html \ + doc/html/pcre2serialize.html \ + doc/html/pcre2syntax.html \ + doc/html/pcre2test.html \ + doc/html/pcre2unicode.html + +dist_man_MANS = \ + doc/pcre2-config.1 \ + doc/pcre2.3 \ + doc/pcre2_callout_enumerate.3 \ + doc/pcre2_code_copy.3 \ + doc/pcre2_code_copy_with_tables.3 \ + doc/pcre2_code_free.3 \ + doc/pcre2_compile.3 \ + doc/pcre2_compile_context_copy.3 \ + doc/pcre2_compile_context_create.3 \ + doc/pcre2_compile_context_free.3 \ + doc/pcre2_config.3 \ + doc/pcre2_convert_context_copy.3 \ + doc/pcre2_convert_context_create.3 \ + doc/pcre2_convert_context_free.3 \ + doc/pcre2_converted_pattern_free.3 \ + doc/pcre2_dfa_match.3 \ + doc/pcre2_general_context_copy.3 \ + doc/pcre2_general_context_create.3 \ + doc/pcre2_general_context_free.3 \ + doc/pcre2_get_error_message.3 \ + doc/pcre2_get_mark.3 \ + doc/pcre2_get_match_data_size.3 \ + doc/pcre2_get_ovector_count.3 \ + doc/pcre2_get_ovector_pointer.3 \ + doc/pcre2_get_startchar.3 \ + doc/pcre2_jit_compile.3 \ + doc/pcre2_jit_free_unused_memory.3 \ + doc/pcre2_jit_match.3 \ + doc/pcre2_jit_stack_assign.3 \ + doc/pcre2_jit_stack_create.3 \ + doc/pcre2_jit_stack_free.3 \ + doc/pcre2_maketables.3 \ + doc/pcre2_maketables_free.3 \ + doc/pcre2_match.3 \ + doc/pcre2_match_context_copy.3 \ + doc/pcre2_match_context_create.3 \ + doc/pcre2_match_context_free.3 \ + doc/pcre2_match_data_create.3 \ + doc/pcre2_match_data_create_from_pattern.3 \ + doc/pcre2_match_data_free.3 \ + doc/pcre2_pattern_convert.3 \ + doc/pcre2_pattern_info.3 \ + doc/pcre2_serialize_decode.3 \ + doc/pcre2_serialize_encode.3 \ + doc/pcre2_serialize_free.3 \ + doc/pcre2_serialize_get_number_of_codes.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_bsr.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_callout.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_character_tables.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_compile_extra_options.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_compile_recursion_guard.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_depth_limit.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_glob_escape.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_glob_separator.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_heap_limit.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_match_limit.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_max_pattern_length.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_offset_limit.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_newline.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_parens_nest_limit.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_recursion_limit.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_recursion_memory_management.3 \ + doc/pcre2_set_substitute_callout.3 \ + doc/pcre2_substitute.3 \ + doc/pcre2_substring_copy_byname.3 \ + doc/pcre2_substring_copy_bynumber.3 \ + doc/pcre2_substring_free.3 \ + doc/pcre2_substring_get_byname.3 \ + doc/pcre2_substring_get_bynumber.3 \ + doc/pcre2_substring_length_byname.3 \ + doc/pcre2_substring_length_bynumber.3 \ + doc/pcre2_substring_list_free.3 \ + doc/pcre2_substring_list_get.3 \ + doc/pcre2_substring_nametable_scan.3 \ + doc/pcre2_substring_number_from_name.3 \ + doc/pcre2api.3 \ + doc/pcre2build.3 \ + doc/pcre2callout.3 \ + doc/pcre2compat.3 \ + doc/pcre2convert.3 \ + doc/pcre2demo.3 \ + doc/pcre2grep.1 \ + doc/pcre2jit.3 \ + doc/pcre2limits.3 \ + doc/pcre2matching.3 \ + doc/pcre2partial.3 \ + doc/pcre2pattern.3 \ + doc/pcre2perform.3 \ + doc/pcre2posix.3 \ + doc/pcre2sample.3 \ + doc/pcre2serialize.3 \ + doc/pcre2syntax.3 \ + doc/pcre2test.1 \ + doc/pcre2unicode.3 + +# The Libtool libraries to install. We'll add to this later. + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = + +# Unit tests you want to run when people type 'make check'. +# TESTS is for binary unit tests, check_SCRIPTS for script-based tests + +TESTS = +check_SCRIPTS = +dist_noinst_SCRIPTS = + +# Some of the binaries we make are to be installed, and others are +# (non-user-visible) helper programs needed to build the libraries. + +bin_PROGRAMS = +noinst_PROGRAMS = + +# Additional files to delete on 'make clean', 'make distclean', +# and 'make maintainer-clean'. + +CLEANFILES = +DISTCLEANFILES = src/config.h.in~ +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = + +# Additional files to bundle with the distribution, over and above what +# the Autotools include by default. + +EXTRA_DIST = + +# These files contain additional m4 macros that are used by autoconf. + +EXTRA_DIST += \ + m4/ax_pthread.m4 m4/pcre2_visibility.m4 + +# These files contain maintenance information + +EXTRA_DIST += \ + NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD \ + HACKING + +# These files are used in the preparation of a release + +EXTRA_DIST += \ + PrepareRelease \ + CheckMan \ + CleanTxt \ + Detrail \ + 132html \ + doc/index.html.src + +# These files are usable versions of pcre2.h and config.h that are distributed +# for the benefit of people who are building PCRE2 manually, without the +# Autotools support. + +EXTRA_DIST += \ + src/pcre2.h.generic \ + src/config.h.generic + +# The only difference between pcre2.h.in and pcre2.h is the setting of the PCRE +# version number. Therefore, we can create the generic version just by copying. + +src/pcre2.h.generic: src/pcre2.h.in configure.ac + rm -f $@ + cp -p src/pcre2.h $@ + +# It is more complicated for config.h.generic. We need the version that results +# from a default configuration so as to get all the default values for PCRE +# configuration macros such as MATCH_LIMIT and NEWLINE. We can get this by +# doing a configure in a temporary directory. However, some trickery is needed, +# because the source directory may already be configured. If you just try +# running configure in a new directory, it complains. For this reason, we move +# config.status out of the way while doing the default configuration. The +# resulting config.h is munged by perl to put #ifdefs round any #defines for +# macros with values, and to #undef all boolean macros such as HAVE_xxx and +# SUPPORT_xxx. We also get rid of any gcc-specific visibility settings. Make +# sure that PCRE2_EXP_DEFN is unset (in case it has visibility settings). + +src/config.h.generic: configure.ac + rm -rf $@ _generic + mkdir _generic + cs=$(srcdir)/config.status; test ! -f $$cs || mv -f $$cs $$cs.aside + cd _generic && $(abs_top_srcdir)/configure || : + cs=$(srcdir)/config.status; test ! -f $$cs.aside || mv -f $$cs.aside $$cs + test -f _generic/src/config.h + perl -n \ + -e 'BEGIN{$$blank=0;}' \ + -e 'if(/PCRE2_EXP_DEFN/){print"/* #undef PCRE2_EXP_DEFN */\n";$$blank=0;next;}' \ + -e 'if(/to make a symbol visible/){next;}' \ + -e 'if(/__attribute__ \(\(visibility/){next;}' \ + -e 'if(/LT_OBJDIR/){print"/* This is ignored unless you are using libtool. */\n";}' \ + -e 'if(/^#define\s((?:HAVE|SUPPORT|STDC)_\w+)/){print"/* #undef $$1 */\n";$$blank=0;next;}' \ + -e 'if(/^#define\s(?!PACKAGE|VERSION)(\w+)/){print"#ifndef $$1\n$$_#endif\n";$$blank=0;next;}' \ + -e 'if(/^\s*$$/){print unless $$blank; $$blank=1;} else{print;$$blank=0;}' \ + _generic/src/config.h >$@ + rm -rf _generic + +MAINTAINERCLEANFILES += src/pcre2.h.generic src/config.h.generic + +# These are the header files we'll install. We do not distribute pcre2.h +# because it is generated from pcre2.h.in. + +nodist_include_HEADERS = src/pcre2.h +include_HEADERS = src/pcre2posix.h + +# This is the "config" script. + +bin_SCRIPTS = pcre2-config + +## --------------------------------------------------------------- +## The pcre2_dftables program is used to rebuild character tables before +## compiling PCRE2, if --enable-rebuild-chartables is specified. It is not an +## installed program. The default (when --enable-rebuild-chartables is not +## specified) is to copy a distributed set of tables that are defined for ASCII +## code. In this case, pcre2_dftables is not needed. + +if WITH_REBUILD_CHARTABLES +noinst_PROGRAMS += pcre2_dftables +pcre2_dftables_SOURCES = src/pcre2_dftables.c +src/pcre2_chartables.c: pcre2_dftables$(EXEEXT) + rm -f $@ + ./pcre2_dftables$(EXEEXT) $@ +else +src/pcre2_chartables.c: $(srcdir)/src/pcre2_chartables.c.dist + rm -f $@ + $(LN_S) $(abs_srcdir)/src/pcre2_chartables.c.dist $(abs_builddir)/src/pcre2_chartables.c +endif # WITH_REBUILD_CHARTABLES + +BUILT_SOURCES = src/pcre2_chartables.c +NODIST_SOURCES = src/pcre2_chartables.c + +## Define the list of common sources, then arrange to build whichever of the +## 8-, 16-, or 32-bit libraries are configured. + +COMMON_SOURCES = \ + src/pcre2_auto_possess.c \ + src/pcre2_compile.c \ + src/pcre2_config.c \ + src/pcre2_context.c \ + src/pcre2_convert.c \ + src/pcre2_dfa_match.c \ + src/pcre2_error.c \ + src/pcre2_extuni.c \ + src/pcre2_find_bracket.c \ + src/pcre2_internal.h \ + src/pcre2_intmodedep.h \ + src/pcre2_jit_compile.c \ + src/pcre2_jit_neon_inc.h \ + src/pcre2_jit_simd_inc.h \ + src/pcre2_maketables.c \ + src/pcre2_match.c \ + src/pcre2_match_data.c \ + src/pcre2_newline.c \ + src/pcre2_ord2utf.c \ + src/pcre2_pattern_info.c \ + src/pcre2_script_run.c \ + src/pcre2_serialize.c \ + src/pcre2_string_utils.c \ + src/pcre2_study.c \ + src/pcre2_substitute.c \ + src/pcre2_substring.c \ + src/pcre2_tables.c \ + src/pcre2_ucd.c \ + src/pcre2_ucp.h \ + src/pcre2_valid_utf.c \ + src/pcre2_xclass.c + +# The pcre2_ucptables.c file is #included by pcre2_tables.c + +EXTRA_DIST += src/pcre2_ucptables.c + +if WITH_PCRE2_8 +lib_LTLIBRARIES += libpcre2-8.la +libpcre2_8_la_SOURCES = \ + $(COMMON_SOURCES) +nodist_libpcre2_8_la_SOURCES = \ + $(NODIST_SOURCES) +libpcre2_8_la_CFLAGS = \ + -DPCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=8 \ + $(VISIBILITY_CFLAGS) \ + $(CET_CFLAGS) \ + $(AM_CFLAGS) +libpcre2_8_la_LIBADD = +endif # WITH_PCRE2_8 + +if WITH_PCRE2_16 +lib_LTLIBRARIES += libpcre2-16.la +libpcre2_16_la_SOURCES = \ + $(COMMON_SOURCES) +nodist_libpcre2_16_la_SOURCES = \ + $(NODIST_SOURCES) +libpcre2_16_la_CFLAGS = \ + -DPCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=16 \ + $(VISIBILITY_CFLAGS) \ + $(CET_CFLAGS) \ + $(AM_CFLAGS) +libpcre2_16_la_LIBADD = +endif # WITH_PCRE2_16 + +if WITH_PCRE2_32 +lib_LTLIBRARIES += libpcre2-32.la +libpcre2_32_la_SOURCES = \ + $(COMMON_SOURCES) +nodist_libpcre2_32_la_SOURCES = \ + $(NODIST_SOURCES) +libpcre2_32_la_CFLAGS = \ + -DPCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=32 \ + $(VISIBILITY_CFLAGS) \ + $(CET_CFLAGS) \ + $(AM_CFLAGS) +libpcre2_32_la_LIBADD = +endif # WITH_PCRE2_32 + +# The pcre2_chartables.c.dist file is the default version of +# pcre2_chartables.c, used unless --enable-rebuild-chartables is specified. + +EXTRA_DIST += src/pcre2_chartables.c.dist +CLEANFILES += src/pcre2_chartables.c + +# The JIT compiler lives in a separate directory, but its files are #included +# when pcre2_jit_compile.c is processed, so they must be distributed. + +EXTRA_DIST += \ + src/sljit/sljitConfig.h \ + src/sljit/sljitConfigInternal.h \ + src/sljit/sljitExecAllocator.c \ + src/sljit/sljitLir.c \ + src/sljit/sljitLir.h \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeARM_32.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeARM_64.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeARM_T2_32.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeMIPS_32.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeMIPS_64.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeMIPS_common.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativePPC_32.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativePPC_64.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativePPC_common.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeRISCV_32.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeRISCV_64.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeRISCV_common.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeS390X.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeX86_32.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeX86_64.c \ + src/sljit/sljitNativeX86_common.c \ + src/sljit/sljitProtExecAllocator.c \ + src/sljit/sljitUtils.c \ + src/sljit/sljitWXExecAllocator.c + +# Some of the JIT sources are also in separate files that are #included. + +EXTRA_DIST += \ + src/pcre2_jit_match.c \ + src/pcre2_jit_misc.c + +if WITH_PCRE2_8 +libpcre2_8_la_LDFLAGS = $(EXTRA_LIBPCRE2_8_LDFLAGS) +endif # WITH_PCRE2_8 +if WITH_PCRE2_16 +libpcre2_16_la_LDFLAGS = $(EXTRA_LIBPCRE2_16_LDFLAGS) +endif # WITH_PCRE2_16 +if WITH_PCRE2_32 +libpcre2_32_la_LDFLAGS = $(EXTRA_LIBPCRE2_32_LDFLAGS) +endif # WITH_PCRE2_32 + +if WITH_VALGRIND +if WITH_PCRE2_8 +libpcre2_8_la_CFLAGS += $(VALGRIND_CFLAGS) +endif # WITH_PCRE2_8 +if WITH_PCRE2_16 +libpcre2_16_la_CFLAGS += $(VALGRIND_CFLAGS) +endif # WITH_PCRE2_16 +if WITH_PCRE2_32 +libpcre2_32_la_CFLAGS += $(VALGRIND_CFLAGS) +endif # WITH_PCRE2_32 +endif # WITH_VALGRIND + +if WITH_GCOV +if WITH_PCRE2_8 +libpcre2_8_la_CFLAGS += $(GCOV_CFLAGS) +endif # WITH_PCRE2_8 +if WITH_PCRE2_16 +libpcre2_16_la_CFLAGS += $(GCOV_CFLAGS) +endif # WITH_PCRE2_16 +if WITH_PCRE2_32 +libpcre2_32_la_CFLAGS += $(GCOV_CFLAGS) +endif # WITH_PCRE2_32 +endif # WITH_GCOV + +## A version of the 8-bit library that has a POSIX API. + +if WITH_PCRE2_8 +lib_LTLIBRARIES += libpcre2-posix.la +libpcre2_posix_la_SOURCES = src/pcre2posix.c +libpcre2_posix_la_CFLAGS = \ + -DPCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=8 \ + $(VISIBILITY_CFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) +libpcre2_posix_la_LDFLAGS = $(EXTRA_LIBPCRE2_POSIX_LDFLAGS) +libpcre2_posix_la_LIBADD = libpcre2-8.la +if WITH_GCOV +libpcre2_posix_la_CFLAGS += $(GCOV_CFLAGS) +endif # WITH_GCOV +endif # WITH_PCRE2_8 + +## Build pcre2grep and optional fuzzer stuff if the 8-bit library is enabled + +if WITH_PCRE2_8 +bin_PROGRAMS += pcre2grep +pcre2grep_SOURCES = src/pcre2grep.c +pcre2grep_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) +pcre2grep_LDADD = $(LIBZ) $(LIBBZ2) +pcre2grep_LDADD += libpcre2-8.la +if WITH_GCOV +pcre2grep_CFLAGS += $(GCOV_CFLAGS) +pcre2grep_LDADD += $(GCOV_LIBS) +endif # WITH_GCOV + +## If fuzzer support is enabled, build a non-distributed library containing the +## fuzzing function. Also build the standalone checking binary from the same +## source but using -DSTANDALONE. + +if WITH_FUZZ_SUPPORT +noinst_LIBRARIES = .libs/libpcre2-fuzzsupport.a +_libs_libpcre2_fuzzsupport_a_SOURCES = src/pcre2_fuzzsupport.c +_libs_libpcre2_fuzzsupport_a_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) +_libs_libpcre2_fuzzsupport_a_LIBADD = + +noinst_PROGRAMS += pcre2fuzzcheck +pcre2fuzzcheck_SOURCES = src/pcre2_fuzzsupport.c +pcre2fuzzcheck_CFLAGS = -DSTANDALONE $(AM_CFLAGS) +pcre2fuzzcheck_LDADD = libpcre2-8.la +if WITH_GCOV +pcre2fuzzcheck_CFLAGS += $(GCOV_CFLAGS) +pcre2fuzzcheck_LDADD += $(GCOV_LIBS) +endif # WITH_GCOV +endif # WITH FUZZ_SUPPORT +endif # WITH_PCRE2_8 + +## -------- Testing ---------- + +## If the 8-bit library is enabled, build the POSIX wrapper test program and +## arrange for it to run. + +if WITH_PCRE2_8 +TESTS += pcre2posix_test +noinst_PROGRAMS += pcre2posix_test +pcre2posix_test_SOURCES = src/pcre2posix_test.c +pcre2posix_test_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) +pcre2posix_test_LDADD = libpcre2-posix.la libpcre2-8.la +endif # WITH_PCRE2_8 + +## If JIT support is enabled, arrange for the JIT test program to run. + +if WITH_JIT +TESTS += pcre2_jit_test +noinst_PROGRAMS += pcre2_jit_test +pcre2_jit_test_SOURCES = src/pcre2_jit_test.c +pcre2_jit_test_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) +pcre2_jit_test_LDADD = +if WITH_PCRE2_8 +pcre2_jit_test_LDADD += libpcre2-8.la +endif # WITH_PCRE2_8 +if WITH_PCRE2_16 +pcre2_jit_test_LDADD += libpcre2-16.la +endif # WITH_PCRE2_16 +if WITH_PCRE2_32 +pcre2_jit_test_LDADD += libpcre2-32.la +endif # WITH_PCRE2_32 +if WITH_GCOV +pcre2_jit_test_CFLAGS += $(GCOV_CFLAGS) +pcre2_jit_test_LDADD += $(GCOV_LIBS) +endif # WITH_GCOV +endif # WITH_JIT + +# Build the general pcre2test program. The file src/pcre2_printint.c is +# #included by pcre2test as many times as needed, at different code unit +# widths. + +bin_PROGRAMS += pcre2test +EXTRA_DIST += src/pcre2_printint.c +pcre2test_SOURCES = src/pcre2test.c +pcre2test_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) +pcre2test_LDADD = $(LIBREADLINE) + +if WITH_PCRE2_8 +pcre2test_LDADD += libpcre2-8.la libpcre2-posix.la +endif # WITH_PCRE2_8 + +if WITH_PCRE2_16 +pcre2test_LDADD += libpcre2-16.la +endif # WITH_PCRE2_16 + +if WITH_PCRE2_32 +pcre2test_LDADD += libpcre2-32.la +endif # WITH_PCRE2_32 + +if WITH_VALGRIND +pcre2test_CFLAGS += $(VALGRIND_CFLAGS) +endif # WITH_VALGRIND + +if WITH_GCOV +pcre2test_CFLAGS += $(GCOV_CFLAGS) +pcre2test_LDADD += $(GCOV_LIBS) +endif # WITH_GCOV + +## The main library tests. Each test is a binary plus a script that runs that +## binary in various ways. We install these test binaries in case folks find it +## helpful. The two .bat files are for running the tests under Windows. + +TESTS += RunTest +EXTRA_DIST += RunTest.bat +dist_noinst_SCRIPTS += RunTest + +## When the 8-bit library is configured, pcre2grep will have been built. + +if WITH_PCRE2_8 +TESTS += RunGrepTest +EXTRA_DIST += RunGrepTest.bat +dist_noinst_SCRIPTS += RunGrepTest +endif # WITH_PCRE2_8 + +## Distribute all the test data files + +EXTRA_DIST += \ + testdata/grepbinary \ + testdata/grepfilelist \ + testdata/grepinput \ + testdata/grepinput3 \ + testdata/grepinput8 \ + testdata/grepinputC.bz2 \ + testdata/grepinputC.gz \ + testdata/grepinputM \ + testdata/grepinputv \ + testdata/grepinputx \ + testdata/greplist \ + testdata/grepnot.bz2 \ + testdata/grepoutput \ + testdata/grepoutput8 \ + testdata/grepoutputC \ + testdata/grepoutputCN \ + testdata/grepoutputCNU \ + testdata/grepoutputCU \ + testdata/grepoutputCbz2 \ + testdata/grepoutputCgz \ + testdata/grepoutputN \ + testdata/grepoutputUN \ + testdata/greppatN4 \ + testdata/testbtables \ + testdata/testinput1 \ + testdata/testinput2 \ + testdata/testinput3 \ + testdata/testinput4 \ + testdata/testinput5 \ + testdata/testinput6 \ + testdata/testinput7 \ + testdata/testinput8 \ + testdata/testinput9 \ + testdata/testinput10 \ + testdata/testinput11 \ + testdata/testinput12 \ + testdata/testinput13 \ + testdata/testinput14 \ + testdata/testinput15 \ + testdata/testinput16 \ + testdata/testinput17 \ + testdata/testinput18 \ + testdata/testinput19 \ + testdata/testinput20 \ + testdata/testinput21 \ + testdata/testinput22 \ + testdata/testinput23 \ + testdata/testinput24 \ + testdata/testinput25 \ + testdata/testinput26 \ + testdata/testinputEBC \ + testdata/testinputheap \ + testdata/testoutput1 \ + testdata/testoutput2 \ + testdata/testoutput3 \ + testdata/testoutput3A \ + testdata/testoutput3B \ + testdata/testoutput4 \ + testdata/testoutput5 \ + testdata/testoutput6 \ + testdata/testoutput7 \ + testdata/testoutput8-16-2 \ + testdata/testoutput8-16-3 \ + testdata/testoutput8-16-4 \ + testdata/testoutput8-32-2 \ + testdata/testoutput8-32-3 \ + testdata/testoutput8-32-4 \ + testdata/testoutput8-8-2 \ + testdata/testoutput8-8-3 \ + testdata/testoutput8-8-4 \ + testdata/testoutput9 \ + testdata/testoutput10 \ + testdata/testoutput11-16 \ + testdata/testoutput11-32 \ + testdata/testoutput12-16 \ + testdata/testoutput12-32 \ + testdata/testoutput13 \ + testdata/testoutput14-16 \ + testdata/testoutput14-32 \ + testdata/testoutput14-8 \ + testdata/testoutput15 \ + testdata/testoutput16 \ + testdata/testoutput17 \ + testdata/testoutput18 \ + testdata/testoutput19 \ + testdata/testoutput20 \ + testdata/testoutput21 \ + testdata/testoutput22-16 \ + testdata/testoutput22-32 \ + testdata/testoutput22-8 \ + testdata/testoutput23 \ + testdata/testoutput24 \ + testdata/testoutput25 \ + testdata/testoutput26 \ + testdata/testoutputEBC \ + testdata/testoutputheap-16 \ + testdata/testoutputheap-32 \ + testdata/testoutputheap-8 \ + testdata/valgrind-jit.supp \ + testdata/wintestinput3 \ + testdata/wintestoutput3 \ + perltest.sh + +# RunTest and RunGrepTest should clean up after themselves, but just in case +# they don't, add their working files to CLEANFILES. + +CLEANFILES += \ + testSinput \ + test3input \ + test3output \ + test3outputA \ + test3outputB \ + testtry \ + teststdout \ + teststderr \ + teststderrgrep \ + testtemp1grep \ + testtemp2grep \ + testtrygrep \ + testNinputgrep + +## ------------ End of testing ------------- + + +# PCRE2 demonstration program. Not built automatically. The point is that the +# users should build it themselves. So just distribute the source. + +EXTRA_DIST += src/pcre2demo.c + + +# We have .pc files for pkg-config users. + +pkgconfigdir = $(libdir)/pkgconfig +pkgconfig_DATA = + +if WITH_PCRE2_8 +pkgconfig_DATA += libpcre2-8.pc libpcre2-posix.pc +endif + +if WITH_PCRE2_16 +pkgconfig_DATA += libpcre2-16.pc +endif + +if WITH_PCRE2_32 +pkgconfig_DATA += libpcre2-32.pc +endif + + +# gcov/lcov code coverage reporting +# +# Coverage reporting targets: +# +# coverage: Create a coverage report from 'make check' +# coverage-baseline: Capture baseline coverage information +# coverage-reset: This zeros the coverage counters only +# coverage-report: This creates the coverage report only +# coverage-clean-report: This removes the generated coverage report +# without cleaning the coverage data itself +# coverage-clean-data: This removes the captured coverage data without +# removing the coverage files created at compile time (*.gcno) +# coverage-clean: This cleans all coverage data including the generated +# coverage report. + +if WITH_GCOV +COVERAGE_TEST_NAME = $(PACKAGE) +COVERAGE_NAME = $(PACKAGE)-$(VERSION) +COVERAGE_OUTPUT_FILE = $(COVERAGE_NAME)-coverage.info +COVERAGE_OUTPUT_DIR = $(COVERAGE_NAME)-coverage +COVERAGE_LCOV_EXTRA_FLAGS = +COVERAGE_GENHTML_EXTRA_FLAGS = + +coverage_quiet = $(coverage_quiet_$(V)) +coverage_quiet_ = $(coverage_quiet_$(AM_DEFAULT_VERBOSITY)) +coverage_quiet_0 = --quiet + +coverage-check: all + -$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) -k check + +coverage-baseline: + $(LCOV) $(coverage_quiet) \ + --directory $(top_builddir) \ + --output-file "$(COVERAGE_OUTPUT_FILE)" \ + --capture \ + --initial + +coverage-report: + $(LCOV) $(coverage_quiet) \ + --directory $(top_builddir) \ + --capture \ + --output-file "$(COVERAGE_OUTPUT_FILE).tmp" \ + --test-name "$(COVERAGE_TEST_NAME)" \ + --no-checksum \ + --compat-libtool \ + $(COVERAGE_LCOV_EXTRA_FLAGS) + $(LCOV) $(coverage_quiet) \ + --directory $(top_builddir) \ + --output-file "$(COVERAGE_OUTPUT_FILE)" \ + --remove "$(COVERAGE_OUTPUT_FILE).tmp" \ + "/tmp/*" \ + "/usr/include/*" \ + "$(includedir)/*" + -@rm -f "$(COVERAGE_OUTPUT_FILE).tmp" + LANG=C $(GENHTML) $(coverage_quiet) \ + --prefix $(top_builddir) \ + --output-directory "$(COVERAGE_OUTPUT_DIR)" \ + --title "$(PACKAGE) $(VERSION) Code Coverage Report" \ + --show-details "$(COVERAGE_OUTPUT_FILE)" \ + --legend \ + $(COVERAGE_GENHTML_EXTRA_FLAGS) + @echo "Code coverage report written to file://$(abs_builddir)/$(COVERAGE_OUTPUT_DIR)/index.html" + +coverage-reset: + -$(LCOV) $(coverage_quiet) --zerocounters --directory $(top_builddir) + +coverage-clean-report: + -rm -f "$(COVERAGE_OUTPUT_FILE)" "$(COVERAGE_OUTPUT_FILE).tmp" + -rm -rf "$(COVERAGE_OUTPUT_DIR)" + +coverage-clean-data: + -find $(top_builddir) -name "*.gcda" -delete + +coverage-clean: coverage-reset coverage-clean-report coverage-clean-data + -find $(top_builddir) -name "*.gcno" -delete + +coverage-distclean: coverage-clean + +coverage: coverage-reset coverage-baseline coverage-check coverage-report +clean-local: coverage-clean +distclean-local: coverage-distclean + +.PHONY: coverage coverage-baseline coverage-check coverage-report coverage-reset coverage-clean-report coverage-clean-data coverage-clean coverage-distclean + +# Without coverage support, still arrange for 'make distclean' to get rid of +# any coverage files that may have been left from a different configuration. + +else + +coverage: + @echo "Configuring with --enable-coverage is required to generate code coverage report." + +DISTCLEANFILES += src/*.gcda src/*.gcno + +distclean-local: + rm -rf $(PACKAGE)-$(VERSION)-coverage* + +endif # WITH_GCOV + +## CMake support + +EXTRA_DIST += \ + cmake/COPYING-CMAKE-SCRIPTS \ + cmake/FindEditline.cmake \ + cmake/FindPackageHandleStandardArgs.cmake \ + cmake/FindReadline.cmake \ + cmake/pcre2-config-version.cmake.in \ + cmake/pcre2-config.cmake.in \ + CMakeLists.txt \ + config-cmake.h.in + +## end Makefile.am diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/NEWS b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/NEWS new file mode 100644 index 00000000..97da19e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/NEWS @@ -0,0 +1,436 @@ +News about PCRE2 releases +------------------------- + + +Version 10.42 11-December-2022 +------------------------------ + +This is an unexpectedly early release to fix a problem that was introduced in +10.41. ChangeLog number 19 (GitHub #139) added the default definition of +PCRE2_CALL_CONVENTION to pcre2posix.c instead of pcre2posix.h, which meant that +programs including pcre2posix.h but not pcre2.h couldn't compile. A new test +that checks this case has been added. + +A couple of other minor issues are also fixed, and a patch for an intermittent +JIT fault is also included. See ChangeLog and the Git log. + + +Version 10.41 06-December-2022 +------------------------------ + +This is another mainly bug-fixing and code-tidying release. There is one +significant upgrade to pcre2grep: it now behaves like GNU grep when matching +more than one pattern and a later pattern matches at an earlier point in the +subject when the matched substrings are being identified by colour or by +offsets. + + +Version 10.40 15-April-2022 +--------------------------- + +This is mostly a bug-fixing and code-tidying release. However, there are some +extensions to Unicode property handling: + +* Added support for Bidi_Class and a number of binary Unicode properties, +including Bidi_Control. + +* A number of changes to script matching for \p and \P: + + (a) Script extensions for a character are now coded as a bitmap instead of + a list of script numbers, which should be faster and does not need a + loop. + + (b) Added the syntax \p{script:xxx} and \p{script_extensions:xxx} (synonyms + sc and scx). + + (c) Changed \p{scriptname} from being the same as \p{sc:scriptname} to being + the same as \p{scx:scriptname} because this change happened in Perl at + release 5.26. + + (d) The standard Unicode 4-letter abbreviations for script names are now + recognized. + + (e) In accordance with Unicode and Perl's "loose matching" rules, spaces, + hyphens, and underscores are ignored in property names, which are then + matched independent of case. + +As always, see ChangeLog for a list of all changes (also the Git log). + + +Version 10.39 29-October-2021 +----------------------------- + +This release is happening soon after 10.38 because the bug fix is important. + +1. Fix incorrect detection of alternatives in first character search in JIT. + +2. Update to Unicode 14.0.0. + +3. Some code cleanups (see ChangeLog). + + +Version 10.38 01-October-2021 +----------------------------- + +As well as some bug fixes and tidies (as always, see ChangeLog for details), +the documentation is updated to list the new URLs, following the move of the +source repository to GitHub and the mailing list to Google Groups. + +* The CMake build system can now build both static and shared libraries in one +go. + +* Following Perl's lead, \K is now locked out in lookaround assertions by +default, but an option is provided to re-enable the previous behaviour. + + +Version 10.37 26-May-2021 +------------------------- + +A few more bug fixes and tidies. The only change of real note is the removal of +the actual POSIX names regcomp etc. from the POSIX wrapper library because +these have caused issues for some applications (see 10.33 #2 below). + + +Version 10.36 04-December-2020 +------------------------------ + +Again, mainly bug fixes and tidies. The only enhancements are the addition of +GNU grep's -m (aka --max-count) option to pcre2grep, and also unifying the +handling of substitution strings for both -O and callouts in pcre2grep, with +the addition of $x{...} and $o{...} to allow for characters whose code points +are greater than 255 in Unicode mode. + +NOTE: there is an outstanding issue with JIT support for MacOS on arm64 +hardware. For details, please see Bugzilla issue #2618. + + +Version 10.35 15-April-2020 +--------------------------- + +Bugfixes, tidies, and a few new enhancements. + +1. Capturing groups that contain recursive backreferences to themselves are no +longer automatically atomic, because the restriction is no longer necessary +as a result of the 10.30 restructuring. + +2. Several new options for pcre2_substitute(). + +3. When Unicode is supported and PCRE2_UCP is set without PCRE2_UTF, Unicode +character properties are used for upper/lower case computations on characters +whose code points are greater than 127. + +4. The character tables (for low-valued characters) can now more easily be +saved and restored in binary. + +5. Updated to Unicode 13.0.0. + + +Version 10.34 21-November-2019 +------------------------------ + +Another release with a few enhancements as well as bugfixes and tidies. The +main new features are: + +1. There is now some support for matching in invalid UTF strings. + +2. Non-atomic positive lookarounds are implemented in the pcre2_match() +interpreter, but not in JIT. + +3. Added two new functions: pcre2_get_match_data_size() and +pcre2_maketables_free(). + +4. Upgraded to Unicode 12.1.0. + + +Version 10.33 16-April-2019 +--------------------------- + +Yet more bugfixes, tidies, and a few enhancements, summarized here (see +ChangeLog for the full list): + +1. Callouts from pcre2_substitute() are now available. + +2. The POSIX functions are now all called pcre2_regcomp() etc., with wrapper +functions that use the standard POSIX names. However, in pcre2posix.h the POSIX +names are defined as macros. This should help avoid linking with the wrong +library in some environments, while still exporting the POSIX names for +pre-existing programs that use them. + +3. Some new options: + + (a) PCRE2_EXTRA_ESCAPED_CR_IS_LF makes \r behave as \n. + + (b) PCRE2_EXTRA_ALT_BSUX enables support for ECMAScript 6's \u{hh...} + construct. + + (c) PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT causes a copy of a matched subject to be + made, instead of just remembering a pointer. + +4. Some new Perl features: + + (a) Perl 5.28's experimental alphabetic names for atomic groups and + lookaround assertions, for example, (*pla:...) and (*atomic:...). + + (b) The new Perl "script run" features (*script_run:...) and + (*atomic_script_run:...) aka (*sr:...) and (*asr:...). + + (c) When PCRE2_UTF is set, allow non-ASCII letters and decimal digits in + capture group names. + +5. --disable-percent-zt disables the use of %zu and %td in formatting strings +in pcre2test. They were already automatically disabled for VC and older C +compilers. + +6. Some changes related to callouts in pcre2grep: + + (a) Support for running an external program under VMS has been added, in + addition to Windows and fork() support. + + (b) --disable-pcre2grep-callout-fork restricts the callout support in + to the inbuilt echo facility. + + +Version 10.32 10-September-2018 +------------------------------- + +This is another mainly bugfix and tidying release with a few minor +enhancements. These are the main ones: + +1. pcre2grep now supports the inclusion of binary zeros in patterns that are +read from files via the -f option. + +2. ./configure now supports --enable-jit=auto, which automatically enables JIT +if the hardware supports it. + +3. In pcre2_dfa_match(), internal recursive calls no longer use the stack for +local workspace and local ovectors. Instead, an initial block of stack is +reserved, but if this is insufficient, heap memory is used. The heap limit +parameter now applies to pcre2_dfa_match(). + +4. Updated to Unicode version 11.0.0. + +5. (*ACCEPT:ARG), (*FAIL:ARG), and (*COMMIT:ARG) are now supported. + +6. Added support for \N{U+dddd}, but only in Unicode mode. + +7. Added support for (?^) to unset all imnsx options. + + +Version 10.31 12-February-2018 +------------------------------ + +This is mainly a bugfix and tidying release (see ChangeLog for full details). +However, there are some minor enhancements. + +1. New pcre2_config() options: PCRE2_CONFIG_NEVER_BACKSLASH_C and +PCRE2_CONFIG_COMPILED_WIDTHS. + +2. New pcre2_pattern_info() option PCRE2_INFO_EXTRAOPTIONS to retrieve the +extra compile time options. + +3. There are now public names for all the pcre2_compile() error numbers. + +4. Added PCRE2_CALLOUT_STARTMATCH and PCRE2_CALLOUT_BACKTRACK bits to a new +field callout_flags in callout blocks. + + +Version 10.30 14-August-2017 +---------------------------- + +The full list of changes that includes bugfixes and tidies is, as always, in +ChangeLog. These are the most important new features: + +1. The main interpreter, pcre2_match(), has been refactored into a new version +that does not use recursive function calls (and therefore the system stack) for +remembering backtracking positions. This makes --disable-stack-for-recursion a +NOOP. The new implementation allows backtracking into recursive group calls in +patterns, making it more compatible with Perl, and also fixes some other +previously hard-to-do issues. For patterns that have a lot of backtracking, the +heap is now used, and there is an explicit limit on the amount, settable by +pcre2_set_heap_limit() or (*LIMIT_HEAP=xxx). The "recursion limit" is retained, +but is renamed as "depth limit" (though the old names remain for +compatibility). + +There is also a change in the way callouts from pcre2_match() are handled. The +offset_vector field in the callout block is no longer a pointer to the +actual ovector that was passed to the matching function in the match data +block. Instead it points to an internal ovector of a size large enough to hold +all possible captured substrings in the pattern. + +2. The new option PCRE2_ENDANCHORED insists that a pattern match must end at +the end of the subject. + +3. The new option PCRE2_EXTENDED_MORE implements Perl's /xx feature, and +pcre2test is upgraded to support it. Setting within the pattern by (?xx) is +also supported. + +4. (?n) can be used to set PCRE2_NO_AUTO_CAPTURE, because Perl now has this. + +5. Additional compile options in the compile context are now available, and the +first two are: PCRE2_EXTRA_ALLOW_SURROGATE_ESCAPES and +PCRE2_EXTRA_BAD_ESCAPE_IS_LITERAL. + +6. The newline type PCRE2_NEWLINE_NUL is now available. + +7. The match limit value now also applies to pcre2_dfa_match() as there are +patterns that can use up a lot of resources without necessarily recursing very +deeply. + +8. The option REG_PEND (a GNU extension) is now available for the POSIX +wrapper. Also there is a new option PCRE2_LITERAL which is used to support +REG_NOSPEC. + +9. PCRE2_EXTRA_MATCH_LINE and PCRE2_EXTRA_MATCH_WORD are implemented for the +benefit of pcre2grep, and pcre2grep's -F, -w, and -x options are re-implemented +using PCRE2_LITERAL, PCRE2_EXTRA_MATCH_WORD, and PCRE2_EXTRA_MATCH_LINE. This +is tidier and also fixes some bugs. + +10. The Unicode tables are upgraded from Unicode 8.0.0 to Unicode 10.0.0. + +11. There are some experimental functions for converting foreign patterns +(globs and POSIX patterns) into PCRE2 patterns. + + +Version 10.23 14-February-2017 +------------------------------ + +1. ChangeLog has the details of a lot of bug fixes and tidies. + +2. There has been a major re-factoring of the pcre2_compile.c file. Most syntax +checking is now done in the pre-pass that identifies capturing groups. This has +reduced the amount of duplication and made the code tidier. While doing this, +some minor bugs and Perl incompatibilities were fixed (see ChangeLog for +details.) + +3. Back references are now permitted in lookbehind assertions when there are +no duplicated group numbers (that is, (?| has not been used), and, if the +reference is by name, there is only one group of that name. The referenced +group must, of course be of fixed length. + +4. \g{+} (e.g. \g{+2} ) is now supported. It is a "forward back +reference" and can be useful in repetitions (compare \g{-} ). Perl does +not recognize this syntax. + +5. pcre2grep now automatically expands its buffer up to a maximum set by +--max-buffer-size. + +6. The -t option (grand total) has been added to pcre2grep. + +7. A new function called pcre2_code_copy_with_tables() exists to copy a +compiled pattern along with a private copy of the character tables that is +uses. + +8. A user supplied a number of patches to upgrade pcre2grep under Windows and +tidy the code. + +9. Several updates have been made to pcre2test and test scripts (see +ChangeLog). + + +Version 10.22 29-July-2016 +-------------------------- + +1. ChangeLog has the details of a number of bug fixes. + +2. The POSIX wrapper function regcomp() did not used to support back references +and subroutine calls if called with the REG_NOSUB option. It now does. + +3. A new function, pcre2_code_copy(), is added, to make a copy of a compiled +pattern. + +4. Support for string callouts is added to pcre2grep. + +5. Added the PCRE2_NO_JIT option to pcre2_match(). + +6. The pcre2_get_error_message() function now returns with a negative error +code if the error number it is given is unknown. + +7. Several updates have been made to pcre2test and test scripts (see +ChangeLog). + + +Version 10.21 12-January-2016 +----------------------------- + +1. Many bugs have been fixed. A large number of them were provoked only by very +strange pattern input, and were discovered by fuzzers. Some others were +discovered by code auditing. See ChangeLog for details. + +2. The Unicode tables have been updated to Unicode version 8.0.0. + +3. For Perl compatibility in EBCDIC environments, ranges such as a-z in a +class, where both values are literal letters in the same case, omit the +non-letter EBCDIC code points within the range. + +4. There have been a number of enhancements to the pcre2_substitute() function, +giving more flexibility to replacement facilities. It is now also possible to +cause the function to return the needed buffer size if the one given is too +small. + +5. The PCRE2_ALT_VERBNAMES option causes the "name" parts of special verbs such +as (*THEN:name) to be processed for backslashes and to take note of +PCRE2_EXTENDED. + +6. PCRE2_INFO_HASBACKSLASHC makes it possible for a client to find out if a +pattern uses \C, and --never-backslash-C makes it possible to compile a version +PCRE2 in which the use of \C is always forbidden. + +7. A limit to the length of pattern that can be handled can now be set by +calling pcre2_set_max_pattern_length(). + +8. When matching an unanchored pattern, a match can be required to begin within +a given number of code units after the start of the subject by calling +pcre2_set_offset_limit(). + +9. The pcre2test program has been extended to test new facilities, and it can +now run the tests when LF on its own is not a valid newline sequence. + +10. The RunTest script has also been updated to enable more tests to be run. + +11. There have been some minor performance enhancements. + + +Version 10.20 30-June-2015 +-------------------------- + +1. Callouts with string arguments and the pcre2_callout_enumerate() function +have been implemented. + +2. The PCRE2_NEVER_BACKSLASH_C option, which locks out the use of \C, is added. + +3. The PCRE2_ALT_CIRCUMFLEX option lets ^ match after a newline at the end of a +subject in multiline mode. + +4. The way named subpatterns are handled has been refactored. The previous +approach had several bugs. + +5. The handling of \c in EBCDIC environments has been changed to conform to the +perlebcdic document. This is an incompatible change. + +6. Bugs have been mended, many of them discovered by fuzzers. + + +Version 10.10 06-March-2015 +--------------------------- + +1. Serialization and de-serialization functions have been added to the API, +making it possible to save and restore sets of compiled patterns, though +restoration must be done in the same environment that was used for compilation. + +2. The (*NO_JIT) feature has been added; this makes it possible for a pattern +creator to specify that JIT is not to be used. + +3. A number of bugs have been fixed. In particular, bugs that caused building +on Windows using CMake to fail have been mended. + + +Version 10.00 05-January-2015 +----------------------------- + +Version 10.00 is the first release of PCRE2, a revised API for the PCRE +library. Changes prior to 10.00 are logged in the ChangeLog file for the old +API, up to item 20 for release 8.36. New programs are recommended to use the +new library. Programs that use the original (PCRE1) API will need changing +before linking with the new library. + +**** diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d83591a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD @@ -0,0 +1,415 @@ +Building PCRE2 without using autotools +-------------------------------------- + +This document contains the following sections: + + General + Generic instructions for the PCRE2 C library + Stack size in Windows environments + Linking programs in Windows environments + Calling conventions in Windows environments + Comments about Win32 builds + Building PCRE2 on Windows with CMake + Building PCRE2 on Windows with Visual Studio + Testing with RunTest.bat + Building PCRE2 on native z/OS and z/VM + + +GENERAL + +The basic PCRE2 library consists entirely of code written in Standard C, and so +should compile successfully on any system that has a Standard C compiler and +library. + +The PCRE2 distribution includes a "configure" file for use by the +configure/make (autotools) build system, as found in many Unix-like +environments. The README file contains information about the options for +"configure". + +There is also support for CMake, which some users prefer, especially in Windows +environments, though it can also be run in Unix-like environments. See the +section entitled "Building PCRE2 on Windows with CMake" below. + +Versions of src/config.h and src/pcre2.h are distributed in the PCRE2 tarballs +under the names src/config.h.generic and src/pcre2.h.generic. These are +provided for those who build PCRE2 without using "configure" or CMake. If you +use "configure" or CMake, the .generic versions are not used. + + +GENERIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PCRE2 C LIBRARY + +The following are generic instructions for building the PCRE2 C library "by +hand". If you are going to use CMake, this section does not apply to you; you +can skip ahead to the CMake section. Note that the settings concerned with +8-bit, 16-bit, and 32-bit code units relate to the type of data string that +PCRE2 processes. They are NOT referring to the underlying operating system bit +width. You do not have to do anything special to compile in a 64-bit +environment, for example. + + (1) Copy or rename the file src/config.h.generic as src/config.h, and edit the + macro settings that it contains to whatever is appropriate for your + environment. In particular, you can alter the definition of the NEWLINE + macro to specify what character(s) you want to be interpreted as line + terminators by default. + + When you subsequently compile any of the PCRE2 modules, you must specify + -DHAVE_CONFIG_H to your compiler so that src/config.h is included in the + sources. + + An alternative approach is not to edit src/config.h, but to use -D on the + compiler command line to make any changes that you need to the + configuration options. In this case -DHAVE_CONFIG_H must not be set. + + NOTE: There have been occasions when the way in which certain parameters + in src/config.h are used has changed between releases. (In the + configure/make world, this is handled automatically.) When upgrading to a + new release, you are strongly advised to review src/config.h.generic + before re-using what you had previously. + + Note also that the src/config.h.generic file is created from a config.h + that was generated by Autotools, which automatically includes settings of + a number of macros that are not actually used by PCRE2 (for example, + HAVE_DLFCN_H). + + (2) Copy or rename the file src/pcre2.h.generic as src/pcre2.h. + + (3) EITHER: + Copy or rename file src/pcre2_chartables.c.dist as + src/pcre2_chartables.c. + + OR: + Compile src/pcre2_dftables.c as a stand-alone program (using + -DHAVE_CONFIG_H if you have set up src/config.h), and then run it with + the single argument "src/pcre2_chartables.c". This generates a set of + standard character tables and writes them to that file. The tables are + generated using the default C locale for your system. If you want to use + a locale that is specified by LC_xxx environment variables, add the -L + option to the pcre2_dftables command. You must use this method if you + are building on a system that uses EBCDIC code. + + The tables in src/pcre2_chartables.c are defaults. The caller of PCRE2 can + specify alternative tables at run time. + + (4) For a library that supports 8-bit code units in the character strings that + it processes, compile the following source files from the src directory, + setting -DPCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH=8 as a compiler option. Also set + -DHAVE_CONFIG_H if you have set up src/config.h with your configuration, + or else use other -D settings to change the configuration as required. + + pcre2_auto_possess.c + pcre2_chartables.c + pcre2_compile.c + pcre2_config.c + pcre2_context.c + pcre2_convert.c + pcre2_dfa_match.c + pcre2_error.c + pcre2_extuni.c + pcre2_find_bracket.c + pcre2_jit_compile.c + pcre2_maketables.c + pcre2_match.c + pcre2_match_data.c + pcre2_newline.c + pcre2_ord2utf.c + pcre2_pattern_info.c + pcre2_script_run.c + pcre2_serialize.c + pcre2_string_utils.c + pcre2_study.c + pcre2_substitute.c + pcre2_substring.c + pcre2_tables.c + pcre2_ucd.c + pcre2_ucptables.c + pcre2_valid_utf.c + pcre2_xclass.c + + Make sure that you include -I. in the compiler command (or equivalent for + an unusual compiler) so that all included PCRE2 header files are first + sought in the src directory under the current directory. Otherwise you run + the risk of picking up a previously-installed file from somewhere else. + + Note that you must compile pcre2_jit_compile.c, even if you have not + defined SUPPORT_JIT in src/config.h, because when JIT support is not + configured, dummy functions are compiled. When JIT support IS configured, + pcre2_jit_compile.c #includes other files from the sljit subdirectory, + all of whose names begin with "sljit". It also #includes + src/pcre2_jit_match.c and src/pcre2_jit_misc.c, so you should not compile + those yourself. + + Note also that the pcre2_fuzzsupport.c file contains special code that is + useful to those who want to run fuzzing tests on the PCRE2 library. Unless + you are doing that, you can ignore it. + + (5) Now link all the compiled code into an object library in whichever form + your system keeps such libraries. This is the basic PCRE2 C 8-bit library. + If your system has static and shared libraries, you may have to do this + once for each type. + + (6) If you want to build a library that supports 16-bit or 32-bit code units, + (as well as, or instead of the 8-bit library) just supply 16 or 32 as the + value of -DPCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH when you are compiling. + + (7) If you want to build the POSIX wrapper functions (which apply only to the + 8-bit library), ensure that you have the src/pcre2posix.h file and then + compile src/pcre2posix.c. Link the result (on its own) as the pcre2posix + library. + + (8) The pcre2test program can be linked with any combination of the 8-bit, + 16-bit and 32-bit libraries (depending on what you selected in + src/config.h). Compile src/pcre2test.c; don't forget -DHAVE_CONFIG_H if + necessary, but do NOT define PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH. Then link with the + appropriate library/ies. If you compiled an 8-bit library, pcre2test also + needs the pcre2posix wrapper library. + + (9) Run pcre2test on the testinput files in the testdata directory, and check + that the output matches the corresponding testoutput files. There are + comments about what each test does in the section entitled "Testing PCRE2" + in the README file. If you compiled more than one of the 8-bit, 16-bit and + 32-bit libraries, you need to run pcre2test with the -16 option to do + 16-bit tests and with the -32 option to do 32-bit tests. + + Some tests are relevant only when certain build-time options are selected. + For example, test 4 is for Unicode support, and will not run if you have + built PCRE2 without it. See the comments at the start of each testinput + file. If you have a suitable Unix-like shell, the RunTest script will run + the appropriate tests for you. The command "RunTest list" will output a + list of all the tests. + + Note that the supplied files are in Unix format, with just LF characters + as line terminators. You may need to edit them to change this if your + system uses a different convention. + +(10) If you have built PCRE2 with SUPPORT_JIT, the JIT features can be tested + by running pcre2test with the -jit option. This is done automatically by + the RunTest script. You might also like to build and run the freestanding + JIT test program, src/pcre2_jit_test.c. + +(11) The pcre2test program tests the POSIX wrapper library, but there is also a + freestanding test program in src/pcre2posix_test.c. It must be linked with + both the pcre2posix library and the 8-bit PCRE2 library. + +(12) If you want to use the pcre2grep command, compile and link + src/pcre2grep.c; it uses only the basic 8-bit PCRE2 library (it does not + need the pcre2posix library). If you have built the PCRE2 library with JIT + support by defining SUPPORT_JIT in src/config.h, you can also define + SUPPORT_PCRE2GREP_JIT, which causes pcre2grep to make use of JIT (unless + it is run with --no-jit). If you define SUPPORT_PCRE2GREP_JIT without + defining SUPPORT_JIT, pcre2grep does not try to make use of JIT. + + +STACK SIZE IN WINDOWS ENVIRONMENTS + +Prior to release 10.30 the default system stack size of 1MiB in some Windows +environments caused issues with some tests. This should no longer be the case +for 10.30 and later releases. + + +LINKING PROGRAMS IN WINDOWS ENVIRONMENTS + +If you want to statically link a program against a PCRE2 library in the form of +a non-dll .a file, you must define PCRE2_STATIC before including src/pcre2.h. + + +CALLING CONVENTIONS IN WINDOWS ENVIRONMENTS + +It is possible to compile programs to use different calling conventions using +MSVC. Search the web for "calling conventions" for more information. To make it +easier to change the calling convention for the exported functions in the +PCRE2 library, the macro PCRE2_CALL_CONVENTION is present in all the external +definitions. It can be set externally when compiling (e.g. in CFLAGS). If it is +not set, it defaults to empty; the default calling convention is then used +(which is what is wanted most of the time). + + +COMMENTS ABOUT WIN32 BUILDS (see also "BUILDING PCRE2 ON WINDOWS WITH CMAKE") + +There are two ways of building PCRE2 using the "configure, make, make install" +paradigm on Windows systems: using MinGW or using Cygwin. These are not at all +the same thing; they are completely different from each other. There is also +support for building using CMake, which some users find a more straightforward +way of building PCRE2 under Windows. + +The MinGW home page (http://www.mingw.org/) says this: + + MinGW: A collection of freely available and freely distributable Windows + specific header files and import libraries combined with GNU toolsets that + allow one to produce native Windows programs that do not rely on any + 3rd-party C runtime DLLs. + +The Cygwin home page (http://www.cygwin.com/) says this: + + Cygwin is a Linux-like environment for Windows. It consists of two parts: + + . A DLL (cygwin1.dll) which acts as a Linux API emulation layer providing + substantial Linux API functionality + + . A collection of tools which provide Linux look and feel. + +On both MinGW and Cygwin, PCRE2 should build correctly using: + + ./configure && make && make install + +This should create two libraries called libpcre2-8 and libpcre2-posix. These +are independent libraries: when you link with libpcre2-posix you must also link +with libpcre2-8, which contains the basic functions. + +Using Cygwin's compiler generates libraries and executables that depend on +cygwin1.dll. If a library that is generated this way is distributed, +cygwin1.dll has to be distributed as well. Since cygwin1.dll is under the GPL +licence, this forces not only PCRE2 to be under the GPL, but also the entire +application. A distributor who wants to keep their own code proprietary must +purchase an appropriate Cygwin licence. + +MinGW has no such restrictions. The MinGW compiler generates a library or +executable that can run standalone on Windows without any third party dll or +licensing issues. + +But there is more complication: + +If a Cygwin user uses the -mno-cygwin Cygwin gcc flag, what that really does is +to tell Cygwin's gcc to use the MinGW gcc. Cygwin's gcc is only acting as a +front end to MinGW's gcc (if you install Cygwin's gcc, you get both Cygwin's +gcc and MinGW's gcc). So, a user can: + +. Build native binaries by using MinGW or by getting Cygwin and using + -mno-cygwin. + +. Build binaries that depend on cygwin1.dll by using Cygwin with the normal + compiler flags. + +The test files that are supplied with PCRE2 are in UNIX format, with LF +characters as line terminators. Unless your PCRE2 library uses a default +newline option that includes LF as a valid newline, it may be necessary to +change the line terminators in the test files to get some of the tests to work. + + +BUILDING PCRE2 ON WINDOWS WITH CMAKE + +CMake is an alternative configuration facility that can be used instead of +"configure". CMake creates project files (make files, solution files, etc.) +tailored to numerous development environments, including Visual Studio, +Borland, Msys, MinGW, NMake, and Unix. If possible, use short paths with no +spaces in the names for your CMake installation and your PCRE2 source and build +directories. + +The following instructions were contributed by a PCRE1 user, but they should +also work for PCRE2. If they are not followed exactly, errors may occur. In the +event that errors do occur, it is recommended that you delete the CMake cache +before attempting to repeat the CMake build process. In the CMake GUI, the +cache can be deleted by selecting "File > Delete Cache". + +1. Install the latest CMake version available from http://www.cmake.org/, and + ensure that cmake\bin is on your path. + +2. Unzip (retaining folder structure) the PCRE2 source tree into a source + directory such as C:\pcre2. You should ensure your local date and time + is not earlier than the file dates in your source dir if the release is + very new. + +3. Create a new, empty build directory, preferably a subdirectory of the + source dir. For example, C:\pcre2\pcre2-xx\build. + +4. Run cmake-gui from the Shell environment of your build tool, for example, + Msys for Msys/MinGW or Visual Studio Command Prompt for VC/VC++. Do not try + to start Cmake from the Windows Start menu, as this can lead to errors. + +5. Enter C:\pcre2\pcre2-xx and C:\pcre2\pcre2-xx\build for the source and + build directories, respectively. + +6. Hit the "Configure" button. + +7. Select the particular IDE / build tool that you are using (Visual + Studio, MSYS makefiles, MinGW makefiles, etc.) + +8. The GUI will then list several configuration options. This is where + you can disable Unicode support or select other PCRE2 optional features. + +9. Hit "Configure" again. The adjacent "Generate" button should now be + active. + +10. Hit "Generate". + +11. The build directory should now contain a usable build system, be it a + solution file for Visual Studio, makefiles for MinGW, etc. Exit from + cmake-gui and use the generated build system with your compiler or IDE. + E.g., for MinGW you can run "make", or for Visual Studio, open the PCRE2 + solution, select the desired configuration (Debug, or Release, etc.) and + build the ALL_BUILD project. + +12. If during configuration with cmake-gui you've elected to build the test + programs, you can execute them by building the test project. E.g., for + MinGW: "make test"; for Visual Studio build the RUN_TESTS project. The + most recent build configuration is targeted by the tests. A summary of + test results is presented. Complete test output is subsequently + available for review in Testing\Temporary under your build dir. + + +BUILDING PCRE2 ON WINDOWS WITH VISUAL STUDIO + +The code currently cannot be compiled without an inttypes.h header, which is +available only with Visual Studio 2013 or newer. However, this portable and +permissively-licensed implementation of the stdint.h header could be used as an +alternative: + + http://www.azillionmonkeys.com/qed/pstdint.h + +Just rename it and drop it into the top level of the build tree. + + +TESTING WITH RUNTEST.BAT + +If configured with CMake, building the test project ("make test" or building +ALL_TESTS in Visual Studio) creates (and runs) pcre2_test.bat (and depending +on your configuration options, possibly other test programs) in the build +directory. The pcre2_test.bat script runs RunTest.bat with correct source and +exe paths. + +For manual testing with RunTest.bat, provided the build dir is a subdirectory +of the source directory: Open command shell window. Chdir to the location +of your pcre2test.exe and pcre2grep.exe programs. Call RunTest.bat with +"..\RunTest.Bat" or "..\..\RunTest.bat" as appropriate. + +To run only a particular test with RunTest.Bat provide a test number argument. + +Otherwise: + +1. Copy RunTest.bat into the directory where pcre2test.exe and pcre2grep.exe + have been created. + +2. Edit RunTest.bat to identify the full or relative location of + the pcre2 source (wherein which the testdata folder resides), e.g.: + + set srcdir=C:\pcre2\pcre2-10.00 + +3. In a Windows command environment, chdir to the location of your bat and + exe programs. + +4. Run RunTest.bat. Test outputs will automatically be compared to expected + results, and discrepancies will be identified in the console output. + +To independently test the just-in-time compiler, run pcre2_jit_test.exe. + + +BUILDING PCRE2 ON NATIVE Z/OS AND Z/VM + +z/OS and z/VM are operating systems for mainframe computers, produced by IBM. +The character code used is EBCDIC, not ASCII or Unicode. In z/OS, UNIX APIs and +applications can be supported through UNIX System Services, and in such an +environment it should be possible to build PCRE2 in the same way as in other +systems, with the EBCDIC related configuration settings, but it is not known if +anybody has tried this. + +In native z/OS (without UNIX System Services) and in z/VM, special ports are +required. For details, please see file 939 on this web site: + + http://www.cbttape.org + +Everything in that location, source and executable, is in EBCDIC and native +z/OS file formats. The port provides an API for LE languages such as COBOL and +for the z/OS and z/VM versions of the Rexx languages. + +============================== +Last Updated: 10 December 2022 +============================== diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/PrepareRelease b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/PrepareRelease new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1852c76e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/PrepareRelease @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +#/bin/sh + +# Script to prepare the files for building a PCRE2 release. It does some +# processing of the documentation, detrails files, and creates pcre2.h.generic +# and config.h.generic (for use by builders who can't run ./configure). + +# You must run this script before runnning "make dist". If its first argument +# is "doc", it stops after preparing the documentation. There are no other +# arguments. The script makes use of the following files: + +# 132html A Perl script that converts a .1 or .3 man page into HTML. It +# "knows" the relevant troff constructs that are used in the PCRE2 +# man pages. + +# CheckMan A Perl script that checks man pages for typos in the mark up. + +# CleanTxt A Perl script that cleans up the output of "nroff -man" by +# removing backspaces and other redundant text so as to produce +# a readable .txt file. + +# Detrail A Perl script that removes trailing spaces from files. + +# doc/index.html.src +# A file that is copied as index.html into the doc/html directory +# when the HTML documentation is built. It works like this so that +# doc/html can be deleted and re-created from scratch. + +# README & NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD +# These files are copied into the doc/html directory, with .txt +# extensions so that they can by hyperlinked from the HTML +# documentation, because some people just go to the HTML without +# looking for text files. + + +# First, sort out the documentation. Remove pcre2demo.3 first because it won't +# pass the markup check (it is created below, using markup that none of the +# other pages use). + +cd doc +echo Processing documentation + +/bin/rm -f pcre2demo.3 + +# Check the remaining man pages + +perl ../CheckMan *.1 *.3 +if [ $? != 0 ] ; then exit 1; fi + +# Make Text form of the documentation. It needs some mangling to make it +# tidy for online reading. Concatenate all the .3 stuff, but omit the +# individual function pages. + +cat <pcre2.txt +----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +This file contains a concatenation of the PCRE2 man pages, converted to plain +text format for ease of searching with a text editor, or for use on systems +that do not have a man page processor. The small individual files that give +synopses of each function in the library have not been included. Neither has +the pcre2demo program. There are separate text files for the pcre2grep and +pcre2test commands. +----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +End + +echo "Making pcre2.txt" +for file in pcre2 pcre2api pcre2build pcre2callout pcre2compat pcre2jit \ + pcre2limits pcre2matching pcre2partial pcre2pattern pcre2perform \ + pcre2posix pcre2sample pcre2serialize pcre2syntax \ + pcre2unicode ; do + echo " Processing $file.3" + nroff -c -man $file.3 >$file.rawtxt + perl ../CleanTxt <$file.rawtxt >>pcre2.txt + /bin/rm $file.rawtxt + echo "------------------------------------------------------------------------------" >>pcre2.txt + if [ "$file" != "pcre2sample" ] ; then + echo " " >>pcre2.txt + echo " " >>pcre2.txt + fi +done + +# The three commands +for file in pcre2test pcre2grep pcre2-config ; do + echo Making $file.txt + nroff -c -man $file.1 >$file.rawtxt + perl ../CleanTxt <$file.rawtxt >$file.txt + /bin/rm $file.rawtxt +done + + +# Make pcre2demo.3 from the pcre2demo.c source file + +echo "Making pcre2demo.3" +perl <<"END" >pcre2demo.3 + open(IN, "../src/pcre2demo.c") || die "Failed to open src/pcre2demo.c\n"; + open(OUT, ">pcre2demo.3") || die "Failed to open pcre2demo.3\n"; + print OUT ".SH NAME\n" . + "// - A demonstration C program for PCRE2 - //\n" . + ".sp\n" . + ".\\\" Start example.\n" . + ".de EX\n" . + ". nr mE \\\\n(.f\n" . + ". nf\n" . + ". nh\n" . + ". ft CW\n" . + "..\n" . + ".\n" . + ".\n" . + ".\\\" End example.\n" . + ".de EE\n" . + ". ft \\\\n(mE\n" . + ". fi\n" . + ". hy \\\\n(HY\n" . + "..\n" . + ".\n" . + ".EX\n" ; + while () + { + s/\\/\\e/g; + print OUT; + } + print OUT ".EE\n"; + close(IN); + close(OUT); +END +if [ $? != 0 ] ; then exit 1; fi + + +# Make HTML form of the documentation. + +echo "Making HTML documentation" +/bin/rm html/* +cp index.html.src html/index.html +cp ../README html/README.txt +cp ../NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD html/NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD.txt + +for file in *.1 ; do + base=`basename $file .1` + echo " Making $base.html" + perl ../132html -toc $base <$file >html/$base.html +done + +# Exclude table of contents for function summaries. It seems that expr +# forces an anchored regex. Also exclude them for small pages that have +# only one section. + +for file in *.3 ; do + base=`basename $file .3` + toc=-toc + if [ `expr $base : '.*_'` -ne 0 ] ; then toc="" ; fi + if [ "$base" = "pcre2sample" ] || \ + [ "$base" = "pcre2compat" ] || \ + [ "$base" = "pcre2limits" ] || \ + [ "$base" = "pcre2unicode" ] ; then + toc="" + fi + echo " Making $base.html" + perl ../132html $toc $base <$file >html/$base.html + if [ $? != 0 ] ; then exit 1; fi +done + +# End of documentation processing; stop if only documentation required. + +cd .. +echo Documentation done +if [ "$1" = "doc" ] ; then exit; fi + +# These files are detrailed; do not detrail the test data because there may be +# significant trailing spaces. Do not detrail RunTest.bat, because it has CRLF +# line endings and the detrail script removes all trailing white space. The +# configure files are also omitted from the detrailing. + +files="\ + Makefile.am \ + configure.ac \ + README \ + LICENCE \ + COPYING \ + AUTHORS \ + NEWS \ + NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD \ + INSTALL \ + 132html \ + CleanTxt \ + Detrail \ + ChangeLog \ + CMakeLists.txt \ + RunGrepTest \ + RunTest \ + pcre2-config.in \ + perltest.sh \ + libpcre2-8.pc.in \ + libpcre2-16.pc.in \ + libpcre2-32.pc.in \ + libpcre2-posix.pc.in \ + src/pcre2_dftables.c \ + src/pcre2.h.in \ + src/pcre2_auto_possess.c \ + src/pcre2_compile.c \ + src/pcre2_config.c \ + src/pcre2_context.c \ + src/pcre2_convert.c \ + src/pcre2_dfa_match.c \ + src/pcre2_error.c \ + src/pcre2_extuni.c \ + src/pcre2_find_bracket.c \ + src/pcre2_internal.h \ + src/pcre2_intmodedep.h \ + src/pcre2_jit_compile.c \ + src/pcre2_jit_match.c \ + src/pcre2_jit_misc.c \ + src/pcre2_jit_test.c \ + src/pcre2_maketables.c \ + src/pcre2_match.c \ + src/pcre2_match_data.c \ + src/pcre2_newline.c \ + src/pcre2_ord2utf.c \ + src/pcre2_pattern_info.c \ + src/pcre2_printint.c \ + src/pcre2_string_utils.c \ + src/pcre2_study.c \ + src/pcre2_substring.c \ + src/pcre2_tables.c \ + src/pcre2_ucd.c \ + src/pcre2_ucp.h \ + src/pcre2_valid_utf.c \ + src/pcre2_xclass.c \ + src/pcre2demo.c \ + src/pcre2grep.c \ + src/pcre2posix.c \ + src/pcre2posix.h \ + src/pcre2test.c" + +echo Detrailing +perl ./Detrail $files doc/p* doc/html/* + +echo Done + +#End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/README b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/README new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c88acff8 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/README @@ -0,0 +1,924 @@ +README file for PCRE2 (Perl-compatible regular expression library) +------------------------------------------------------------------ + +PCRE2 is a re-working of the original PCRE1 library to provide an entirely new +API. Since its initial release in 2015, there has been further development of +the code and it now differs from PCRE1 in more than just the API. There are new +features, and the internals have been improved. The original PCRE1 library is +now obsolete and no longer maintained. The latest release of PCRE2 is available +in .tar.gz, tar.bz2, or .zip form from this GitHub repository: + +https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/releases + +There is a mailing list for discussion about the development of PCRE2 at +pcre2-dev@googlegroups.com. You can subscribe by sending an email to +pcre2-dev+subscribe@googlegroups.com. + +You can access the archives and also subscribe or manage your subscription +here: + +https://groups.google.com/g/pcre2-dev + +Please read the NEWS file if you are upgrading from a previous release. The +contents of this README file are: + + The PCRE2 APIs + Documentation for PCRE2 + Contributions by users of PCRE2 + Building PCRE2 on non-Unix-like systems + Building PCRE2 without using autotools + Building PCRE2 using autotools + Retrieving configuration information + Shared libraries + Cross-compiling using autotools + Making new tarballs + Testing PCRE2 + Character tables + File manifest + + +The PCRE2 APIs +-------------- + +PCRE2 is written in C, and it has its own API. There are three sets of +functions, one for the 8-bit library, which processes strings of bytes, one for +the 16-bit library, which processes strings of 16-bit values, and one for the +32-bit library, which processes strings of 32-bit values. Unlike PCRE1, there +are no C++ wrappers. + +The distribution does contain a set of C wrapper functions for the 8-bit +library that are based on the POSIX regular expression API (see the pcre2posix +man page). These are built into a library called libpcre2-posix. Note that this +just provides a POSIX calling interface to PCRE2; the regular expressions +themselves still follow Perl syntax and semantics. The POSIX API is restricted, +and does not give full access to all of PCRE2's facilities. + +The header file for the POSIX-style functions is called pcre2posix.h. The +official POSIX name is regex.h, but I did not want to risk possible problems +with existing files of that name by distributing it that way. To use PCRE2 with +an existing program that uses the POSIX API, pcre2posix.h will have to be +renamed or pointed at by a link (or the program modified, of course). See the +pcre2posix documentation for more details. + + +Documentation for PCRE2 +----------------------- + +If you install PCRE2 in the normal way on a Unix-like system, you will end up +with a set of man pages whose names all start with "pcre2". The one that is +just called "pcre2" lists all the others. In addition to these man pages, the +PCRE2 documentation is supplied in two other forms: + + 1. There are files called doc/pcre2.txt, doc/pcre2grep.txt, and + doc/pcre2test.txt in the source distribution. The first of these is a + concatenation of the text forms of all the section 3 man pages except the + listing of pcre2demo.c and those that summarize individual functions. The + other two are the text forms of the section 1 man pages for the pcre2grep + and pcre2test commands. These text forms are provided for ease of scanning + with text editors or similar tools. They are installed in + /share/doc/pcre2, where is the installation prefix + (defaulting to /usr/local). + + 2. A set of files containing all the documentation in HTML form, hyperlinked + in various ways, and rooted in a file called index.html, is distributed in + doc/html and installed in /share/doc/pcre2/html. + + +Building PCRE2 on non-Unix-like systems +--------------------------------------- + +For a non-Unix-like system, please read the file NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD, though if +your system supports the use of "configure" and "make" you may be able to build +PCRE2 using autotools in the same way as for many Unix-like systems. + +PCRE2 can also be configured using CMake, which can be run in various ways +(command line, GUI, etc). This creates Makefiles, solution files, etc. The file +NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD has information about CMake. + +PCRE2 has been compiled on many different operating systems. It should be +straightforward to build PCRE2 on any system that has a Standard C compiler and +library, because it uses only Standard C functions. + + +Building PCRE2 without using autotools +-------------------------------------- + +The use of autotools (in particular, libtool) is problematic in some +environments, even some that are Unix or Unix-like. See the NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD +file for ways of building PCRE2 without using autotools. + + +Building PCRE2 using autotools +------------------------------ + +The following instructions assume the use of the widely used "configure; make; +make install" (autotools) process. + +If you have downloaded and unpacked a PCRE2 release tarball, run the +"configure" command from the PCRE2 directory, with your current directory set +to the directory where you want the files to be created. This command is a +standard GNU "autoconf" configuration script, for which generic instructions +are supplied in the file INSTALL. + +The files in the GitHub repository do not contain "configure". If you have +downloaded the PCRE2 source files from GitHub, before you can run "configure" +you must run the shell script called autogen.sh. This runs a number of +autotools to create a "configure" script (you must of course have the autotools +commands installed in order to do this). + +Most commonly, people build PCRE2 within its own distribution directory, and in +this case, on many systems, just running "./configure" is sufficient. However, +the usual methods of changing standard defaults are available. For example: + +CFLAGS='-O2 -Wall' ./configure --prefix=/opt/local + +This command specifies that the C compiler should be run with the flags '-O2 +-Wall' instead of the default, and that "make install" should install PCRE2 +under /opt/local instead of the default /usr/local. + +If you want to build in a different directory, just run "configure" with that +directory as current. For example, suppose you have unpacked the PCRE2 source +into /source/pcre2/pcre2-xxx, but you want to build it in +/build/pcre2/pcre2-xxx: + +cd /build/pcre2/pcre2-xxx +/source/pcre2/pcre2-xxx/configure + +PCRE2 is written in C and is normally compiled as a C library. However, it is +possible to build it as a C++ library, though the provided building apparatus +does not have any features to support this. + +There are some optional features that can be included or omitted from the PCRE2 +library. They are also documented in the pcre2build man page. + +. By default, both shared and static libraries are built. You can change this + by adding one of these options to the "configure" command: + + --disable-shared + --disable-static + + (See also "Shared libraries on Unix-like systems" below.) + +. By default, only the 8-bit library is built. If you add --enable-pcre2-16 to + the "configure" command, the 16-bit library is also built. If you add + --enable-pcre2-32 to the "configure" command, the 32-bit library is also + built. If you want only the 16-bit or 32-bit library, use --disable-pcre2-8 + to disable building the 8-bit library. + +. If you want to include support for just-in-time (JIT) compiling, which can + give large performance improvements on certain platforms, add --enable-jit to + the "configure" command. This support is available only for certain hardware + architectures. If you try to enable it on an unsupported architecture, there + will be a compile time error. If in doubt, use --enable-jit=auto, which + enables JIT only if the current hardware is supported. + +. If you are enabling JIT under SELinux environment you may also want to add + --enable-jit-sealloc, which enables the use of an executable memory allocator + that is compatible with SELinux. Warning: this allocator is experimental! + It does not support fork() operation and may crash when no disk space is + available. This option has no effect if JIT is disabled. + +. If you do not want to make use of the default support for UTF-8 Unicode + character strings in the 8-bit library, UTF-16 Unicode character strings in + the 16-bit library, or UTF-32 Unicode character strings in the 32-bit + library, you can add --disable-unicode to the "configure" command. This + reduces the size of the libraries. It is not possible to configure one + library with Unicode support, and another without, in the same configuration. + It is also not possible to use --enable-ebcdic (see below) with Unicode + support, so if this option is set, you must also use --disable-unicode. + + When Unicode support is available, the use of a UTF encoding still has to be + enabled by setting the PCRE2_UTF option at run time or starting a pattern + with (*UTF). When PCRE2 is compiled with Unicode support, its input can only + either be ASCII or UTF-8/16/32, even when running on EBCDIC platforms. + + As well as supporting UTF strings, Unicode support includes support for the + \P, \p, and \X sequences that recognize Unicode character properties. + However, only a subset of Unicode properties are supported; see the + pcre2pattern man page for details. Escape sequences such as \d and \w in + patterns do not by default make use of Unicode properties, but can be made to + do so by setting the PCRE2_UCP option or starting a pattern with (*UCP). + +. You can build PCRE2 to recognize either CR or LF or the sequence CRLF, or any + of the preceding, or any of the Unicode newline sequences, or the NUL (zero) + character as indicating the end of a line. Whatever you specify at build time + is the default; the caller of PCRE2 can change the selection at run time. The + default newline indicator is a single LF character (the Unix standard). You + can specify the default newline indicator by adding --enable-newline-is-cr, + --enable-newline-is-lf, --enable-newline-is-crlf, + --enable-newline-is-anycrlf, --enable-newline-is-any, or + --enable-newline-is-nul to the "configure" command, respectively. + +. By default, the sequence \R in a pattern matches any Unicode line ending + sequence. This is independent of the option specifying what PCRE2 considers + to be the end of a line (see above). However, the caller of PCRE2 can + restrict \R to match only CR, LF, or CRLF. You can make this the default by + adding --enable-bsr-anycrlf to the "configure" command (bsr = "backslash R"). + +. In a pattern, the escape sequence \C matches a single code unit, even in a + UTF mode. This can be dangerous because it breaks up multi-code-unit + characters. You can build PCRE2 with the use of \C permanently locked out by + adding --enable-never-backslash-C (note the upper case C) to the "configure" + command. When \C is allowed by the library, individual applications can lock + it out by calling pcre2_compile() with the PCRE2_NEVER_BACKSLASH_C option. + +. PCRE2 has a counter that limits the depth of nesting of parentheses in a + pattern. This limits the amount of system stack that a pattern uses when it + is compiled. The default is 250, but you can change it by setting, for + example, + + --with-parens-nest-limit=500 + +. PCRE2 has a counter that can be set to limit the amount of computing resource + it uses when matching a pattern. If the limit is exceeded during a match, the + match fails. The default is ten million. You can change the default by + setting, for example, + + --with-match-limit=500000 + + on the "configure" command. This is just the default; individual calls to + pcre2_match() or pcre2_dfa_match() can supply their own value. There is more + discussion in the pcre2api man page (search for pcre2_set_match_limit). + +. There is a separate counter that limits the depth of nested backtracking + (pcre2_match()) or nested function calls (pcre2_dfa_match()) during a + matching process, which indirectly limits the amount of heap memory that is + used, and in the case of pcre2_dfa_match() the amount of stack as well. This + counter also has a default of ten million, which is essentially "unlimited". + You can change the default by setting, for example, + + --with-match-limit-depth=5000 + + There is more discussion in the pcre2api man page (search for + pcre2_set_depth_limit). + +. You can also set an explicit limit on the amount of heap memory used by + the pcre2_match() and pcre2_dfa_match() interpreters: + + --with-heap-limit=500 + + The units are kibibytes (units of 1024 bytes). This limit does not apply when + the JIT optimization (which has its own memory control features) is used. + There is more discussion on the pcre2api man page (search for + pcre2_set_heap_limit). + +. In the 8-bit library, the default maximum compiled pattern size is around + 64 kibibytes. You can increase this by adding --with-link-size=3 to the + "configure" command. PCRE2 then uses three bytes instead of two for offsets + to different parts of the compiled pattern. In the 16-bit library, + --with-link-size=3 is the same as --with-link-size=4, which (in both + libraries) uses four-byte offsets. Increasing the internal link size reduces + performance in the 8-bit and 16-bit libraries. In the 32-bit library, the + link size setting is ignored, as 4-byte offsets are always used. + +. For speed, PCRE2 uses four tables for manipulating and identifying characters + whose code point values are less than 256. By default, it uses a set of + tables for ASCII encoding that is part of the distribution. If you specify + + --enable-rebuild-chartables + + a program called pcre2_dftables is compiled and run in the default C locale + when you obey "make". It builds a source file called pcre2_chartables.c. If + you do not specify this option, pcre2_chartables.c is created as a copy of + pcre2_chartables.c.dist. See "Character tables" below for further + information. + +. It is possible to compile PCRE2 for use on systems that use EBCDIC as their + character code (as opposed to ASCII/Unicode) by specifying + + --enable-ebcdic --disable-unicode + + This automatically implies --enable-rebuild-chartables (see above). However, + when PCRE2 is built this way, it always operates in EBCDIC. It cannot support + both EBCDIC and UTF-8/16/32. There is a second option, --enable-ebcdic-nl25, + which specifies that the code value for the EBCDIC NL character is 0x25 + instead of the default 0x15. + +. If you specify --enable-debug, additional debugging code is included in the + build. This option is intended for use by the PCRE2 maintainers. + +. In environments where valgrind is installed, if you specify + + --enable-valgrind + + PCRE2 will use valgrind annotations to mark certain memory regions as + unaddressable. This allows it to detect invalid memory accesses, and is + mostly useful for debugging PCRE2 itself. + +. In environments where the gcc compiler is used and lcov is installed, if you + specify + + --enable-coverage + + the build process implements a code coverage report for the test suite. The + report is generated by running "make coverage". If ccache is installed on + your system, it must be disabled when building PCRE2 for coverage reporting. + You can do this by setting the environment variable CCACHE_DISABLE=1 before + running "make" to build PCRE2. There is more information about coverage + reporting in the "pcre2build" documentation. + +. When JIT support is enabled, pcre2grep automatically makes use of it, unless + you add --disable-pcre2grep-jit to the "configure" command. + +. There is support for calling external programs during matching in the + pcre2grep command, using PCRE2's callout facility with string arguments. This + support can be disabled by adding --disable-pcre2grep-callout to the + "configure" command. There are two kinds of callout: one that generates + output from inbuilt code, and another that calls an external program. The + latter has special support for Windows and VMS; otherwise it assumes the + existence of the fork() function. This facility can be disabled by adding + --disable-pcre2grep-callout-fork to the "configure" command. + +. The pcre2grep program currently supports only 8-bit data files, and so + requires the 8-bit PCRE2 library. It is possible to compile pcre2grep to use + libz and/or libbz2, in order to read .gz and .bz2 files (respectively), by + specifying one or both of + + --enable-pcre2grep-libz + --enable-pcre2grep-libbz2 + + Of course, the relevant libraries must be installed on your system. + +. The default starting size (in bytes) of the internal buffer used by pcre2grep + can be set by, for example: + + --with-pcre2grep-bufsize=51200 + + The value must be a plain integer. The default is 20480. The amount of memory + used by pcre2grep is actually three times this number, to allow for "before" + and "after" lines. If very long lines are encountered, the buffer is + automatically enlarged, up to a fixed maximum size. + +. The default maximum size of pcre2grep's internal buffer can be set by, for + example: + + --with-pcre2grep-max-bufsize=2097152 + + The default is either 1048576 or the value of --with-pcre2grep-bufsize, + whichever is the larger. + +. It is possible to compile pcre2test so that it links with the libreadline + or libedit libraries, by specifying, respectively, + + --enable-pcre2test-libreadline or --enable-pcre2test-libedit + + If this is done, when pcre2test's input is from a terminal, it reads it using + the readline() function. This provides line-editing and history facilities. + Note that libreadline is GPL-licenced, so if you distribute a binary of + pcre2test linked in this way, there may be licensing issues. These can be + avoided by linking with libedit (which has a BSD licence) instead. + + Enabling libreadline causes the -lreadline option to be added to the + pcre2test build. In many operating environments with a sytem-installed + readline library this is sufficient. However, in some environments (e.g. if + an unmodified distribution version of readline is in use), it may be + necessary to specify something like LIBS="-lncurses" as well. This is + because, to quote the readline INSTALL, "Readline uses the termcap functions, + but does not link with the termcap or curses library itself, allowing + applications which link with readline the option to choose an appropriate + library." If you get error messages about missing functions tgetstr, tgetent, + tputs, tgetflag, or tgoto, this is the problem, and linking with the ncurses + library should fix it. + +. The C99 standard defines formatting modifiers z and t for size_t and + ptrdiff_t values, respectively. By default, PCRE2 uses these modifiers in + environments other than Microsoft Visual Studio versions earlier than 2013 + when __STDC_VERSION__ is defined and has a value greater than or equal to + 199901L (indicating C99). However, there is at least one environment that + claims to be C99 but does not support these modifiers. If + --disable-percent-zt is specified, no use is made of the z or t modifiers. + Instead of %td or %zu, %lu is used, with a cast for size_t values. + +. There is a special option called --enable-fuzz-support for use by people who + want to run fuzzing tests on PCRE2. At present this applies only to the 8-bit + library. If set, it causes an extra library called libpcre2-fuzzsupport.a to + be built, but not installed. This contains a single function called + LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput() whose arguments are a pointer to a string and the + length of the string. When called, this function tries to compile the string + as a pattern, and if that succeeds, to match it. This is done both with no + options and with some random options bits that are generated from the string. + Setting --enable-fuzz-support also causes a binary called pcre2fuzzcheck to + be created. This is normally run under valgrind or used when PCRE2 is + compiled with address sanitizing enabled. It calls the fuzzing function and + outputs information about what it is doing. The input strings are specified + by arguments: if an argument starts with "=" the rest of it is a literal + input string. Otherwise, it is assumed to be a file name, and the contents + of the file are the test string. + +. Releases before 10.30 could be compiled with --disable-stack-for-recursion, + which caused pcre2_match() to use individual blocks on the heap for + backtracking instead of recursive function calls (which use the stack). This + is now obsolete because pcre2_match() was refactored always to use the heap + (in a much more efficient way than before). This option is retained for + backwards compatibility, but has no effect other than to output a warning. + +The "configure" script builds the following files for the basic C library: + +. Makefile the makefile that builds the library +. src/config.h build-time configuration options for the library +. src/pcre2.h the public PCRE2 header file +. pcre2-config script that shows the building settings such as CFLAGS + that were set for "configure" +. libpcre2-8.pc ) +. libpcre2-16.pc ) data for the pkg-config command +. libpcre2-32.pc ) +. libpcre2-posix.pc ) +. libtool script that builds shared and/or static libraries + +Versions of config.h and pcre2.h are distributed in the src directory of PCRE2 +tarballs under the names config.h.generic and pcre2.h.generic. These are +provided for those who have to build PCRE2 without using "configure" or CMake. +If you use "configure" or CMake, the .generic versions are not used. + +The "configure" script also creates config.status, which is an executable +script that can be run to recreate the configuration, and config.log, which +contains compiler output from tests that "configure" runs. + +Once "configure" has run, you can run "make". This builds whichever of the +libraries libpcre2-8, libpcre2-16 and libpcre2-32 are configured, and a test +program called pcre2test. If you enabled JIT support with --enable-jit, another +test program called pcre2_jit_test is built as well. If the 8-bit library is +built, libpcre2-posix, pcre2posix_test, and the pcre2grep command are also +built. Running "make" with the -j option may speed up compilation on +multiprocessor systems. + +The command "make check" runs all the appropriate tests. Details of the PCRE2 +tests are given below in a separate section of this document. The -j option of +"make" can also be used when running the tests. + +You can use "make install" to install PCRE2 into live directories on your +system. The following are installed (file names are all relative to the + that is set when "configure" is run): + + Commands (bin): + pcre2test + pcre2grep (if 8-bit support is enabled) + pcre2-config + + Libraries (lib): + libpcre2-8 (if 8-bit support is enabled) + libpcre2-16 (if 16-bit support is enabled) + libpcre2-32 (if 32-bit support is enabled) + libpcre2-posix (if 8-bit support is enabled) + + Configuration information (lib/pkgconfig): + libpcre2-8.pc + libpcre2-16.pc + libpcre2-32.pc + libpcre2-posix.pc + + Header files (include): + pcre2.h + pcre2posix.h + + Man pages (share/man/man{1,3}): + pcre2grep.1 + pcre2test.1 + pcre2-config.1 + pcre2.3 + pcre2*.3 (lots more pages, all starting "pcre2") + + HTML documentation (share/doc/pcre2/html): + index.html + *.html (lots more pages, hyperlinked from index.html) + + Text file documentation (share/doc/pcre2): + AUTHORS + COPYING + ChangeLog + LICENCE + NEWS + README + pcre2.txt (a concatenation of the man(3) pages) + pcre2test.txt the pcre2test man page + pcre2grep.txt the pcre2grep man page + pcre2-config.txt the pcre2-config man page + +If you want to remove PCRE2 from your system, you can run "make uninstall". +This removes all the files that "make install" installed. However, it does not +remove any directories, because these are often shared with other programs. + + +Retrieving configuration information +------------------------------------ + +Running "make install" installs the command pcre2-config, which can be used to +recall information about the PCRE2 configuration and installation. For example: + + pcre2-config --version + +prints the version number, and + + pcre2-config --libs8 + +outputs information about where the 8-bit library is installed. This command +can be included in makefiles for programs that use PCRE2, saving the programmer +from having to remember too many details. Run pcre2-config with no arguments to +obtain a list of possible arguments. + +The pkg-config command is another system for saving and retrieving information +about installed libraries. Instead of separate commands for each library, a +single command is used. For example: + + pkg-config --libs libpcre2-16 + +The data is held in *.pc files that are installed in a directory called +/lib/pkgconfig. + + +Shared libraries +---------------- + +The default distribution builds PCRE2 as shared libraries and static libraries, +as long as the operating system supports shared libraries. Shared library +support relies on the "libtool" script which is built as part of the +"configure" process. + +The libtool script is used to compile and link both shared and static +libraries. They are placed in a subdirectory called .libs when they are newly +built. The programs pcre2test and pcre2grep are built to use these uninstalled +libraries (by means of wrapper scripts in the case of shared libraries). When +you use "make install" to install shared libraries, pcre2grep and pcre2test are +automatically re-built to use the newly installed shared libraries before being +installed themselves. However, the versions left in the build directory still +use the uninstalled libraries. + +To build PCRE2 using static libraries only you must use --disable-shared when +configuring it. For example: + +./configure --prefix=/usr/gnu --disable-shared + +Then run "make" in the usual way. Similarly, you can use --disable-static to +build only shared libraries. + + +Cross-compiling using autotools +------------------------------- + +You can specify CC and CFLAGS in the normal way to the "configure" command, in +order to cross-compile PCRE2 for some other host. However, you should NOT +specify --enable-rebuild-chartables, because if you do, the pcre2_dftables.c +source file is compiled and run on the local host, in order to generate the +inbuilt character tables (the pcre2_chartables.c file). This will probably not +work, because pcre2_dftables.c needs to be compiled with the local compiler, +not the cross compiler. + +When --enable-rebuild-chartables is not specified, pcre2_chartables.c is +created by making a copy of pcre2_chartables.c.dist, which is a default set of +tables that assumes ASCII code. Cross-compiling with the default tables should +not be a problem. + +If you need to modify the character tables when cross-compiling, you should +move pcre2_chartables.c.dist out of the way, then compile pcre2_dftables.c by +hand and run it on the local host to make a new version of +pcre2_chartables.c.dist. See the pcre2build section "Creating character tables +at build time" for more details. + + +Making new tarballs +------------------- + +The command "make dist" creates three PCRE2 tarballs, in tar.gz, tar.bz2, and +zip formats. The command "make distcheck" does the same, but then does a trial +build of the new distribution to ensure that it works. + +If you have modified any of the man page sources in the doc directory, you +should first run the PrepareRelease script before making a distribution. This +script creates the .txt and HTML forms of the documentation from the man pages. + + +Testing PCRE2 +------------- + +To test the basic PCRE2 library on a Unix-like system, run the RunTest script. +There is another script called RunGrepTest that tests the pcre2grep command. +When the 8-bit library is built, a test program for the POSIX wrapper, called +pcre2posix_test, is compiled, and when JIT support is enabled, a test program +called pcre2_jit_test is built. The scripts and the program tests are all run +when you obey "make check". For other environments, see the instructions in +NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD. + +The RunTest script runs the pcre2test test program (which is documented in its +own man page) on each of the relevant testinput files in the testdata +directory, and compares the output with the contents of the corresponding +testoutput files. RunTest uses a file called testtry to hold the main output +from pcre2test. Other files whose names begin with "test" are used as working +files in some tests. + +Some tests are relevant only when certain build-time options were selected. For +example, the tests for UTF-8/16/32 features are run only when Unicode support +is available. RunTest outputs a comment when it skips a test. + +Many (but not all) of the tests that are not skipped are run twice if JIT +support is available. On the second run, JIT compilation is forced. This +testing can be suppressed by putting "-nojit" on the RunTest command line. + +The entire set of tests is run once for each of the 8-bit, 16-bit and 32-bit +libraries that are enabled. If you want to run just one set of tests, call +RunTest with either the -8, -16 or -32 option. + +If valgrind is installed, you can run the tests under it by putting "-valgrind" +on the RunTest command line. To run pcre2test on just one or more specific test +files, give their numbers as arguments to RunTest, for example: + + RunTest 2 7 11 + +You can also specify ranges of tests such as 3-6 or 3- (meaning 3 to the +end), or a number preceded by ~ to exclude a test. For example: + + Runtest 3-15 ~10 + +This runs tests 3 to 15, excluding test 10, and just ~13 runs all the tests +except test 13. Whatever order the arguments are in, the tests are always run +in numerical order. + +You can also call RunTest with the single argument "list" to cause it to output +a list of tests. + +The test sequence starts with "test 0", which is a special test that has no +input file, and whose output is not checked. This is because it will be +different on different hardware and with different configurations. The test +exists in order to exercise some of pcre2test's code that would not otherwise +be run. + +Tests 1 and 2 can always be run, as they expect only plain text strings (not +UTF) and make no use of Unicode properties. The first test file can be fed +directly into the perltest.sh script to check that Perl gives the same results. +The only difference you should see is in the first few lines, where the Perl +version is given instead of the PCRE2 version. The second set of tests check +auxiliary functions, error detection, and run-time flags that are specific to +PCRE2. It also uses the debugging flags to check some of the internals of +pcre2_compile(). + +If you build PCRE2 with a locale setting that is not the standard C locale, the +character tables may be different (see next paragraph). In some cases, this may +cause failures in the second set of tests. For example, in a locale where the +isprint() function yields TRUE for characters in the range 128-255, the use of +[:isascii:] inside a character class defines a different set of characters, and +this shows up in this test as a difference in the compiled code, which is being +listed for checking. For example, where the comparison test output contains +[\x00-\x7f] the test might contain [\x00-\xff], and similarly in some other +cases. This is not a bug in PCRE2. + +Test 3 checks pcre2_maketables(), the facility for building a set of character +tables for a specific locale and using them instead of the default tables. The +script uses the "locale" command to check for the availability of the "fr_FR", +"french", or "fr" locale, and uses the first one that it finds. If the "locale" +command fails, or if its output doesn't include "fr_FR", "french", or "fr" in +the list of available locales, the third test cannot be run, and a comment is +output to say why. If running this test produces an error like this: + + ** Failed to set locale "fr_FR" + +it means that the given locale is not available on your system, despite being +listed by "locale". This does not mean that PCRE2 is broken. There are three +alternative output files for the third test, because three different versions +of the French locale have been encountered. The test passes if its output +matches any one of them. + +Tests 4 and 5 check UTF and Unicode property support, test 4 being compatible +with the perltest.sh script, and test 5 checking PCRE2-specific things. + +Tests 6 and 7 check the pcre2_dfa_match() alternative matching function, in +non-UTF mode and UTF-mode with Unicode property support, respectively. + +Test 8 checks some internal offsets and code size features, but it is run only +when Unicode support is enabled. The output is different in 8-bit, 16-bit, and +32-bit modes and for different link sizes, so there are different output files +for each mode and link size. + +Tests 9 and 10 are run only in 8-bit mode, and tests 11 and 12 are run only in +16-bit and 32-bit modes. These are tests that generate different output in +8-bit mode. Each pair are for general cases and Unicode support, respectively. + +Test 13 checks the handling of non-UTF characters greater than 255 by +pcre2_dfa_match() in 16-bit and 32-bit modes. + +Test 14 contains some special UTF and UCP tests that give different output for +different code unit widths. + +Test 15 contains a number of tests that must not be run with JIT. They check, +among other non-JIT things, the match-limiting features of the interpretive +matcher. + +Test 16 is run only when JIT support is not available. It checks that an +attempt to use JIT has the expected behaviour. + +Test 17 is run only when JIT support is available. It checks JIT complete and +partial modes, match-limiting under JIT, and other JIT-specific features. + +Tests 18 and 19 are run only in 8-bit mode. They check the POSIX interface to +the 8-bit library, without and with Unicode support, respectively. + +Test 20 checks the serialization functions by writing a set of compiled +patterns to a file, and then reloading and checking them. + +Tests 21 and 22 test \C support when the use of \C is not locked out, without +and with UTF support, respectively. Test 23 tests \C when it is locked out. + +Tests 24 and 25 test the experimental pattern conversion functions, without and +with UTF support, respectively. + +Test 26 checks Unicode property support using tests that are generated +automatically from the Unicode data tables. + + +Character tables +---------------- + +For speed, PCRE2 uses four tables for manipulating and identifying characters +whose code point values are less than 256. By default, a set of tables that is +built into the library is used. The pcre2_maketables() function can be called +by an application to create a new set of tables in the current locale. This are +passed to PCRE2 by calling pcre2_set_character_tables() to put a pointer into a +compile context. + +The source file called pcre2_chartables.c contains the default set of tables. +By default, this is created as a copy of pcre2_chartables.c.dist, which +contains tables for ASCII coding. However, if --enable-rebuild-chartables is +specified for ./configure, a new version of pcre2_chartables.c is built by the +program pcre2_dftables (compiled from pcre2_dftables.c), which uses the ANSI C +character handling functions such as isalnum(), isalpha(), isupper(), +islower(), etc. to build the table sources. This means that the default C +locale that is set for your system will control the contents of these default +tables. You can change the default tables by editing pcre2_chartables.c and +then re-building PCRE2. If you do this, you should take care to ensure that the +file does not get automatically re-generated. The best way to do this is to +move pcre2_chartables.c.dist out of the way and replace it with your customized +tables. + +When the pcre2_dftables program is run as a result of specifying +--enable-rebuild-chartables, it uses the default C locale that is set on your +system. It does not pay attention to the LC_xxx environment variables. In other +words, it uses the system's default locale rather than whatever the compiling +user happens to have set. If you really do want to build a source set of +character tables in a locale that is specified by the LC_xxx variables, you can +run the pcre2_dftables program by hand with the -L option. For example: + + ./pcre2_dftables -L pcre2_chartables.c.special + +The second argument names the file where the source code for the tables is +written. The first two 256-byte tables provide lower casing and case flipping +functions, respectively. The next table consists of a number of 32-byte bit +maps which identify certain character classes such as digits, "word" +characters, white space, etc. These are used when building 32-byte bit maps +that represent character classes for code points less than 256. The final +256-byte table has bits indicating various character types, as follows: + + 1 white space character + 2 letter + 4 lower case letter + 8 decimal digit + 16 alphanumeric or '_' + +You can also specify -b (with or without -L) when running pcre2_dftables. This +causes the tables to be written in binary instead of as source code. A set of +binary tables can be loaded into memory by an application and passed to +pcre2_compile() in the same way as tables created dynamically by calling +pcre2_maketables(). The tables are just a string of bytes, independent of +hardware characteristics such as endianness. This means they can be bundled +with an application that runs in different environments, to ensure consistent +behaviour. + +See also the pcre2build section "Creating character tables at build time". + + +File manifest +------------- + +The distribution should contain the files listed below. + +(A) Source files for the PCRE2 library functions and their headers are found in + the src directory: + + src/pcre2_dftables.c auxiliary program for building pcre2_chartables.c + when --enable-rebuild-chartables is specified + + src/pcre2_chartables.c.dist a default set of character tables that assume + ASCII coding; unless --enable-rebuild-chartables is + specified, used by copying to pcre2_chartables.c + + src/pcre2posix.c ) + src/pcre2_auto_possess.c ) + src/pcre2_compile.c ) + src/pcre2_config.c ) + src/pcre2_context.c ) + src/pcre2_convert.c ) + src/pcre2_dfa_match.c ) + src/pcre2_error.c ) + src/pcre2_extuni.c ) + src/pcre2_find_bracket.c ) + src/pcre2_jit_compile.c ) + src/pcre2_jit_match.c ) sources for the functions in the library, + src/pcre2_jit_misc.c ) and some internal functions that they use + src/pcre2_maketables.c ) + src/pcre2_match.c ) + src/pcre2_match_data.c ) + src/pcre2_newline.c ) + src/pcre2_ord2utf.c ) + src/pcre2_pattern_info.c ) + src/pcre2_script_run.c ) + src/pcre2_serialize.c ) + src/pcre2_string_utils.c ) + src/pcre2_study.c ) + src/pcre2_substitute.c ) + src/pcre2_substring.c ) + src/pcre2_tables.c ) + src/pcre2_ucd.c ) + src/pcre2_ucptables.c ) + src/pcre2_valid_utf.c ) + src/pcre2_xclass.c ) + + src/pcre2_printint.c debugging function that is used by pcre2test, + src/pcre2_fuzzsupport.c function for (optional) fuzzing support + + src/config.h.in template for config.h, when built by "configure" + src/pcre2.h.in template for pcre2.h when built by "configure" + src/pcre2posix.h header for the external POSIX wrapper API + src/pcre2_internal.h header for internal use + src/pcre2_intmodedep.h a mode-specific internal header + src/pcre2_jit_neon_inc.h header used by JIT + src/pcre2_jit_simd_inc.h header used by JIT + src/pcre2_ucp.h header for Unicode property handling + + sljit/* source files for the JIT compiler + +(B) Source files for programs that use PCRE2: + + src/pcre2demo.c simple demonstration of coding calls to PCRE2 + src/pcre2grep.c source of a grep utility that uses PCRE2 + src/pcre2test.c comprehensive test program + src/pcre2_jit_test.c JIT test program + src/pcre2posix_test.c POSIX wrapper API test program + +(C) Auxiliary files: + + 132html script to turn "man" pages into HTML + AUTHORS information about the author of PCRE2 + ChangeLog log of changes to the code + CleanTxt script to clean nroff output for txt man pages + Detrail script to remove trailing spaces + HACKING some notes about the internals of PCRE2 + INSTALL generic installation instructions + LICENCE conditions for the use of PCRE2 + COPYING the same, using GNU's standard name + Makefile.in ) template for Unix Makefile, which is built by + ) "configure" + Makefile.am ) the automake input that was used to create + ) Makefile.in + NEWS important changes in this release + NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD notes on building PCRE2 without using autotools + PrepareRelease script to make preparations for "make dist" + README this file + RunTest a Unix shell script for running tests + RunGrepTest a Unix shell script for pcre2grep tests + aclocal.m4 m4 macros (generated by "aclocal") + config.guess ) files used by libtool, + config.sub ) used only when building a shared library + configure a configuring shell script (built by autoconf) + configure.ac ) the autoconf input that was used to build + ) "configure" and config.h + depcomp ) script to find program dependencies, generated by + ) automake + doc/*.3 man page sources for PCRE2 + doc/*.1 man page sources for pcre2grep and pcre2test + doc/index.html.src the base HTML page + doc/html/* HTML documentation + doc/pcre2.txt plain text version of the man pages + doc/pcre2test.txt plain text documentation of test program + install-sh a shell script for installing files + libpcre2-8.pc.in template for libpcre2-8.pc for pkg-config + libpcre2-16.pc.in template for libpcre2-16.pc for pkg-config + libpcre2-32.pc.in template for libpcre2-32.pc for pkg-config + libpcre2-posix.pc.in template for libpcre2-posix.pc for pkg-config + ltmain.sh file used to build a libtool script + missing ) common stub for a few missing GNU programs while + ) installing, generated by automake + mkinstalldirs script for making install directories + perltest.sh Script for running a Perl test program + pcre2-config.in source of script which retains PCRE2 information + testdata/testinput* test data for main library tests + testdata/testoutput* expected test results + testdata/grep* input and output for pcre2grep tests + testdata/* other supporting test files + +(D) Auxiliary files for cmake support + + cmake/COPYING-CMAKE-SCRIPTS + cmake/FindPackageHandleStandardArgs.cmake + cmake/FindEditline.cmake + cmake/FindReadline.cmake + CMakeLists.txt + config-cmake.h.in + +(E) Auxiliary files for building PCRE2 "by hand" + + src/pcre2.h.generic ) a version of the public PCRE2 header file + ) for use in non-"configure" environments + src/config.h.generic ) a version of config.h for use in non-"configure" + ) environments + +Philip Hazel +Email local part: Philip.Hazel +Email domain: gmail.com +Last updated: 10 December 2022 diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/README.md b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d3fff179 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +# PCRE2 - Perl-Compatible Regular Expressions + +The PCRE2 library is a set of C functions that implement regular expression +pattern matching using the same syntax and semantics as Perl 5. PCRE2 has its +own native API, as well as a set of wrapper functions that correspond to the +POSIX regular expression API. The PCRE2 library is free, even for building +proprietary software. It comes in three forms, for processing 8-bit, 16-bit, +or 32-bit code units, in either literal or UTF encoding. + +PCRE2 was first released in 2015 to replace the API in the original PCRE +library, which is now obsolete and no longer maintained. As well as a more +flexible API, the code of PCRE2 has been much improved since the fork. + +## Download + +As well as downloading from the +[GitHub site](https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2), you can download PCRE2 +or the older, unmaintained PCRE1 library from an +[*unofficial* mirror](https://sourceforge.net/projects/pcre/files/) at SourceForge. + +You can check out the PCRE2 source code via Git or Subversion: + + git clone https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2.git + svn co https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2.git + +## Contributed Ports + +If you just need the command-line PCRE2 tools on Windows, precompiled binary +versions are available at this +[Rexegg page](http://www.rexegg.com/pcregrep-pcretest.html). + +A PCRE2 port for z/OS, a mainframe operating system which uses EBCDIC as its +default character encoding, can be found at +[http://www.cbttape.org](http://www.cbttape.org/) (File 939). + +## Documentation + +You can read the PCRE2 documentation +[here](https://PCRE2Project.github.io/pcre2/doc/html/index.html). + +Comparisons to Perl's regular expression semantics can be found in the +community authored Wikipedia entry for PCRE. + +There is a curated summary of changes for each PCRE release, copies of +documentation from older releases, and other useful information from the third +party authored +[RexEgg PCRE Documentation and Change Log page](http://www.rexegg.com/pcre-documentation.html). + +## Contact + +To report a problem with the PCRE2 library, or to make a feature request, please +use the PCRE2 GitHub issues tracker. There is a mailing list for discussion of + PCRE2 issues and development at pcre2-dev@googlegroups.com, which is where any +announcements will be made. You can browse the +[list archives](https://groups.google.com/g/pcre2-dev). + diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/RunGrepTest b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/RunGrepTest new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0a00e829 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/RunGrepTest @@ -0,0 +1,1045 @@ +#! /bin/sh + +# Run pcre2grep tests. The assumption is that the PCRE2 tests check the library +# itself. What we are checking here is the file handling and options that are +# supported by pcre2grep. This script must be run in the build directory. + +# CODING CONVENTIONS: +# * Put printf arguments in single, not double quotes to avoid unwanted +# escaping. +# * Use \0 for binary zero in printf, not \x0, for the benefit of older +# versions (and use octal for other special values). + +# Set the C locale, so that sort(1) behaves predictably. + +LC_ALL=C +export LC_ALL + +# Remove any non-default colouring and aliases that the caller may have set. + +unset PCRE2GREP_COLOUR PCRE2GREP_COLOR PCREGREP_COLOUR PCREGREP_COLOR +unset GREP_COLOR GREP_COLORS +unset cp ls mv rm + +# Remember the current (build) directory, set the program to be tested, and +# valgrind settings when requested. + +builddir=`pwd` +pcre2grep=$builddir/pcre2grep +pcre2test=$builddir/pcre2test + +if [ ! -x $pcre2grep ] ; then + echo "** $pcre2grep does not exist or is not executable." + exit 1 +fi + +if [ ! -x $pcre2test ] ; then + echo "** $pcre2test does not exist or is not executable." + exit 1 +fi + +valgrind= +while [ $# -gt 0 ] ; do + case $1 in + valgrind) valgrind="valgrind -q --leak-check=no --smc-check=all-non-file";; + *) echo "RunGrepTest: Unknown argument $1"; exit 1;; + esac + shift +done + +vjs= +pcre2grep_version=`$pcre2grep -V` +if [ "$valgrind" = "" ] ; then + echo "Testing $pcre2grep_version" +else + echo "Testing $pcre2grep_version using valgrind" + $pcre2test -C jit >/dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + vjs="--suppressions=./testdata/valgrind-jit.supp" + fi +fi + +# Set up a suitable "diff" command for comparison. Some systems have a diff +# that lacks a -u option. Try to deal with this; better do the test for the -b +# option as well. + +cf="diff" +diff -b /dev/null /dev/null 2>/dev/null && cf="diff -b" +diff -u /dev/null /dev/null 2>/dev/null && cf="diff -u" +diff -ub /dev/null /dev/null 2>/dev/null && cf="diff -ub" + +# Add a -a (always treat as text) if available. This was added in an attempt +# to get more detail from an Alpine Linux test failure on GitHub. + +$cf -a /dev/null /dev/null 2>/dev/null && cf="$cf -a" + +# Some tests involve NUL characters. It seems impossible to handle them easily +# in many operating systems. An earlier version of this script used sed to +# translate NUL into the string ZERO, but this didn't work on Solaris (aka +# SunOS), where the version of sed explicitly doesn't like them, and also MacOS +# (Darwin), OpenBSD, FreeBSD, NetBSD, and some Linux distributions like Alpine, +# even when using GNU sed. A user suggested using tr instead, which +# necessitates translating to a single character. However, on (some versions +# of?) Solaris, the normal "tr" cannot handle binary zeros, but if +# /usr/xpg4/bin/tr is available, it can do so, so test for that. + +if [ -x /usr/xpg4/bin/tr ] ; then + tr=/usr/xpg4/bin/tr +else + tr=tr +fi + +# If this test is being run from "make check", $srcdir will be set. If not, set +# it to the current or parent directory, whichever one contains the test data. +# Subsequently, we run most of the pcre2grep tests in the source directory so +# that the file names in the output are always the same. + +if [ -z "$srcdir" -o ! -d "$srcdir/testdata" ] ; then + if [ -d "./testdata" ] ; then + srcdir=. + elif [ -d "../testdata" ] ; then + srcdir=.. + else + echo "Cannot find the testdata directory" + exit 1 + fi +fi + +# Check for the availability of UTF-8 support + +$pcre2test -C unicode >/dev/null +utf8=$? + +# Check default newline convention. If it does not include LF, force LF. + +nl=`$pcre2test -C newline` +if [ "$nl" != "LF" -a "$nl" != "ANY" -a "$nl" != "ANYCRLF" ]; then + pcre2grep="$pcre2grep -N LF" + echo "Default newline setting forced to LF" +fi + +# ------ Function to run and check a special pcre2grep arguments test ------- + +checkspecial() + { + $valgrind $pcre2grep $1 >>testtrygrep 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne $2 ] ; then + echo "** pcre2grep $1 failed - check testtrygrep" + exit 1 + fi + } + +# ------ Normal tests ------ + +echo "Testing pcre2grep main features" + +echo "---------------------------- Test 1 ------------------------------" >testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 2 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep '^PATTERN' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 3 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -in PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 4 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -ic PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 5 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -in PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 6 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -inh PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 7 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -il PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 8 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -l PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 9 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -q PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 10 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -q NEVER-PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 11 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -vn pattern ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 12 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -ix pattern ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 13 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +echo seventeen >testtemp1grep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -f./testdata/greplist -f $builddir/testtemp1grep ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 14 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -w pat ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 15 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep 'abc^*' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 16 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep abc ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/nonexistfile) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 17 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -M 'the\noutput' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 18 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -Mn '(the\noutput|dog\.\n--)' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 19 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -Mix 'Pattern' ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 20 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -Mixn 'complete pair\nof lines' ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 21 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -nA3 'four' ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 22 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -nB3 'four' ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 23 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -C3 'four' ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 24 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -A9 'four' ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 25 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -nB9 'four' ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 26 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -A9 -B9 'four' ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 27 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -A10 'four' ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 28 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -nB10 'four' ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 29 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -C12 -B10 'four' ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 30 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -inB3 'pattern' ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 31 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -inA3 'pattern' ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 32 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -L 'fox' ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 33 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep 'fox' ./testdata/grepnonexist) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 34 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -s 'fox' ./testdata/grepnonexist) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 35 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -L -r --include=grepinputx --include grepinput8 --exclude-dir='^\.' 'fox' ./testdata | sort) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 36 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -L -r --include='grepinput[^C]' --exclude 'grepinput$' --exclude=grepinput8 --exclude=grepinputM --exclude-dir='^\.' 'fox' ./testdata | sort) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 37 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep '^(a+)*\d' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>teststderrgrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +echo "======== STDERR ========" >>testtrygrep +cat teststderrgrep >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 38 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep '>\x00<' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 39 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -A1 'before the binary zero' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 40 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -B1 'after the binary zero' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 41 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -B1 -o '\w+ the binary zero' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 42 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -B1 -onH '\w+ the binary zero' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 43 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -on 'before|zero|after' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 44 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -on -e before -ezero -e after ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 45 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -on -f ./testdata/greplist -e binary ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 46 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -e 'unopened)' -e abc ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -eabc -e '(unclosed' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -eabc -e xyz -e '[unclosed' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --regex=123 -eabc -e xyz -e '[unclosed' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 47 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -Fx "AB.VE +elephant" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 48 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -F "AB.VE +elephant" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 49 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -F -e DATA -e "AB.VE +elephant" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 50 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep "^(abc|def|ghi|jkl)" ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 51 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -Mv "brown\sfox" ./testdata/grepinputv) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 52 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --colour=always jumps ./testdata/grepinputv) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 53 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --file-offsets 'before|zero|after' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 54 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --line-offsets 'before|zero|after' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 55 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -f./testdata/greplist --color=always ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 56 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -c --exclude=grepinputC lazy ./testdata/grepinput*) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 57 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -c -l --exclude=grepinputC lazy ./testdata/grepinput*) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 58 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --regex=PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 59 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --regexp=PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 60 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --regex PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 61 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --regexp PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 62 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $pcre2grep --match-limit=1000 --no-jit -M 'This is a file(.|\R)*file.' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 63 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $pcre2grep --recursion-limit=1K --no-jit -M 'This is a file(.|\R)*file.' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 64 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o1 '(?<=PAT)TERN (ap(pear)s)' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 65 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o2 '(?<=PAT)TERN (ap(pear)s)' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 66 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o3 '(?<=PAT)TERN (ap(pear)s)' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 67 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o12 '(?<=PAT)TERN (ap(pear)s)' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 68 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --only-matching=2 '(?<=PAT)TERN (ap(pear)s)' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 69 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -vn --colour=always pattern ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 70 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --color=always -M "triple:\t.*\n\n" ./testdata/grepinput3) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --color=always -M -n "triple:\t.*\n\n" ./testdata/grepinput3) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -M "triple:\t.*\n\n" ./testdata/grepinput3) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -M -n "triple:\t.*\n\n" ./testdata/grepinput3) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 71 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o "^01|^02|^03" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 72 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --color=always "^01|^02|^03" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 73 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o --colour=always "^01|^02|^03" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 74 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o "^01|02|^03" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 75 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --color=always "^01|02|^03" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 76 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o --colour=always "^01|02|^03" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 77 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o "^01|^02|03" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 78 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --color=always "^01|^02|03" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 79 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o --colour=always "^01|^02|03" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 80 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o "\b01|\b02" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 81 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --color=always "\\b01|\\b02" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 82 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o --colour=always "\\b01|\\b02" ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 83 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --buffer-size=10 --max-buffer-size=100 "^a" ./testdata/grepinput3) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 84 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +echo testdata/grepinput3 >testtemp1grep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --file-list ./testdata/grepfilelist --file-list $builddir/testtemp1grep "fox|complete|t7") >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 85 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --file-list=./testdata/grepfilelist "dolor" ./testdata/grepinput3) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 86 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 87 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep "cat" ./testdata/grepbinary) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 88 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -v "cat" ./testdata/grepbinary) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 89 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -I "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 90 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --binary-files=without-match "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 91 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -a "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 92 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --binary-files=text "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 93 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --text "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 94 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -L -r --include=grepinputx --include grepinput8 'fox' ./testdata/grepinput* | sort) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 95 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --file-list ./testdata/grepfilelist --exclude grepinputv "fox|complete") >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 96 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -L -r --include-dir=testdata --exclude '^(?!grepinput)' --exclude=grepinput[MC] 'fox' ./test* | sort) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 97 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +echo "grepinput$" >testtemp1grep +echo "grepinput8" >>testtemp1grep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -L -r --include=grepinput --exclude=grepinput[MC] --exclude-from $builddir/testtemp1grep --exclude-dir='^\.' 'fox' ./testdata | sort) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 98 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +echo "grepinput$" >testtemp1grep +echo "grepinput8" >>testtemp1grep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -L -r --exclude=grepinput3 --exclude=grepinput[MC] --include=grepinput --exclude-from $builddir/testtemp1grep --exclude-dir='^\.' 'fox' ./testdata | sort) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 99 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +echo "grepinput$" >testtemp1grep +echo "grepinput8" >testtemp2grep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -L -r --include grepinput --exclude=grepinput[MC] --exclude-from $builddir/testtemp1grep --exclude-from=$builddir/testtemp2grep --exclude-dir='^\.' 'fox' ./testdata | sort) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 100 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -Ho2 --only-matching=1 -o3 '(\w+) binary (\w+)(\.)?' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 101 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o3 -Ho2 -o12 --only-matching=1 -o3 --colour=always --om-separator='|' '(\w+) binary (\w+)(\.)?' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 102 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -n "^$" ./testdata/grepinput3) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 103 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --only-matching "^$" ./testdata/grepinput3) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 104 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -n --only-matching "^$" ./testdata/grepinput3) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 105 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --colour=always "ipsum|" ./testdata/grepinput3) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 106 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; echo "a" | $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -M "|a" ) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 107 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +echo "a" >testtemp1grep +echo "aaaaa" >>testtemp1grep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --line-offsets --allow-lookaround-bsk '(?<=\Ka)' $builddir/testtemp1grep) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 108 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -lq PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 109 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -cq --exclude=grepinputC lazy ./testdata/grepinput*) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 110 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --om-separator / -Mo0 -o1 -o2 'match (\d+):\n (.)\n' testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 111 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --line-offsets -M 'match (\d+):\n (.)\n' testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 112 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --file-offsets -M 'match (\d+):\n (.)\n' testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 113 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --total-count --exclude=grepinputC 'the' testdata/grepinput*) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 114 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -tc --exclude=grepinputC 'the' testdata/grepinput*) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 115 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -tlc --exclude=grepinputC 'the' testdata/grepinput*) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 116 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --exclude=grepinput[MC] -th 'the' testdata/grepinput*) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 117 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -tch --exclude=grepinputC 'the' testdata/grepinput*) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 118 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -tL --exclude=grepinputC 'the' testdata/grepinput*) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 119 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +printf '123\n456\n789\n---abc\ndef\nxyz\n---\n' >testNinputgrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -Mo '(\n|[^-])*---' testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 120 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -HO '$0:$2$1$3' '(\w+) binary (\w+)(\.)?' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -m 1 -O '$0:$a$b$e$f$r$t$v' '(\w+) binary (\w+)(\.)?' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -HO '${X}' '(\w+) binary (\w+)(\.)?' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -HO 'XX$' '(\w+) binary (\w+)(\.)?' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -O '$x{12345678}' '(\w+) binary (\w+)(\.)?' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -O '$x{123Z' '(\w+) binary (\w+)(\.)?' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --output '$x{1234}' '(\w+) binary (\w+)(\.)?' ./testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 121 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -F '\E and (regex)' testdata/grepinputv) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 122 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -w 'cat|dog' testdata/grepinputv) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 123 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -w 'dog|cat' testdata/grepinputv) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 124 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -Mn --colour=always 'start[\s]+end' testdata/grepinputM) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -Mn --colour=always -A2 'start[\s]+end' testdata/grepinputM) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -Mn 'start[\s]+end' testdata/grepinputM) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -Mn -A2 'start[\s]+end' testdata/grepinputM) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 125 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +printf 'abcd\n' >testNinputgrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --colour=always --allow-lookaround-bsk '(?<=\K.)' testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --colour=always --allow-lookaround-bsk '(?=.\K)' testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --colour=always --allow-lookaround-bsk '(?<=\K[ac])' testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --colour=always --allow-lookaround-bsk '(?=[ac]\K)' testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +GREP_COLORS='ms=1;20' $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --colour=always --allow-lookaround-bsk '(?=[ac]\K)' testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 126 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +printf 'Next line pattern has binary zero\nABC\0XYZ\n' >testtemp1grep +printf 'ABC\0XYZ\nABCDEF\nDEFABC\n' >testtemp2grep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -a -f testtemp1grep testtemp2grep >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +printf 'Next line pattern is erroneous.\n^abc)(xy' >testtemp1grep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -a -f testtemp1grep testtemp2grep >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 127 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o --om-capture=0 'pattern()()()()' testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 128 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -m1M -o1 --om-capture=0 'pattern()()()()' testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 129 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -m 2 'fox' testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 130 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -o -m2 'fox' testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 131 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -oc -m2 'fox' testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 132 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; exec 3>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 133 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; exec 3>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 134 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --max-count=1 -nH -O '=$x{41}$x423$o{103}$o1045=' 'fox' -) <$srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 135 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -HZ 'word' ./testdata/grepinputv) | $tr '\000' '@' >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -lZ 'word' ./testdata/grepinputv ./testdata/grepinputv) | $tr '\000' '@' >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -A 1 -B 1 -HZ 'word' ./testdata/grepinputv) | $tr '\000' '@' >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -MHZn 'start[\s]+end' testdata/grepinputM) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 136 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -m1MK -o1 --om-capture=0 'pattern()()()()' testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --max-count=1MK -o1 --om-capture=0 'pattern()()()()' testdata/grepinput) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 137 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +printf 'Last line\nhas no newline' >testtemp1grep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -A1 Last testtemp1grep >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 138 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +printf 'AbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\nAbC\n' >testtemp1grep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --no-jit --heap-limit=0 b testtemp1grep >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 139 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --line-buffered 'fox' testdata/grepinputv) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 140 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --buffer-size=10 -A1 'brown' testdata/grepinputv) >>testtrygrep +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 141 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +printf "$srcdir/testdata/grepinputv\n-\n" >testtemp1grep +printf 'This is a line from stdin.' >testtemp2grep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --file-list testtemp1grep "line from stdin" >testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 142 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +printf "/does/not/exist\n" >testtemp1grep +printf 'This is a line from stdin.' >testtemp2grep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --file-list testtemp1grep "line from stdin" >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 143 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +printf 'fox|cat' >testtemp1grep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -f - $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 144 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -f /non/exist $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 145 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +printf '*meta*\rdog.' >testtemp1grep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -Ncr -F -f testtemp1grep $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 146 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +printf 'A123B' >testtemp1grep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -H -e '123|fox' - >testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -h -e '123|fox' - $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep - $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 147 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -e '123|fox' -- -nonfile >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 148 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --nonexist >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -n-n-bad >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --context >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --only-matching --output=xx >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --colour=badvalue >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --newline=badvalue >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -d badvalue >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -D badvalue >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --buffer-size=0 >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --exclude '(badpat' abc /dev/null >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --exclude-from /non/exist abc /dev/null >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --include-from /non/exist abc /dev/null >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --file-list=/non/exist abc /dev/null >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +echo "---------------------------- Test 149 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --binary-files=binary "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --binary-files=wrong "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + +# This test runs the code that tests locale support. However, on some systems +# (e.g. Alpine Linux) there is no locale support and running this test just +# generates a "no match" result. Therefore, we test for locale support, and if +# it is found missing, we pretend that the test has run as expected so that the +# output matches. + +echo "---------------------------- Test 150 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +which locale >/dev/null 2>&1 +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "pcre2grep: Failed to set locale badlocale (obtained from LC_CTYPE)" >>testtrygrep + echo "RC=2" >>testtrygrep +else + + (cd $srcdir; unset LC_ALL; env LC_CTYPE=badlocale $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep abc /dev/null) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 + echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep +fi + +echo "---------------------------- Test 151 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep +(cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --colour=always -e this -e The -e 'The wo' testdata/grepinputv) >>testtrygrep + + + + +# Now compare the results. + +$cf $srcdir/testdata/grepoutput testtrygrep +if [ $? != 0 ] ; then exit 1; fi + + +# These tests require UTF-8 support + +if [ $utf8 -ne 0 ] ; then + echo "Testing pcre2grep UTF-8 features" + + echo "---------------------------- Test U1 ------------------------------" >testtrygrep + (cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -n -u --newline=any "^X" ./testdata/grepinput8) >>testtrygrep + echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + + echo "---------------------------- Test U2 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep + (cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -n -u -C 3 --newline=any "Match" ./testdata/grepinput8) >>testtrygrep + echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + + echo "---------------------------- Test U3 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep + (cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --line-offsets -u --newline=any --allow-lookaround-bsk '(?<=\K\x{17f})' ./testdata/grepinput8) >>testtrygrep + echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + + echo "---------------------------- Test U4 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep + printf 'A\341\200\200\200CD\342\200\200Z\n' >testtemp1grep + (cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -u -o '....' $builddir/testtemp1grep) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 + echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + + echo "---------------------------- Test U5 ------------------------------" >>testtrygrep + printf 'A\341\200\200\200CD\342\200\200Z\n' >testtemp1grep + (cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -U -o '....' $builddir/testtemp1grep) >>testtrygrep + echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + + echo "---------------------------- Test U6 -----------------------------" >>testtrygrep + (cd $srcdir; $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -u -m1 -O '=$x{1d3}$o{744}=' 'fox') <$srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep 2>&1 + echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + + $cf $srcdir/testdata/grepoutput8 testtrygrep + if [ $? != 0 ] ; then exit 1; fi + +else + echo "Skipping pcre2grep UTF-8 tests: no UTF-8 support in PCRE2 library" +fi + + +# We go to some contortions to try to ensure that the tests for the various +# newline settings will work in environments where the normal newline sequence +# is not \n. Do not use exported files, whose line endings might be changed. +# Instead, create an input file using printf so that its contents are exactly +# what we want. Note the messy fudge to get printf to write a string that +# starts with a hyphen. These tests are run in the build directory. + +echo "Testing pcre2grep newline settings" +printf 'abc\rdef\r\nghi\njkl' >testNinputgrep + +printf '%c--------------------------- Test N1 ------------------------------\r\n' - >testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -n -N CR "^(abc|def|ghi|jkl)" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -B1 -n -N CR "^def" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + +printf '%c--------------------------- Test N2 ------------------------------\r\n' - >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -n --newline=crlf "^(abc|def|ghi|jkl)" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -B1 -n -N CRLF "^ghi" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + +printf '%c--------------------------- Test N3 ------------------------------\r\n' - >>testtrygrep +pattern=`printf 'def\rjkl'` +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -n --newline=cr -F "$pattern" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + +printf '%c--------------------------- Test N4 ------------------------------\r\n' - >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -n --newline=crlf -F -f $srcdir/testdata/greppatN4 testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + +printf '%c--------------------------- Test N5 ------------------------------\r\n' - >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -n --newline=any "^(abc|def|ghi|jkl)" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -B1 -n --newline=any "^def" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + +printf '%c--------------------------- Test N6 ------------------------------\r\n' - >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -n --newline=anycrlf "^(abc|def|ghi|jkl)" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -B1 -n --newline=anycrlf "^jkl" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + +printf '%c--------------------------- Test N7 ------------------------------\r\n' - >>testtrygrep +printf 'xyz\0abc\0def' >testNinputgrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -na --newline=nul "^(abc|def)" testNinputgrep | $tr '\000' '@' >>testtrygrep +$valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -B1 -na --newline=nul "^(abc|def)" testNinputgrep | $tr '\000' '@' >>testtrygrep +echo "" >>testtrygrep + +$cf $srcdir/testdata/grepoutputN testtrygrep +if [ $? != 0 ] ; then exit 1; fi + + +# These newline tests need UTF support. + +if [ $utf8 -ne 0 ] ; then + echo "Testing pcre2grep newline settings with UTF-8 features" + + printf '%c--------------------------- Test UN1 ------------------------------\r\n' - >testtrygrep + printf 'abc\341\210\264def\nxyz' >testNinputgrep + $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -nau --newline=anycrlf "^(abc|def)" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + echo "" >>testtrygrep + + $cf $srcdir/testdata/grepoutputUN testtrygrep + if [ $? != 0 ] ; then exit 1; fi +else + echo "Skipping pcre2grep newline UTF-8 tests: no UTF-8 support in PCRE2 library" +fi + + +# If pcre2grep supports script callouts, run some tests on them. It is possible +# to restrict these callouts to the non-fork case, either for security, or for +# environments that do not support fork(). This is handled by comparing to a +# different output. + +if $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --help | $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -q 'callout scripts in patterns are supported'; then + echo "Testing pcre2grep script callouts" + $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep '(T)(..(.))(?C"/bin/echo|Arg1: [$1] [$2] [$3]|Arg2: $|${1}$| ($4) ($14) ($0)")()' $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >testtrygrep + $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep '(T)(..(.))()()()()()()()(..)(?C"/bin/echo|Arg1: [$11] [${11}]")' $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep + $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep '(T)(?C"|$0:$1$n")' $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep + $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep '(T)(?C"/bin/echo|$0:$1$n")' $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep + $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep '(T)(?C"|$1$n")(*F)' $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep + $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -m1 '(T)(?C"|$0:$1:$x{41}$o{101}$n")' $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep + + if $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --help | $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -q 'Non-fork callout scripts in patterns are supported'; then + nonfork=1 + $cf $srcdir/testdata/grepoutputCN testtrygrep + else + nonfork=0 + $cf $srcdir/testdata/grepoutputC testtrygrep + fi + if [ $? != 0 ] ; then exit 1; fi + + # These callout tests need UTF support. + + if [ $utf8 -ne 0 ] ; then + echo "Testing pcre2grep script callout with UTF-8 features" + $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -u '(T)(?C"|$0:$x{a6}$n")' $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >testtrygrep + $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -u '(T)(?C"/bin/echo|$0:$x{a6}$n")' $srcdir/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep + + if [ $nonfork = 1 ] ; then + $cf $srcdir/testdata/grepoutputCNU testtrygrep + else + $cf $srcdir/testdata/grepoutputCU testtrygrep + fi + if [ $? != 0 ] ; then exit 1; fi + fi +else + echo "Script callouts are not supported" +fi + + +# Test reading .gz and .bz2 files when supported. + +if $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --help | $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -q '\.gz are read using zlib'; then + echo "Testing reading .gz file" + $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep 'one|two' $srcdir/testdata/grepinputC.gz >testtrygrep + echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + $cf $srcdir/testdata/grepoutputCgz testtrygrep + if [ $? != 0 ] ; then exit 1; fi +fi + +if $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep --help | $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep -q '\.bz2 are read using bzlib2'; then + echo "Testing reading .bz2 file" + $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep 'one|two' $srcdir/testdata/grepinputC.bz2 >testtrygrep + echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + $valgrind $vjs $pcre2grep 'one|two' $srcdir/testdata/grepnot.bz2 >>testtrygrep + echo "RC=$?" >>testtrygrep + $cf $srcdir/testdata/grepoutputCbz2 testtrygrep + if [ $? != 0 ] ; then exit 1; fi +fi + + +# Finally, some tests to exercise code that is not tested above, just to be +# sure that it runs OK. Doing this improves the coverage statistics. The output +# is not checked. + +echo "Testing miscellaneous pcre2grep arguments (unchecked)" +echo '' >testtrygrep +checkspecial '-xxxxx' 2 +checkspecial '--help' 0 +checkspecial '--line-buffered --colour=auto abc /dev/null' 1 +checkspecial '--line-buffered --color abc /dev/null' 1 +checkspecial '-dskip abc .' 1 +checkspecial '-Dread -Dskip abc /dev/null' 1 + +# Clean up local working files +rm -f testNinputgrep teststderrgrep testtrygrep testtemp1grep testtemp2grep + +exit 0 + +# End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/RunGrepTest.bat b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/RunGrepTest.bat new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4a095a36 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/RunGrepTest.bat @@ -0,0 +1,699 @@ +@echo off + +:: Run pcre2grep tests. The assumption is that the PCRE2 tests check the library +:: itself. What we are checking here is the file handling and options that are +:: supported by pcre2grep. This script must be run in the build directory. +:: (jmh: I've only tested in the main directory, using my own builds.) + +setlocal enabledelayedexpansion + +:: Remove any non-default colouring that the caller may have set. + +set PCRE2GREP_COLOUR= +set PCRE2GREP_COLOR= +set PCREGREP_COLOUR= +set PCREGREP_COLOR= +set GREP_COLORS= +set GREP_COLOR= + +:: Remember the current (build) directory and set the program to be tested. + +set builddir="%CD%" +set pcre2grep=%builddir%\pcre2grep.exe +set pcre2test=%builddir%\pcre2test.exe + +if NOT exist %pcre2grep% ( + echo ** %pcre2grep% does not exist. + exit /b 1 +) + +if NOT exist %pcre2test% ( + echo ** %pcre2test% does not exist. + exit /b 1 +) + +for /f "delims=" %%a in ('"%pcre2grep%" -V') do set pcre2grep_version=%%a +echo Testing %pcre2grep_version% + +:: Set up a suitable "diff" command for comparison. Some systems have a diff +:: that lacks a -u option. Try to deal with this; better do the test for the -b +:: option as well. Use FC if there's no diff, taking care to ignore equality. + +set cf= +set cfout= +diff -b nul nul 2>nul && set cf=diff -b +diff -u nul nul 2>nul && set cf=diff -u +diff -ub nul nul 2>nul && set cf=diff -ub +if NOT defined cf ( + set cf=fc /n + set "cfout=>testcf || (type testcf & cmd /c exit /b 1)" +) + +:: Set srcdir to the current or parent directory, whichever one contains the +:: test data. Subsequently, we run most of the pcre2grep tests in the source +:: directory so that the file names in the output are always the same. + +if NOT defined srcdir set srcdir=. +if NOT exist %srcdir%\testdata\ ( + if exist testdata\ ( + set srcdir=. + ) else if exist ..\testdata\ ( + set srcdir=.. + ) else if exist ..\..\testdata\ ( + set srcdir=..\.. + ) else ( + echo Cannot find the testdata directory + exit /b 1 + ) +) + +:: Check for the availability of UTF-8 support + +%pcre2test% -C unicode >nul +set utf8=%ERRORLEVEL% + +:: Check default newline convention. If it does not include LF, force LF. + +for /f %%a in ('"%pcre2test%" -C newline') do set nl=%%a +if NOT "%nl%" == "LF" if NOT "%nl%" == "ANY" if NOT "%nl%" == "ANYCRLF" ( + set pcre2grep=%pcre2grep% -N LF + echo Default newline setting forced to LF +) + +:: Create a simple printf via cscript/JScript (an actual printf may translate +:: LF to CRLF, which this one does not). + +echo WScript.StdOut.Write(WScript.Arguments(0).replace(/\\r/g, "\r").replace(/\\n/g, "\n")) >printf.js +set printf=cscript //nologo printf.js + +:: ------ Normal tests ------ + +echo Testing pcre2grep main features + +echo ---------------------------- Test 1 ------------------------------>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 2 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% "^PATTERN" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 3 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -in PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 4 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -ic PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 5 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -in PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 6 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -inh PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 7 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -il PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 8 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -l PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 9 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -q PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 10 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -q NEVER-PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 11 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -vn pattern ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 12 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -ix pattern ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 13 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +echo seventeen >testtemp1grep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -f./testdata/greplist -f %builddir%\testtemp1grep ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 14 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -w pat ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 15 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% "abc^*" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 16 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% abc ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/nonexistfile & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 17 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -M "the\noutput" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 18 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -Mn "(the\noutput|dog\.\n--)" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 19 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -Mix "Pattern" ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 20 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -Mixn "complete pair\nof lines" ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 21 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -nA3 "four" ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 22 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -nB3 "four" ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 23 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -C3 "four" ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 24 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -A9 "four" ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 25 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -nB9 "four" ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 26 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -A9 -B9 "four" ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 27 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -A10 "four" ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 28 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -nB10 "four" ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 29 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -C12 -B10 "four" ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 30 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -inB3 "pattern" ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 31 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -inA3 "pattern" ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 32 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -L "fox" ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 33 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% "fox" ./testdata/grepnonexist & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 34 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -s "fox" ./testdata/grepnonexist & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 35 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -L -r --include=grepinputx --include grepinput8 --exclude-dir="^\." "fox" ./testdata | sort & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 36 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -L -r --include=grepinput --exclude "grepinput$" --exclude=grepinput8 --exclude-dir="^\." "fox" ./testdata | sort & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 37 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% "^(a+)*\d" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>teststderrgrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep +echo ======== STDERR ========>>testtrygrep +type teststderrgrep >>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 38 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% ">\x00<" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 39 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -A1 "before the binary zero" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 40 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -B1 "after the binary zero" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 41 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -B1 -o "\w+ the binary zero" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 42 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -B1 -onH "\w+ the binary zero" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 43 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -on "before|zero|after" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 44 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -on -e before -ezero -e after ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 45 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -on -f ./testdata/greplist -e binary ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 46 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -eabc -e "(unclosed" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 47 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -Fx AB.VE^ + +elephant ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 48 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -F AB.VE^ + +elephant ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 49 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -F -e DATA -e AB.VE^ + +elephant ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 50 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% "^(abc|def|ghi|jkl)" ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 51 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -Mv "brown\sfox" ./testdata/grepinputv & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 52 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --colour=always jumps ./testdata/grepinputv & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 53 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --file-offsets "before|zero|after" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 54 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --line-offsets "before|zero|after" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 55 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -f./testdata/greplist --color=always ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 56 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -c lazy ./testdata/grepinput* & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 57 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -c -l lazy ./testdata/grepinput* & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 58 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --regex=PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 59 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --regexp=PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 60 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --regex PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 61 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --regexp PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 62 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --match-limit=1000 --no-jit -M "This is a file(.|\R)*file." ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 63 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --recursion-limit=1000 --no-jit -M "This is a file(.|\R)*file." ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 64 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o1 "(?<=PAT)TERN (ap(pear)s)" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 65 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o2 "(?<=PAT)TERN (ap(pear)s)" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 66 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o3 "(?<=PAT)TERN (ap(pear)s)" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 67 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o12 "(?<=PAT)TERN (ap(pear)s)" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 68 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --only-matching=2 "(?<=PAT)TERN (ap(pear)s)" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 69 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -vn --colour=always pattern ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 70 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --color=always -M "triple:\t.*\n\n" ./testdata/grepinput3 & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 71 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o "^01|^02|^03" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 72 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --color=always "^01|^02|^03" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 73 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o --colour=always "^01|^02|^03" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 74 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o "^01|02|^03" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 75 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --color=always "^01|02|^03" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 76 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o --colour=always "^01|02|^03" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 77 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o "^01|^02|03" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 78 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --color=always "^01|^02|03" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 79 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o --colour=always "^01|^02|03" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 80 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o "\b01|\b02" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 81 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --color=always "\b01|\b02" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 82 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o --colour=always "\b01|\b02" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 83 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --buffer-size=10 --max-buffer-size=100 "^a" ./testdata/grepinput3 & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 84 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +echo testdata/grepinput3 >testtemp1grep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --file-list ./testdata/grepfilelist --file-list %builddir%\testtemp1grep "fox|complete|t7" & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 85 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --file-list=./testdata/grepfilelist "dolor" ./testdata/grepinput3 & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 86 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 87 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% "cat" ./testdata/grepbinary & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 88 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -v "cat" ./testdata/grepbinary & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 89 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -I "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 90 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --binary-files=without-match "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 91 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -a "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 92 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --binary-files=text "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 93 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --text "dog" ./testdata/grepbinary & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 94 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -L -r --include=grepinputx --include grepinput8 "fox" ./testdata/grepinput* | sort & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 95 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --file-list ./testdata/grepfilelist --exclude grepinputv "fox|complete" & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 96 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -L -r --include-dir=testdata --exclude "^^(?^!grepinput)" "fox" ./test* | sort & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 97 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +echo grepinput$>testtemp1grep +echo grepinput8>>testtemp1grep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -L -r --include=grepinput --exclude-from %builddir%\testtemp1grep --exclude-dir="^\." "fox" ./testdata | sort & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 98 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +echo grepinput$>testtemp1grep +echo grepinput8>>testtemp1grep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -L -r --exclude=grepinput3 --include=grepinput --exclude-from %builddir%\testtemp1grep --exclude-dir="^\." "fox" ./testdata | sort & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 99 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +echo grepinput$>testtemp1grep +echo grepinput8>testtemp2grep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -L -r --include grepinput --exclude-from %builddir%\testtemp1grep --exclude-from=%builddir%\testtemp2grep --exclude-dir="^\." "fox" ./testdata | sort & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 100 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -Ho2 --only-matching=1 -o3 "(\w+) binary (\w+)(\.)?" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 101 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -o3 -Ho2 -o12 --only-matching=1 -o3 --colour=always --om-separator="|" "(\w+) binary (\w+)(\.)?" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 102 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -n "^$" ./testdata/grepinput3 & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 103 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --only-matching "^$" ./testdata/grepinput3 & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 104 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -n --only-matching "^$" ./testdata/grepinput3 & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 105 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --colour=always "ipsum|" ./testdata/grepinput3 & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 106 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & echo a| %pcre2grep% -M "|a" & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 107 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +echo a>testtemp1grep +echo aaaaa>>testtemp1grep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --line-offsets "(?<=\Ka)" %builddir%\testtemp1grep & popd) >>testtrygrep 2>&1 +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 108 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -lq PATTERN ./testdata/grepinput ./testdata/grepinputx & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 109 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -cq lazy ./testdata/grepinput* & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 110 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --om-separator / -Mo0 -o1 -o2 "match (\d+):\n (.)\n" testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 111 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --line-offsets -M "match (\d+):\n (.)\n" testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 112 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --file-offsets -M "match (\d+):\n (.)\n" testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 113 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --total-count "the" testdata/grepinput* & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 114 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -tc "the" testdata/grepinput* & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 115 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -tlc "the" testdata/grepinput* & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 116 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -th "the" testdata/grepinput* & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 117 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -tch "the" testdata/grepinput* & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 118 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -tL "the" testdata/grepinput* & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 119 ----------------------------->>testtrygrep +%printf% "123\n456\n789\n---abc\ndef\nxyz\n---\n" >testNinputgrep +%pcre2grep% -Mo "(\n|[^-])*---" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test 120 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +(pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -HO "$0:$2$1$3" "(\w+) binary (\w+)(\.)?" ./testdata/grepinput & popd) >>testtrygrep +echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + +:: Now compare the results. + +%cf% %srcdir%\testdata\grepoutput testtrygrep %cfout% +if ERRORLEVEL 1 exit /b 1 + + +:: These tests require UTF-8 support + +if %utf8% neq 0 ( + echo Testing pcre2grep UTF-8 features + + echo ---------------------------- Test U1 ------------------------------>testtrygrep + (pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -n -u --newline=any "^X" ./testdata/grepinput8 & popd) >>testtrygrep + echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + + echo ---------------------------- Test U2 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep + (pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% -n -u -C 3 --newline=any "Match" ./testdata/grepinput8 & popd) >>testtrygrep + echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + + echo ---------------------------- Test U3 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep + (pushd %srcdir% & %pcre2grep% --line-offsets -u --newline=any "(?<=\K\x{17f})" ./testdata/grepinput8 & popd) >>testtrygrep + echo RC=^%ERRORLEVEL%>>testtrygrep + + %cf% %srcdir%\testdata\grepoutput8 testtrygrep %cfout% + if ERRORLEVEL 1 exit /b 1 + +) else ( + echo Skipping pcre2grep UTF-8 tests: no UTF-8 support in PCRE2 library +) + + +:: We go to some contortions to try to ensure that the tests for the various +:: newline settings will work in environments where the normal newline sequence +:: is not \n. Do not use exported files, whose line endings might be changed. +:: Instead, create an input file so that its contents are exactly what we want. +:: These tests are run in the build directory. + +echo Testing pcre2grep newline settings +%printf% "abc\rdef\r\nghi\njkl" >testNinputgrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test N1 ------------------------------>testtrygrep +%pcre2grep% -n -N CR "^(abc|def|ghi|jkl)" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test N2 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +%pcre2grep% -n --newline=crlf "^(abc|def|ghi|jkl)" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test N3 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +for /f %%a in ('%printf% "def\rjkl"') do set pattern=%%a +%pcre2grep% -n --newline=cr -F "!pattern!" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test N4 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +%pcre2grep% -n --newline=crlf -F -f %srcdir%/testdata/greppatN4 testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test N5 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +%pcre2grep% -n --newline=any "^(abc|def|ghi|jkl)" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + +echo ---------------------------- Test N6 ------------------------------>>testtrygrep +%pcre2grep% -n --newline=anycrlf "^(abc|def|ghi|jkl)" testNinputgrep >>testtrygrep + +%cf% %srcdir%\testdata\grepoutputN testtrygrep %cfout% +if ERRORLEVEL 1 exit /b 1 + +:: If pcre2grep supports script callouts, run some tests on them. + +%pcre2grep% --help | %pcre2grep% -q "callout scripts in patterns are supported" +if %ERRORLEVEL% equ 0 ( + echo Testing pcre2grep script callouts + %pcre2grep% "(T)(..(.))(?C'cmd|/c echo|Arg1: [$1] [$2] [$3]|Arg2: ^$|${1}^$| ($4) ($14) ($0)')()" %srcdir%/testdata/grepinputv >testtrygrep + %pcre2grep% "(T)(..(.))()()()()()()()(..)(?C'cmd|/c echo|Arg1: [$11] [${11}]')" %srcdir%/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep + %pcre2grep% "(T)(?C'|$0:$1$n')" %srcdir%/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep + %pcre2grep% "(T)(?C'|$1$n')(*F)" %srcdir%/testdata/grepinputv >>testtrygrep + %pcre2grep% --help | %pcre2grep% -q "Non-script callout scripts in patterns are supported" + if %ERRORLEVEL% equ 0 ( + %cf% %srcdir%\testdata\grepoutputCN testtrygrep %cfout% + ) else ( + %cf% %srcdir%\testdata\grepoutputC testtrygrep %cfout% + ) + if ERRORLEVEL 1 exit /b 1 +) else ( + echo Script callouts are not supported +) + +:: Finally, some tests to exercise code that is not tested above, just to be +:: sure that it runs OK. Doing this improves the coverage statistics. The output +:: is not checked. + +echo Testing miscellaneous pcre2grep arguments (unchecked) +%printf% "" >testtrygrep +call :checkspecial "-xxxxx" 2 || exit /b 1 +call :checkspecial "--help" 0 || exit /b 1 +call :checkspecial "--line-buffered --colour=auto abc nul" 1 || exit /b 1 + +:: Clean up local working files +del testcf printf.js testNinputgrep teststderrgrep testtrygrep testtemp1grep testtemp2grep + +exit /b 0 + +:: ------ Function to run and check a special pcre2grep arguments test ------- + +:checkspecial + %pcre2grep% %~1 >>testtrygrep 2>&1 + if %ERRORLEVEL% neq %2 ( + echo ** pcre2grep %~1 failed - check testtrygrep + exit /b 1 + ) + exit /b 0 + +:: End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/RunTest b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/RunTest new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ae32f5d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/RunTest @@ -0,0 +1,916 @@ +#! /bin/sh + +############################################################################### +# Run the PCRE2 tests using the pcre2test program. The appropriate tests are +# selected, depending on which build-time options were used. +# +# When JIT support is available, all appropriate tests are run with and without +# JIT, unless "-nojit" is given on the command line. There are also two tests +# for JIT-specific features, one to be run when JIT support is available +# (unless "-nojit" is specified), and one when it is not. +# +# Whichever of the 8-, 16- and 32-bit libraries exist are tested. It is also +# possible to select which to test by giving "-8", "-16" or "-32" on the +# command line. +# +# As well as "-nojit", "-8", "-16", and "-32", arguments for this script are +# individual test numbers, ranges of tests such as 3-6 or 3- (meaning 3 to the +# end), or a number preceded by ~ to exclude a test. For example, "3-15 ~10" +# runs tests 3 to 15, excluding test 10, and just "~10" runs all the tests +# except test 10. Whatever order the arguments are in, these tests are always +# run in numerical order. +# +# If no specific tests are selected (which is the case when this script is run +# via 'make check') the default is to run all the numbered tests. +# +# There may also be named (as well as numbered) tests for special purposes. At +# present there is just one, called "heap". This test's output contains the +# sizes of heap frames and frame vectors, which depend on the environment. It +# is therefore not run unless explicitly requested. +# +# Inappropriate tests are automatically skipped (with a comment to say so). For +# example, if JIT support is not compiled, test 16 is skipped, whereas if JIT +# support is compiled, test 15 is skipped. +# +# Other arguments can be one of the words "-valgrind", "-valgrind-log", or +# "-sim" followed by an argument to run cross-compiled executables under a +# simulator, for example: +# +# RunTest 3 -sim "qemu-arm -s 8388608" +# +# For backwards compatibility, -nojit, -valgrind, -valgrind-log, and -sim may +# be given without the leading "-" character. +# +# When PCRE2 is compiled by clang with -fsanitize arguments, some tests need +# very much more stack than normal. In environments where the stack can be +# set at runtime, -bigstack sets a gigantic stack. +# +# There are two special cases where only one argument is allowed: +# +# If the first and only argument is "ebcdic", the script runs the special +# EBCDIC test that can be useful for checking certain EBCDIC features, even +# when run in an ASCII environment. PCRE2 must be built with EBCDIC support for +# this test to be run. +# +# If the script is obeyed as "RunTest list", a list of available tests is +# output, but none of them are run. +############################################################################### + +# Define test titles in variables so that they can be output as a list. Some +# of them are modified (e.g. with -8 or -16) when used in the actual tests. + +title0="Test 0: Unchecked pcre2test argument tests (to improve coverage)" +title1="Test 1: Main non-UTF, non-UCP functionality (compatible with Perl >= 5.10)" +title2="Test 2: API, errors, internals and non-Perl stuff" +title3="Test 3: Locale-specific features" +title4A="Test 4: UTF" +title4B=" and Unicode property support (compatible with Perl >= 5.10)" +title5A="Test 5: API, internals, and non-Perl stuff for UTF" +title5B=" and UCP support" +title6="Test 6: DFA matching main non-UTF, non-UCP functionality" +title7A="Test 7: DFA matching with UTF" +title7B=" and Unicode property support" +title8="Test 8: Internal offsets and code size tests" +title9="Test 9: Specials for the basic 8-bit library" +title10="Test 10: Specials for the 8-bit library with UTF-8 and UCP support" +title11="Test 11: Specials for the basic 16-bit and 32-bit libraries" +title12="Test 12: Specials for the 16-bit and 32-bit libraries UTF and UCP support" +title13="Test 13: DFA specials for the basic 16-bit and 32-bit libraries" +title14="Test 14: DFA specials for UTF and UCP support" +title15="Test 15: Non-JIT limits and other non-JIT tests" +title16="Test 16: JIT-specific features when JIT is not available" +title17="Test 17: JIT-specific features when JIT is available" +title18="Test 18: Tests of the POSIX interface, excluding UTF/UCP" +title19="Test 19: Tests of the POSIX interface with UTF/UCP" +title20="Test 20: Serialization and code copy tests" +title21="Test 21: \C tests without UTF (supported for DFA matching)" +title22="Test 22: \C tests with UTF (not supported for DFA matching)" +title23="Test 23: \C disabled test" +title24="Test 24: Non-UTF pattern conversion tests" +title25="Test 25: UTF pattern conversion tests" +title26="Test 26: Auto-generated unicode property tests" +maxtest=26 +titleheap="Test 'heap': Environment-specific heap tests" + +if [ $# -eq 1 -a "$1" = "list" ]; then + echo $title0 + echo $title1 + echo $title2 "(not UTF or UCP)" + echo $title3 + echo $title4A $title4B + echo $title5A $title5B + echo $title6 + echo $title7A $title7B + echo $title8 + echo $title9 + echo $title10 + echo $title11 + echo $title12 + echo $title13 + echo $title14 + echo $title15 + echo $title16 + echo $title17 + echo $title18 + echo $title19 + echo $title20 + echo $title21 + echo $title22 + echo $title23 + echo $title24 + echo $title25 + echo $title26 + echo "" + echo $titleheap + echo "" + echo "Numbered tests are automatically run if nothing selected." + echo "Named tests must be explicitly selected." + exit 0 +fi + +# Set up a suitable "diff" command for comparison. Some systems +# have a diff that lacks a -u option. Try to deal with this. + +cf="diff" +diff -u /dev/null /dev/null 2>/dev/null && cf="diff -u" + +# Find the test data + +if [ -n "$srcdir" -a -d "$srcdir" ] ; then + testdata="$srcdir/testdata" +elif [ -d "./testdata" ] ; then + testdata=./testdata +elif [ -d "../testdata" ] ; then + testdata=../testdata +else + echo "Cannot find the testdata directory" + exit 1 +fi + + +# ------ Function to check results of a test ------- + +# This function is called with three parameters: +# +# $1 the value of $? after a call to pcre2test +# $2 the suffix of the output file to compare with +# $3 the $opt value (empty, -jit, or -dfa) +# +# Note: must define using name(), not "function name", for Solaris. + +checkresult() + { + if [ $1 -ne 0 ] ; then + echo "** pcre2test failed - check testtry" + exit 1 + fi + case "$3" in + -jit) with=" with JIT";; + -dfa) with=" with DFA";; + *) with="";; + esac + $cf $testdata/testoutput$2 testtry + if [ $? != 0 ] ; then + echo "" + echo "** Test $2 failed$with" + exit 1 + fi + echo " OK$with" + } + + +# ------ Function to run and check a special pcre2test arguments test ------- + +checkspecial() + { + $valgrind $vjs ./pcre2test $1 >>testtry + if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then + echo "** pcre2test $1 failed - check testtry" + exit 1 + fi + } + + +# ------ Special EBCDIC Test ------- + +if [ $# -eq 1 -a "$1" = "ebcdic" ]; then + $valgrind ./pcre2test -C ebcdic >/dev/null + ebcdic=$? + if [ $ebcdic -ne 1 ] ; then + echo "Cannot run EBCDIC tests: EBCDIC support not compiled" + exit 1 + fi + for opt in "" "-dfa"; do + ./pcre2test -q $opt $testdata/testinputEBC >testtry + checkresult $? EBC "$opt" + done +exit 0 +fi + + +# ------ Normal Tests ------ + +# Default values + +arg8= +arg16= +arg32= +nojit= +bigstack= +sim= +skip= +valgrind= +vjs= + +# This is in case the caller has set aliases (as I do - PH) +unset cp ls mv rm + +# Process options and select which tests to run; for those that are explicitly +# requested, check that the necessary optional facilities are available. + +do0=no +do1=no +do2=no +do3=no +do4=no +do5=no +do6=no +do7=no +do8=no +do9=no +do10=no +do11=no +do12=no +do13=no +do14=no +do15=no +do16=no +do17=no +do18=no +do19=no +do20=no +do21=no +do22=no +do23=no +do24=no +do25=no +do26=no +doheap=no + +while [ $# -gt 0 ] ; do + case $1 in + 0) do0=yes;; + 1) do1=yes;; + 2) do2=yes;; + 3) do3=yes;; + 4) do4=yes;; + 5) do5=yes;; + 6) do6=yes;; + 7) do7=yes;; + 8) do8=yes;; + 9) do9=yes;; + 10) do10=yes;; + 11) do11=yes;; + 12) do12=yes;; + 13) do13=yes;; + 14) do14=yes;; + 15) do15=yes;; + 16) do16=yes;; + 17) do17=yes;; + 18) do18=yes;; + 19) do19=yes;; + 20) do20=yes;; + 21) do21=yes;; + 22) do22=yes;; + 23) do23=yes;; + 24) do24=yes;; + 25) do25=yes;; + 26) do26=yes;; + heap) doheap=yes;; + -8) arg8=yes;; + -16) arg16=yes;; + -32) arg32=yes;; + bigstack|-bigstack) bigstack=yes;; + nojit|-nojit) nojit=yes;; + sim|-sim) shift; sim=$1;; + valgrind|-valgrind) valgrind="valgrind --tool=memcheck -q --smc-check=all-non-file";; + valgrind-log|-valgrind-log) valgrind="valgrind --tool=memcheck --num-callers=30 --leak-check=no --error-limit=no --smc-check=all-non-file --log-file=report.%p ";; + ~*) + if expr "$1" : '~[0-9][0-9]*$' >/dev/null; then + skip="$skip `expr "$1" : '~\([0-9]*\)*$'`" + else + echo "Unknown option or test selector '$1'"; exit 1 + fi + ;; + *-*) + if expr "$1" : '[0-9][0-9]*-[0-9]*$' >/dev/null; then + tf=`expr "$1" : '\([0-9]*\)'` + tt=`expr "$1" : '.*-\([0-9]*\)'` + if [ "$tt" = "" ] ; then tt=$maxtest; fi + if expr \( "$tt" ">" "$maxtest" \) >/dev/null; then + echo "Invalid test range '$1'"; exit 1 + fi + while expr "$tf" "<=" "$tt" >/dev/null; do + eval do${tf}=yes + tf=`expr $tf + 1` + done + else + echo "Invalid test range '$1'"; exit 1 + fi + ;; + *) echo "Unknown option or test selector '$1'"; exit 1;; + esac + shift +done + +# Find which optional facilities are available. + +$sim ./pcre2test -C linksize >/dev/null +link_size=$? +if [ $link_size -lt 2 ] ; then + echo "RunTest: Failed to find internal link size" + exit 1 +fi +if [ $link_size -gt 4 ] ; then + echo "RunTest: Failed to find internal link size" + exit 1 +fi + +# If it is possible to set the system stack size and -bigstack was given, +# set up a large stack. + +$sim ./pcre2test -S 64 /dev/null /dev/null +support_setstack=$? +if [ $support_setstack -eq 0 -a "$bigstack" != "" ] ; then + setstack="-S 64" +else + setstack="" +fi + +# All of 8-bit, 16-bit, and 32-bit character strings may be supported, but only +# one need be. + +$sim ./pcre2test -C pcre2-8 >/dev/null +support8=$? +$sim ./pcre2test -C pcre2-16 >/dev/null +support16=$? +$sim ./pcre2test -C pcre2-32 >/dev/null +support32=$? + +# \C may be disabled + +$sim ./pcre2test -C backslash-C >/dev/null +supportBSC=$? + +# Initialize all bitsizes skipped + +test8=skip +test16=skip +test32=skip + +# If no bitsize arguments, select all that are available + +if [ "$arg8$arg16$arg32" = "" ] ; then + if [ $support8 -ne 0 ] ; then + test8=-8 + fi + if [ $support16 -ne 0 ] ; then + test16=-16 + fi + if [ $support32 -ne 0 ] ; then + test32=-32 + fi + +# Otherwise, select requested bit sizes + +else + if [ "$arg8" = yes ] ; then + if [ $support8 -eq 0 ] ; then + echo "Cannot run 8-bit library tests: 8-bit library not compiled" + exit 1 + fi + test8=-8 + fi + if [ "$arg16" = yes ] ; then + if [ $support16 -eq 0 ] ; then + echo "Cannot run 16-bit library tests: 16-bit library not compiled" + exit 1 + fi + test16=-16 + fi + if [ "$arg32" = yes ] ; then + if [ $support32 -eq 0 ] ; then + echo "Cannot run 32-bit library tests: 32-bit library not compiled" + exit 1 + fi + test32=-32 + fi +fi + +# UTF support is implied by Unicode support, and it always applies to all bit +# sizes if both are supported; we can't have UTF-8 support without UTF-16 or +# UTF-32 support. + +$sim ./pcre2test -C unicode >/dev/null +utf=$? + +# When JIT is used with valgrind, we need to set up valgrind suppressions as +# otherwise there are a lot of false positive valgrind reports when the +# the hardware supports SSE2. + +jitopt= +$sim ./pcre2test -C jit >/dev/null +jit=$? +if [ $jit -ne 0 -a "$nojit" != "yes" ] ; then + jitopt=-jit + if [ "$valgrind" != "" ] ; then + vjs="--suppressions=$testdata/valgrind-jit.supp" + fi +fi + +# If no specific tests were requested, select all the numbered tests. Those +# that are not relevant will be automatically skipped. + +if [ $do0 = no -a $do1 = no -a $do2 = no -a $do3 = no -a \ + $do4 = no -a $do5 = no -a $do6 = no -a $do7 = no -a \ + $do8 = no -a $do9 = no -a $do10 = no -a $do11 = no -a \ + $do12 = no -a $do13 = no -a $do14 = no -a $do15 = no -a \ + $do16 = no -a $do17 = no -a $do18 = no -a $do19 = no -a \ + $do20 = no -a $do21 = no -a $do22 = no -a $do23 = no -a \ + $do24 = no -a $do25 = no -a $do26 = no -a $doheap = no \ + ]; then + do0=yes + do1=yes + do2=yes + do3=yes + do4=yes + do5=yes + do6=yes + do7=yes + do8=yes + do9=yes + do10=yes + do11=yes + do12=yes + do13=yes + do14=yes + do15=yes + do16=yes + do17=yes + do18=yes + do19=yes + do20=yes + do21=yes + do22=yes + do23=yes + do24=yes + do25=yes + do26=yes +fi + +# Handle any explicit skips at this stage, so that an argument list may consist +# only of explicit skips. + +for i in $skip; do eval do$i=no; done + +# Show which release and which test data + +echo "" +echo PCRE2 C library tests using test data from $testdata +$sim ./pcre2test /dev/null +echo "" + +for bmode in "$test8" "$test16" "$test32"; do + case "$bmode" in + skip) continue;; + -16) if [ "$test8$test32" != "skipskip" ] ; then echo ""; fi + bits=16; echo "---- Testing 16-bit library ----"; echo "";; + -32) if [ "$test8$test16" != "skipskip" ] ; then echo ""; fi + bits=32; echo "---- Testing 32-bit library ----"; echo "";; + -8) bits=8; echo "---- Testing 8-bit library ----"; echo "";; + esac + + # Test 0 is a special test. Its output is not checked, because it will + # be different on different hardware and with different configurations. + # Running this test just exercises the code. + + if [ $do0 = yes ] ; then + echo $title0 + echo '/abc/jit,memory,framesize' >testSinput + echo ' abc' >>testSinput + echo '' >testtry + checkspecial '-C' + checkspecial '--help' + if [ $support_setstack -eq 0 ] ; then + checkspecial '-S 1 -t 10 testSinput' + fi + echo " OK" + fi + + # Primary non-UTF test, compatible with JIT and all versions of Perl >= 5.8 + + if [ $do1 = yes ] ; then + echo $title1 + for opt in "" $jitopt; do + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput1 testtry + checkresult $? 1 "$opt" + done + fi + + # PCRE2 tests that are not Perl-compatible: API, errors, internals. We copy + # the testbtables file to the current directory for use by this test. + + if [ $do2 = yes ] ; then + echo $title2 "(excluding UTF-$bits)" + cp $testdata/testbtables . + for opt in "" $jitopt; do + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput2 testtry + saverc=$? + if [ $saverc = 0 ] ; then + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $bmode $opt -error -70,-62,-2,-1,0,100,101,191,200 >>testtry + checkresult $? 2 "$opt" + else + checkresult $saverc 2 "$opt" + fi + done + fi + + # Locale-specific tests, provided that either the "fr_FR", "fr_CA", "french" + # or "fr" locale is available. The first two are Unix-like standards; the + # last two are for Windows. Unfortunately, different versions of the French + # locale give different outputs for some items. This test passes if the + # output matches any one of the alternative output files. + + if [ $do3 = yes ] ; then + locale= + + # In some environments locales that are listed by the "locale -a" + # command do not seem to work with setlocale(). Therefore, we do + # a preliminary test to see if pcre2test can set one before going + # on to use it. + + for loc in 'fr_FR' 'french' 'fr' 'fr_CA'; do + locale -a | grep "^$loc\$" >/dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then + echo "/a/locale=$loc" | \ + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $bmode | \ + grep "Failed to set locale" >/dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then + locale=$loc + if [ "$locale" = "fr_FR" ] ; then + infile=$testdata/testinput3 + outfile=$testdata/testoutput3 + outfile2=$testdata/testoutput3A + outfile3=$testdata/testoutput3B + else + infile=test3input + outfile=test3output + outfile2=test3outputA + outfile3=test3outputB + sed "s/fr_FR/$loc/" $testdata/testinput3 >test3input + sed "s/fr_FR/$loc/" $testdata/testoutput3 >test3output + sed "s/fr_FR/$loc/" $testdata/testoutput3A >test3outputA + sed "s/fr_FR/$loc/" $testdata/testoutput3B >test3outputB + fi + break + fi + fi + done + + if [ "$locale" != "" ] ; then + echo $title3 "(using '$locale' locale)" + for opt in "" $jitopt; do + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $infile testtry + if [ $? = 0 ] ; then + case "$opt" in + -jit) with=" with JIT";; + *) with="";; + esac + if $cf $outfile testtry >teststdout || \ + $cf $outfile2 testtry >teststdout || \ + $cf $outfile3 testtry >teststdout + then + echo " OK$with" + else + echo "** Locale test did not run successfully$with. The output did not match" + echo " $outfile, $outfile2 or $outfile3." + echo " This may mean that there is a problem with the locale settings rather" + echo " than a bug in PCRE2." + exit 1 + fi + else exit 1 + fi + done + else + echo "Cannot test locale-specific features - none of the 'fr_FR', 'fr_CA'," + echo "'fr' or 'french' locales can be set, or the \"locale\" command is" + echo "not available to check for them." + echo " " + fi + fi + + # Tests for UTF and Unicode property support + + if [ $do4 = yes ] ; then + echo ${title4A}-${bits}${title4B} + if [ $utf -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because UTF-$bits support is not available" + else + for opt in "" $jitopt; do + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput4 testtry + checkresult $? 4 "$opt" + done + fi + fi + + if [ $do5 = yes ] ; then + echo ${title5A}-${bits}$title5B + if [ $utf -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because UTF-$bits support is not available" + else + for opt in "" $jitopt; do + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput5 testtry + checkresult $? 5 "$opt" + done + fi + fi + + # Tests for DFA matching support + + if [ $do6 = yes ] ; then + echo $title6 + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinput6 testtry + checkresult $? 6 "" + fi + + if [ $do7 = yes ] ; then + echo ${title7A}-${bits}$title7B + if [ $utf -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because UTF-$bits support is not available" + else + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput7 testtry + checkresult $? 7 "" + fi + fi + + # Test of internal offsets and code sizes. This test is run only when there + # is UTF/UCP support. The actual tests are mostly the same as in some of the + # above, but in this test we inspect some offsets and sizes. This is a + # doublecheck for the maintainer, just in case something changes unexpectedly. + # The output from this test is different in 8-bit, 16-bit, and 32-bit modes + # and for different link sizes, so there are different output files for each + # mode and link size. + + if [ $do8 = yes ] ; then + echo $title8 + if [ $utf -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because UTF-$bits support is not available" + else + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinput8 testtry + checkresult $? 8-$bits-$link_size "" + fi + fi + + # Tests for 8-bit-specific features + + if [ "$do9" = yes ] ; then + echo $title9 + if [ "$bits" = "16" -o "$bits" = "32" ] ; then + echo " Skipped when running 16/32-bit tests" + else + for opt in "" $jitopt; do + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput9 testtry + checkresult $? 9 "$opt" + done + fi + fi + + # Tests for UTF-8 and UCP 8-bit-specific features + + if [ "$do10" = yes ] ; then + echo $title10 + if [ "$bits" = "16" -o "$bits" = "32" ] ; then + echo " Skipped when running 16/32-bit tests" + elif [ $utf -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because UTF-$bits support is not available" + else + for opt in "" $jitopt; do + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput10 testtry + checkresult $? 10 "$opt" + done + fi + fi + + # Tests for 16-bit and 32-bit features. Output is different for the two widths. + + if [ $do11 = yes ] ; then + echo $title11 + if [ "$bits" = "8" ] ; then + echo " Skipped when running 8-bit tests" + else + for opt in "" $jitopt; do + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput11 testtry + checkresult $? 11-$bits "$opt" + done + fi + fi + + # Tests for 16-bit and 32-bit features with UTF-16/32 and UCP support. Output + # is different for the two widths. + + if [ $do12 = yes ] ; then + echo $title12 + if [ "$bits" = "8" ] ; then + echo " Skipped when running 8-bit tests" + elif [ $utf -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because UTF-$bits support is not available" + else + for opt in "" $jitopt; do + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput12 testtry + checkresult $? 12-$bits "$opt" + done + fi + fi + + # Tests for 16/32-bit-specific features in DFA non-UTF modes + + if [ $do13 = yes ] ; then + echo $title13 + if [ "$bits" = "8" ] ; then + echo " Skipped when running 8-bit tests" + else + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinput13 testtry + checkresult $? 13 "" + fi + fi + + # Tests for DFA UTF and UCP features. Output is different for the different widths. + + if [ $do14 = yes ] ; then + echo $title14 + if [ $utf -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because UTF-$bits support is not available" + else + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput14 testtry + checkresult $? 14-$bits "" + fi + fi + + # Test non-JIT match and recursion limits + + if [ $do15 = yes ] ; then + echo $title15 + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinput15 testtry + checkresult $? 15 "" + fi + + # Test JIT-specific features when JIT is not available + + if [ $do16 = yes ] ; then + echo $title16 + if [ $jit -ne 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because JIT is available" + else + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinput16 testtry + checkresult $? 16 "" + fi + fi + + # Test JIT-specific features when JIT is available + + if [ $do17 = yes ] ; then + echo $title17 + if [ $jit -eq 0 -o "$nojit" = "yes" ] ; then + echo " Skipped because JIT is not available or nojit was specified" + else + $sim $valgrind $vjs ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinput17 testtry + checkresult $? 17 "" + fi + fi + + # Tests for the POSIX interface without UTF/UCP (8-bit only) + + if [ $do18 = yes ] ; then + echo $title18 + if [ "$bits" = "16" -o "$bits" = "32" ] ; then + echo " Skipped when running 16/32-bit tests" + else + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinput18 testtry + checkresult $? 18 "" + fi + fi + + # Tests for the POSIX interface with UTF/UCP (8-bit only) + + if [ $do19 = yes ] ; then + echo $title19 + if [ "$bits" = "16" -o "$bits" = "32" ] ; then + echo " Skipped when running 16/32-bit tests" + elif [ $utf -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because UTF-$bits support is not available" + else + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinput19 testtry + checkresult $? 19 "" + fi + fi + + # Serialization tests + + if [ $do20 = yes ] ; then + echo $title20 + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinput20 testtry + checkresult $? 20 "" + fi + + # \C tests without UTF - DFA matching is supported + + if [ "$do21" = yes ] ; then + echo $title21 + if [ $supportBSC -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because \C is disabled" + else + for opt in "" $jitopt -dfa; do + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput21 testtry + checkresult $? 21 "$opt" + done + fi + fi + + # \C tests with UTF - DFA matching is not supported for \C in UTF mode + + if [ "$do22" = yes ] ; then + echo $title22 + if [ $supportBSC -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because \C is disabled" + elif [ $utf -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because UTF-$bits support is not available" + else + for opt in "" $jitopt; do + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput22 testtry + checkresult $? 22-$bits "$opt" + done + fi + fi + + # Test when \C is disabled + + if [ "$do23" = yes ] ; then + echo $title23 + if [ $supportBSC -ne 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because \C is not disabled" + else + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinput23 testtry + checkresult $? 23 "" + fi + fi + + # Non-UTF pattern conversion tests + + if [ "$do24" = yes ] ; then + echo $title24 + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinput24 testtry + checkresult $? 24 "" + fi + + # UTF pattern conversion tests + + if [ "$do25" = yes ] ; then + echo $title25 + if [ $utf -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because UTF-$bits support is not available" + else + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinput25 testtry + checkresult $? 25 "" + fi + fi + + # Auto-generated unicode property tests + + if [ $do26 = yes ] ; then + echo $title26 + if [ $utf -eq 0 ] ; then + echo " Skipped because UTF-$bits support is not available" + else + for opt in "" $jitopt; do + $sim $valgrind ${opt:+$vjs} ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $opt $testdata/testinput26 testtry + checkresult $? 26 "$opt" + done + fi + fi + + # Manually selected heap tests - output may vary in different environments, + # which is why that are not automatically run. + + if [ $doheap = yes ] ; then + echo $titleheap + $sim $valgrind ./pcre2test -q $setstack $bmode $testdata/testinputheap testtry + checkresult $? heap-$bits "" + fi + +# End of loop for 8/16/32-bit tests +done + +# Clean up local working files +rm -f testbtables testSinput test3input testsaved1 testsaved2 test3output test3outputA test3outputB teststdout teststderr testtry + +# End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/RunTest.bat b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/RunTest.bat new file mode 100644 index 00000000..401b95af --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/RunTest.bat @@ -0,0 +1,525 @@ +@echo off +@rem +@rem MS Windows batch file to run pcre2test on testfiles with the correct +@rem options. This file must use CRLF linebreaks to function properly, +@rem and requires both pcre2test and pcre2grep. +@rem +@rem ------------------------ HISTORY ---------------------------------- +@rem This file was originally contributed to PCRE1 by Ralf Junker, and touched +@rem up by Daniel Richard G. Tests 10-12 added by Philip H. +@rem Philip H also changed test 3 to use "wintest" files. +@rem +@rem Updated by Tom Fortmann to support explicit test numbers on the command +@rem line. Added argument validation and added error reporting. +@rem +@rem Sheri Pierce added logic to skip feature dependent tests +@rem tests 4 5 7 10 12 14 19 and 22 require Unicode support +@rem 8 requires Unicode and link size 2 +@rem 16 requires absence of jit support +@rem 17 requires presence of jit support +@rem Sheri P also added override tests for study and jit testing +@rem Zoltan Herczeg added libpcre16 support +@rem Zoltan Herczeg added libpcre32 support +@rem ------------------------------------------------------------------- +@rem +@rem The file was converted for PCRE2 by PH, February 2015. +@rem Updated for new test 14 (moving others up a number), August 2015. +@rem Tidied and updated for new tests 21, 22, 23 by PH, October 2015. +@rem PH added missing "set type" for test 22, April 2016. +@rem PH added copy command for new testbtables file, November 2020 + + +setlocal enabledelayedexpansion +if [%srcdir%]==[] ( +if exist testdata\ set srcdir=.) +if [%srcdir%]==[] ( +if exist ..\testdata\ set srcdir=..) +if [%srcdir%]==[] ( +if exist ..\..\testdata\ set srcdir=..\..) +if NOT exist %srcdir%\testdata\ ( +Error: echo distribution testdata folder not found! +call :conferror +exit /b 1 +goto :eof +) + +if [%pcre2test%]==[] set pcre2test=.\pcre2test.exe + +echo source dir is %srcdir% +echo pcre2test=%pcre2test% + +if NOT exist %pcre2test% ( +echo Error: %pcre2test% not found! +echo. +call :conferror +exit /b 1 +) + +%pcre2test% -C linksize >NUL +set link_size=%ERRORLEVEL% +%pcre2test% -C pcre2-8 >NUL +set support8=%ERRORLEVEL% +%pcre2test% -C pcre2-16 >NUL +set support16=%ERRORLEVEL% +%pcre2test% -C pcre2-32 >NUL +set support32=%ERRORLEVEL% +%pcre2test% -C unicode >NUL +set unicode=%ERRORLEVEL% +%pcre2test% -C jit >NUL +set jit=%ERRORLEVEL% +%pcre2test% -C backslash-C >NUL +set supportBSC=%ERRORLEVEL% + +if %support8% EQU 1 ( +if not exist testout8 md testout8 +if not exist testoutjit8 md testoutjit8 +) + +if %support16% EQU 1 ( +if not exist testout16 md testout16 +if not exist testoutjit16 md testoutjit16 +) + +if %support16% EQU 1 ( +if not exist testout32 md testout32 +if not exist testoutjit32 md testoutjit32 +) + +set do1=no +set do2=no +set do3=no +set do4=no +set do5=no +set do6=no +set do7=no +set do8=no +set do9=no +set do10=no +set do11=no +set do12=no +set do13=no +set do14=no +set do15=no +set do16=no +set do17=no +set do18=no +set do19=no +set do20=no +set do21=no +set do22=no +set do23=no +set all=yes + +for %%a in (%*) do ( + set valid=no + for %%v in (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23) do if %%v == %%a set valid=yes + if "!valid!" == "yes" ( + set do%%a=yes + set all=no +) else ( + echo Invalid test number - %%a! + echo Usage %0 [ test_number ] ... + echo Where test_number is one or more optional test numbers 1 through 23, default is all tests. + exit /b 1 +) +) +set failed="no" + +if "%all%" == "yes" ( + set do1=yes + set do2=yes + set do3=yes + set do4=yes + set do5=yes + set do6=yes + set do7=yes + set do8=yes + set do9=yes + set do10=no + set do11=yes + set do12=no + set do13=yes + set do14=yes + set do15=yes + set do16=yes + set do17=yes + set do18=yes + set do19=yes + set do20=yes + set do21=yes + set do22=yes + set do23=yes +) + +@echo RunTest.bat's pcre2test output is written to newly created subfolders +@echo named testout{8,16,32} and testoutjit{8,16,32}. +@echo. + +set mode= +set bits=8 + +:nextMode +if "%mode%" == "" ( + if %support8% EQU 0 goto modeSkip + echo. + echo ---- Testing 8-bit library ---- + echo. +) +if "%mode%" == "-16" ( + if %support16% EQU 0 goto modeSkip + echo. + echo ---- Testing 16-bit library ---- + echo. +) +if "%mode%" == "-32" ( + if %support32% EQU 0 goto modeSkip + echo. + echo ---- Testing 32-bit library ---- + echo. +) +if "%do1%" == "yes" call :do1 +if "%do2%" == "yes" call :do2 +if "%do3%" == "yes" call :do3 +if "%do4%" == "yes" call :do4 +if "%do5%" == "yes" call :do5 +if "%do6%" == "yes" call :do6 +if "%do7%" == "yes" call :do7 +if "%do8%" == "yes" call :do8 +if "%do9%" == "yes" call :do9 +if "%do10%" == "yes" call :do10 +if "%do11%" == "yes" call :do11 +if "%do12%" == "yes" call :do12 +if "%do13%" == "yes" call :do13 +if "%do14%" == "yes" call :do14 +if "%do15%" == "yes" call :do15 +if "%do16%" == "yes" call :do16 +if "%do17%" == "yes" call :do17 +if "%do18%" == "yes" call :do18 +if "%do19%" == "yes" call :do19 +if "%do20%" == "yes" call :do20 +if "%do21%" == "yes" call :do21 +if "%do22%" == "yes" call :do22 +if "%do23%" == "yes" call :do23 +:modeSkip +if "%mode%" == "" ( + set mode=-16 + set bits=16 + goto nextMode +) +if "%mode%" == "-16" ( + set mode=-32 + set bits=32 + goto nextMode +) + +@rem If mode is -32, testing is finished +if %failed% == "yes" ( +echo In above output, one or more of the various tests failed! +exit /b 1 +) +echo All OK +goto :eof + +:runsub +@rem Function to execute pcre2test and compare the output +@rem Arguments are as follows: +@rem +@rem 1 = test number +@rem 2 = outputdir +@rem 3 = test name use double quotes +@rem 4 - 9 = pcre2test options + +if [%1] == [] ( + echo Missing test number argument! + exit /b 1 +) + +if [%2] == [] ( + echo Missing outputdir! + exit /b 1 +) + +if [%3] == [] ( + echo Missing test name argument! + exit /b 1 +) + +if %1 == 8 ( + set outnum=8-%bits%-%link_size% +) else ( + set outnum=%1 +) +set testinput=testinput%1 +set testoutput=testoutput%outnum% +if exist %srcdir%\testdata\win%testinput% ( + set testinput=wintestinput%1 + set testoutput=wintestoutput%outnum% +) + +echo Test %1: %3 +%pcre2test% %mode% %4 %5 %6 %7 %8 %9 %srcdir%\testdata\%testinput% >%2%bits%\%testoutput% +if errorlevel 1 ( + echo. failed executing command-line: + echo. %pcre2test% %mode% %4 %5 %6 %7 %8 %9 %srcdir%\testdata\%testinput% ^>%2%bits%\%testoutput% + set failed="yes" + goto :eof +) else if [%1]==[2] ( + %pcre2test% %mode% %4 %5 %6 %7 %8 %9 -error -70,-62,-2,-1,0,100,101,191,200 >>%2%bits%\%testoutput% +) + +set type= +if [%1]==[11] ( + set type=-%bits% +) +if [%1]==[12] ( + set type=-%bits% +) +if [%1]==[14] ( + set type=-%bits% +) +if [%1]==[22] ( + set type=-%bits% +) + +fc /n %srcdir%\testdata\%testoutput%%type% %2%bits%\%testoutput% >NUL + +if errorlevel 1 ( + echo. failed comparison: fc /n %srcdir%\testdata\%testoutput% %2%bits%\%testoutput% + if [%1]==[3] ( + echo. + echo ** Test 3 failure usually means french locale is not + echo ** available on the system, rather than a bug or problem with PCRE2. + echo. + goto :eof +) + + set failed="yes" + goto :eof +) + +echo. Passed. +goto :eof + +:do1 +call :runsub 1 testout "Main non-UTF, non-UCP functionality (Compatible with Perl >= 5.10)" -q +if %jit% EQU 1 call :runsub 1 testoutjit "Test with JIT Override" -q -jit +goto :eof + +:do2 + copy /y %srcdir%\testdata\testbtables testbtables + call :runsub 2 testout "API, errors, internals, and non-Perl stuff" -q + if %jit% EQU 1 call :runsub 2 testoutjit "Test with JIT Override" -q -jit +goto :eof + +:do3 + call :runsub 3 testout "Locale-specific features" -q + if %jit% EQU 1 call :runsub 3 testoutjit "Test with JIT Override" -q -jit +goto :eof + +:do4 +if %unicode% EQU 0 ( + echo Test 4 Skipped due to absence of Unicode support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 4 testout "UTF-%bits% and Unicode property support - (Compatible with Perl >= 5.10)" -q + if %jit% EQU 1 call :runsub 4 testoutjit "Test with JIT Override" -q -jit +goto :eof + +:do5 +if %unicode% EQU 0 ( + echo Test 5 Skipped due to absence of Unicode support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 5 testout "API, internals, and non-Perl stuff for UTF-%bits% and UCP" -q + if %jit% EQU 1 call :runsub 5 testoutjit "Test with JIT Override" -q -jit +goto :eof + +:do6 + call :runsub 6 testout "DFA matching main non-UTF, non-UCP functionality" -q +goto :eof + +:do7 +if %unicode% EQU 0 ( + echo Test 7 Skipped due to absence of Unicode support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 7 testout "DFA matching with UTF-%bits% and Unicode property support" -q + goto :eof + +:do8 +if NOT %link_size% EQU 2 ( + echo Test 8 Skipped because link size is not 2. + goto :eof +) +if %unicode% EQU 0 ( + echo Test 8 Skipped due to absence of Unicode support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 8 testout "Internal offsets and code size tests" -q +goto :eof + +:do9 +if NOT %bits% EQU 8 ( + echo Test 9 Skipped when running 16/32-bit tests. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 9 testout "Specials for the basic 8-bit library" -q + if %jit% EQU 1 call :runsub 9 testoutjit "Test with JIT Override" -q -jit +goto :eof + +:do10 +if NOT %bits% EQU 8 ( + echo Test 10 Skipped when running 16/32-bit tests. + goto :eof +) +if %unicode% EQU 0 ( + echo Test 10 Skipped due to absence of Unicode support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 10 testout "Specials for the 8-bit library with Unicode support" -q + if %jit% EQU 1 call :runsub 10 testoutjit "Test with JIT Override" -q -jit +goto :eof + +:do11 +if %bits% EQU 8 ( + echo Test 11 Skipped when running 8-bit tests. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 11 testout "Specials for the basic 16/32-bit library" -q + if %jit% EQU 1 call :runsub 11 testoutjit "Test with JIT Override" -q -jit +goto :eof + +:do12 +if %bits% EQU 8 ( + echo Test 12 Skipped when running 8-bit tests. + goto :eof +) +if %unicode% EQU 0 ( + echo Test 12 Skipped due to absence of Unicode support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 12 testout "Specials for the 16/32-bit library with Unicode support" -q + if %jit% EQU 1 call :runsub 12 testoutjit "Test with JIT Override" -q -jit +goto :eof + +:do13 +if %bits% EQU 8 ( + echo Test 13 Skipped when running 8-bit tests. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 13 testout "DFA specials for the basic 16/32-bit library" -q +goto :eof + +:do14 +if %unicode% EQU 0 ( + echo Test 14 Skipped due to absence of Unicode support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 14 testout "DFA specials for UTF and UCP support" -q + goto :eof + +:do15 +call :runsub 15 testout "Non-JIT limits and other non_JIT tests" -q +goto :eof + +:do16 +if %jit% EQU 1 ( + echo Test 16 Skipped due to presence of JIT support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 16 testout "JIT-specific features when JIT is not available" -q +goto :eof + +:do17 +if %jit% EQU 0 ( + echo Test 17 Skipped due to absence of JIT support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 17 testout "JIT-specific features when JIT is available" -q +goto :eof + +:do18 +if %bits% EQU 16 ( + echo Test 18 Skipped when running 16-bit tests. + goto :eof +) +if %bits% EQU 32 ( + echo Test 18 Skipped when running 32-bit tests. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 18 testout "POSIX interface, excluding UTF-8 and UCP" -q +goto :eof + +:do19 +if %bits% EQU 16 ( + echo Test 19 Skipped when running 16-bit tests. + goto :eof +) +if %bits% EQU 32 ( + echo Test 19 Skipped when running 32-bit tests. + goto :eof +) +if %unicode% EQU 0 ( + echo Test 19 Skipped due to absence of Unicode support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 19 testout "POSIX interface with UTF-8 and UCP" -q +goto :eof + +:do20 +call :runsub 20 testout "Serialization tests" -q +goto :eof + +:do21 +if %supportBSC% EQU 0 ( + echo Test 21 Skipped due to absence of backslash-C support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 21 testout "Backslash-C tests without UTF" -q + call :runsub 21 testout "Backslash-C tests without UTF (DFA)" -q -dfa + if %jit% EQU 1 call :runsub 21 testoutjit "Test with JIT Override" -q -jit +goto :eof + +:do22 +if %supportBSC% EQU 0 ( + echo Test 22 Skipped due to absence of backslash-C support. + goto :eof +) +if %unicode% EQU 0 ( + echo Test 22 Skipped due to absence of Unicode support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 22 testout "Backslash-C tests with UTF" -q + if %jit% EQU 1 call :runsub 22 testoutjit "Test with JIT Override" -q -jit +goto :eof + +:do23 +if %supportBSC% EQU 1 ( + echo Test 23 Skipped due to presence of backslash-C support. + goto :eof +) + call :runsub 23 testout "Backslash-C disabled test" -q +goto :eof + +:conferror +@echo. +@echo Either your build is incomplete or you have a configuration error. +@echo. +@echo If configured with cmake and executed via "make test" or the MSVC "RUN_TESTS" +@echo project, pcre2_test.bat defines variables and automatically calls RunTest.bat. +@echo For manual testing of all available features, after configuring with cmake +@echo and building, you can run the built pcre2_test.bat. For best results with +@echo cmake builds and tests avoid directories with full path names that include +@echo spaces for source or build. +@echo. +@echo Otherwise, if the build dir is in a subdir of the source dir, testdata needed +@echo for input and verification should be found automatically when (from the +@echo location of the the built exes) you call RunTest.bat. By default RunTest.bat +@echo runs all tests compatible with the linked pcre2 library but it can be given +@echo a test number as an argument. +@echo. +@echo If the build dir is not under the source dir you can either copy your exes +@echo to the source folder or copy RunTest.bat and the testdata folder to the +@echo location of your built exes and then run RunTest.bat. +@echo. +goto :eof diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/WORKSPACE.bazel b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/WORKSPACE.bazel new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4ce2c8ce --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/WORKSPACE.bazel @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +# See MODULE.bazel diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/autogen.sh b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/autogen.sh new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0d5a55ff --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/autogen.sh @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Running aclocal here first (as happened for a while) caused the macros that +# libtoolize puts in the m4 directory to be newer than the aclocal.m4 file that +# aclocal creates. This meant that the next "make" cause aclocal to be run +# again. Moving aclocal to after libtoolize does not seem to cause any +# problems, and it fixes this issue. + +# GNU libtool is named differently on some systems. This code tries several +# variants like glibtoolize (MacOSX) and libtoolize1x (FreeBSD) + +set +ex +echo "Looking for a version of libtoolize (which can have different names)..." +libtoolize="" +for l in glibtoolize libtoolize15 libtoolize14 libtoolize ; do + $l --version > /dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? = 0 ]; then + libtoolize=$l + echo "Found $l" + break + fi + echo "Did not find $l" +done + +if [ "x$libtoolize" = "x" ]; then + echo "Can't find libtoolize on your system" + exit 1 +fi + +set -ex +$libtoolize -c -f +rm -rf autom4te.cache Makefile.in aclocal.m4 +aclocal --force -I m4 +autoconf -f -W all,no-obsolete +autoheader -f -W all + +# Added no-portability to suppress automake 1.12's warning about the use +# of recursive variables. + +automake -a -c -f -W all,no-portability + +rm -rf autom4te.cache +exit 0 + +# end autogen.sh diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/COPYING-CMAKE-SCRIPTS b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/COPYING-CMAKE-SCRIPTS new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4b417765 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/COPYING-CMAKE-SCRIPTS @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +are met: + +1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/FindEditline.cmake b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/FindEditline.cmake new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1f0c9514 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/FindEditline.cmake @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# Modified from FindReadline.cmake (PH Feb 2012) + +if(EDITLINE_INCLUDE_DIR AND EDITLINE_LIBRARY) + set(EDITLINE_FOUND TRUE) +else(EDITLINE_INCLUDE_DIR AND EDITLINE_LIBRARY) + FIND_PATH(EDITLINE_INCLUDE_DIR readline.h PATH_SUFFIXES + editline + edit/readline + ) + + FIND_LIBRARY(EDITLINE_LIBRARY NAMES edit) + include(FindPackageHandleStandardArgs) + FIND_PACKAGE_HANDLE_STANDARD_ARGS(Editline DEFAULT_MSG EDITLINE_INCLUDE_DIR EDITLINE_LIBRARY) + + MARK_AS_ADVANCED(EDITLINE_INCLUDE_DIR EDITLINE_LIBRARY) +endif(EDITLINE_INCLUDE_DIR AND EDITLINE_LIBRARY) diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/FindPackageHandleStandardArgs.cmake b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/FindPackageHandleStandardArgs.cmake new file mode 100644 index 00000000..151d8125 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/FindPackageHandleStandardArgs.cmake @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +# FIND_PACKAGE_HANDLE_STANDARD_ARGS(NAME (DEFAULT_MSG|"Custom failure message") VAR1 ... ) +# This macro is intended to be used in FindXXX.cmake modules files. +# It handles the REQUIRED and QUIET argument to FIND_PACKAGE() and +# it also sets the _FOUND variable. +# The package is found if all variables listed are TRUE. +# Example: +# +# FIND_PACKAGE_HANDLE_STANDARD_ARGS(LibXml2 DEFAULT_MSG LIBXML2_LIBRARIES LIBXML2_INCLUDE_DIR) +# +# LibXml2 is considered to be found, if both LIBXML2_LIBRARIES and +# LIBXML2_INCLUDE_DIR are valid. Then also LIBXML2_FOUND is set to TRUE. +# If it is not found and REQUIRED was used, it fails with FATAL_ERROR, +# independent whether QUIET was used or not. +# If it is found, the location is reported using the VAR1 argument, so +# here a message "Found LibXml2: /usr/lib/libxml2.so" will be printed out. +# If the second argument is DEFAULT_MSG, the message in the failure case will +# be "Could NOT find LibXml2", if you don't like this message you can specify +# your own custom failure message there. + +MACRO(FIND_PACKAGE_HANDLE_STANDARD_ARGS _NAME _FAIL_MSG _VAR1 ) + + IF("${_FAIL_MSG}" STREQUAL "DEFAULT_MSG") + IF (${_NAME}_FIND_REQUIRED) + SET(_FAIL_MESSAGE "Could not find REQUIRED package ${_NAME}") + ELSE (${_NAME}_FIND_REQUIRED) + SET(_FAIL_MESSAGE "Could not find OPTIONAL package ${_NAME}") + ENDIF (${_NAME}_FIND_REQUIRED) + ELSE("${_FAIL_MSG}" STREQUAL "DEFAULT_MSG") + SET(_FAIL_MESSAGE "${_FAIL_MSG}") + ENDIF("${_FAIL_MSG}" STREQUAL "DEFAULT_MSG") + + STRING(TOUPPER ${_NAME} _NAME_UPPER) + + SET(${_NAME_UPPER}_FOUND TRUE) + IF(NOT ${_VAR1}) + SET(${_NAME_UPPER}_FOUND FALSE) + ENDIF(NOT ${_VAR1}) + + FOREACH(_CURRENT_VAR ${ARGN}) + IF(NOT ${_CURRENT_VAR}) + SET(${_NAME_UPPER}_FOUND FALSE) + ENDIF(NOT ${_CURRENT_VAR}) + ENDFOREACH(_CURRENT_VAR) + + IF (${_NAME_UPPER}_FOUND) + IF (NOT ${_NAME}_FIND_QUIETLY) + MESSAGE(STATUS "Found ${_NAME}: ${${_VAR1}}") + ENDIF (NOT ${_NAME}_FIND_QUIETLY) + ELSE (${_NAME_UPPER}_FOUND) + IF (${_NAME}_FIND_REQUIRED) + MESSAGE(FATAL_ERROR "${_FAIL_MESSAGE}") + ELSE (${_NAME}_FIND_REQUIRED) + IF (NOT ${_NAME}_FIND_QUIETLY) + MESSAGE(STATUS "${_FAIL_MESSAGE}") + ENDIF (NOT ${_NAME}_FIND_QUIETLY) + ENDIF (${_NAME}_FIND_REQUIRED) + ENDIF (${_NAME_UPPER}_FOUND) +ENDMACRO(FIND_PACKAGE_HANDLE_STANDARD_ARGS) diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/FindReadline.cmake b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/FindReadline.cmake new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1d4cc558 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/FindReadline.cmake @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# from http://websvn.kde.org/trunk/KDE/kdeedu/cmake/modules/FindReadline.cmake +# http://websvn.kde.org/trunk/KDE/kdeedu/cmake/modules/COPYING-CMAKE-SCRIPTS +# --> BSD licensed +# +# GNU Readline library finder +if(READLINE_INCLUDE_DIR AND READLINE_LIBRARY AND NCURSES_LIBRARY) + set(READLINE_FOUND TRUE) +else(READLINE_INCLUDE_DIR AND READLINE_LIBRARY AND NCURSES_LIBRARY) + FIND_PATH(READLINE_INCLUDE_DIR readline/readline.h + /usr/include/readline + ) + +# 2008-04-22 The next clause used to read like this: +# +# FIND_LIBRARY(READLINE_LIBRARY NAMES readline) +# FIND_LIBRARY(NCURSES_LIBRARY NAMES ncurses ) +# include(FindPackageHandleStandardArgs) +# FIND_PACKAGE_HANDLE_STANDARD_ARGS(Readline DEFAULT_MSG NCURSES_LIBRARY READLINE_INCLUDE_DIR READLINE_LIBRARY ) +# +# I was advised to modify it such that it will find an ncurses library if +# required, but not if one was explicitly given, that is, it allows the +# default to be overridden. PH + + FIND_LIBRARY(READLINE_LIBRARY NAMES readline) + include(FindPackageHandleStandardArgs) + FIND_PACKAGE_HANDLE_STANDARD_ARGS(Readline DEFAULT_MSG READLINE_INCLUDE_DIR READLINE_LIBRARY ) + + MARK_AS_ADVANCED(READLINE_INCLUDE_DIR READLINE_LIBRARY) +endif(READLINE_INCLUDE_DIR AND READLINE_LIBRARY AND NCURSES_LIBRARY) diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/pcre2-config-version.cmake.in b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/pcre2-config-version.cmake.in new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dac149eb --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/pcre2-config-version.cmake.in @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +set(PACKAGE_VERSION_MAJOR @PCRE2_MAJOR@) +set(PACKAGE_VERSION_MINOR @PCRE2_MINOR@) +set(PACKAGE_VERSION_PATCH 0) +set(PACKAGE_VERSION @PCRE2_MAJOR@.@PCRE2_MINOR@.0) + +# Check whether the requested PACKAGE_FIND_VERSION is compatible +if(PACKAGE_VERSION VERSION_LESS PACKAGE_FIND_VERSION OR + PACKAGE_VERSION_MAJOR GREATER PACKAGE_FIND_VERSION_MAJOR) + set(PACKAGE_VERSION_COMPATIBLE FALSE) +else() + set(PACKAGE_VERSION_COMPATIBLE TRUE) + if(PACKAGE_VERSION VERSION_EQUAL PACKAGE_FIND_VERSION) + set(PACKAGE_VERSION_EXACT TRUE) + endif() +endif() diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/pcre2-config.cmake.in b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/pcre2-config.cmake.in new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b313d6df --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/cmake/pcre2-config.cmake.in @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +# pcre2-config.cmake +# ---------------- +# +# Finds the PCRE2 library, specify the starting search path in PCRE2_ROOT. +# +# Static vs. shared +# ----------------- +# To make use of the static library instead of the shared one, one needs +# to set the variable PCRE2_USE_STATIC_LIBS to ON before calling find_package. +# Example: +# set(PCRE2_USE_STATIC_LIBS ON) +# find_package(PCRE2 CONFIG COMPONENTS 8BIT) +# +# This will define the following variables: +# +# PCRE2_FOUND - True if the system has the PCRE2 library. +# PCRE2_VERSION - The version of the PCRE2 library which was found. +# +# and the following imported targets: +# +# PCRE2::8BIT - The 8 bit PCRE2 library. +# PCRE2::16BIT - The 16 bit PCRE2 library. +# PCRE2::32BIT - The 32 bit PCRE2 library. +# PCRE2::POSIX - The POSIX PCRE2 library. + +set(PCRE2_NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX @NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX@) +set(PCRE2_NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX @NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX@) +set(PCRE2_8BIT_NAME pcre2-8) +set(PCRE2_16BIT_NAME pcre2-16) +set(PCRE2_32BIT_NAME pcre2-32) +set(PCRE2_POSIX_NAME pcre2-posix) +find_path(PCRE2_INCLUDE_DIR NAMES pcre2.h DOC "PCRE2 include directory") +if (PCRE2_USE_STATIC_LIBS) + if (MSVC) + set(PCRE2_8BIT_NAME pcre2-8-static) + set(PCRE2_16BIT_NAME pcre2-16-static) + set(PCRE2_32BIT_NAME pcre2-32-static) + set(PCRE2_POSIX_NAME pcre2-posix-static) + endif () + + set(PCRE2_PREFIX ${CMAKE_STATIC_LIBRARY_PREFIX}) + set(PCRE2_SUFFIX ${CMAKE_STATIC_LIBRARY_SUFFIX}) +else () + set(PCRE2_PREFIX ${CMAKE_SHARED_LIBRARY_PREFIX}) + if (MINGW AND PCRE2_NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX) + set(PCRE2_PREFIX "") + endif () + + set(PCRE2_SUFFIX ${CMAKE_SHARED_LIBRARY_SUFFIX}) + if (MINGW AND PCRE2_NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX) + set(PCRE2_SUFFIX "-0.dll") + endif () +endif () +find_library(PCRE2_8BIT_LIBRARY NAMES ${PCRE2_PREFIX}${PCRE2_8BIT_NAME}${PCRE2_SUFFIX} ${PCRE2_PREFIX}${PCRE2_8BIT_NAME}d${PCRE2_SUFFIX} DOC "8 bit PCRE2 library") +find_library(PCRE2_16BIT_LIBRARY NAMES ${PCRE2_PREFIX}${PCRE2_16BIT_NAME}${PCRE2_SUFFIX} ${PCRE2_PREFIX}${PCRE2_8BIT_NAME}d${PCRE2_SUFFIX} DOC "16 bit PCRE2 library") +find_library(PCRE2_32BIT_LIBRARY NAMES ${PCRE2_PREFIX}${PCRE2_32BIT_NAME}${PCRE2_SUFFIX} ${PCRE2_PREFIX}${PCRE2_8BIT_NAME}d${PCRE2_SUFFIX} DOC "32 bit PCRE2 library") +find_library(PCRE2_POSIX_LIBRARY NAMES ${PCRE2_PREFIX}${PCRE2_POSIX_NAME}${PCRE2_SUFFIX} ${PCRE2_PREFIX}${PCRE2_8BIT_NAME}d${PCRE2_SUFFIX} DOC "8 bit POSIX PCRE2 library") +unset(PCRE2_NON_STANDARD_LIB_PREFIX) +unset(PCRE2_NON_STANDARD_LIB_SUFFIX) +unset(PCRE2_8BIT_NAME) +unset(PCRE2_16BIT_NAME) +unset(PCRE2_32BIT_NAME) +unset(PCRE2_POSIX_NAME) + +# Set version +if (PCRE2_INCLUDE_DIR) + set(PCRE2_VERSION "@PCRE2_MAJOR@.@PCRE2_MINOR@.0") +endif () + +# Which components have been found. +if (PCRE2_8BIT_LIBRARY) + set(PCRE2_8BIT_FOUND TRUE) +endif () +if (PCRE2_16BIT_LIBRARY) + set(PCRE2_16BIT_FOUND TRUE) +endif () +if (PCRE2_32BIT_LIBRARY) + set(PCRE2_32BIT_FOUND TRUE) +endif () +if (PCRE2_POSIX_LIBRARY) + set(PCRE2_POSIX_FOUND TRUE) +endif () + +# Check if at least one component has been specified. +list(LENGTH PCRE2_FIND_COMPONENTS PCRE2_NCOMPONENTS) +if (PCRE2_NCOMPONENTS LESS 1) + message(FATAL_ERROR "No components have been specified. This is not allowed. Please, specify at least one component.") +endif () +unset(PCRE2_NCOMPONENTS) + +# When POSIX component has been specified make sure that also 8BIT component is specified. +set(PCRE2_8BIT_COMPONENT FALSE) +set(PCRE2_POSIX_COMPONENT FALSE) +foreach(component ${PCRE2_FIND_COMPONENTS}) + if (component STREQUAL "8BIT") + set(PCRE2_8BIT_COMPONENT TRUE) + elseif (component STREQUAL "POSIX") + set(PCRE2_POSIX_COMPONENT TRUE) + endif () +endforeach() + +if (PCRE2_POSIX_COMPONENT AND NOT PCRE2_8BIT_COMPONENT) + message(FATAL_ERROR "The component POSIX is specified while the 8BIT one is not. This is not allowed. Please, also specify the 8BIT component.") +endif() +unset(PCRE2_8BIT_COMPONENT) +unset(PCRE2_POSIX_COMPONENT) + +include(FindPackageHandleStandardArgs) +set(${CMAKE_FIND_PACKAGE_NAME}_CONFIG "${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_FILE}") +find_package_handle_standard_args(PCRE2 + FOUND_VAR PCRE2_FOUND + REQUIRED_VARS PCRE2_INCLUDE_DIR + HANDLE_COMPONENTS + VERSION_VAR PCRE2_VERSION + CONFIG_MODE +) + +set(PCRE2_LIBRARIES) +if (PCRE2_FOUND) + foreach(component ${PCRE2_FIND_COMPONENTS}) + if (PCRE2_USE_STATIC_LIBS) + add_library(PCRE2::${component} STATIC IMPORTED) + target_compile_definitions(PCRE2::${component} INTERFACE PCRE2_STATIC) + else () + add_library(PCRE2::${component} SHARED IMPORTED) + endif () + set_target_properties(PCRE2::${component} PROPERTIES + IMPORTED_LOCATION "${PCRE2_${component}_LIBRARY}" + INTERFACE_INCLUDE_DIRECTORIES "${PCRE2_INCLUDE_DIR}" + ) + if (component STREQUAL "POSIX") + set_target_properties(PCRE2::${component} PROPERTIES + INTERFACE_LINK_LIBRARIES "PCRE2::8BIT" + LINK_LIBRARIES "PCRE2::8BIT" + ) + endif () + + set(PCRE2_LIBRARIES ${PCRE2_LIBRARIES} ${PCRE2_${component}_LIBRARY}) + mark_as_advanced(PCRE2_${component}_LIBRARY) + endforeach() +endif () + +mark_as_advanced( + PCRE2_INCLUDE_DIR +) diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/config-cmake.h.in b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/config-cmake.h.in new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f560afe8 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/config-cmake.h.in @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* config.h for CMake builds */ + +#cmakedefine HAVE_ATTRIBUTE_UNINITIALIZED 1 +#cmakedefine HAVE_DIRENT_H 1 +#cmakedefine HAVE_STRERROR 1 +#cmakedefine HAVE_SYS_STAT_H 1 +#cmakedefine HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H 1 +#cmakedefine HAVE_UNISTD_H 1 +#cmakedefine HAVE_WINDOWS_H 1 + +#cmakedefine HAVE_BCOPY 1 +#cmakedefine HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE 1 +#cmakedefine HAVE_MEMMOVE 1 +#cmakedefine HAVE_SECURE_GETENV 1 +#cmakedefine HAVE_STRERROR 1 + +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_PCRE2_8 1 +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_PCRE2_16 1 +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_PCRE2_32 1 +#cmakedefine PCRE2_DEBUG 1 +#cmakedefine DISABLE_PERCENT_ZT 1 + +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_LIBBZ2 1 +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_LIBEDIT 1 +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE 1 +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_LIBZ 1 + +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_JIT 1 +#cmakedefine SLJIT_PROT_EXECUTABLE_ALLOCATOR 1 +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_PCRE2GREP_JIT 1 +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_PCRE2GREP_CALLOUT 1 +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_PCRE2GREP_CALLOUT_FORK 1 +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_UNICODE 1 +#cmakedefine SUPPORT_VALGRIND 1 + +#cmakedefine BSR_ANYCRLF 1 +#cmakedefine EBCDIC 1 +#cmakedefine EBCDIC_NL25 1 +#cmakedefine HEAP_MATCH_RECURSE 1 +#cmakedefine NEVER_BACKSLASH_C 1 + +#define LINK_SIZE @PCRE2_LINK_SIZE@ +#define HEAP_LIMIT @PCRE2_HEAP_LIMIT@ +#define MATCH_LIMIT @PCRE2_MATCH_LIMIT@ +#define MATCH_LIMIT_DEPTH @PCRE2_MATCH_LIMIT_DEPTH@ +#define NEWLINE_DEFAULT @NEWLINE_DEFAULT@ +#define PARENS_NEST_LIMIT @PCRE2_PARENS_NEST_LIMIT@ +#define PCRE2GREP_BUFSIZE @PCRE2GREP_BUFSIZE@ +#define PCRE2GREP_MAX_BUFSIZE @PCRE2GREP_MAX_BUFSIZE@ + +#define MAX_NAME_SIZE 32 +#define MAX_NAME_COUNT 10000 + +/* end config.h for CMake builds */ diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/configure.ac b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/configure.ac new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ce5bda3c --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/configure.ac @@ -0,0 +1,1129 @@ +dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script. + +dnl NOTE FOR MAINTAINERS: Do not use minor version numbers 08 or 09 because +dnl the leading zeros may cause them to be treated as invalid octal constants +dnl if a PCRE2 user writes code that uses PCRE2_MINOR as a number. There is now +dnl a check further down that throws an error if 08 or 09 are used. + +dnl The PCRE2_PRERELEASE feature is for identifying release candidates. It might +dnl be defined as -RC2, for example. For real releases, it should be empty. + +m4_define(pcre2_major, [10]) +m4_define(pcre2_minor, [42]) +m4_define(pcre2_prerelease, []) +m4_define(pcre2_date, [2022-12-11]) + +# Libtool shared library interface versions (current:revision:age) +m4_define(libpcre2_8_version, [11:2:11]) +m4_define(libpcre2_16_version, [11:2:11]) +m4_define(libpcre2_32_version, [11:2:11]) +m4_define(libpcre2_posix_version, [3:4:0]) + +# NOTE: The CMakeLists.txt file searches for the above variables in the first +# 50 lines of this file. Please update that if the variables above are moved. + +AC_PREREQ([2.60]) +AC_INIT([PCRE2],pcre2_major.pcre2_minor[]pcre2_prerelease,[],[pcre2]) +AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/pcre2.h.in]) +AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([dist-bzip2 dist-zip]) +m4_ifdef([AM_SILENT_RULES], [AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])]) +AC_CONFIG_HEADERS(src/config.h) + +# This was added at the suggestion of libtoolize (03-Jan-10) +AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4]) + +# The default CFLAGS in Autoconf are "-g -O2" for gcc and just "-g" for any +# other compiler. There doesn't seem to be a standard way of getting rid of the +# -g (which I don't think is needed for a production library). This fudge seems +# to achieve the necessary. First, we remember the externally set values of +# CFLAGS. Then call the AC_PROG_CC macro to find the compiler - if CFLAGS is +# not set, it will be set to Autoconf's defaults. Afterwards, if the original +# values were not set, remove the -g from the Autoconf defaults. + +remember_set_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + +AC_PROG_CC +AM_PROG_CC_C_O +AC_USE_SYSTEM_EXTENSIONS + +if test "x$remember_set_CFLAGS" = "x" +then + if test "$CFLAGS" = "-g -O2" + then + CFLAGS="-O2" + elif test "$CFLAGS" = "-g" + then + CFLAGS="" + fi +fi + +# This is a new thing required to stop a warning from automake 1.12 +m4_ifdef([AM_PROG_AR], [AM_PROG_AR]) + +# Check for a 64-bit integer type +AC_TYPE_INT64_T + +AC_PROG_INSTALL +LT_INIT([win32-dll]) +AC_PROG_LN_S + +AC_SYS_LARGEFILE + +# Check for GCC visibility feature + +PCRE2_VISIBILITY + +# Check for Clang __attribute__((uninitialized)) feature + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for __attribute__((uninitialized))]) +AC_LANG_PUSH([C]) +tmp_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror" +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM(, + [[char buf[128] __attribute__((uninitialized));(void)buf]])], + [pcre2_cc_cv_attribute_uninitialized=yes], + [pcre2_cc_cv_attribute_uninitialized=no]) +AC_MSG_RESULT([$pcre2_cc_cv_attribute_uninitialized]) +if test "$pcre2_cc_cv_attribute_uninitialized" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE_UNINITIALIZED], 1, [Define this if your compiler + supports __attribute__((uninitialized))]) +fi +CFLAGS=$tmp_CFLAGS +AC_LANG_POP([C]) + +# Versioning + +PCRE2_MAJOR="pcre2_major" +PCRE2_MINOR="pcre2_minor" +PCRE2_PRERELEASE="pcre2_prerelease" +PCRE2_DATE="pcre2_date" + +if test "$PCRE2_MINOR" = "08" -o "$PCRE2_MINOR" = "09" +then + echo "***" + echo "*** Minor version number $PCRE2_MINOR must not be used. ***" + echo "*** Use only 00 to 07 or 10 onwards, to avoid octal issues. ***" + echo "***" + exit 1 +fi + +AC_SUBST(PCRE2_MAJOR) +AC_SUBST(PCRE2_MINOR) +AC_SUBST(PCRE2_PRERELEASE) +AC_SUBST(PCRE2_DATE) + +# Set a more sensible default value for $(htmldir). +if test "x$htmldir" = 'x${docdir}' +then + htmldir='${docdir}/html' +fi + +# Force an error for PCRE1 size options +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre8,,,enable_pcre8=no) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre16,,,enable_pcre16=no) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre32,,,enable_pcre32=no) + +if test "$enable_pcre8$enable_pcre16$enable_pcre32" != "nonono" +then + echo "** ERROR: Use --[[en|dis]]able-pcre2-[[8|16|32]], not --[[en|dis]]able-pcre[[8|16|32]]" + exit 1 +fi + +# Handle --disable-pcre2-8 (enabled by default) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre2-8, + AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-pcre2-8], + [disable 8 bit character support]), + , enable_pcre2_8=unset) +AC_SUBST(enable_pcre2_8) + +# Handle --enable-pcre2-16 (disabled by default) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre2-16, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pcre2-16], + [enable 16 bit character support]), + , enable_pcre2_16=unset) +AC_SUBST(enable_pcre2_16) + +# Handle --enable-pcre2-32 (disabled by default) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre2-32, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pcre2-32], + [enable 32 bit character support]), + , enable_pcre2_32=unset) +AC_SUBST(enable_pcre2_32) + +# Handle --enable-debug (disabled by default) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(debug, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-debug], + [enable debugging code]), + , enable_debug=no) + +# Handle --enable-jit (disabled by default) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(jit, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-jit], + [enable Just-In-Time compiling support]), + , enable_jit=no) + +# This code enables JIT if the hardware supports it. +if test "$enable_jit" = "auto"; then + AC_LANG(C) + SAVE_CPPFLAGS=$CPPFLAGS + CPPFLAGS=-I$srcdir + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ + #define SLJIT_CONFIG_AUTO 1 + #include "src/sljit/sljitConfigInternal.h" + #if (defined SLJIT_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED && SLJIT_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED) + #error unsupported + #endif]])], enable_jit=yes, enable_jit=no) + CPPFLAGS=$SAVE_CPPFLAGS + echo checking for JIT support on this hardware... $enable_jit +fi + +# Handle --enable-jit-sealloc (disabled by default and only experimental) +case $host_os in + linux* | netbsd*) + AC_ARG_ENABLE(jit-sealloc, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-jit-sealloc], + [enable SELinux compatible execmem allocator in JIT (experimental)]), + ,enable_jit_sealloc=no) + ;; + *) + enable_jit_sealloc=unsupported + ;; +esac + +# Handle --disable-pcre2grep-jit (enabled by default) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre2grep-jit, + AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-pcre2grep-jit], + [disable JIT support in pcre2grep]), + , enable_pcre2grep_jit=yes) + +# Handle --disable-pcre2grep-callout (enabled by default) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre2grep-callout, + AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-pcre2grep-callout], + [disable callout script support in pcre2grep]), + , enable_pcre2grep_callout=yes) + +# Handle --disable-pcre2grep-callout-fork (enabled by default) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre2grep-callout-fork, + AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-pcre2grep-callout-fork], + [disable callout script fork support in pcre2grep]), + , enable_pcre2grep_callout_fork=yes) + +# Handle --enable-rebuild-chartables +AC_ARG_ENABLE(rebuild-chartables, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-rebuild-chartables], + [rebuild character tables in current locale]), + , enable_rebuild_chartables=no) + +# Handle --disable-unicode (enabled by default) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(unicode, + AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-unicode], + [disable Unicode support]), + , enable_unicode=unset) + +# Handle newline options +ac_pcre2_newline=lf +AC_ARG_ENABLE(newline-is-cr, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-newline-is-cr], + [use CR as newline character]), + ac_pcre2_newline=cr) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(newline-is-lf, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-newline-is-lf], + [use LF as newline character (default)]), + ac_pcre2_newline=lf) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(newline-is-crlf, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-newline-is-crlf], + [use CRLF as newline sequence]), + ac_pcre2_newline=crlf) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(newline-is-anycrlf, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-newline-is-anycrlf], + [use CR, LF, or CRLF as newline sequence]), + ac_pcre2_newline=anycrlf) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(newline-is-any, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-newline-is-any], + [use any valid Unicode newline sequence]), + ac_pcre2_newline=any) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(newline-is-nul, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-newline-is-nul], + [use NUL (binary zero) as newline character]), + ac_pcre2_newline=nul) +enable_newline="$ac_pcre2_newline" + +# Handle --enable-bsr-anycrlf +AC_ARG_ENABLE(bsr-anycrlf, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-bsr-anycrlf], + [\R matches only CR, LF, CRLF by default]), + , enable_bsr_anycrlf=no) + +# Handle --enable-never-backslash-C +AC_ARG_ENABLE(never-backslash-C, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-never-backslash-C], + [use of \C causes an error]), + , enable_never_backslash_C=no) + +# Handle --enable-ebcdic +AC_ARG_ENABLE(ebcdic, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-ebcdic], + [assume EBCDIC coding rather than ASCII; incompatible with --enable-utf; use only in (uncommon) EBCDIC environments; it implies --enable-rebuild-chartables]), + , enable_ebcdic=no) + +# Handle --enable-ebcdic-nl25 +AC_ARG_ENABLE(ebcdic-nl25, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-ebcdic-nl25], + [set EBCDIC code for NL to 0x25 instead of 0x15; it implies --enable-ebcdic]), + , enable_ebcdic_nl25=no) + +# Handle --enable-pcre2grep-libz +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre2grep-libz, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pcre2grep-libz], + [link pcre2grep with libz to handle .gz files]), + , enable_pcre2grep_libz=no) + +# Handle --enable-pcre2grep-libbz2 +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre2grep-libbz2, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pcre2grep-libbz2], + [link pcre2grep with libbz2 to handle .bz2 files]), + , enable_pcre2grep_libbz2=no) + +# Handle --with-pcre2grep-bufsize=N +AC_ARG_WITH(pcre2grep-bufsize, + AS_HELP_STRING([--with-pcre2grep-bufsize=N], + [pcre2grep initial buffer size (default=20480, minimum=8192)]), + , with_pcre2grep_bufsize=20480) + +# Handle --with-pcre2grep-max-bufsize=N +AC_ARG_WITH(pcre2grep-max-bufsize, + AS_HELP_STRING([--with-pcre2grep-max-bufsize=N], + [pcre2grep maximum buffer size (default=1048576, minimum=8192)]), + , with_pcre2grep_max_bufsize=1048576) + +# Handle --enable-pcre2test-libedit +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre2test-libedit, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pcre2test-libedit], + [link pcre2test with libedit]), + , enable_pcre2test_libedit=no) + +# Handle --enable-pcre2test-libreadline +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pcre2test-libreadline, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pcre2test-libreadline], + [link pcre2test with libreadline]), + , enable_pcre2test_libreadline=no) + +# Handle --with-link-size=N +AC_ARG_WITH(link-size, + AS_HELP_STRING([--with-link-size=N], + [internal link size (2, 3, or 4 allowed; default=2)]), + , with_link_size=2) + +# Handle --with-parens-nest-limit=N +AC_ARG_WITH(parens-nest-limit, + AS_HELP_STRING([--with-parens-nest-limit=N], + [nested parentheses limit (default=250)]), + , with_parens_nest_limit=250) + +# Handle --with-heap-limit +AC_ARG_WITH(heap-limit, + AS_HELP_STRING([--with-heap-limit=N], + [default limit on heap memory (kibibytes, default=20000000)]), + , with_heap_limit=20000000) + +# Handle --with-match-limit=N +AC_ARG_WITH(match-limit, + AS_HELP_STRING([--with-match-limit=N], + [default limit on internal looping (default=10000000)]), + , with_match_limit=10000000) + +# Handle --with-match-limit-depth=N +# Recognize old synonym --with-match-limit-recursion +# +# Note: In config.h, the default is to define MATCH_LIMIT_DEPTH symbolically as +# MATCH_LIMIT, which in turn is defined to be some numeric value (e.g. +# 10000000). MATCH_LIMIT_DEPTH can otherwise be set to some different numeric +# value (or even the same numeric value as MATCH_LIMIT, though no longer +# defined in terms of the latter). +# +AC_ARG_WITH(match-limit-depth, + AS_HELP_STRING([--with-match-limit-depth=N], + [default limit on match tree depth (default=MATCH_LIMIT)]), + , with_match_limit_depth=MATCH_LIMIT) + +AC_ARG_WITH(match-limit-recursion,, + , with_match_limit_recursion=UNSET) + +# Handle --enable-valgrind +AC_ARG_ENABLE(valgrind, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-valgrind], + [enable valgrind support]), + , enable_valgrind=no) + +# Enable code coverage reports using gcov +AC_ARG_ENABLE(coverage, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-coverage], + [enable code coverage reports using gcov]), + , enable_coverage=no) + +# Handle --enable-fuzz-support +AC_ARG_ENABLE(fuzz_support, + AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-fuzz-support], + [enable fuzzer support]), + , enable_fuzz_support=no) + +# Handle --disable-stack-for-recursion +# This option became obsolete at release 10.30. +AC_ARG_ENABLE(stack-for-recursion,, + , enable_stack_for_recursion=yes) + +# Original code +# AC_ARG_ENABLE(stack-for-recursion, +# AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-stack-for-recursion], +# [don't use stack recursion when matching]), +# , enable_stack_for_recursion=yes) + +# Handle --disable-percent_zt (set as "auto" by default) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(percent-zt, + AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-percent-zt], + [disable the use of z and t formatting modifiers]), + , enable_percent_zt=auto) + +# Set the default value for pcre2-8 +if test "x$enable_pcre2_8" = "xunset" +then + enable_pcre2_8=yes +fi + +# Set the default value for pcre2-16 +if test "x$enable_pcre2_16" = "xunset" +then + enable_pcre2_16=no +fi + +# Set the default value for pcre2-32 +if test "x$enable_pcre2_32" = "xunset" +then + enable_pcre2_32=no +fi + +# Make sure at least one library is selected +if test "x$enable_pcre2_8$enable_pcre2_16$enable_pcre2_32" = "xnonono" +then + AC_MSG_ERROR([At least one of the 8, 16 or 32 bit libraries must be enabled]) +fi + +# Unicode is enabled by default. +if test "x$enable_unicode" = "xunset" +then + enable_unicode=yes +fi + +# Convert the newline identifier into the appropriate integer value. These must +# agree with the PCRE2_NEWLINE_xxx values in pcre2.h. + +case "$enable_newline" in + cr) ac_pcre2_newline_value=1 ;; + lf) ac_pcre2_newline_value=2 ;; + crlf) ac_pcre2_newline_value=3 ;; + any) ac_pcre2_newline_value=4 ;; + anycrlf) ac_pcre2_newline_value=5 ;; + nul) ac_pcre2_newline_value=6 ;; + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid argument "$enable_newline" to --enable-newline option]) + ;; +esac + +# --enable-ebcdic-nl25 implies --enable-ebcdic +if test "x$enable_ebcdic_nl25" = "xyes"; then + enable_ebcdic=yes +fi + +# Make sure that if enable_ebcdic is set, rebuild_chartables is also enabled. +# Also check that UTF support is not requested, because PCRE2 cannot handle +# EBCDIC and UTF in the same build. To do so it would need to use different +# character constants depending on the mode. Also, EBCDIC cannot be used with +# 16-bit and 32-bit libraries. +# +if test "x$enable_ebcdic" = "xyes"; then + enable_rebuild_chartables=yes + if test "x$enable_unicode" = "xyes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([support for EBCDIC and Unicode cannot be enabled at the same time]) + fi + if test "x$enable_pcre2_16" = "xyes" -o "x$enable_pcre2_32" = "xyes"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([EBCDIC support is available only for the 8-bit library]) + fi +fi + +# Check argument to --with-link-size +case "$with_link_size" in + 2|3|4) ;; + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid argument "$with_link_size" to --with-link-size option]) + ;; +esac + +AH_TOP([ +/* PCRE2 is written in Standard C, but there are a few non-standard things it +can cope with, allowing it to run on SunOS4 and other "close to standard" +systems. + +In environments that support the GNU autotools, config.h.in is converted into +config.h by the "configure" script. In environments that use CMake, +config-cmake.in is converted into config.h. If you are going to build PCRE2 "by +hand" without using "configure" or CMake, you should copy the distributed +config.h.generic to config.h, and edit the macro definitions to be the way you +need them. You must then add -DHAVE_CONFIG_H to all of your compile commands, +so that config.h is included at the start of every source. + +Alternatively, you can avoid editing by using -D on the compiler command line +to set the macro values. In this case, you do not have to set -DHAVE_CONFIG_H, +but if you do, default values will be taken from config.h for non-boolean +macros that are not defined on the command line. + +Boolean macros such as HAVE_STDLIB_H and SUPPORT_PCRE2_8 should either be +defined (conventionally to 1) for TRUE, and not defined at all for FALSE. All +such macros are listed as a commented #undef in config.h.generic. Macros such +as MATCH_LIMIT, whose actual value is relevant, have defaults defined, but are +surrounded by #ifndef/#endif lines so that the value can be overridden by -D. + +PCRE2 uses memmove() if HAVE_MEMMOVE is defined; otherwise it uses bcopy() if +HAVE_BCOPY is defined. If your system has neither bcopy() nor memmove(), make +sure both macros are undefined; an emulation function will then be used. */]) + +# Checks for header files. +AC_CHECK_HEADERS(limits.h sys/types.h sys/stat.h dirent.h) +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([windows.h], [HAVE_WINDOWS_H=1]) +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/wait.h], [HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H=1]) + +# Conditional compilation +AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_PCRE2_8, test "x$enable_pcre2_8" = "xyes") +AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_PCRE2_16, test "x$enable_pcre2_16" = "xyes") +AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_PCRE2_32, test "x$enable_pcre2_32" = "xyes") +AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_DEBUG, test "x$enable_debug" = "xyes") +AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_REBUILD_CHARTABLES, test "x$enable_rebuild_chartables" = "xyes") +AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_JIT, test "x$enable_jit" = "xyes") +AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_UNICODE, test "x$enable_unicode" = "xyes") +AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_VALGRIND, test "x$enable_valgrind" = "xyes") +AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_FUZZ_SUPPORT, test "x$enable_fuzz_support" = "xyes") + +if test "$enable_fuzz_support" = "yes" -a "$enable_pcre2_8" = "no"; then + echo "** ERROR: Fuzzer support requires the 8-bit library" + exit 1 +fi + +# Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics. + +AC_C_CONST +AC_TYPE_SIZE_T + +# Checks for library functions. + +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(bcopy memfd_create memmove mkostemp secure_getenv strerror) +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for realpath]) +AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +]],[[ +char buffer[PATH_MAX]; +realpath(".", buffer); +]])], +[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_REALPATH], 1, + [Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function.]) +], +AC_MSG_RESULT([no])) + +# Check for the availability of libz (aka zlib) + +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([zlib.h], [HAVE_ZLIB_H=1]) +AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [gzopen], [HAVE_LIBZ=1]) + +# Check for the availability of libbz2. Originally we just used AC_CHECK_LIB, +# as for libz. However, this had the following problem, diagnosed and fixed by +# a user: +# +# - libbz2 uses the Pascal calling convention (WINAPI) for the functions +# under Win32. +# - The standard autoconf AC_CHECK_LIB fails to include "bzlib.h", +# therefore missing the function definition. +# - The compiler thus generates a "C" signature for the test function. +# - The linker fails to find the "C" function. +# - PCRE2 fails to configure if asked to do so against libbz2. +# +# Solution: +# +# - Replace the AC_CHECK_LIB test with a custom test. + +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bzlib.h], [HAVE_BZLIB_H=1]) +# Original test +# AC_CHECK_LIB([bz2], [BZ2_bzopen], [HAVE_LIBBZ2=1]) +# +# Custom test follows + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libbz2]) +OLD_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="$LIBS -lbz2" +AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#ifdef HAVE_BZLIB_H +#include +#endif]], +[[return (int)BZ2_bzopen("conftest", "rb");]])], +[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]);HAVE_LIBBZ2=1; break;], +AC_MSG_RESULT([no])) +LIBS="$OLD_LIBS" + +# Check for the availabiity of libreadline + +if test "$enable_pcre2test_libreadline" = "yes"; then + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([readline/readline.h], [HAVE_READLINE_H=1]) + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([readline/history.h], [HAVE_HISTORY_H=1]) + AC_CHECK_LIB([readline], [readline], [LIBREADLINE="-lreadline"], + [unset ac_cv_lib_readline_readline; + AC_CHECK_LIB([readline], [readline], [LIBREADLINE="-ltinfo"], + [unset ac_cv_lib_readline_readline; + AC_CHECK_LIB([readline], [readline], [LIBREADLINE="-lcurses"], + [unset ac_cv_lib_readline_readline; + AC_CHECK_LIB([readline], [readline], [LIBREADLINE="-lncurses"], + [unset ac_cv_lib_readline_readline; + AC_CHECK_LIB([readline], [readline], [LIBREADLINE="-lncursesw"], + [unset ac_cv_lib_readline_readline; + AC_CHECK_LIB([readline], [readline], [LIBREADLINE="-ltermcap"], + [LIBREADLINE=""], + [-ltermcap])], + [-lncursesw])], + [-lncurses])], + [-lcurses])], + [-ltinfo])]) + AC_SUBST(LIBREADLINE) + if test -n "$LIBREADLINE"; then + if test "$LIBREADLINE" != "-lreadline"; then + echo "-lreadline needs $LIBREADLINE" + LIBREADLINE="-lreadline $LIBREADLINE" + fi + fi +fi + +# Check for the availability of libedit. Different distributions put its +# headers in different places. Try to cover the most common ones. + +if test "$enable_pcre2test_libedit" = "yes"; then + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([editline/readline.h edit/readline/readline.h readline.h], [ + HAVE_LIBEDIT_HEADER=1 + break + ]) + AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [readline], [LIBEDIT="-ledit"]) +fi + +PCRE2_STATIC_CFLAG="" +if test "x$enable_shared" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([PCRE2_STATIC], [1], [ + Define to any value if linking statically (TODO: make nice with Libtool)]) + PCRE2_STATIC_CFLAG="-DPCRE2_STATIC" +fi +AC_SUBST(PCRE2_STATIC_CFLAG) + +# Here is where PCRE2-specific defines are handled + +if test "$enable_pcre2_8" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([SUPPORT_PCRE2_8], [], [ + Define to any value to enable the 8 bit PCRE2 library.]) +fi + +if test "$enable_pcre2_16" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([SUPPORT_PCRE2_16], [], [ + Define to any value to enable the 16 bit PCRE2 library.]) +fi + +if test "$enable_pcre2_32" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([SUPPORT_PCRE2_32], [], [ + Define to any value to enable the 32 bit PCRE2 library.]) +fi + +if test "$enable_debug" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([PCRE2_DEBUG], [], [ + Define to any value to include debugging code.]) +fi + +if test "$enable_percent_zt" = "no"; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PERCENT_ZT], [], [ + Define to any value to disable the use of the z and t modifiers in + formatting settings such as %zu or %td (this is rarely needed).]) +else + enable_percent_zt=auto +fi + +# Unless running under Windows, JIT support requires pthreads. + +if test "$enable_jit" = "yes"; then + if test "$HAVE_WINDOWS_H" != "1"; then + AX_PTHREAD([], [AC_MSG_ERROR([JIT support requires pthreads])]) + CC="$PTHREAD_CC" + CFLAGS="$PTHREAD_CFLAGS $CFLAGS" + LIBS="$PTHREAD_LIBS $LIBS" + fi + AC_DEFINE([SUPPORT_JIT], [], [ + Define to any value to enable support for Just-In-Time compiling.]) +else + enable_pcre2grep_jit="no" +fi + +if test "$enable_jit_sealloc" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([SLJIT_PROT_EXECUTABLE_ALLOCATOR], [1], [ + Define to any non-zero number to enable support for SELinux + compatible executable memory allocator in JIT. Note that this + will have no effect unless SUPPORT_JIT is also defined.]) +fi + +if test "$enable_pcre2grep_jit" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([SUPPORT_PCRE2GREP_JIT], [], [ + Define to any value to enable JIT support in pcre2grep. Note that this will + have no effect unless SUPPORT_JIT is also defined.]) +fi + +if test "$enable_pcre2grep_callout" = "yes"; then + if test "$enable_pcre2grep_callout_fork" = "yes"; then + if test "$HAVE_WINDOWS_H" != "1"; then + if test "$HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H" != "1"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Callout script support needs sys/wait.h.]) + fi + fi + AC_DEFINE([SUPPORT_PCRE2GREP_CALLOUT_FORK], [], [ + Define to any value to enable fork support in pcre2grep callout scripts. + This will have no effect unless SUPPORT_PCRE2GREP_CALLOUT is also + defined.]) + fi + AC_DEFINE([SUPPORT_PCRE2GREP_CALLOUT], [], [ + Define to any value to enable callout script support in pcre2grep.]) +else + enable_pcre2grep_callout_fork="no" +fi + +if test "$enable_unicode" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([SUPPORT_UNICODE], [], [ + Define to any value to enable support for Unicode and UTF encoding. + This will work even in an EBCDIC environment, but it is incompatible + with the EBCDIC macro. That is, PCRE2 can support *either* EBCDIC + code *or* ASCII/Unicode, but not both at once.]) +fi + +if test "$enable_pcre2grep_libz" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([SUPPORT_LIBZ], [], [ + Define to any value to allow pcre2grep to be linked with libz, so that it is + able to handle .gz files.]) +fi + +if test "$enable_pcre2grep_libbz2" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([SUPPORT_LIBBZ2], [], [ + Define to any value to allow pcre2grep to be linked with libbz2, so that it + is able to handle .bz2 files.]) +fi + +if test $with_pcre2grep_bufsize -lt 8192 ; then + AC_MSG_WARN([$with_pcre2grep_bufsize is too small for --with-pcre2grep-bufsize; using 8192]) + with_pcre2grep_bufsize="8192" +else + if test $? -gt 1 ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Bad value for --with-pcre2grep-bufsize]) + fi +fi + +if test $with_pcre2grep_max_bufsize -lt $with_pcre2grep_bufsize ; then + with_pcre2grep_max_bufsize="$with_pcre2grep_bufsize" +else + if test $? -gt 1 ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Bad value for --with-pcre2grep-max-bufsize]) + fi +fi + +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PCRE2GREP_BUFSIZE], [$with_pcre2grep_bufsize], [ + The value of PCRE2GREP_BUFSIZE is the starting size of the buffer used by + pcre2grep to hold parts of the file it is searching. The buffer will be + expanded up to PCRE2GREP_MAX_BUFSIZE if necessary, for files containing very + long lines. The actual amount of memory used by pcre2grep is three times this + number, because it allows for the buffering of "before" and "after" lines.]) + +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PCRE2GREP_MAX_BUFSIZE], [$with_pcre2grep_max_bufsize], [ + The value of PCRE2GREP_MAX_BUFSIZE specifies the maximum size of the buffer + used by pcre2grep to hold parts of the file it is searching. The actual + amount of memory used by pcre2grep is three times this number, because it + allows for the buffering of "before" and "after" lines.]) + +if test "$enable_pcre2test_libedit" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([SUPPORT_LIBEDIT], [], [ + Define to any value to allow pcre2test to be linked with libedit.]) + LIBREADLINE="$LIBEDIT" +elif test "$enable_pcre2test_libreadline" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([SUPPORT_LIBREADLINE], [], [ + Define to any value to allow pcre2test to be linked with libreadline.]) +fi + +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([NEWLINE_DEFAULT], [$ac_pcre2_newline_value], [ + The value of NEWLINE_DEFAULT determines the default newline character + sequence. PCRE2 client programs can override this by selecting other values + at run time. The valid values are 1 (CR), 2 (LF), 3 (CRLF), 4 (ANY), + 5 (ANYCRLF), and 6 (NUL).]) + +if test "$enable_bsr_anycrlf" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([BSR_ANYCRLF], [], [ + By default, the \R escape sequence matches any Unicode line ending + character or sequence of characters. If BSR_ANYCRLF is defined (to any + value), this is changed so that backslash-R matches only CR, LF, or CRLF. + The build-time default can be overridden by the user of PCRE2 at runtime.]) +fi + +if test "$enable_never_backslash_C" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE([NEVER_BACKSLASH_C], [], [ + Defining NEVER_BACKSLASH_C locks out the use of \C in all patterns.]) +fi + +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LINK_SIZE], [$with_link_size], [ + The value of LINK_SIZE determines the number of bytes used to store + links as offsets within the compiled regex. The default is 2, which + allows for compiled patterns up to 65535 code units long. This covers the + vast majority of cases. However, PCRE2 can also be compiled to use 3 or 4 + bytes instead. This allows for longer patterns in extreme cases.]) + +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PARENS_NEST_LIMIT], [$with_parens_nest_limit], [ + The value of PARENS_NEST_LIMIT specifies the maximum depth of nested + parentheses (of any kind) in a pattern. This limits the amount of system + stack that is used while compiling a pattern.]) + +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MATCH_LIMIT], [$with_match_limit], [ + The value of MATCH_LIMIT determines the default number of times the + pcre2_match() function can record a backtrack position during a single + matching attempt. The value is also used to limit a loop counter in + pcre2_dfa_match(). There is a runtime interface for setting a different + limit. The limit exists in order to catch runaway regular expressions that + take for ever to determine that they do not match. The default is set very + large so that it does not accidentally catch legitimate cases.]) + +# --with-match-limit-recursion is an obsolete synonym for --with-match-limit-depth + +if test "$with_match_limit_recursion" != "UNSET"; then +cat < +# Copyright (c) 2011 Daniel Richard G. +# +# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it +# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the +# Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your +# option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General +# Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along +# with this program. If not, see . +# +# As a special exception, the respective Autoconf Macro's copyright owner +# gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify the configure +# scripts that are the output of Autoconf when processing the Macro. You +# need not follow the terms of the GNU General Public License when using +# or distributing such scripts, even though portions of the text of the +# Macro appear in them. The GNU General Public License (GPL) does govern +# all other use of the material that constitutes the Autoconf Macro. +# +# This special exception to the GPL applies to versions of the Autoconf +# Macro released by the Autoconf Archive. When you make and distribute a +# modified version of the Autoconf Macro, you may extend this special +# exception to the GPL to apply to your modified version as well. + +#serial 18 + +AU_ALIAS([ACX_PTHREAD], [AX_PTHREAD]) +AC_DEFUN([AX_PTHREAD], [ +AC_REQUIRE([AC_CANONICAL_HOST]) +AC_LANG_PUSH([C]) +ax_pthread_ok=no + +# We used to check for pthread.h first, but this fails if pthread.h +# requires special compiler flags (e.g. on True64 or Sequent). +# It gets checked for in the link test anyway. + +# First of all, check if the user has set any of the PTHREAD_LIBS, +# etcetera environment variables, and if threads linking works using +# them: +if test x"$PTHREAD_LIBS$PTHREAD_CFLAGS" != x; then + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $PTHREAD_CFLAGS" + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$PTHREAD_LIBS $LIBS" + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for pthread_join in LIBS=$PTHREAD_LIBS with CFLAGS=$PTHREAD_CFLAGS]) + AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC(pthread_join, ax_pthread_ok=yes) + AC_MSG_RESULT($ax_pthread_ok) + if test x"$ax_pthread_ok" = xno; then + PTHREAD_LIBS="" + PTHREAD_CFLAGS="" + fi + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" +fi + +# We must check for the threads library under a number of different +# names; the ordering is very important because some systems +# (e.g. DEC) have both -lpthread and -lpthreads, where one of the +# libraries is broken (non-POSIX). + +# Create a list of thread flags to try. Items starting with a "-" are +# C compiler flags, and other items are library names, except for "none" +# which indicates that we try without any flags at all, and "pthread-config" +# which is a program returning the flags for the Pth emulation library. + +ax_pthread_flags="pthreads none -Kthread -kthread lthread -pthread -pthreads -mthreads pthread --thread-safe -mt pthread-config" + +# The ordering *is* (sometimes) important. Some notes on the +# individual items follow: + +# pthreads: AIX (must check this before -lpthread) +# none: in case threads are in libc; should be tried before -Kthread and +# other compiler flags to prevent continual compiler warnings +# -Kthread: Sequent (threads in libc, but -Kthread needed for pthread.h) +# -kthread: FreeBSD kernel threads (preferred to -pthread since SMP-able) +# lthread: LinuxThreads port on FreeBSD (also preferred to -pthread) +# -pthread: Linux/gcc (kernel threads), BSD/gcc (userland threads) +# -pthreads: Solaris/gcc +# -mthreads: Mingw32/gcc, Lynx/gcc +# -mt: Sun Workshop C (may only link SunOS threads [-lthread], but it +# doesn't hurt to check since this sometimes defines pthreads too; +# also defines -D_REENTRANT) +# ... -mt is also the pthreads flag for HP/aCC +# pthread: Linux, etcetera +# --thread-safe: KAI C++ +# pthread-config: use pthread-config program (for GNU Pth library) + +case ${host_os} in + solaris*) + + # On Solaris (at least, for some versions), libc contains stubbed + # (non-functional) versions of the pthreads routines, so link-based + # tests will erroneously succeed. (We need to link with -pthreads/-mt/ + # -lpthread.) (The stubs are missing pthread_cleanup_push, or rather + # a function called by this macro, so we could check for that, but + # who knows whether they'll stub that too in a future libc.) So, + # we'll just look for -pthreads and -lpthread first: + + ax_pthread_flags="-pthreads pthread -mt -pthread $ax_pthread_flags" + ;; + + darwin*) + ax_pthread_flags="-pthread $ax_pthread_flags" + ;; +esac + +if test x"$ax_pthread_ok" = xno; then +for flag in $ax_pthread_flags; do + + case $flag in + none) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pthreads work without any flags]) + ;; + + -*) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pthreads work with $flag]) + PTHREAD_CFLAGS="$flag" + ;; + + pthread-config) + AC_CHECK_PROG(ax_pthread_config, pthread-config, yes, no) + if test x"$ax_pthread_config" = xno; then continue; fi + PTHREAD_CFLAGS="`pthread-config --cflags`" + PTHREAD_LIBS="`pthread-config --ldflags` `pthread-config --libs`" + ;; + + *) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for the pthreads library -l$flag]) + PTHREAD_LIBS="-l$flag" + ;; + esac + + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + LIBS="$PTHREAD_LIBS $LIBS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $PTHREAD_CFLAGS" + + # Check for various functions. We must include pthread.h, + # since some functions may be macros. (On the Sequent, we + # need a special flag -Kthread to make this header compile.) + # We check for pthread_join because it is in -lpthread on IRIX + # while pthread_create is in libc. We check for pthread_attr_init + # due to DEC craziness with -lpthreads. We check for + # pthread_cleanup_push because it is one of the few pthread + # functions on Solaris that doesn't have a non-functional libc stub. + # We try pthread_create on general principles. + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include + static void routine(void *a) { a = 0; } + static void *start_routine(void *a) { return a; }], + [pthread_t th; pthread_attr_t attr; + pthread_create(&th, 0, start_routine, 0); + pthread_join(th, 0); + pthread_attr_init(&attr); + pthread_cleanup_push(routine, 0); + pthread_cleanup_pop(0) /* ; */])], + [ax_pthread_ok=yes], + []) + + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + + AC_MSG_RESULT($ax_pthread_ok) + if test "x$ax_pthread_ok" = xyes; then + break; + fi + + PTHREAD_LIBS="" + PTHREAD_CFLAGS="" +done +fi + +# Various other checks: +if test "x$ax_pthread_ok" = xyes; then + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$PTHREAD_LIBS $LIBS" + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $PTHREAD_CFLAGS" + + # Detect AIX lossage: JOINABLE attribute is called UNDETACHED. + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for joinable pthread attribute]) + attr_name=unknown + for attr in PTHREAD_CREATE_JOINABLE PTHREAD_CREATE_UNDETACHED; do + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include ], + [int attr = $attr; return attr /* ; */])], + [attr_name=$attr; break], + []) + done + AC_MSG_RESULT($attr_name) + if test "$attr_name" != PTHREAD_CREATE_JOINABLE; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PTHREAD_CREATE_JOINABLE, $attr_name, + [Define to necessary symbol if this constant + uses a non-standard name on your system.]) + fi + + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if more special flags are required for pthreads]) + flag=no + case ${host_os} in + aix* | freebsd* | darwin*) flag="-D_THREAD_SAFE";; + osf* | hpux*) flag="-D_REENTRANT";; + solaris*) + if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then + flag="-D_REENTRANT" + else + flag="-mt -D_REENTRANT" + fi + ;; + esac + AC_MSG_RESULT(${flag}) + if test "x$flag" != xno; then + PTHREAD_CFLAGS="$flag $PTHREAD_CFLAGS" + fi + + AC_CACHE_CHECK([for PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT], + ax_cv_PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT, [ + AC_LINK_IFELSE([ + AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include ]], [[int i = PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT;]])], + [ax_cv_PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT=yes], + [ax_cv_PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT=no]) + ]) + AS_IF([test "x$ax_cv_PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT" = "xyes"], + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT], 1, [Have PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT.])) + + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + + # More AIX lossage: must compile with xlc_r or cc_r + if test x"$GCC" != xyes; then + AC_CHECK_PROGS(PTHREAD_CC, xlc_r cc_r, ${CC}) + else + PTHREAD_CC=$CC + fi +else + PTHREAD_CC="$CC" +fi + +AC_SUBST(PTHREAD_LIBS) +AC_SUBST(PTHREAD_CFLAGS) +AC_SUBST(PTHREAD_CC) + +# Finally, execute ACTION-IF-FOUND/ACTION-IF-NOT-FOUND: +if test x"$ax_pthread_ok" = xyes; then + ifelse([$1],,AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PTHREAD,1,[Define if you have POSIX threads libraries and header files.]),[$1]) + : +else + ax_pthread_ok=no + $2 +fi +AC_LANG_POP +])dnl AX_PTHREAD diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/m4/pcre2_visibility.m4 b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/m4/pcre2_visibility.m4 new file mode 100644 index 00000000..480f2eef --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/m4/pcre2_visibility.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +# visibility.m4 serial 4 (gettext-0.18.2) +dnl Copyright (C) 2005, 2008, 2010-2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +dnl This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation +dnl gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +dnl with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +dnl From Bruno Haible. + +dnl Tests whether the compiler supports the command-line option +dnl -fvisibility=hidden and the function and variable attributes +dnl __attribute__((__visibility__("hidden"))) and +dnl __attribute__((__visibility__("default"))). +dnl Does *not* test for __visibility__("protected") - which has tricky +dnl semantics (see the 'vismain' test in glibc) and does not exist e.g. on +dnl MacOS X. +dnl Does *not* test for __visibility__("internal") - which has processor +dnl dependent semantics. +dnl Does *not* test for #pragma GCC visibility push(hidden) - which is +dnl "really only recommended for legacy code". +dnl Set the variable CFLAG_VISIBILITY. +dnl Defines and sets the variable HAVE_VISIBILITY. + +dnl Modified to fit with PCRE build environment by Cristian Rodríguez. +dnl Adjusted for PCRE2 by PH + +AC_DEFUN([PCRE2_VISIBILITY], +[ + AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_CC]) + VISIBILITY_CFLAGS= + VISIBILITY_CXXFLAGS= + HAVE_VISIBILITY=0 + if test -n "$GCC"; then + dnl First, check whether -Werror can be added to the command line, or + dnl whether it leads to an error because of some other option that the + dnl user has put into $CC $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS. + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether the -Werror option is usable]) + AC_CACHE_VAL([pcre2_cv_cc_vis_werror], [ + pcre2_save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror" + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])], + [pcre2_cv_cc_vis_werror=yes], + [pcre2_cv_cc_vis_werror=no]) + CFLAGS="$pcre2_save_CFLAGS"]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([$pcre2_cv_cc_vis_werror]) + dnl Now check whether visibility declarations are supported. + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for simple visibility declarations]) + AC_CACHE_VAL([pcre2_cv_cc_visibility], [ + pcre2_save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fvisibility=hidden" + dnl We use the option -Werror and a function dummyfunc, because on some + dnl platforms (Cygwin 1.7) the use of -fvisibility triggers a warning + dnl "visibility attribute not supported in this configuration; ignored" + dnl at the first function definition in every compilation unit, and we + dnl don't want to use the option in this case. + if test $pcre2_cv_cc_vis_werror = yes; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror" + fi + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( + [[extern __attribute__((__visibility__("hidden"))) int hiddenvar; + extern __attribute__((__visibility__("default"))) int exportedvar; + extern __attribute__((__visibility__("hidden"))) int hiddenfunc (void); + extern __attribute__((__visibility__("default"))) int exportedfunc (void); + void dummyfunc (void) {} + ]], + [[]])], + [pcre2_cv_cc_visibility=yes], + [pcre2_cv_cc_visibility=no]) + CFLAGS="$pcre2_save_CFLAGS"]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([$pcre2_cv_cc_visibility]) + if test $pcre2_cv_cc_visibility = yes; then + VISIBILITY_CFLAGS="-fvisibility=hidden" + VISIBILITY_CXXFLAGS="-fvisibility=hidden -fvisibility-inlines-hidden" + HAVE_VISIBILITY=1 + AC_DEFINE(PCRE2_EXP_DECL, [extern __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))], [to make a symbol visible]) + AC_DEFINE(PCRE2_EXP_DEFN, [__attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))], [to make a symbol visible]) + AC_DEFINE(PCRE2POSIX_EXP_DECL, [extern __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))], [to make a symbol visible]) + AC_DEFINE(PCRE2POSIX_EXP_DEFN, [extern __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))], [to make a symbol visible]) + fi + fi + AC_SUBST([VISIBILITY_CFLAGS]) + AC_SUBST([VISIBILITY_CXXFLAGS]) + AC_SUBST([HAVE_VISIBILITY]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_VISIBILITY], [$HAVE_VISIBILITY], + [Define to 1 if the compiler supports simple visibility declarations.]) +]) diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateCommon.py b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateCommon.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03f9ac55 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateCommon.py @@ -0,0 +1,355 @@ +#! /usr/bin/python + +# PCRE2 UNICODE PROPERTY SUPPORT +# ------------------------------ + +# This file is a Python module containing common lists and functions for the +# GenerateXXX scripts that create various.c and .h files from Unicode data +# files. It was created as part of a re-organizaton of these scripts in +# December 2021. + + +import re + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# DATA LISTS +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +# BIDI classes in the DerivedBidiClass.txt file, with comments. + +bidi_classes = [ + 'AL', 'Arabic letter', + 'AN', 'Arabic number', + 'B', 'Paragraph separator', + 'BN', 'Boundary neutral', + 'CS', 'Common separator', + 'EN', 'European number', + 'ES', 'European separator', + 'ET', 'European terminator', + 'FSI', 'First strong isolate', + 'L', 'Left to right', + 'LRE', 'Left to right embedding', + 'LRI', 'Left to right isolate', + 'LRO', 'Left to right override', + 'NSM', 'Non-spacing mark', + 'ON', 'Other neutral', + 'PDF', 'Pop directional format', + 'PDI', 'Pop directional isolate', + 'R', 'Right to left', + 'RLE', 'Right to left embedding', + 'RLI', 'Right to left isolate', + 'RLO', 'Right to left override', + 'S', 'Segment separator', + 'WS', 'White space' + ] + +# Particular category property names, with comments. NOTE: If ever this list +# is changed, the table called "catposstab" in the pcre2_auto_possess.c file +# must be edited to keep in step. + +category_names = [ + 'Cc', 'Control', + 'Cf', 'Format', + 'Cn', 'Unassigned', + 'Co', 'Private use', + 'Cs', 'Surrogate', + 'Ll', 'Lower case letter', + 'Lm', 'Modifier letter', + 'Lo', 'Other letter', + 'Lt', 'Title case letter', + 'Lu', 'Upper case letter', + 'Mc', 'Spacing mark', + 'Me', 'Enclosing mark', + 'Mn', 'Non-spacing mark', + 'Nd', 'Decimal number', + 'Nl', 'Letter number', + 'No', 'Other number', + 'Pc', 'Connector punctuation', + 'Pd', 'Dash punctuation', + 'Pe', 'Close punctuation', + 'Pf', 'Final punctuation', + 'Pi', 'Initial punctuation', + 'Po', 'Other punctuation', + 'Ps', 'Open punctuation', + 'Sc', 'Currency symbol', + 'Sk', 'Modifier symbol', + 'Sm', 'Mathematical symbol', + 'So', 'Other symbol', + 'Zl', 'Line separator', + 'Zp', 'Paragraph separator', + 'Zs', 'Space separator' + ] + +# The Extended_Pictographic property is not found in the file where all the +# others are (GraphemeBreakProperty.txt). It comes from the emoji-data.txt +# file, but we list it here so that the name has the correct index value. + +break_properties = [ + 'CR', ' 0', + 'LF', ' 1', + 'Control', ' 2', + 'Extend', ' 3', + 'Prepend', ' 4', + 'SpacingMark', ' 5', + 'L', ' 6 Hangul syllable type L', + 'V', ' 7 Hangul syllable type V', + 'T', ' 8 Hangul syllable type T', + 'LV', ' 9 Hangul syllable type LV', + 'LVT', '10 Hangul syllable type LVT', + 'Regional_Indicator', '11', + 'Other', '12', + 'ZWJ', '13', + 'Extended_Pictographic', '14' + ] + +# List of files from which the names of Boolean properties are obtained, along +# with a list of regex patterns for properties to be ignored, and a list of +# extra pattern names to add. + +bool_propsfiles = ['PropList.txt', 'DerivedCoreProperties.txt', 'emoji-data.txt'] +bool_propsignore = [r'^Other_', r'^Hyphen$'] +bool_propsextras = ['ASCII', 'Bidi_Mirrored'] + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# GET BOOLEAN PROPERTY NAMES +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +# Get a list of Boolean property names from a number of files. + +def getbpropslist(): + bplist = [] + bplast = "" + + for filename in bool_propsfiles: + try: + file = open('Unicode.tables/' + filename, 'r') + except IOError: + print(f"** Couldn't open {'Unicode.tables/' + filename}\n") + sys.exit(1) + + for line in file: + line = re.sub(r'#.*', '', line) + data = list(map(str.strip, line.split(';'))) + if len(data) <= 1 or data[1] == bplast: + continue + bplast = data[1] + for pat in bool_propsignore: + if re.match(pat, bplast) != None: + break + else: + bplist.append(bplast) + + file.close() + + bplist.extend(bool_propsextras) + bplist.sort() + return bplist + +bool_properties = getbpropslist() +bool_props_list_item_size = (len(bool_properties) + 31) // 32 + + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# COLLECTING PROPERTY NAMES AND ALIASES +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +script_names = ['Unknown'] +abbreviations = {} + +def collect_property_names(): + global script_names + global abbreviations + + names_re = re.compile(r'^[0-9A-F]{4,6}(?:\.\.[0-9A-F]{4,6})? +; ([A-Za-z_]+) #') + + last_script_name = "" + with open("Unicode.tables/Scripts.txt") as f: + for line in f: + match_obj = names_re.match(line) + + if match_obj == None or match_obj.group(1) == last_script_name: + continue + + last_script_name = match_obj.group(1) + script_names.append(last_script_name) + + # Sometimes there is comment in the line + # so splitting around semicolon is not enough + value_alias_re = re.compile(r' *([A-Za-z_]+) *; *([A-Za-z_]+) *; *([A-Za-z_]+)(?: *; *([A-Za-z_ ]+))?') + + with open("Unicode.tables/PropertyValueAliases.txt") as f: + for line in f: + match_obj = value_alias_re.match(line) + + if match_obj == None: + continue + + if match_obj.group(1) == "sc": + if match_obj.group(2) == match_obj.group(3): + abbreviations[match_obj.group(3)] = () + elif match_obj.group(4) == None: + abbreviations[match_obj.group(3)] = (match_obj.group(2),) + else: + abbreviations[match_obj.group(3)] = (match_obj.group(2), match_obj.group(4)) + + # We can also collect Boolean property abbreviations into the same dictionary + + bin_alias_re = re.compile(r' *([A-Za-z_]+) *; *([A-Za-z_]+)(?: *; *([A-Za-z_]+))?') + with open("Unicode.tables/PropertyAliases.txt") as f: + for line in f: + match_obj = bin_alias_re.match(line) + if match_obj == None: + continue + + if match_obj.group(2) in bool_properties: + if match_obj.group(3) == None: + abbreviations[match_obj.group(2)] = (match_obj.group(1),) + else: + abbreviations[match_obj.group(2)] = (match_obj.group(1), match_obj.group(3)) + +collect_property_names() + + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# REORDERING SCRIPT NAMES +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +script_abbrevs = [] + +def reorder_scripts(): + global script_names + global script_abbrevs + global abbreviations + + for name in script_names: + abbrevs = abbreviations[name] + script_abbrevs.append(name if len(abbrevs) == 0 else abbrevs[0]) + + extended_script_abbrevs = set() + with open("Unicode.tables/ScriptExtensions.txt") as f: + names_re = re.compile(r'^[0-9A-F]{4,6}(?:\.\.[0-9A-F]{4,6})? +; ([A-Za-z_ ]+) #') + + for line in f: + match_obj = names_re.match(line) + + if match_obj == None: + continue + + for name in match_obj.group(1).split(" "): + extended_script_abbrevs.add(name) + + new_script_names = [] + new_script_abbrevs = [] + + for idx, abbrev in enumerate(script_abbrevs): + if abbrev in extended_script_abbrevs: + new_script_names.append(script_names[idx]) + new_script_abbrevs.append(abbrev) + + for idx, abbrev in enumerate(script_abbrevs): + if abbrev not in extended_script_abbrevs: + new_script_names.append(script_names[idx]) + new_script_abbrevs.append(abbrev) + + script_names = new_script_names + script_abbrevs = new_script_abbrevs + +reorder_scripts() +script_list_item_size = (script_names.index('Unknown') + 31) // 32 + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# DERIVED LISTS +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +# Create general character property names from the first letters of the +# particular categories. + +gcn_set = set(category_names[i][0] for i in range(0, len(category_names), 2)) +general_category_names = list(gcn_set) +general_category_names.sort() + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# FUNCTIONS +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +import sys + +# Open an output file, using the command's argument or a default. Write common +# preliminary header information. + +def open_output(default): + if len(sys.argv) > 2: + print('** Too many arguments: just give a file name') + sys.exit(1) + if len(sys.argv) == 2: + output_name = sys.argv[1] + else: + output_name = default + try: + file = open(output_name, "w") + except IOError: + print ("** Couldn't open %s" % output_name) + sys.exit(1) + + script_name = sys.argv[0] + i = script_name.rfind('/') + if i >= 0: + script_name = script_name[i+1:] + + file.write("""\ +/************************************************* +* Perl-Compatible Regular Expressions * +*************************************************/ + +/* PCRE is a library of functions to support regular expressions whose syntax +and semantics are as close as possible to those of the Perl 5 language. + + Written by Philip Hazel + Original API code Copyright (c) 1997-2012 University of Cambridge + New API code Copyright (c) 2016-2022 University of Cambridge + +This module is auto-generated from Unicode data files. DO NOT EDIT MANUALLY! +""") + + file.write("Instead, modify the maint/%s script and run it to generate\n" + "a new version of this code.\n\n" % script_name) + + file.write("""\ +----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + + * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + + * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + + * Neither the name of the University of Cambridge nor the names of its + contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from + this software without specific prior written permission. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" +AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE +LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR +CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF +SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN +CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) +ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE +POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +*/ +\n""") + return file + +# End of UcpCommon.py diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateTest26.py b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateTest26.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2afdf25e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateTest26.py @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +#! /usr/bin/python + +# PCRE2 UNICODE PROPERTY SUPPORT +# ------------------------------ +# +# This file auto-generates unicode property tests and their expected output. +# It is recommended to re-run this generator after the unicode files are +# updated. The names of the generated files are `testinput26` and `testoutput26` + +import re +import sys + +from GenerateCommon import \ + script_names, \ + script_abbrevs + +def write_both(text): + input_file.write(text) + output_file.write(text) + +def to_string_char(ch_idx): + if ch_idx < 128: + if ch_idx < 16: + return "\\x{0%x}" % ch_idx + if ch_idx >= 32: + return chr(ch_idx) + return "\\x{%x}" % ch_idx + +output_directory = "" + +if len(sys.argv) > 2: + print('** Too many arguments: just give a directory name') + sys.exit(1) +if len(sys.argv) == 2: + output_directory = sys.argv[1] + if not output_directory.endswith("/"): + output_directory += "/" + +try: + input_file = open(output_directory + "testinput26", "w") + output_file = open(output_directory + "testoutput26", "w") +except IOError: + print ("** Couldn't open output files") + sys.exit(1) + +write_both("# These tests are generated by maint/GenerateTest26.py, do not edit.\n\n") + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# UNICODE SCRIPT EXTENSION TESTS +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +write_both("# Unicode Script Extension tests.\n\n") + +def gen_script_tests(): + script_data = [None] * len(script_names) + char_data = [None] * 0x110000 + + property_re = re.compile("^([0-9A-F]{4,6})(?:\\.\\.([0-9A-F]{4,6}))? +; ([A-Za-z_ ]+) #") + prev_name = "" + script_idx = -1 + + with open("Unicode.tables/Scripts.txt") as f: + for line in f: + match_obj = property_re.match(line) + + if match_obj == None: + continue + + name = match_obj.group(3) + if name != prev_name: + script_idx = script_names.index(name) + prev_name = name + + low = int(match_obj.group(1), 16) + high = low + char_data[low] = name + + if match_obj.group(2) != None: + high = int(match_obj.group(2), 16) + for idx in range(low + 1, high + 1): + char_data[idx] = name + + if script_data[script_idx] == None: + script_data[script_idx] = [low, None, None, None, None] + script_data[script_idx][1] = high + + extended_script_indicies = {} + + with open("Unicode.tables/ScriptExtensions.txt") as f: + for line in f: + match_obj = property_re.match(line) + + if match_obj == None: + continue + + low = int(match_obj.group(1), 16) + high = low + if match_obj.group(2) != None: + high = int(match_obj.group(2), 16) + + for abbrev in match_obj.group(3).split(" "): + if abbrev not in extended_script_indicies: + idx = script_abbrevs.index(abbrev) + extended_script_indicies[abbrev] = idx + rec = script_data[idx] + rec[2] = low + rec[3] = high + else: + idx = extended_script_indicies[abbrev] + rec = script_data[idx] + if rec[2] > low: + rec[2] = low + if rec[3] < high: + rec[3] = high + + if rec[4] == None: + name = script_names[idx] + for idx in range(low, high + 1): + if char_data[idx] != name: + rec[4] = idx + break + + long_property_name = False + + for idx, rec in enumerate(script_data): + script_name = script_names[idx] + + if script_name == "Unknown": + continue + + script_abbrev = script_abbrevs[idx] + + write_both("# Base script check\n") + write_both("/^\\p{sc=%s}/utf\n" % script_name) + write_both(" %s\n" % to_string_char(rec[0])) + output_file.write(" 0: %s\n" % to_string_char(rec[0])) + write_both("\n") + + write_both("/^\\p{Script=%s}/utf\n" % script_abbrev) + write_both(" %s\n" % to_string_char(rec[1])) + output_file.write(" 0: %s\n" % to_string_char(rec[1])) + write_both("\n") + + if rec[2] != None: + property_name = "scx" + if long_property_name: + property_name = "Script_Extensions" + + write_both("# Script extension check\n") + write_both("/^\\p{%s}/utf\n" % script_name) + write_both(" %s\n" % to_string_char(rec[2])) + output_file.write(" 0: %s\n" % to_string_char(rec[2])) + write_both("\n") + + write_both("/^\\p{%s=%s}/utf\n" % (property_name, script_abbrev)) + write_both(" %s\n" % to_string_char(rec[3])) + output_file.write(" 0: %s\n" % to_string_char(rec[3])) + write_both("\n") + + long_property_name = not long_property_name + + if rec[4] != None: + write_both("# Script extension only character\n") + write_both("/^\\p{%s}/utf\n" % script_name) + write_both(" %s\n" % to_string_char(rec[4])) + output_file.write(" 0: %s\n" % to_string_char(rec[4])) + write_both("\n") + + write_both("/^\\p{sc=%s}/utf\n" % script_name) + write_both(" %s\n" % to_string_char(rec[4])) + output_file.write("No match\n") + write_both("\n") + else: + print("External character has not found for %s" % script_name) + + high = rec[1] + if rec[3] != None and rec[3] > rec[1]: + high = rec[3] + write_both("# Character not in script\n") + write_both("/^\\p{%s}/utf\n" % script_name) + write_both(" %s\n" % to_string_char(high + 1)) + output_file.write("No match\n") + write_both("\n") + + +gen_script_tests() + +write_both("# End of testinput26\n") diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateUcd.py b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateUcd.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6081800d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateUcd.py @@ -0,0 +1,923 @@ +#! /usr/bin/python + +# PCRE2 UNICODE PROPERTY SUPPORT +# ------------------------------ +# +# This script generates the pcre2_ucd.c file from Unicode data files. This is +# the compressed Unicode property data used by PCRE2. The script was created in +# December 2021 as part of the Unicode data generation refactoring. It is +# basically a re-working of the MultiStage2.py script that was submitted to the +# PCRE project by Peter Kankowski in 2008 as part of a previous upgrading of +# Unicode property support. A number of extensions have since been added. The +# main difference in the 2021 upgrade (apart from comments and layout) is that +# the data tables (e.g. list of script names) are now listed in or generated by +# a separate Python module that is shared with the other Generate scripts. +# +# This script must be run in the "maint" directory. It requires the following +# Unicode data tables: BidiMirrorring.txt, CaseFolding.txt, +# DerivedBidiClass.txt, DerivedCoreProperties.txt, DerivedGeneralCategory.txt, +# GraphemeBreakProperty.txt, PropList.txt, PropertyAliases.txt, +# PropertyValueAliases.txt, ScriptExtensions.txt, Scripts.txt, and +# emoji-data.txt. These must be in the Unicode.tables subdirectory. +# +# The emoji-data.txt file is found in the "emoji" subdirectory even though it +# is technically part of a different (but coordinated) standard as shown +# in files associated with Unicode Technical Standard #51 ("Unicode Emoji"), +# for example: +# +# http://unicode.org/Public/emoji/13.0/ReadMe.txt +# +# DerivedBidiClass.txt and DerivedGeneralCategory.txt are in the "extracted" +# subdirectory of the Unicode database (UCD) on the Unicode web site; +# GraphemeBreakProperty.txt is in the "auxiliary" subdirectory. The other files +# are in the top-level UCD directory. +# +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Minor modifications made to the original script: +# Added #! line at start +# Removed tabs +# Made it work with Python 2.4 by rewriting two statements that needed 2.5 +# Consequent code tidy +# Adjusted data file names to take from the Unicode.tables directory +# Adjusted global table names by prefixing _pcre_. +# Commented out stuff relating to the casefolding table, which isn't used; +# removed completely in 2012. +# Corrected size calculation +# Add #ifndef SUPPORT_UCP to use dummy tables when no UCP support is needed. +# Update for PCRE2: name changes, and SUPPORT_UCP is abolished. +# +# Major modifications made to the original script: +# Added code to add a grapheme break property field to records. +# +# Added code to search for sets of more than two characters that must match +# each other caselessly. A new table is output containing these sets, and +# offsets into the table are added to the main output records. This new +# code scans CaseFolding.txt instead of UnicodeData.txt, which is no longer +# used. +# +# Update for Python3: +# . Processed with 2to3, but that didn't fix everything +# . Changed string.strip to str.strip +# . Added encoding='utf-8' to the open() call +# . Inserted 'int' before blocksize/ELEMS_PER_LINE because an int is +# required and the result of the division is a float +# +# Added code to scan the emoji-data.txt file to find the Extended Pictographic +# property, which is used by PCRE2 as a grapheme breaking property. This was +# done when updating to Unicode 11.0.0 (July 2018). +# +# Added code to add a Script Extensions field to records. This has increased +# their size from 8 to 12 bytes, only 10 of which are currently used. +# +# Added code to add a bidi class field to records by scanning the +# DerivedBidiClass.txt and PropList.txt files. This uses one of the two spare +# bytes, so now 11 out of 12 are in use. +# +# 01-March-2010: Updated list of scripts for Unicode 5.2.0 +# 30-April-2011: Updated list of scripts for Unicode 6.0.0 +# July-2012: Updated list of scripts for Unicode 6.1.0 +# 20-August-2012: Added scan of GraphemeBreakProperty.txt and added a new +# field in the record to hold the value. Luckily, the +# structure had a hole in it, so the resulting table is +# not much bigger than before. +# 18-September-2012: Added code for multiple caseless sets. This uses the +# final hole in the structure. +# 30-September-2012: Added RegionalIndicator break property from Unicode 6.2.0 +# 13-May-2014: Updated for PCRE2 +# 03-June-2014: Updated for Python 3 +# 20-June-2014: Updated for Unicode 7.0.0 +# 12-August-2014: Updated to put Unicode version into the file +# 19-June-2015: Updated for Unicode 8.0.0 +# 02-July-2017: Updated for Unicode 10.0.0 +# 03-July-2018: Updated for Unicode 11.0.0 +# 07-July-2018: Added code to scan emoji-data.txt for the Extended +# Pictographic property. +# 01-October-2018: Added the 'Unknown' script name +# 03-October-2018: Added new field for Script Extensions +# 27-July-2019: Updated for Unicode 12.1.0 +# 10-March-2020: Updated for Unicode 13.0.0 +# PCRE2-10.39: Updated for Unicode 14.0.0 +# 05-December-2021: Added code to scan DerivedBidiClass.txt for bidi class, +# and also PropList.txt for the Bidi_Control property +# 19-December-2021: Reworked script extensions lists to be bit maps instead +# of zero-terminated lists of script numbers. +# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +# Changes to the refactored script: +# +# 26-December-2021: Refactoring completed +# 10-January-2022: Addition of general Boolean property support +# 12-January-2022: Merge scriptx and bidiclass fields +# 14-January-2022: Enlarge Boolean property offset to 12 bits +# +# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +# +# The main tables generated by this script are used by macros defined in +# pcre2_internal.h. They look up Unicode character properties using short +# sequences of code that contains no branches, which makes for greater speed. +# +# Conceptually, there is a table of records (of type ucd_record), one for each +# Unicode character. Each record contains the script number, script extension +# value, character type, grapheme break type, offset to caseless matching set, +# offset to the character's other case, the bidi class, and offset to bitmap of +# Boolean properties. +# +# A real table covering all Unicode characters would be far too big. It can be +# efficiently compressed by observing that many characters have the same +# record, and many blocks of characters (taking 128 characters in a block) have +# the same set of records as other blocks. This leads to a 2-stage lookup +# process. +# +# This script constructs seven tables. The ucd_caseless_sets table contains +# lists of characters that all match each other caselessly. Each list is +# in order, and is terminated by NOTACHAR (0xffffffff), which is larger than +# any valid character. The first list is empty; this is used for characters +# that are not part of any list. +# +# The ucd_digit_sets table contains the code points of the '9' characters in +# each set of 10 decimal digits in Unicode. This is used to ensure that digits +# in script runs all come from the same set. The first element in the vector +# contains the number of subsequent elements, which are in ascending order. +# +# Scripts are partitioned into two groups. Scripts that appear in at least one +# character's script extension list come first, followed by "Unknown" and then +# all the rest. This sorting is done automatically in the GenerateCommon.py +# script. A script's number is its index in the script_names list. +# +# The ucd_script_sets table contains bitmaps that represent lists of scripts +# for Script Extensions properties. Each bitmap consists of a fixed number of +# unsigned 32-bit numbers, enough to allocate a bit for every script that is +# used in any character's extension list, that is, enough for every script +# whose number is less than ucp_Unknown. A character's script extension value +# in its ucd record is an offset into the ucd_script_sets vector. The first +# bitmap has no bits set; characters that have no script extensions have zero +# as their script extensions value so that they use this map. +# +# The ucd_boolprop_sets table contains bitmaps that represent lists of Boolean +# properties. Each bitmap consists of a fixed number of unsigned 32-bit +# numbers, enough to allocate a bit for each supported Boolean property. +# +# The ucd_records table contains one instance of every unique character record +# that is required. The ucd_stage1 table is indexed by a character's block +# number, which is the character's code point divided by 128, since 128 is the +# size of each block. The result of a lookup in ucd_stage1 a "virtual" block +# number. +# +# The ucd_stage2 table is a table of "virtual" blocks; each block is indexed by +# the offset of a character within its own block, and the result is the index +# number of the required record in the ucd_records vector. +# +# The following examples are correct for the Unicode 14.0.0 database. Future +# updates may make change the actual lookup values. +# +# Example: lowercase "a" (U+0061) is in block 0 +# lookup 0 in stage1 table yields 0 +# lookup 97 (0x61) in the first table in stage2 yields 35 +# record 35 is { 0, 5, 12, 0, -32, 18432, 44 } +# 0 = ucp_Latin => Latin script +# 5 = ucp_Ll => Lower case letter +# 12 = ucp_gbOther => Grapheme break property "Other" +# 0 => Not part of a caseless set +# -32 (-0x20) => Other case is U+0041 +# 18432 = 0x4800 => Combined Bidi class + script extension values +# 44 => Offset to Boolean properties +# +# The top 5 bits of the sixth field are the Bidi class, with the rest being the +# script extension value, giving: +# +# 9 = ucp_bidiL => Bidi class left-to-right +# 0 => No special script extension property +# +# Almost all lowercase latin characters resolve to the same record. One or two +# are different because they are part of a multi-character caseless set (for +# example, k, K and the Kelvin symbol are such a set). +# +# Example: hiragana letter A (U+3042) is in block 96 (0x60) +# lookup 96 in stage1 table yields 93 +# lookup 66 (0x42) in table 93 in stage2 yields 819 +# record 819 is { 20, 7, 12, 0, 0, 18432, 82 } +# 20 = ucp_Hiragana => Hiragana script +# 7 = ucp_Lo => Other letter +# 12 = ucp_gbOther => Grapheme break property "Other" +# 0 => Not part of a caseless set +# 0 => No other case +# 18432 = 0x4800 => Combined Bidi class + script extension values +# 82 => Offset to Boolean properties +# +# The top 5 bits of the sixth field are the Bidi class, with the rest being the +# script extension value, giving: +# +# 9 = ucp_bidiL => Bidi class left-to-right +# 0 => No special script extension property +# +# Example: vedic tone karshana (U+1CD0) is in block 57 (0x39) +# lookup 57 in stage1 table yields 55 +# lookup 80 (0x50) in table 55 in stage2 yields 621 +# record 621 is { 84, 12, 3, 0, 0, 26762, 96 } +# 84 = ucp_Inherited => Script inherited from predecessor +# 12 = ucp_Mn => Non-spacing mark +# 3 = ucp_gbExtend => Grapheme break property "Extend" +# 0 => Not part of a caseless set +# 0 => No other case +# 26762 = 0x688A => Combined Bidi class + script extension values +# 96 => Offset to Boolean properties +# +# The top 5 bits of the sixth field are the Bidi class, with the rest being the +# script extension value, giving: +# +# 13 = ucp_bidiNSM => Bidi class non-spacing mark +# 138 => Script Extension list offset = 138 +# +# At offset 138 in the ucd_script_sets vector we find a bitmap with bits 1, 8, +# 18, and 47 set. This means that this character is expected to be used with +# any of those scripts, which are Bengali, Devanagari, Kannada, and Grantha. +# +# Philip Hazel, last updated 14 January 2022. +############################################################################## + + +# Import standard modules + +import re +import string +import sys + +# Import common data lists and functions + +from GenerateCommon import \ + bidi_classes, \ + bool_properties, \ + bool_propsfiles, \ + bool_props_list_item_size, \ + break_properties, \ + category_names, \ + general_category_names, \ + script_abbrevs, \ + script_list_item_size, \ + script_names, \ + open_output + +# Some general parameters + +MAX_UNICODE = 0x110000 +NOTACHAR = 0xffffffff + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# DEFINE FUNCTIONS +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +# Parse a line of Scripts.txt, GraphemeBreakProperty.txt, DerivedBidiClass.txt +# or DerivedGeneralCategory.txt + +def make_get_names(enum): + return lambda chardata: enum.index(chardata[1]) + + +# Parse a line of CaseFolding.txt + +def get_other_case(chardata): + if chardata[1] == 'C' or chardata[1] == 'S': + return int(chardata[2], 16) - int(chardata[0], 16) + return 0 + + +# Parse a line of ScriptExtensions.txt + +def get_script_extension(chardata): + global last_script_extension + + offset = len(script_lists) * script_list_item_size + if last_script_extension == chardata[1]: + return offset - script_list_item_size + + last_script_extension = chardata[1] + script_lists.append(tuple(script_abbrevs.index(abbrev) for abbrev in last_script_extension.split(' '))) + return offset + + +# Read a whole table in memory, setting/checking the Unicode version + +def read_table(file_name, get_value, default_value): + global unicode_version + + f = re.match(r'^[^/]+/([^.]+)\.txt$', file_name) + file_base = f.group(1) + version_pat = r"^# " + re.escape(file_base) + r"-(\d+\.\d+\.\d+)\.txt$" + file = open(file_name, 'r', encoding='utf-8') + f = re.match(version_pat, file.readline()) + version = f.group(1) + if unicode_version == "": + unicode_version = version + elif unicode_version != version: + print("WARNING: Unicode version differs in %s", file_name, file=sys.stderr) + + table = [default_value] * MAX_UNICODE + for line in file: + line = re.sub(r'#.*', '', line) + chardata = list(map(str.strip, line.split(';'))) + if len(chardata) <= 1: + continue + value = get_value(chardata) + m = re.match(r'([0-9a-fA-F]+)(\.\.([0-9a-fA-F]+))?$', chardata[0]) + char = int(m.group(1), 16) + if m.group(3) is None: + last = char + else: + last = int(m.group(3), 16) + for i in range(char, last + 1): + # It is important not to overwrite a previously set value because in the + # CaseFolding file there are lines to be ignored (returning the default + # value of 0) which often come after a line which has already set data. + if table[i] == default_value: + table[i] = value + file.close() + return table + + +# Get the smallest possible C language type for the values in a table + +def get_type_size(table): + type_size = [("uint8_t", 1), ("uint16_t", 2), ("uint32_t", 4), + ("signed char", 1), ("int16_t", 2), ("int32_t", 4)] + limits = [(0, 255), (0, 65535), (0, 4294967295), (-128, 127), + (-32768, 32767), (-2147483648, 2147483647)] + minval = min(table) + maxval = max(table) + for num, (minlimit, maxlimit) in enumerate(limits): + if minlimit <= minval and maxval <= maxlimit: + return type_size[num] + raise OverflowError("Too large to fit into C types") + + +# Get the total size of a list of tables + +def get_tables_size(*tables): + total_size = 0 + for table in tables: + type, size = get_type_size(table) + total_size += size * len(table) + return total_size + + +# Compress a table into the two stages + +def compress_table(table, block_size): + blocks = {} # Dictionary for finding identical blocks + stage1 = [] # Stage 1 table contains block numbers (indices into stage 2 table) + stage2 = [] # Stage 2 table contains the blocks with property values + table = tuple(table) + for i in range(0, len(table), block_size): + block = table[i:i+block_size] + start = blocks.get(block) + if start is None: + # Allocate a new block + start = len(stage2) / block_size + stage2 += block + blocks[block] = start + stage1.append(start) + return stage1, stage2 + + +# Output a table + +def write_table(table, table_name, block_size = None): + type, size = get_type_size(table) + ELEMS_PER_LINE = 16 + + s = "const %s %s[] = { /* %d bytes" % (type, table_name, size * len(table)) + if block_size: + s += ", block = %d" % block_size + f.write(s + " */\n") + table = tuple(table) + if block_size is None: + fmt = "%3d," * ELEMS_PER_LINE + " /* U+%04X */\n" + mult = MAX_UNICODE / len(table) + for i in range(0, len(table), ELEMS_PER_LINE): + f.write(fmt % (table[i:i+ELEMS_PER_LINE] + (int(i * mult),))) + else: + if block_size > ELEMS_PER_LINE: + el = ELEMS_PER_LINE + else: + el = block_size + fmt = "%3d," * el + "\n" + if block_size > ELEMS_PER_LINE: + fmt = fmt * int(block_size / ELEMS_PER_LINE) + for i in range(0, len(table), block_size): + f.write(("\n/* block %d */\n" + fmt) % ((i / block_size,) + table[i:i+block_size])) + f.write("};\n\n") + + +# Extract the unique combinations of properties into records + +def combine_tables(*tables): + records = {} + index = [] + for t in zip(*tables): + i = records.get(t) + if i is None: + i = records[t] = len(records) + index.append(i) + return index, records + + +# Create a record struct + +def get_record_size_struct(records): + size = 0 + structure = 'typedef struct {\n' + for i in range(len(records[0])): + record_slice = [record[i] for record in records] + slice_type, slice_size = get_type_size(record_slice) + # add padding: round up to the nearest power of slice_size + size = (size + slice_size - 1) & -slice_size + size += slice_size + structure += '%s property_%d;\n' % (slice_type, i) + + # round up to the first item of the next structure in array + record_slice = [record[0] for record in records] + slice_type, slice_size = get_type_size(record_slice) + size = (size + slice_size - 1) & -slice_size + + structure += '} ucd_record;\n*/\n' + return size, structure + + +# Write records + +def write_records(records, record_size): + f.write('const ucd_record PRIV(ucd_records)[] = { ' + \ + '/* %d bytes, record size %d */\n' % (len(records) * record_size, record_size)) + records = list(zip(list(records.keys()), list(records.values()))) + records.sort(key = lambda x: x[1]) + for i, record in enumerate(records): + f.write((' {' + '%6d, ' * len(record[0]) + '}, /* %3d */\n') % (record[0] + (i,))) + f.write('};\n\n') + + +# Write a bit set + +def write_bitsets(list, item_size): + for d in list: + bitwords = [0] * item_size + for idx in d: + bitwords[idx // 32] |= 1 << (idx & 31) + s = " " + for x in bitwords: + f.write("%s" % s) + s = ", " + f.write("0x%08xu" % x) + f.write(",\n") + f.write("};\n\n") + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# This bit of code must have been useful when the original script was being +# developed. Retain it just in case it is ever needed again. + +# def test_record_size(): +# tests = [ \ +# ( [(3,), (6,), (6,), (1,)], 1 ), \ +# ( [(300,), (600,), (600,), (100,)], 2 ), \ +# ( [(25, 3), (6, 6), (34, 6), (68, 1)], 2 ), \ +# ( [(300, 3), (6, 6), (340, 6), (690, 1)], 4 ), \ +# ( [(3, 300), (6, 6), (6, 340), (1, 690)], 4 ), \ +# ( [(300, 300), (6, 6), (6, 340), (1, 690)], 4 ), \ +# ( [(3, 100000), (6, 6), (6, 123456), (1, 690)], 8 ), \ +# ( [(100000, 300), (6, 6), (123456, 6), (1, 690)], 8 ), \ +# ] +# for test in tests: +# size, struct = get_record_size_struct(test[0]) +# assert(size == test[1]) +# test_record_size() +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# MAIN CODE FOR CREATING TABLES +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +unicode_version = "" + +# Some of the tables imported from GenerateCommon.py have alternate comment +# strings for use by GenerateUcpHeader. The comments are not wanted here, so +# remove them. + +bidi_classes = bidi_classes[::2] +break_properties = break_properties[::2] +category_names = category_names[::2] + +# Create the various tables from Unicode data files + +script = read_table('Unicode.tables/Scripts.txt', make_get_names(script_names), script_names.index('Unknown')) +category = read_table('Unicode.tables/DerivedGeneralCategory.txt', make_get_names(category_names), category_names.index('Cn')) +break_props = read_table('Unicode.tables/GraphemeBreakProperty.txt', make_get_names(break_properties), break_properties.index('Other')) +other_case = read_table('Unicode.tables/CaseFolding.txt', get_other_case, 0) +bidi_class = read_table('Unicode.tables/DerivedBidiClass.txt', make_get_names(bidi_classes), bidi_classes.index('L')) + +# The grapheme breaking rules were changed for Unicode 11.0.0 (June 2018). Now +# we need to find the Extended_Pictographic property for emoji characters. This +# can be set as an additional grapheme break property, because the default for +# all the emojis is "other". We scan the emoji-data.txt file and modify the +# break-props table. + +file = open('Unicode.tables/emoji-data.txt', 'r', encoding='utf-8') +for line in file: + line = re.sub(r'#.*', '', line) + chardata = list(map(str.strip, line.split(';'))) + if len(chardata) <= 1: + continue + if chardata[1] != "Extended_Pictographic": + continue + m = re.match(r'([0-9a-fA-F]+)(\.\.([0-9a-fA-F]+))?$', chardata[0]) + char = int(m.group(1), 16) + if m.group(3) is None: + last = char + else: + last = int(m.group(3), 16) + for i in range(char, last + 1): + if break_props[i] != break_properties.index('Other'): + print("WARNING: Emoji 0x%x has break property %s, not 'Other'", + i, break_properties[break_props[i]], file=sys.stderr) + break_props[i] = break_properties.index('Extended_Pictographic') +file.close() + +# Handle script extensions. The get_script_extesion() function maintains a +# list of unique bitmaps representing lists of scripts, returning the offset +# in that list. Initialize the list with an empty set, which is used for +# characters that have no script extensions. + +script_lists = [[]] +last_script_extension = "" +scriptx_bidi_class = read_table('Unicode.tables/ScriptExtensions.txt', get_script_extension, 0) + +for idx in range(len(scriptx_bidi_class)): + scriptx_bidi_class[idx] = scriptx_bidi_class[idx] | (bidi_class[idx] << 11) +bidi_class = None + +# Find the Boolean properties of each character. This next bit of magic creates +# a list of empty lists. Using [[]] * MAX_UNICODE gives a list of references to +# the *same* list, which is not what we want. + +bprops = [[] for _ in range(MAX_UNICODE)] + +# Collect the properties from the various files + +for filename in bool_propsfiles: + try: + file = open('Unicode.tables/' + filename, 'r') + except IOError: + print(f"** Couldn't open {'Unicode.tables/' + filename}\n") + sys.exit(1) + + for line in file: + line = re.sub(r'#.*', '', line) + data = list(map(str.strip, line.split(';'))) + if len(data) <= 1: + continue + + try: + ix = bool_properties.index(data[1]) + except ValueError: + continue + + m = re.match(r'([0-9a-fA-F]+)(\.\.([0-9a-fA-F]+))?$', data[0]) + char = int(m.group(1), 16) + if m.group(3) is None: + last = char + else: + last = int(m.group(3), 16) + + for i in range(char, last + 1): + bprops[i].append(ix) + + file.close() + +# The ASCII property isn't listed in any files, but it is easy enough to add +# it manually. + +ix = bool_properties.index("ASCII") +for i in range(128): + bprops[i].append(ix) + +# The Bidi_Mirrored property isn't listed in any property files. We have to +# deduce it from the file that lists the mirrored characters. + +ix = bool_properties.index("Bidi_Mirrored") + +try: + file = open('Unicode.tables/BidiMirroring.txt', 'r') +except IOError: + print(f"** Couldn't open {'Unicode.tables/BidiMirroring.txt'}\n") + sys.exit(1) + +for line in file: + line = re.sub(r'#.*', '', line) + data = list(map(str.strip, line.split(';'))) + if len(data) <= 1: + continue + c = int(data[0], 16) + bprops[c].append(ix) + +file.close() + +# Scan each character's boolean property list and created a list of unique +# lists, at the same time, setting the index in that list for each property in +# the bool_props vector. + +bool_props = [0] * MAX_UNICODE +bool_props_lists = [[]] + +for c in range(MAX_UNICODE): + s = set(bprops[c]) + for i in range(len(bool_props_lists)): + if s == set(bool_props_lists[i]): + break; + else: + bool_props_lists.append(bprops[c]) + i += 1 + + bool_props[c] = i * bool_props_list_item_size + +# This block of code was added by PH in September 2012. It scans the other_case +# table to find sets of more than two characters that must all match each other +# caselessly. Later in this script a table of these sets is written out. +# However, we have to do this work here in order to compute the offsets in the +# table that are inserted into the main table. + +# The CaseFolding.txt file lists pairs, but the common logic for reading data +# sets only one value, so first we go through the table and set "return" +# offsets for those that are not already set. + +for c in range(MAX_UNICODE): + if other_case[c] != 0 and other_case[c + other_case[c]] == 0: + other_case[c + other_case[c]] = -other_case[c] + +# Now scan again and create equivalence sets. + +caseless_sets = [] + +for c in range(MAX_UNICODE): + o = c + other_case[c] + + # Trigger when this character's other case does not point back here. We + # now have three characters that are case-equivalent. + + if other_case[o] != -other_case[c]: + t = o + other_case[o] + + # Scan the existing sets to see if any of the three characters are already + # part of a set. If so, unite the existing set with the new set. + + appended = 0 + for s in caseless_sets: + found = 0 + for x in s: + if x == c or x == o or x == t: + found = 1 + + # Add new characters to an existing set + + if found: + found = 0 + for y in [c, o, t]: + for x in s: + if x == y: + found = 1 + if not found: + s.append(y) + appended = 1 + + # If we have not added to an existing set, create a new one. + + if not appended: + caseless_sets.append([c, o, t]) + +# End of loop looking for caseless sets. + +# Now scan the sets and set appropriate offsets for the characters. + +caseless_offsets = [0] * MAX_UNICODE + +offset = 1; +for s in caseless_sets: + for x in s: + caseless_offsets[x] = offset + offset += len(s) + 1 + +# End of block of code for creating offsets for caseless matching sets. + + +# Combine all the tables + +table, records = combine_tables(script, category, break_props, + caseless_offsets, other_case, scriptx_bidi_class, bool_props) + +# Find the record size and create a string definition of the structure for +# outputting as a comment. + +record_size, record_struct = get_record_size_struct(list(records.keys())) + +# Find the optimum block size for the two-stage table + +min_size = sys.maxsize +for block_size in [2 ** i for i in range(5,10)]: + size = len(records) * record_size + stage1, stage2 = compress_table(table, block_size) + size += get_tables_size(stage1, stage2) + #print "/* block size %5d => %5d bytes */" % (block_size, size) + if size < min_size: + min_size = size + min_stage1, min_stage2 = stage1, stage2 + min_block_size = block_size + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# MAIN CODE FOR WRITING THE OUTPUT FILE +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +# Open the output file (no return on failure). This call also writes standard +# header boilerplate. + +f = open_output("pcre2_ucd.c") + +# Output this file's heading text + +f.write("""\ +/* This file contains tables of Unicode properties that are extracted from +Unicode data files. See the comments at the start of maint/GenerateUcd.py for +details. + +As well as being part of the PCRE2 library, this file is #included by the +pcre2test program, which redefines the PRIV macro to change table names from +_pcre2_xxx to xxxx, thereby avoiding name clashes with the library. At present, +just one of these tables is actually needed. When compiling the library, some +headers are needed. */ + +#ifndef PCRE2_PCRE2TEST +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#endif +#include "pcre2_internal.h" +#endif /* PCRE2_PCRE2TEST */ + +/* The tables herein are needed only when UCP support is built, and in PCRE2 +that happens automatically with UTF support. This module should not be +referenced otherwise, so it should not matter whether it is compiled or not. +However a comment was received about space saving - maybe the guy linked all +the modules rather than using a library - so we include a condition to cut out +the tables when not needed. But don't leave a totally empty module because some +compilers barf at that. Instead, just supply some small dummy tables. */ + +#ifndef SUPPORT_UNICODE +const ucd_record PRIV(ucd_records)[] = {{0,0,0,0,0,0,0}}; +const uint16_t PRIV(ucd_stage1)[] = {0}; +const uint16_t PRIV(ucd_stage2)[] = {0}; +const uint32_t PRIV(ucd_caseless_sets)[] = {0}; +#else +\n""") + +# --- Output some variable heading stuff --- + +f.write("/* Total size: %d bytes, block size: %d. */\n\n" % (min_size, min_block_size)) +f.write('const char *PRIV(unicode_version) = "{}";\n\n'.format(unicode_version)) + +f.write("""\ +/* When recompiling tables with a new Unicode version, please check the types +in this structure definition with those in pcre2_internal.h (the actual field +names will be different). +\n""") + +f.write(record_struct) + +f.write(""" +/* If the 32-bit library is run in non-32-bit mode, character values greater +than 0x10ffff may be encountered. For these we set up a special record. */ + +#if PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH == 32 +const ucd_record PRIV(dummy_ucd_record)[] = {{ + ucp_Unknown, /* script */ + ucp_Cn, /* type unassigned */ + ucp_gbOther, /* grapheme break property */ + 0, /* case set */ + 0, /* other case */ + 0 | (ucp_bidiL << UCD_BIDICLASS_SHIFT), /* script extension and bidi class */ + 0, /* bool properties offset */ + }}; +#endif +\n""") + +# --- Output the table of caseless character sets --- + +f.write("""\ +/* This table contains lists of characters that are caseless sets of +more than one character. Each list is terminated by NOTACHAR. */ + +const uint32_t PRIV(ucd_caseless_sets)[] = { + NOTACHAR, +""") + +for s in caseless_sets: + s = sorted(s) + for x in s: + f.write(' 0x%04x,' % x) + f.write(' NOTACHAR,\n') +f.write('};\n\n') + +# --- Other tables are not needed by pcre2test --- + +f.write("""\ +/* When #included in pcre2test, we don't need the table of digit sets, nor the +the large main UCD tables. */ + +#ifndef PCRE2_PCRE2TEST +\n""") + +# --- Read Scripts.txt again for the sets of 10 digits. --- + +digitsets = [] +file = open('Unicode.tables/Scripts.txt', 'r', encoding='utf-8') + +for line in file: + m = re.match(r'([0-9a-fA-F]+)\.\.([0-9a-fA-F]+)\s+;\s+\S+\s+#\s+Nd\s+', line) + if m is None: + continue + first = int(m.group(1),16) + last = int(m.group(2),16) + if ((last - first + 1) % 10) != 0: + f.write("ERROR: %04x..%04x does not contain a multiple of 10 characters" % (first, last), + file=sys.stderr) + while first < last: + digitsets.append(first + 9) + first += 10 +file.close() +digitsets.sort() + +f.write("""\ +/* This table lists the code points for the '9' characters in each set of +decimal digits. It is used to ensure that all the digits in a script run come +from the same set. */ + +const uint32_t PRIV(ucd_digit_sets)[] = { +""") + +f.write(" %d, /* Number of subsequent values */" % len(digitsets)) +count = 8 +for d in digitsets: + if count == 8: + f.write("\n ") + count = 0 + f.write(" 0x%05x," % d) + count += 1 +f.write("\n};\n\n") + +f.write("""\ +/* This vector is a list of script bitsets for the Script Extension property. +The number of 32-bit words in each bitset is #defined in pcre2_ucp.h as +ucd_script_sets_item_size. */ + +const uint32_t PRIV(ucd_script_sets)[] = { +""") +write_bitsets(script_lists, script_list_item_size) + +f.write("""\ +/* This vector is a list of bitsets for Boolean properties. The number of +32_bit words in each bitset is #defined as ucd_boolprop_sets_item_size in +pcre2_ucp.h. */ + +const uint32_t PRIV(ucd_boolprop_sets)[] = { +""") +write_bitsets(bool_props_lists, bool_props_list_item_size) + + +# Output the main UCD tables. + +f.write("""\ +/* These are the main two-stage UCD tables. The fields in each record are: +script (8 bits), character type (8 bits), grapheme break property (8 bits), +offset to multichar other cases or zero (8 bits), offset to other case or zero +(32 bits, signed), bidi class (5 bits) and script extension (11 bits) packed +into a 16-bit field, and offset in binary properties table (16 bits). */ +\n""") + +write_records(records, record_size) +write_table(min_stage1, 'PRIV(ucd_stage1)') +write_table(min_stage2, 'PRIV(ucd_stage2)', min_block_size) + +f.write("#if UCD_BLOCK_SIZE != %d\n" % min_block_size) +f.write("""\ +#error Please correct UCD_BLOCK_SIZE in pcre2_internal.h +#endif +#endif /* SUPPORT_UNICODE */ + +#endif /* PCRE2_PCRE2TEST */ + +/* End of pcre2_ucd.c */ +""") + +f.close + +# End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateUcpHeader.py b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateUcpHeader.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4fe43d5e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateUcpHeader.py @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +#! /usr/bin/python + +# PCRE2 UNICODE PROPERTY SUPPORT +# ------------------------------ + +# This script generates the pcre2_ucp.h file from Unicode data files. This +# header uses enumerations to give names to Unicode property types and script +# names. + +# This script was created in December 2021 as part of the Unicode data +# generation refactoring. + + +# Import common data lists and functions + +from GenerateCommon import \ + bidi_classes, \ + bool_properties, \ + bool_props_list_item_size, \ + break_properties, \ + category_names, \ + general_category_names, \ + script_list_item_size, \ + script_names, \ + open_output + +# Open the output file (no return on failure). This call also writes standard +# header boilerplate. + +f = open_output("pcre2_ucp.h") + +# Output this file's heading text + +f.write("""\ +#ifndef PCRE2_UCP_H_IDEMPOTENT_GUARD +#define PCRE2_UCP_H_IDEMPOTENT_GUARD + +/* This file contains definitions of the Unicode property values that are +returned by the UCD access macros and used throughout PCRE2. + +IMPORTANT: The specific values of the first two enums (general and particular +character categories) are assumed by the table called catposstab in the file +pcre2_auto_possess.c. They are unlikely to change, but should be checked after +an update. */ +\n""") + +f.write("/* These are the general character categories. */\n\nenum {\n") +for i in general_category_names: + f.write(" ucp_%s,\n" % i) +f.write("};\n\n") + +f.write("/* These are the particular character categories. */\n\nenum {\n") +for i in range(0, len(category_names), 2): + f.write(" ucp_%s, /* %s */\n" % (category_names[i], category_names[i+1])) +f.write("};\n\n") + +f.write("/* These are Boolean properties. */\n\nenum {\n") +for i in bool_properties: + f.write(" ucp_%s,\n" % i) + +f.write(" /* This must be last */\n") +f.write(" ucp_Bprop_Count\n};\n\n") + +f.write("/* Size of entries in ucd_boolprop_sets[] */\n\n") +f.write("#define ucd_boolprop_sets_item_size %d\n\n" % bool_props_list_item_size) + +f.write("/* These are the bidi class values. */\n\nenum {\n") +for i in range(0, len(bidi_classes), 2): + sp = ' ' * (4 - len(bidi_classes[i])) + f.write(" ucp_bidi%s,%s /* %s */\n" % (bidi_classes[i], sp, bidi_classes[i+1])) +f.write("};\n\n") + +f.write("/* These are grapheme break properties. The Extended Pictographic " + "property\ncomes from the emoji-data.txt file. */\n\nenum {\n") +for i in range(0, len(break_properties), 2): + sp = ' ' * (21 - len(break_properties[i])) + f.write(" ucp_gb%s,%s /* %s */\n" % (break_properties[i], sp, break_properties[i+1])) +f.write("};\n\n") + +f.write("/* These are the script identifications. */\n\nenum {\n /* Scripts which has characters in other scripts. */\n") +for i in script_names: + if i == "Unknown": + f.write("\n /* Scripts which has no characters in other scripts. */\n") + f.write(" ucp_%s,\n" % i) +f.write("\n") + +f.write(" /* This must be last */\n") +f.write(" ucp_Script_Count\n};\n\n") + +f.write("/* Size of entries in ucd_script_sets[] */\n\n") +f.write("#define ucd_script_sets_item_size %d\n\n" % script_list_item_size) + +f.write("#endif /* PCRE2_UCP_H_IDEMPOTENT_GUARD */\n\n") +f.write("/* End of pcre2_ucp.h */\n") + +f.close() + +# End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateUcpTables.py b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateUcpTables.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..528ff916 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/GenerateUcpTables.py @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +#! /usr/bin/python + +# PCRE2 UNICODE PROPERTY SUPPORT +# ------------------------------ + +# This script generates the pcre2_ucptables.c file, which contains tables for +# recognizing Unicode property names. It is #included by pcre2_tables.c. In +# order to reduce the number of relocations when loading the PCRE2 library, the +# names are held as a single large string, with offsets in the table. This is +# tedious to maintain by hand. Therefore, a script is used to generate the +# table. + +# This script was created in December 2021 based on the previous GenerateUtt +# script, whose output had to be manually edited into pcre2_tables.c. Here is +# the history of the original script: + +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Modified by PH 17-March-2009 to generate the more verbose form that works +# for UTF-support in EBCDIC as well as ASCII environments. +# Modified by PH 01-March-2010 to add new scripts for Unicode 5.2.0. +# Modified by PH 04-May-2010 to add new "X.." special categories. +# Modified by PH 30-April-2011 to add new scripts for Unicode 6.0.0 +# Modified by ChPe 30-September-2012 to add this note; no other changes were +# necessary for Unicode 6.2.0 support. +# Modfied by PH 26-February-2013 to add the Xuc special category. +# Comment modified by PH 13-May-2014 to update to PCRE2 file names. +# Script updated to Python 3 by running it through the 2to3 converter. +# Added script names for Unicode 7.0.0, 20-June-2014. +# Added script names for Unicode 8.0.0, 19-June-2015. +# Added script names for Unicode 10.0.0, 02-July-2017. +# Added script names for Unicode 11.0.0, 03-July-2018. +# Added 'Unknown' script, 01-October-2018. +# Added script names for Unicode 12.1.0, 27-July-2019. +# Added script names for Unicode 13.0.0, 10-March-2020. +# Added Script names for Unicode 14.0.0, PCRE2-10.39 +# Added support for bidi class and bidi control, 06-December-2021 +# This also involved lower casing strings and removing underscores, in +# accordance with Unicode's "loose matching" rules, which Perl observes. +# Changed default script type from PT_SC to PT_SCX, 18-December-2021 +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# +# Note subsequent changes here: +# +# 27-December-2021: Added support for 4-letter script abbreviations. +# 10-January-2022: Further updates for Boolean property support +# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +# Import common data lists and functions + +from GenerateCommon import \ + abbreviations, \ + bool_properties, \ + bidi_classes, \ + category_names, \ + general_category_names, \ + script_names, \ + open_output + +# Open the output file (no return on failure). This call also writes standard +# header boilerplate. + +f = open_output("pcre2_ucptables.c") + +# The list in bidi_classes contains just the Unicode classes such as AN, LRE, +# etc., along with comments. We need to add "bidi" in front of each value, in +# order to create names that don't clash with other types of property. + +bidi_class_names = [] +for i in range(0, len(bidi_classes), 2): + bidi_class_names.append("bidi" + bidi_classes[i]) + +# Remove the comments from other lists that contain them. + +category_names = category_names[::2] + +# Create standardized versions of the names by lowercasing and removing +# underscores. + +def stdname(x): + return x.lower().replace('_', '') + +def stdnames(x): + y = [''] * len(x) + for i in range(len(x)): + y[i] = stdname(x[i]) + return y + +std_category_names = stdnames(category_names) +std_general_category_names = stdnames(general_category_names) +std_bidi_class_names = stdnames(bidi_class_names) +std_bool_properties = stdnames(bool_properties) + +# Create the table, starting with the Unicode script, category and bidi class +# names. We keep both the standardized name and the original, because the +# latter is used for the ucp_xx names. NOTE: for the script abbreviations, we +# still use the full original names. + +utt_table = [] + +scx_end = script_names.index('Unknown') + +for idx, name in enumerate(script_names): + pt_type = 'PT_SCX' if idx < scx_end else 'PT_SC' + utt_table.append((stdname(name), name, pt_type)) + for abbrev in abbreviations[name]: + utt_table.append((stdname(abbrev), name, pt_type)) + +# Add the remaining property lists + +utt_table += list(zip(std_category_names, category_names, ['PT_PC'] * len(category_names))) +utt_table += list(zip(std_general_category_names, general_category_names, ['PT_GC'] * len(general_category_names))) +utt_table += list(zip(std_bidi_class_names, bidi_class_names, ['PT_BIDICL'] * len(bidi_class_names))) + +for name in bool_properties: + utt_table.append((stdname(name), name, 'PT_BOOL')) + if name in abbreviations: + for abbrev in abbreviations[name]: + utt_table.append((stdname(abbrev), name, 'PT_BOOL')) + +# Now add specials and synonyms. Note both the standardized and capitalized +# forms are needed. + +utt_table.append(('any', 'Any', 'PT_ANY')) +utt_table.append(('l&', 'L&', 'PT_LAMP')) +utt_table.append(('lc', 'LC', 'PT_LAMP')) +utt_table.append(('xan', 'Xan', 'PT_ALNUM')) +utt_table.append(('xps', 'Xps', 'PT_PXSPACE')) +utt_table.append(('xsp', 'Xsp', 'PT_SPACE')) +utt_table.append(('xuc', 'Xuc', 'PT_UCNC')) +utt_table.append(('xwd', 'Xwd', 'PT_WORD')) + +# Remove duplicates from the table and then sort it. + +utt_table = list(set(utt_table)) +utt_table.sort() + +# Output file-specific heading + +f.write("""\ +#ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE + +/* The PRIV(utt)[] table below translates Unicode property names into type and +code values. It is searched by binary chop, so must be in collating sequence of +name. Originally, the table contained pointers to the name strings in the first +field of each entry. However, that leads to a large number of relocations when +a shared library is dynamically loaded. A significant reduction is made by +putting all the names into a single, large string and using offsets instead. +All letters are lower cased, and underscores are removed, in accordance with +the "loose matching" rules that Unicode advises and Perl uses. */ +\n""") + +# We have to use STR_ macros to define the strings so that it all works in +# UTF-8 mode on EBCDIC platforms. + +for utt in utt_table: + f.write('#define STRING_%s0' % (utt[0].replace('&', '_AMPERSAND'))) + for c in utt[0]: + if c == '&': + f.write(' STR_AMPERSAND') + else: + f.write(' STR_%s' % c); + f.write(' "\\0"\n') + +# Output the long string of concatenated names + +f.write('\nconst char PRIV(utt_names)[] =\n'); +last = '' +for utt in utt_table: + if utt == utt_table[-1]: + last = ';' + f.write(' STRING_%s0%s\n' % (utt[0].replace('&', '_AMPERSAND'), last)) + +# Output the property type table + +f.write('\nconst ucp_type_table PRIV(utt)[] = {\n') +offset = 0 +last = ',' +for utt in utt_table: + if utt[2] in ('PT_ANY', 'PT_LAMP', 'PT_ALNUM', 'PT_PXSPACE', + 'PT_SPACE', 'PT_UCNC', 'PT_WORD'): + value = '0' + else: + value = 'ucp_' + utt[1] + if utt == utt_table[-1]: + last = '' + f.write(' { %3d, %s, %s }%s\n' % (offset, utt[2], value, last)) + offset += len(utt[0]) + 1 +f.write('};\n\n') + +# Ending text + +f.write("""\ +const size_t PRIV(utt_size) = sizeof(PRIV(utt)) / sizeof(ucp_type_table); + +#endif /* SUPPORT_UNICODE */ + +/* End of pcre2_ucptables.c */ +""") + +f.close + +# End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/ManyConfigTests b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/ManyConfigTests new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d82613f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/ManyConfigTests @@ -0,0 +1,453 @@ +#! /bin/sh + +# This is a script for the use of PCRE2 maintainers. It configures and rebuilds +# PCRE2 with a variety of configuration options, and in each case runs the +# tests to ensure that all goes well. Every possible combination would take far +# too long, so we use a representative sample. This script should be run in the +# PCRE2 source directory. + +# While debugging, it is sometimes useful to be able to cut out some of the +# tests, in order to run those that are giving errors. The following options +# do this: +# +# -noasan skip the test that uses -fsanitize=address +# -nousan skip the test that uses -fsanitize=undefined +# -nodebug skip the test that uses --enable-debug +# -nojit skip all JIT tests +# -nojitmain skip non-valgrind JIT tests +# -nojitvalgrind skip JIT tests with valgrind +# -nomain skip all the main (non-JIT) set of tests +# -nomainvalgrind skip the main (non-JIT) valgrind tests +# -notmp skip the test in a temporary directory +# -novalgrind skip all the valgrind tests + +# Alternatively, if any of those names are given with '+' instead of '-no', +# only those groups named with '+' are run (e.g. +jit). If -dummy is given, +# no tests are actually run - this provides a means of testing the selectors. + +# The -v option causes a call to 'pcre2test -C' to happen for each +# configuration. + +useasan=1 +useusan=1 +usedebug=1 +usejit=1 +usejitvalgrind=1 +usemain=1 +usemainvalgrind=1 +usetmp=1 +usevalgrind=1 + +dummy=0 +seenplus=0 +verbose=0 + +while [ $# -gt 0 ] ; do + case $1 in + +*) if [ $seenplus -eq 0 ]; then + useasan=0 + useusan=0 + usedebug=0 + usejit=0 + usejitvalgrind=0 + usemain=0 + usemainvalgrind=0 + usetmp=0 + seenplus=1 + fi;; + esac + + case $1 in + -dummy) dummy=1;; + -v) verbose=1;; + -noasan) useasan=0;; + -nousan) useusan=0;; + -nodebug) usedebug=0;; + -nojit) usejit=0; usejitvalgrind=0;; + -nojitmain) usejit=0;; + -nojitvalgrind) usejitvalgrind=0;; + -nomain) usemain=0; usemainvalgrind=0;; + -nomainvalgrind) usemainvalgrind=0;; + -notmp) usetmp=0;; + -novalgrind) usevalgrind=0;; + +asan) useasan=1;; + +usan) useusan=1;; + +debug) usedebug=1;; + +jit) usejit=1; usejitvalgrind=1;; + +jitmain) usejit=1;; + +jitvalgrind) usejitvalgrind=1;; + +main) usemain=1; usemainvalgrind=1;; + +mainvalgrind) usemainvalgrind=1;; + +tmp) usetmp=1;; + +valgrind) usevalgrind=1; usejitvalgrind=1; usemainvalgrind=1;; + *) echo "Unknown option '$1'"; exit 1;; + esac + shift +done + +if [ $usejitvalgrind -eq 0 -a $usemainvalgrind -eq 0 ] ; then + usevalgrind=0 +fi + +# This is in case the caller has set aliases (as I do - PH) + +unset cp ls mv rm + +# This is a temporary directory for testing out-of-line builds + +tmp=/tmp/pcre2testing + +# Don't bother with compiler optimization for most tests; it just slows down +# compilation a lot (and running the tests themselves is quick). However, one +# special test turns optimization on, because it can provoke some compiler +# warnings. + +CFLAGS="-g" +OFLAGS="-O0" +ISGCC=0 + +# If the compiler is gcc, add a lot of warning switches. + +cc --version >/tmp/pcre2ccversion 2>/dev/null +if [ $? -eq 0 ] && grep GCC /tmp/pcre2ccversion >/dev/null; then + ISGCC=1 + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wno-overlength-strings" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wpointer-arith" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wwrite-strings" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wundef -Wshadow" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wmissing-field-initializers" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wunused-parameter" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wextra -Wformat" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wbad-function-cast" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wmissing-declarations" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wnested-externs" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -pedantic" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wuninitialized" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wmaybe-uninitialized" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wmissing-prototypes" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wstrict-prototypes" +fi +rm -f /tmp/pcre2ccversion + +# This function runs a single test with the set of configuration options that +# are in $opts. The source directory must be set in srcdir. The function must +# be defined as "runtest()" not "function runtest()" in order to run on +# Solaris. + +runtest() + { + rm -f $srcdir/pcre2test $srcdir/pcre2grep $srcdir/pcre2_jit_test + testcount=`expr $testcount + 1` + + if [ "$opts" = "" ] ; then + echo "[$testcount/$testtotal] Configuring with: default settings" + else + echo "[$testcount/$testtotal] Configuring with:" + echo " $opts" + fi + + if [ $dummy -eq 1 ]; then return; fi + + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" \ + $srcdir/configure $opts >/dev/null 2>teststderrM + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo " " + echo "******** Error while configuring ********" + cat teststderrM + exit 1 + fi + +# There is an infelicity in the Autotools world (as of October 2015) which +# causes the message +# +# ar: `u' modifier ignored since `D' is the default (see `U') +# +# to be output while linking. This triggers an unwanted error report from this +# script, because it expects no stderr output while making. To get round this +# we filter the stderr output through sed, removing all occurrences of the +# above lines. Just for paranoia, check that sed is available before doing +# this. + + echo "Making" + make -j >/dev/null 2>teststderrM + makeRC=$? + if command -v sed >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + sed "/\`u' modifier ignored since \`D' is the default/ d" \ + teststderrM > teststderrMM + mv -f teststderrMM teststderrM + fi + if [ $makeRC -ne 0 -o -s teststderrM ]; then + echo " " + echo "******** Errors or warnings while making ********" + echo " " + cat teststderrM + exit 1 + fi + + if [ $verbose -eq 1 ]; then + ./pcre2test -C + fi + + ./pcre2test -C jit >/dev/null + jit=$? + ./pcre2test -C pcre2-8 >/dev/null + pcre2_8=$? + + echo "Running PCRE2 library tests $withvalgrind" + $srcdir/RunTest $valgrind >teststdoutM 2>teststderrM + + if [ $? -ne 0 -o -s teststderrM ]; then + echo " " + echo "**** Test failed ****" + if [ -s teststderrM ] ; then + cat teststderrM + else + cat teststdoutM + fi + exit 1 + fi + + if [ $pcre2_8 -gt 0 ]; then + echo "Running pcre2grep tests $withvalgrind" + $srcdir/RunGrepTest $valgrind >teststdoutM 2>teststderrM + if [ $? -ne 0 -o -s teststderrM ]; then + echo " " + echo "**** Test failed ****" + cat teststderrM + cat teststdoutM + exit 1 + fi + else + echo "Skipping pcre2grep tests: 8-bit library not compiled" + fi + + if [ "$jit" -gt 0 ]; then + echo "Running JIT regression tests $withvalgrind" + $jrvalgrind $srcdir/pcre2_jit_test >teststdoutM 2>teststderrM + if [ $? -ne 0 -o -s teststderrM ]; then + echo " " + echo "**** Test failed ****" + cat teststderrM + cat teststdoutM + exit 1 + fi + else + echo "Skipping JIT regression tests: JIT is not enabled" + fi + } + +# Update the total count whenever a new test is added; it is used to show +# progess as each test is run. + +testtotal=`expr 17 \* $usemain + \ + 1 \* $usemain \* $usedebug + \ + 1 \* $usetmp + \ + 1 \* $ISGCC \* $usemain + \ + 1 \* $ISGCC \* $usemain \* $useasan + \ + 1 \* $ISGCC \* $usemain \* $useusan + \ + 13 \* $usejit + \ + 2 \* $usemainvalgrind + \ + 2 \* $usejitvalgrind` + +testcount=0 + +if [ $testtotal -eq 0 ] ; then + echo "** No tests selected" + exit 1 +fi + +valgrind= +jrvalgrind= +withvalgrind= +srcdir=. +export srcdir + +if [ $usejit -ne 0 ]; then + enable_jit=--enable-jit +else + enable_jit= +fi + +# If gcc is in use, run a maximally configured test with -O2, because that can +# throw up warnings that are not detected with -O0. Then run a second test with +# -fsanitize=address, which also may throw up new warnings as well as checking +# things at runtime. Finally, run another test using -fsanitize=undefined +# -std-gnu99 to check for runtime actions that are not well defined. However, +# we also use -fno-sanitize=shift to avoid warnings for shifts of negative +# numbers, which occur in src/pcre2_jit_compile.c. + +if [ $ISGCC -ne 0 -a $usemain -ne 0 ]; then + echo "---------- Maximally configured test with -O2 ----------" + SAVECFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="-O2 $CFLAGS" + echo "CFLAGS=$CFLAGS" + opts="--disable-shared $enable_jit --enable-pcre2-16 --enable-pcre2-32" + runtest + if [ $useasan -ne 0 ]; then + echo "---------- Maximally configured test with -fsanitize=address ----------" +# Following a kernel change, sanitize address doesn't work unless the extra +# PIE options are also set. + CFLAGS="$OFLAGS $SAVECFLAGS -no-pie -fno-PIE -fsanitize=address" + echo "CFLAGS=$CFLAGS" + opts="--disable-shared $enable_jit --enable-pcre2-16 --enable-pcre2-32" + runtest + fi +# This also seems to be the case for sanitize undefined. + if [ $useusan -ne 0 ]; then + echo "------- Maximally configured test with -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize=shift -fno-sanitize=alignment -std=gnu99 -------" + CFLAGS="$OFLAGS $SAVECFLAGS -no-pie -fno-PIE -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize=shift -fno-sanitize=alignment -std=gnu99" + echo "CFLAGS=$CFLAGS" + opts="--disable-shared $enable_jit --enable-pcre2-16 --enable-pcre2-32" + runtest + fi + CFLAGS="$OFLAGS $SAVECFLAGS" +fi + +# This set of tests builds PCRE2 and runs the tests with a variety of configure +# options, in the current (source) directory. The empty configuration builds +# with all the default settings. As well as testing that these options work, we +# use --disable-shared or --disable-static except for the default test (which +# builds both) to save a bit of time by building only one version of the +# library for the subsequent tests. + +echo "---------- CFLAGS for the remaining tests ----------" +echo "CFLAGS=$CFLAGS" + +if [ $usemain -ne 0 ]; then + if [ $usedebug -ne 0 ]; then + echo "---------- Maximally configured test with --enable-debug ----------" + opts="--disable-shared $enable_jit --enable-pcre2-16 --enable-pcre2-32 --enable-debug" + runtest + fi + + echo "---------- Non-JIT tests in the current directory ----------" + for opts in \ + "" \ + "--disable-static" \ + "--disable-shared" \ + "--disable-unicode --disable-shared --enable-never-backslash-C" \ + "--with-link-size=3 --disable-shared --disable-pcre2grep-callout" \ + "--disable-unicode --enable-rebuild-chartables --disable-shared" \ + "--disable-unicode --enable-newline-is-any --disable-shared" \ + "--disable-unicode --enable-newline-is-cr --disable-shared" \ + "--disable-unicode --enable-newline-is-crlf --disable-shared" \ + "--disable-unicode --enable-newline-is-anycrlf --enable-bsr-anycrlf --disable-shared" \ + "--enable-newline-is-any --disable-static" \ + "--disable-unicode --enable-pcre2-16" \ + "--enable-pcre2-16 --disable-shared" \ + "--disable-unicode --enable-pcre2-32" \ + "--enable-pcre2-32 --disable-shared" \ + "--disable-unicode --enable-pcre2-32 --enable-pcre2-16 --disable-shared" \ + "--disable-unicode --enable-pcre2-32 --enable-pcre2-16 --disable-pcre2-8 --disable-shared" + do + runtest + done +fi + +# Now run the JIT tests unless disabled + +if [ $usejit -ne 0 ]; then + echo "---------- JIT tests in the current directory ----------" + for opts in \ + "--disable-unicode --enable-jit --disable-shared" \ + "--enable-jit --disable-shared" \ + "--enable-jit --with-link-size=3 --disable-shared" \ + "--enable-jit --enable-pcre2-16 --disable-shared" \ + "--disable-unicode --enable-jit --enable-pcre2-16 --disable-pcre2-8 --disable-shared" \ + "--enable-jit --enable-pcre2-16 --disable-pcre2-8 --disable-shared" \ + "--enable-jit --enable-pcre2-16 --with-link-size=3 --disable-shared" \ + "--enable-jit --enable-pcre2-16 --with-link-size=4 --disable-shared" \ + "--enable-jit --enable-pcre2-32 --disable-shared" \ + "--disable-unicode --enable-jit --enable-pcre2-32 --disable-pcre2-8 --disable-shared" \ + "--enable-jit --enable-pcre2-32 --disable-pcre2-8 --disable-shared" \ + "--enable-jit --enable-pcre2-32 --with-link-size=4 --disable-shared" \ + "--enable-jit --enable-pcre2-32 --enable-pcre2-16 --disable-pcre2-8 --enable-newline-is-anycrlf --enable-bsr-anycrlf --disable-shared" + do + runtest + done +fi + +# Now re-run some of the tests under valgrind. + +if [ $usevalgrind -ne 0 ]; then + echo "---------- Tests in the current directory using valgrind ----------" + valgrind=valgrind + withvalgrind="with valgrind" + + if [ $usemainvalgrind -ne 0 ]; then + for opts in \ + "--disable-shared" \ + "--with-link-size=3 --enable-pcre2-16 --enable-pcre2-32 --disable-shared" + do + opts="--enable-valgrind $opts" + runtest + done + fi + + if [ $usejitvalgrind -ne 0 ]; then + jrvalgrind="valgrind --tool=memcheck -q --smc-check=all-non-file --suppressions=$srcdir/testdata/valgrind-jit.supp" + for opts in \ + "--enable-jit --disable-shared" \ + "--enable-jit --enable-pcre2-16 --enable-pcre2-32" + do + opts="--enable-valgrind $opts" + runtest + done + fi +fi + +valgrind= +jrvalgrind= +withvalgrind= + +# Clean up the distribution and then do at least one build and test in a +# directory other than the source directory. It doesn't work unless the +# source directory is cleaned up first. + +if [ -f Makefile ]; then + echo "Running 'make distclean'" + make distclean >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "** 'make distclean' failed" + exit 1 + fi +fi + +echo "---------- End of tests in the source directory ----------" +echo "Removing teststdoutM and teststderrM" +rm -rf teststdoutM teststderrM + +if [ $usetmp -ne 0 ]; then + echo "---------- Tests in the $tmp directory ----------" + srcdir=`pwd` + export srcdir + + if [ ! -e $tmp ]; then + mkdir $tmp + fi + + if [ ! -d $tmp ]; then + echo "** Failed to create $tmp or it is not a directory" + exit 1 + fi + + cd $tmp + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "** Failed to cd to $tmp" + exit 1 + fi + + for opts in \ + "--disable-shared" + do + runtest + done + + echo "Removing $tmp" + rm -rf $tmp +fi + +echo "---------- All done ----------" + +# End diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/README b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/README new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3d341b80 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/README @@ -0,0 +1,460 @@ +MAINTENANCE README FOR PCRE2 +============================ + +The files in the "maint" directory of the PCRE2 source contain data, scripts, +and programs that are used for the maintenance of PCRE2, but which do not form +part of the PCRE2 distribution tarballs. This document describes these files +and also contains some notes for maintainers. Its contents are: + + Files in the maint directory + Updating to a new Unicode release + Preparing for a PCRE2 release + Making a PCRE2 release + Long-term ideas (wish list) + + +Files in the maint directory +============================ + +GenerateCommon.py + A Python module containing data and functions that are used by the other + Generate scripts. + +GenerateTest26.py + A Python script that generates input and expected output test data for test + 26, which tests certain aspects of Unicode property support. + +GenerateUcd.py + A Python script that generates the file pcre2_ucd.c from GenerateCommon.py + and Unicode data files, which are themselves downloaded from the Unicode web + site. The generated file contains the tables for a 2-stage lookup of Unicode + properties, along with some auxiliary tables. The script starts with a long + comment that gives details of the tables it constructs. + +GenerateUcpHeader.py + A Python script that generates the file pcre2_ucp.h from GenerateCommon.py + and Unicode data files. The generated file defines constants for various + Unicode property values. + +GenerateUcpTables.py + A Python script that generates the file pcre2_ucptables.c from + GenerateCommon.py and Unicode data files. The generated file contains tables + for looking up Unicode property names. + +ManyConfigTests + A shell script that runs "configure, make, test" a number of times with + different configuration settings. + +pcre2_chartables.c.non-standard + This is a set of character tables that came from a Windows system. It has + characters greater than 128 that are set as spaces, amongst other things. I + kept it so that it can be used for testing from time to time. + +README + This file. + +Unicode.tables + The files in this directory were downloaded from the Unicode web site. They + contain information about Unicode characters and scripts, and are used by the + Generate scripts. There is also UnicodeData.txt, which is no longer used by + any script, because it is useful occasionally for manually looking up the + details of certain characters. However, note that character names in this + file such as "Arabic sign sanah" do NOT mean that the character is in a + particular script (in this case, Arabic). Scripts.txt and + ScriptExtensions.txt are where to look for script information. + +ucptest.c + A program for testing the Unicode property macros that do lookups in the + pcre2_ucd.c data, mainly useful after rebuilding the Unicode property tables. + Compile and run this in the "maint" directory (see comments at its head). + This program can also be used to find characters with specific properties and + to list which properties are supported. + +ucptestdata + A directory containing four files, testinput{1,2} and testoutput{1,2}, for + use in conjunction with the ucptest program. + +utf8.c + A short, freestanding C program for converting a Unicode code point into a + sequence of bytes in the UTF-8 encoding, and vice versa. If its argument is a + hex number such as 0x1234, it outputs a list of the equivalent UTF-8 bytes. + If its argument is a sequence of concatenated UTF-8 bytes (e.g. 12e188b4) it + treats them as a UTF-8 string and outputs the equivalent code points in hex. + See comments at its head for details. + + +Updating to a new Unicode release +================================= + +When there is a new release of Unicode, the files in Unicode.tables must be +refreshed from the web site. Once that is done, the four Python scripts that +generate files from the Unicode data can be run from within the "maint" +directory. + +Note: Previously, it was necessary to update lists of scripts and their +abbreviations by hand before running the Python scripts. This is no longer +necessary because the scripts have been upgraded to extract this information +themselves. Also, there used to be explicit lists of scripts in two of the man +pages. This is no longer the case; the pcre2test program can now output a list +of supported scripts. + +You can give an output file name as an argument to the following scripts, but +by default: + +GenerateUcd.py creates pcre2_ucd.c ) +GenerateUcpHeader.py creates pcre2_ucp.h ) in the current directory +GenerateUcpTables.py creates pcre2_ucptables.c ) + +These files can be compared against the existing versions in the src directory +to check on any changes before replacing the old files, but you can also +generate directly into the final location by running: + +./GenerateUcd.py ../src/pcre2_ucd.c +./GenerateUcpHeader.py ../src/pcre2_ucp.h +./GenerateUcpTables.py ../src/pcre2_ucptables.c + +Once the .c and .h files are in the ../src directory, the ucptest program can +be compiled and used to check that the new tables work properly. The data files +in ucptestdata are set up to check a number of test characters. See the +comments at the start of ucptest.c. If there are new scripts, adding a few +tests to the files in ucptestdata is a good idea. + +Finally, you should run the GenerateTest26.py script to regenerate new versions +of the input and expected output from a series of Unicode property tests that +are automatically generated from the Unicode data files. By default, the files +are written to testinput26 and testoutput26 in the current directory, but you +can give an alternative directory name as an argument to the script. These +files should eventually be installed in the main testdata directory. + + +Preparing for a PCRE2 release +============================= + +This section contains a checklist of things that I do before building a new +release. + +. Ensure that the version number and version date are correct in configure.ac. + +. Update the library version numbers in configure.ac according to the rules + given below. + +. If new build options or new source files have been added, ensure that they + are added to the CMake files as well as to the autoconf files. The relevant + files are CMakeLists.txt and config-cmake.h.in. After making a release, test + it out with CMake if there have been changes here. + +. Run ./autogen.sh to ensure everything is up-to-date. + +. Compile and test with many different config options, and combinations of + options. Also, test with valgrind by running "RunTest valgrind" and + "RunGrepTest valgrind". The script maint/ManyConfigTests now encapsulates + this testing. It runs tests with different configurations, and it also runs + some of them with valgrind, all of which can take quite some time. + +. Run tests in both 32-bit and 64-bit environments if possible. I can no longer + run 32-bit tests. + +. Run tests with two or more different compilers (e.g. clang and gcc), and + make use of -fsanitize=address and friends where possible. For gcc, + -fsanitize=undefined -std=gnu99 picks up undefined behaviour at runtime, but + needs -fno-sanitize=shift to get rid of warnings for shifts of negative + numbers in the JIT compiler. For clang, -fsanitize=address,undefined,integer + can be used but -fno-sanitize=alignment,shift,unsigned-integer-overflow must + be added when compiling with JIT. Another useful clang option is + -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow + +. Do a test build using CMake. Remove src/config.h first, lest it override the + version that CMake creates. Also do a CMake unity build to check that it + still works: [c]cmake -DCMAKE_UNITY_BUILD=ON sets up a unity build. + +. Run perltest.sh on the test data for tests 1 and 4. The output should match + the PCRE2 test output, apart from the version identification at the start of + each test. Sometimes there are other differences in test 4 if PCRE2 and Perl + are using different Unicode releases. The other tests are not Perl-compatible + (they use various PCRE2-specific features or options). + +. It is possible to test with the emulated memmove() function by undefining + HAVE_MEMMOVE and HAVE_BCOPY in config.h, though I do not do this often. + +. Documentation: check AUTHORS, ChangeLog (check version and date), LICENCE, + NEWS (check version and date), NON-AUTOTOOLS-BUILD, and README. Many of these + won't need changing, but over the long term things do change. + +. I used to test new releases myself on a number of different operating + systems. For example, on Solaris it is helpful to test using Sun's cc + compiler as a change from gcc. Adding -xarch=v9 to the cc options does a + 64-bit test, but it also needs -S 64 for pcre2test to increase the stack size + for test 2. Since I retired I can no longer do much of this. There are + automated tests under Ubuntu, Alpine, and Windows that are now set up as + GitHub actions. Check that they are running clean. + +. The buildbots at http://buildfarm.opencsw.org/ do some automated testing + of PCRE2 and should also be checked before putting out a release. + + +Updating version info for libtool +================================= + +This set of rules for updating library version information came from a web page +whose URL I have forgotten. The version information consists of three parts: +(current, revision, age). + +1. Start with version information of 0:0:0 for each libtool library. + +2. Update the version information only immediately before a public release of + your software. More frequent updates are unnecessary, and only guarantee + that the current interface number gets larger faster. + +3. If the library source code has changed at all since the last update, then + increment revision; c:r:a becomes c:r+1:a. + +4. If any interfaces have been added, removed, or changed since the last + update, increment current, and set revision to 0. + +5. If any interfaces have been added since the last public release, then + increment age. + +6. If any interfaces have been removed or changed since the last public + release, then set age to 0. + +The following explanation may help in understanding the above rules a bit +better. Consider that there are three possible kinds of reaction from users to +changes in a shared library: + +1. Programs using the previous version may use the new version as a drop-in + replacement, and programs using the new version can also work with the + previous one. In other words, no recompiling nor relinking is needed. In + this case, increment revision only, don't touch current or age. + +2. Programs using the previous version may use the new version as a drop-in + replacement, but programs using the new version may use APIs not present in + the previous one. In other words, a program linking against the new version + may fail if linked against the old version at run time. In this case, set + revision to 0, increment current and age. + +3. Programs may need to be changed, recompiled, relinked in order to use the + new version. Increment current, set revision and age to 0. + + +Making a PCRE2 release +====================== + +Run PrepareRelease and commit the files that it changes. The first thing this +script does is to run CheckMan on the man pages; if it finds any markup errors, +it reports them and then aborts. Otherwise it removes trailing spaces from +sources and refreshes the HTML documentation. Update the GitHub repository with +"git push". + +Once PrepareRelease has run clean, run "make distcheck" to create the tarballs +and the zipball. I then sign these files. Double-check with "git status" that +the repository is fully up-to-date, then create a new tag and a release on +GitHub. Upload the tarballs, zipball, and the signatures as "assets" of the +GitHub release. + +When the new release is out, don't forget to tell webmaster@pcre.org and the +mailing list. + + +Future ideas (wish list) +======================== + +This section records a list of ideas so that they do not get forgotten. They +vary enormously in their usefulness and potential for implementation. Some are +very sensible; some are rather wacky. Some have been on this list for many +years. + +. Optimization + + There are always ideas for new optimizations so as to speed up pattern + matching. Most of them try to save work by recognizing a non-match without + having to scan all the possibilities. These are some that I've recorded: + + * /((A{0,5}){0,5}){0,5}(something complex)/ on a non-matching string is very + slow, though Perl is fast. Can we speed up somehow? Convert to {0,125}? + OTOH, this is pathological - the user could easily fix it. + + * Turn ={4} into ==== ? (for speed). I once did an experiment, and it seems + to have little effect, and maybe makes things worse. + + * "Ends with literal string" - note that a single character doesn't gain much + over the existing "required code unit" feature that just remembers one code + unit. + + * Remember an initial string rather than just 1 code unit. + + * A required code unit from alternatives - not just the last unit, but an + earlier one if common to all alternatives. + + * Friedl contains other ideas. + + * The code does not set initial code unit flags for Unicode property types + such as \p; I don't know how much benefit there would be for, for example, + setting the bits for 0-9 and all values >= xC0 (in 8-bit mode) when a + pattern starts with \p{N}. + +. If Perl gets to a consistent state over the settings of capturing sub- + patterns inside repeats, see if we can match it. One example of the + difference is the matching of /(main(O)?)+/ against mainOmain, where PCRE2 + leaves $2 set. In Perl, it's unset. Changing this in PCRE2 will be very hard + because I think it needs much more state to be remembered. + +. A feature to suspend a match via a callout was once requested. + +. An option to convert results into character offsets and character lengths. + +. A (non-Unix) user wanted pcregrep options to (a) list a file name just once, + preceded by a blank line, instead of adding it to every matched line, and (b) + support --outputfile=name. + +. Define a union for the results from pcre2_pattern_info(). + +. Provide a "random access to the subject" facility so that the way in which it + is stored is independent of PCRE2. For efficiency, it probably isn't possible + to switch this dynamically. It would have to be specified when PCRE2 was + compiled. PCRE2 would then call a function every time it wanted a character. + +. pcre2grep: add -rs for a sorted recurse. Having to store file names and sort + them will of course slow it down. + +. Someone suggested --disable-callout to save code space when callouts are + never wanted. This seems rather marginal. + +. A user suggested a parameter to limit the length of string matched, for + example if the parameter is N, the current match should fail if the matched + substring exceeds N. This could apply to both match functions. The value + could be a new field in the match context. Compare the offset_limit feature, + which limits where a match must start. + +. Write a function that generates random matching strings for a compiled + pattern. + +. Pcre2grep: an option to specify the output line separator, either as a string + or select from a fixed list. This is not straightforward, because at the + moment it outputs whatever is in the input file. + +. Improve the code for duplicate checking in pcre2_dfa_match(). An incomplete, + non-thread-safe patch showed that this can help performance for patterns + where there are many alternatives. However, a simple thread-safe + implementation that I tried made things worse in many simple cases, so this + is not an obviously good thing. + +. PCRE2 cannot at present distinguish between subpatterns with different names, + but the same number (created by the use of ?|). In order to do so, a way of + remembering *which* subpattern numbered n matched is needed. (*MARK) can + perhaps be used as a way round this problem. However, note that Perl does not + distinguish: like PCRE2, a name is just an alias for a number in Perl. + +. Instead of having #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H in each module, put #include + "something" and the the #ifdef appears only in one place, in "something". + +. Implement something like (?(R2+)... to check outer recursions. + +. If Perl ever supports the POSIX notation [[.something.]] PCRE2 should try + to follow. + +. A user wanted a way of ignoring all Unicode "mark" characters so that, for + example "a" followed by an accent would, together, match "a". This can only + be done clumsily at present by using a lookahead such as /(?=a)\X/, which + works for "combining" characters. + +. Perl supports [\N{x}-\N{y}] as a Unicode range, even in EBCDIC. PCRE2 + supports \N{U+dd..} everywhere, but not in EBCDIC. + +. Unicode stuff from Perl: + + \b{gcb} or \b{g} grapheme cluster boundary + \b{sb} sentence boundary + \b{wb} word boundary + + See Unicode TR 29. The last two are very much aimed at natural language. + +. Allow a callout to specify a number of characters to skip. This can be done + compatibly via an extra callout field. + +. Allow callouts to return *PRUNE, *COMMIT, *THEN, *SKIP, with and without + continuing (that is, with and without an implied *FAIL). A new option, + PCRE2_CALLOUT_EXTENDED say, would be needed. This is unlikely ever to be + implemented by JIT, so this could be an option for pcre2_match(). + +. A limit on substitutions: a user suggested somehow finding a way of making + match_limit apply to the whole operation instead of each match separately. + +. Some #defines could be replaced with enums to improve robustness. + +. There was a request for an option for pcre2_match() to return the longest + match. This would mean searching for all possible matches, of course. + +. Perl's /a modifier sets Unicode, but restricts \d etc to ASCII characters, + which is the PCRE2 default for PCRE2_UTF (use PCRE2_UCP to change). However, + Perl also has /aa, which in addition, disables ASCII/non-ASCII caseless + matching. Perhaps we need a new option PCRE2_CASELESS_RESTRICT_ASCII. In + practice, this just means not using the ucd_caseless_sets[] table. + +. There is more that could be done to the oss-fuzz setup (needs some research). + A seed corpus could be built. I noted something about $LIB_FUZZING_ENGINE. + The test function could make use of get_substrings() to cover more code. + +. A neater way of handling recursion file names in pcre2grep, e.g. a single + buffer that can grow. See also GitHub issue #2 (recursion looping via + symlinks). + +. A user suggested that before/after parameters in pcre2grep could have + negative values, to list lines near to the matched line, but not necessarily + the line itself. For example, --before-context=-1 would list the line *after* + each matched line, without showing the matched line. The problem here is what + to do with matches that are close together. Maybe a simpler way would be a + flag to disable showing matched lines, only valid with either -A or -B? + +. There was a suggestiong for a pcre2grep colour default, or possibly a more + general PCRE2GREP_OPT, but only for some options - not file names or patterns. + +. Breaking loops that match an empty string: perhaps find a way of continuing + if *something* has changed, but this might mean remembering additional data. + "Something" could be a capture value, but then a list of previous values + would be needed to avoid a cycle of changes. + +. If a function could be written to find 3-character (or other length) fixed + strings, at least one of which must be present for a match, efficient + pre-searching of large datasets could be implemented. + +. If pcre2grep had --first-line (match only in the first line) it could be + efficiently used to find files "starting with xxx". What about --last-line? + There was also the suggestion of an option for pcre2grep to scan only the + start of a file. I am not keen - this is the job of "head". + +. A user requested a means of determining whether a failed match was failed by + the start-of-match optimizations, or by running the match engine. Easy enough + to define a bit in the match data, but all three matchers would need work. + +. Would inlining "simple" recursions provide a useful performance boost for the + interpreters? JIT already does some of this, but it may not be worth it for + the interpreters. + +. Redesign handling of class/nclass/xclass because the compile code logic is + currently very contorted and obscure. Also there was a request for a way of + re-defining \w (and therefore \W, \b, and \B). An in-pattern sequence such as + (?w=[...]) was suggested. Easiest way would be simply to inline the class, + with lookarounds for \b and \B. Ideally the setting should last till the end + of the group, which means remembering all previous settings; maybe a fixed + amount of stack would do - how deep would anyone want to nest these things? + See GitHub issue #13 for a compendium of character class issues, including + (?[...]) extended classes. + +. A user suggested something like --with-build-info to set a build information + string that could be retrieved by pcre2_config(). However, there's no + facility for a length limit in pcre2_config(), and what would be the + encoding? + +. Quantified groups with a fixed count currently operate by replicating the + group in the compiled bytecode. This may not really matter in these days of + gigabyte memory, but perhaps another implementation might be considered. + Needs coordination between the interpreters and JIT. + +. There are regular requests for variable-length lookbehinds. + +. See also any suggestions in the GitHub issues. + +Philip Hazel +Email local part: Philip.Hazel +Email domain: gmail.com +Last updated: 25 April 2022 diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/BidiMirroring.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/BidiMirroring.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bd8e2c5d --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/BidiMirroring.txt @@ -0,0 +1,633 @@ +# BidiMirroring-14.0.0.txt +# Date: 2021-08-08, 22:55:00 GMT [KW, RP] +# © 2021 Unicode®, Inc. +# For terms of use, see https://www.unicode.org/terms_of_use.html +# +# Unicode Character Database +# For documentation, see https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr44/ +# +# Bidi_Mirroring_Glyph Property +# +# This file is an informative contributory data file in the +# Unicode Character Database. +# +# This data file lists characters that have the Bidi_Mirrored=Yes property +# value, for which there is another Unicode character that typically has a glyph +# that is the mirror image of the original character's glyph. +# +# The repertoire covered by the file is Unicode 14.0.0. +# +# The file contains a list of lines with mappings from one code point +# to another one for character-based mirroring. +# Note that for "real" mirroring, a rendering engine needs to select +# appropriate alternative glyphs, and that many Unicode characters do not +# have a mirror-image Unicode character. +# +# Each mapping line contains two fields, separated by a semicolon (';'). +# Each of the two fields contains a code point represented as a +# variable-length hexadecimal value with 4 to 6 digits. +# A comment indicates where the characters are "BEST FIT" mirroring. +# +# Code points for which Bidi_Mirrored=Yes, but for which no appropriate +# characters exist with mirrored glyphs, are +# listed as comments at the end of the file. +# +# Formally, the default value of the Bidi_Mirroring_Glyph property +# for each code point is , unless a mapping to +# some other character is specified in this data file. When a code +# point has the default value for the Bidi_Mirroring_Glyph property, +# that means that no other character exists whose glyph is suitable +# for character-based mirroring. +# +# For information on bidi mirroring, see UAX #9: Unicode Bidirectional Algorithm, +# at https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr9/ +# +# This file was originally created by Markus Scherer. +# Extended for Unicode 3.2, 4.0, 4.1, 5.0, 5.1, 5.2, and 6.0 by Ken Whistler, +# and for subsequent versions by Ken Whistler, Laurentiu Iancu, and Roozbeh Pournader. +# +# Historical and Compatibility Information: +# +# The OpenType Mirroring Pairs List (OMPL) is frozen to match the +# Unicode 5.1 version of the Bidi_Mirroring_Glyph property (2008). +# See https://www.microsoft.com/typography/otspec/ompl.txt +# +# The Unicode 6.1 version of the Bidi_Mirroring_Glyph property (2011) +# added one mirroring pair: 27CB <--> 27CD. +# +# The Unicode 11.0 version of the Bidi_Mirroring_Glyph property (2018) +# underwent a substantial revision, to formally recognize all of the +# exact mirroring pairs and "BEST FIT" mirroring pairs that had been +# added after the freezing of the OMPL list. As a result, starting +# with Unicode 11.0, the bmg mapping values more accurately reflect +# the current status of glyphs for Bidi_Mirrored characters in +# the Unicode Standard, but this listing now extends significantly +# beyond the frozen OMPL list. Implementers should be aware of this +# intentional distinction. +# +# ############################################################ +# +# Property: Bidi_Mirroring_Glyph +# +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; + +0028; 0029 # LEFT PARENTHESIS +0029; 0028 # RIGHT PARENTHESIS +003C; 003E # LESS-THAN SIGN +003E; 003C # GREATER-THAN SIGN +005B; 005D # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET +005D; 005B # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET +007B; 007D # LEFT CURLY BRACKET +007D; 007B # RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +00AB; 00BB # LEFT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +00BB; 00AB # RIGHT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +0F3A; 0F3B # TIBETAN MARK GUG RTAGS GYON +0F3B; 0F3A # TIBETAN MARK GUG RTAGS GYAS +0F3C; 0F3D # TIBETAN MARK ANG KHANG GYON +0F3D; 0F3C # TIBETAN MARK ANG KHANG GYAS +169B; 169C # OGHAM FEATHER MARK +169C; 169B # OGHAM REVERSED FEATHER MARK +2039; 203A # SINGLE LEFT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +203A; 2039 # SINGLE RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +2045; 2046 # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH QUILL +2046; 2045 # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH QUILL +207D; 207E # SUPERSCRIPT LEFT PARENTHESIS +207E; 207D # SUPERSCRIPT RIGHT PARENTHESIS +208D; 208E # SUBSCRIPT LEFT PARENTHESIS +208E; 208D # SUBSCRIPT RIGHT PARENTHESIS +2208; 220B # ELEMENT OF +2209; 220C # [BEST FIT] NOT AN ELEMENT OF +220A; 220D # SMALL ELEMENT OF +220B; 2208 # CONTAINS AS MEMBER +220C; 2209 # [BEST FIT] DOES NOT CONTAIN AS MEMBER +220D; 220A # SMALL CONTAINS AS MEMBER +2215; 29F5 # DIVISION SLASH +221F; 2BFE # RIGHT ANGLE +2220; 29A3 # ANGLE +2221; 299B # MEASURED ANGLE +2222; 29A0 # SPHERICAL ANGLE +2224; 2AEE # DOES NOT DIVIDE +223C; 223D # TILDE OPERATOR +223D; 223C # REVERSED TILDE +2243; 22CD # ASYMPTOTICALLY EQUAL TO +2245; 224C # APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO +224C; 2245 # ALL EQUAL TO +2252; 2253 # APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO OR THE IMAGE OF +2253; 2252 # IMAGE OF OR APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO +2254; 2255 # COLON EQUALS +2255; 2254 # EQUALS COLON +2264; 2265 # LESS-THAN OR EQUAL TO +2265; 2264 # GREATER-THAN OR EQUAL TO +2266; 2267 # LESS-THAN OVER EQUAL TO +2267; 2266 # GREATER-THAN OVER EQUAL TO +2268; 2269 # [BEST FIT] LESS-THAN BUT NOT EQUAL TO +2269; 2268 # [BEST FIT] GREATER-THAN BUT NOT EQUAL TO +226A; 226B # MUCH LESS-THAN +226B; 226A # MUCH GREATER-THAN +226E; 226F # [BEST FIT] NOT LESS-THAN +226F; 226E # [BEST FIT] NOT GREATER-THAN +2270; 2271 # [BEST FIT] NEITHER LESS-THAN NOR EQUAL TO +2271; 2270 # [BEST FIT] NEITHER GREATER-THAN NOR EQUAL TO +2272; 2273 # [BEST FIT] LESS-THAN OR EQUIVALENT TO +2273; 2272 # [BEST FIT] GREATER-THAN OR EQUIVALENT TO +2274; 2275 # [BEST FIT] NEITHER LESS-THAN NOR EQUIVALENT TO +2275; 2274 # [BEST FIT] NEITHER GREATER-THAN NOR EQUIVALENT TO +2276; 2277 # LESS-THAN OR GREATER-THAN +2277; 2276 # GREATER-THAN OR LESS-THAN +2278; 2279 # [BEST FIT] NEITHER LESS-THAN NOR GREATER-THAN +2279; 2278 # [BEST FIT] NEITHER GREATER-THAN NOR LESS-THAN +227A; 227B # PRECEDES +227B; 227A # SUCCEEDS +227C; 227D # PRECEDES OR EQUAL TO +227D; 227C # SUCCEEDS OR EQUAL TO +227E; 227F # [BEST FIT] PRECEDES OR EQUIVALENT TO +227F; 227E # [BEST FIT] SUCCEEDS OR EQUIVALENT TO +2280; 2281 # [BEST FIT] DOES NOT PRECEDE +2281; 2280 # [BEST FIT] DOES NOT SUCCEED +2282; 2283 # SUBSET OF +2283; 2282 # SUPERSET OF +2284; 2285 # [BEST FIT] NOT A SUBSET OF +2285; 2284 # [BEST FIT] NOT A SUPERSET OF +2286; 2287 # SUBSET OF OR EQUAL TO +2287; 2286 # SUPERSET OF OR EQUAL TO +2288; 2289 # [BEST FIT] NEITHER A SUBSET OF NOR EQUAL TO +2289; 2288 # [BEST FIT] NEITHER A SUPERSET OF NOR EQUAL TO +228A; 228B # [BEST FIT] SUBSET OF WITH NOT EQUAL TO +228B; 228A # [BEST FIT] SUPERSET OF WITH NOT EQUAL TO +228F; 2290 # SQUARE IMAGE OF +2290; 228F # SQUARE ORIGINAL OF +2291; 2292 # SQUARE IMAGE OF OR EQUAL TO +2292; 2291 # SQUARE ORIGINAL OF OR EQUAL TO +2298; 29B8 # CIRCLED DIVISION SLASH +22A2; 22A3 # RIGHT TACK +22A3; 22A2 # LEFT TACK +22A6; 2ADE # ASSERTION +22A8; 2AE4 # TRUE +22A9; 2AE3 # FORCES +22AB; 2AE5 # DOUBLE VERTICAL BAR DOUBLE RIGHT TURNSTILE +22B0; 22B1 # PRECEDES UNDER RELATION +22B1; 22B0 # SUCCEEDS UNDER RELATION +22B2; 22B3 # NORMAL SUBGROUP OF +22B3; 22B2 # CONTAINS AS NORMAL SUBGROUP +22B4; 22B5 # NORMAL SUBGROUP OF OR EQUAL TO +22B5; 22B4 # CONTAINS AS NORMAL SUBGROUP OR EQUAL TO +22B6; 22B7 # ORIGINAL OF +22B7; 22B6 # IMAGE OF +22B8; 27DC # MULTIMAP +22C9; 22CA # LEFT NORMAL FACTOR SEMIDIRECT PRODUCT +22CA; 22C9 # RIGHT NORMAL FACTOR SEMIDIRECT PRODUCT +22CB; 22CC # LEFT SEMIDIRECT PRODUCT +22CC; 22CB # RIGHT SEMIDIRECT PRODUCT +22CD; 2243 # REVERSED TILDE EQUALS +22D0; 22D1 # DOUBLE SUBSET +22D1; 22D0 # DOUBLE SUPERSET +22D6; 22D7 # LESS-THAN WITH DOT +22D7; 22D6 # GREATER-THAN WITH DOT +22D8; 22D9 # VERY MUCH LESS-THAN +22D9; 22D8 # VERY MUCH GREATER-THAN +22DA; 22DB # LESS-THAN EQUAL TO OR GREATER-THAN +22DB; 22DA # GREATER-THAN EQUAL TO OR LESS-THAN +22DC; 22DD # EQUAL TO OR LESS-THAN +22DD; 22DC # EQUAL TO OR GREATER-THAN +22DE; 22DF # EQUAL TO OR PRECEDES +22DF; 22DE # EQUAL TO OR SUCCEEDS +22E0; 22E1 # [BEST FIT] DOES NOT PRECEDE OR EQUAL +22E1; 22E0 # [BEST FIT] DOES NOT SUCCEED OR EQUAL +22E2; 22E3 # [BEST FIT] NOT SQUARE IMAGE OF OR EQUAL TO +22E3; 22E2 # [BEST FIT] NOT SQUARE ORIGINAL OF OR EQUAL TO +22E4; 22E5 # [BEST FIT] SQUARE IMAGE OF OR NOT EQUAL TO +22E5; 22E4 # [BEST FIT] SQUARE ORIGINAL OF OR NOT EQUAL TO +22E6; 22E7 # [BEST FIT] LESS-THAN BUT NOT EQUIVALENT TO +22E7; 22E6 # [BEST FIT] GREATER-THAN BUT NOT EQUIVALENT TO +22E8; 22E9 # [BEST FIT] PRECEDES BUT NOT EQUIVALENT TO +22E9; 22E8 # [BEST FIT] SUCCEEDS BUT NOT EQUIVALENT TO +22EA; 22EB # [BEST FIT] NOT NORMAL SUBGROUP OF +22EB; 22EA # [BEST FIT] DOES NOT CONTAIN AS NORMAL SUBGROUP +22EC; 22ED # [BEST FIT] NOT NORMAL SUBGROUP OF OR EQUAL TO +22ED; 22EC # [BEST FIT] DOES NOT CONTAIN AS NORMAL SUBGROUP OR EQUAL +22F0; 22F1 # UP RIGHT DIAGONAL ELLIPSIS +22F1; 22F0 # DOWN RIGHT DIAGONAL ELLIPSIS +22F2; 22FA # ELEMENT OF WITH LONG HORIZONTAL STROKE +22F3; 22FB # ELEMENT OF WITH VERTICAL BAR AT END OF HORIZONTAL STROKE +22F4; 22FC # SMALL ELEMENT OF WITH VERTICAL BAR AT END OF HORIZONTAL STROKE +22F6; 22FD # ELEMENT OF WITH OVERBAR +22F7; 22FE # SMALL ELEMENT OF WITH OVERBAR +22FA; 22F2 # CONTAINS WITH LONG HORIZONTAL STROKE +22FB; 22F3 # CONTAINS WITH VERTICAL BAR AT END OF HORIZONTAL STROKE +22FC; 22F4 # SMALL CONTAINS WITH VERTICAL BAR AT END OF HORIZONTAL STROKE +22FD; 22F6 # CONTAINS WITH OVERBAR +22FE; 22F7 # SMALL CONTAINS WITH OVERBAR +2308; 2309 # LEFT CEILING +2309; 2308 # RIGHT CEILING +230A; 230B # LEFT FLOOR +230B; 230A # RIGHT FLOOR +2329; 232A # LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET +232A; 2329 # RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET +2768; 2769 # MEDIUM LEFT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +2769; 2768 # MEDIUM RIGHT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276A; 276B # MEDIUM FLATTENED LEFT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276B; 276A # MEDIUM FLATTENED RIGHT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276C; 276D # MEDIUM LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +276D; 276C # MEDIUM RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +276E; 276F # HEAVY LEFT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK ORNAMENT +276F; 276E # HEAVY RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK ORNAMENT +2770; 2771 # HEAVY LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +2771; 2770 # HEAVY RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +2772; 2773 # LIGHT LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET ORNAMENT +2773; 2772 # LIGHT RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET ORNAMENT +2774; 2775 # MEDIUM LEFT CURLY BRACKET ORNAMENT +2775; 2774 # MEDIUM RIGHT CURLY BRACKET ORNAMENT +27C3; 27C4 # OPEN SUBSET +27C4; 27C3 # OPEN SUPERSET +27C5; 27C6 # LEFT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27C6; 27C5 # RIGHT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27C8; 27C9 # REVERSE SOLIDUS PRECEDING SUBSET +27C9; 27C8 # SUPERSET PRECEDING SOLIDUS +27CB; 27CD # MATHEMATICAL RISING DIAGONAL +27CD; 27CB # MATHEMATICAL FALLING DIAGONAL +27D5; 27D6 # LEFT OUTER JOIN +27D6; 27D5 # RIGHT OUTER JOIN +27DC; 22B8 # LEFT MULTIMAP +27DD; 27DE # LONG RIGHT TACK +27DE; 27DD # LONG LEFT TACK +27E2; 27E3 # WHITE CONCAVE-SIDED DIAMOND WITH LEFTWARDS TICK +27E3; 27E2 # WHITE CONCAVE-SIDED DIAMOND WITH RIGHTWARDS TICK +27E4; 27E5 # WHITE SQUARE WITH LEFTWARDS TICK +27E5; 27E4 # WHITE SQUARE WITH RIGHTWARDS TICK +27E6; 27E7 # MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E7; 27E6 # MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E8; 27E9 # MATHEMATICAL LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +27E9; 27E8 # MATHEMATICAL RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +27EA; 27EB # MATHEMATICAL LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EB; 27EA # MATHEMATICAL RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EC; 27ED # MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27ED; 27EC # MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27EE; 27EF # MATHEMATICAL LEFT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +27EF; 27EE # MATHEMATICAL RIGHT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +2983; 2984 # LEFT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2984; 2983 # RIGHT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2985; 2986 # LEFT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2986; 2985 # RIGHT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2987; 2988 # Z NOTATION LEFT IMAGE BRACKET +2988; 2987 # Z NOTATION RIGHT IMAGE BRACKET +2989; 298A # Z NOTATION LEFT BINDING BRACKET +298A; 2989 # Z NOTATION RIGHT BINDING BRACKET +298B; 298C # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298C; 298B # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298D; 2990 # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +298E; 298F # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +298F; 298E # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +2990; 298D # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +2991; 2992 # LEFT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2992; 2991 # RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2993; 2994 # LEFT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2994; 2993 # RIGHT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2995; 2996 # DOUBLE LEFT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2996; 2995 # DOUBLE RIGHT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2997; 2998 # LEFT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +2998; 2997 # RIGHT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +299B; 2221 # MEASURED ANGLE OPENING LEFT +29A0; 2222 # SPHERICAL ANGLE OPENING LEFT +29A3; 2220 # REVERSED ANGLE +29A4; 29A5 # ANGLE WITH UNDERBAR +29A5; 29A4 # REVERSED ANGLE WITH UNDERBAR +29A8; 29A9 # MEASURED ANGLE WITH OPEN ARM ENDING IN ARROW POINTING UP AND RIGHT +29A9; 29A8 # MEASURED ANGLE WITH OPEN ARM ENDING IN ARROW POINTING UP AND LEFT +29AA; 29AB # MEASURED ANGLE WITH OPEN ARM ENDING IN ARROW POINTING DOWN AND RIGHT +29AB; 29AA # MEASURED ANGLE WITH OPEN ARM ENDING IN ARROW POINTING DOWN AND LEFT +29AC; 29AD # MEASURED ANGLE WITH OPEN ARM ENDING IN ARROW POINTING RIGHT AND UP +29AD; 29AC # MEASURED ANGLE WITH OPEN ARM ENDING IN ARROW POINTING LEFT AND UP +29AE; 29AF # MEASURED ANGLE WITH OPEN ARM ENDING IN ARROW POINTING RIGHT AND DOWN +29AF; 29AE # MEASURED ANGLE WITH OPEN ARM ENDING IN ARROW POINTING LEFT AND DOWN +29B8; 2298 # CIRCLED REVERSE SOLIDUS +29C0; 29C1 # CIRCLED LESS-THAN +29C1; 29C0 # CIRCLED GREATER-THAN +29C4; 29C5 # SQUARED RISING DIAGONAL SLASH +29C5; 29C4 # SQUARED FALLING DIAGONAL SLASH +29CF; 29D0 # LEFT TRIANGLE BESIDE VERTICAL BAR +29D0; 29CF # VERTICAL BAR BESIDE RIGHT TRIANGLE +29D1; 29D2 # BOWTIE WITH LEFT HALF BLACK +29D2; 29D1 # BOWTIE WITH RIGHT HALF BLACK +29D4; 29D5 # TIMES WITH LEFT HALF BLACK +29D5; 29D4 # TIMES WITH RIGHT HALF BLACK +29D8; 29D9 # LEFT WIGGLY FENCE +29D9; 29D8 # RIGHT WIGGLY FENCE +29DA; 29DB # LEFT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29DB; 29DA # RIGHT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29E8; 29E9 # DOWN-POINTING TRIANGLE WITH LEFT HALF BLACK +29E9; 29E8 # DOWN-POINTING TRIANGLE WITH RIGHT HALF BLACK +29F5; 2215 # REVERSE SOLIDUS OPERATOR +29F8; 29F9 # BIG SOLIDUS +29F9; 29F8 # BIG REVERSE SOLIDUS +29FC; 29FD # LEFT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +29FD; 29FC # RIGHT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +2A2B; 2A2C # MINUS SIGN WITH FALLING DOTS +2A2C; 2A2B # MINUS SIGN WITH RISING DOTS +2A2D; 2A2E # PLUS SIGN IN LEFT HALF CIRCLE +2A2E; 2A2D # PLUS SIGN IN RIGHT HALF CIRCLE +2A34; 2A35 # MULTIPLICATION SIGN IN LEFT HALF CIRCLE +2A35; 2A34 # MULTIPLICATION SIGN IN RIGHT HALF CIRCLE +2A3C; 2A3D # INTERIOR PRODUCT +2A3D; 2A3C # RIGHTHAND INTERIOR PRODUCT +2A64; 2A65 # Z NOTATION DOMAIN ANTIRESTRICTION +2A65; 2A64 # Z NOTATION RANGE ANTIRESTRICTION +2A79; 2A7A # LESS-THAN WITH CIRCLE INSIDE +2A7A; 2A79 # GREATER-THAN WITH CIRCLE INSIDE +2A7B; 2A7C # [BEST FIT] LESS-THAN WITH QUESTION MARK ABOVE +2A7C; 2A7B # [BEST FIT] GREATER-THAN WITH QUESTION MARK ABOVE +2A7D; 2A7E # LESS-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO +2A7E; 2A7D # GREATER-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO +2A7F; 2A80 # LESS-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO WITH DOT INSIDE +2A80; 2A7F # GREATER-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO WITH DOT INSIDE +2A81; 2A82 # LESS-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO WITH DOT ABOVE +2A82; 2A81 # GREATER-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO WITH DOT ABOVE +2A83; 2A84 # LESS-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO WITH DOT ABOVE RIGHT +2A84; 2A83 # GREATER-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO WITH DOT ABOVE LEFT +2A85; 2A86 # [BEST FIT] LESS-THAN OR APPROXIMATE +2A86; 2A85 # [BEST FIT] GREATER-THAN OR APPROXIMATE +2A87; 2A88 # [BEST FIT] LESS-THAN AND SINGLE-LINE NOT EQUAL TO +2A88; 2A87 # [BEST FIT] GREATER-THAN AND SINGLE-LINE NOT EQUAL TO +2A89; 2A8A # [BEST FIT] LESS-THAN AND NOT APPROXIMATE +2A8A; 2A89 # [BEST FIT] GREATER-THAN AND NOT APPROXIMATE +2A8B; 2A8C # LESS-THAN ABOVE DOUBLE-LINE EQUAL ABOVE GREATER-THAN +2A8C; 2A8B # GREATER-THAN ABOVE DOUBLE-LINE EQUAL ABOVE LESS-THAN +2A8D; 2A8E # [BEST FIT] LESS-THAN ABOVE SIMILAR OR EQUAL +2A8E; 2A8D # [BEST FIT] GREATER-THAN ABOVE SIMILAR OR EQUAL +2A8F; 2A90 # [BEST FIT] LESS-THAN ABOVE SIMILAR ABOVE GREATER-THAN +2A90; 2A8F # [BEST FIT] GREATER-THAN ABOVE SIMILAR ABOVE LESS-THAN +2A91; 2A92 # LESS-THAN ABOVE GREATER-THAN ABOVE DOUBLE-LINE EQUAL +2A92; 2A91 # GREATER-THAN ABOVE LESS-THAN ABOVE DOUBLE-LINE EQUAL +2A93; 2A94 # LESS-THAN ABOVE SLANTED EQUAL ABOVE GREATER-THAN ABOVE SLANTED EQUAL +2A94; 2A93 # GREATER-THAN ABOVE SLANTED EQUAL ABOVE LESS-THAN ABOVE SLANTED EQUAL +2A95; 2A96 # SLANTED EQUAL TO OR LESS-THAN +2A96; 2A95 # SLANTED EQUAL TO OR GREATER-THAN +2A97; 2A98 # SLANTED EQUAL TO OR LESS-THAN WITH DOT INSIDE +2A98; 2A97 # SLANTED EQUAL TO OR GREATER-THAN WITH DOT INSIDE +2A99; 2A9A # DOUBLE-LINE EQUAL TO OR LESS-THAN +2A9A; 2A99 # DOUBLE-LINE EQUAL TO OR GREATER-THAN +2A9B; 2A9C # DOUBLE-LINE SLANTED EQUAL TO OR LESS-THAN +2A9C; 2A9B # DOUBLE-LINE SLANTED EQUAL TO OR GREATER-THAN +2A9D; 2A9E # [BEST FIT] SIMILAR OR LESS-THAN +2A9E; 2A9D # [BEST FIT] SIMILAR OR GREATER-THAN +2A9F; 2AA0 # [BEST FIT] SIMILAR ABOVE LESS-THAN ABOVE EQUALS SIGN +2AA0; 2A9F # [BEST FIT] SIMILAR ABOVE GREATER-THAN ABOVE EQUALS SIGN +2AA1; 2AA2 # DOUBLE NESTED LESS-THAN +2AA2; 2AA1 # DOUBLE NESTED GREATER-THAN +2AA6; 2AA7 # LESS-THAN CLOSED BY CURVE +2AA7; 2AA6 # GREATER-THAN CLOSED BY CURVE +2AA8; 2AA9 # LESS-THAN CLOSED BY CURVE ABOVE SLANTED EQUAL +2AA9; 2AA8 # GREATER-THAN CLOSED BY CURVE ABOVE SLANTED EQUAL +2AAA; 2AAB # SMALLER THAN +2AAB; 2AAA # LARGER THAN +2AAC; 2AAD # SMALLER THAN OR EQUAL TO +2AAD; 2AAC # LARGER THAN OR EQUAL TO +2AAF; 2AB0 # PRECEDES ABOVE SINGLE-LINE EQUALS SIGN +2AB0; 2AAF # SUCCEEDS ABOVE SINGLE-LINE EQUALS SIGN +2AB1; 2AB2 # [BEST FIT] PRECEDES ABOVE SINGLE-LINE NOT EQUAL TO +2AB2; 2AB1 # [BEST FIT] SUCCEEDS ABOVE SINGLE-LINE NOT EQUAL TO +2AB3; 2AB4 # PRECEDES ABOVE EQUALS SIGN +2AB4; 2AB3 # SUCCEEDS ABOVE EQUALS SIGN +2AB5; 2AB6 # [BEST FIT] PRECEDES ABOVE NOT EQUAL TO +2AB6; 2AB5 # [BEST FIT] SUCCEEDS ABOVE NOT EQUAL TO +2AB7; 2AB8 # [BEST FIT] PRECEDES ABOVE ALMOST EQUAL TO +2AB8; 2AB7 # [BEST FIT] SUCCEEDS ABOVE ALMOST EQUAL TO +2AB9; 2ABA # [BEST FIT] PRECEDES ABOVE NOT ALMOST EQUAL TO +2ABA; 2AB9 # [BEST FIT] SUCCEEDS ABOVE NOT ALMOST EQUAL TO +2ABB; 2ABC # DOUBLE PRECEDES +2ABC; 2ABB # DOUBLE SUCCEEDS +2ABD; 2ABE # SUBSET WITH DOT +2ABE; 2ABD # SUPERSET WITH DOT +2ABF; 2AC0 # SUBSET WITH PLUS SIGN BELOW +2AC0; 2ABF # SUPERSET WITH PLUS SIGN BELOW +2AC1; 2AC2 # SUBSET WITH MULTIPLICATION SIGN BELOW +2AC2; 2AC1 # SUPERSET WITH MULTIPLICATION SIGN BELOW +2AC3; 2AC4 # SUBSET OF OR EQUAL TO WITH DOT ABOVE +2AC4; 2AC3 # SUPERSET OF OR EQUAL TO WITH DOT ABOVE +2AC5; 2AC6 # SUBSET OF ABOVE EQUALS SIGN +2AC6; 2AC5 # SUPERSET OF ABOVE EQUALS SIGN +2AC7; 2AC8 # [BEST FIT] SUBSET OF ABOVE TILDE OPERATOR +2AC8; 2AC7 # [BEST FIT] SUPERSET OF ABOVE TILDE OPERATOR +2AC9; 2ACA # [BEST FIT] SUBSET OF ABOVE ALMOST EQUAL TO +2ACA; 2AC9 # [BEST FIT] SUPERSET OF ABOVE ALMOST EQUAL TO +2ACB; 2ACC # [BEST FIT] SUBSET OF ABOVE NOT EQUAL TO +2ACC; 2ACB # [BEST FIT] SUPERSET OF ABOVE NOT EQUAL TO +2ACD; 2ACE # SQUARE LEFT OPEN BOX OPERATOR +2ACE; 2ACD # SQUARE RIGHT OPEN BOX OPERATOR +2ACF; 2AD0 # CLOSED SUBSET +2AD0; 2ACF # CLOSED SUPERSET +2AD1; 2AD2 # CLOSED SUBSET OR EQUAL TO +2AD2; 2AD1 # CLOSED SUPERSET OR EQUAL TO +2AD3; 2AD4 # SUBSET ABOVE SUPERSET +2AD4; 2AD3 # SUPERSET ABOVE SUBSET +2AD5; 2AD6 # SUBSET ABOVE SUBSET +2AD6; 2AD5 # SUPERSET ABOVE SUPERSET +2ADE; 22A6 # SHORT LEFT TACK +2AE3; 22A9 # DOUBLE VERTICAL BAR LEFT TURNSTILE +2AE4; 22A8 # VERTICAL BAR DOUBLE LEFT TURNSTILE +2AE5; 22AB # DOUBLE VERTICAL BAR DOUBLE LEFT TURNSTILE +2AEC; 2AED # DOUBLE STROKE NOT SIGN +2AED; 2AEC # REVERSED DOUBLE STROKE NOT SIGN +2AEE; 2224 # DOES NOT DIVIDE WITH REVERSED NEGATION SLASH +2AF7; 2AF8 # TRIPLE NESTED LESS-THAN +2AF8; 2AF7 # TRIPLE NESTED GREATER-THAN +2AF9; 2AFA # DOUBLE-LINE SLANTED LESS-THAN OR EQUAL TO +2AFA; 2AF9 # DOUBLE-LINE SLANTED GREATER-THAN OR EQUAL TO +2BFE; 221F # REVERSED RIGHT ANGLE +2E02; 2E03 # LEFT SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E03; 2E02 # RIGHT SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E04; 2E05 # LEFT DOTTED SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E05; 2E04 # RIGHT DOTTED SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E09; 2E0A # LEFT TRANSPOSITION BRACKET +2E0A; 2E09 # RIGHT TRANSPOSITION BRACKET +2E0C; 2E0D # LEFT RAISED OMISSION BRACKET +2E0D; 2E0C # RIGHT RAISED OMISSION BRACKET +2E1C; 2E1D # LEFT LOW PARAPHRASE BRACKET +2E1D; 2E1C # RIGHT LOW PARAPHRASE BRACKET +2E20; 2E21 # LEFT VERTICAL BAR WITH QUILL +2E21; 2E20 # RIGHT VERTICAL BAR WITH QUILL +2E22; 2E23 # TOP LEFT HALF BRACKET +2E23; 2E22 # TOP RIGHT HALF BRACKET +2E24; 2E25 # BOTTOM LEFT HALF BRACKET +2E25; 2E24 # BOTTOM RIGHT HALF BRACKET +2E26; 2E27 # LEFT SIDEWAYS U BRACKET +2E27; 2E26 # RIGHT SIDEWAYS U BRACKET +2E28; 2E29 # LEFT DOUBLE PARENTHESIS +2E29; 2E28 # RIGHT DOUBLE PARENTHESIS +2E55; 2E56 # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH STROKE +2E56; 2E55 # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH STROKE +2E57; 2E58 # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH DOUBLE STROKE +2E58; 2E57 # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH DOUBLE STROKE +2E59; 2E5A # TOP HALF LEFT PARENTHESIS +2E5A; 2E59 # TOP HALF RIGHT PARENTHESIS +2E5B; 2E5C # BOTTOM HALF LEFT PARENTHESIS +2E5C; 2E5B # BOTTOM HALF RIGHT PARENTHESIS +3008; 3009 # LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +3009; 3008 # RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +300A; 300B # LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +300B; 300A # RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +300C; 300D # [BEST FIT] LEFT CORNER BRACKET +300D; 300C # [BEST FIT] RIGHT CORNER BRACKET +300E; 300F # [BEST FIT] LEFT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +300F; 300E # [BEST FIT] RIGHT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +3010; 3011 # LEFT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +3011; 3010 # RIGHT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +3014; 3015 # LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3015; 3014 # RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3016; 3017 # LEFT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +3017; 3016 # RIGHT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +3018; 3019 # LEFT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3019; 3018 # RIGHT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +301A; 301B # LEFT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +301B; 301A # RIGHT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +FE59; FE5A # SMALL LEFT PARENTHESIS +FE5A; FE59 # SMALL RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FE5B; FE5C # SMALL LEFT CURLY BRACKET +FE5C; FE5B # SMALL RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +FE5D; FE5E # SMALL LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FE5E; FE5D # SMALL RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FE64; FE65 # SMALL LESS-THAN SIGN +FE65; FE64 # SMALL GREATER-THAN SIGN +FF08; FF09 # FULLWIDTH LEFT PARENTHESIS +FF09; FF08 # FULLWIDTH RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FF1C; FF1E # FULLWIDTH LESS-THAN SIGN +FF1E; FF1C # FULLWIDTH GREATER-THAN SIGN +FF3B; FF3D # FULLWIDTH LEFT SQUARE BRACKET +FF3D; FF3B # FULLWIDTH RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET +FF5B; FF5D # FULLWIDTH LEFT CURLY BRACKET +FF5D; FF5B # FULLWIDTH RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +FF5F; FF60 # FULLWIDTH LEFT WHITE PARENTHESIS +FF60; FF5F # FULLWIDTH RIGHT WHITE PARENTHESIS +FF62; FF63 # [BEST FIT] HALFWIDTH LEFT CORNER BRACKET +FF63; FF62 # [BEST FIT] HALFWIDTH RIGHT CORNER BRACKET + +# The following characters have no appropriate mirroring character. +# For these characters it is up to the rendering system +# to provide mirrored glyphs. + +# 2140; DOUBLE-STRUCK N-ARY SUMMATION +# 2201; COMPLEMENT +# 2202; PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +# 2203; THERE EXISTS +# 2204; THERE DOES NOT EXIST +# 2211; N-ARY SUMMATION +# 2216; SET MINUS +# 221A; SQUARE ROOT +# 221B; CUBE ROOT +# 221C; FOURTH ROOT +# 221D; PROPORTIONAL TO +# 2226; NOT PARALLEL TO +# 222B; INTEGRAL +# 222C; DOUBLE INTEGRAL +# 222D; TRIPLE INTEGRAL +# 222E; CONTOUR INTEGRAL +# 222F; SURFACE INTEGRAL +# 2230; VOLUME INTEGRAL +# 2231; CLOCKWISE INTEGRAL +# 2232; CLOCKWISE CONTOUR INTEGRAL +# 2233; ANTICLOCKWISE CONTOUR INTEGRAL +# 2239; EXCESS +# 223B; HOMOTHETIC +# 223E; INVERTED LAZY S +# 223F; SINE WAVE +# 2240; WREATH PRODUCT +# 2241; NOT TILDE +# 2242; MINUS TILDE +# 2244; NOT ASYMPTOTICALLY EQUAL TO +# 2246; APPROXIMATELY BUT NOT ACTUALLY EQUAL TO +# 2247; NEITHER APPROXIMATELY NOR ACTUALLY EQUAL TO +# 2248; ALMOST EQUAL TO +# 2249; NOT ALMOST EQUAL TO +# 224A; ALMOST EQUAL OR EQUAL TO +# 224B; TRIPLE TILDE +# 225F; QUESTIONED EQUAL TO +# 2260; NOT EQUAL TO +# 2262; NOT IDENTICAL TO +# 228C; MULTISET +# 22A7; MODELS +# 22AA; TRIPLE VERTICAL BAR RIGHT TURNSTILE +# 22AC; DOES NOT PROVE +# 22AD; NOT TRUE +# 22AE; DOES NOT FORCE +# 22AF; NEGATED DOUBLE VERTICAL BAR DOUBLE RIGHT TURNSTILE +# 22BE; RIGHT ANGLE WITH ARC +# 22BF; RIGHT TRIANGLE +# 22F5; ELEMENT OF WITH DOT ABOVE +# 22F8; ELEMENT OF WITH UNDERBAR +# 22F9; ELEMENT OF WITH TWO HORIZONTAL STROKES +# 22FF; Z NOTATION BAG MEMBERSHIP +# 2320; TOP HALF INTEGRAL +# 2321; BOTTOM HALF INTEGRAL +# 27C0; THREE DIMENSIONAL ANGLE +# 27CC; LONG DIVISION +# 27D3; LOWER RIGHT CORNER WITH DOT +# 27D4; UPPER LEFT CORNER WITH DOT +# 299C; RIGHT ANGLE VARIANT WITH SQUARE +# 299D; MEASURED RIGHT ANGLE WITH DOT +# 299E; ANGLE WITH S INSIDE +# 299F; ACUTE ANGLE +# 29A2; TURNED ANGLE +# 29A6; OBLIQUE ANGLE OPENING UP +# 29A7; OBLIQUE ANGLE OPENING DOWN +# 29C2; CIRCLE WITH SMALL CIRCLE TO THE RIGHT +# 29C3; CIRCLE WITH TWO HORIZONTAL STROKES TO THE RIGHT +# 29C9; TWO JOINED SQUARES +# 29CE; RIGHT TRIANGLE ABOVE LEFT TRIANGLE +# 29DC; INCOMPLETE INFINITY +# 29E1; INCREASES AS +# 29E3; EQUALS SIGN AND SLANTED PARALLEL +# 29E4; EQUALS SIGN AND SLANTED PARALLEL WITH TILDE ABOVE +# 29E5; IDENTICAL TO AND SLANTED PARALLEL +# 29F4; RULE-DELAYED +# 29F6; SOLIDUS WITH OVERBAR +# 29F7; REVERSE SOLIDUS WITH HORIZONTAL STROKE +# 2A0A; MODULO TWO SUM +# 2A0B; SUMMATION WITH INTEGRAL +# 2A0C; QUADRUPLE INTEGRAL OPERATOR +# 2A0D; FINITE PART INTEGRAL +# 2A0E; INTEGRAL WITH DOUBLE STROKE +# 2A0F; INTEGRAL AVERAGE WITH SLASH +# 2A10; CIRCULATION FUNCTION +# 2A11; ANTICLOCKWISE INTEGRATION +# 2A12; LINE INTEGRATION WITH RECTANGULAR PATH AROUND POLE +# 2A13; LINE INTEGRATION WITH SEMICIRCULAR PATH AROUND POLE +# 2A14; LINE INTEGRATION NOT INCLUDING THE POLE +# 2A15; INTEGRAL AROUND A POINT OPERATOR +# 2A16; QUATERNION INTEGRAL OPERATOR +# 2A17; INTEGRAL WITH LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH HOOK +# 2A18; INTEGRAL WITH TIMES SIGN +# 2A19; INTEGRAL WITH INTERSECTION +# 2A1A; INTEGRAL WITH UNION +# 2A1B; INTEGRAL WITH OVERBAR +# 2A1C; INTEGRAL WITH UNDERBAR +# 2A1E; LARGE LEFT TRIANGLE OPERATOR +# 2A1F; Z NOTATION SCHEMA COMPOSITION +# 2A20; Z NOTATION SCHEMA PIPING +# 2A21; Z NOTATION SCHEMA PROJECTION +# 2A24; PLUS SIGN WITH TILDE ABOVE +# 2A26; PLUS SIGN WITH TILDE BELOW +# 2A29; MINUS SIGN WITH COMMA ABOVE +# 2A3E; Z NOTATION RELATIONAL COMPOSITION +# 2A57; SLOPING LARGE OR +# 2A58; SLOPING LARGE AND +# 2A6A; TILDE OPERATOR WITH DOT ABOVE +# 2A6B; TILDE OPERATOR WITH RISING DOTS +# 2A6C; SIMILAR MINUS SIMILAR +# 2A6D; CONGRUENT WITH DOT ABOVE +# 2A6F; ALMOST EQUAL TO WITH CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +# 2A70; APPROXIMATELY EQUAL OR EQUAL TO +# 2A73; EQUALS SIGN ABOVE TILDE OPERATOR +# 2A74; DOUBLE COLON EQUAL +# 2AA3; DOUBLE NESTED LESS-THAN WITH UNDERBAR +# 2ADC; FORKING +# 2AE2; VERTICAL BAR TRIPLE RIGHT TURNSTILE +# 2AE6; LONG DASH FROM LEFT MEMBER OF DOUBLE VERTICAL +# 2AF3; PARALLEL WITH TILDE OPERATOR +# 2AFB; TRIPLE SOLIDUS BINARY RELATION +# 2AFD; DOUBLE SOLIDUS OPERATOR +# 1D6DB; MATHEMATICAL BOLD PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +# 1D715; MATHEMATICAL ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +# 1D74F; MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +# 1D789; MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +# 1D7C3; MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL + +# EOF diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/CaseFolding.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/CaseFolding.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..932ace29 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/CaseFolding.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1624 @@ +# CaseFolding-14.0.0.txt +# Date: 2021-03-08, 19:35:41 GMT +# © 2021 Unicode®, Inc. +# Unicode and the Unicode Logo are registered trademarks of Unicode, Inc. in the U.S. and other countries. +# For terms of use, see http://www.unicode.org/terms_of_use.html +# +# Unicode Character Database +# For documentation, see http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr44/ +# +# Case Folding Properties +# +# This file is a supplement to the UnicodeData file. +# It provides a case folding mapping generated from the Unicode Character Database. +# If all characters are mapped according to the full mapping below, then +# case differences (according to UnicodeData.txt and SpecialCasing.txt) +# are eliminated. +# +# The data supports both implementations that require simple case foldings +# (where string lengths don't change), and implementations that allow full case folding +# (where string lengths may grow). Note that where they can be supported, the +# full case foldings are superior: for example, they allow "MASSE" and "Maße" to match. +# +# All code points not listed in this file map to themselves. +# +# NOTE: case folding does not preserve normalization formats! +# +# For information on case folding, including how to have case folding +# preserve normalization formats, see Section 3.13 Default Case Algorithms in +# The Unicode Standard. +# +# ================================================================================ +# Format +# ================================================================================ +# The entries in this file are in the following machine-readable format: +# +# ; ; ; # +# +# The status field is: +# C: common case folding, common mappings shared by both simple and full mappings. +# F: full case folding, mappings that cause strings to grow in length. Multiple characters are separated by spaces. +# S: simple case folding, mappings to single characters where different from F. +# T: special case for uppercase I and dotted uppercase I +# - For non-Turkic languages, this mapping is normally not used. +# - For Turkic languages (tr, az), this mapping can be used instead of the normal mapping for these characters. +# Note that the Turkic mappings do not maintain canonical equivalence without additional processing. +# See the discussions of case mapping in the Unicode Standard for more information. +# +# Usage: +# A. To do a simple case folding, use the mappings with status C + S. +# B. To do a full case folding, use the mappings with status C + F. +# +# The mappings with status T can be used or omitted depending on the desired case-folding +# behavior. (The default option is to exclude them.) +# +# ================================================================= + +# Property: Case_Folding + +# All code points not explicitly listed for Case_Folding +# have the value C for the status field, and the code point itself for the mapping field. + +# ================================================================= +0041; C; 0061; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A +0042; C; 0062; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B +0043; C; 0063; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C +0044; C; 0064; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D +0045; C; 0065; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E +0046; C; 0066; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F +0047; C; 0067; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G +0048; C; 0068; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H +0049; C; 0069; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I +0049; T; 0131; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I +004A; C; 006A; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J +004B; C; 006B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K +004C; C; 006C; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L +004D; C; 006D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M +004E; C; 006E; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N +004F; C; 006F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O +0050; C; 0070; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P +0051; C; 0071; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q +0052; C; 0072; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R +0053; C; 0073; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S +0054; C; 0074; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T +0055; C; 0075; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U +0056; C; 0076; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V +0057; C; 0077; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W +0058; C; 0078; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X +0059; C; 0079; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y +005A; C; 007A; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +00B5; C; 03BC; # MICRO SIGN +00C0; C; 00E0; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE +00C1; C; 00E1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH ACUTE +00C2; C; 00E2; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX +00C3; C; 00E3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH TILDE +00C4; C; 00E4; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS +00C5; C; 00E5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING ABOVE +00C6; C; 00E6; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AE +00C7; C; 00E7; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CEDILLA +00C8; C; 00E8; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH GRAVE +00C9; C; 00E9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH ACUTE +00CA; C; 00EA; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX +00CB; C; 00EB; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DIAERESIS +00CC; C; 00EC; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH GRAVE +00CD; C; 00ED; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH ACUTE +00CE; C; 00EE; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH CIRCUMFLEX +00CF; C; 00EF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS +00D0; C; 00F0; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ETH +00D1; C; 00F1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH TILDE +00D2; C; 00F2; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH GRAVE +00D3; C; 00F3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH ACUTE +00D4; C; 00F4; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX +00D5; C; 00F5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE +00D6; C; 00F6; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8; C; 00F8; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE +00D9; C; 00F9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH GRAVE +00DA; C; 00FA; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH ACUTE +00DB; C; 00FB; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH CIRCUMFLEX +00DC; C; 00FC; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS +00DD; C; 00FD; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH ACUTE +00DE; C; 00FE; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN +00DF; F; 0073 0073; # LATIN SMALL LETTER SHARP S +0100; C; 0101; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH MACRON +0102; C; 0103; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE +0104; C; 0105; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH OGONEK +0106; C; 0107; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH ACUTE +0108; C; 0109; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CIRCUMFLEX +010A; C; 010B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH DOT ABOVE +010C; C; 010D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CARON +010E; C; 010F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CARON +0110; C; 0111; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH STROKE +0112; C; 0113; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON +0114; C; 0115; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH BREVE +0116; C; 0117; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOT ABOVE +0118; C; 0119; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH OGONEK +011A; C; 011B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CARON +011C; C; 011D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CIRCUMFLEX +011E; C; 011F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH BREVE +0120; C; 0121; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH DOT ABOVE +0122; C; 0123; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CEDILLA +0124; C; 0125; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0126; C; 0127; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH STROKE +0128; C; 0129; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH TILDE +012A; C; 012B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH MACRON +012C; C; 012D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH BREVE +012E; C; 012F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH OGONEK +0130; F; 0069 0307; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOT ABOVE +0130; T; 0069; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOT ABOVE +0132; C; 0133; # LATIN CAPITAL LIGATURE IJ +0134; C; 0135; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0136; C; 0137; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH CEDILLA +0139; C; 013A; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH ACUTE +013B; C; 013C; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CEDILLA +013D; C; 013E; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CARON +013F; C; 0140; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE DOT +0141; C; 0142; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH STROKE +0143; C; 0144; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH ACUTE +0145; C; 0146; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CEDILLA +0147; C; 0148; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CARON +0149; F; 02BC 006E; # LATIN SMALL LETTER N PRECEDED BY APOSTROPHE +014A; C; 014B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ENG +014C; C; 014D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON +014E; C; 014F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH BREVE +0150; C; 0151; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0152; C; 0153; # LATIN CAPITAL LIGATURE OE +0154; C; 0155; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH ACUTE +0156; C; 0157; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH CEDILLA +0158; C; 0159; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH CARON +015A; C; 015B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH ACUTE +015C; C; 015D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CIRCUMFLEX +015E; C; 015F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CEDILLA +0160; C; 0161; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CARON +0162; C; 0163; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CEDILLA +0164; C; 0165; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CARON +0166; C; 0167; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH STROKE +0168; C; 0169; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE +016A; C; 016B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON +016C; C; 016D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH BREVE +016E; C; 016F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH RING ABOVE +0170; C; 0171; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0172; C; 0173; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH OGONEK +0174; C; 0175; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0176; C; 0177; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0178; C; 00FF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DIAERESIS +0179; C; 017A; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH ACUTE +017B; C; 017C; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DOT ABOVE +017D; C; 017E; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH CARON +017F; C; 0073; # LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S +0181; C; 0253; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH HOOK +0182; C; 0183; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH TOPBAR +0184; C; 0185; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE SIX +0186; C; 0254; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OPEN O +0187; C; 0188; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH HOOK +0189; C; 0256; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AFRICAN D +018A; C; 0257; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH HOOK +018B; C; 018C; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH TOPBAR +018E; C; 01DD; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED E +018F; C; 0259; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SCHWA +0190; C; 025B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OPEN E +0191; C; 0192; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH HOOK +0193; C; 0260; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH HOOK +0194; C; 0263; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GAMMA +0196; C; 0269; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER IOTA +0197; C; 0268; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH STROKE +0198; C; 0199; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH HOOK +019C; C; 026F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED M +019D; C; 0272; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LEFT HOOK +019F; C; 0275; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MIDDLE TILDE +01A0; C; 01A1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN +01A2; C; 01A3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OI +01A4; C; 01A5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH HOOK +01A6; C; 0280; # LATIN LETTER YR +01A7; C; 01A8; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE TWO +01A9; C; 0283; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ESH +01AC; C; 01AD; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH HOOK +01AE; C; 0288; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +01AF; C; 01B0; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN +01B1; C; 028A; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON +01B2; C; 028B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH HOOK +01B3; C; 01B4; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH HOOK +01B5; C; 01B6; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH STROKE +01B7; C; 0292; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH +01B8; C; 01B9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH REVERSED +01BC; C; 01BD; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE +01C4; C; 01C6; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON +01C5; C; 01C6; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SMALL LETTER Z WITH CARON +01C7; C; 01C9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER LJ +01C8; C; 01C9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH SMALL LETTER J +01CA; C; 01CC; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER NJ +01CB; C; 01CC; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH SMALL LETTER J +01CD; C; 01CE; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CARON +01CF; C; 01D0; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH CARON +01D1; C; 01D2; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CARON +01D3; C; 01D4; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH CARON +01D5; C; 01D6; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01D7; C; 01D8; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +01D9; C; 01DA; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND CARON +01DB; C; 01DC; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND GRAVE +01DE; C; 01DF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01E0; C; 01E1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +01E2; C; 01E3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AE WITH MACRON +01E4; C; 01E5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH STROKE +01E6; C; 01E7; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CARON +01E8; C; 01E9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH CARON +01EA; C; 01EB; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH OGONEK +01EC; C; 01ED; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH OGONEK AND MACRON +01EE; C; 01EF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH WITH CARON +01F0; F; 006A 030C; # LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH CARON +01F1; C; 01F3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ +01F2; C; 01F3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SMALL LETTER Z +01F4; C; 01F5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH ACUTE +01F6; C; 0195; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HWAIR +01F7; C; 01BF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER WYNN +01F8; C; 01F9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH GRAVE +01FA; C; 01FB; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING ABOVE AND ACUTE +01FC; C; 01FD; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AE WITH ACUTE +01FE; C; 01FF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE AND ACUTE +0200; C; 0201; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0202; C; 0203; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH INVERTED BREVE +0204; C; 0205; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0206; C; 0207; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH INVERTED BREVE +0208; C; 0209; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020A; C; 020B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH INVERTED BREVE +020C; C; 020D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020E; C; 020F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH INVERTED BREVE +0210; C; 0211; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0212; C; 0213; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH INVERTED BREVE +0214; C; 0215; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0216; C; 0217; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH INVERTED BREVE +0218; C; 0219; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH COMMA BELOW +021A; C; 021B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH COMMA BELOW +021C; C; 021D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER YOGH +021E; C; 021F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CARON +0220; C; 019E; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LONG RIGHT LEG +0222; C; 0223; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OU +0224; C; 0225; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH HOOK +0226; C; 0227; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE +0228; C; 0229; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA +022A; C; 022B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +022C; C; 022D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND MACRON +022E; C; 022F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE +0230; C; 0231; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +0232; C; 0233; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH MACRON +023A; C; 2C65; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH STROKE +023B; C; 023C; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH STROKE +023D; C; 019A; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH BAR +023E; C; 2C66; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +0241; C; 0242; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0243; C; 0180; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH STROKE +0244; C; 0289; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U BAR +0245; C; 028C; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED V +0246; C; 0247; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH STROKE +0248; C; 0249; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J WITH STROKE +024A; C; 024B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SMALL Q WITH HOOK TAIL +024C; C; 024D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH STROKE +024E; C; 024F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH STROKE +0345; C; 03B9; # COMBINING GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +0370; C; 0371; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA +0372; C; 0373; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0376; C; 0377; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037F; C; 03F3; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386; C; 03AC; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0388; C; 03AD; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS +0389; C; 03AE; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH TONOS +038A; C; 03AF; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C; C; 03CC; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E; C; 03CD; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS +038F; C; 03CE; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH TONOS +0390; F; 03B9 0308 0301; # GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND TONOS +0391; C; 03B1; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA +0392; C; 03B2; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER BETA +0393; C; 03B3; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER GAMMA +0394; C; 03B4; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER DELTA +0395; C; 03B5; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON +0396; C; 03B6; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ZETA +0397; C; 03B7; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA +0398; C; 03B8; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER THETA +0399; C; 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA +039A; C; 03BA; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER KAPPA +039B; C; 03BB; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER LAMDA +039C; C; 03BC; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER MU +039D; C; 03BD; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER NU +039E; C; 03BE; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER XI +039F; C; 03BF; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON +03A0; C; 03C0; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PI +03A1; C; 03C1; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3; C; 03C3; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA +03A4; C; 03C4; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER TAU +03A5; C; 03C5; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON +03A6; C; 03C6; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PHI +03A7; C; 03C7; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER CHI +03A8; C; 03C8; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PSI +03A9; C; 03C9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA +03AA; C; 03CA; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA +03AB; C; 03CB; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA +03B0; F; 03C5 0308 0301; # GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA AND TONOS +03C2; C; 03C3; # GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA +03CF; C; 03D7; # GREEK CAPITAL KAI SYMBOL +03D0; C; 03B2; # GREEK BETA SYMBOL +03D1; C; 03B8; # GREEK THETA SYMBOL +03D5; C; 03C6; # GREEK PHI SYMBOL +03D6; C; 03C0; # GREEK PI SYMBOL +03D8; C; 03D9; # GREEK LETTER ARCHAIC KOPPA +03DA; C; 03DB; # GREEK LETTER STIGMA +03DC; C; 03DD; # GREEK LETTER DIGAMMA +03DE; C; 03DF; # GREEK LETTER KOPPA +03E0; C; 03E1; # GREEK LETTER SAMPI +03E2; C; 03E3; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SHEI +03E4; C; 03E5; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER FEI +03E6; C; 03E7; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KHEI +03E8; C; 03E9; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER HORI +03EA; C; 03EB; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER GANGIA +03EC; C; 03ED; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SHIMA +03EE; C; 03EF; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DEI +03F0; C; 03BA; # GREEK KAPPA SYMBOL +03F1; C; 03C1; # GREEK RHO SYMBOL +03F4; C; 03B8; # GREEK CAPITAL THETA SYMBOL +03F5; C; 03B5; # GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F7; C; 03F8; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO +03F9; C; 03F2; # GREEK CAPITAL LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +03FA; C; 03FB; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SAN +03FD; C; 037B; # GREEK CAPITAL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +03FE; C; 037C; # GREEK CAPITAL DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +03FF; C; 037D; # GREEK CAPITAL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +0400; C; 0450; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IE WITH GRAVE +0401; C; 0451; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IO +0402; C; 0452; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DJE +0403; C; 0453; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GJE +0404; C; 0454; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER UKRAINIAN IE +0405; C; 0455; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZE +0406; C; 0456; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BYELORUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN I +0407; C; 0457; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YI +0408; C; 0458; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER JE +0409; C; 0459; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER LJE +040A; C; 045A; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER NJE +040B; C; 045B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TSHE +040C; C; 045C; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KJE +040D; C; 045D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I WITH GRAVE +040E; C; 045E; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT U +040F; C; 045F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZHE +0410; C; 0430; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER A +0411; C; 0431; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BE +0412; C; 0432; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER VE +0413; C; 0433; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE +0414; C; 0434; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DE +0415; C; 0435; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IE +0416; C; 0436; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE +0417; C; 0437; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZE +0418; C; 0438; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I +0419; C; 0439; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I +041A; C; 043A; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA +041B; C; 043B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL +041C; C; 043C; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EM +041D; C; 043D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN +041E; C; 043E; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER O +041F; C; 043F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PE +0420; C; 0440; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ER +0421; C; 0441; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ES +0422; C; 0442; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TE +0423; C; 0443; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U +0424; C; 0444; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EF +0425; C; 0445; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA +0426; C; 0446; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TSE +0427; C; 0447; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE +0428; C; 0448; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHA +0429; C; 0449; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHCHA +042A; C; 044A; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HARD SIGN +042B; C; 044B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YERU +042C; C; 044C; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT SIGN +042D; C; 044D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER E +042E; C; 044E; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YU +042F; C; 044F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YA +0460; C; 0461; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA +0462; C; 0463; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YAT +0464; C; 0465; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED E +0466; C; 0467; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER LITTLE YUS +0468; C; 0469; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED LITTLE YUS +046A; C; 046B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BIG YUS +046C; C; 046D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +046E; C; 046F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KSI +0470; C; 0471; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PSI +0472; C; 0473; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER FITA +0474; C; 0475; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IZHITSA +0476; C; 0477; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IZHITSA WITH DOUBLE GRAVE ACCENT +0478; C; 0479; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER UK +047A; C; 047B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ROUND OMEGA +047C; C; 047D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH TITLO +047E; C; 047F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OT +0480; C; 0481; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOPPA +048A; C; 048B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL +048C; C; 048D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SEMISOFT SIGN +048E; C; 048F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ER WITH TICK +0490; C; 0491; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH UPTURN +0492; C; 0493; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE +0494; C; 0495; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0496; C; 0497; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH DESCENDER +0498; C; 0499; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZE WITH DESCENDER +049A; C; 049B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH DESCENDER +049C; C; 049D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH VERTICAL STROKE +049E; C; 049F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH STROKE +04A0; C; 04A1; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BASHKIR KA +04A2; C; 04A3; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH DESCENDER +04A4; C; 04A5; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE EN GHE +04A6; C; 04A7; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +04A8; C; 04A9; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN HA +04AA; C; 04AB; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ES WITH DESCENDER +04AC; C; 04AD; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TE WITH DESCENDER +04AE; C; 04AF; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER STRAIGHT U +04B0; C; 04B1; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER STRAIGHT U WITH STROKE +04B2; C; 04B3; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH DESCENDER +04B4; C; 04B5; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE TE TSE +04B6; C; 04B7; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH DESCENDER +04B8; C; 04B9; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH VERTICAL STROKE +04BA; C; 04BB; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHHA +04BC; C; 04BD; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE +04BE; C; 04BF; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE WITH DESCENDER +04C0; C; 04CF; # CYRILLIC LETTER PALOCHKA +04C1; C; 04C2; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH BREVE +04C3; C; 04C4; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH HOOK +04C5; C; 04C6; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH TAIL +04C7; C; 04C8; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH HOOK +04C9; C; 04CA; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH TAIL +04CB; C; 04CC; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KHAKASSIAN CHE +04CD; C; 04CE; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EM WITH TAIL +04D0; C; 04D1; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE +04D2; C; 04D3; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS +04D4; C; 04D5; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE A IE +04D6; C; 04D7; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IE WITH BREVE +04D8; C; 04D9; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SCHWA +04DA; C; 04DB; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SCHWA WITH DIAERESIS +04DC; C; 04DD; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH DIAERESIS +04DE; C; 04DF; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZE WITH DIAERESIS +04E0; C; 04E1; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN DZE +04E2; C; 04E3; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I WITH MACRON +04E4; C; 04E5; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS +04E6; C; 04E7; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +04E8; C; 04E9; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BARRED O +04EA; C; 04EB; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BARRED O WITH DIAERESIS +04EC; C; 04ED; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DIAERESIS +04EE; C; 04EF; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON +04F0; C; 04F1; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS +04F2; C; 04F3; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +04F4; C; 04F5; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH DIAERESIS +04F6; C; 04F7; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH DESCENDER +04F8; C; 04F9; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YERU WITH DIAERESIS +04FA; C; 04FB; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE AND HOOK +04FC; C; 04FD; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH HOOK +04FE; C; 04FF; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH STROKE +0500; C; 0501; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DE +0502; C; 0503; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DJE +0504; C; 0505; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI ZJE +0506; C; 0507; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DZJE +0508; C; 0509; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI LJE +050A; C; 050B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI NJE +050C; C; 050D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI SJE +050E; C; 050F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI TJE +0510; C; 0511; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED ZE +0512; C; 0513; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH HOOK +0514; C; 0515; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER LHA +0516; C; 0517; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER RHA +0518; C; 0519; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YAE +051A; C; 051B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER QA +051C; C; 051D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER WE +051E; C; 051F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ALEUT KA +0520; C; 0521; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0522; C; 0523; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0524; C; 0525; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PE WITH DESCENDER +0526; C; 0527; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHHA WITH DESCENDER +0528; C; 0529; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH LEFT HOOK +052A; C; 052B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZZHE +052C; C; 052D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DCHE +052E; C; 052F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531; C; 0561; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB +0532; C; 0562; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER BEN +0533; C; 0563; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER GIM +0534; C; 0564; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER DA +0535; C; 0565; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER ECH +0536; C; 0566; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER ZA +0537; C; 0567; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER EH +0538; C; 0568; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER ET +0539; C; 0569; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER TO +053A; C; 056A; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER ZHE +053B; C; 056B; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER INI +053C; C; 056C; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER LIWN +053D; C; 056D; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER XEH +053E; C; 056E; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER CA +053F; C; 056F; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER KEN +0540; C; 0570; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER HO +0541; C; 0571; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER JA +0542; C; 0572; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER GHAD +0543; C; 0573; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER CHEH +0544; C; 0574; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER MEN +0545; C; 0575; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER YI +0546; C; 0576; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER NOW +0547; C; 0577; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER SHA +0548; C; 0578; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER VO +0549; C; 0579; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER CHA +054A; C; 057A; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER PEH +054B; C; 057B; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER JHEH +054C; C; 057C; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER RA +054D; C; 057D; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER SEH +054E; C; 057E; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER VEW +054F; C; 057F; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER TIWN +0550; C; 0580; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER REH +0551; C; 0581; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER CO +0552; C; 0582; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER YIWN +0553; C; 0583; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER PIWR +0554; C; 0584; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER KEH +0555; C; 0585; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER OH +0556; C; 0586; # ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +0587; F; 0565 0582; # ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE ECH YIWN +10A0; C; 2D00; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN +10A1; C; 2D01; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER BAN +10A2; C; 2D02; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER GAN +10A3; C; 2D03; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER DON +10A4; C; 2D04; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER EN +10A5; C; 2D05; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER VIN +10A6; C; 2D06; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER ZEN +10A7; C; 2D07; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER TAN +10A8; C; 2D08; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER IN +10A9; C; 2D09; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER KAN +10AA; C; 2D0A; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER LAS +10AB; C; 2D0B; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER MAN +10AC; C; 2D0C; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER NAR +10AD; C; 2D0D; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER ON +10AE; C; 2D0E; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER PAR +10AF; C; 2D0F; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER ZHAR +10B0; C; 2D10; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER RAE +10B1; C; 2D11; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER SAN +10B2; C; 2D12; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER TAR +10B3; C; 2D13; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER UN +10B4; C; 2D14; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER PHAR +10B5; C; 2D15; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER KHAR +10B6; C; 2D16; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER GHAN +10B7; C; 2D17; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER QAR +10B8; C; 2D18; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER SHIN +10B9; C; 2D19; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER CHIN +10BA; C; 2D1A; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER CAN +10BB; C; 2D1B; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER JIL +10BC; C; 2D1C; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER CIL +10BD; C; 2D1D; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER CHAR +10BE; C; 2D1E; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER XAN +10BF; C; 2D1F; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER JHAN +10C0; C; 2D20; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HAE +10C1; C; 2D21; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HE +10C2; C; 2D22; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HIE +10C3; C; 2D23; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER WE +10C4; C; 2D24; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HAR +10C5; C; 2D25; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7; C; 2D27; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD; C; 2D2D; # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +13F8; C; 13F0; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE +13F9; C; 13F1; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YI +13FA; C; 13F2; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YO +13FB; C; 13F3; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YU +13FC; C; 13F4; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YV +13FD; C; 13F5; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1C80; C; 0432; # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE +1C81; C; 0434; # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER LONG-LEGGED DE +1C82; C; 043E; # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER NARROW O +1C83; C; 0441; # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER WIDE ES +1C84; C; 0442; # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TALL TE +1C85; C; 0442; # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER THREE-LEGGED TE +1C86; C; 044A; # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TALL HARD SIGN +1C87; C; 0463; # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TALL YAT +1C88; C; A64B; # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1C90; C; 10D0; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN +1C91; C; 10D1; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER BAN +1C92; C; 10D2; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER GAN +1C93; C; 10D3; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER DON +1C94; C; 10D4; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER EN +1C95; C; 10D5; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER VIN +1C96; C; 10D6; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER ZEN +1C97; C; 10D7; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER TAN +1C98; C; 10D8; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER IN +1C99; C; 10D9; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER KAN +1C9A; C; 10DA; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LAS +1C9B; C; 10DB; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER MAN +1C9C; C; 10DC; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER NAR +1C9D; C; 10DD; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER ON +1C9E; C; 10DE; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER PAR +1C9F; C; 10DF; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER ZHAR +1CA0; C; 10E0; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER RAE +1CA1; C; 10E1; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER SAN +1CA2; C; 10E2; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER TAR +1CA3; C; 10E3; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER UN +1CA4; C; 10E4; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER PHAR +1CA5; C; 10E5; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER KHAR +1CA6; C; 10E6; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER GHAN +1CA7; C; 10E7; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER QAR +1CA8; C; 10E8; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER SHIN +1CA9; C; 10E9; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER CHIN +1CAA; C; 10EA; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER CAN +1CAB; C; 10EB; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER JIL +1CAC; C; 10EC; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER CIL +1CAD; C; 10ED; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER CHAR +1CAE; C; 10EE; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER XAN +1CAF; C; 10EF; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER JHAN +1CB0; C; 10F0; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER HAE +1CB1; C; 10F1; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER HE +1CB2; C; 10F2; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER HIE +1CB3; C; 10F3; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER WE +1CB4; C; 10F4; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER HAR +1CB5; C; 10F5; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER HOE +1CB6; C; 10F6; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER FI +1CB7; C; 10F7; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER YN +1CB8; C; 10F8; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER ELIFI +1CB9; C; 10F9; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER TURNED GAN +1CBA; C; 10FA; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD; C; 10FD; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN +1CBE; C; 10FE; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER HARD SIGN +1CBF; C; 10FF; # GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1E00; C; 1E01; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW +1E02; C; 1E03; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH DOT ABOVE +1E04; C; 1E05; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH DOT BELOW +1E06; C; 1E07; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH LINE BELOW +1E08; C; 1E09; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CEDILLA AND ACUTE +1E0A; C; 1E0B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH DOT ABOVE +1E0C; C; 1E0D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH DOT BELOW +1E0E; C; 1E0F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH LINE BELOW +1E10; C; 1E11; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CEDILLA +1E12; C; 1E13; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E14; C; 1E15; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E16; C; 1E17; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E18; C; 1E19; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E1A; C; 1E1B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH TILDE BELOW +1E1C; C; 1E1D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA AND BREVE +1E1E; C; 1E1F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH DOT ABOVE +1E20; C; 1E21; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH MACRON +1E22; C; 1E23; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DOT ABOVE +1E24; C; 1E25; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DOT BELOW +1E26; C; 1E27; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DIAERESIS +1E28; C; 1E29; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CEDILLA +1E2A; C; 1E2B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH BREVE BELOW +1E2C; C; 1E2D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH TILDE BELOW +1E2E; C; 1E2F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +1E30; C; 1E31; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH ACUTE +1E32; C; 1E33; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DOT BELOW +1E34; C; 1E35; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH LINE BELOW +1E36; C; 1E37; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW +1E38; C; 1E39; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E3A; C; 1E3B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH LINE BELOW +1E3C; C; 1E3D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E3E; C; 1E3F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH ACUTE +1E40; C; 1E41; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH DOT ABOVE +1E42; C; 1E43; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH DOT BELOW +1E44; C; 1E45; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DOT ABOVE +1E46; C; 1E47; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DOT BELOW +1E48; C; 1E49; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LINE BELOW +1E4A; C; 1E4B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E4C; C; 1E4D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E4E; C; 1E4F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND DIAERESIS +1E50; C; 1E51; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E52; C; 1E53; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E54; C; 1E55; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH ACUTE +1E56; C; 1E57; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH DOT ABOVE +1E58; C; 1E59; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT ABOVE +1E5A; C; 1E5B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW +1E5C; C; 1E5D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E5E; C; 1E5F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH LINE BELOW +1E60; C; 1E61; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT ABOVE +1E62; C; 1E63; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW +1E64; C; 1E65; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH ACUTE AND DOT ABOVE +1E66; C; 1E67; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CARON AND DOT ABOVE +1E68; C; 1E69; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW AND DOT ABOVE +1E6A; C; 1E6B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DOT ABOVE +1E6C; C; 1E6D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DOT BELOW +1E6E; C; 1E6F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH LINE BELOW +1E70; C; 1E71; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E72; C; 1E73; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS BELOW +1E74; C; 1E75; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE BELOW +1E76; C; 1E77; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E78; C; 1E79; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E7A; C; 1E7B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON AND DIAERESIS +1E7C; C; 1E7D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH TILDE +1E7E; C; 1E7F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH DOT BELOW +1E80; C; 1E81; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH GRAVE +1E82; C; 1E83; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH ACUTE +1E84; C; 1E85; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DIAERESIS +1E86; C; 1E87; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DOT ABOVE +1E88; C; 1E89; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DOT BELOW +1E8A; C; 1E8B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X WITH DOT ABOVE +1E8C; C; 1E8D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X WITH DIAERESIS +1E8E; C; 1E8F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DOT ABOVE +1E90; C; 1E91; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH CIRCUMFLEX +1E92; C; 1E93; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DOT BELOW +1E94; C; 1E95; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH LINE BELOW +1E96; F; 0068 0331; # LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH LINE BELOW +1E97; F; 0074 0308; # LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DIAERESIS +1E98; F; 0077 030A; # LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH RING ABOVE +1E99; F; 0079 030A; # LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH RING ABOVE +1E9A; F; 0061 02BE; # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH RIGHT HALF RING +1E9B; C; 1E61; # LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S WITH DOT ABOVE +1E9E; F; 0073 0073; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SHARP S +1E9E; S; 00DF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SHARP S +1EA0; C; 1EA1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT BELOW +1EA2; C; 1EA3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EA4; C; 1EA5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EA6; C; 1EA7; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EA8; C; 1EA9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EAA; C; 1EAB; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EAC; C; 1EAD; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EAE; C; 1EAF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND ACUTE +1EB0; C; 1EB1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND GRAVE +1EB2; C; 1EB3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND HOOK ABOVE +1EB4; C; 1EB5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND TILDE +1EB6; C; 1EB7; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND DOT BELOW +1EB8; C; 1EB9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOT BELOW +1EBA; C; 1EBB; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EBC; C; 1EBD; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH TILDE +1EBE; C; 1EBF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EC0; C; 1EC1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EC2; C; 1EC3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EC4; C; 1EC5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EC6; C; 1EC7; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EC8; C; 1EC9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ECA; C; 1ECB; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOT BELOW +1ECC; C; 1ECD; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT BELOW +1ECE; C; 1ECF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ED0; C; 1ED1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1ED2; C; 1ED3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1ED4; C; 1ED5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1ED6; C; 1ED7; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1ED8; C; 1ED9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EDA; C; 1EDB; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EDC; C; 1EDD; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EDE; C; 1EDF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EE0; C; 1EE1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EE2; C; 1EE3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EE4; C; 1EE5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOT BELOW +1EE6; C; 1EE7; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EE8; C; 1EE9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EEA; C; 1EEB; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EEC; C; 1EED; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EEE; C; 1EEF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EF0; C; 1EF1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EF2; C; 1EF3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH GRAVE +1EF4; C; 1EF5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DOT BELOW +1EF6; C; 1EF7; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EF8; C; 1EF9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH TILDE +1EFA; C; 1EFB; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH LL +1EFC; C; 1EFD; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH V +1EFE; C; 1EFF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH LOOP +1F08; C; 1F00; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI +1F09; C; 1F01; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA +1F0A; C; 1F02; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND VARIA +1F0B; C; 1F03; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F0C; C; 1F04; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA +1F0D; C; 1F05; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F0E; C; 1F06; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI +1F0F; C; 1F07; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F18; C; 1F10; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI +1F19; C; 1F11; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA +1F1A; C; 1F12; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND VARIA +1F1B; C; 1F13; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F1C; C; 1F14; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA +1F1D; C; 1F15; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F28; C; 1F20; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI +1F29; C; 1F21; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA +1F2A; C; 1F22; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND VARIA +1F2B; C; 1F23; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F2C; C; 1F24; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND OXIA +1F2D; C; 1F25; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F2E; C; 1F26; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI +1F2F; C; 1F27; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F38; C; 1F30; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI +1F39; C; 1F31; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA +1F3A; C; 1F32; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND VARIA +1F3B; C; 1F33; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F3C; C; 1F34; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND OXIA +1F3D; C; 1F35; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F3E; C; 1F36; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI +1F3F; C; 1F37; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F48; C; 1F40; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI +1F49; C; 1F41; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA +1F4A; C; 1F42; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI AND VARIA +1F4B; C; 1F43; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F4C; C; 1F44; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI AND OXIA +1F4D; C; 1F45; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50; F; 03C5 0313; # GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI +1F52; F; 03C5 0313 0300; # GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI AND VARIA +1F54; F; 03C5 0313 0301; # GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA +1F56; F; 03C5 0313 0342; # GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI +1F59; C; 1F51; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B; C; 1F53; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D; C; 1F55; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F; C; 1F57; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F68; C; 1F60; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI +1F69; C; 1F61; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA +1F6A; C; 1F62; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND VARIA +1F6B; C; 1F63; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F6C; C; 1F64; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND OXIA +1F6D; C; 1F65; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F6E; C; 1F66; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI +1F6F; C; 1F67; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F80; F; 1F00 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F81; F; 1F01 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F82; F; 1F02 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F83; F; 1F03 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F84; F; 1F04 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F85; F; 1F05 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F86; F; 1F06 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F87; F; 1F07 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F88; F; 1F00 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F88; S; 1F80; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F89; F; 1F01 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F89; S; 1F81; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F8A; F; 1F02 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND VARIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F8A; S; 1F82; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND VARIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F8B; F; 1F03 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND VARIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F8B; S; 1F83; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND VARIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F8C; F; 1F04 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F8C; S; 1F84; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND OXIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F8D; F; 1F05 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND OXIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F8D; S; 1F85; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND OXIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F8E; F; 1F06 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F8E; S; 1F86; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F8F; F; 1F07 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F8F; S; 1F87; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F90; F; 1F20 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F91; F; 1F21 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F92; F; 1F22 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F93; F; 1F23 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F94; F; 1F24 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F95; F; 1F25 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F96; F; 1F26 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F97; F; 1F27 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F98; F; 1F20 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F98; S; 1F90; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F99; F; 1F21 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F99; S; 1F91; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F9A; F; 1F22 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND VARIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F9A; S; 1F92; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND VARIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F9B; F; 1F23 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND VARIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F9B; S; 1F93; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND VARIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F9C; F; 1F24 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND OXIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F9C; S; 1F94; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND OXIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F9D; F; 1F25 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND OXIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F9D; S; 1F95; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND OXIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F9E; F; 1F26 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F9E; S; 1F96; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F9F; F; 1F27 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F9F; S; 1F97; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FA0; F; 1F60 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FA1; F; 1F61 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FA2; F; 1F62 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FA3; F; 1F63 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FA4; F; 1F64 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FA5; F; 1F65 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FA6; F; 1F66 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FA7; F; 1F67 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FA8; F; 1F60 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FA8; S; 1FA0; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FA9; F; 1F61 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FA9; S; 1FA1; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FAA; F; 1F62 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND VARIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FAA; S; 1FA2; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND VARIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FAB; F; 1F63 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND VARIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FAB; S; 1FA3; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND VARIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FAC; F; 1F64 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND OXIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FAC; S; 1FA4; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND OXIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FAD; F; 1F65 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND OXIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FAD; S; 1FA5; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND OXIA AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FAE; F; 1F66 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FAE; S; 1FA6; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FAF; F; 1F67 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FAF; S; 1FA7; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FB2; F; 1F70 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB3; F; 03B1 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB4; F; 03AC 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6; F; 03B1 0342; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI +1FB7; F; 03B1 0342 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB8; C; 1FB0; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH VRACHY +1FB9; C; 1FB1; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH MACRON +1FBA; C; 1F70; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA +1FBB; C; 1F71; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA +1FBC; F; 03B1 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBC; S; 1FB3; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBE; C; 03B9; # GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2; F; 1F74 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC3; F; 03B7 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC4; F; 03AE 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6; F; 03B7 0342; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI +1FC7; F; 03B7 0342 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC8; C; 1F72; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA +1FC9; C; 1F73; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH OXIA +1FCA; C; 1F74; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA +1FCB; C; 1F75; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA +1FCC; F; 03B7 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FCC; S; 1FC3; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FD2; F; 03B9 0308 0300; # GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND VARIA +1FD3; F; 03B9 0308 0301; # GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6; F; 03B9 0342; # GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI +1FD7; F; 03B9 0308 0342; # GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FD8; C; 1FD0; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY +1FD9; C; 1FD1; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH MACRON +1FDA; C; 1F76; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH VARIA +1FDB; C; 1F77; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE2; F; 03C5 0308 0300; # GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA AND VARIA +1FE3; F; 03C5 0308 0301; # GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FE4; F; 03C1 0313; # GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO WITH PSILI +1FE6; F; 03C5 0342; # GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PERISPOMENI +1FE7; F; 03C5 0308 0342; # GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FE8; C; 1FE0; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY +1FE9; C; 1FE1; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH MACRON +1FEA; C; 1F7A; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH VARIA +1FEB; C; 1F7B; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH OXIA +1FEC; C; 1FE5; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF2; F; 1F7C 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF3; F; 03C9 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF4; F; 03CE 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6; F; 03C9 0342; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI +1FF7; F; 03C9 0342 03B9; # GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF8; C; 1F78; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA +1FF9; C; 1F79; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH OXIA +1FFA; C; 1F7C; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA +1FFB; C; 1F7D; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1FFC; F; 03C9 03B9; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FFC; S; 1FF3; # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +2126; C; 03C9; # OHM SIGN +212A; C; 006B; # KELVIN SIGN +212B; C; 00E5; # ANGSTROM SIGN +2132; C; 214E; # TURNED CAPITAL F +2160; C; 2170; # ROMAN NUMERAL ONE +2161; C; 2171; # ROMAN NUMERAL TWO +2162; C; 2172; # ROMAN NUMERAL THREE +2163; C; 2173; # ROMAN NUMERAL FOUR +2164; C; 2174; # ROMAN NUMERAL FIVE +2165; C; 2175; # ROMAN NUMERAL SIX +2166; C; 2176; # ROMAN NUMERAL SEVEN +2167; C; 2177; # ROMAN NUMERAL EIGHT +2168; C; 2178; # ROMAN NUMERAL NINE +2169; C; 2179; # ROMAN NUMERAL TEN +216A; C; 217A; # ROMAN NUMERAL ELEVEN +216B; C; 217B; # ROMAN NUMERAL TWELVE +216C; C; 217C; # ROMAN NUMERAL FIFTY +216D; C; 217D; # ROMAN NUMERAL ONE HUNDRED +216E; C; 217E; # ROMAN NUMERAL FIVE HUNDRED +216F; C; 217F; # ROMAN NUMERAL ONE THOUSAND +2183; C; 2184; # ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED +24B6; C; 24D0; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A +24B7; C; 24D1; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B +24B8; C; 24D2; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C +24B9; C; 24D3; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D +24BA; C; 24D4; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E +24BB; C; 24D5; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F +24BC; C; 24D6; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G +24BD; C; 24D7; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H +24BE; C; 24D8; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I +24BF; C; 24D9; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J +24C0; C; 24DA; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K +24C1; C; 24DB; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L +24C2; C; 24DC; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M +24C3; C; 24DD; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N +24C4; C; 24DE; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O +24C5; C; 24DF; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P +24C6; C; 24E0; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q +24C7; C; 24E1; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R +24C8; C; 24E2; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S +24C9; C; 24E3; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T +24CA; C; 24E4; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U +24CB; C; 24E5; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V +24CC; C; 24E6; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W +24CD; C; 24E7; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X +24CE; C; 24E8; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y +24CF; C; 24E9; # CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +2C00; C; 2C30; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU +2C01; C; 2C31; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER BUKY +2C02; C; 2C32; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER VEDE +2C03; C; 2C33; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER GLAGOLI +2C04; C; 2C34; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER DOBRO +2C05; C; 2C35; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER YESTU +2C06; C; 2C36; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHIVETE +2C07; C; 2C37; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER DZELO +2C08; C; 2C38; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLJA +2C09; C; 2C39; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER IZHE +2C0A; C; 2C3A; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER INITIAL IZHE +2C0B; C; 2C3B; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER I +2C0C; C; 2C3C; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER DJERVI +2C0D; C; 2C3D; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER KAKO +2C0E; C; 2C3E; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER LJUDIJE +2C0F; C; 2C3F; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER MYSLITE +2C10; C; 2C40; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER NASHI +2C11; C; 2C41; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER ONU +2C12; C; 2C42; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER POKOJI +2C13; C; 2C43; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER RITSI +2C14; C; 2C44; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER SLOVO +2C15; C; 2C45; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER TVRIDO +2C16; C; 2C46; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER UKU +2C17; C; 2C47; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER FRITU +2C18; C; 2C48; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER HERU +2C19; C; 2C49; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER OTU +2C1A; C; 2C4A; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER PE +2C1B; C; 2C4B; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER SHTA +2C1C; C; 2C4C; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER TSI +2C1D; C; 2C4D; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER CHRIVI +2C1E; C; 2C4E; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER SHA +2C1F; C; 2C4F; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER YERU +2C20; C; 2C50; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER YERI +2C21; C; 2C51; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER YATI +2C22; C; 2C52; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER SPIDERY HA +2C23; C; 2C53; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER YU +2C24; C; 2C54; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER SMALL YUS +2C25; C; 2C55; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER SMALL YUS WITH TAIL +2C26; C; 2C56; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER YO +2C27; C; 2C57; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTATED SMALL YUS +2C28; C; 2C58; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER BIG YUS +2C29; C; 2C59; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTATED BIG YUS +2C2A; C; 2C5A; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER FITA +2C2B; C; 2C5B; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER IZHITSA +2C2C; C; 2C5C; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER SHTAPIC +2C2D; C; 2C5D; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER TROKUTASTI A +2C2E; C; 2C5E; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER LATINATE MYSLITE +2C2F; C; 2C5F; # GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER CAUDATE CHRIVI +2C60; C; 2C61; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOUBLE BAR +2C62; C; 026B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE TILDE +2C63; C; 1D7D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH STROKE +2C64; C; 027D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH TAIL +2C67; C; 2C68; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DESCENDER +2C69; C; 2C6A; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DESCENDER +2C6B; C; 2C6C; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DESCENDER +2C6D; C; 0251; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA +2C6E; C; 0271; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH HOOK +2C6F; C; 0250; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED A +2C70; C; 0252; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED ALPHA +2C72; C; 2C73; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH HOOK +2C75; C; 2C76; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HALF H +2C7E; C; 023F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL +2C7F; C; 0240; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH SWASH TAIL +2C80; C; 2C81; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER ALFA +2C82; C; 2C83; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER VIDA +2C84; C; 2C85; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER GAMMA +2C86; C; 2C87; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DALDA +2C88; C; 2C89; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER EIE +2C8A; C; 2C8B; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SOU +2C8C; C; 2C8D; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER ZATA +2C8E; C; 2C8F; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER HATE +2C90; C; 2C91; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER THETHE +2C92; C; 2C93; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER IAUDA +2C94; C; 2C95; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KAPA +2C96; C; 2C97; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER LAULA +2C98; C; 2C99; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER MI +2C9A; C; 2C9B; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER NI +2C9C; C; 2C9D; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KSI +2C9E; C; 2C9F; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER O +2CA0; C; 2CA1; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER PI +2CA2; C; 2CA3; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER RO +2CA4; C; 2CA5; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SIMA +2CA6; C; 2CA7; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER TAU +2CA8; C; 2CA9; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER UA +2CAA; C; 2CAB; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER FI +2CAC; C; 2CAD; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KHI +2CAE; C; 2CAF; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER PSI +2CB0; C; 2CB1; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OOU +2CB2; C; 2CB3; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P ALEF +2CB4; C; 2CB5; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC AIN +2CB6; C; 2CB7; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC EIE +2CB8; C; 2CB9; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P KAPA +2CBA; C; 2CBB; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P NI +2CBC; C; 2CBD; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC NI +2CBE; C; 2CBF; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC OOU +2CC0; C; 2CC1; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SAMPI +2CC2; C; 2CC3; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CROSSED SHEI +2CC4; C; 2CC5; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHEI +2CC6; C; 2CC7; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC ESH +2CC8; C; 2CC9; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER AKHMIMIC KHEI +2CCA; C; 2CCB; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P HORI +2CCC; C; 2CCD; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HORI +2CCE; C; 2CCF; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HA +2CD0; C; 2CD1; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER L-SHAPED HA +2CD2; C; 2CD3; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HEI +2CD4; C; 2CD5; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HAT +2CD6; C; 2CD7; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC GANGIA +2CD8; C; 2CD9; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC DJA +2CDA; C; 2CDB; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHIMA +2CDC; C; 2CDD; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN SHIMA +2CDE; C; 2CDF; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NGI +2CE0; C; 2CE1; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NYI +2CE2; C; 2CE3; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN WAU +2CEB; C; 2CEC; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI +2CED; C; 2CEE; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF2; C; 2CF3; # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +A640; C; A641; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA +A642; C; A643; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZELO +A644; C; A645; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED DZE +A646; C; A647; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTA +A648; C; A649; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DJERV +A64A; C; A64B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER MONOGRAPH UK +A64C; C; A64D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BROAD OMEGA +A64E; C; A64F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER NEUTRAL YER +A650; C; A651; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YERU WITH BACK YER +A652; C; A653; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED YAT +A654; C; A655; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED YU +A656; C; A657; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED A +A658; C; A659; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65A; C; A65B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BLENDED YUS +A65C; C; A65D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65E; C; A65F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YN +A660; C; A661; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED TSE +A662; C; A663; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT DE +A664; C; A665; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT EL +A666; C; A667; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT EM +A668; C; A669; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER MONOCULAR O +A66A; C; A66B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BINOCULAR O +A66C; C; A66D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A680; C; A681; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE +A682; C; A683; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZWE +A684; C; A685; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHWE +A686; C; A687; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CCHE +A688; C; A689; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZZE +A68A; C; A68B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +A68C; C; A68D; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TWE +A68E; C; A68F; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TSWE +A690; C; A691; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TSSE +A692; C; A693; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TCHE +A694; C; A695; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HWE +A696; C; A697; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHWE +A698; C; A699; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DOUBLE O +A69A; C; A69B; # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CROSSED O +A722; C; A723; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF +A724; C; A725; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL AIN +A726; C; A727; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HENG +A728; C; A729; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TZ +A72A; C; A72B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TRESILLO +A72C; C; A72D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CUATRILLO +A72E; C; A72F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CUATRILLO WITH COMMA +A732; C; A733; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AA +A734; C; A735; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AO +A736; C; A737; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AU +A738; C; A739; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AV +A73A; C; A73B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AV WITH HORIZONTAL BAR +A73C; C; A73D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AY +A73E; C; A73F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED C WITH DOT +A740; C; A741; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH STROKE +A742; C; A743; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A744; C; A745; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH STROKE AND DIAGONAL STROKE +A746; C; A747; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER BROKEN L +A748; C; A749; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH HIGH STROKE +A74A; C; A74B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH LONG STROKE OVERLAY +A74C; C; A74D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH LOOP +A74E; C; A74F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OO +A750; C; A751; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A752; C; A753; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH FLOURISH +A754; C; A755; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH SQUIRREL TAIL +A756; C; A757; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A758; C; A759; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A75A; C; A75B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R ROTUNDA +A75C; C; A75D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER RUM ROTUNDA +A75E; C; A75F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A760; C; A761; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VY +A762; C; A763; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VISIGOTHIC Z +A764; C; A765; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE +A766; C; A767; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A768; C; A769; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VEND +A76A; C; A76B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ET +A76C; C; A76D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER IS +A76E; C; A76F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CON +A779; C; A77A; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR D +A77B; C; A77C; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR F +A77D; C; 1D79; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR G +A77E; C; A77F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED INSULAR G +A780; C; A781; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED L +A782; C; A783; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR R +A784; C; A785; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR S +A786; C; A787; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR T +A78B; C; A78C; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO +A78D; C; 0265; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED H +A790; C; A791; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER +A792; C; A793; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH BAR +A796; C; A797; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH FLOURISH +A798; C; A799; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH STROKE +A79A; C; A79B; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK AE +A79C; C; A79D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK OE +A79E; C; A79F; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK UE +A7A0; C; A7A1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A2; C; A7A3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A4; C; A7A5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A6; C; A7A7; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A8; C; A7A9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7AA; C; 0266; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH HOOK +A7AB; C; 025C; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED OPEN E +A7AC; C; 0261; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SCRIPT G +A7AD; C; 026C; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH BELT +A7AE; C; 026A; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SMALL CAPITAL I +A7B0; C; 029E; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED K +A7B1; C; 0287; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED T +A7B2; C; 029D; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J WITH CROSSED-TAIL +A7B3; C; AB53; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CHI +A7B4; C; A7B5; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER BETA +A7B6; C; A7B7; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA +A7B8; C; A7B9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH STROKE +A7BA; C; A7BB; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL A +A7BC; C; A7BD; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL I +A7BE; C; A7BF; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL U +A7C0; C; A7C1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OLD POLISH O +A7C2; C; A7C3; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ANGLICANA W +A7C4; C; A794; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH PALATAL HOOK +A7C5; C; 0282; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH HOOK +A7C6; C; 1D8E; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH PALATAL HOOK +A7C7; C; A7C8; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7C9; C; A7CA; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0; C; A7D1; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D6; C; A7D7; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE SCOTS S +A7D8; C; A7D9; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F5; C; A7F6; # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +AB70; C; 13A0; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A +AB71; C; 13A1; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER E +AB72; C; 13A2; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER I +AB73; C; 13A3; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER O +AB74; C; 13A4; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER U +AB75; C; 13A5; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER V +AB76; C; 13A6; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER GA +AB77; C; 13A7; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER KA +AB78; C; 13A8; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER GE +AB79; C; 13A9; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER GI +AB7A; C; 13AA; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER GO +AB7B; C; 13AB; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER GU +AB7C; C; 13AC; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER GV +AB7D; C; 13AD; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER HA +AB7E; C; 13AE; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER HE +AB7F; C; 13AF; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER HI +AB80; C; 13B0; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER HO +AB81; C; 13B1; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER HU +AB82; C; 13B2; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER HV +AB83; C; 13B3; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER LA +AB84; C; 13B4; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER LE +AB85; C; 13B5; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER LI +AB86; C; 13B6; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER LO +AB87; C; 13B7; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER LU +AB88; C; 13B8; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER LV +AB89; C; 13B9; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MA +AB8A; C; 13BA; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER ME +AB8B; C; 13BB; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MI +AB8C; C; 13BC; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MO +AB8D; C; 13BD; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MU +AB8E; C; 13BE; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER NA +AB8F; C; 13BF; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER HNA +AB90; C; 13C0; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER NAH +AB91; C; 13C1; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER NE +AB92; C; 13C2; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER NI +AB93; C; 13C3; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER NO +AB94; C; 13C4; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER NU +AB95; C; 13C5; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER NV +AB96; C; 13C6; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER QUA +AB97; C; 13C7; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER QUE +AB98; C; 13C8; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER QUI +AB99; C; 13C9; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER QUO +AB9A; C; 13CA; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER QUU +AB9B; C; 13CB; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER QUV +AB9C; C; 13CC; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER SA +AB9D; C; 13CD; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER S +AB9E; C; 13CE; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER SE +AB9F; C; 13CF; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER SI +ABA0; C; 13D0; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER SO +ABA1; C; 13D1; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER SU +ABA2; C; 13D2; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER SV +ABA3; C; 13D3; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER DA +ABA4; C; 13D4; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TA +ABA5; C; 13D5; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER DE +ABA6; C; 13D6; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TE +ABA7; C; 13D7; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER DI +ABA8; C; 13D8; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TI +ABA9; C; 13D9; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER DO +ABAA; C; 13DA; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER DU +ABAB; C; 13DB; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER DV +ABAC; C; 13DC; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER DLA +ABAD; C; 13DD; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TLA +ABAE; C; 13DE; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TLE +ABAF; C; 13DF; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TLI +ABB0; C; 13E0; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TLO +ABB1; C; 13E1; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TLU +ABB2; C; 13E2; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TLV +ABB3; C; 13E3; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TSA +ABB4; C; 13E4; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TSE +ABB5; C; 13E5; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TSI +ABB6; C; 13E6; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TSO +ABB7; C; 13E7; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TSU +ABB8; C; 13E8; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER TSV +ABB9; C; 13E9; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER WA +ABBA; C; 13EA; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER WE +ABBB; C; 13EB; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER WI +ABBC; C; 13EC; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER WO +ABBD; C; 13ED; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER WU +ABBE; C; 13EE; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER WV +ABBF; C; 13EF; # CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +FB00; F; 0066 0066; # LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF +FB01; F; 0066 0069; # LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FI +FB02; F; 0066 006C; # LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FL +FB03; F; 0066 0066 0069; # LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FFI +FB04; F; 0066 0066 006C; # LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FFL +FB05; F; 0073 0074; # LATIN SMALL LIGATURE LONG S T +FB06; F; 0073 0074; # LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13; F; 0574 0576; # ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW +FB14; F; 0574 0565; # ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN ECH +FB15; F; 0574 056B; # ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN INI +FB16; F; 057E 0576; # ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE VEW NOW +FB17; F; 0574 056D; # ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FF21; C; FF41; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A +FF22; C; FF42; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B +FF23; C; FF43; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C +FF24; C; FF44; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D +FF25; C; FF45; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E +FF26; C; FF46; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F +FF27; C; FF47; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G +FF28; C; FF48; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H +FF29; C; FF49; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I +FF2A; C; FF4A; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J +FF2B; C; FF4B; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K +FF2C; C; FF4C; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L +FF2D; C; FF4D; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M +FF2E; C; FF4E; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N +FF2F; C; FF4F; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O +FF30; C; FF50; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P +FF31; C; FF51; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q +FF32; C; FF52; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R +FF33; C; FF53; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S +FF34; C; FF54; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T +FF35; C; FF55; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U +FF36; C; FF56; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V +FF37; C; FF57; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W +FF38; C; FF58; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X +FF39; C; FF59; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y +FF3A; C; FF5A; # FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +10400; C; 10428; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I +10401; C; 10429; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG E +10402; C; 1042A; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG A +10403; C; 1042B; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG AH +10404; C; 1042C; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG O +10405; C; 1042D; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG OO +10406; C; 1042E; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I +10407; C; 1042F; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER SHORT E +10408; C; 10430; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER SHORT A +10409; C; 10431; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER SHORT AH +1040A; C; 10432; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER SHORT O +1040B; C; 10433; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER SHORT OO +1040C; C; 10434; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER AY +1040D; C; 10435; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER OW +1040E; C; 10436; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER WU +1040F; C; 10437; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER YEE +10410; C; 10438; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER H +10411; C; 10439; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER PEE +10412; C; 1043A; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER BEE +10413; C; 1043B; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER TEE +10414; C; 1043C; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER DEE +10415; C; 1043D; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER CHEE +10416; C; 1043E; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER JEE +10417; C; 1043F; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER KAY +10418; C; 10440; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER GAY +10419; C; 10441; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER EF +1041A; C; 10442; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER VEE +1041B; C; 10443; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER ETH +1041C; C; 10444; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER THEE +1041D; C; 10445; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER ES +1041E; C; 10446; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER ZEE +1041F; C; 10447; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER ESH +10420; C; 10448; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER ZHEE +10421; C; 10449; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER ER +10422; C; 1044A; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER EL +10423; C; 1044B; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER EM +10424; C; 1044C; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER EN +10425; C; 1044D; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER ENG +10426; C; 1044E; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER OI +10427; C; 1044F; # DESERET CAPITAL LETTER EW +104B0; C; 104D8; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A +104B1; C; 104D9; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER AI +104B2; C; 104DA; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER AIN +104B3; C; 104DB; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER AH +104B4; C; 104DC; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER BRA +104B5; C; 104DD; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER CHA +104B6; C; 104DE; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER EHCHA +104B7; C; 104DF; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER E +104B8; C; 104E0; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER EIN +104B9; C; 104E1; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER HA +104BA; C; 104E2; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER HYA +104BB; C; 104E3; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER I +104BC; C; 104E4; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER KA +104BD; C; 104E5; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER EHKA +104BE; C; 104E6; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER KYA +104BF; C; 104E7; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER LA +104C0; C; 104E8; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER MA +104C1; C; 104E9; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER NA +104C2; C; 104EA; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER O +104C3; C; 104EB; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER OIN +104C4; C; 104EC; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER PA +104C5; C; 104ED; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER EHPA +104C6; C; 104EE; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER SA +104C7; C; 104EF; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER SHA +104C8; C; 104F0; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER TA +104C9; C; 104F1; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER EHTA +104CA; C; 104F2; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER TSA +104CB; C; 104F3; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER EHTSA +104CC; C; 104F4; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER TSHA +104CD; C; 104F5; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER DHA +104CE; C; 104F6; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER U +104CF; C; 104F7; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER WA +104D0; C; 104F8; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER KHA +104D1; C; 104F9; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER GHA +104D2; C; 104FA; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZA +104D3; C; 104FB; # OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +10570; C; 10597; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A +10571; C; 10598; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER BBE +10572; C; 10599; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER BE +10573; C; 1059A; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER CE +10574; C; 1059B; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER CHE +10575; C; 1059C; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER DE +10576; C; 1059D; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER DHE +10577; C; 1059E; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER EI +10578; C; 1059F; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER E +10579; C; 105A0; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER FE +1057A; C; 105A1; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C; C; 105A3; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA +1057D; C; 105A4; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HHA +1057E; C; 105A5; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER I +1057F; C; 105A6; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER IJE +10580; C; 105A7; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER JE +10581; C; 105A8; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER KA +10582; C; 105A9; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER LA +10583; C; 105AA; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER LLA +10584; C; 105AB; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ME +10585; C; 105AC; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER NE +10586; C; 105AD; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER NJE +10587; C; 105AE; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER O +10588; C; 105AF; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER PE +10589; C; 105B0; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER QA +1058A; C; 105B1; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C; C; 105B3; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE +1058D; C; 105B4; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SHE +1058E; C; 105B5; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER TE +1058F; C; 105B6; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER THE +10590; C; 105B7; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER U +10591; C; 105B8; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER VE +10592; C; 105B9; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594; C; 105BB; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y +10595; C; 105BC; # VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10C80; C; 10CC0; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A +10C81; C; 10CC1; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER AA +10C82; C; 10CC2; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EB +10C83; C; 10CC3; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER AMB +10C84; C; 10CC4; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EC +10C85; C; 10CC5; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ENC +10C86; C; 10CC6; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ECS +10C87; C; 10CC7; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ED +10C88; C; 10CC8; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER AND +10C89; C; 10CC9; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER E +10C8A; C; 10CCA; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSE E +10C8B; C; 10CCB; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EE +10C8C; C; 10CCC; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EF +10C8D; C; 10CCD; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EG +10C8E; C; 10CCE; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EGY +10C8F; C; 10CCF; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EH +10C90; C; 10CD0; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER I +10C91; C; 10CD1; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER II +10C92; C; 10CD2; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EJ +10C93; C; 10CD3; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EK +10C94; C; 10CD4; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER AK +10C95; C; 10CD5; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER UNK +10C96; C; 10CD6; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EL +10C97; C; 10CD7; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ELY +10C98; C; 10CD8; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EM +10C99; C; 10CD9; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EN +10C9A; C; 10CDA; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ENY +10C9B; C; 10CDB; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER O +10C9C; C; 10CDC; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER OO +10C9D; C; 10CDD; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER NIKOLSBURG OE +10C9E; C; 10CDE; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER RUDIMENTA OE +10C9F; C; 10CDF; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER OEE +10CA0; C; 10CE0; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EP +10CA1; C; 10CE1; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EMP +10CA2; C; 10CE2; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ER +10CA3; C; 10CE3; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER SHORT ER +10CA4; C; 10CE4; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ES +10CA5; C; 10CE5; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ESZ +10CA6; C; 10CE6; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ET +10CA7; C; 10CE7; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ENT +10CA8; C; 10CE8; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ETY +10CA9; C; 10CE9; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ECH +10CAA; C; 10CEA; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER U +10CAB; C; 10CEB; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER UU +10CAC; C; 10CEC; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER NIKOLSBURG UE +10CAD; C; 10CED; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER RUDIMENTA UE +10CAE; C; 10CEE; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EV +10CAF; C; 10CEF; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EZ +10CB0; C; 10CF0; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER EZS +10CB1; C; 10CF1; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER ENT-SHAPED SIGN +10CB2; C; 10CF2; # OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +118A0; C; 118C0; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA +118A1; C; 118C1; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER A +118A2; C; 118C2; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER WI +118A3; C; 118C3; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER YU +118A4; C; 118C4; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER YA +118A5; C; 118C5; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER YO +118A6; C; 118C6; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER II +118A7; C; 118C7; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER UU +118A8; C; 118C8; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER E +118A9; C; 118C9; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER O +118AA; C; 118CA; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER ANG +118AB; C; 118CB; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER GA +118AC; C; 118CC; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER KO +118AD; C; 118CD; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER ENY +118AE; C; 118CE; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER YUJ +118AF; C; 118CF; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER UC +118B0; C; 118D0; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER ENN +118B1; C; 118D1; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER ODD +118B2; C; 118D2; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER TTE +118B3; C; 118D3; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NUNG +118B4; C; 118D4; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER DA +118B5; C; 118D5; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER AT +118B6; C; 118D6; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER AM +118B7; C; 118D7; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER BU +118B8; C; 118D8; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER PU +118B9; C; 118D9; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER HIYO +118BA; C; 118DA; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER HOLO +118BB; C; 118DB; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER HORR +118BC; C; 118DC; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER HAR +118BD; C; 118DD; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER SSUU +118BE; C; 118DE; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER SII +118BF; C; 118DF; # WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER VIYO +16E40; C; 16E60; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M +16E41; C; 16E61; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER S +16E42; C; 16E62; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER V +16E43; C; 16E63; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER W +16E44; C; 16E64; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER ATIU +16E45; C; 16E65; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +16E46; C; 16E66; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER KP +16E47; C; 16E67; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER P +16E48; C; 16E68; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER T +16E49; C; 16E69; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER G +16E4A; C; 16E6A; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER F +16E4B; C; 16E6B; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER I +16E4C; C; 16E6C; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER K +16E4D; C; 16E6D; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER A +16E4E; C; 16E6E; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER J +16E4F; C; 16E6F; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER E +16E50; C; 16E70; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER B +16E51; C; 16E71; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER C +16E52; C; 16E72; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER U +16E53; C; 16E73; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER YU +16E54; C; 16E74; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER L +16E55; C; 16E75; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER Q +16E56; C; 16E76; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER HP +16E57; C; 16E77; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER NY +16E58; C; 16E78; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER X +16E59; C; 16E79; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER D +16E5A; C; 16E7A; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER OE +16E5B; C; 16E7B; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER N +16E5C; C; 16E7C; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER R +16E5D; C; 16E7D; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER O +16E5E; C; 16E7E; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER AI +16E5F; C; 16E7F; # MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER Y +1E900; C; 1E922; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF +1E901; C; 1E923; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER DAALI +1E902; C; 1E924; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER LAAM +1E903; C; 1E925; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER MIIM +1E904; C; 1E926; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER BA +1E905; C; 1E927; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER SINNYIIYHE +1E906; C; 1E928; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER PE +1E907; C; 1E929; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER BHE +1E908; C; 1E92A; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER RA +1E909; C; 1E92B; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER E +1E90A; C; 1E92C; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER FA +1E90B; C; 1E92D; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER I +1E90C; C; 1E92E; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER O +1E90D; C; 1E92F; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER DHA +1E90E; C; 1E930; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER YHE +1E90F; C; 1E931; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER WAW +1E910; C; 1E932; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER NUN +1E911; C; 1E933; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER KAF +1E912; C; 1E934; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER YA +1E913; C; 1E935; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER U +1E914; C; 1E936; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER JIIM +1E915; C; 1E937; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER CHI +1E916; C; 1E938; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER HA +1E917; C; 1E939; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER QAAF +1E918; C; 1E93A; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER GA +1E919; C; 1E93B; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER NYA +1E91A; C; 1E93C; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER TU +1E91B; C; 1E93D; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER NHA +1E91C; C; 1E93E; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER VA +1E91D; C; 1E93F; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER KHA +1E91E; C; 1E940; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER GBE +1E91F; C; 1E941; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ZAL +1E920; C; 1E942; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER KPO +1E921; C; 1E943; # ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER SHA +# +# EOF diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/DerivedBidiClass.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/DerivedBidiClass.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4012dc25 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/DerivedBidiClass.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2524 @@ +# DerivedBidiClass-14.0.0.txt +# Date: 2021-07-10, 00:35:02 GMT +# © 2021 Unicode®, Inc. +# Unicode and the Unicode Logo are registered trademarks of Unicode, Inc. in the U.S. and other countries. +# For terms of use, see http://www.unicode.org/terms_of_use.html +# +# Unicode Character Database +# For documentation, see http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr44/ + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi Class (listing UnicodeData.txt, field 4: see UAX #44: https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr44/) +# Unlike other properties, unassigned code points in blocks +# reserved for right-to-left scripts are given either types R or AL. +# +# The unassigned code points that default to AL are in the ranges: +# [\u0600-\u07BF \u0860-\u08FF \uFB50-\uFDCF \uFDF0-\uFDFF \uFE70-\uFEFF +# \U00010D00-\U00010D3F \U00010F30-\U00010F6F +# \U0001EC70-\U0001ECBF \U0001ED00-\U0001ED4F \U0001EE00-\U0001EEFF] +# +# This includes code points in the Arabic, Syriac, and Thaana blocks, among others. +# +# The unassigned code points that default to R are in the ranges: +# [\u0590-\u05FF \u07C0-\u085F \uFB1D-\uFB4F +# \U00010800-\U00010CFF \U00010D40-\U00010F2F \U00010F70-\U00010FFF +# \U0001E800-\U0001EC6F \U0001ECC0-\U0001ECFF \U0001ED50-\U0001EDFF \U0001EF00-\U0001EFFF] +# +# This includes code points in the Hebrew, NKo, and Phoenician blocks, among others. +# +# The unassigned code points that default to ET are in the range: +# [\u20A0-\u20CF] +# +# This consists of code points in the Currency Symbols block. +# +# The unassigned code points that default to BN have one of the following properties: +# Default_Ignorable_Code_Point +# Noncharacter_Code_Point +# +# For all other cases: + +# All code points not explicitly listed for Bidi_Class +# have the value Left_To_Right (L). + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Left_To_Right + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Left_To_Right + +0041..005A ; L # L& [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +0061..007A ; L # L& [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +00AA ; L # Lo FEMININE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00B5 ; L # L& MICRO SIGN +00BA ; L # Lo MASCULINE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00C0..00D6 ; L # L& [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8..00F6 ; L # L& [31] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F8..01BA ; L # L& [195] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH TAIL +01BB ; L # Lo LATIN LETTER TWO WITH STROKE +01BC..01BF ; L # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE..LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C0..01C3 ; L # Lo [4] LATIN LETTER DENTAL CLICK..LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK +01C4..0293 ; L # L& [208] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CURL +0294 ; L # Lo LATIN LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0295..02AF ; L # L& [27] LATIN LETTER PHARYNGEAL VOICED FRICATIVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H WITH FISHHOOK AND TAIL +02B0..02B8 ; L # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL Y +02BB..02C1 ; L # Lm [7] MODIFIER LETTER TURNED COMMA..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02D0..02D1 ; L # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER TRIANGULAR COLON..MODIFIER LETTER HALF TRIANGULAR COLON +02E0..02E4 ; L # Lm [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02EE ; L # Lm MODIFIER LETTER DOUBLE APOSTROPHE +0370..0373 ; L # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA..GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0376..0377 ; L # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA..GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037A ; L # Lm GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +037B..037D ; L # L& [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +037F ; L # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386 ; L # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0388..038A ; L # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; L # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..03A1 ; L # L& [20] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03F5 ; L # L& [83] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F7..0481 ; L # L& [139] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +0482 ; L # So CYRILLIC THOUSANDS SIGN +048A..052F ; L # L& [166] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; L # L& [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +0559 ; L # Lm ARMENIAN MODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RING +055A..055F ; L # Po [6] ARMENIAN APOSTROPHE..ARMENIAN ABBREVIATION MARK +0560..0588 ; L # L& [41] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER TURNED AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER YI WITH STROKE +0589 ; L # Po ARMENIAN FULL STOP +0903 ; L # Mc DEVANAGARI SIGN VISARGA +0904..0939 ; L # Lo [54] DEVANAGARI LETTER SHORT A..DEVANAGARI LETTER HA +093B ; L # Mc DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OOE +093D ; L # Lo DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +093E..0940 ; L # Mc [3] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +0949..094C ; L # Mc [4] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AU +094E..094F ; L # Mc [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AW +0950 ; L # Lo DEVANAGARI OM +0958..0961 ; L # Lo [10] DEVANAGARI LETTER QA..DEVANAGARI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0964..0965 ; L # Po [2] DEVANAGARI DANDA..DEVANAGARI DOUBLE DANDA +0966..096F ; L # Nd [10] DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..DEVANAGARI DIGIT NINE +0970 ; L # Po DEVANAGARI ABBREVIATION SIGN +0971 ; L # Lm DEVANAGARI SIGN HIGH SPACING DOT +0972..0980 ; L # Lo [15] DEVANAGARI LETTER CANDRA A..BENGALI ANJI +0982..0983 ; L # Mc [2] BENGALI SIGN ANUSVARA..BENGALI SIGN VISARGA +0985..098C ; L # Lo [8] BENGALI LETTER A..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC L +098F..0990 ; L # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER E..BENGALI LETTER AI +0993..09A8 ; L # Lo [22] BENGALI LETTER O..BENGALI LETTER NA +09AA..09B0 ; L # Lo [7] BENGALI LETTER PA..BENGALI LETTER RA +09B2 ; L # Lo BENGALI LETTER LA +09B6..09B9 ; L # Lo [4] BENGALI LETTER SHA..BENGALI LETTER HA +09BD ; L # Lo BENGALI SIGN AVAGRAHA +09BE..09C0 ; L # Mc [3] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AA..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN II +09C7..09C8 ; L # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN E..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AI +09CB..09CC ; L # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN O..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AU +09CE ; L # Lo BENGALI LETTER KHANDA TA +09D7 ; L # Mc BENGALI AU LENGTH MARK +09DC..09DD ; L # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RRA..BENGALI LETTER RHA +09DF..09E1 ; L # Lo [3] BENGALI LETTER YYA..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC LL +09E6..09EF ; L # Nd [10] BENGALI DIGIT ZERO..BENGALI DIGIT NINE +09F0..09F1 ; L # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RA WITH MIDDLE DIAGONAL..BENGALI LETTER RA WITH LOWER DIAGONAL +09F4..09F9 ; L # No [6] BENGALI CURRENCY NUMERATOR ONE..BENGALI CURRENCY DENOMINATOR SIXTEEN +09FA ; L # So BENGALI ISSHAR +09FC ; L # Lo BENGALI LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA +09FD ; L # Po BENGALI ABBREVIATION SIGN +0A03 ; L # Mc GURMUKHI SIGN VISARGA +0A05..0A0A ; L # Lo [6] GURMUKHI LETTER A..GURMUKHI LETTER UU +0A0F..0A10 ; L # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER EE..GURMUKHI LETTER AI +0A13..0A28 ; L # Lo [22] GURMUKHI LETTER OO..GURMUKHI LETTER NA +0A2A..0A30 ; L # Lo [7] GURMUKHI LETTER PA..GURMUKHI LETTER RA +0A32..0A33 ; L # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER LA..GURMUKHI LETTER LLA +0A35..0A36 ; L # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER VA..GURMUKHI LETTER SHA +0A38..0A39 ; L # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER SA..GURMUKHI LETTER HA +0A3E..0A40 ; L # Mc [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AA..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN II +0A59..0A5C ; L # Lo [4] GURMUKHI LETTER KHHA..GURMUKHI LETTER RRA +0A5E ; L # Lo GURMUKHI LETTER FA +0A66..0A6F ; L # Nd [10] GURMUKHI DIGIT ZERO..GURMUKHI DIGIT NINE +0A72..0A74 ; L # Lo [3] GURMUKHI IRI..GURMUKHI EK ONKAR +0A76 ; L # Po GURMUKHI ABBREVIATION SIGN +0A83 ; L # Mc GUJARATI SIGN VISARGA +0A85..0A8D ; L # Lo [9] GUJARATI LETTER A..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA E +0A8F..0A91 ; L # Lo [3] GUJARATI LETTER E..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA O +0A93..0AA8 ; L # Lo [22] GUJARATI LETTER O..GUJARATI LETTER NA +0AAA..0AB0 ; L # Lo [7] GUJARATI LETTER PA..GUJARATI LETTER RA +0AB2..0AB3 ; L # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER LA..GUJARATI LETTER LLA +0AB5..0AB9 ; L # Lo [5] GUJARATI LETTER VA..GUJARATI LETTER HA +0ABD ; L # Lo GUJARATI SIGN AVAGRAHA +0ABE..0AC0 ; L # Mc [3] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN II +0AC9 ; L # Mc GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O +0ACB..0ACC ; L # Mc [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN O..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AU +0AD0 ; L # Lo GUJARATI OM +0AE0..0AE1 ; L # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC RR..GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0AE6..0AEF ; L # Nd [10] GUJARATI DIGIT ZERO..GUJARATI DIGIT NINE +0AF0 ; L # Po GUJARATI ABBREVIATION SIGN +0AF9 ; L # Lo GUJARATI LETTER ZHA +0B02..0B03 ; L # Mc [2] ORIYA SIGN ANUSVARA..ORIYA SIGN VISARGA +0B05..0B0C ; L # Lo [8] ORIYA LETTER A..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC L +0B0F..0B10 ; L # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER E..ORIYA LETTER AI +0B13..0B28 ; L # Lo [22] ORIYA LETTER O..ORIYA LETTER NA +0B2A..0B30 ; L # Lo [7] ORIYA LETTER PA..ORIYA LETTER RA +0B32..0B33 ; L # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER LA..ORIYA LETTER LLA +0B35..0B39 ; L # Lo [5] ORIYA LETTER VA..ORIYA LETTER HA +0B3D ; L # Lo ORIYA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0B3E ; L # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AA +0B40 ; L # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN II +0B47..0B48 ; L # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN E..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AI +0B4B..0B4C ; L # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN O..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AU +0B57 ; L # Mc ORIYA AU LENGTH MARK +0B5C..0B5D ; L # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER RRA..ORIYA LETTER RHA +0B5F..0B61 ; L # Lo [3] ORIYA LETTER YYA..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0B66..0B6F ; L # Nd [10] ORIYA DIGIT ZERO..ORIYA DIGIT NINE +0B70 ; L # So ORIYA ISSHAR +0B71 ; L # Lo ORIYA LETTER WA +0B72..0B77 ; L # No [6] ORIYA FRACTION ONE QUARTER..ORIYA FRACTION THREE SIXTEENTHS +0B83 ; L # Lo TAMIL SIGN VISARGA +0B85..0B8A ; L # Lo [6] TAMIL LETTER A..TAMIL LETTER UU +0B8E..0B90 ; L # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER E..TAMIL LETTER AI +0B92..0B95 ; L # Lo [4] TAMIL LETTER O..TAMIL LETTER KA +0B99..0B9A ; L # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NGA..TAMIL LETTER CA +0B9C ; L # Lo TAMIL LETTER JA +0B9E..0B9F ; L # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NYA..TAMIL LETTER TTA +0BA3..0BA4 ; L # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NNA..TAMIL LETTER TA +0BA8..0BAA ; L # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER NA..TAMIL LETTER PA +0BAE..0BB9 ; L # Lo [12] TAMIL LETTER MA..TAMIL LETTER HA +0BBE..0BBF ; L # Mc [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AA..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN I +0BC1..0BC2 ; L # Mc [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN U..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN UU +0BC6..0BC8 ; L # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN E..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AI +0BCA..0BCC ; L # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN O..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AU +0BD0 ; L # Lo TAMIL OM +0BD7 ; L # Mc TAMIL AU LENGTH MARK +0BE6..0BEF ; L # Nd [10] TAMIL DIGIT ZERO..TAMIL DIGIT NINE +0BF0..0BF2 ; L # No [3] TAMIL NUMBER TEN..TAMIL NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +0C01..0C03 ; L # Mc [3] TELUGU SIGN CANDRABINDU..TELUGU SIGN VISARGA +0C05..0C0C ; L # Lo [8] TELUGU LETTER A..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC L +0C0E..0C10 ; L # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER E..TELUGU LETTER AI +0C12..0C28 ; L # Lo [23] TELUGU LETTER O..TELUGU LETTER NA +0C2A..0C39 ; L # Lo [16] TELUGU LETTER PA..TELUGU LETTER HA +0C3D ; L # Lo TELUGU SIGN AVAGRAHA +0C41..0C44 ; L # Mc [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN U..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0C58..0C5A ; L # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER TSA..TELUGU LETTER RRRA +0C5D ; L # Lo TELUGU LETTER NAKAARA POLLU +0C60..0C61 ; L # Lo [2] TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC RR..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC LL +0C66..0C6F ; L # Nd [10] TELUGU DIGIT ZERO..TELUGU DIGIT NINE +0C77 ; L # Po TELUGU SIGN SIDDHAM +0C7F ; L # So TELUGU SIGN TUUMU +0C80 ; L # Lo KANNADA SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU +0C82..0C83 ; L # Mc [2] KANNADA SIGN ANUSVARA..KANNADA SIGN VISARGA +0C84 ; L # Po KANNADA SIGN SIDDHAM +0C85..0C8C ; L # Lo [8] KANNADA LETTER A..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC L +0C8E..0C90 ; L # Lo [3] KANNADA LETTER E..KANNADA LETTER AI +0C92..0CA8 ; L # Lo [23] KANNADA LETTER O..KANNADA LETTER NA +0CAA..0CB3 ; L # Lo [10] KANNADA LETTER PA..KANNADA LETTER LLA +0CB5..0CB9 ; L # Lo [5] KANNADA LETTER VA..KANNADA LETTER HA +0CBD ; L # Lo KANNADA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0CBE ; L # Mc KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AA +0CBF ; L # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN I +0CC0..0CC4 ; L # Mc [5] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN II..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0CC6 ; L # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN E +0CC7..0CC8 ; L # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN EE..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AI +0CCA..0CCB ; L # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN O..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN OO +0CD5..0CD6 ; L # Mc [2] KANNADA LENGTH MARK..KANNADA AI LENGTH MARK +0CDD..0CDE ; L # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER NAKAARA POLLU..KANNADA LETTER FA +0CE0..0CE1 ; L # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC RR..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0CE6..0CEF ; L # Nd [10] KANNADA DIGIT ZERO..KANNADA DIGIT NINE +0CF1..0CF2 ; L # Lo [2] KANNADA SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..KANNADA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +0D02..0D03 ; L # Mc [2] MALAYALAM SIGN ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM SIGN VISARGA +0D04..0D0C ; L # Lo [9] MALAYALAM LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC L +0D0E..0D10 ; L # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER E..MALAYALAM LETTER AI +0D12..0D3A ; L # Lo [41] MALAYALAM LETTER O..MALAYALAM LETTER TTTA +0D3D ; L # Lo MALAYALAM SIGN AVAGRAHA +0D3E..0D40 ; L # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AA..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN II +0D46..0D48 ; L # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN E..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AI +0D4A..0D4C ; L # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN O..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AU +0D4E ; L # Lo MALAYALAM LETTER DOT REPH +0D4F ; L # So MALAYALAM SIGN PARA +0D54..0D56 ; L # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU M..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU LLL +0D57 ; L # Mc MALAYALAM AU LENGTH MARK +0D58..0D5E ; L # No [7] MALAYALAM FRACTION ONE ONE-HUNDRED-AND-SIXTIETH..MALAYALAM FRACTION ONE FIFTH +0D5F..0D61 ; L # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER ARCHAIC II..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC LL +0D66..0D6F ; L # Nd [10] MALAYALAM DIGIT ZERO..MALAYALAM DIGIT NINE +0D70..0D78 ; L # No [9] MALAYALAM NUMBER TEN..MALAYALAM FRACTION THREE SIXTEENTHS +0D79 ; L # So MALAYALAM DATE MARK +0D7A..0D7F ; L # Lo [6] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU NN..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU K +0D82..0D83 ; L # Mc [2] SINHALA SIGN ANUSVARAYA..SINHALA SIGN VISARGAYA +0D85..0D96 ; L # Lo [18] SINHALA LETTER AYANNA..SINHALA LETTER AUYANNA +0D9A..0DB1 ; L # Lo [24] SINHALA LETTER ALPAPRAANA KAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA NAYANNA +0DB3..0DBB ; L # Lo [9] SINHALA LETTER SANYAKA DAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER RAYANNA +0DBD ; L # Lo SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA LAYANNA +0DC0..0DC6 ; L # Lo [7] SINHALA LETTER VAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER FAYANNA +0DCF..0DD1 ; L # Mc [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN AELA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA AEDA-PILLA +0DD8..0DDF ; L # Mc [8] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAYANUKITTA +0DE6..0DEF ; L # Nd [10] SINHALA LITH DIGIT ZERO..SINHALA LITH DIGIT NINE +0DF2..0DF3 ; L # Mc [2] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAYANUKITTA +0DF4 ; L # Po SINHALA PUNCTUATION KUNDDALIYA +0E01..0E30 ; L # Lo [48] THAI CHARACTER KO KAI..THAI CHARACTER SARA A +0E32..0E33 ; L # Lo [2] THAI CHARACTER SARA AA..THAI CHARACTER SARA AM +0E40..0E45 ; L # Lo [6] THAI CHARACTER SARA E..THAI CHARACTER LAKKHANGYAO +0E46 ; L # Lm THAI CHARACTER MAIYAMOK +0E4F ; L # Po THAI CHARACTER FONGMAN +0E50..0E59 ; L # Nd [10] THAI DIGIT ZERO..THAI DIGIT NINE +0E5A..0E5B ; L # Po [2] THAI CHARACTER ANGKHANKHU..THAI CHARACTER KHOMUT +0E81..0E82 ; L # Lo [2] LAO LETTER KO..LAO LETTER KHO SUNG +0E84 ; L # Lo LAO LETTER KHO TAM +0E86..0E8A ; L # Lo [5] LAO LETTER PALI GHA..LAO LETTER SO TAM +0E8C..0EA3 ; L # Lo [24] LAO LETTER PALI JHA..LAO LETTER LO LING +0EA5 ; L # Lo LAO LETTER LO LOOT +0EA7..0EB0 ; L # Lo [10] LAO LETTER WO..LAO VOWEL SIGN A +0EB2..0EB3 ; L # Lo [2] LAO VOWEL SIGN AA..LAO VOWEL SIGN AM +0EBD ; L # Lo LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN NYO +0EC0..0EC4 ; L # Lo [5] LAO VOWEL SIGN E..LAO VOWEL SIGN AI +0EC6 ; L # Lm LAO KO LA +0ED0..0ED9 ; L # Nd [10] LAO DIGIT ZERO..LAO DIGIT NINE +0EDC..0EDF ; L # Lo [4] LAO HO NO..LAO LETTER KHMU NYO +0F00 ; L # Lo TIBETAN SYLLABLE OM +0F01..0F03 ; L # So [3] TIBETAN MARK GTER YIG MGO TRUNCATED A..TIBETAN MARK GTER YIG MGO -UM GTER TSHEG MA +0F04..0F12 ; L # Po [15] TIBETAN MARK INITIAL YIG MGO MDUN MA..TIBETAN MARK RGYA GRAM SHAD +0F13 ; L # So TIBETAN MARK CARET -DZUD RTAGS ME LONG CAN +0F14 ; L # Po TIBETAN MARK GTER TSHEG +0F15..0F17 ; L # So [3] TIBETAN LOGOTYPE SIGN CHAD RTAGS..TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN SGRA GCAN -CHAR RTAGS +0F1A..0F1F ; L # So [6] TIBETAN SIGN RDEL DKAR GCIG..TIBETAN SIGN RDEL DKAR RDEL NAG +0F20..0F29 ; L # Nd [10] TIBETAN DIGIT ZERO..TIBETAN DIGIT NINE +0F2A..0F33 ; L # No [10] TIBETAN DIGIT HALF ONE..TIBETAN DIGIT HALF ZERO +0F34 ; L # So TIBETAN MARK BSDUS RTAGS +0F36 ; L # So TIBETAN MARK CARET -DZUD RTAGS BZHI MIG CAN +0F38 ; L # So TIBETAN MARK CHE MGO +0F3E..0F3F ; L # Mc [2] TIBETAN SIGN YAR TSHES..TIBETAN SIGN MAR TSHES +0F40..0F47 ; L # Lo [8] TIBETAN LETTER KA..TIBETAN LETTER JA +0F49..0F6C ; L # Lo [36] TIBETAN LETTER NYA..TIBETAN LETTER RRA +0F7F ; L # Mc TIBETAN SIGN RNAM BCAD +0F85 ; L # Po TIBETAN MARK PALUTA +0F88..0F8C ; L # Lo [5] TIBETAN SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SIGN INVERTED MCHU CAN +0FBE..0FC5 ; L # So [8] TIBETAN KU RU KHA..TIBETAN SYMBOL RDO RJE +0FC7..0FCC ; L # So [6] TIBETAN SYMBOL RDO RJE RGYA GRAM..TIBETAN SYMBOL NOR BU BZHI -KHYIL +0FCE..0FCF ; L # So [2] TIBETAN SIGN RDEL NAG RDEL DKAR..TIBETAN SIGN RDEL NAG GSUM +0FD0..0FD4 ; L # Po [5] TIBETAN MARK BSKA- SHOG GI MGO RGYAN..TIBETAN MARK CLOSING BRDA RNYING YIG MGO SGAB MA +0FD5..0FD8 ; L # So [4] RIGHT-FACING SVASTI SIGN..LEFT-FACING SVASTI SIGN WITH DOTS +0FD9..0FDA ; L # Po [2] TIBETAN MARK LEADING MCHAN RTAGS..TIBETAN MARK TRAILING MCHAN RTAGS +1000..102A ; L # Lo [43] MYANMAR LETTER KA..MYANMAR LETTER AU +102B..102C ; L # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN TALL AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AA +1031 ; L # Mc MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN E +1038 ; L # Mc MYANMAR SIGN VISARGA +103B..103C ; L # Mc [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL YA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +103F ; L # Lo MYANMAR LETTER GREAT SA +1040..1049 ; L # Nd [10] MYANMAR DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR DIGIT NINE +104A..104F ; L # Po [6] MYANMAR SIGN LITTLE SECTION..MYANMAR SYMBOL GENITIVE +1050..1055 ; L # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER SHA..MYANMAR LETTER VOCALIC LL +1056..1057 ; L # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +105A..105D ; L # Lo [4] MYANMAR LETTER MON NGA..MYANMAR LETTER MON BBE +1061 ; L # Lo MYANMAR LETTER SGAW KAREN SHA +1062..1064 ; L # Mc [3] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SGAW KAREN EU..MYANMAR TONE MARK SGAW KAREN KE PHO +1065..1066 ; L # Lo [2] MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN THA..MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN PWA +1067..106D ; L # Mc [7] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN EU..MYANMAR SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN TONE-5 +106E..1070 ; L # Lo [3] MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN NNA..MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN GHWA +1075..1081 ; L # Lo [13] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN KA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN HA +1083..1084 ; L # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E +1087..108C ; L # Mc [6] MYANMAR SIGN SHAN TONE-2..MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL TONE-3 +108E ; L # Lo MYANMAR LETTER RUMAI PALAUNG FA +108F ; L # Mc MYANMAR SIGN RUMAI PALAUNG TONE-5 +1090..1099 ; L # Nd [10] MYANMAR SHAN DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR SHAN DIGIT NINE +109A..109C ; L # Mc [3] MYANMAR SIGN KHAMTI TONE-1..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON A +109E..109F ; L # So [2] MYANMAR SYMBOL SHAN ONE..MYANMAR SYMBOL SHAN EXCLAMATION +10A0..10C5 ; L # L& [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; L # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; L # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +10D0..10FA ; L # L& [43] GEORGIAN LETTER AN..GEORGIAN LETTER AIN +10FB ; L # Po GEORGIAN PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR +10FC ; L # Lm MODIFIER LETTER GEORGIAN NAR +10FD..10FF ; L # L& [3] GEORGIAN LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1100..1248 ; L # Lo [329] HANGUL CHOSEONG KIYEOK..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWA +124A..124D ; L # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWE +1250..1256 ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHO +1258 ; L # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWA +125A..125D ; L # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWE +1260..1288 ; L # Lo [41] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWA +128A..128D ; L # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWE +1290..12B0 ; L # Lo [33] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE NA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWA +12B2..12B5 ; L # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWE +12B8..12BE ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXO +12C0 ; L # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWA +12C2..12C5 ; L # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWE +12C8..12D6 ; L # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE WA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PHARYNGEAL O +12D8..1310 ; L # Lo [57] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWA +1312..1315 ; L # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWE +1318..135A ; L # Lo [67] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE FYA +1360..1368 ; L # Po [9] ETHIOPIC SECTION MARK..ETHIOPIC PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR +1369..137C ; L # No [20] ETHIOPIC DIGIT ONE..ETHIOPIC NUMBER TEN THOUSAND +1380..138F ; L # Lo [16] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SEBATBEIT MWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PWE +13A0..13F5 ; L # L& [86] CHEROKEE LETTER A..CHEROKEE LETTER MV +13F8..13FD ; L # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1401..166C ; L # Lo [620] CANADIAN SYLLABICS E..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER TTSA +166D ; L # So CANADIAN SYLLABICS CHI SIGN +166E ; L # Po CANADIAN SYLLABICS FULL STOP +166F..167F ; L # Lo [17] CANADIAN SYLLABICS QAI..CANADIAN SYLLABICS BLACKFOOT W +1681..169A ; L # Lo [26] OGHAM LETTER BEITH..OGHAM LETTER PEITH +16A0..16EA ; L # Lo [75] RUNIC LETTER FEHU FEOH FE F..RUNIC LETTER X +16EB..16ED ; L # Po [3] RUNIC SINGLE PUNCTUATION..RUNIC CROSS PUNCTUATION +16EE..16F0 ; L # Nl [3] RUNIC ARLAUG SYMBOL..RUNIC BELGTHOR SYMBOL +16F1..16F8 ; L # Lo [8] RUNIC LETTER K..RUNIC LETTER FRANKS CASKET AESC +1700..1711 ; L # Lo [18] TAGALOG LETTER A..TAGALOG LETTER HA +1715 ; L # Mc TAGALOG SIGN PAMUDPOD +171F..1731 ; L # Lo [19] TAGALOG LETTER ARCHAIC RA..HANUNOO LETTER HA +1734 ; L # Mc HANUNOO SIGN PAMUDPOD +1735..1736 ; L # Po [2] PHILIPPINE SINGLE PUNCTUATION..PHILIPPINE DOUBLE PUNCTUATION +1740..1751 ; L # Lo [18] BUHID LETTER A..BUHID LETTER HA +1760..176C ; L # Lo [13] TAGBANWA LETTER A..TAGBANWA LETTER YA +176E..1770 ; L # Lo [3] TAGBANWA LETTER LA..TAGBANWA LETTER SA +1780..17B3 ; L # Lo [52] KHMER LETTER KA..KHMER INDEPENDENT VOWEL QAU +17B6 ; L # Mc KHMER VOWEL SIGN AA +17BE..17C5 ; L # Mc [8] KHMER VOWEL SIGN OE..KHMER VOWEL SIGN AU +17C7..17C8 ; L # Mc [2] KHMER SIGN REAHMUK..KHMER SIGN YUUKALEAPINTU +17D4..17D6 ; L # Po [3] KHMER SIGN KHAN..KHMER SIGN CAMNUC PII KUUH +17D7 ; L # Lm KHMER SIGN LEK TOO +17D8..17DA ; L # Po [3] KHMER SIGN BEYYAL..KHMER SIGN KOOMUUT +17DC ; L # Lo KHMER SIGN AVAKRAHASANYA +17E0..17E9 ; L # Nd [10] KHMER DIGIT ZERO..KHMER DIGIT NINE +1810..1819 ; L # Nd [10] MONGOLIAN DIGIT ZERO..MONGOLIAN DIGIT NINE +1820..1842 ; L # Lo [35] MONGOLIAN LETTER A..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHI +1843 ; L # Lm MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO LONG VOWEL SIGN +1844..1878 ; L # Lo [53] MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO E..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHA WITH TWO DOTS +1880..1884 ; L # Lo [5] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI ANUSVARA ONE..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI INVERTED UBADAMA +1887..18A8 ; L # Lo [34] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI A..MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI BHA +18AA ; L # Lo MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI LHA +18B0..18F5 ; L # Lo [70] CANADIAN SYLLABICS OY..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER DENTAL S +1900..191E ; L # Lo [31] LIMBU VOWEL-CARRIER LETTER..LIMBU LETTER TRA +1923..1926 ; L # Mc [4] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN EE..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN AU +1929..192B ; L # Mc [3] LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER WA +1930..1931 ; L # Mc [2] LIMBU SMALL LETTER KA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER NGA +1933..1938 ; L # Mc [6] LIMBU SMALL LETTER TA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER LA +1946..194F ; L # Nd [10] LIMBU DIGIT ZERO..LIMBU DIGIT NINE +1950..196D ; L # Lo [30] TAI LE LETTER KA..TAI LE LETTER AI +1970..1974 ; L # Lo [5] TAI LE LETTER TONE-2..TAI LE LETTER TONE-6 +1980..19AB ; L # Lo [44] NEW TAI LUE LETTER HIGH QA..NEW TAI LUE LETTER LOW SUA +19B0..19C9 ; L # Lo [26] NEW TAI LUE VOWEL SIGN VOWEL SHORTENER..NEW TAI LUE TONE MARK-2 +19D0..19D9 ; L # Nd [10] NEW TAI LUE DIGIT ZERO..NEW TAI LUE DIGIT NINE +19DA ; L # No NEW TAI LUE THAM DIGIT ONE +1A00..1A16 ; L # Lo [23] BUGINESE LETTER KA..BUGINESE LETTER HA +1A19..1A1A ; L # Mc [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN E..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN O +1A1E..1A1F ; L # Po [2] BUGINESE PALLAWA..BUGINESE END OF SECTION +1A20..1A54 ; L # Lo [53] TAI THAM LETTER HIGH KA..TAI THAM LETTER GREAT SA +1A55 ; L # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +1A57 ; L # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN LA TANG LAI +1A61 ; L # Mc TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN A +1A63..1A64 ; L # Mc [2] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN AA..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN TALL AA +1A6D..1A72 ; L # Mc [6] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OY..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN THAM AI +1A80..1A89 ; L # Nd [10] TAI THAM HORA DIGIT ZERO..TAI THAM HORA DIGIT NINE +1A90..1A99 ; L # Nd [10] TAI THAM THAM DIGIT ZERO..TAI THAM THAM DIGIT NINE +1AA0..1AA6 ; L # Po [7] TAI THAM SIGN WIANG..TAI THAM SIGN REVERSED ROTATED RANA +1AA7 ; L # Lm TAI THAM SIGN MAI YAMOK +1AA8..1AAD ; L # Po [6] TAI THAM SIGN KAAN..TAI THAM SIGN CAANG +1B04 ; L # Mc BALINESE SIGN BISAH +1B05..1B33 ; L # Lo [47] BALINESE LETTER AKARA..BALINESE LETTER HA +1B35 ; L # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TEDUNG +1B3B ; L # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA TEDUNG +1B3D..1B41 ; L # Mc [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA TEDUNG..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TALING REPA TEDUNG +1B43..1B44 ; L # Mc [2] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET TEDUNG..BALINESE ADEG ADEG +1B45..1B4C ; L # Lo [8] BALINESE LETTER KAF SASAK..BALINESE LETTER ARCHAIC JNYA +1B50..1B59 ; L # Nd [10] BALINESE DIGIT ZERO..BALINESE DIGIT NINE +1B5A..1B60 ; L # Po [7] BALINESE PANTI..BALINESE PAMENENG +1B61..1B6A ; L # So [10] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL DONG..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL DANG GEDE +1B74..1B7C ; L # So [9] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL RIGHT-HAND OPEN DUG..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL LEFT-HAND OPEN PING +1B7D..1B7E ; L # Po [2] BALINESE PANTI LANTANG..BALINESE PAMADA LANTANG +1B82 ; L # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PANGWISAD +1B83..1BA0 ; L # Lo [30] SUNDANESE LETTER A..SUNDANESE LETTER HA +1BA1 ; L # Mc SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PAMINGKAL +1BA6..1BA7 ; L # Mc [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANAELAENG..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANOLONG +1BAA ; L # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PAMAAEH +1BAE..1BAF ; L # Lo [2] SUNDANESE LETTER KHA..SUNDANESE LETTER SYA +1BB0..1BB9 ; L # Nd [10] SUNDANESE DIGIT ZERO..SUNDANESE DIGIT NINE +1BBA..1BE5 ; L # Lo [44] SUNDANESE AVAGRAHA..BATAK LETTER U +1BE7 ; L # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN E +1BEA..1BEC ; L # Mc [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN I..BATAK VOWEL SIGN O +1BEE ; L # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN U +1BF2..1BF3 ; L # Mc [2] BATAK PANGOLAT..BATAK PANONGONAN +1BFC..1BFF ; L # Po [4] BATAK SYMBOL BINDU NA METEK..BATAK SYMBOL BINDU PANGOLAT +1C00..1C23 ; L # Lo [36] LEPCHA LETTER KA..LEPCHA LETTER A +1C24..1C2B ; L # Mc [8] LEPCHA SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN UU +1C34..1C35 ; L # Mc [2] LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN NYIN-DO..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN KANG +1C3B..1C3F ; L # Po [5] LEPCHA PUNCTUATION TA-ROL..LEPCHA PUNCTUATION TSHOOK +1C40..1C49 ; L # Nd [10] LEPCHA DIGIT ZERO..LEPCHA DIGIT NINE +1C4D..1C4F ; L # Lo [3] LEPCHA LETTER TTA..LEPCHA LETTER DDA +1C50..1C59 ; L # Nd [10] OL CHIKI DIGIT ZERO..OL CHIKI DIGIT NINE +1C5A..1C77 ; L # Lo [30] OL CHIKI LETTER LA..OL CHIKI LETTER OH +1C78..1C7D ; L # Lm [6] OL CHIKI MU TTUDDAG..OL CHIKI AHAD +1C7E..1C7F ; L # Po [2] OL CHIKI PUNCTUATION MUCAAD..OL CHIKI PUNCTUATION DOUBLE MUCAAD +1C80..1C88 ; L # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1C90..1CBA ; L # L& [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; L # L& [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1CC0..1CC7 ; L # Po [8] SUNDANESE PUNCTUATION BINDU SURYA..SUNDANESE PUNCTUATION BINDU BA SATANGA +1CD3 ; L # Po VEDIC SIGN NIHSHVASA +1CE1 ; L # Mc VEDIC TONE ATHARVAVEDIC INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE9..1CEC ; L # Lo [4] VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA..VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA VAMAGOMUKHA WITH TAIL +1CEE..1CF3 ; L # Lo [6] VEDIC SIGN HEXIFORM LONG ANUSVARA..VEDIC SIGN ROTATED ARDHAVISARGA +1CF5..1CF6 ; L # Lo [2] VEDIC SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..VEDIC SIGN UPADHMANIYA +1CF7 ; L # Mc VEDIC SIGN ATIKRAMA +1CFA ; L # Lo VEDIC SIGN DOUBLE ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA +1D00..1D2B ; L # L& [44] LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL A..CYRILLIC LETTER SMALL CAPITAL EL +1D2C..1D6A ; L # Lm [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1D6B..1D77 ; L # L& [13] LATIN SMALL LETTER UE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED G +1D78 ; L # Lm MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC EN +1D79..1D9A ; L # L& [34] LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1D9B..1DBF ; L # Lm [37] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED ALPHA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL THETA +1E00..1F15 ; L # L& [278] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F18..1F1D ; L # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F45 ; L # L& [38] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F48..1F4D ; L # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; L # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F59 ; L # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; L # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; L # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F..1F7D ; L # L& [31] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1FB4 ; L # L& [53] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FBC ; L # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBE ; L # L& GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; L # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FCC ; L # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; L # L& [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FDB ; L # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE0..1FEC ; L # L& [13] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF2..1FF4 ; L # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FFC ; L # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +200E ; L # Cf LEFT-TO-RIGHT MARK +2071 ; L # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +207F ; L # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER N +2090..209C ; L # Lm [13] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER T +2102 ; L # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL C +2107 ; L # L& EULER CONSTANT +210A..2113 ; L # L& [10] SCRIPT SMALL G..SCRIPT SMALL L +2115 ; L # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL N +2119..211D ; L # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL P..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL R +2124 ; L # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Z +2126 ; L # L& OHM SIGN +2128 ; L # L& BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL Z +212A..212D ; L # L& [4] KELVIN SIGN..BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL C +212F..2134 ; L # L& [6] SCRIPT SMALL E..SCRIPT SMALL O +2135..2138 ; L # Lo [4] ALEF SYMBOL..DALET SYMBOL +2139 ; L # L& INFORMATION SOURCE +213C..213F ; L # L& [4] DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL PI..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL PI +2145..2149 ; L # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC CAPITAL D..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +214E ; L # L& TURNED SMALL F +214F ; L # So SYMBOL FOR SAMARITAN SOURCE +2160..2182 ; L # Nl [35] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..ROMAN NUMERAL TEN THOUSAND +2183..2184 ; L # L& [2] ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +2185..2188 ; L # Nl [4] ROMAN NUMERAL SIX LATE FORM..ROMAN NUMERAL ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND +2336..237A ; L # So [69] APL FUNCTIONAL SYMBOL I-BEAM..APL FUNCTIONAL SYMBOL ALPHA +2395 ; L # So APL FUNCTIONAL SYMBOL QUAD +249C..24E9 ; L # So [78] PARENTHESIZED LATIN SMALL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +26AC ; L # So MEDIUM SMALL WHITE CIRCLE +2800..28FF ; L # So [256] BRAILLE PATTERN BLANK..BRAILLE PATTERN DOTS-12345678 +2C00..2C7B ; L # L& [124] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED E +2C7C..2C7D ; L # Lm [2] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL V +2C7E..2CE4 ; L # L& [103] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC SYMBOL KAI +2CEB..2CEE ; L # L& [4] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF2..2CF3 ; L # L& [2] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2D00..2D25 ; L # L& [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; L # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; L # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +2D30..2D67 ; L # Lo [56] TIFINAGH LETTER YA..TIFINAGH LETTER YO +2D6F ; L # Lm TIFINAGH MODIFIER LETTER LABIALIZATION MARK +2D70 ; L # Po TIFINAGH SEPARATOR MARK +2D80..2D96 ; L # Lo [23] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE LOA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGWE +2DA0..2DA6 ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSO +2DA8..2DAE ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCO +2DB0..2DB6 ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZO +2DB8..2DBE ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHO +2DC0..2DC6 ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYO +2DC8..2DCE ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYO +2DD0..2DD6 ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYO +2DD8..2DDE ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYO +3005 ; L # Lm IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +3006 ; L # Lo IDEOGRAPHIC CLOSING MARK +3007 ; L # Nl IDEOGRAPHIC NUMBER ZERO +3021..3029 ; L # Nl [9] HANGZHOU NUMERAL ONE..HANGZHOU NUMERAL NINE +302E..302F ; L # Mc [2] HANGUL SINGLE DOT TONE MARK..HANGUL DOUBLE DOT TONE MARK +3031..3035 ; L # Lm [5] VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK..VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK LOWER HALF +3038..303A ; L # Nl [3] HANGZHOU NUMERAL TEN..HANGZHOU NUMERAL THIRTY +303B ; L # Lm VERTICAL IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +303C ; L # Lo MASU MARK +3041..3096 ; L # Lo [86] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL A..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL KE +309D..309E ; L # Lm [2] HIRAGANA ITERATION MARK..HIRAGANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +309F ; L # Lo HIRAGANA DIGRAPH YORI +30A1..30FA ; L # Lo [90] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL A..KATAKANA LETTER VO +30FC..30FE ; L # Lm [3] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +30FF ; L # Lo KATAKANA DIGRAPH KOTO +3105..312F ; L # Lo [43] BOPOMOFO LETTER B..BOPOMOFO LETTER NN +3131..318E ; L # Lo [94] HANGUL LETTER KIYEOK..HANGUL LETTER ARAEAE +3190..3191 ; L # So [2] IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION LINKING MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION REVERSE MARK +3192..3195 ; L # No [4] IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION ONE MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION FOUR MARK +3196..319F ; L # So [10] IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION TOP MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION MAN MARK +31A0..31BF ; L # Lo [32] BOPOMOFO LETTER BU..BOPOMOFO LETTER AH +31F0..31FF ; L # Lo [16] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL KU..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL RO +3200..321C ; L # So [29] PARENTHESIZED HANGUL KIYEOK..PARENTHESIZED HANGUL CIEUC U +3220..3229 ; L # No [10] PARENTHESIZED IDEOGRAPH ONE..PARENTHESIZED IDEOGRAPH TEN +322A..3247 ; L # So [30] PARENTHESIZED IDEOGRAPH MOON..CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH KOTO +3248..324F ; L # No [8] CIRCLED NUMBER TEN ON BLACK SQUARE..CIRCLED NUMBER EIGHTY ON BLACK SQUARE +3260..327B ; L # So [28] CIRCLED HANGUL KIYEOK..CIRCLED HANGUL HIEUH A +327F ; L # So KOREAN STANDARD SYMBOL +3280..3289 ; L # No [10] CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH ONE..CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH TEN +328A..32B0 ; L # So [39] CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH MOON..CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH NIGHT +32C0..32CB ; L # So [12] IDEOGRAPHIC TELEGRAPH SYMBOL FOR JANUARY..IDEOGRAPHIC TELEGRAPH SYMBOL FOR DECEMBER +32D0..3376 ; L # So [167] CIRCLED KATAKANA A..SQUARE PC +337B..33DD ; L # So [99] SQUARE ERA NAME HEISEI..SQUARE WB +33E0..33FE ; L # So [31] IDEOGRAPHIC TELEGRAPH SYMBOL FOR DAY ONE..IDEOGRAPHIC TELEGRAPH SYMBOL FOR DAY THIRTY-ONE +3400..4DBF ; L # Lo [6592] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3400..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4DBF +4E00..A014 ; L # Lo [21013] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4E00..YI SYLLABLE E +A015 ; L # Lm YI SYLLABLE WU +A016..A48C ; L # Lo [1143] YI SYLLABLE BIT..YI SYLLABLE YYR +A4D0..A4F7 ; L # Lo [40] LISU LETTER BA..LISU LETTER OE +A4F8..A4FD ; L # Lm [6] LISU LETTER TONE MYA TI..LISU LETTER TONE MYA JEU +A4FE..A4FF ; L # Po [2] LISU PUNCTUATION COMMA..LISU PUNCTUATION FULL STOP +A500..A60B ; L # Lo [268] VAI SYLLABLE EE..VAI SYLLABLE NG +A60C ; L # Lm VAI SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +A610..A61F ; L # Lo [16] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE FA..VAI SYMBOL JONG +A620..A629 ; L # Nd [10] VAI DIGIT ZERO..VAI DIGIT NINE +A62A..A62B ; L # Lo [2] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE MA..VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE DO +A640..A66D ; L # L& [46] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A66E ; L # Lo CYRILLIC LETTER MULTIOCULAR O +A680..A69B ; L # L& [28] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A69C..A69D ; L # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A6A0..A6E5 ; L # Lo [70] BAMUM LETTER A..BAMUM LETTER KI +A6E6..A6EF ; L # Nl [10] BAMUM LETTER MO..BAMUM LETTER KOGHOM +A6F2..A6F7 ; L # Po [6] BAMUM NJAEMLI..BAMUM QUESTION MARK +A722..A76F ; L # L& [78] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF..LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A770 ; L # Lm MODIFIER LETTER US +A771..A787 ; L # L& [23] LATIN SMALL LETTER DUM..LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A789..A78A ; L # Sk [2] MODIFIER LETTER COLON..MODIFIER LETTER SHORT EQUALS SIGN +A78B..A78E ; L # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH RETROFLEX HOOK AND BELT +A78F ; L # Lo LATIN LETTER SINOLOGICAL DOT +A790..A7CA ; L # L& [59] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0..A7D1 ; L # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D3 ; L # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE THORN +A7D5..A7D9 ; L # L& [5] LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE WYNN..LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F2..A7F4 ; L # Lm [3] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL C..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL Q +A7F5..A7F6 ; L # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +A7F7 ; L # Lo LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER SIDEWAYS I +A7F8..A7F9 ; L # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +A7FA ; L # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED M +A7FB..A801 ; L # Lo [7] LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER REVERSED F..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER I +A803..A805 ; L # Lo [3] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER U..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER O +A807..A80A ; L # Lo [4] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER KO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER GHO +A80C..A822 ; L # Lo [23] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER CO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER HO +A823..A824 ; L # Mc [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN A..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN I +A827 ; L # Mc SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN OO +A830..A835 ; L # No [6] NORTH INDIC FRACTION ONE QUARTER..NORTH INDIC FRACTION THREE SIXTEENTHS +A836..A837 ; L # So [2] NORTH INDIC QUARTER MARK..NORTH INDIC PLACEHOLDER MARK +A840..A873 ; L # Lo [52] PHAGS-PA LETTER KA..PHAGS-PA LETTER CANDRABINDU +A880..A881 ; L # Mc [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN ANUSVARA..SAURASHTRA SIGN VISARGA +A882..A8B3 ; L # Lo [50] SAURASHTRA LETTER A..SAURASHTRA LETTER LLA +A8B4..A8C3 ; L # Mc [16] SAURASHTRA CONSONANT SIGN HAARU..SAURASHTRA VOWEL SIGN AU +A8CE..A8CF ; L # Po [2] SAURASHTRA DANDA..SAURASHTRA DOUBLE DANDA +A8D0..A8D9 ; L # Nd [10] SAURASHTRA DIGIT ZERO..SAURASHTRA DIGIT NINE +A8F2..A8F7 ; L # Lo [6] DEVANAGARI SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU..DEVANAGARI SIGN CANDRABINDU AVAGRAHA +A8F8..A8FA ; L # Po [3] DEVANAGARI SIGN PUSHPIKA..DEVANAGARI CARET +A8FB ; L # Lo DEVANAGARI HEADSTROKE +A8FC ; L # Po DEVANAGARI SIGN SIDDHAM +A8FD..A8FE ; L # Lo [2] DEVANAGARI JAIN OM..DEVANAGARI LETTER AY +A900..A909 ; L # Nd [10] KAYAH LI DIGIT ZERO..KAYAH LI DIGIT NINE +A90A..A925 ; L # Lo [28] KAYAH LI LETTER KA..KAYAH LI LETTER OO +A92E..A92F ; L # Po [2] KAYAH LI SIGN CWI..KAYAH LI SIGN SHYA +A930..A946 ; L # Lo [23] REJANG LETTER KA..REJANG LETTER A +A952..A953 ; L # Mc [2] REJANG CONSONANT SIGN H..REJANG VIRAMA +A95F ; L # Po REJANG SECTION MARK +A960..A97C ; L # Lo [29] HANGUL CHOSEONG TIKEUT-MIEUM..HANGUL CHOSEONG SSANGYEORINHIEUH +A983 ; L # Mc JAVANESE SIGN WIGNYAN +A984..A9B2 ; L # Lo [47] JAVANESE LETTER A..JAVANESE LETTER HA +A9B4..A9B5 ; L # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TARUNG..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TOLONG +A9BA..A9BB ; L # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TALING..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN DIRGA MURE +A9BE..A9C0 ; L # Mc [3] JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN PENGKAL..JAVANESE PANGKON +A9C1..A9CD ; L # Po [13] JAVANESE LEFT RERENGGAN..JAVANESE TURNED PADA PISELEH +A9CF ; L # Lm JAVANESE PANGRANGKEP +A9D0..A9D9 ; L # Nd [10] JAVANESE DIGIT ZERO..JAVANESE DIGIT NINE +A9DE..A9DF ; L # Po [2] JAVANESE PADA TIRTA TUMETES..JAVANESE PADA ISEN-ISEN +A9E0..A9E4 ; L # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN GHA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN BHA +A9E6 ; L # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER SHAN REDUPLICATION +A9E7..A9EF ; L # Lo [9] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NYA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NNA +A9F0..A9F9 ; L # Nd [10] MYANMAR TAI LAING DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR TAI LAING DIGIT NINE +A9FA..A9FE ; L # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING LLA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING BHA +AA00..AA28 ; L # Lo [41] CHAM LETTER A..CHAM LETTER HA +AA2F..AA30 ; L # Mc [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN O..CHAM VOWEL SIGN AI +AA33..AA34 ; L # Mc [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN YA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN RA +AA40..AA42 ; L # Lo [3] CHAM LETTER FINAL K..CHAM LETTER FINAL NG +AA44..AA4B ; L # Lo [8] CHAM LETTER FINAL CH..CHAM LETTER FINAL SS +AA4D ; L # Mc CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL H +AA50..AA59 ; L # Nd [10] CHAM DIGIT ZERO..CHAM DIGIT NINE +AA5C..AA5F ; L # Po [4] CHAM PUNCTUATION SPIRAL..CHAM PUNCTUATION TRIPLE DANDA +AA60..AA6F ; L # Lo [16] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI GA..MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI FA +AA70 ; L # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER KHAMTI REDUPLICATION +AA71..AA76 ; L # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI XA..MYANMAR LOGOGRAM KHAMTI HM +AA77..AA79 ; L # So [3] MYANMAR SYMBOL AITON EXCLAMATION..MYANMAR SYMBOL AITON TWO +AA7A ; L # Lo MYANMAR LETTER AITON RA +AA7B ; L # Mc MYANMAR SIGN PAO KAREN TONE +AA7D ; L # Mc MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-5 +AA7E..AAAF ; L # Lo [50] MYANMAR LETTER SHWE PALAUNG CHA..TAI VIET LETTER HIGH O +AAB1 ; L # Lo TAI VIET VOWEL AA +AAB5..AAB6 ; L # Lo [2] TAI VIET VOWEL E..TAI VIET VOWEL O +AAB9..AABD ; L # Lo [5] TAI VIET VOWEL UEA..TAI VIET VOWEL AN +AAC0 ; L # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI NUENG +AAC2 ; L # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI SONG +AADB..AADC ; L # Lo [2] TAI VIET SYMBOL KON..TAI VIET SYMBOL NUENG +AADD ; L # Lm TAI VIET SYMBOL SAM +AADE..AADF ; L # Po [2] TAI VIET SYMBOL HO HOI..TAI VIET SYMBOL KOI KOI +AAE0..AAEA ; L # Lo [11] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER E..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER SSA +AAEB ; L # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN II +AAEE..AAEF ; L # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAU +AAF0..AAF1 ; L # Po [2] MEETEI MAYEK CHEIKHAN..MEETEI MAYEK AHANG KHUDAM +AAF2 ; L # Lo MEETEI MAYEK ANJI +AAF3..AAF4 ; L # Lm [2] MEETEI MAYEK SYLLABLE REPETITION MARK..MEETEI MAYEK WORD REPETITION MARK +AAF5 ; L # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN VISARGA +AB01..AB06 ; L # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHO +AB09..AB0E ; L # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHO +AB11..AB16 ; L # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZO +AB20..AB26 ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHO +AB28..AB2E ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBO +AB30..AB5A ; L # L& [43] LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED ALPHA..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH SHORT RIGHT LEG +AB5B ; L # Sk MODIFIER BREVE WITH INVERTED BREVE +AB5C..AB5F ; L # Lm [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +AB60..AB68 ; L # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER SAKHA YAT..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED R WITH MIDDLE TILDE +AB69 ; L # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED W +AB70..ABBF ; L # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +ABC0..ABE2 ; L # Lo [35] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER KOK..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER I LONSUM +ABE3..ABE4 ; L # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ONAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN INAP +ABE6..ABE7 ; L # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN YENAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN SOUNAP +ABE9..ABEA ; L # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN CHEINAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN NUNG +ABEB ; L # Po MEETEI MAYEK CHEIKHEI +ABEC ; L # Mc MEETEI MAYEK LUM IYEK +ABF0..ABF9 ; L # Nd [10] MEETEI MAYEK DIGIT ZERO..MEETEI MAYEK DIGIT NINE +AC00..D7A3 ; L # Lo [11172] HANGUL SYLLABLE GA..HANGUL SYLLABLE HIH +D7B0..D7C6 ; L # Lo [23] HANGUL JUNGSEONG O-YEO..HANGUL JUNGSEONG ARAEA-E +D7CB..D7FB ; L # Lo [49] HANGUL JONGSEONG NIEUN-RIEUL..HANGUL JONGSEONG PHIEUPH-THIEUTH +E000..F8FF ; L # Co [6400] .. +F900..FA6D ; L # Lo [366] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-F900..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA6D +FA70..FAD9 ; L # Lo [106] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA70..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FAD9 +FB00..FB06 ; L # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; L # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FF21..FF3A ; L # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +FF41..FF5A ; L # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +FF66..FF6F ; L # Lo [10] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER WO..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER SMALL TU +FF70 ; L # Lm HALFWIDTH KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK +FF71..FF9D ; L # Lo [45] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER A..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER N +FF9E..FF9F ; L # Lm [2] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA VOICED SOUND MARK..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +FFA0..FFBE ; L # Lo [31] HALFWIDTH HANGUL FILLER..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER HIEUH +FFC2..FFC7 ; L # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER A..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER E +FFCA..FFCF ; L # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YEO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER OE +FFD2..FFD7 ; L # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YU +FFDA..FFDC ; L # Lo [3] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER EU..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER I +10000..1000B ; L # Lo [12] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B008 A..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B046 JE +1000D..10026 ; L # Lo [26] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B036 JO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B032 QO +10028..1003A ; L # Lo [19] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B060 RA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B042 WO +1003C..1003D ; L # Lo [2] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B017 ZA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B074 ZE +1003F..1004D ; L # Lo [15] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B020 ZO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B091 TWO +10050..1005D ; L # Lo [14] LINEAR B SYMBOL B018..LINEAR B SYMBOL B089 +10080..100FA ; L # Lo [123] LINEAR B IDEOGRAM B100 MAN..LINEAR B IDEOGRAM VESSEL B305 +10100 ; L # Po AEGEAN WORD SEPARATOR LINE +10102 ; L # Po AEGEAN CHECK MARK +10107..10133 ; L # No [45] AEGEAN NUMBER ONE..AEGEAN NUMBER NINETY THOUSAND +10137..1013F ; L # So [9] AEGEAN WEIGHT BASE UNIT..AEGEAN MEASURE THIRD SUBUNIT +1018D..1018E ; L # So [2] GREEK INDICTION SIGN..NOMISMA SIGN +101D0..101FC ; L # So [45] PHAISTOS DISC SIGN PEDESTRIAN..PHAISTOS DISC SIGN WAVY BAND +10280..1029C ; L # Lo [29] LYCIAN LETTER A..LYCIAN LETTER X +102A0..102D0 ; L # Lo [49] CARIAN LETTER A..CARIAN LETTER UUU3 +10300..1031F ; L # Lo [32] OLD ITALIC LETTER A..OLD ITALIC LETTER ESS +10320..10323 ; L # No [4] OLD ITALIC NUMERAL ONE..OLD ITALIC NUMERAL FIFTY +1032D..10340 ; L # Lo [20] OLD ITALIC LETTER YE..GOTHIC LETTER PAIRTHRA +10341 ; L # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINETY +10342..10349 ; L # Lo [8] GOTHIC LETTER RAIDA..GOTHIC LETTER OTHAL +1034A ; L # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINE HUNDRED +10350..10375 ; L # Lo [38] OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..OLD PERMIC LETTER IA +10380..1039D ; L # Lo [30] UGARITIC LETTER ALPA..UGARITIC LETTER SSU +1039F ; L # Po UGARITIC WORD DIVIDER +103A0..103C3 ; L # Lo [36] OLD PERSIAN SIGN A..OLD PERSIAN SIGN HA +103C8..103CF ; L # Lo [8] OLD PERSIAN SIGN AURAMAZDAA..OLD PERSIAN SIGN BUUMISH +103D0 ; L # Po OLD PERSIAN WORD DIVIDER +103D1..103D5 ; L # Nl [5] OLD PERSIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD PERSIAN NUMBER HUNDRED +10400..1044F ; L # L& [80] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +10450..1049D ; L # Lo [78] SHAVIAN LETTER PEEP..OSMANYA LETTER OO +104A0..104A9 ; L # Nd [10] OSMANYA DIGIT ZERO..OSMANYA DIGIT NINE +104B0..104D3 ; L # L& [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +104D8..104FB ; L # L& [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10500..10527 ; L # Lo [40] ELBASAN LETTER A..ELBASAN LETTER KHE +10530..10563 ; L # Lo [52] CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER ALT..CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER KIW +1056F ; L # Po CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN CITATION MARK +10570..1057A ; L # L& [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; L # L& [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; L # L& [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; L # L& [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10597..105A1 ; L # L& [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; L # L& [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; L # L& [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; L # L& [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10600..10736 ; L # Lo [311] LINEAR A SIGN AB001..LINEAR A SIGN A664 +10740..10755 ; L # Lo [22] LINEAR A SIGN A701 A..LINEAR A SIGN A732 JE +10760..10767 ; L # Lo [8] LINEAR A SIGN A800..LINEAR A SIGN A807 +10780..10785 ; L # Lm [6] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; L # Lm [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; L # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL +11000 ; L # Mc BRAHMI SIGN CANDRABINDU +11002 ; L # Mc BRAHMI SIGN VISARGA +11003..11037 ; L # Lo [53] BRAHMI SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL NNNA +11047..1104D ; L # Po [7] BRAHMI DANDA..BRAHMI PUNCTUATION LOTUS +11066..1106F ; L # Nd [10] BRAHMI DIGIT ZERO..BRAHMI DIGIT NINE +11071..11072 ; L # Lo [2] BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT O +11075 ; L # Lo BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL LLA +11082 ; L # Mc KAITHI SIGN VISARGA +11083..110AF ; L # Lo [45] KAITHI LETTER A..KAITHI LETTER HA +110B0..110B2 ; L # Mc [3] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AA..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN II +110B7..110B8 ; L # Mc [2] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN O..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AU +110BB..110BC ; L # Po [2] KAITHI ABBREVIATION SIGN..KAITHI ENUMERATION SIGN +110BD ; L # Cf KAITHI NUMBER SIGN +110BE..110C1 ; L # Po [4] KAITHI SECTION MARK..KAITHI DOUBLE DANDA +110CD ; L # Cf KAITHI NUMBER SIGN ABOVE +110D0..110E8 ; L # Lo [25] SORA SOMPENG LETTER SAH..SORA SOMPENG LETTER MAE +110F0..110F9 ; L # Nd [10] SORA SOMPENG DIGIT ZERO..SORA SOMPENG DIGIT NINE +11103..11126 ; L # Lo [36] CHAKMA LETTER AA..CHAKMA LETTER HAA +1112C ; L # Mc CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN E +11136..1113F ; L # Nd [10] CHAKMA DIGIT ZERO..CHAKMA DIGIT NINE +11140..11143 ; L # Po [4] CHAKMA SECTION MARK..CHAKMA QUESTION MARK +11144 ; L # Lo CHAKMA LETTER LHAA +11145..11146 ; L # Mc [2] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN EI +11147 ; L # Lo CHAKMA LETTER VAA +11150..11172 ; L # Lo [35] MAHAJANI LETTER A..MAHAJANI LETTER RRA +11174..11175 ; L # Po [2] MAHAJANI ABBREVIATION SIGN..MAHAJANI SECTION MARK +11176 ; L # Lo MAHAJANI LIGATURE SHRI +11182 ; L # Mc SHARADA SIGN VISARGA +11183..111B2 ; L # Lo [48] SHARADA LETTER A..SHARADA LETTER HA +111B3..111B5 ; L # Mc [3] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AA..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN II +111BF..111C0 ; L # Mc [2] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AU..SHARADA SIGN VIRAMA +111C1..111C4 ; L # Lo [4] SHARADA SIGN AVAGRAHA..SHARADA OM +111C5..111C8 ; L # Po [4] SHARADA DANDA..SHARADA SEPARATOR +111CD ; L # Po SHARADA SUTRA MARK +111CE ; L # Mc SHARADA VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +111D0..111D9 ; L # Nd [10] SHARADA DIGIT ZERO..SHARADA DIGIT NINE +111DA ; L # Lo SHARADA EKAM +111DB ; L # Po SHARADA SIGN SIDDHAM +111DC ; L # Lo SHARADA HEADSTROKE +111DD..111DF ; L # Po [3] SHARADA CONTINUATION SIGN..SHARADA SECTION MARK-2 +111E1..111F4 ; L # No [20] SINHALA ARCHAIC DIGIT ONE..SINHALA ARCHAIC NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +11200..11211 ; L # Lo [18] KHOJKI LETTER A..KHOJKI LETTER JJA +11213..1122B ; L # Lo [25] KHOJKI LETTER NYA..KHOJKI LETTER LLA +1122C..1122E ; L # Mc [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN II +11232..11233 ; L # Mc [2] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN O..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AU +11235 ; L # Mc KHOJKI SIGN VIRAMA +11238..1123D ; L # Po [6] KHOJKI DANDA..KHOJKI ABBREVIATION SIGN +11280..11286 ; L # Lo [7] MULTANI LETTER A..MULTANI LETTER GA +11288 ; L # Lo MULTANI LETTER GHA +1128A..1128D ; L # Lo [4] MULTANI LETTER CA..MULTANI LETTER JJA +1128F..1129D ; L # Lo [15] MULTANI LETTER NYA..MULTANI LETTER BA +1129F..112A8 ; L # Lo [10] MULTANI LETTER BHA..MULTANI LETTER RHA +112A9 ; L # Po MULTANI SECTION MARK +112B0..112DE ; L # Lo [47] KHUDAWADI LETTER A..KHUDAWADI LETTER HA +112E0..112E2 ; L # Mc [3] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN II +112F0..112F9 ; L # Nd [10] KHUDAWADI DIGIT ZERO..KHUDAWADI DIGIT NINE +11302..11303 ; L # Mc [2] GRANTHA SIGN ANUSVARA..GRANTHA SIGN VISARGA +11305..1130C ; L # Lo [8] GRANTHA LETTER A..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC L +1130F..11310 ; L # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER EE..GRANTHA LETTER AI +11313..11328 ; L # Lo [22] GRANTHA LETTER OO..GRANTHA LETTER NA +1132A..11330 ; L # Lo [7] GRANTHA LETTER PA..GRANTHA LETTER RA +11332..11333 ; L # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER LA..GRANTHA LETTER LLA +11335..11339 ; L # Lo [5] GRANTHA LETTER VA..GRANTHA LETTER HA +1133D ; L # Lo GRANTHA SIGN AVAGRAHA +1133E..1133F ; L # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AA..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN I +11341..11344 ; L # Mc [4] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN U..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +11347..11348 ; L # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN EE..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AI +1134B..1134D ; L # Mc [3] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN OO..GRANTHA SIGN VIRAMA +11350 ; L # Lo GRANTHA OM +11357 ; L # Mc GRANTHA AU LENGTH MARK +1135D..11361 ; L # Lo [5] GRANTHA SIGN PLUTA..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC LL +11362..11363 ; L # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +11400..11434 ; L # Lo [53] NEWA LETTER A..NEWA LETTER HA +11435..11437 ; L # Mc [3] NEWA VOWEL SIGN AA..NEWA VOWEL SIGN II +11440..11441 ; L # Mc [2] NEWA VOWEL SIGN O..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AU +11445 ; L # Mc NEWA SIGN VISARGA +11447..1144A ; L # Lo [4] NEWA SIGN AVAGRAHA..NEWA SIDDHI +1144B..1144F ; L # Po [5] NEWA DANDA..NEWA ABBREVIATION SIGN +11450..11459 ; L # Nd [10] NEWA DIGIT ZERO..NEWA DIGIT NINE +1145A..1145B ; L # Po [2] NEWA DOUBLE COMMA..NEWA PLACEHOLDER MARK +1145D ; L # Po NEWA INSERTION SIGN +1145F..11461 ; L # Lo [3] NEWA LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..NEWA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +11480..114AF ; L # Lo [48] TIRHUTA ANJI..TIRHUTA LETTER HA +114B0..114B2 ; L # Mc [3] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AA..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN II +114B9 ; L # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN E +114BB..114BE ; L # Mc [4] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AI..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AU +114C1 ; L # Mc TIRHUTA SIGN VISARGA +114C4..114C5 ; L # Lo [2] TIRHUTA SIGN AVAGRAHA..TIRHUTA GVANG +114C6 ; L # Po TIRHUTA ABBREVIATION SIGN +114C7 ; L # Lo TIRHUTA OM +114D0..114D9 ; L # Nd [10] TIRHUTA DIGIT ZERO..TIRHUTA DIGIT NINE +11580..115AE ; L # Lo [47] SIDDHAM LETTER A..SIDDHAM LETTER HA +115AF..115B1 ; L # Mc [3] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN II +115B8..115BB ; L # Mc [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN E..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AU +115BE ; L # Mc SIDDHAM SIGN VISARGA +115C1..115D7 ; L # Po [23] SIDDHAM SIGN SIDDHAM..SIDDHAM SECTION MARK WITH CIRCLES AND FOUR ENCLOSURES +115D8..115DB ; L # Lo [4] SIDDHAM LETTER THREE-CIRCLE ALTERNATE I..SIDDHAM LETTER ALTERNATE U +11600..1162F ; L # Lo [48] MODI LETTER A..MODI LETTER LLA +11630..11632 ; L # Mc [3] MODI VOWEL SIGN AA..MODI VOWEL SIGN II +1163B..1163C ; L # Mc [2] MODI VOWEL SIGN O..MODI VOWEL SIGN AU +1163E ; L # Mc MODI SIGN VISARGA +11641..11643 ; L # Po [3] MODI DANDA..MODI ABBREVIATION SIGN +11644 ; L # Lo MODI SIGN HUVA +11650..11659 ; L # Nd [10] MODI DIGIT ZERO..MODI DIGIT NINE +11680..116AA ; L # Lo [43] TAKRI LETTER A..TAKRI LETTER RRA +116AC ; L # Mc TAKRI SIGN VISARGA +116AE..116AF ; L # Mc [2] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN I..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN II +116B6 ; L # Mc TAKRI SIGN VIRAMA +116B8 ; L # Lo TAKRI LETTER ARCHAIC KHA +116B9 ; L # Po TAKRI ABBREVIATION SIGN +116C0..116C9 ; L # Nd [10] TAKRI DIGIT ZERO..TAKRI DIGIT NINE +11700..1171A ; L # Lo [27] AHOM LETTER KA..AHOM LETTER ALTERNATE BA +11720..11721 ; L # Mc [2] AHOM VOWEL SIGN A..AHOM VOWEL SIGN AA +11726 ; L # Mc AHOM VOWEL SIGN E +11730..11739 ; L # Nd [10] AHOM DIGIT ZERO..AHOM DIGIT NINE +1173A..1173B ; L # No [2] AHOM NUMBER TEN..AHOM NUMBER TWENTY +1173C..1173E ; L # Po [3] AHOM SIGN SMALL SECTION..AHOM SIGN RULAI +1173F ; L # So AHOM SYMBOL VI +11740..11746 ; L # Lo [7] AHOM LETTER CA..AHOM LETTER LLA +11800..1182B ; L # Lo [44] DOGRA LETTER A..DOGRA LETTER RRA +1182C..1182E ; L # Mc [3] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN AA..DOGRA VOWEL SIGN II +11838 ; L # Mc DOGRA SIGN VISARGA +1183B ; L # Po DOGRA ABBREVIATION SIGN +118A0..118DF ; L # L& [64] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +118E0..118E9 ; L # Nd [10] WARANG CITI DIGIT ZERO..WARANG CITI DIGIT NINE +118EA..118F2 ; L # No [9] WARANG CITI NUMBER TEN..WARANG CITI NUMBER NINETY +118FF..11906 ; L # Lo [8] WARANG CITI OM..DIVES AKURU LETTER E +11909 ; L # Lo DIVES AKURU LETTER O +1190C..11913 ; L # Lo [8] DIVES AKURU LETTER KA..DIVES AKURU LETTER JA +11915..11916 ; L # Lo [2] DIVES AKURU LETTER NYA..DIVES AKURU LETTER TTA +11918..1192F ; L # Lo [24] DIVES AKURU LETTER DDA..DIVES AKURU LETTER ZA +11930..11935 ; L # Mc [6] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AA..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN E +11937..11938 ; L # Mc [2] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AI..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN O +1193D ; L # Mc DIVES AKURU SIGN HALANTA +1193F ; L # Lo DIVES AKURU PREFIXED NASAL SIGN +11940 ; L # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL YA +11941 ; L # Lo DIVES AKURU INITIAL RA +11942 ; L # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL RA +11944..11946 ; L # Po [3] DIVES AKURU DOUBLE DANDA..DIVES AKURU END OF TEXT MARK +11950..11959 ; L # Nd [10] DIVES AKURU DIGIT ZERO..DIVES AKURU DIGIT NINE +119A0..119A7 ; L # Lo [8] NANDINAGARI LETTER A..NANDINAGARI LETTER VOCALIC RR +119AA..119D0 ; L # Lo [39] NANDINAGARI LETTER E..NANDINAGARI LETTER RRA +119D1..119D3 ; L # Mc [3] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +119DC..119DF ; L # Mc [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN O..NANDINAGARI SIGN VISARGA +119E1 ; L # Lo NANDINAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +119E2 ; L # Po NANDINAGARI SIGN SIDDHAM +119E3 ; L # Lo NANDINAGARI HEADSTROKE +119E4 ; L # Mc NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +11A00 ; L # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER A +11A07..11A08 ; L # Mn [2] ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN AI..ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN AU +11A0B..11A32 ; L # Lo [40] ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KSSA +11A39 ; L # Mc ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN VISARGA +11A3A ; L # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER RA +11A3F..11A46 ; L # Po [8] ZANABAZAR SQUARE INITIAL HEAD MARK..ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLOSING DOUBLE-LINED HEAD MARK +11A50 ; L # Lo SOYOMBO LETTER A +11A57..11A58 ; L # Mc [2] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AI..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AU +11A5C..11A89 ; L # Lo [46] SOYOMBO LETTER KA..SOYOMBO CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER SA +11A97 ; L # Mc SOYOMBO SIGN VISARGA +11A9A..11A9C ; L # Po [3] SOYOMBO MARK TSHEG..SOYOMBO MARK DOUBLE SHAD +11A9D ; L # Lo SOYOMBO MARK PLUTA +11A9E..11AA2 ; L # Po [5] SOYOMBO HEAD MARK WITH MOON AND SUN AND TRIPLE FLAME..SOYOMBO TERMINAL MARK-2 +11AB0..11AF8 ; L # Lo [73] CANADIAN SYLLABICS NATTILIK HI..PAU CIN HAU GLOTTAL STOP FINAL +11C00..11C08 ; L # Lo [9] BHAIKSUKI LETTER A..BHAIKSUKI LETTER VOCALIC L +11C0A..11C2E ; L # Lo [37] BHAIKSUKI LETTER E..BHAIKSUKI LETTER HA +11C2F ; L # Mc BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN AA +11C3E ; L # Mc BHAIKSUKI SIGN VISARGA +11C3F ; L # Mn BHAIKSUKI SIGN VIRAMA +11C40 ; L # Lo BHAIKSUKI SIGN AVAGRAHA +11C41..11C45 ; L # Po [5] BHAIKSUKI DANDA..BHAIKSUKI GAP FILLER-2 +11C50..11C59 ; L # Nd [10] BHAIKSUKI DIGIT ZERO..BHAIKSUKI DIGIT NINE +11C5A..11C6C ; L # No [19] BHAIKSUKI NUMBER ONE..BHAIKSUKI HUNDREDS UNIT MARK +11C70..11C71 ; L # Po [2] MARCHEN HEAD MARK..MARCHEN MARK SHAD +11C72..11C8F ; L # Lo [30] MARCHEN LETTER KA..MARCHEN LETTER A +11CA9 ; L # Mc MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER YA +11CB1 ; L # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN I +11CB4 ; L # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN O +11D00..11D06 ; L # Lo [7] MASARAM GONDI LETTER A..MASARAM GONDI LETTER E +11D08..11D09 ; L # Lo [2] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AI..MASARAM GONDI LETTER O +11D0B..11D30 ; L # Lo [38] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AU..MASARAM GONDI LETTER TRA +11D46 ; L # Lo MASARAM GONDI REPHA +11D50..11D59 ; L # Nd [10] MASARAM GONDI DIGIT ZERO..MASARAM GONDI DIGIT NINE +11D60..11D65 ; L # Lo [6] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER A..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER UU +11D67..11D68 ; L # Lo [2] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER EE..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER AI +11D6A..11D89 ; L # Lo [32] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER OO..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER SA +11D8A..11D8E ; L # Mc [5] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN UU +11D93..11D94 ; L # Mc [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN OO..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU +11D96 ; L # Mc GUNJALA GONDI SIGN VISARGA +11D98 ; L # Lo GUNJALA GONDI OM +11DA0..11DA9 ; L # Nd [10] GUNJALA GONDI DIGIT ZERO..GUNJALA GONDI DIGIT NINE +11EE0..11EF2 ; L # Lo [19] MAKASAR LETTER KA..MAKASAR ANGKA +11EF5..11EF6 ; L # Mc [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN E..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN O +11EF7..11EF8 ; L # Po [2] MAKASAR PASSIMBANG..MAKASAR END OF SECTION +11FB0 ; L # Lo LISU LETTER YHA +11FC0..11FD4 ; L # No [21] TAMIL FRACTION ONE THREE-HUNDRED-AND-TWENTIETH..TAMIL FRACTION DOWNSCALING FACTOR KIIZH +11FFF ; L # Po TAMIL PUNCTUATION END OF TEXT +12000..12399 ; L # Lo [922] CUNEIFORM SIGN A..CUNEIFORM SIGN U U +12400..1246E ; L # Nl [111] CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN TWO ASH..CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN NINE U VARIANT FORM +12470..12474 ; L # Po [5] CUNEIFORM PUNCTUATION SIGN OLD ASSYRIAN WORD DIVIDER..CUNEIFORM PUNCTUATION SIGN DIAGONAL QUADCOLON +12480..12543 ; L # Lo [196] CUNEIFORM SIGN AB TIMES NUN TENU..CUNEIFORM SIGN ZU5 TIMES THREE DISH TENU +12F90..12FF0 ; L # Lo [97] CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM001..CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM114 +12FF1..12FF2 ; L # Po [2] CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM301..CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM302 +13000..1342E ; L # Lo [1071] EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH AA032 +13430..13438 ; L # Cf [9] EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH VERTICAL JOINER..EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH END SEGMENT +14400..14646 ; L # Lo [583] ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A530 +16800..16A38 ; L # Lo [569] BAMUM LETTER PHASE-A NGKUE MFON..BAMUM LETTER PHASE-F VUEQ +16A40..16A5E ; L # Lo [31] MRO LETTER TA..MRO LETTER TEK +16A60..16A69 ; L # Nd [10] MRO DIGIT ZERO..MRO DIGIT NINE +16A6E..16A6F ; L # Po [2] MRO DANDA..MRO DOUBLE DANDA +16A70..16ABE ; L # Lo [79] TANGSA LETTER OZ..TANGSA LETTER ZA +16AC0..16AC9 ; L # Nd [10] TANGSA DIGIT ZERO..TANGSA DIGIT NINE +16AD0..16AED ; L # Lo [30] BASSA VAH LETTER ENNI..BASSA VAH LETTER I +16AF5 ; L # Po BASSA VAH FULL STOP +16B00..16B2F ; L # Lo [48] PAHAWH HMONG VOWEL KEEB..PAHAWH HMONG CONSONANT CAU +16B37..16B3B ; L # Po [5] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS THOM..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS FEEM +16B3C..16B3F ; L # So [4] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN XYEEM NTXIV..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN XYEEM FAIB +16B40..16B43 ; L # Lm [4] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS SEEV..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN IB YAM +16B44 ; L # Po PAHAWH HMONG SIGN XAUS +16B45 ; L # So PAHAWH HMONG SIGN CIM TSOV ROG +16B50..16B59 ; L # Nd [10] PAHAWH HMONG DIGIT ZERO..PAHAWH HMONG DIGIT NINE +16B5B..16B61 ; L # No [7] PAHAWH HMONG NUMBER TENS..PAHAWH HMONG NUMBER TRILLIONS +16B63..16B77 ; L # Lo [21] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS LUB..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN CIM NRES TOS +16B7D..16B8F ; L # Lo [19] PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN TSHEEJ..PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN VWJ +16E40..16E7F ; L # L& [64] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +16E80..16E96 ; L # No [23] MEDEFAIDRIN DIGIT ZERO..MEDEFAIDRIN DIGIT THREE ALTERNATE FORM +16E97..16E9A ; L # Po [4] MEDEFAIDRIN COMMA..MEDEFAIDRIN EXCLAMATION OH +16F00..16F4A ; L # Lo [75] MIAO LETTER PA..MIAO LETTER RTE +16F50 ; L # Lo MIAO LETTER NASALIZATION +16F51..16F87 ; L # Mc [55] MIAO SIGN ASPIRATION..MIAO VOWEL SIGN UI +16F93..16F9F ; L # Lm [13] MIAO LETTER TONE-2..MIAO LETTER REFORMED TONE-8 +16FE0..16FE1 ; L # Lm [2] TANGUT ITERATION MARK..NUSHU ITERATION MARK +16FE3 ; L # Lm OLD CHINESE ITERATION MARK +16FF0..16FF1 ; L # Mc [2] VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK CA..VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK NHAY +17000..187F7 ; L # Lo [6136] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-17000..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-187F7 +18800..18CD5 ; L # Lo [1238] TANGUT COMPONENT-001..KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT CHARACTER-18CD5 +18D00..18D08 ; L # Lo [9] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D00..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D08 +1AFF0..1AFF3 ; L # Lm [4] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-2..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-5 +1AFF5..1AFFB ; L # Lm [7] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-5 +1AFFD..1AFFE ; L # Lm [2] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-8 +1B000..1B122 ; L # Lo [291] KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC E..KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC WU +1B150..1B152 ; L # Lo [3] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WI..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WO +1B164..1B167 ; L # Lo [4] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL WI..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL N +1B170..1B2FB ; L # Lo [396] NUSHU CHARACTER-1B170..NUSHU CHARACTER-1B2FB +1BC00..1BC6A ; L # Lo [107] DUPLOYAN LETTER H..DUPLOYAN LETTER VOCALIC M +1BC70..1BC7C ; L # Lo [13] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LEFT HORIZONTAL SECANT..DUPLOYAN AFFIX ATTACHED TANGENT HOOK +1BC80..1BC88 ; L # Lo [9] DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH VERTICAL +1BC90..1BC99 ; L # Lo [10] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ARROW +1BC9C ; L # So DUPLOYAN SIGN O WITH CROSS +1BC9F ; L # Po DUPLOYAN PUNCTUATION CHINOOK FULL STOP +1CF50..1CFC3 ; L # So [116] ZNAMENNY NEUME KRYUK..ZNAMENNY NEUME PAUK +1D000..1D0F5 ; L # So [246] BYZANTINE MUSICAL SYMBOL PSILI..BYZANTINE MUSICAL SYMBOL GORGON NEO KATO +1D100..1D126 ; L # So [39] MUSICAL SYMBOL SINGLE BARLINE..MUSICAL SYMBOL DRUM CLEF-2 +1D129..1D164 ; L # So [60] MUSICAL SYMBOL MULTIPLE MEASURE REST..MUSICAL SYMBOL ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHTH NOTE +1D165..1D166 ; L # Mc [2] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING STEM..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SPRECHGESANG STEM +1D16A..1D16C ; L # So [3] MUSICAL SYMBOL FINGERED TREMOLO-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL FINGERED TREMOLO-3 +1D16D..1D172 ; L # Mc [6] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING AUGMENTATION DOT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING FLAG-5 +1D183..1D184 ; L # So [2] MUSICAL SYMBOL ARPEGGIATO UP..MUSICAL SYMBOL ARPEGGIATO DOWN +1D18C..1D1A9 ; L # So [30] MUSICAL SYMBOL RINFORZANDO..MUSICAL SYMBOL DEGREE SLASH +1D1AE..1D1E8 ; L # So [59] MUSICAL SYMBOL PEDAL MARK..MUSICAL SYMBOL KIEVAN FLAT SIGN +1D2E0..1D2F3 ; L # No [20] MAYAN NUMERAL ZERO..MAYAN NUMERAL NINETEEN +1D360..1D378 ; L # No [25] COUNTING ROD UNIT DIGIT ONE..TALLY MARK FIVE +1D400..1D454 ; L # L& [85] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL G +1D456..1D49C ; L # L& [71] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A +1D49E..1D49F ; L # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D +1D4A2 ; L # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL G +1D4A5..1D4A6 ; L # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K +1D4A9..1D4AC ; L # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Q +1D4AE..1D4B9 ; L # L& [12] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL D +1D4BB ; L # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL F +1D4BD..1D4C3 ; L # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL H..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL N +1D4C5..1D505 ; L # L& [65] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL P..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL B +1D507..1D50A ; L # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL G +1D50D..1D514 ; L # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Q +1D516..1D51C ; L # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Y +1D51E..1D539 ; L # L& [28] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL B +1D53B..1D53E ; L # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL G +1D540..1D544 ; L # L& [5] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M +1D546 ; L # L& MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL O +1D54A..1D550 ; L # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Y +1D552..1D6A5 ; L # L& [340] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL DOTLESS J +1D6A8..1D6C0 ; L # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6C1 ; L # Sm MATHEMATICAL BOLD NABLA +1D6C2..1D6DA ; L # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D6DC..1D6FA ; L # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6FB ; L # Sm MATHEMATICAL ITALIC NABLA +1D6FC..1D714 ; L # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D716..1D734 ; L # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D735 ; L # Sm MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC NABLA +1D736..1D74E ; L # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D750..1D76E ; L # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D76F ; L # Sm MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD NABLA +1D770..1D788 ; L # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D78A..1D7A8 ; L # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D7A9 ; L # Sm MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC NABLA +1D7AA..1D7C2 ; L # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D7C4..1D7CB ; L # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL DIGAMMA +1D800..1D9FF ; L # So [512] SIGNWRITING HAND-FIST INDEX..SIGNWRITING HEAD +1DA37..1DA3A ; L # So [4] SIGNWRITING AIR BLOW SMALL ROTATIONS..SIGNWRITING BREATH EXHALE +1DA6D..1DA74 ; L # So [8] SIGNWRITING SHOULDER HIP SPINE..SIGNWRITING TORSO-FLOORPLANE TWISTING +1DA76..1DA83 ; L # So [14] SIGNWRITING LIMB COMBINATION..SIGNWRITING LOCATION DEPTH +1DA85..1DA86 ; L # So [2] SIGNWRITING LOCATION TORSO..SIGNWRITING LOCATION LIMBS DIGITS +1DA87..1DA8B ; L # Po [5] SIGNWRITING COMMA..SIGNWRITING PARENTHESIS +1DF00..1DF09 ; L # L& [10] LATIN SMALL LETTER FENG DIGRAPH WITH TRILL..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK AND RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0A ; L # Lo LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0B..1DF1E ; L # L& [20] LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH WITH DOUBLE BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CURL +1E100..1E12C ; L # Lo [45] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER MA..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER W +1E137..1E13D ; L # Lm [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SIGN FOR PERSON..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +1E140..1E149 ; L # Nd [10] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG DIGIT ZERO..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG DIGIT NINE +1E14E ; L # Lo NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LOGOGRAM NYAJ +1E14F ; L # So NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG CIRCLED CA +1E290..1E2AD ; L # Lo [30] TOTO LETTER PA..TOTO LETTER A +1E2C0..1E2EB ; L # Lo [44] WANCHO LETTER AA..WANCHO LETTER YIH +1E2F0..1E2F9 ; L # Nd [10] WANCHO DIGIT ZERO..WANCHO DIGIT NINE +1E7E0..1E7E6 ; L # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYO +1E7E8..1E7EB ; L # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE HHWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHWE +1E7ED..1E7EE ; L # Lo [2] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWEE +1E7F0..1E7FE ; L # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE PWEE +1F110..1F12E ; L # So [31] PARENTHESIZED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..CIRCLED WZ +1F130..1F169 ; L # So [58] SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..NEGATIVE CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +1F170..1F1AC ; L # So [61] NEGATIVE SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..SQUARED VOD +1F1E6..1F202 ; L # So [29] REGIONAL INDICATOR SYMBOL LETTER A..SQUARED KATAKANA SA +1F210..1F23B ; L # So [44] SQUARED CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-624B..SQUARED CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-914D +1F240..1F248 ; L # So [9] TORTOISE SHELL BRACKETED CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-672C..TORTOISE SHELL BRACKETED CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-6557 +1F250..1F251 ; L # So [2] CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH ADVANTAGE..CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH ACCEPT +20000..2A6DF ; L # Lo [42720] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-20000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A6DF +2A700..2B738 ; L # Lo [4153] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A700..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B738 +2B740..2B81D ; L # Lo [222] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B740..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B81D +2B820..2CEA1 ; L # Lo [5762] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B820..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEA1 +2CEB0..2EBE0 ; L # Lo [7473] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEB0..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2EBE0 +2F800..2FA1D ; L # Lo [542] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2F800..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2FA1D +30000..3134A ; L # Lo [4939] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-30000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3134A +F0000..FFFFD ; L # Co [65534] .. +100000..10FFFD; L # Co [65534] .. + +# The above property value applies to 825575 code points not listed here. +# Total code points: 1096333 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Right_To_Left + +0590 ; R # Cn +05BE ; R # Pd HEBREW PUNCTUATION MAQAF +05C0 ; R # Po HEBREW PUNCTUATION PASEQ +05C3 ; R # Po HEBREW PUNCTUATION SOF PASUQ +05C6 ; R # Po HEBREW PUNCTUATION NUN HAFUKHA +05C8..05CF ; R # Cn [8] .. +05D0..05EA ; R # Lo [27] HEBREW LETTER ALEF..HEBREW LETTER TAV +05EB..05EE ; R # Cn [4] .. +05EF..05F2 ; R # Lo [4] HEBREW YOD TRIANGLE..HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH DOUBLE YOD +05F3..05F4 ; R # Po [2] HEBREW PUNCTUATION GERESH..HEBREW PUNCTUATION GERSHAYIM +05F5..05FF ; R # Cn [11] .. +07C0..07C9 ; R # Nd [10] NKO DIGIT ZERO..NKO DIGIT NINE +07CA..07EA ; R # Lo [33] NKO LETTER A..NKO LETTER JONA RA +07F4..07F5 ; R # Lm [2] NKO HIGH TONE APOSTROPHE..NKO LOW TONE APOSTROPHE +07FA ; R # Lm NKO LAJANYALAN +07FB..07FC ; R # Cn [2] .. +07FE..07FF ; R # Sc [2] NKO DOROME SIGN..NKO TAMAN SIGN +0800..0815 ; R # Lo [22] SAMARITAN LETTER ALAF..SAMARITAN LETTER TAAF +081A ; R # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER EPENTHETIC YUT +0824 ; R # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER SHORT A +0828 ; R # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER I +082E..082F ; R # Cn [2] .. +0830..083E ; R # Po [15] SAMARITAN PUNCTUATION NEQUDAA..SAMARITAN PUNCTUATION ANNAAU +083F ; R # Cn +0840..0858 ; R # Lo [25] MANDAIC LETTER HALQA..MANDAIC LETTER AIN +085C..085D ; R # Cn [2] .. +085E ; R # Po MANDAIC PUNCTUATION +085F ; R # Cn +200F ; R # Cf RIGHT-TO-LEFT MARK +FB1D ; R # Lo HEBREW LETTER YOD WITH HIRIQ +FB1F..FB28 ; R # Lo [10] HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH YOD YOD PATAH..HEBREW LETTER WIDE TAV +FB2A..FB36 ; R # Lo [13] HEBREW LETTER SHIN WITH SHIN DOT..HEBREW LETTER ZAYIN WITH DAGESH +FB37 ; R # Cn +FB38..FB3C ; R # Lo [5] HEBREW LETTER TET WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER LAMED WITH DAGESH +FB3D ; R # Cn +FB3E ; R # Lo HEBREW LETTER MEM WITH DAGESH +FB3F ; R # Cn +FB40..FB41 ; R # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER NUN WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER SAMEKH WITH DAGESH +FB42 ; R # Cn +FB43..FB44 ; R # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER FINAL PE WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER PE WITH DAGESH +FB45 ; R # Cn +FB46..FB4F ; R # Lo [10] HEBREW LETTER TSADI WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LIGATURE ALEF LAMED +10800..10805 ; R # Lo [6] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE A..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JA +10806..10807 ; R # Cn [2] .. +10808 ; R # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JO +10809 ; R # Cn +1080A..10835 ; R # Lo [44] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE KA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE WO +10836 ; R # Cn +10837..10838 ; R # Lo [2] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XE +10839..1083B ; R # Cn [3] .. +1083C ; R # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZA +1083D..1083E ; R # Cn [2] .. +1083F..10855 ; R # Lo [23] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZO..IMPERIAL ARAMAIC LETTER TAW +10856 ; R # Cn +10857 ; R # Po IMPERIAL ARAMAIC SECTION SIGN +10858..1085F ; R # No [8] IMPERIAL ARAMAIC NUMBER ONE..IMPERIAL ARAMAIC NUMBER TEN THOUSAND +10860..10876 ; R # Lo [23] PALMYRENE LETTER ALEPH..PALMYRENE LETTER TAW +10877..10878 ; R # So [2] PALMYRENE LEFT-POINTING FLEURON..PALMYRENE RIGHT-POINTING FLEURON +10879..1087F ; R # No [7] PALMYRENE NUMBER ONE..PALMYRENE NUMBER TWENTY +10880..1089E ; R # Lo [31] NABATAEAN LETTER FINAL ALEPH..NABATAEAN LETTER TAW +1089F..108A6 ; R # Cn [8] .. +108A7..108AF ; R # No [9] NABATAEAN NUMBER ONE..NABATAEAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +108B0..108DF ; R # Cn [48] .. +108E0..108F2 ; R # Lo [19] HATRAN LETTER ALEPH..HATRAN LETTER QOPH +108F3 ; R # Cn +108F4..108F5 ; R # Lo [2] HATRAN LETTER SHIN..HATRAN LETTER TAW +108F6..108FA ; R # Cn [5] .. +108FB..108FF ; R # No [5] HATRAN NUMBER ONE..HATRAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10900..10915 ; R # Lo [22] PHOENICIAN LETTER ALF..PHOENICIAN LETTER TAU +10916..1091B ; R # No [6] PHOENICIAN NUMBER ONE..PHOENICIAN NUMBER THREE +1091C..1091E ; R # Cn [3] .. +10920..10939 ; R # Lo [26] LYDIAN LETTER A..LYDIAN LETTER C +1093A..1093E ; R # Cn [5] .. +1093F ; R # Po LYDIAN TRIANGULAR MARK +10940..1097F ; R # Cn [64] .. +10980..109B7 ; R # Lo [56] MEROITIC HIEROGLYPHIC LETTER A..MEROITIC CURSIVE LETTER DA +109B8..109BB ; R # Cn [4] .. +109BC..109BD ; R # No [2] MEROITIC CURSIVE FRACTION ELEVEN TWELFTHS..MEROITIC CURSIVE FRACTION ONE HALF +109BE..109BF ; R # Lo [2] MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM RMT..MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM IMN +109C0..109CF ; R # No [16] MEROITIC CURSIVE NUMBER ONE..MEROITIC CURSIVE NUMBER SEVENTY +109D0..109D1 ; R # Cn [2] .. +109D2..109FF ; R # No [46] MEROITIC CURSIVE NUMBER ONE HUNDRED..MEROITIC CURSIVE FRACTION TEN TWELFTHS +10A00 ; R # Lo KHAROSHTHI LETTER A +10A04 ; R # Cn +10A07..10A0B ; R # Cn [5] .. +10A10..10A13 ; R # Lo [4] KHAROSHTHI LETTER KA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER GHA +10A14 ; R # Cn +10A15..10A17 ; R # Lo [3] KHAROSHTHI LETTER CA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER JA +10A18 ; R # Cn +10A19..10A35 ; R # Lo [29] KHAROSHTHI LETTER NYA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER VHA +10A36..10A37 ; R # Cn [2] .. +10A3B..10A3E ; R # Cn [4] .. +10A40..10A48 ; R # No [9] KHAROSHTHI DIGIT ONE..KHAROSHTHI FRACTION ONE HALF +10A49..10A4F ; R # Cn [7] .. +10A50..10A58 ; R # Po [9] KHAROSHTHI PUNCTUATION DOT..KHAROSHTHI PUNCTUATION LINES +10A59..10A5F ; R # Cn [7] .. +10A60..10A7C ; R # Lo [29] OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER HE..OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER THETH +10A7D..10A7E ; R # No [2] OLD SOUTH ARABIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD SOUTH ARABIAN NUMBER FIFTY +10A7F ; R # Po OLD SOUTH ARABIAN NUMERIC INDICATOR +10A80..10A9C ; R # Lo [29] OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER HEH..OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER ZAH +10A9D..10A9F ; R # No [3] OLD NORTH ARABIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD NORTH ARABIAN NUMBER TWENTY +10AA0..10ABF ; R # Cn [32] .. +10AC0..10AC7 ; R # Lo [8] MANICHAEAN LETTER ALEPH..MANICHAEAN LETTER WAW +10AC8 ; R # So MANICHAEAN SIGN UD +10AC9..10AE4 ; R # Lo [28] MANICHAEAN LETTER ZAYIN..MANICHAEAN LETTER TAW +10AE7..10AEA ; R # Cn [4] .. +10AEB..10AEF ; R # No [5] MANICHAEAN NUMBER ONE..MANICHAEAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10AF0..10AF6 ; R # Po [7] MANICHAEAN PUNCTUATION STAR..MANICHAEAN PUNCTUATION LINE FILLER +10AF7..10AFF ; R # Cn [9] .. +10B00..10B35 ; R # Lo [54] AVESTAN LETTER A..AVESTAN LETTER HE +10B36..10B38 ; R # Cn [3] .. +10B40..10B55 ; R # Lo [22] INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER TAW +10B56..10B57 ; R # Cn [2] .. +10B58..10B5F ; R # No [8] INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN NUMBER ONE..INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +10B60..10B72 ; R # Lo [19] INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10B73..10B77 ; R # Cn [5] .. +10B78..10B7F ; R # No [8] INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI NUMBER ONE..INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +10B80..10B91 ; R # Lo [18] PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10B92..10B98 ; R # Cn [7] .. +10B99..10B9C ; R # Po [4] PSALTER PAHLAVI SECTION MARK..PSALTER PAHLAVI FOUR DOTS WITH DOT +10B9D..10BA8 ; R # Cn [12] .. +10BA9..10BAF ; R # No [7] PSALTER PAHLAVI NUMBER ONE..PSALTER PAHLAVI NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10BB0..10BFF ; R # Cn [80] .. +10C00..10C48 ; R # Lo [73] OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON A..OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON BASH +10C49..10C7F ; R # Cn [55] .. +10C80..10CB2 ; R # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +10CB3..10CBF ; R # Cn [13] .. +10CC0..10CF2 ; R # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +10CF3..10CF9 ; R # Cn [7] .. +10CFA..10CFF ; R # No [6] OLD HUNGARIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD HUNGARIAN NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +10D40..10E5F ; R # Cn [288] .. +10E7F ; R # Cn +10E80..10EA9 ; R # Lo [42] YEZIDI LETTER ELIF..YEZIDI LETTER ET +10EAA ; R # Cn +10EAD ; R # Pd YEZIDI HYPHENATION MARK +10EAE..10EAF ; R # Cn [2] .. +10EB0..10EB1 ; R # Lo [2] YEZIDI LETTER LAM WITH DOT ABOVE..YEZIDI LETTER YOT WITH CIRCUMFLEX ABOVE +10EB2..10EFF ; R # Cn [78] .. +10F00..10F1C ; R # Lo [29] OLD SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..OLD SOGDIAN LETTER FINAL TAW WITH VERTICAL TAIL +10F1D..10F26 ; R # No [10] OLD SOGDIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD SOGDIAN FRACTION ONE HALF +10F27 ; R # Lo OLD SOGDIAN LIGATURE AYIN-DALETH +10F28..10F2F ; R # Cn [8] .. +10F70..10F81 ; R # Lo [18] OLD UYGHUR LETTER ALEPH..OLD UYGHUR LETTER LESH +10F86..10F89 ; R # Po [4] OLD UYGHUR PUNCTUATION BAR..OLD UYGHUR PUNCTUATION FOUR DOTS +10F8A..10FAF ; R # Cn [38] .. +10FB0..10FC4 ; R # Lo [21] CHORASMIAN LETTER ALEPH..CHORASMIAN LETTER TAW +10FC5..10FCB ; R # No [7] CHORASMIAN NUMBER ONE..CHORASMIAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10FCC..10FDF ; R # Cn [20] .. +10FE0..10FF6 ; R # Lo [23] ELYMAIC LETTER ALEPH..ELYMAIC LIGATURE ZAYIN-YODH +10FF7..10FFF ; R # Cn [9] .. +1E800..1E8C4 ; R # Lo [197] MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M001 KI..MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M060 NYON +1E8C5..1E8C6 ; R # Cn [2] .. +1E8C7..1E8CF ; R # No [9] MENDE KIKAKUI DIGIT ONE..MENDE KIKAKUI DIGIT NINE +1E8D7..1E8FF ; R # Cn [41] .. +1E900..1E943 ; R # L& [68] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA +1E94B ; R # Lm ADLAM NASALIZATION MARK +1E94C..1E94F ; R # Cn [4] .. +1E950..1E959 ; R # Nd [10] ADLAM DIGIT ZERO..ADLAM DIGIT NINE +1E95A..1E95D ; R # Cn [4] .. +1E95E..1E95F ; R # Po [2] ADLAM INITIAL EXCLAMATION MARK..ADLAM INITIAL QUESTION MARK +1E960..1EC6F ; R # Cn [784] .. +1ECC0..1ECFF ; R # Cn [64] .. +1ED50..1EDFF ; R # Cn [176] .. +1EF00..1EFFF ; R # Cn [256] .. + +# Total code points: 3711 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=European_Number + +0030..0039 ; EN # Nd [10] DIGIT ZERO..DIGIT NINE +00B2..00B3 ; EN # No [2] SUPERSCRIPT TWO..SUPERSCRIPT THREE +00B9 ; EN # No SUPERSCRIPT ONE +06F0..06F9 ; EN # Nd [10] EXTENDED ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT ZERO..EXTENDED ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT NINE +2070 ; EN # No SUPERSCRIPT ZERO +2074..2079 ; EN # No [6] SUPERSCRIPT FOUR..SUPERSCRIPT NINE +2080..2089 ; EN # No [10] SUBSCRIPT ZERO..SUBSCRIPT NINE +2488..249B ; EN # No [20] DIGIT ONE FULL STOP..NUMBER TWENTY FULL STOP +FF10..FF19 ; EN # Nd [10] FULLWIDTH DIGIT ZERO..FULLWIDTH DIGIT NINE +102E1..102FB ; EN # No [27] COPTIC EPACT DIGIT ONE..COPTIC EPACT NUMBER NINE HUNDRED +1D7CE..1D7FF ; EN # Nd [50] MATHEMATICAL BOLD DIGIT ZERO..MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE DIGIT NINE +1F100..1F10A ; EN # No [11] DIGIT ZERO FULL STOP..DIGIT NINE COMMA +1FBF0..1FBF9 ; EN # Nd [10] SEGMENTED DIGIT ZERO..SEGMENTED DIGIT NINE + +# Total code points: 168 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=European_Separator + +002B ; ES # Sm PLUS SIGN +002D ; ES # Pd HYPHEN-MINUS +207A..207B ; ES # Sm [2] SUPERSCRIPT PLUS SIGN..SUPERSCRIPT MINUS +208A..208B ; ES # Sm [2] SUBSCRIPT PLUS SIGN..SUBSCRIPT MINUS +2212 ; ES # Sm MINUS SIGN +FB29 ; ES # Sm HEBREW LETTER ALTERNATIVE PLUS SIGN +FE62 ; ES # Sm SMALL PLUS SIGN +FE63 ; ES # Pd SMALL HYPHEN-MINUS +FF0B ; ES # Sm FULLWIDTH PLUS SIGN +FF0D ; ES # Pd FULLWIDTH HYPHEN-MINUS + +# Total code points: 12 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=European_Terminator + +0023 ; ET # Po NUMBER SIGN +0024 ; ET # Sc DOLLAR SIGN +0025 ; ET # Po PERCENT SIGN +00A2..00A5 ; ET # Sc [4] CENT SIGN..YEN SIGN +00B0 ; ET # So DEGREE SIGN +00B1 ; ET # Sm PLUS-MINUS SIGN +058F ; ET # Sc ARMENIAN DRAM SIGN +0609..060A ; ET # Po [2] ARABIC-INDIC PER MILLE SIGN..ARABIC-INDIC PER TEN THOUSAND SIGN +066A ; ET # Po ARABIC PERCENT SIGN +09F2..09F3 ; ET # Sc [2] BENGALI RUPEE MARK..BENGALI RUPEE SIGN +09FB ; ET # Sc BENGALI GANDA MARK +0AF1 ; ET # Sc GUJARATI RUPEE SIGN +0BF9 ; ET # Sc TAMIL RUPEE SIGN +0E3F ; ET # Sc THAI CURRENCY SYMBOL BAHT +17DB ; ET # Sc KHMER CURRENCY SYMBOL RIEL +2030..2034 ; ET # Po [5] PER MILLE SIGN..TRIPLE PRIME +20A0..20C0 ; ET # Sc [33] EURO-CURRENCY SIGN..SOM SIGN +20C1..20CF ; ET # Cn [15] .. +212E ; ET # So ESTIMATED SYMBOL +2213 ; ET # Sm MINUS-OR-PLUS SIGN +A838 ; ET # Sc NORTH INDIC RUPEE MARK +A839 ; ET # So NORTH INDIC QUANTITY MARK +FE5F ; ET # Po SMALL NUMBER SIGN +FE69 ; ET # Sc SMALL DOLLAR SIGN +FE6A ; ET # Po SMALL PERCENT SIGN +FF03 ; ET # Po FULLWIDTH NUMBER SIGN +FF04 ; ET # Sc FULLWIDTH DOLLAR SIGN +FF05 ; ET # Po FULLWIDTH PERCENT SIGN +FFE0..FFE1 ; ET # Sc [2] FULLWIDTH CENT SIGN..FULLWIDTH POUND SIGN +FFE5..FFE6 ; ET # Sc [2] FULLWIDTH YEN SIGN..FULLWIDTH WON SIGN +11FDD..11FE0 ; ET # Sc [4] TAMIL SIGN KAACU..TAMIL SIGN VARAAKAN +1E2FF ; ET # Sc WANCHO NGUN SIGN + +# Total code points: 92 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Arabic_Number + +0600..0605 ; AN # Cf [6] ARABIC NUMBER SIGN..ARABIC NUMBER MARK ABOVE +0660..0669 ; AN # Nd [10] ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT ZERO..ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT NINE +066B..066C ; AN # Po [2] ARABIC DECIMAL SEPARATOR..ARABIC THOUSANDS SEPARATOR +06DD ; AN # Cf ARABIC END OF AYAH +0890..0891 ; AN # Cf [2] ARABIC POUND MARK ABOVE..ARABIC PIASTRE MARK ABOVE +08E2 ; AN # Cf ARABIC DISPUTED END OF AYAH +10D30..10D39 ; AN # Nd [10] HANIFI ROHINGYA DIGIT ZERO..HANIFI ROHINGYA DIGIT NINE +10E60..10E7E ; AN # No [31] RUMI DIGIT ONE..RUMI FRACTION TWO THIRDS + +# Total code points: 63 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Common_Separator + +002C ; CS # Po COMMA +002E..002F ; CS # Po [2] FULL STOP..SOLIDUS +003A ; CS # Po COLON +00A0 ; CS # Zs NO-BREAK SPACE +060C ; CS # Po ARABIC COMMA +202F ; CS # Zs NARROW NO-BREAK SPACE +2044 ; CS # Sm FRACTION SLASH +FE50 ; CS # Po SMALL COMMA +FE52 ; CS # Po SMALL FULL STOP +FE55 ; CS # Po SMALL COLON +FF0C ; CS # Po FULLWIDTH COMMA +FF0E..FF0F ; CS # Po [2] FULLWIDTH FULL STOP..FULLWIDTH SOLIDUS +FF1A ; CS # Po FULLWIDTH COLON + +# Total code points: 15 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Paragraph_Separator + +000A ; B # Cc +000D ; B # Cc +001C..001E ; B # Cc [3] .. +0085 ; B # Cc +2029 ; B # Zp PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR + +# Total code points: 7 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Segment_Separator + +0009 ; S # Cc +000B ; S # Cc +001F ; S # Cc + +# Total code points: 3 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=White_Space + +000C ; WS # Cc +0020 ; WS # Zs SPACE +1680 ; WS # Zs OGHAM SPACE MARK +2000..200A ; WS # Zs [11] EN QUAD..HAIR SPACE +2028 ; WS # Zl LINE SEPARATOR +205F ; WS # Zs MEDIUM MATHEMATICAL SPACE +3000 ; WS # Zs IDEOGRAPHIC SPACE + +# Total code points: 17 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Other_Neutral + +0021..0022 ; ON # Po [2] EXCLAMATION MARK..QUOTATION MARK +0026..0027 ; ON # Po [2] AMPERSAND..APOSTROPHE +0028 ; ON # Ps LEFT PARENTHESIS +0029 ; ON # Pe RIGHT PARENTHESIS +002A ; ON # Po ASTERISK +003B ; ON # Po SEMICOLON +003C..003E ; ON # Sm [3] LESS-THAN SIGN..GREATER-THAN SIGN +003F..0040 ; ON # Po [2] QUESTION MARK..COMMERCIAL AT +005B ; ON # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET +005C ; ON # Po REVERSE SOLIDUS +005D ; ON # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET +005E ; ON # Sk CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +005F ; ON # Pc LOW LINE +0060 ; ON # Sk GRAVE ACCENT +007B ; ON # Ps LEFT CURLY BRACKET +007C ; ON # Sm VERTICAL LINE +007D ; ON # Pe RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +007E ; ON # Sm TILDE +00A1 ; ON # Po INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +00A6 ; ON # So BROKEN BAR +00A7 ; ON # Po SECTION SIGN +00A8 ; ON # Sk DIAERESIS +00A9 ; ON # So COPYRIGHT SIGN +00AB ; ON # Pi LEFT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +00AC ; ON # Sm NOT SIGN +00AE ; ON # So REGISTERED SIGN +00AF ; ON # Sk MACRON +00B4 ; ON # Sk ACUTE ACCENT +00B6..00B7 ; ON # Po [2] PILCROW SIGN..MIDDLE DOT +00B8 ; ON # Sk CEDILLA +00BB ; ON # Pf RIGHT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +00BC..00BE ; ON # No [3] VULGAR FRACTION ONE QUARTER..VULGAR FRACTION THREE QUARTERS +00BF ; ON # Po INVERTED QUESTION MARK +00D7 ; ON # Sm MULTIPLICATION SIGN +00F7 ; ON # Sm DIVISION SIGN +02B9..02BA ; ON # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER PRIME..MODIFIER LETTER DOUBLE PRIME +02C2..02C5 ; ON # Sk [4] MODIFIER LETTER LEFT ARROWHEAD..MODIFIER LETTER DOWN ARROWHEAD +02C6..02CF ; ON # Lm [10] MODIFIER LETTER CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..MODIFIER LETTER LOW ACUTE ACCENT +02D2..02DF ; ON # Sk [14] MODIFIER LETTER CENTRED RIGHT HALF RING..MODIFIER LETTER CROSS ACCENT +02E5..02EB ; ON # Sk [7] MODIFIER LETTER EXTRA-HIGH TONE BAR..MODIFIER LETTER YANG DEPARTING TONE MARK +02EC ; ON # Lm MODIFIER LETTER VOICING +02ED ; ON # Sk MODIFIER LETTER UNASPIRATED +02EF..02FF ; ON # Sk [17] MODIFIER LETTER LOW DOWN ARROWHEAD..MODIFIER LETTER LOW LEFT ARROW +0374 ; ON # Lm GREEK NUMERAL SIGN +0375 ; ON # Sk GREEK LOWER NUMERAL SIGN +037E ; ON # Po GREEK QUESTION MARK +0384..0385 ; ON # Sk [2] GREEK TONOS..GREEK DIALYTIKA TONOS +0387 ; ON # Po GREEK ANO TELEIA +03F6 ; ON # Sm GREEK REVERSED LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +058A ; ON # Pd ARMENIAN HYPHEN +058D..058E ; ON # So [2] RIGHT-FACING ARMENIAN ETERNITY SIGN..LEFT-FACING ARMENIAN ETERNITY SIGN +0606..0607 ; ON # Sm [2] ARABIC-INDIC CUBE ROOT..ARABIC-INDIC FOURTH ROOT +060E..060F ; ON # So [2] ARABIC POETIC VERSE SIGN..ARABIC SIGN MISRA +06DE ; ON # So ARABIC START OF RUB EL HIZB +06E9 ; ON # So ARABIC PLACE OF SAJDAH +07F6 ; ON # So NKO SYMBOL OO DENNEN +07F7..07F9 ; ON # Po [3] NKO SYMBOL GBAKURUNEN..NKO EXCLAMATION MARK +0BF3..0BF8 ; ON # So [6] TAMIL DAY SIGN..TAMIL AS ABOVE SIGN +0BFA ; ON # So TAMIL NUMBER SIGN +0C78..0C7E ; ON # No [7] TELUGU FRACTION DIGIT ZERO FOR ODD POWERS OF FOUR..TELUGU FRACTION DIGIT THREE FOR EVEN POWERS OF FOUR +0F3A ; ON # Ps TIBETAN MARK GUG RTAGS GYON +0F3B ; ON # Pe TIBETAN MARK GUG RTAGS GYAS +0F3C ; ON # Ps TIBETAN MARK ANG KHANG GYON +0F3D ; ON # Pe TIBETAN MARK ANG KHANG GYAS +1390..1399 ; ON # So [10] ETHIOPIC TONAL MARK YIZET..ETHIOPIC TONAL MARK KURT +1400 ; ON # Pd CANADIAN SYLLABICS HYPHEN +169B ; ON # Ps OGHAM FEATHER MARK +169C ; ON # Pe OGHAM REVERSED FEATHER MARK +17F0..17F9 ; ON # No [10] KHMER SYMBOL LEK ATTAK SON..KHMER SYMBOL LEK ATTAK PRAM-BUON +1800..1805 ; ON # Po [6] MONGOLIAN BIRGA..MONGOLIAN FOUR DOTS +1806 ; ON # Pd MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN +1807..180A ; ON # Po [4] MONGOLIAN SIBE SYLLABLE BOUNDARY MARKER..MONGOLIAN NIRUGU +1940 ; ON # So LIMBU SIGN LOO +1944..1945 ; ON # Po [2] LIMBU EXCLAMATION MARK..LIMBU QUESTION MARK +19DE..19FF ; ON # So [34] NEW TAI LUE SIGN LAE..KHMER SYMBOL DAP-PRAM ROC +1FBD ; ON # Sk GREEK KORONIS +1FBF..1FC1 ; ON # Sk [3] GREEK PSILI..GREEK DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FCD..1FCF ; ON # Sk [3] GREEK PSILI AND VARIA..GREEK PSILI AND PERISPOMENI +1FDD..1FDF ; ON # Sk [3] GREEK DASIA AND VARIA..GREEK DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1FED..1FEF ; ON # Sk [3] GREEK DIALYTIKA AND VARIA..GREEK VARIA +1FFD..1FFE ; ON # Sk [2] GREEK OXIA..GREEK DASIA +2010..2015 ; ON # Pd [6] HYPHEN..HORIZONTAL BAR +2016..2017 ; ON # Po [2] DOUBLE VERTICAL LINE..DOUBLE LOW LINE +2018 ; ON # Pi LEFT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK +2019 ; ON # Pf RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK +201A ; ON # Ps SINGLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK +201B..201C ; ON # Pi [2] SINGLE HIGH-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK..LEFT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK +201D ; ON # Pf RIGHT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK +201E ; ON # Ps DOUBLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK +201F ; ON # Pi DOUBLE HIGH-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK +2020..2027 ; ON # Po [8] DAGGER..HYPHENATION POINT +2035..2038 ; ON # Po [4] REVERSED PRIME..CARET +2039 ; ON # Pi SINGLE LEFT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +203A ; ON # Pf SINGLE RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +203B..203E ; ON # Po [4] REFERENCE MARK..OVERLINE +203F..2040 ; ON # Pc [2] UNDERTIE..CHARACTER TIE +2041..2043 ; ON # Po [3] CARET INSERTION POINT..HYPHEN BULLET +2045 ; ON # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH QUILL +2046 ; ON # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH QUILL +2047..2051 ; ON # Po [11] DOUBLE QUESTION MARK..TWO ASTERISKS ALIGNED VERTICALLY +2052 ; ON # Sm COMMERCIAL MINUS SIGN +2053 ; ON # Po SWUNG DASH +2054 ; ON # Pc INVERTED UNDERTIE +2055..205E ; ON # Po [10] FLOWER PUNCTUATION MARK..VERTICAL FOUR DOTS +207C ; ON # Sm SUPERSCRIPT EQUALS SIGN +207D ; ON # Ps SUPERSCRIPT LEFT PARENTHESIS +207E ; ON # Pe SUPERSCRIPT RIGHT PARENTHESIS +208C ; ON # Sm SUBSCRIPT EQUALS SIGN +208D ; ON # Ps SUBSCRIPT LEFT PARENTHESIS +208E ; ON # Pe SUBSCRIPT RIGHT PARENTHESIS +2100..2101 ; ON # So [2] ACCOUNT OF..ADDRESSED TO THE SUBJECT +2103..2106 ; ON # So [4] DEGREE CELSIUS..CADA UNA +2108..2109 ; ON # So [2] SCRUPLE..DEGREE FAHRENHEIT +2114 ; ON # So L B BAR SYMBOL +2116..2117 ; ON # So [2] NUMERO SIGN..SOUND RECORDING COPYRIGHT +2118 ; ON # Sm SCRIPT CAPITAL P +211E..2123 ; ON # So [6] PRESCRIPTION TAKE..VERSICLE +2125 ; ON # So OUNCE SIGN +2127 ; ON # So INVERTED OHM SIGN +2129 ; ON # So TURNED GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA +213A..213B ; ON # So [2] ROTATED CAPITAL Q..FACSIMILE SIGN +2140..2144 ; ON # Sm [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK N-ARY SUMMATION..TURNED SANS-SERIF CAPITAL Y +214A ; ON # So PROPERTY LINE +214B ; ON # Sm TURNED AMPERSAND +214C..214D ; ON # So [2] PER SIGN..AKTIESELSKAB +2150..215F ; ON # No [16] VULGAR FRACTION ONE SEVENTH..FRACTION NUMERATOR ONE +2189 ; ON # No VULGAR FRACTION ZERO THIRDS +218A..218B ; ON # So [2] TURNED DIGIT TWO..TURNED DIGIT THREE +2190..2194 ; ON # Sm [5] LEFTWARDS ARROW..LEFT RIGHT ARROW +2195..2199 ; ON # So [5] UP DOWN ARROW..SOUTH WEST ARROW +219A..219B ; ON # Sm [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH STROKE..RIGHTWARDS ARROW WITH STROKE +219C..219F ; ON # So [4] LEFTWARDS WAVE ARROW..UPWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW +21A0 ; ON # Sm RIGHTWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW +21A1..21A2 ; ON # So [2] DOWNWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW..LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH TAIL +21A3 ; ON # Sm RIGHTWARDS ARROW WITH TAIL +21A4..21A5 ; ON # So [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW FROM BAR..UPWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21A6 ; ON # Sm RIGHTWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21A7..21AD ; ON # So [7] DOWNWARDS ARROW FROM BAR..LEFT RIGHT WAVE ARROW +21AE ; ON # Sm LEFT RIGHT ARROW WITH STROKE +21AF..21CD ; ON # So [31] DOWNWARDS ZIGZAG ARROW..LEFTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE +21CE..21CF ; ON # Sm [2] LEFT RIGHT DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE..RIGHTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE +21D0..21D1 ; ON # So [2] LEFTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW..UPWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D2 ; ON # Sm RIGHTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D3 ; ON # So DOWNWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D4 ; ON # Sm LEFT RIGHT DOUBLE ARROW +21D5..21F3 ; ON # So [31] UP DOWN DOUBLE ARROW..UP DOWN WHITE ARROW +21F4..2211 ; ON # Sm [30] RIGHT ARROW WITH SMALL CIRCLE..N-ARY SUMMATION +2214..22FF ; ON # Sm [236] DOT PLUS..Z NOTATION BAG MEMBERSHIP +2300..2307 ; ON # So [8] DIAMETER SIGN..WAVY LINE +2308 ; ON # Ps LEFT CEILING +2309 ; ON # Pe RIGHT CEILING +230A ; ON # Ps LEFT FLOOR +230B ; ON # Pe RIGHT FLOOR +230C..231F ; ON # So [20] BOTTOM RIGHT CROP..BOTTOM RIGHT CORNER +2320..2321 ; ON # Sm [2] TOP HALF INTEGRAL..BOTTOM HALF INTEGRAL +2322..2328 ; ON # So [7] FROWN..KEYBOARD +2329 ; ON # Ps LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET +232A ; ON # Pe RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET +232B..2335 ; ON # So [11] ERASE TO THE LEFT..COUNTERSINK +237B ; ON # So NOT CHECK MARK +237C ; ON # Sm RIGHT ANGLE WITH DOWNWARDS ZIGZAG ARROW +237D..2394 ; ON # So [24] SHOULDERED OPEN BOX..SOFTWARE-FUNCTION SYMBOL +2396..239A ; ON # So [5] DECIMAL SEPARATOR KEY SYMBOL..CLEAR SCREEN SYMBOL +239B..23B3 ; ON # Sm [25] LEFT PARENTHESIS UPPER HOOK..SUMMATION BOTTOM +23B4..23DB ; ON # So [40] TOP SQUARE BRACKET..FUSE +23DC..23E1 ; ON # Sm [6] TOP PARENTHESIS..BOTTOM TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +23E2..2426 ; ON # So [69] WHITE TRAPEZIUM..SYMBOL FOR SUBSTITUTE FORM TWO +2440..244A ; ON # So [11] OCR HOOK..OCR DOUBLE BACKSLASH +2460..2487 ; ON # No [40] CIRCLED DIGIT ONE..PARENTHESIZED NUMBER TWENTY +24EA..24FF ; ON # No [22] CIRCLED DIGIT ZERO..NEGATIVE CIRCLED DIGIT ZERO +2500..25B6 ; ON # So [183] BOX DRAWINGS LIGHT HORIZONTAL..BLACK RIGHT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25B7 ; ON # Sm WHITE RIGHT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25B8..25C0 ; ON # So [9] BLACK RIGHT-POINTING SMALL TRIANGLE..BLACK LEFT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25C1 ; ON # Sm WHITE LEFT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25C2..25F7 ; ON # So [54] BLACK LEFT-POINTING SMALL TRIANGLE..WHITE CIRCLE WITH UPPER RIGHT QUADRANT +25F8..25FF ; ON # Sm [8] UPPER LEFT TRIANGLE..LOWER RIGHT TRIANGLE +2600..266E ; ON # So [111] BLACK SUN WITH RAYS..MUSIC NATURAL SIGN +266F ; ON # Sm MUSIC SHARP SIGN +2670..26AB ; ON # So [60] WEST SYRIAC CROSS..MEDIUM BLACK CIRCLE +26AD..2767 ; ON # So [187] MARRIAGE SYMBOL..ROTATED FLORAL HEART BULLET +2768 ; ON # Ps MEDIUM LEFT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +2769 ; ON # Pe MEDIUM RIGHT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276A ; ON # Ps MEDIUM FLATTENED LEFT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276B ; ON # Pe MEDIUM FLATTENED RIGHT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276C ; ON # Ps MEDIUM LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +276D ; ON # Pe MEDIUM RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +276E ; ON # Ps HEAVY LEFT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK ORNAMENT +276F ; ON # Pe HEAVY RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK ORNAMENT +2770 ; ON # Ps HEAVY LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +2771 ; ON # Pe HEAVY RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +2772 ; ON # Ps LIGHT LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET ORNAMENT +2773 ; ON # Pe LIGHT RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET ORNAMENT +2774 ; ON # Ps MEDIUM LEFT CURLY BRACKET ORNAMENT +2775 ; ON # Pe MEDIUM RIGHT CURLY BRACKET ORNAMENT +2776..2793 ; ON # No [30] DINGBAT NEGATIVE CIRCLED DIGIT ONE..DINGBAT NEGATIVE CIRCLED SANS-SERIF NUMBER TEN +2794..27BF ; ON # So [44] HEAVY WIDE-HEADED RIGHTWARDS ARROW..DOUBLE CURLY LOOP +27C0..27C4 ; ON # Sm [5] THREE DIMENSIONAL ANGLE..OPEN SUPERSET +27C5 ; ON # Ps LEFT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27C6 ; ON # Pe RIGHT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27C7..27E5 ; ON # Sm [31] OR WITH DOT INSIDE..WHITE SQUARE WITH RIGHTWARDS TICK +27E6 ; ON # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E7 ; ON # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E8 ; ON # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +27E9 ; ON # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +27EA ; ON # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EB ; ON # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EC ; ON # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27ED ; ON # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27EE ; ON # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +27EF ; ON # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +27F0..27FF ; ON # Sm [16] UPWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW..LONG RIGHTWARDS SQUIGGLE ARROW +2900..2982 ; ON # Sm [131] RIGHTWARDS TWO-HEADED ARROW WITH VERTICAL STROKE..Z NOTATION TYPE COLON +2983 ; ON # Ps LEFT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2984 ; ON # Pe RIGHT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2985 ; ON # Ps LEFT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2986 ; ON # Pe RIGHT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2987 ; ON # Ps Z NOTATION LEFT IMAGE BRACKET +2988 ; ON # Pe Z NOTATION RIGHT IMAGE BRACKET +2989 ; ON # Ps Z NOTATION LEFT BINDING BRACKET +298A ; ON # Pe Z NOTATION RIGHT BINDING BRACKET +298B ; ON # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298C ; ON # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298D ; ON # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +298E ; ON # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +298F ; ON # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +2990 ; ON # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +2991 ; ON # Ps LEFT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2992 ; ON # Pe RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2993 ; ON # Ps LEFT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2994 ; ON # Pe RIGHT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2995 ; ON # Ps DOUBLE LEFT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2996 ; ON # Pe DOUBLE RIGHT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2997 ; ON # Ps LEFT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +2998 ; ON # Pe RIGHT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +2999..29D7 ; ON # Sm [63] DOTTED FENCE..BLACK HOURGLASS +29D8 ; ON # Ps LEFT WIGGLY FENCE +29D9 ; ON # Pe RIGHT WIGGLY FENCE +29DA ; ON # Ps LEFT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29DB ; ON # Pe RIGHT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29DC..29FB ; ON # Sm [32] INCOMPLETE INFINITY..TRIPLE PLUS +29FC ; ON # Ps LEFT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +29FD ; ON # Pe RIGHT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +29FE..2AFF ; ON # Sm [258] TINY..N-ARY WHITE VERTICAL BAR +2B00..2B2F ; ON # So [48] NORTH EAST WHITE ARROW..WHITE VERTICAL ELLIPSE +2B30..2B44 ; ON # Sm [21] LEFT ARROW WITH SMALL CIRCLE..RIGHTWARDS ARROW THROUGH SUPERSET +2B45..2B46 ; ON # So [2] LEFTWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW..RIGHTWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW +2B47..2B4C ; ON # Sm [6] REVERSE TILDE OPERATOR ABOVE RIGHTWARDS ARROW..RIGHTWARDS ARROW ABOVE REVERSE TILDE OPERATOR +2B4D..2B73 ; ON # So [39] DOWNWARDS TRIANGLE-HEADED ZIGZAG ARROW..DOWNWARDS TRIANGLE-HEADED ARROW TO BAR +2B76..2B95 ; ON # So [32] NORTH WEST TRIANGLE-HEADED ARROW TO BAR..RIGHTWARDS BLACK ARROW +2B97..2BFF ; ON # So [105] SYMBOL FOR TYPE A ELECTRONICS..HELLSCHREIBER PAUSE SYMBOL +2CE5..2CEA ; ON # So [6] COPTIC SYMBOL MI RO..COPTIC SYMBOL SHIMA SIMA +2CF9..2CFC ; ON # Po [4] COPTIC OLD NUBIAN FULL STOP..COPTIC OLD NUBIAN VERSE DIVIDER +2CFD ; ON # No COPTIC FRACTION ONE HALF +2CFE..2CFF ; ON # Po [2] COPTIC FULL STOP..COPTIC MORPHOLOGICAL DIVIDER +2E00..2E01 ; ON # Po [2] RIGHT ANGLE SUBSTITUTION MARKER..RIGHT ANGLE DOTTED SUBSTITUTION MARKER +2E02 ; ON # Pi LEFT SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E03 ; ON # Pf RIGHT SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E04 ; ON # Pi LEFT DOTTED SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E05 ; ON # Pf RIGHT DOTTED SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E06..2E08 ; ON # Po [3] RAISED INTERPOLATION MARKER..DOTTED TRANSPOSITION MARKER +2E09 ; ON # Pi LEFT TRANSPOSITION BRACKET +2E0A ; ON # Pf RIGHT TRANSPOSITION BRACKET +2E0B ; ON # Po RAISED SQUARE +2E0C ; ON # Pi LEFT RAISED OMISSION BRACKET +2E0D ; ON # Pf RIGHT RAISED OMISSION BRACKET +2E0E..2E16 ; ON # Po [9] EDITORIAL CORONIS..DOTTED RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE +2E17 ; ON # Pd DOUBLE OBLIQUE HYPHEN +2E18..2E19 ; ON # Po [2] INVERTED INTERROBANG..PALM BRANCH +2E1A ; ON # Pd HYPHEN WITH DIAERESIS +2E1B ; ON # Po TILDE WITH RING ABOVE +2E1C ; ON # Pi LEFT LOW PARAPHRASE BRACKET +2E1D ; ON # Pf RIGHT LOW PARAPHRASE BRACKET +2E1E..2E1F ; ON # Po [2] TILDE WITH DOT ABOVE..TILDE WITH DOT BELOW +2E20 ; ON # Pi LEFT VERTICAL BAR WITH QUILL +2E21 ; ON # Pf RIGHT VERTICAL BAR WITH QUILL +2E22 ; ON # Ps TOP LEFT HALF BRACKET +2E23 ; ON # Pe TOP RIGHT HALF BRACKET +2E24 ; ON # Ps BOTTOM LEFT HALF BRACKET +2E25 ; ON # Pe BOTTOM RIGHT HALF BRACKET +2E26 ; ON # Ps LEFT SIDEWAYS U BRACKET +2E27 ; ON # Pe RIGHT SIDEWAYS U BRACKET +2E28 ; ON # Ps LEFT DOUBLE PARENTHESIS +2E29 ; ON # Pe RIGHT DOUBLE PARENTHESIS +2E2A..2E2E ; ON # Po [5] TWO DOTS OVER ONE DOT PUNCTUATION..REVERSED QUESTION MARK +2E2F ; ON # Lm VERTICAL TILDE +2E30..2E39 ; ON # Po [10] RING POINT..TOP HALF SECTION SIGN +2E3A..2E3B ; ON # Pd [2] TWO-EM DASH..THREE-EM DASH +2E3C..2E3F ; ON # Po [4] STENOGRAPHIC FULL STOP..CAPITULUM +2E40 ; ON # Pd DOUBLE HYPHEN +2E41 ; ON # Po REVERSED COMMA +2E42 ; ON # Ps DOUBLE LOW-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK +2E43..2E4F ; ON # Po [13] DASH WITH LEFT UPTURN..CORNISH VERSE DIVIDER +2E50..2E51 ; ON # So [2] CROSS PATTY WITH RIGHT CROSSBAR..CROSS PATTY WITH LEFT CROSSBAR +2E52..2E54 ; ON # Po [3] TIRONIAN SIGN CAPITAL ET..MEDIEVAL QUESTION MARK +2E55 ; ON # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH STROKE +2E56 ; ON # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH STROKE +2E57 ; ON # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH DOUBLE STROKE +2E58 ; ON # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH DOUBLE STROKE +2E59 ; ON # Ps TOP HALF LEFT PARENTHESIS +2E5A ; ON # Pe TOP HALF RIGHT PARENTHESIS +2E5B ; ON # Ps BOTTOM HALF LEFT PARENTHESIS +2E5C ; ON # Pe BOTTOM HALF RIGHT PARENTHESIS +2E5D ; ON # Pd OBLIQUE HYPHEN +2E80..2E99 ; ON # So [26] CJK RADICAL REPEAT..CJK RADICAL RAP +2E9B..2EF3 ; ON # So [89] CJK RADICAL CHOKE..CJK RADICAL C-SIMPLIFIED TURTLE +2F00..2FD5 ; ON # So [214] KANGXI RADICAL ONE..KANGXI RADICAL FLUTE +2FF0..2FFB ; ON # So [12] IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTER LEFT TO RIGHT..IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTER OVERLAID +3001..3003 ; ON # Po [3] IDEOGRAPHIC COMMA..DITTO MARK +3004 ; ON # So JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL STANDARD SYMBOL +3008 ; ON # Ps LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +3009 ; ON # Pe RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +300A ; ON # Ps LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +300B ; ON # Pe RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +300C ; ON # Ps LEFT CORNER BRACKET +300D ; ON # Pe RIGHT CORNER BRACKET +300E ; ON # Ps LEFT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +300F ; ON # Pe RIGHT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +3010 ; ON # Ps LEFT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +3011 ; ON # Pe RIGHT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +3012..3013 ; ON # So [2] POSTAL MARK..GETA MARK +3014 ; ON # Ps LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3015 ; ON # Pe RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3016 ; ON # Ps LEFT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +3017 ; ON # Pe RIGHT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +3018 ; ON # Ps LEFT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3019 ; ON # Pe RIGHT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +301A ; ON # Ps LEFT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +301B ; ON # Pe RIGHT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +301C ; ON # Pd WAVE DASH +301D ; ON # Ps REVERSED DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK +301E..301F ; ON # Pe [2] DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK..LOW DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK +3020 ; ON # So POSTAL MARK FACE +3030 ; ON # Pd WAVY DASH +3036..3037 ; ON # So [2] CIRCLED POSTAL MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC TELEGRAPH LINE FEED SEPARATOR SYMBOL +303D ; ON # Po PART ALTERNATION MARK +303E..303F ; ON # So [2] IDEOGRAPHIC VARIATION INDICATOR..IDEOGRAPHIC HALF FILL SPACE +309B..309C ; ON # Sk [2] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +30A0 ; ON # Pd KATAKANA-HIRAGANA DOUBLE HYPHEN +30FB ; ON # Po KATAKANA MIDDLE DOT +31C0..31E3 ; ON # So [36] CJK STROKE T..CJK STROKE Q +321D..321E ; ON # So [2] PARENTHESIZED KOREAN CHARACTER OJEON..PARENTHESIZED KOREAN CHARACTER O HU +3250 ; ON # So PARTNERSHIP SIGN +3251..325F ; ON # No [15] CIRCLED NUMBER TWENTY ONE..CIRCLED NUMBER THIRTY FIVE +327C..327E ; ON # So [3] CIRCLED KOREAN CHARACTER CHAMKO..CIRCLED HANGUL IEUNG U +32B1..32BF ; ON # No [15] CIRCLED NUMBER THIRTY SIX..CIRCLED NUMBER FIFTY +32CC..32CF ; ON # So [4] SQUARE HG..LIMITED LIABILITY SIGN +3377..337A ; ON # So [4] SQUARE DM..SQUARE IU +33DE..33DF ; ON # So [2] SQUARE V OVER M..SQUARE A OVER M +33FF ; ON # So SQUARE GAL +4DC0..4DFF ; ON # So [64] HEXAGRAM FOR THE CREATIVE HEAVEN..HEXAGRAM FOR BEFORE COMPLETION +A490..A4C6 ; ON # So [55] YI RADICAL QOT..YI RADICAL KE +A60D..A60F ; ON # Po [3] VAI COMMA..VAI QUESTION MARK +A673 ; ON # Po SLAVONIC ASTERISK +A67E ; ON # Po CYRILLIC KAVYKA +A67F ; ON # Lm CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A700..A716 ; ON # Sk [23] MODIFIER LETTER CHINESE TONE YIN PING..MODIFIER LETTER EXTRA-LOW LEFT-STEM TONE BAR +A717..A71F ; ON # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER DOT VERTICAL BAR..MODIFIER LETTER LOW INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +A720..A721 ; ON # Sk [2] MODIFIER LETTER STRESS AND HIGH TONE..MODIFIER LETTER STRESS AND LOW TONE +A788 ; ON # Lm MODIFIER LETTER LOW CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +A828..A82B ; ON # So [4] SYLOTI NAGRI POETRY MARK-1..SYLOTI NAGRI POETRY MARK-4 +A874..A877 ; ON # Po [4] PHAGS-PA SINGLE HEAD MARK..PHAGS-PA MARK DOUBLE SHAD +AB6A..AB6B ; ON # Sk [2] MODIFIER LETTER LEFT TACK..MODIFIER LETTER RIGHT TACK +FD3E ; ON # Pe ORNATE LEFT PARENTHESIS +FD3F ; ON # Ps ORNATE RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FD40..FD4F ; ON # So [16] ARABIC LIGATURE RAHIMAHU ALLAAH..ARABIC LIGATURE RAHIMAHUM ALLAAH +FDCF ; ON # So ARABIC LIGATURE SALAAMUHU ALAYNAA +FDFD..FDFF ; ON # So [3] ARABIC LIGATURE BISMILLAH AR-RAHMAN AR-RAHEEM..ARABIC LIGATURE AZZA WA JALL +FE10..FE16 ; ON # Po [7] PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL COMMA..PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL QUESTION MARK +FE17 ; ON # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +FE18 ; ON # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT WHITE LENTICULAR BRAKCET +FE19 ; ON # Po PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL HORIZONTAL ELLIPSIS +FE30 ; ON # Po PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL TWO DOT LEADER +FE31..FE32 ; ON # Pd [2] PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL EM DASH..PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL EN DASH +FE33..FE34 ; ON # Pc [2] PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LOW LINE..PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL WAVY LOW LINE +FE35 ; ON # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT PARENTHESIS +FE36 ; ON # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FE37 ; ON # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT CURLY BRACKET +FE38 ; ON # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +FE39 ; ON # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FE3A ; ON # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FE3B ; ON # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +FE3C ; ON # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +FE3D ; ON # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +FE3E ; ON # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +FE3F ; ON # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +FE40 ; ON # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +FE41 ; ON # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT CORNER BRACKET +FE42 ; ON # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT CORNER BRACKET +FE43 ; ON # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +FE44 ; ON # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +FE45..FE46 ; ON # Po [2] SESAME DOT..WHITE SESAME DOT +FE47 ; ON # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT SQUARE BRACKET +FE48 ; ON # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET +FE49..FE4C ; ON # Po [4] DASHED OVERLINE..DOUBLE WAVY OVERLINE +FE4D..FE4F ; ON # Pc [3] DASHED LOW LINE..WAVY LOW LINE +FE51 ; ON # Po SMALL IDEOGRAPHIC COMMA +FE54 ; ON # Po SMALL SEMICOLON +FE56..FE57 ; ON # Po [2] SMALL QUESTION MARK..SMALL EXCLAMATION MARK +FE58 ; ON # Pd SMALL EM DASH +FE59 ; ON # Ps SMALL LEFT PARENTHESIS +FE5A ; ON # Pe SMALL RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FE5B ; ON # Ps SMALL LEFT CURLY BRACKET +FE5C ; ON # Pe SMALL RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +FE5D ; ON # Ps SMALL LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FE5E ; ON # Pe SMALL RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FE60..FE61 ; ON # Po [2] SMALL AMPERSAND..SMALL ASTERISK +FE64..FE66 ; ON # Sm [3] SMALL LESS-THAN SIGN..SMALL EQUALS SIGN +FE68 ; ON # Po SMALL REVERSE SOLIDUS +FE6B ; ON # Po SMALL COMMERCIAL AT +FF01..FF02 ; ON # Po [2] FULLWIDTH EXCLAMATION MARK..FULLWIDTH QUOTATION MARK +FF06..FF07 ; ON # Po [2] FULLWIDTH AMPERSAND..FULLWIDTH APOSTROPHE +FF08 ; ON # Ps FULLWIDTH LEFT PARENTHESIS +FF09 ; ON # Pe FULLWIDTH RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FF0A ; ON # Po FULLWIDTH ASTERISK +FF1B ; ON # Po FULLWIDTH SEMICOLON +FF1C..FF1E ; ON # Sm [3] FULLWIDTH LESS-THAN SIGN..FULLWIDTH GREATER-THAN SIGN +FF1F..FF20 ; ON # Po [2] FULLWIDTH QUESTION MARK..FULLWIDTH COMMERCIAL AT +FF3B ; ON # Ps FULLWIDTH LEFT SQUARE BRACKET +FF3C ; ON # Po FULLWIDTH REVERSE SOLIDUS +FF3D ; ON # Pe FULLWIDTH RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET +FF3E ; ON # Sk FULLWIDTH CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +FF3F ; ON # Pc FULLWIDTH LOW LINE +FF40 ; ON # Sk FULLWIDTH GRAVE ACCENT +FF5B ; ON # Ps FULLWIDTH LEFT CURLY BRACKET +FF5C ; ON # Sm FULLWIDTH VERTICAL LINE +FF5D ; ON # Pe FULLWIDTH RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +FF5E ; ON # Sm FULLWIDTH TILDE +FF5F ; ON # Ps FULLWIDTH LEFT WHITE PARENTHESIS +FF60 ; ON # Pe FULLWIDTH RIGHT WHITE PARENTHESIS +FF61 ; ON # Po HALFWIDTH IDEOGRAPHIC FULL STOP +FF62 ; ON # Ps HALFWIDTH LEFT CORNER BRACKET +FF63 ; ON # Pe HALFWIDTH RIGHT CORNER BRACKET +FF64..FF65 ; ON # Po [2] HALFWIDTH IDEOGRAPHIC COMMA..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA MIDDLE DOT +FFE2 ; ON # Sm FULLWIDTH NOT SIGN +FFE3 ; ON # Sk FULLWIDTH MACRON +FFE4 ; ON # So FULLWIDTH BROKEN BAR +FFE8 ; ON # So HALFWIDTH FORMS LIGHT VERTICAL +FFE9..FFEC ; ON # Sm [4] HALFWIDTH LEFTWARDS ARROW..HALFWIDTH DOWNWARDS ARROW +FFED..FFEE ; ON # So [2] HALFWIDTH BLACK SQUARE..HALFWIDTH WHITE CIRCLE +FFF9..FFFB ; ON # Cf [3] INTERLINEAR ANNOTATION ANCHOR..INTERLINEAR ANNOTATION TERMINATOR +FFFC..FFFD ; ON # So [2] OBJECT REPLACEMENT CHARACTER..REPLACEMENT CHARACTER +10101 ; ON # Po AEGEAN WORD SEPARATOR DOT +10140..10174 ; ON # Nl [53] GREEK ACROPHONIC ATTIC ONE QUARTER..GREEK ACROPHONIC STRATIAN FIFTY MNAS +10175..10178 ; ON # No [4] GREEK ONE HALF SIGN..GREEK THREE QUARTERS SIGN +10179..10189 ; ON # So [17] GREEK YEAR SIGN..GREEK TRYBLION BASE SIGN +1018A..1018B ; ON # No [2] GREEK ZERO SIGN..GREEK ONE QUARTER SIGN +1018C ; ON # So GREEK SINUSOID SIGN +10190..1019C ; ON # So [13] ROMAN SEXTANS SIGN..ASCIA SYMBOL +101A0 ; ON # So GREEK SYMBOL TAU RHO +1091F ; ON # Po PHOENICIAN WORD SEPARATOR +10B39..10B3F ; ON # Po [7] AVESTAN ABBREVIATION MARK..LARGE ONE RING OVER TWO RINGS PUNCTUATION +11052..11065 ; ON # No [20] BRAHMI NUMBER ONE..BRAHMI NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +11660..1166C ; ON # Po [13] MONGOLIAN BIRGA WITH ORNAMENT..MONGOLIAN TURNED SWIRL BIRGA WITH DOUBLE ORNAMENT +11FD5..11FDC ; ON # So [8] TAMIL SIGN NEL..TAMIL SIGN MUKKURUNI +11FE1..11FF1 ; ON # So [17] TAMIL SIGN PAARAM..TAMIL SIGN VAKAIYARAA +16FE2 ; ON # Po OLD CHINESE HOOK MARK +1D1E9..1D1EA ; ON # So [2] MUSICAL SYMBOL SORI..MUSICAL SYMBOL KORON +1D200..1D241 ; ON # So [66] GREEK VOCAL NOTATION SYMBOL-1..GREEK INSTRUMENTAL NOTATION SYMBOL-54 +1D245 ; ON # So GREEK MUSICAL LEIMMA +1D300..1D356 ; ON # So [87] MONOGRAM FOR EARTH..TETRAGRAM FOR FOSTERING +1D6DB ; ON # Sm MATHEMATICAL BOLD PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D715 ; ON # Sm MATHEMATICAL ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D74F ; ON # Sm MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D789 ; ON # Sm MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D7C3 ; ON # Sm MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1EEF0..1EEF1 ; ON # Sm [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL OPERATOR MEEM WITH HAH WITH TATWEEL..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL OPERATOR HAH WITH DAL +1F000..1F02B ; ON # So [44] MAHJONG TILE EAST WIND..MAHJONG TILE BACK +1F030..1F093 ; ON # So [100] DOMINO TILE HORIZONTAL BACK..DOMINO TILE VERTICAL-06-06 +1F0A0..1F0AE ; ON # So [15] PLAYING CARD BACK..PLAYING CARD KING OF SPADES +1F0B1..1F0BF ; ON # So [15] PLAYING CARD ACE OF HEARTS..PLAYING CARD RED JOKER +1F0C1..1F0CF ; ON # So [15] PLAYING CARD ACE OF DIAMONDS..PLAYING CARD BLACK JOKER +1F0D1..1F0F5 ; ON # So [37] PLAYING CARD ACE OF CLUBS..PLAYING CARD TRUMP-21 +1F10B..1F10C ; ON # No [2] DINGBAT CIRCLED SANS-SERIF DIGIT ZERO..DINGBAT NEGATIVE CIRCLED SANS-SERIF DIGIT ZERO +1F10D..1F10F ; ON # So [3] CIRCLED ZERO WITH SLASH..CIRCLED DOLLAR SIGN WITH OVERLAID BACKSLASH +1F12F ; ON # So COPYLEFT SYMBOL +1F16A..1F16F ; ON # So [6] RAISED MC SIGN..CIRCLED HUMAN FIGURE +1F1AD ; ON # So MASK WORK SYMBOL +1F260..1F265 ; ON # So [6] ROUNDED SYMBOL FOR FU..ROUNDED SYMBOL FOR CAI +1F300..1F3FA ; ON # So [251] CYCLONE..AMPHORA +1F3FB..1F3FF ; ON # Sk [5] EMOJI MODIFIER FITZPATRICK TYPE-1-2..EMOJI MODIFIER FITZPATRICK TYPE-6 +1F400..1F6D7 ; ON # So [728] RAT..ELEVATOR +1F6DD..1F6EC ; ON # So [16] PLAYGROUND SLIDE..AIRPLANE ARRIVING +1F6F0..1F6FC ; ON # So [13] SATELLITE..ROLLER SKATE +1F700..1F773 ; ON # So [116] ALCHEMICAL SYMBOL FOR QUINTESSENCE..ALCHEMICAL SYMBOL FOR HALF OUNCE +1F780..1F7D8 ; ON # So [89] BLACK LEFT-POINTING ISOSCELES RIGHT TRIANGLE..NEGATIVE CIRCLED SQUARE +1F7E0..1F7EB ; ON # So [12] LARGE ORANGE CIRCLE..LARGE BROWN SQUARE +1F7F0 ; ON # So HEAVY EQUALS SIGN +1F800..1F80B ; ON # So [12] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH SMALL TRIANGLE ARROWHEAD..DOWNWARDS ARROW WITH LARGE TRIANGLE ARROWHEAD +1F810..1F847 ; ON # So [56] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH SMALL EQUILATERAL ARROWHEAD..DOWNWARDS HEAVY ARROW +1F850..1F859 ; ON # So [10] LEFTWARDS SANS-SERIF ARROW..UP DOWN SANS-SERIF ARROW +1F860..1F887 ; ON # So [40] WIDE-HEADED LEFTWARDS LIGHT BARB ARROW..WIDE-HEADED SOUTH WEST VERY HEAVY BARB ARROW +1F890..1F8AD ; ON # So [30] LEFTWARDS TRIANGLE ARROWHEAD..WHITE ARROW SHAFT WIDTH TWO THIRDS +1F8B0..1F8B1 ; ON # So [2] ARROW POINTING UPWARDS THEN NORTH WEST..ARROW POINTING RIGHTWARDS THEN CURVING SOUTH WEST +1F900..1FA53 ; ON # So [340] CIRCLED CROSS FORMEE WITH FOUR DOTS..BLACK CHESS KNIGHT-BISHOP +1FA60..1FA6D ; ON # So [14] XIANGQI RED GENERAL..XIANGQI BLACK SOLDIER +1FA70..1FA74 ; ON # So [5] BALLET SHOES..THONG SANDAL +1FA78..1FA7C ; ON # So [5] DROP OF BLOOD..CRUTCH +1FA80..1FA86 ; ON # So [7] YO-YO..NESTING DOLLS +1FA90..1FAAC ; ON # So [29] RINGED PLANET..HAMSA +1FAB0..1FABA ; ON # So [11] FLY..NEST WITH EGGS +1FAC0..1FAC5 ; ON # So [6] ANATOMICAL HEART..PERSON WITH CROWN +1FAD0..1FAD9 ; ON # So [10] BLUEBERRIES..JAR +1FAE0..1FAE7 ; ON # So [8] MELTING FACE..BUBBLES +1FAF0..1FAF6 ; ON # So [7] HAND WITH INDEX FINGER AND THUMB CROSSED..HEART HANDS +1FB00..1FB92 ; ON # So [147] BLOCK SEXTANT-1..UPPER HALF INVERSE MEDIUM SHADE AND LOWER HALF BLOCK +1FB94..1FBCA ; ON # So [55] LEFT HALF INVERSE MEDIUM SHADE AND RIGHT HALF BLOCK..WHITE UP-POINTING CHEVRON + +# Total code points: 6000 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Boundary_Neutral + +0000..0008 ; BN # Cc [9] .. +000E..001B ; BN # Cc [14] .. +007F..0084 ; BN # Cc [6] .. +0086..009F ; BN # Cc [26] .. +00AD ; BN # Cf SOFT HYPHEN +180E ; BN # Cf MONGOLIAN VOWEL SEPARATOR +200B..200D ; BN # Cf [3] ZERO WIDTH SPACE..ZERO WIDTH JOINER +2060..2064 ; BN # Cf [5] WORD JOINER..INVISIBLE PLUS +2065 ; BN # Cn +206A..206F ; BN # Cf [6] INHIBIT SYMMETRIC SWAPPING..NOMINAL DIGIT SHAPES +FDD0..FDEF ; BN # Cn [32] .. +FEFF ; BN # Cf ZERO WIDTH NO-BREAK SPACE +FFF0..FFF8 ; BN # Cn [9] .. +FFFE..FFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +1BCA0..1BCA3 ; BN # Cf [4] SHORTHAND FORMAT LETTER OVERLAP..SHORTHAND FORMAT UP STEP +1D173..1D17A ; BN # Cf [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL BEGIN BEAM..MUSICAL SYMBOL END PHRASE +1FFFE..1FFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +2FFFE..2FFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +3FFFE..3FFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +4FFFE..4FFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +5FFFE..5FFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +6FFFE..6FFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +7FFFE..7FFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +8FFFE..8FFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +9FFFE..9FFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +AFFFE..AFFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +BFFFE..BFFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +CFFFE..CFFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +DFFFE..E0000 ; BN # Cn [3] .. +E0001 ; BN # Cf LANGUAGE TAG +E0002..E001F ; BN # Cn [30] .. +E0020..E007F ; BN # Cf [96] TAG SPACE..CANCEL TAG +E0080..E00FF ; BN # Cn [128] .. +E01F0..E0FFF ; BN # Cn [3600] .. +EFFFE..EFFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +FFFFE..FFFFF ; BN # Cn [2] .. +10FFFE..10FFFF; BN # Cn [2] .. + +# Total code points: 4016 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Nonspacing_Mark + +0300..036F ; NSM # Mn [112] COMBINING GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER X +0483..0487 ; NSM # Mn [5] COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO..COMBINING CYRILLIC POKRYTIE +0488..0489 ; NSM # Me [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC HUNDRED THOUSANDS SIGN..COMBINING CYRILLIC MILLIONS SIGN +0591..05BD ; NSM # Mn [45] HEBREW ACCENT ETNAHTA..HEBREW POINT METEG +05BF ; NSM # Mn HEBREW POINT RAFE +05C1..05C2 ; NSM # Mn [2] HEBREW POINT SHIN DOT..HEBREW POINT SIN DOT +05C4..05C5 ; NSM # Mn [2] HEBREW MARK UPPER DOT..HEBREW MARK LOWER DOT +05C7 ; NSM # Mn HEBREW POINT QAMATS QATAN +0610..061A ; NSM # Mn [11] ARABIC SIGN SALLALLAHOU ALAYHE WASSALLAM..ARABIC SMALL KASRA +064B..065F ; NSM # Mn [21] ARABIC FATHATAN..ARABIC WAVY HAMZA BELOW +0670 ; NSM # Mn ARABIC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALEF +06D6..06DC ; NSM # Mn [7] ARABIC SMALL HIGH LIGATURE SAD WITH LAM WITH ALEF MAKSURA..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SEEN +06DF..06E4 ; NSM # Mn [6] ARABIC SMALL HIGH ROUNDED ZERO..ARABIC SMALL HIGH MADDA +06E7..06E8 ; NSM # Mn [2] ARABIC SMALL HIGH YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH NOON +06EA..06ED ; NSM # Mn [4] ARABIC EMPTY CENTRE LOW STOP..ARABIC SMALL LOW MEEM +0711 ; NSM # Mn SYRIAC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALAPH +0730..074A ; NSM # Mn [27] SYRIAC PTHAHA ABOVE..SYRIAC BARREKH +07A6..07B0 ; NSM # Mn [11] THAANA ABAFILI..THAANA SUKUN +07EB..07F3 ; NSM # Mn [9] NKO COMBINING SHORT HIGH TONE..NKO COMBINING DOUBLE DOT ABOVE +07FD ; NSM # Mn NKO DANTAYALAN +0816..0819 ; NSM # Mn [4] SAMARITAN MARK IN..SAMARITAN MARK DAGESH +081B..0823 ; NSM # Mn [9] SAMARITAN MARK EPENTHETIC YUT..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN A +0825..0827 ; NSM # Mn [3] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN SHORT A..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN U +0829..082D ; NSM # Mn [5] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN LONG I..SAMARITAN MARK NEQUDAA +0859..085B ; NSM # Mn [3] MANDAIC AFFRICATION MARK..MANDAIC GEMINATION MARK +0898..089F ; NSM # Mn [8] ARABIC SMALL HIGH WORD AL-JUZ..ARABIC HALF MADDA OVER MADDA +08CA..08E1 ; NSM # Mn [24] ARABIC SMALL HIGH FARSI YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SIGN SAFHA +08E3..0902 ; NSM # Mn [32] ARABIC TURNED DAMMA BELOW..DEVANAGARI SIGN ANUSVARA +093A ; NSM # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OE +093C ; NSM # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN NUKTA +0941..0948 ; NSM # Mn [8] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +094D ; NSM # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +0951..0957 ; NSM # Mn [7] DEVANAGARI STRESS SIGN UDATTA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN UUE +0962..0963 ; NSM # Mn [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0981 ; NSM # Mn BENGALI SIGN CANDRABINDU +09BC ; NSM # Mn BENGALI SIGN NUKTA +09C1..09C4 ; NSM # Mn [4] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN U..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +09CD ; NSM # Mn BENGALI SIGN VIRAMA +09E2..09E3 ; NSM # Mn [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +09FE ; NSM # Mn BENGALI SANDHI MARK +0A01..0A02 ; NSM # Mn [2] GURMUKHI SIGN ADAK BINDI..GURMUKHI SIGN BINDI +0A3C ; NSM # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN NUKTA +0A41..0A42 ; NSM # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN U..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN UU +0A47..0A48 ; NSM # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN EE..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AI +0A4B..0A4D ; NSM # Mn [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN OO..GURMUKHI SIGN VIRAMA +0A51 ; NSM # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN UDAAT +0A70..0A71 ; NSM # Mn [2] GURMUKHI TIPPI..GURMUKHI ADDAK +0A75 ; NSM # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN YAKASH +0A81..0A82 ; NSM # Mn [2] GUJARATI SIGN CANDRABINDU..GUJARATI SIGN ANUSVARA +0ABC ; NSM # Mn GUJARATI SIGN NUKTA +0AC1..0AC5 ; NSM # Mn [5] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN U..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA E +0AC7..0AC8 ; NSM # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN E..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AI +0ACD ; NSM # Mn GUJARATI SIGN VIRAMA +0AE2..0AE3 ; NSM # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0AFA..0AFF ; NSM # Mn [6] GUJARATI SIGN SUKUN..GUJARATI SIGN TWO-CIRCLE NUKTA ABOVE +0B01 ; NSM # Mn ORIYA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0B3C ; NSM # Mn ORIYA SIGN NUKTA +0B3F ; NSM # Mn ORIYA VOWEL SIGN I +0B41..0B44 ; NSM # Mn [4] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN U..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0B4D ; NSM # Mn ORIYA SIGN VIRAMA +0B55..0B56 ; NSM # Mn [2] ORIYA SIGN OVERLINE..ORIYA AI LENGTH MARK +0B62..0B63 ; NSM # Mn [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0B82 ; NSM # Mn TAMIL SIGN ANUSVARA +0BC0 ; NSM # Mn TAMIL VOWEL SIGN II +0BCD ; NSM # Mn TAMIL SIGN VIRAMA +0C00 ; NSM # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING CANDRABINDU ABOVE +0C04 ; NSM # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE +0C3C ; NSM # Mn TELUGU SIGN NUKTA +0C3E..0C40 ; NSM # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AA..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN II +0C46..0C48 ; NSM # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN E..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AI +0C4A..0C4D ; NSM # Mn [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN O..TELUGU SIGN VIRAMA +0C55..0C56 ; NSM # Mn [2] TELUGU LENGTH MARK..TELUGU AI LENGTH MARK +0C62..0C63 ; NSM # Mn [2] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0C81 ; NSM # Mn KANNADA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0CBC ; NSM # Mn KANNADA SIGN NUKTA +0CCC..0CCD ; NSM # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AU..KANNADA SIGN VIRAMA +0CE2..0CE3 ; NSM # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D00..0D01 ; NSM # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..MALAYALAM SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D3B..0D3C ; NSM # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN VERTICAL BAR VIRAMA..MALAYALAM SIGN CIRCULAR VIRAMA +0D41..0D44 ; NSM # Mn [4] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN U..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0D4D ; NSM # Mn MALAYALAM SIGN VIRAMA +0D62..0D63 ; NSM # Mn [2] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D81 ; NSM # Mn SINHALA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0DCA ; NSM # Mn SINHALA SIGN AL-LAKUNA +0DD2..0DD4 ; NSM # Mn [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI IS-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI PAA-PILLA +0DD6 ; NSM # Mn SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA PAA-PILLA +0E31 ; NSM # Mn THAI CHARACTER MAI HAN-AKAT +0E34..0E3A ; NSM # Mn [7] THAI CHARACTER SARA I..THAI CHARACTER PHINTHU +0E47..0E4E ; NSM # Mn [8] THAI CHARACTER MAITAIKHU..THAI CHARACTER YAMAKKAN +0EB1 ; NSM # Mn LAO VOWEL SIGN MAI KAN +0EB4..0EBC ; NSM # Mn [9] LAO VOWEL SIGN I..LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN LO +0EC8..0ECD ; NSM # Mn [6] LAO TONE MAI EK..LAO NIGGAHITA +0F18..0F19 ; NSM # Mn [2] TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN -KHYUD PA..TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN SDONG TSHUGS +0F35 ; NSM # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG NYI ZLA +0F37 ; NSM # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG SGOR RTAGS +0F39 ; NSM # Mn TIBETAN MARK TSA -PHRU +0F71..0F7E ; NSM # Mn [14] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN AA..TIBETAN SIGN RJES SU NGA RO +0F80..0F84 ; NSM # Mn [5] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN REVERSED I..TIBETAN MARK HALANTA +0F86..0F87 ; NSM # Mn [2] TIBETAN SIGN LCI RTAGS..TIBETAN SIGN YANG RTAGS +0F8D..0F97 ; NSM # Mn [11] TIBETAN SUBJOINED SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER JA +0F99..0FBC ; NSM # Mn [36] TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER NYA..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER FIXED-FORM RA +0FC6 ; NSM # Mn TIBETAN SYMBOL PADMA GDAN +102D..1030 ; NSM # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN UU +1032..1037 ; NSM # Mn [6] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AI..MYANMAR SIGN DOT BELOW +1039..103A ; NSM # Mn [2] MYANMAR SIGN VIRAMA..MYANMAR SIGN ASAT +103D..103E ; NSM # Mn [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL WA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL HA +1058..1059 ; NSM # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +105E..1060 ; NSM # Mn [3] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL NA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL LA +1071..1074 ; NSM # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN GEBA KAREN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN KAYAH EE +1082 ; NSM # Mn MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN SHAN MEDIAL WA +1085..1086 ; NSM # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E ABOVE..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN FINAL Y +108D ; NSM # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL EMPHATIC TONE +109D ; NSM # Mn MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON AI +135D..135F ; NSM # Mn [3] ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION AND VOWEL LENGTH MARK..ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION MARK +1712..1714 ; NSM # Mn [3] TAGALOG VOWEL SIGN I..TAGALOG SIGN VIRAMA +1732..1733 ; NSM # Mn [2] HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN I..HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN U +1752..1753 ; NSM # Mn [2] BUHID VOWEL SIGN I..BUHID VOWEL SIGN U +1772..1773 ; NSM # Mn [2] TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN I..TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN U +17B4..17B5 ; NSM # Mn [2] KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AQ..KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AA +17B7..17BD ; NSM # Mn [7] KHMER VOWEL SIGN I..KHMER VOWEL SIGN UA +17C6 ; NSM # Mn KHMER SIGN NIKAHIT +17C9..17D3 ; NSM # Mn [11] KHMER SIGN MUUSIKATOAN..KHMER SIGN BATHAMASAT +17DD ; NSM # Mn KHMER SIGN ATTHACAN +180B..180D ; NSM # Mn [3] MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR ONE..MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR THREE +180F ; NSM # Mn MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR FOUR +1885..1886 ; NSM # Mn [2] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI BALUDA..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI THREE BALUDA +18A9 ; NSM # Mn MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI DAGALGA +1920..1922 ; NSM # Mn [3] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN A..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN U +1927..1928 ; NSM # Mn [2] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN E..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN O +1932 ; NSM # Mn LIMBU SMALL LETTER ANUSVARA +1939..193B ; NSM # Mn [3] LIMBU SIGN MUKPHRENG..LIMBU SIGN SA-I +1A17..1A18 ; NSM # Mn [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN I..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN U +1A1B ; NSM # Mn BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN AE +1A56 ; NSM # Mn TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA +1A58..1A5E ; NSM # Mn [7] TAI THAM SIGN MAI KANG LAI..TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN SA +1A60 ; NSM # Mn TAI THAM SIGN SAKOT +1A62 ; NSM # Mn TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN MAI SAT +1A65..1A6C ; NSM # Mn [8] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN I..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA BELOW +1A73..1A7C ; NSM # Mn [10] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA ABOVE..TAI THAM SIGN KHUEN-LUE KARAN +1A7F ; NSM # Mn TAI THAM COMBINING CRYPTOGRAMMIC DOT +1AB0..1ABD ; NSM # Mn [14] COMBINING DOUBLED CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..COMBINING PARENTHESES BELOW +1ABE ; NSM # Me COMBINING PARENTHESES OVERLAY +1ABF..1ACE ; NSM # Mn [16] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER W BELOW..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +1B00..1B03 ; NSM # Mn [4] BALINESE SIGN ULU RICEM..BALINESE SIGN SURANG +1B34 ; NSM # Mn BALINESE SIGN REREKAN +1B36..1B3A ; NSM # Mn [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN ULU..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA +1B3C ; NSM # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA +1B42 ; NSM # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET +1B6B..1B73 ; NSM # Mn [9] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TEGEH..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING GONG +1B80..1B81 ; NSM # Mn [2] SUNDANESE SIGN PANYECEK..SUNDANESE SIGN PANGLAYAR +1BA2..1BA5 ; NSM # Mn [4] SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PANYAKRA..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANYUKU +1BA8..1BA9 ; NSM # Mn [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PAMEPET..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANEULEUNG +1BAB..1BAD ; NSM # Mn [3] SUNDANESE SIGN VIRAMA..SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PASANGAN WA +1BE6 ; NSM # Mn BATAK SIGN TOMPI +1BE8..1BE9 ; NSM # Mn [2] BATAK VOWEL SIGN PAKPAK E..BATAK VOWEL SIGN EE +1BED ; NSM # Mn BATAK VOWEL SIGN KARO O +1BEF..1BF1 ; NSM # Mn [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN U FOR SIMALUNGUN SA..BATAK CONSONANT SIGN H +1C2C..1C33 ; NSM # Mn [8] LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN E..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN T +1C36..1C37 ; NSM # Mn [2] LEPCHA SIGN RAN..LEPCHA SIGN NUKTA +1CD0..1CD2 ; NSM # Mn [3] VEDIC TONE KARSHANA..VEDIC TONE PRENKHA +1CD4..1CE0 ; NSM # Mn [13] VEDIC SIGN YAJURVEDIC MIDLINE SVARITA..VEDIC TONE RIGVEDIC KASHMIRI INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE2..1CE8 ; NSM # Mn [7] VEDIC SIGN VISARGA SVARITA..VEDIC SIGN VISARGA ANUDATTA WITH TAIL +1CED ; NSM # Mn VEDIC SIGN TIRYAK +1CF4 ; NSM # Mn VEDIC TONE CANDRA ABOVE +1CF8..1CF9 ; NSM # Mn [2] VEDIC TONE RING ABOVE..VEDIC TONE DOUBLE RING ABOVE +1DC0..1DFF ; NSM # Mn [64] COMBINING DOTTED GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING RIGHT ARROWHEAD AND DOWN ARROWHEAD BELOW +20D0..20DC ; NSM # Mn [13] COMBINING LEFT HARPOON ABOVE..COMBINING FOUR DOTS ABOVE +20DD..20E0 ; NSM # Me [4] COMBINING ENCLOSING CIRCLE..COMBINING ENCLOSING CIRCLE BACKSLASH +20E1 ; NSM # Mn COMBINING LEFT RIGHT ARROW ABOVE +20E2..20E4 ; NSM # Me [3] COMBINING ENCLOSING SCREEN..COMBINING ENCLOSING UPWARD POINTING TRIANGLE +20E5..20F0 ; NSM # Mn [12] COMBINING REVERSE SOLIDUS OVERLAY..COMBINING ASTERISK ABOVE +2CEF..2CF1 ; NSM # Mn [3] COPTIC COMBINING NI ABOVE..COPTIC COMBINING SPIRITUS LENIS +2D7F ; NSM # Mn TIFINAGH CONSONANT JOINER +2DE0..2DFF ; NSM # Mn [32] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER BE..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +302A..302D ; NSM # Mn [4] IDEOGRAPHIC LEVEL TONE MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ENTERING TONE MARK +3099..309A ; NSM # Mn [2] COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +A66F ; NSM # Mn COMBINING CYRILLIC VZMET +A670..A672 ; NSM # Me [3] COMBINING CYRILLIC TEN MILLIONS SIGN..COMBINING CYRILLIC THOUSAND MILLIONS SIGN +A674..A67D ; NSM # Mn [10] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER UKRAINIAN IE..COMBINING CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A69E..A69F ; NSM # Mn [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER EF..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED E +A6F0..A6F1 ; NSM # Mn [2] BAMUM COMBINING MARK KOQNDON..BAMUM COMBINING MARK TUKWENTIS +A802 ; NSM # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN DVISVARA +A806 ; NSM # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN HASANTA +A80B ; NSM # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ANUSVARA +A825..A826 ; NSM # Mn [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN U..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN E +A82C ; NSM # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ALTERNATE HASANTA +A8C4..A8C5 ; NSM # Mn [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN VIRAMA..SAURASHTRA SIGN CANDRABINDU +A8E0..A8F1 ; NSM # Mn [18] COMBINING DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +A8FF ; NSM # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AY +A926..A92D ; NSM # Mn [8] KAYAH LI VOWEL UE..KAYAH LI TONE CALYA PLOPHU +A947..A951 ; NSM # Mn [11] REJANG VOWEL SIGN I..REJANG CONSONANT SIGN R +A980..A982 ; NSM # Mn [3] JAVANESE SIGN PANYANGGA..JAVANESE SIGN LAYAR +A9B3 ; NSM # Mn JAVANESE SIGN CECAK TELU +A9B6..A9B9 ; NSM # Mn [4] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN WULU..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN SUKU MENDUT +A9BC..A9BD ; NSM # Mn [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET..JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN KERET +A9E5 ; NSM # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN SAW +AA29..AA2E ; NSM # Mn [6] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAM VOWEL SIGN OE +AA31..AA32 ; NSM # Mn [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AU..CHAM VOWEL SIGN UE +AA35..AA36 ; NSM # Mn [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN LA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN WA +AA43 ; NSM # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL NG +AA4C ; NSM # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL M +AA7C ; NSM # Mn MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-2 +AAB0 ; NSM # Mn TAI VIET MAI KANG +AAB2..AAB4 ; NSM # Mn [3] TAI VIET VOWEL I..TAI VIET VOWEL U +AAB7..AAB8 ; NSM # Mn [2] TAI VIET MAI KHIT..TAI VIET VOWEL IA +AABE..AABF ; NSM # Mn [2] TAI VIET VOWEL AM..TAI VIET TONE MAI EK +AAC1 ; NSM # Mn TAI VIET TONE MAI THO +AAEC..AAED ; NSM # Mn [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAI +AAF6 ; NSM # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VIRAMA +ABE5 ; NSM # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ANAP +ABE8 ; NSM # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UNAP +ABED ; NSM # Mn MEETEI MAYEK APUN IYEK +FB1E ; NSM # Mn HEBREW POINT JUDEO-SPANISH VARIKA +FE00..FE0F ; NSM # Mn [16] VARIATION SELECTOR-1..VARIATION SELECTOR-16 +FE20..FE2F ; NSM # Mn [16] COMBINING LIGATURE LEFT HALF..COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO RIGHT HALF +101FD ; NSM # Mn PHAISTOS DISC SIGN COMBINING OBLIQUE STROKE +102E0 ; NSM # Mn COPTIC EPACT THOUSANDS MARK +10376..1037A ; NSM # Mn [5] COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER SII +10A01..10A03 ; NSM # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN I..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +10A05..10A06 ; NSM # Mn [2] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN E..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN O +10A0C..10A0F ; NSM # Mn [4] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL LENGTH MARK..KHAROSHTHI SIGN VISARGA +10A38..10A3A ; NSM # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI SIGN BAR ABOVE..KHAROSHTHI SIGN DOT BELOW +10A3F ; NSM # Mn KHAROSHTHI VIRAMA +10AE5..10AE6 ; NSM # Mn [2] MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK ABOVE..MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK BELOW +10D24..10D27 ; NSM # Mn [4] HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN HARBAHAY..HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN TASSI +10EAB..10EAC ; NSM # Mn [2] YEZIDI COMBINING HAMZA MARK..YEZIDI COMBINING MADDA MARK +10F46..10F50 ; NSM # Mn [11] SOGDIAN COMBINING DOT BELOW..SOGDIAN COMBINING STROKE BELOW +10F82..10F85 ; NSM # Mn [4] OLD UYGHUR COMBINING DOT ABOVE..OLD UYGHUR COMBINING TWO DOTS BELOW +11001 ; NSM # Mn BRAHMI SIGN ANUSVARA +11038..11046 ; NSM # Mn [15] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN AA..BRAHMI VIRAMA +11070 ; NSM # Mn BRAHMI SIGN OLD TAMIL VIRAMA +11073..11074 ; NSM # Mn [2] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT O +1107F..11081 ; NSM # Mn [3] BRAHMI NUMBER JOINER..KAITHI SIGN ANUSVARA +110B3..110B6 ; NSM # Mn [4] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN U..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AI +110B9..110BA ; NSM # Mn [2] KAITHI SIGN VIRAMA..KAITHI SIGN NUKTA +110C2 ; NSM # Mn KAITHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11100..11102 ; NSM # Mn [3] CHAKMA SIGN CANDRABINDU..CHAKMA SIGN VISARGA +11127..1112B ; NSM # Mn [5] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN A..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN UU +1112D..11134 ; NSM # Mn [8] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AI..CHAKMA MAAYYAA +11173 ; NSM # Mn MAHAJANI SIGN NUKTA +11180..11181 ; NSM # Mn [2] SHARADA SIGN CANDRABINDU..SHARADA SIGN ANUSVARA +111B6..111BE ; NSM # Mn [9] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN U..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN O +111C9..111CC ; NSM # Mn [4] SHARADA SANDHI MARK..SHARADA EXTRA SHORT VOWEL MARK +111CF ; NSM # Mn SHARADA SIGN INVERTED CANDRABINDU +1122F..11231 ; NSM # Mn [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN U..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AI +11234 ; NSM # Mn KHOJKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11236..11237 ; NSM # Mn [2] KHOJKI SIGN NUKTA..KHOJKI SIGN SHADDA +1123E ; NSM # Mn KHOJKI SIGN SUKUN +112DF ; NSM # Mn KHUDAWADI SIGN ANUSVARA +112E3..112EA ; NSM # Mn [8] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN U..KHUDAWADI SIGN VIRAMA +11300..11301 ; NSM # Mn [2] GRANTHA SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..GRANTHA SIGN CANDRABINDU +1133B..1133C ; NSM # Mn [2] COMBINING BINDU BELOW..GRANTHA SIGN NUKTA +11340 ; NSM # Mn GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN II +11366..1136C ; NSM # Mn [7] COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT SIX +11370..11374 ; NSM # Mn [5] COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER A..COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER PA +11438..1143F ; NSM # Mn [8] NEWA VOWEL SIGN U..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AI +11442..11444 ; NSM # Mn [3] NEWA SIGN VIRAMA..NEWA SIGN ANUSVARA +11446 ; NSM # Mn NEWA SIGN NUKTA +1145E ; NSM # Mn NEWA SANDHI MARK +114B3..114B8 ; NSM # Mn [6] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN U..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +114BA ; NSM # Mn TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN SHORT E +114BF..114C0 ; NSM # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN CANDRABINDU..TIRHUTA SIGN ANUSVARA +114C2..114C3 ; NSM # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN VIRAMA..TIRHUTA SIGN NUKTA +115B2..115B5 ; NSM # Mn [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +115BC..115BD ; NSM # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN CANDRABINDU..SIDDHAM SIGN ANUSVARA +115BF..115C0 ; NSM # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN VIRAMA..SIDDHAM SIGN NUKTA +115DC..115DD ; NSM # Mn [2] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE UU +11633..1163A ; NSM # Mn [8] MODI VOWEL SIGN U..MODI VOWEL SIGN AI +1163D ; NSM # Mn MODI SIGN ANUSVARA +1163F..11640 ; NSM # Mn [2] MODI SIGN VIRAMA..MODI SIGN ARDHACANDRA +116AB ; NSM # Mn TAKRI SIGN ANUSVARA +116AD ; NSM # Mn TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AA +116B0..116B5 ; NSM # Mn [6] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN U..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AU +116B7 ; NSM # Mn TAKRI SIGN NUKTA +1171D..1171F ; NSM # Mn [3] AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA..AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LIGATING RA +11722..11725 ; NSM # Mn [4] AHOM VOWEL SIGN I..AHOM VOWEL SIGN UU +11727..1172B ; NSM # Mn [5] AHOM VOWEL SIGN AW..AHOM SIGN KILLER +1182F..11837 ; NSM # Mn [9] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN U..DOGRA SIGN ANUSVARA +11839..1183A ; NSM # Mn [2] DOGRA SIGN VIRAMA..DOGRA SIGN NUKTA +1193B..1193C ; NSM # Mn [2] DIVES AKURU SIGN ANUSVARA..DIVES AKURU SIGN CANDRABINDU +1193E ; NSM # Mn DIVES AKURU VIRAMA +11943 ; NSM # Mn DIVES AKURU SIGN NUKTA +119D4..119D7 ; NSM # Mn [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +119DA..119DB ; NSM # Mn [2] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN E..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +119E0 ; NSM # Mn NANDINAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +11A01..11A06 ; NSM # Mn [6] ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN I..ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN O +11A09..11A0A ; NSM # Mn [2] ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN REVERSED I..ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A33..11A38 ; NSM # Mn [6] ZANABAZAR SQUARE FINAL CONSONANT MARK..ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN ANUSVARA +11A3B..11A3E ; NSM # Mn [4] ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER YA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER VA +11A47 ; NSM # Mn ZANABAZAR SQUARE SUBJOINER +11A51..11A56 ; NSM # Mn [6] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN I..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN OE +11A59..11A5B ; NSM # Mn [3] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..SOYOMBO VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A8A..11A96 ; NSM # Mn [13] SOYOMBO FINAL CONSONANT SIGN G..SOYOMBO SIGN ANUSVARA +11A98..11A99 ; NSM # Mn [2] SOYOMBO GEMINATION MARK..SOYOMBO SUBJOINER +11C30..11C36 ; NSM # Mn [7] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN I..BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L +11C38..11C3D ; NSM # Mn [6] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN E..BHAIKSUKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11C92..11CA7 ; NSM # Mn [22] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER KA..MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER ZA +11CAA..11CB0 ; NSM # Mn [7] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER RA..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN AA +11CB2..11CB3 ; NSM # Mn [2] MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN U..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN E +11CB5..11CB6 ; NSM # Mn [2] MARCHEN SIGN ANUSVARA..MARCHEN SIGN CANDRABINDU +11D31..11D36 ; NSM # Mn [6] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11D3A ; NSM # Mn MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN E +11D3C..11D3D ; NSM # Mn [2] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN O +11D3F..11D45 ; NSM # Mn [7] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU..MASARAM GONDI VIRAMA +11D47 ; NSM # Mn MASARAM GONDI RA-KARA +11D90..11D91 ; NSM # Mn [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN EE..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI +11D95 ; NSM # Mn GUNJALA GONDI SIGN ANUSVARA +11D97 ; NSM # Mn GUNJALA GONDI VIRAMA +11EF3..11EF4 ; NSM # Mn [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN I..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN U +16AF0..16AF4 ; NSM # Mn [5] BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH TONE..BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH-LOW TONE +16B30..16B36 ; NSM # Mn [7] PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TUB..PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TAUM +16F4F ; NSM # Mn MIAO SIGN CONSONANT MODIFIER BAR +16F8F..16F92 ; NSM # Mn [4] MIAO TONE RIGHT..MIAO TONE BELOW +16FE4 ; NSM # Mn KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT FILLER +1BC9D..1BC9E ; NSM # Mn [2] DUPLOYAN THICK LETTER SELECTOR..DUPLOYAN DOUBLE MARK +1CF00..1CF2D ; NSM # Mn [46] ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK GORAZDO NIZKO S KRYZHEM ON LEFT..ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK KRYZH ON LEFT +1CF30..1CF46 ; NSM # Mn [23] ZNAMENNY COMBINING TONAL RANGE MARK MRACHNO..ZNAMENNY PRIZNAK MODIFIER ROG +1D167..1D169 ; NSM # Mn [3] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-3 +1D17B..1D182 ; NSM # Mn [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING ACCENT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING LOURE +1D185..1D18B ; NSM # Mn [7] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOIT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TRIPLE TONGUE +1D1AA..1D1AD ; NSM # Mn [4] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOWN BOW..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SNAP PIZZICATO +1D242..1D244 ; NSM # Mn [3] COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL TRISEME..COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL PENTASEME +1DA00..1DA36 ; NSM # Mn [55] SIGNWRITING HEAD RIM..SIGNWRITING AIR SUCKING IN +1DA3B..1DA6C ; NSM # Mn [50] SIGNWRITING MOUTH CLOSED NEUTRAL..SIGNWRITING EXCITEMENT +1DA75 ; NSM # Mn SIGNWRITING UPPER BODY TILTING FROM HIP JOINTS +1DA84 ; NSM # Mn SIGNWRITING LOCATION HEAD NECK +1DA9B..1DA9F ; NSM # Mn [5] SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-6 +1DAA1..1DAAF ; NSM # Mn [15] SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-16 +1E000..1E006 ; NSM # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER AZU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZHIVETE +1E008..1E018 ; NSM # Mn [17] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZEMLJA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER HERU +1E01B..1E021 ; NSM # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SHTA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YATI +1E023..1E024 ; NSM # Mn [2] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SMALL YUS +1E026..1E02A ; NSM # Mn [5] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YO..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER FITA +1E130..1E136 ; NSM # Mn [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-B..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-D +1E2AE ; NSM # Mn TOTO SIGN RISING TONE +1E2EC..1E2EF ; NSM # Mn [4] WANCHO TONE TUP..WANCHO TONE KOINI +1E8D0..1E8D6 ; NSM # Mn [7] MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER TEENS..MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER MILLIONS +1E944..1E94A ; NSM # Mn [7] ADLAM ALIF LENGTHENER..ADLAM NUKTA +E0100..E01EF ; NSM # Mn [240] VARIATION SELECTOR-17..VARIATION SELECTOR-256 + +# Total code points: 1958 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Arabic_Letter + +0608 ; AL # Sm ARABIC RAY +060B ; AL # Sc AFGHANI SIGN +060D ; AL # Po ARABIC DATE SEPARATOR +061B ; AL # Po ARABIC SEMICOLON +061C ; AL # Cf ARABIC LETTER MARK +061D..061F ; AL # Po [3] ARABIC END OF TEXT MARK..ARABIC QUESTION MARK +0620..063F ; AL # Lo [32] ARABIC LETTER KASHMIRI YEH..ARABIC LETTER FARSI YEH WITH THREE DOTS ABOVE +0640 ; AL # Lm ARABIC TATWEEL +0641..064A ; AL # Lo [10] ARABIC LETTER FEH..ARABIC LETTER YEH +066D ; AL # Po ARABIC FIVE POINTED STAR +066E..066F ; AL # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS BEH..ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS QAF +0671..06D3 ; AL # Lo [99] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WASLA..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE +06D4 ; AL # Po ARABIC FULL STOP +06D5 ; AL # Lo ARABIC LETTER AE +06E5..06E6 ; AL # Lm [2] ARABIC SMALL WAW..ARABIC SMALL YEH +06EE..06EF ; AL # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DAL WITH INVERTED V..ARABIC LETTER REH WITH INVERTED V +06FA..06FC ; AL # Lo [3] ARABIC LETTER SHEEN WITH DOT BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GHAIN WITH DOT BELOW +06FD..06FE ; AL # So [2] ARABIC SIGN SINDHI AMPERSAND..ARABIC SIGN SINDHI POSTPOSITION MEN +06FF ; AL # Lo ARABIC LETTER HEH WITH INVERTED V +0700..070D ; AL # Po [14] SYRIAC END OF PARAGRAPH..SYRIAC HARKLEAN ASTERISCUS +070E ; AL # Cn +070F ; AL # Cf SYRIAC ABBREVIATION MARK +0710 ; AL # Lo SYRIAC LETTER ALAPH +0712..072F ; AL # Lo [30] SYRIAC LETTER BETH..SYRIAC LETTER PERSIAN DHALATH +074B..074C ; AL # Cn [2] .. +074D..07A5 ; AL # Lo [89] SYRIAC LETTER SOGDIAN ZHAIN..THAANA LETTER WAAVU +07B1 ; AL # Lo THAANA LETTER NAA +07B2..07BF ; AL # Cn [14] .. +0860..086A ; AL # Lo [11] SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM NGA..SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM SSA +086B..086F ; AL # Cn [5] .. +0870..0887 ; AL # Lo [24] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WITH ATTACHED FATHA..ARABIC BASELINE ROUND DOT +0888 ; AL # Sk ARABIC RAISED ROUND DOT +0889..088E ; AL # Lo [6] ARABIC LETTER NOON WITH INVERTED SMALL V..ARABIC VERTICAL TAIL +088F ; AL # Cn +0892..0897 ; AL # Cn [6] .. +08A0..08C8 ; AL # Lo [41] ARABIC LETTER BEH WITH SMALL V BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GRAF +08C9 ; AL # Lm ARABIC SMALL FARSI YEH +FB50..FBB1 ; AL # Lo [98] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WASLA ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE FINAL FORM +FBB2..FBC2 ; AL # Sk [17] ARABIC SYMBOL DOT ABOVE..ARABIC SYMBOL WASLA ABOVE +FBC3..FBD2 ; AL # Cn [16] .. +FBD3..FD3D ; AL # Lo [363] ARABIC LETTER NG ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE ALEF WITH FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM +FD50..FD8F ; AL # Lo [64] ARABIC LIGATURE TEH WITH JEEM WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH KHAH WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM +FD90..FD91 ; AL # Cn [2] .. +FD92..FDC7 ; AL # Lo [54] ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH JEEM WITH KHAH INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE NOON WITH JEEM WITH YEH FINAL FORM +FDC8..FDCE ; AL # Cn [7] .. +FDF0..FDFB ; AL # Lo [12] ARABIC LIGATURE SALLA USED AS KORANIC STOP SIGN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE JALLAJALALOUHOU +FDFC ; AL # Sc RIAL SIGN +FE70..FE74 ; AL # Lo [5] ARABIC FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC KASRATAN ISOLATED FORM +FE75 ; AL # Cn +FE76..FEFC ; AL # Lo [135] ARABIC FATHA ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE LAM WITH ALEF FINAL FORM +FEFD..FEFE ; AL # Cn [2] .. +10D00..10D23 ; AL # Lo [36] HANIFI ROHINGYA LETTER A..HANIFI ROHINGYA MARK NA KHONNA +10D28..10D2F ; AL # Cn [8] .. +10D3A..10D3F ; AL # Cn [6] .. +10F30..10F45 ; AL # Lo [22] SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..SOGDIAN INDEPENDENT SHIN +10F51..10F54 ; AL # No [4] SOGDIAN NUMBER ONE..SOGDIAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10F55..10F59 ; AL # Po [5] SOGDIAN PUNCTUATION TWO VERTICAL BARS..SOGDIAN PUNCTUATION HALF CIRCLE WITH DOT +10F5A..10F6F ; AL # Cn [22] .. +1EC70 ; AL # Cn +1EC71..1ECAB ; AL # No [59] INDIC SIYAQ NUMBER ONE..INDIC SIYAQ NUMBER PREFIXED NINE +1ECAC ; AL # So INDIC SIYAQ PLACEHOLDER +1ECAD..1ECAF ; AL # No [3] INDIC SIYAQ FRACTION ONE QUARTER..INDIC SIYAQ FRACTION THREE QUARTERS +1ECB0 ; AL # Sc INDIC SIYAQ RUPEE MARK +1ECB1..1ECB4 ; AL # No [4] INDIC SIYAQ NUMBER ALTERNATE ONE..INDIC SIYAQ ALTERNATE LAKH MARK +1ECB5..1ECBF ; AL # Cn [11] .. +1ED00 ; AL # Cn +1ED01..1ED2D ; AL # No [45] OTTOMAN SIYAQ NUMBER ONE..OTTOMAN SIYAQ NUMBER NINETY THOUSAND +1ED2E ; AL # So OTTOMAN SIYAQ MARRATAN +1ED2F..1ED3D ; AL # No [15] OTTOMAN SIYAQ ALTERNATE NUMBER TWO..OTTOMAN SIYAQ FRACTION ONE SIXTH +1ED3E..1ED4F ; AL # Cn [18] .. +1EE00..1EE03 ; AL # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DAL +1EE04 ; AL # Cn +1EE05..1EE1F ; AL # Lo [27] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOTLESS QAF +1EE20 ; AL # Cn +1EE21..1EE22 ; AL # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL JEEM +1EE23 ; AL # Cn +1EE24 ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HEH +1EE25..1EE26 ; AL # Cn [2] .. +1EE27 ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HAH +1EE28 ; AL # Cn +1EE29..1EE32 ; AL # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL YEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL QAF +1EE33 ; AL # Cn +1EE34..1EE37 ; AL # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL KHAH +1EE38 ; AL # Cn +1EE39 ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL DAD +1EE3A ; AL # Cn +1EE3B ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL GHAIN +1EE3C..1EE41 ; AL # Cn [6] .. +1EE42 ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED JEEM +1EE43..1EE46 ; AL # Cn [4] .. +1EE47 ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED HAH +1EE48 ; AL # Cn +1EE49 ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED YEH +1EE4A ; AL # Cn +1EE4B ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED LAM +1EE4C ; AL # Cn +1EE4D..1EE4F ; AL # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED NOON..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED AIN +1EE50 ; AL # Cn +1EE51..1EE52 ; AL # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED QAF +1EE53 ; AL # Cn +1EE54 ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SHEEN +1EE55..1EE56 ; AL # Cn [2] .. +1EE57 ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED KHAH +1EE58 ; AL # Cn +1EE59 ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DAD +1EE5A ; AL # Cn +1EE5B ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED GHAIN +1EE5C ; AL # Cn +1EE5D ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS NOON +1EE5E ; AL # Cn +1EE5F ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS QAF +1EE60 ; AL # Cn +1EE61..1EE62 ; AL # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED JEEM +1EE63 ; AL # Cn +1EE64 ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HEH +1EE65..1EE66 ; AL # Cn [2] .. +1EE67..1EE6A ; AL # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HAH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KAF +1EE6B ; AL # Cn +1EE6C..1EE72 ; AL # Lo [7] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED MEEM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED QAF +1EE73 ; AL # Cn +1EE74..1EE77 ; AL # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KHAH +1EE78 ; AL # Cn +1EE79..1EE7C ; AL # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS BEH +1EE7D ; AL # Cn +1EE7E ; AL # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS FEH +1EE7F ; AL # Cn +1EE80..1EE89 ; AL # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED YEH +1EE8A ; AL # Cn +1EE8B..1EE9B ; AL # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED GHAIN +1EE9C..1EEA0 ; AL # Cn [5] .. +1EEA1..1EEA3 ; AL # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK DAL +1EEA4 ; AL # Cn +1EEA5..1EEA9 ; AL # Lo [5] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK YEH +1EEAA ; AL # Cn +1EEAB..1EEBB ; AL # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK GHAIN +1EEBC..1EEEF ; AL # Cn [52] .. +1EEF2..1EEFF ; AL # Cn [14] .. + +# Total code points: 1708 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Left_To_Right_Override + +202D ; LRO # Cf LEFT-TO-RIGHT OVERRIDE + +# Total code points: 1 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Right_To_Left_Override + +202E ; RLO # Cf RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE + +# Total code points: 1 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Left_To_Right_Embedding + +202A ; LRE # Cf LEFT-TO-RIGHT EMBEDDING + +# Total code points: 1 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Right_To_Left_Embedding + +202B ; RLE # Cf RIGHT-TO-LEFT EMBEDDING + +# Total code points: 1 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Pop_Directional_Format + +202C ; PDF # Cf POP DIRECTIONAL FORMATTING + +# Total code points: 1 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Left_To_Right_Isolate + +2066 ; LRI # Cf LEFT-TO-RIGHT ISOLATE + +# Total code points: 1 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Right_To_Left_Isolate + +2067 ; RLI # Cf RIGHT-TO-LEFT ISOLATE + +# Total code points: 1 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=First_Strong_Isolate + +2068 ; FSI # Cf FIRST STRONG ISOLATE + +# Total code points: 1 + +# ================================================ + +# Bidi_Class=Pop_Directional_Isolate + +2069 ; PDI # Cf POP DIRECTIONAL ISOLATE + +# Total code points: 1 + +# EOF diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/DerivedCoreProperties.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/DerivedCoreProperties.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..afc2abd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/DerivedCoreProperties.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12416 @@ +# DerivedCoreProperties-14.0.0.txt +# Date: 2021-08-12, 23:12:53 GMT +# © 2021 Unicode®, Inc. +# Unicode and the Unicode Logo are registered trademarks of Unicode, Inc. in the U.S. and other countries. +# For terms of use, see http://www.unicode.org/terms_of_use.html +# +# Unicode Character Database +# For documentation, see http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr44/ + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Math +# Generated from: Sm + Other_Math + +002B ; Math # Sm PLUS SIGN +003C..003E ; Math # Sm [3] LESS-THAN SIGN..GREATER-THAN SIGN +005E ; Math # Sk CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +007C ; Math # Sm VERTICAL LINE +007E ; Math # Sm TILDE +00AC ; Math # Sm NOT SIGN +00B1 ; Math # Sm PLUS-MINUS SIGN +00D7 ; Math # Sm MULTIPLICATION SIGN +00F7 ; Math # Sm DIVISION SIGN +03D0..03D2 ; Math # L& [3] GREEK BETA SYMBOL..GREEK UPSILON WITH HOOK SYMBOL +03D5 ; Math # L& GREEK PHI SYMBOL +03F0..03F1 ; Math # L& [2] GREEK KAPPA SYMBOL..GREEK RHO SYMBOL +03F4..03F5 ; Math # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL THETA SYMBOL..GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F6 ; Math # Sm GREEK REVERSED LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +0606..0608 ; Math # Sm [3] ARABIC-INDIC CUBE ROOT..ARABIC RAY +2016 ; Math # Po DOUBLE VERTICAL LINE +2032..2034 ; Math # Po [3] PRIME..TRIPLE PRIME +2040 ; Math # Pc CHARACTER TIE +2044 ; Math # Sm FRACTION SLASH +2052 ; Math # Sm COMMERCIAL MINUS SIGN +2061..2064 ; Math # Cf [4] FUNCTION APPLICATION..INVISIBLE PLUS +207A..207C ; Math # Sm [3] SUPERSCRIPT PLUS SIGN..SUPERSCRIPT EQUALS SIGN +207D ; Math # Ps SUPERSCRIPT LEFT PARENTHESIS +207E ; Math # Pe SUPERSCRIPT RIGHT PARENTHESIS +208A..208C ; Math # Sm [3] SUBSCRIPT PLUS SIGN..SUBSCRIPT EQUALS SIGN +208D ; Math # Ps SUBSCRIPT LEFT PARENTHESIS +208E ; Math # Pe SUBSCRIPT RIGHT PARENTHESIS +20D0..20DC ; Math # Mn [13] COMBINING LEFT HARPOON ABOVE..COMBINING FOUR DOTS ABOVE +20E1 ; Math # Mn COMBINING LEFT RIGHT ARROW ABOVE +20E5..20E6 ; Math # Mn [2] COMBINING REVERSE SOLIDUS OVERLAY..COMBINING DOUBLE VERTICAL STROKE OVERLAY +20EB..20EF ; Math # Mn [5] COMBINING LONG DOUBLE SOLIDUS OVERLAY..COMBINING RIGHT ARROW BELOW +2102 ; Math # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL C +2107 ; Math # L& EULER CONSTANT +210A..2113 ; Math # L& [10] SCRIPT SMALL G..SCRIPT SMALL L +2115 ; Math # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL N +2118 ; Math # Sm SCRIPT CAPITAL P +2119..211D ; Math # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL P..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL R +2124 ; Math # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Z +2128 ; Math # L& BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL Z +2129 ; Math # So TURNED GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA +212C..212D ; Math # L& [2] SCRIPT CAPITAL B..BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL C +212F..2131 ; Math # L& [3] SCRIPT SMALL E..SCRIPT CAPITAL F +2133..2134 ; Math # L& [2] SCRIPT CAPITAL M..SCRIPT SMALL O +2135..2138 ; Math # Lo [4] ALEF SYMBOL..DALET SYMBOL +213C..213F ; Math # L& [4] DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL PI..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL PI +2140..2144 ; Math # Sm [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK N-ARY SUMMATION..TURNED SANS-SERIF CAPITAL Y +2145..2149 ; Math # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC CAPITAL D..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +214B ; Math # Sm TURNED AMPERSAND +2190..2194 ; Math # Sm [5] LEFTWARDS ARROW..LEFT RIGHT ARROW +2195..2199 ; Math # So [5] UP DOWN ARROW..SOUTH WEST ARROW +219A..219B ; Math # Sm [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH STROKE..RIGHTWARDS ARROW WITH STROKE +219C..219F ; Math # So [4] LEFTWARDS WAVE ARROW..UPWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW +21A0 ; Math # Sm RIGHTWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW +21A1..21A2 ; Math # So [2] DOWNWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW..LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH TAIL +21A3 ; Math # Sm RIGHTWARDS ARROW WITH TAIL +21A4..21A5 ; Math # So [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW FROM BAR..UPWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21A6 ; Math # Sm RIGHTWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21A7 ; Math # So DOWNWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21A9..21AD ; Math # So [5] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH HOOK..LEFT RIGHT WAVE ARROW +21AE ; Math # Sm LEFT RIGHT ARROW WITH STROKE +21B0..21B1 ; Math # So [2] UPWARDS ARROW WITH TIP LEFTWARDS..UPWARDS ARROW WITH TIP RIGHTWARDS +21B6..21B7 ; Math # So [2] ANTICLOCKWISE TOP SEMICIRCLE ARROW..CLOCKWISE TOP SEMICIRCLE ARROW +21BC..21CD ; Math # So [18] LEFTWARDS HARPOON WITH BARB UPWARDS..LEFTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE +21CE..21CF ; Math # Sm [2] LEFT RIGHT DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE..RIGHTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE +21D0..21D1 ; Math # So [2] LEFTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW..UPWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D2 ; Math # Sm RIGHTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D3 ; Math # So DOWNWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D4 ; Math # Sm LEFT RIGHT DOUBLE ARROW +21D5..21DB ; Math # So [7] UP DOWN DOUBLE ARROW..RIGHTWARDS TRIPLE ARROW +21DD ; Math # So RIGHTWARDS SQUIGGLE ARROW +21E4..21E5 ; Math # So [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW TO BAR..RIGHTWARDS ARROW TO BAR +21F4..22FF ; Math # Sm [268] RIGHT ARROW WITH SMALL CIRCLE..Z NOTATION BAG MEMBERSHIP +2308 ; Math # Ps LEFT CEILING +2309 ; Math # Pe RIGHT CEILING +230A ; Math # Ps LEFT FLOOR +230B ; Math # Pe RIGHT FLOOR +2320..2321 ; Math # Sm [2] TOP HALF INTEGRAL..BOTTOM HALF INTEGRAL +237C ; Math # Sm RIGHT ANGLE WITH DOWNWARDS ZIGZAG ARROW +239B..23B3 ; Math # Sm [25] LEFT PARENTHESIS UPPER HOOK..SUMMATION BOTTOM +23B4..23B5 ; Math # So [2] TOP SQUARE BRACKET..BOTTOM SQUARE BRACKET +23B7 ; Math # So RADICAL SYMBOL BOTTOM +23D0 ; Math # So VERTICAL LINE EXTENSION +23DC..23E1 ; Math # Sm [6] TOP PARENTHESIS..BOTTOM TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +23E2 ; Math # So WHITE TRAPEZIUM +25A0..25A1 ; Math # So [2] BLACK SQUARE..WHITE SQUARE +25AE..25B6 ; Math # So [9] BLACK VERTICAL RECTANGLE..BLACK RIGHT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25B7 ; Math # Sm WHITE RIGHT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25BC..25C0 ; Math # So [5] BLACK DOWN-POINTING TRIANGLE..BLACK LEFT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25C1 ; Math # Sm WHITE LEFT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25C6..25C7 ; Math # So [2] BLACK DIAMOND..WHITE DIAMOND +25CA..25CB ; Math # So [2] LOZENGE..WHITE CIRCLE +25CF..25D3 ; Math # So [5] BLACK CIRCLE..CIRCLE WITH UPPER HALF BLACK +25E2 ; Math # So BLACK LOWER RIGHT TRIANGLE +25E4 ; Math # So BLACK UPPER LEFT TRIANGLE +25E7..25EC ; Math # So [6] SQUARE WITH LEFT HALF BLACK..WHITE UP-POINTING TRIANGLE WITH DOT +25F8..25FF ; Math # Sm [8] UPPER LEFT TRIANGLE..LOWER RIGHT TRIANGLE +2605..2606 ; Math # So [2] BLACK STAR..WHITE STAR +2640 ; Math # So FEMALE SIGN +2642 ; Math # So MALE SIGN +2660..2663 ; Math # So [4] BLACK SPADE SUIT..BLACK CLUB SUIT +266D..266E ; Math # So [2] MUSIC FLAT SIGN..MUSIC NATURAL SIGN +266F ; Math # Sm MUSIC SHARP SIGN +27C0..27C4 ; Math # Sm [5] THREE DIMENSIONAL ANGLE..OPEN SUPERSET +27C5 ; Math # Ps LEFT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27C6 ; Math # Pe RIGHT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27C7..27E5 ; Math # Sm [31] OR WITH DOT INSIDE..WHITE SQUARE WITH RIGHTWARDS TICK +27E6 ; Math # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E7 ; Math # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E8 ; Math # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +27E9 ; Math # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +27EA ; Math # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EB ; Math # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EC ; Math # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27ED ; Math # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27EE ; Math # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +27EF ; Math # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +27F0..27FF ; Math # Sm [16] UPWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW..LONG RIGHTWARDS SQUIGGLE ARROW +2900..2982 ; Math # Sm [131] RIGHTWARDS TWO-HEADED ARROW WITH VERTICAL STROKE..Z NOTATION TYPE COLON +2983 ; Math # Ps LEFT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2984 ; Math # Pe RIGHT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2985 ; Math # Ps LEFT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2986 ; Math # Pe RIGHT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2987 ; Math # Ps Z NOTATION LEFT IMAGE BRACKET +2988 ; Math # Pe Z NOTATION RIGHT IMAGE BRACKET +2989 ; Math # Ps Z NOTATION LEFT BINDING BRACKET +298A ; Math # Pe Z NOTATION RIGHT BINDING BRACKET +298B ; Math # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298C ; Math # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298D ; Math # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +298E ; Math # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +298F ; Math # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +2990 ; Math # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +2991 ; Math # Ps LEFT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2992 ; Math # Pe RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2993 ; Math # Ps LEFT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2994 ; Math # Pe RIGHT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2995 ; Math # Ps DOUBLE LEFT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2996 ; Math # Pe DOUBLE RIGHT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2997 ; Math # Ps LEFT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +2998 ; Math # Pe RIGHT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +2999..29D7 ; Math # Sm [63] DOTTED FENCE..BLACK HOURGLASS +29D8 ; Math # Ps LEFT WIGGLY FENCE +29D9 ; Math # Pe RIGHT WIGGLY FENCE +29DA ; Math # Ps LEFT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29DB ; Math # Pe RIGHT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29DC..29FB ; Math # Sm [32] INCOMPLETE INFINITY..TRIPLE PLUS +29FC ; Math # Ps LEFT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +29FD ; Math # Pe RIGHT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +29FE..2AFF ; Math # Sm [258] TINY..N-ARY WHITE VERTICAL BAR +2B30..2B44 ; Math # Sm [21] LEFT ARROW WITH SMALL CIRCLE..RIGHTWARDS ARROW THROUGH SUPERSET +2B47..2B4C ; Math # Sm [6] REVERSE TILDE OPERATOR ABOVE RIGHTWARDS ARROW..RIGHTWARDS ARROW ABOVE REVERSE TILDE OPERATOR +FB29 ; Math # Sm HEBREW LETTER ALTERNATIVE PLUS SIGN +FE61 ; Math # Po SMALL ASTERISK +FE62 ; Math # Sm SMALL PLUS SIGN +FE63 ; Math # Pd SMALL HYPHEN-MINUS +FE64..FE66 ; Math # Sm [3] SMALL LESS-THAN SIGN..SMALL EQUALS SIGN +FE68 ; Math # Po SMALL REVERSE SOLIDUS +FF0B ; Math # Sm FULLWIDTH PLUS SIGN +FF1C..FF1E ; Math # Sm [3] FULLWIDTH LESS-THAN SIGN..FULLWIDTH GREATER-THAN SIGN +FF3C ; Math # Po FULLWIDTH REVERSE SOLIDUS +FF3E ; Math # Sk FULLWIDTH CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +FF5C ; Math # Sm FULLWIDTH VERTICAL LINE +FF5E ; Math # Sm FULLWIDTH TILDE +FFE2 ; Math # Sm FULLWIDTH NOT SIGN +FFE9..FFEC ; Math # Sm [4] HALFWIDTH LEFTWARDS ARROW..HALFWIDTH DOWNWARDS ARROW +1D400..1D454 ; Math # L& [85] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL G +1D456..1D49C ; Math # L& [71] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A +1D49E..1D49F ; Math # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D +1D4A2 ; Math # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL G +1D4A5..1D4A6 ; Math # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K +1D4A9..1D4AC ; Math # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Q +1D4AE..1D4B9 ; Math # L& [12] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL D +1D4BB ; Math # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL F +1D4BD..1D4C3 ; Math # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL H..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL N +1D4C5..1D505 ; Math # L& [65] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL P..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL B +1D507..1D50A ; Math # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL G +1D50D..1D514 ; Math # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Q +1D516..1D51C ; Math # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Y +1D51E..1D539 ; Math # L& [28] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL B +1D53B..1D53E ; Math # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL G +1D540..1D544 ; Math # L& [5] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M +1D546 ; Math # L& MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL O +1D54A..1D550 ; Math # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Y +1D552..1D6A5 ; Math # L& [340] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL DOTLESS J +1D6A8..1D6C0 ; Math # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6C1 ; Math # Sm MATHEMATICAL BOLD NABLA +1D6C2..1D6DA ; Math # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D6DB ; Math # Sm MATHEMATICAL BOLD PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D6DC..1D6FA ; Math # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6FB ; Math # Sm MATHEMATICAL ITALIC NABLA +1D6FC..1D714 ; Math # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D715 ; Math # Sm MATHEMATICAL ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D716..1D734 ; Math # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D735 ; Math # Sm MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC NABLA +1D736..1D74E ; Math # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D74F ; Math # Sm MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D750..1D76E ; Math # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D76F ; Math # Sm MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD NABLA +1D770..1D788 ; Math # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D789 ; Math # Sm MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D78A..1D7A8 ; Math # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D7A9 ; Math # Sm MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC NABLA +1D7AA..1D7C2 ; Math # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D7C3 ; Math # Sm MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D7C4..1D7CB ; Math # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL DIGAMMA +1D7CE..1D7FF ; Math # Nd [50] MATHEMATICAL BOLD DIGIT ZERO..MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE DIGIT NINE +1EE00..1EE03 ; Math # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DAL +1EE05..1EE1F ; Math # Lo [27] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOTLESS QAF +1EE21..1EE22 ; Math # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL JEEM +1EE24 ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HEH +1EE27 ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HAH +1EE29..1EE32 ; Math # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL YEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL QAF +1EE34..1EE37 ; Math # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL KHAH +1EE39 ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL DAD +1EE3B ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL GHAIN +1EE42 ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED JEEM +1EE47 ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED HAH +1EE49 ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED YEH +1EE4B ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED LAM +1EE4D..1EE4F ; Math # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED NOON..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED AIN +1EE51..1EE52 ; Math # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED QAF +1EE54 ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SHEEN +1EE57 ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED KHAH +1EE59 ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DAD +1EE5B ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED GHAIN +1EE5D ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS NOON +1EE5F ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS QAF +1EE61..1EE62 ; Math # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED JEEM +1EE64 ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HEH +1EE67..1EE6A ; Math # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HAH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KAF +1EE6C..1EE72 ; Math # Lo [7] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED MEEM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED QAF +1EE74..1EE77 ; Math # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KHAH +1EE79..1EE7C ; Math # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS BEH +1EE7E ; Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS FEH +1EE80..1EE89 ; Math # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED YEH +1EE8B..1EE9B ; Math # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED GHAIN +1EEA1..1EEA3 ; Math # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK DAL +1EEA5..1EEA9 ; Math # Lo [5] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK YEH +1EEAB..1EEBB ; Math # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK GHAIN +1EEF0..1EEF1 ; Math # Sm [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL OPERATOR MEEM WITH HAH WITH TATWEEL..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL OPERATOR HAH WITH DAL + +# Total code points: 2310 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Alphabetic +# Generated from: Uppercase + Lowercase + Lt + Lm + Lo + Nl + Other_Alphabetic + +0041..005A ; Alphabetic # L& [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +0061..007A ; Alphabetic # L& [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +00AA ; Alphabetic # Lo FEMININE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00B5 ; Alphabetic # L& MICRO SIGN +00BA ; Alphabetic # Lo MASCULINE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00C0..00D6 ; Alphabetic # L& [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8..00F6 ; Alphabetic # L& [31] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F8..01BA ; Alphabetic # L& [195] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH TAIL +01BB ; Alphabetic # Lo LATIN LETTER TWO WITH STROKE +01BC..01BF ; Alphabetic # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE..LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C0..01C3 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] LATIN LETTER DENTAL CLICK..LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK +01C4..0293 ; Alphabetic # L& [208] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CURL +0294 ; Alphabetic # Lo LATIN LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0295..02AF ; Alphabetic # L& [27] LATIN LETTER PHARYNGEAL VOICED FRICATIVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H WITH FISHHOOK AND TAIL +02B0..02C1 ; Alphabetic # Lm [18] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02C6..02D1 ; Alphabetic # Lm [12] MODIFIER LETTER CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..MODIFIER LETTER HALF TRIANGULAR COLON +02E0..02E4 ; Alphabetic # Lm [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02EC ; Alphabetic # Lm MODIFIER LETTER VOICING +02EE ; Alphabetic # Lm MODIFIER LETTER DOUBLE APOSTROPHE +0345 ; Alphabetic # Mn COMBINING GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +0370..0373 ; Alphabetic # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA..GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0374 ; Alphabetic # Lm GREEK NUMERAL SIGN +0376..0377 ; Alphabetic # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA..GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037A ; Alphabetic # Lm GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +037B..037D ; Alphabetic # L& [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +037F ; Alphabetic # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386 ; Alphabetic # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0388..038A ; Alphabetic # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; Alphabetic # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..03A1 ; Alphabetic # L& [20] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03F5 ; Alphabetic # L& [83] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F7..0481 ; Alphabetic # L& [139] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +048A..052F ; Alphabetic # L& [166] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; Alphabetic # L& [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +0559 ; Alphabetic # Lm ARMENIAN MODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RING +0560..0588 ; Alphabetic # L& [41] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER TURNED AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER YI WITH STROKE +05B0..05BD ; Alphabetic # Mn [14] HEBREW POINT SHEVA..HEBREW POINT METEG +05BF ; Alphabetic # Mn HEBREW POINT RAFE +05C1..05C2 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] HEBREW POINT SHIN DOT..HEBREW POINT SIN DOT +05C4..05C5 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] HEBREW MARK UPPER DOT..HEBREW MARK LOWER DOT +05C7 ; Alphabetic # Mn HEBREW POINT QAMATS QATAN +05D0..05EA ; Alphabetic # Lo [27] HEBREW LETTER ALEF..HEBREW LETTER TAV +05EF..05F2 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] HEBREW YOD TRIANGLE..HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH DOUBLE YOD +0610..061A ; Alphabetic # Mn [11] ARABIC SIGN SALLALLAHOU ALAYHE WASSALLAM..ARABIC SMALL KASRA +0620..063F ; Alphabetic # Lo [32] ARABIC LETTER KASHMIRI YEH..ARABIC LETTER FARSI YEH WITH THREE DOTS ABOVE +0640 ; Alphabetic # Lm ARABIC TATWEEL +0641..064A ; Alphabetic # Lo [10] ARABIC LETTER FEH..ARABIC LETTER YEH +064B..0657 ; Alphabetic # Mn [13] ARABIC FATHATAN..ARABIC INVERTED DAMMA +0659..065F ; Alphabetic # Mn [7] ARABIC ZWARAKAY..ARABIC WAVY HAMZA BELOW +066E..066F ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS BEH..ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS QAF +0670 ; Alphabetic # Mn ARABIC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALEF +0671..06D3 ; Alphabetic # Lo [99] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WASLA..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE +06D5 ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC LETTER AE +06D6..06DC ; Alphabetic # Mn [7] ARABIC SMALL HIGH LIGATURE SAD WITH LAM WITH ALEF MAKSURA..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SEEN +06E1..06E4 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] ARABIC SMALL HIGH DOTLESS HEAD OF KHAH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH MADDA +06E5..06E6 ; Alphabetic # Lm [2] ARABIC SMALL WAW..ARABIC SMALL YEH +06E7..06E8 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] ARABIC SMALL HIGH YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH NOON +06ED ; Alphabetic # Mn ARABIC SMALL LOW MEEM +06EE..06EF ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DAL WITH INVERTED V..ARABIC LETTER REH WITH INVERTED V +06FA..06FC ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] ARABIC LETTER SHEEN WITH DOT BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GHAIN WITH DOT BELOW +06FF ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC LETTER HEH WITH INVERTED V +0710 ; Alphabetic # Lo SYRIAC LETTER ALAPH +0711 ; Alphabetic # Mn SYRIAC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALAPH +0712..072F ; Alphabetic # Lo [30] SYRIAC LETTER BETH..SYRIAC LETTER PERSIAN DHALATH +0730..073F ; Alphabetic # Mn [16] SYRIAC PTHAHA ABOVE..SYRIAC RWAHA +074D..07A5 ; Alphabetic # Lo [89] SYRIAC LETTER SOGDIAN ZHAIN..THAANA LETTER WAAVU +07A6..07B0 ; Alphabetic # Mn [11] THAANA ABAFILI..THAANA SUKUN +07B1 ; Alphabetic # Lo THAANA LETTER NAA +07CA..07EA ; Alphabetic # Lo [33] NKO LETTER A..NKO LETTER JONA RA +07F4..07F5 ; Alphabetic # Lm [2] NKO HIGH TONE APOSTROPHE..NKO LOW TONE APOSTROPHE +07FA ; Alphabetic # Lm NKO LAJANYALAN +0800..0815 ; Alphabetic # Lo [22] SAMARITAN LETTER ALAF..SAMARITAN LETTER TAAF +0816..0817 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] SAMARITAN MARK IN..SAMARITAN MARK IN-ALAF +081A ; Alphabetic # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER EPENTHETIC YUT +081B..0823 ; Alphabetic # Mn [9] SAMARITAN MARK EPENTHETIC YUT..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN A +0824 ; Alphabetic # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER SHORT A +0825..0827 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN SHORT A..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN U +0828 ; Alphabetic # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER I +0829..082C ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN LONG I..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN SUKUN +0840..0858 ; Alphabetic # Lo [25] MANDAIC LETTER HALQA..MANDAIC LETTER AIN +0860..086A ; Alphabetic # Lo [11] SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM NGA..SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM SSA +0870..0887 ; Alphabetic # Lo [24] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WITH ATTACHED FATHA..ARABIC BASELINE ROUND DOT +0889..088E ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] ARABIC LETTER NOON WITH INVERTED SMALL V..ARABIC VERTICAL TAIL +08A0..08C8 ; Alphabetic # Lo [41] ARABIC LETTER BEH WITH SMALL V BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GRAF +08C9 ; Alphabetic # Lm ARABIC SMALL FARSI YEH +08D4..08DF ; Alphabetic # Mn [12] ARABIC SMALL HIGH WORD AR-RUB..ARABIC SMALL HIGH WORD WAQFA +08E3..08E9 ; Alphabetic # Mn [7] ARABIC TURNED DAMMA BELOW..ARABIC CURLY KASRATAN +08F0..0902 ; Alphabetic # Mn [19] ARABIC OPEN FATHATAN..DEVANAGARI SIGN ANUSVARA +0903 ; Alphabetic # Mc DEVANAGARI SIGN VISARGA +0904..0939 ; Alphabetic # Lo [54] DEVANAGARI LETTER SHORT A..DEVANAGARI LETTER HA +093A ; Alphabetic # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OE +093B ; Alphabetic # Mc DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OOE +093D ; Alphabetic # Lo DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +093E..0940 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +0941..0948 ; Alphabetic # Mn [8] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +0949..094C ; Alphabetic # Mc [4] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AU +094E..094F ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AW +0950 ; Alphabetic # Lo DEVANAGARI OM +0955..0957 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA LONG E..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN UUE +0958..0961 ; Alphabetic # Lo [10] DEVANAGARI LETTER QA..DEVANAGARI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0962..0963 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0971 ; Alphabetic # Lm DEVANAGARI SIGN HIGH SPACING DOT +0972..0980 ; Alphabetic # Lo [15] DEVANAGARI LETTER CANDRA A..BENGALI ANJI +0981 ; Alphabetic # Mn BENGALI SIGN CANDRABINDU +0982..0983 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] BENGALI SIGN ANUSVARA..BENGALI SIGN VISARGA +0985..098C ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] BENGALI LETTER A..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC L +098F..0990 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER E..BENGALI LETTER AI +0993..09A8 ; Alphabetic # Lo [22] BENGALI LETTER O..BENGALI LETTER NA +09AA..09B0 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] BENGALI LETTER PA..BENGALI LETTER RA +09B2 ; Alphabetic # Lo BENGALI LETTER LA +09B6..09B9 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] BENGALI LETTER SHA..BENGALI LETTER HA +09BD ; Alphabetic # Lo BENGALI SIGN AVAGRAHA +09BE..09C0 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AA..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN II +09C1..09C4 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN U..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +09C7..09C8 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN E..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AI +09CB..09CC ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN O..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AU +09CE ; Alphabetic # Lo BENGALI LETTER KHANDA TA +09D7 ; Alphabetic # Mc BENGALI AU LENGTH MARK +09DC..09DD ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RRA..BENGALI LETTER RHA +09DF..09E1 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] BENGALI LETTER YYA..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC LL +09E2..09E3 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +09F0..09F1 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RA WITH MIDDLE DIAGONAL..BENGALI LETTER RA WITH LOWER DIAGONAL +09FC ; Alphabetic # Lo BENGALI LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA +0A01..0A02 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] GURMUKHI SIGN ADAK BINDI..GURMUKHI SIGN BINDI +0A03 ; Alphabetic # Mc GURMUKHI SIGN VISARGA +0A05..0A0A ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] GURMUKHI LETTER A..GURMUKHI LETTER UU +0A0F..0A10 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER EE..GURMUKHI LETTER AI +0A13..0A28 ; Alphabetic # Lo [22] GURMUKHI LETTER OO..GURMUKHI LETTER NA +0A2A..0A30 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] GURMUKHI LETTER PA..GURMUKHI LETTER RA +0A32..0A33 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER LA..GURMUKHI LETTER LLA +0A35..0A36 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER VA..GURMUKHI LETTER SHA +0A38..0A39 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER SA..GURMUKHI LETTER HA +0A3E..0A40 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AA..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN II +0A41..0A42 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN U..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN UU +0A47..0A48 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN EE..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AI +0A4B..0A4C ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN OO..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AU +0A51 ; Alphabetic # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN UDAAT +0A59..0A5C ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] GURMUKHI LETTER KHHA..GURMUKHI LETTER RRA +0A5E ; Alphabetic # Lo GURMUKHI LETTER FA +0A70..0A71 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] GURMUKHI TIPPI..GURMUKHI ADDAK +0A72..0A74 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] GURMUKHI IRI..GURMUKHI EK ONKAR +0A75 ; Alphabetic # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN YAKASH +0A81..0A82 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] GUJARATI SIGN CANDRABINDU..GUJARATI SIGN ANUSVARA +0A83 ; Alphabetic # Mc GUJARATI SIGN VISARGA +0A85..0A8D ; Alphabetic # Lo [9] GUJARATI LETTER A..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA E +0A8F..0A91 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] GUJARATI LETTER E..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA O +0A93..0AA8 ; Alphabetic # Lo [22] GUJARATI LETTER O..GUJARATI LETTER NA +0AAA..0AB0 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] GUJARATI LETTER PA..GUJARATI LETTER RA +0AB2..0AB3 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER LA..GUJARATI LETTER LLA +0AB5..0AB9 ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] GUJARATI LETTER VA..GUJARATI LETTER HA +0ABD ; Alphabetic # Lo GUJARATI SIGN AVAGRAHA +0ABE..0AC0 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN II +0AC1..0AC5 ; Alphabetic # Mn [5] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN U..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA E +0AC7..0AC8 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN E..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AI +0AC9 ; Alphabetic # Mc GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O +0ACB..0ACC ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN O..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AU +0AD0 ; Alphabetic # Lo GUJARATI OM +0AE0..0AE1 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC RR..GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0AE2..0AE3 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0AF9 ; Alphabetic # Lo GUJARATI LETTER ZHA +0AFA..0AFC ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] GUJARATI SIGN SUKUN..GUJARATI SIGN MADDAH +0B01 ; Alphabetic # Mn ORIYA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0B02..0B03 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] ORIYA SIGN ANUSVARA..ORIYA SIGN VISARGA +0B05..0B0C ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] ORIYA LETTER A..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC L +0B0F..0B10 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER E..ORIYA LETTER AI +0B13..0B28 ; Alphabetic # Lo [22] ORIYA LETTER O..ORIYA LETTER NA +0B2A..0B30 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ORIYA LETTER PA..ORIYA LETTER RA +0B32..0B33 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER LA..ORIYA LETTER LLA +0B35..0B39 ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] ORIYA LETTER VA..ORIYA LETTER HA +0B3D ; Alphabetic # Lo ORIYA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0B3E ; Alphabetic # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AA +0B3F ; Alphabetic # Mn ORIYA VOWEL SIGN I +0B40 ; Alphabetic # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN II +0B41..0B44 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN U..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0B47..0B48 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN E..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AI +0B4B..0B4C ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN O..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AU +0B56 ; Alphabetic # Mn ORIYA AI LENGTH MARK +0B57 ; Alphabetic # Mc ORIYA AU LENGTH MARK +0B5C..0B5D ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER RRA..ORIYA LETTER RHA +0B5F..0B61 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] ORIYA LETTER YYA..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0B62..0B63 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0B71 ; Alphabetic # Lo ORIYA LETTER WA +0B82 ; Alphabetic # Mn TAMIL SIGN ANUSVARA +0B83 ; Alphabetic # Lo TAMIL SIGN VISARGA +0B85..0B8A ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] TAMIL LETTER A..TAMIL LETTER UU +0B8E..0B90 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER E..TAMIL LETTER AI +0B92..0B95 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] TAMIL LETTER O..TAMIL LETTER KA +0B99..0B9A ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NGA..TAMIL LETTER CA +0B9C ; Alphabetic # Lo TAMIL LETTER JA +0B9E..0B9F ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NYA..TAMIL LETTER TTA +0BA3..0BA4 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NNA..TAMIL LETTER TA +0BA8..0BAA ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER NA..TAMIL LETTER PA +0BAE..0BB9 ; Alphabetic # Lo [12] TAMIL LETTER MA..TAMIL LETTER HA +0BBE..0BBF ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AA..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN I +0BC0 ; Alphabetic # Mn TAMIL VOWEL SIGN II +0BC1..0BC2 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN U..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN UU +0BC6..0BC8 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN E..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AI +0BCA..0BCC ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN O..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AU +0BD0 ; Alphabetic # Lo TAMIL OM +0BD7 ; Alphabetic # Mc TAMIL AU LENGTH MARK +0C00 ; Alphabetic # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING CANDRABINDU ABOVE +0C01..0C03 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] TELUGU SIGN CANDRABINDU..TELUGU SIGN VISARGA +0C05..0C0C ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] TELUGU LETTER A..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC L +0C0E..0C10 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER E..TELUGU LETTER AI +0C12..0C28 ; Alphabetic # Lo [23] TELUGU LETTER O..TELUGU LETTER NA +0C2A..0C39 ; Alphabetic # Lo [16] TELUGU LETTER PA..TELUGU LETTER HA +0C3D ; Alphabetic # Lo TELUGU SIGN AVAGRAHA +0C3E..0C40 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AA..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN II +0C41..0C44 ; Alphabetic # Mc [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN U..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0C46..0C48 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN E..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AI +0C4A..0C4C ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN O..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AU +0C55..0C56 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] TELUGU LENGTH MARK..TELUGU AI LENGTH MARK +0C58..0C5A ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER TSA..TELUGU LETTER RRRA +0C5D ; Alphabetic # Lo TELUGU LETTER NAKAARA POLLU +0C60..0C61 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC RR..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC LL +0C62..0C63 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0C80 ; Alphabetic # Lo KANNADA SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU +0C81 ; Alphabetic # Mn KANNADA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0C82..0C83 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] KANNADA SIGN ANUSVARA..KANNADA SIGN VISARGA +0C85..0C8C ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] KANNADA LETTER A..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC L +0C8E..0C90 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] KANNADA LETTER E..KANNADA LETTER AI +0C92..0CA8 ; Alphabetic # Lo [23] KANNADA LETTER O..KANNADA LETTER NA +0CAA..0CB3 ; Alphabetic # Lo [10] KANNADA LETTER PA..KANNADA LETTER LLA +0CB5..0CB9 ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] KANNADA LETTER VA..KANNADA LETTER HA +0CBD ; Alphabetic # Lo KANNADA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0CBE ; Alphabetic # Mc KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AA +0CBF ; Alphabetic # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN I +0CC0..0CC4 ; Alphabetic # Mc [5] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN II..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0CC6 ; Alphabetic # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN E +0CC7..0CC8 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN EE..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AI +0CCA..0CCB ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN O..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN OO +0CCC ; Alphabetic # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AU +0CD5..0CD6 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] KANNADA LENGTH MARK..KANNADA AI LENGTH MARK +0CDD..0CDE ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER NAKAARA POLLU..KANNADA LETTER FA +0CE0..0CE1 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC RR..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0CE2..0CE3 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0CF1..0CF2 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] KANNADA SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..KANNADA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +0D00..0D01 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..MALAYALAM SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D02..0D03 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] MALAYALAM SIGN ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM SIGN VISARGA +0D04..0D0C ; Alphabetic # Lo [9] MALAYALAM LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC L +0D0E..0D10 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER E..MALAYALAM LETTER AI +0D12..0D3A ; Alphabetic # Lo [41] MALAYALAM LETTER O..MALAYALAM LETTER TTTA +0D3D ; Alphabetic # Lo MALAYALAM SIGN AVAGRAHA +0D3E..0D40 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AA..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN II +0D41..0D44 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN U..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0D46..0D48 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN E..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AI +0D4A..0D4C ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN O..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AU +0D4E ; Alphabetic # Lo MALAYALAM LETTER DOT REPH +0D54..0D56 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU M..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU LLL +0D57 ; Alphabetic # Mc MALAYALAM AU LENGTH MARK +0D5F..0D61 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER ARCHAIC II..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC LL +0D62..0D63 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D7A..0D7F ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU NN..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU K +0D81 ; Alphabetic # Mn SINHALA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D82..0D83 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] SINHALA SIGN ANUSVARAYA..SINHALA SIGN VISARGAYA +0D85..0D96 ; Alphabetic # Lo [18] SINHALA LETTER AYANNA..SINHALA LETTER AUYANNA +0D9A..0DB1 ; Alphabetic # Lo [24] SINHALA LETTER ALPAPRAANA KAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA NAYANNA +0DB3..0DBB ; Alphabetic # Lo [9] SINHALA LETTER SANYAKA DAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER RAYANNA +0DBD ; Alphabetic # Lo SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA LAYANNA +0DC0..0DC6 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] SINHALA LETTER VAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER FAYANNA +0DCF..0DD1 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN AELA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA AEDA-PILLA +0DD2..0DD4 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI IS-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI PAA-PILLA +0DD6 ; Alphabetic # Mn SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA PAA-PILLA +0DD8..0DDF ; Alphabetic # Mc [8] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAYANUKITTA +0DF2..0DF3 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAYANUKITTA +0E01..0E30 ; Alphabetic # Lo [48] THAI CHARACTER KO KAI..THAI CHARACTER SARA A +0E31 ; Alphabetic # Mn THAI CHARACTER MAI HAN-AKAT +0E32..0E33 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] THAI CHARACTER SARA AA..THAI CHARACTER SARA AM +0E34..0E3A ; Alphabetic # Mn [7] THAI CHARACTER SARA I..THAI CHARACTER PHINTHU +0E40..0E45 ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] THAI CHARACTER SARA E..THAI CHARACTER LAKKHANGYAO +0E46 ; Alphabetic # Lm THAI CHARACTER MAIYAMOK +0E4D ; Alphabetic # Mn THAI CHARACTER NIKHAHIT +0E81..0E82 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] LAO LETTER KO..LAO LETTER KHO SUNG +0E84 ; Alphabetic # Lo LAO LETTER KHO TAM +0E86..0E8A ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] LAO LETTER PALI GHA..LAO LETTER SO TAM +0E8C..0EA3 ; Alphabetic # Lo [24] LAO LETTER PALI JHA..LAO LETTER LO LING +0EA5 ; Alphabetic # Lo LAO LETTER LO LOOT +0EA7..0EB0 ; Alphabetic # Lo [10] LAO LETTER WO..LAO VOWEL SIGN A +0EB1 ; Alphabetic # Mn LAO VOWEL SIGN MAI KAN +0EB2..0EB3 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] LAO VOWEL SIGN AA..LAO VOWEL SIGN AM +0EB4..0EB9 ; Alphabetic # Mn [6] LAO VOWEL SIGN I..LAO VOWEL SIGN UU +0EBB..0EBC ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] LAO VOWEL SIGN MAI KON..LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN LO +0EBD ; Alphabetic # Lo LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN NYO +0EC0..0EC4 ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] LAO VOWEL SIGN E..LAO VOWEL SIGN AI +0EC6 ; Alphabetic # Lm LAO KO LA +0ECD ; Alphabetic # Mn LAO NIGGAHITA +0EDC..0EDF ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] LAO HO NO..LAO LETTER KHMU NYO +0F00 ; Alphabetic # Lo TIBETAN SYLLABLE OM +0F40..0F47 ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] TIBETAN LETTER KA..TIBETAN LETTER JA +0F49..0F6C ; Alphabetic # Lo [36] TIBETAN LETTER NYA..TIBETAN LETTER RRA +0F71..0F7E ; Alphabetic # Mn [14] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN AA..TIBETAN SIGN RJES SU NGA RO +0F7F ; Alphabetic # Mc TIBETAN SIGN RNAM BCAD +0F80..0F81 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN REVERSED I..TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN REVERSED II +0F88..0F8C ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] TIBETAN SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SIGN INVERTED MCHU CAN +0F8D..0F97 ; Alphabetic # Mn [11] TIBETAN SUBJOINED SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER JA +0F99..0FBC ; Alphabetic # Mn [36] TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER NYA..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER FIXED-FORM RA +1000..102A ; Alphabetic # Lo [43] MYANMAR LETTER KA..MYANMAR LETTER AU +102B..102C ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN TALL AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AA +102D..1030 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN UU +1031 ; Alphabetic # Mc MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN E +1032..1036 ; Alphabetic # Mn [5] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AI..MYANMAR SIGN ANUSVARA +1038 ; Alphabetic # Mc MYANMAR SIGN VISARGA +103B..103C ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL YA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +103D..103E ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL WA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL HA +103F ; Alphabetic # Lo MYANMAR LETTER GREAT SA +1050..1055 ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER SHA..MYANMAR LETTER VOCALIC LL +1056..1057 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +1058..1059 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +105A..105D ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] MYANMAR LETTER MON NGA..MYANMAR LETTER MON BBE +105E..1060 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL NA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL LA +1061 ; Alphabetic # Lo MYANMAR LETTER SGAW KAREN SHA +1062..1064 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SGAW KAREN EU..MYANMAR TONE MARK SGAW KAREN KE PHO +1065..1066 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN THA..MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN PWA +1067..106D ; Alphabetic # Mc [7] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN EU..MYANMAR SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN TONE-5 +106E..1070 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN NNA..MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN GHWA +1071..1074 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN GEBA KAREN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN KAYAH EE +1075..1081 ; Alphabetic # Lo [13] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN KA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN HA +1082 ; Alphabetic # Mn MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN SHAN MEDIAL WA +1083..1084 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E +1085..1086 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E ABOVE..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN FINAL Y +1087..108C ; Alphabetic # Mc [6] MYANMAR SIGN SHAN TONE-2..MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL TONE-3 +108D ; Alphabetic # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL EMPHATIC TONE +108E ; Alphabetic # Lo MYANMAR LETTER RUMAI PALAUNG FA +108F ; Alphabetic # Mc MYANMAR SIGN RUMAI PALAUNG TONE-5 +109A..109C ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] MYANMAR SIGN KHAMTI TONE-1..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON A +109D ; Alphabetic # Mn MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON AI +10A0..10C5 ; Alphabetic # L& [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; Alphabetic # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; Alphabetic # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +10D0..10FA ; Alphabetic # L& [43] GEORGIAN LETTER AN..GEORGIAN LETTER AIN +10FC ; Alphabetic # Lm MODIFIER LETTER GEORGIAN NAR +10FD..10FF ; Alphabetic # L& [3] GEORGIAN LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1100..1248 ; Alphabetic # Lo [329] HANGUL CHOSEONG KIYEOK..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWA +124A..124D ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWE +1250..1256 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHO +1258 ; Alphabetic # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWA +125A..125D ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWE +1260..1288 ; Alphabetic # Lo [41] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWA +128A..128D ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWE +1290..12B0 ; Alphabetic # Lo [33] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE NA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWA +12B2..12B5 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWE +12B8..12BE ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXO +12C0 ; Alphabetic # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWA +12C2..12C5 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWE +12C8..12D6 ; Alphabetic # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE WA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PHARYNGEAL O +12D8..1310 ; Alphabetic # Lo [57] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWA +1312..1315 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWE +1318..135A ; Alphabetic # Lo [67] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE FYA +1380..138F ; Alphabetic # Lo [16] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SEBATBEIT MWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PWE +13A0..13F5 ; Alphabetic # L& [86] CHEROKEE LETTER A..CHEROKEE LETTER MV +13F8..13FD ; Alphabetic # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1401..166C ; Alphabetic # Lo [620] CANADIAN SYLLABICS E..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER TTSA +166F..167F ; Alphabetic # Lo [17] CANADIAN SYLLABICS QAI..CANADIAN SYLLABICS BLACKFOOT W +1681..169A ; Alphabetic # Lo [26] OGHAM LETTER BEITH..OGHAM LETTER PEITH +16A0..16EA ; Alphabetic # Lo [75] RUNIC LETTER FEHU FEOH FE F..RUNIC LETTER X +16EE..16F0 ; Alphabetic # Nl [3] RUNIC ARLAUG SYMBOL..RUNIC BELGTHOR SYMBOL +16F1..16F8 ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] RUNIC LETTER K..RUNIC LETTER FRANKS CASKET AESC +1700..1711 ; Alphabetic # Lo [18] TAGALOG LETTER A..TAGALOG LETTER HA +1712..1713 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] TAGALOG VOWEL SIGN I..TAGALOG VOWEL SIGN U +171F..1731 ; Alphabetic # Lo [19] TAGALOG LETTER ARCHAIC RA..HANUNOO LETTER HA +1732..1733 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN I..HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN U +1740..1751 ; Alphabetic # Lo [18] BUHID LETTER A..BUHID LETTER HA +1752..1753 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] BUHID VOWEL SIGN I..BUHID VOWEL SIGN U +1760..176C ; Alphabetic # Lo [13] TAGBANWA LETTER A..TAGBANWA LETTER YA +176E..1770 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] TAGBANWA LETTER LA..TAGBANWA LETTER SA +1772..1773 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN I..TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN U +1780..17B3 ; Alphabetic # Lo [52] KHMER LETTER KA..KHMER INDEPENDENT VOWEL QAU +17B6 ; Alphabetic # Mc KHMER VOWEL SIGN AA +17B7..17BD ; Alphabetic # Mn [7] KHMER VOWEL SIGN I..KHMER VOWEL SIGN UA +17BE..17C5 ; Alphabetic # Mc [8] KHMER VOWEL SIGN OE..KHMER VOWEL SIGN AU +17C6 ; Alphabetic # Mn KHMER SIGN NIKAHIT +17C7..17C8 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] KHMER SIGN REAHMUK..KHMER SIGN YUUKALEAPINTU +17D7 ; Alphabetic # Lm KHMER SIGN LEK TOO +17DC ; Alphabetic # Lo KHMER SIGN AVAKRAHASANYA +1820..1842 ; Alphabetic # Lo [35] MONGOLIAN LETTER A..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHI +1843 ; Alphabetic # Lm MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO LONG VOWEL SIGN +1844..1878 ; Alphabetic # Lo [53] MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO E..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHA WITH TWO DOTS +1880..1884 ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI ANUSVARA ONE..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI INVERTED UBADAMA +1885..1886 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI BALUDA..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI THREE BALUDA +1887..18A8 ; Alphabetic # Lo [34] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI A..MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI BHA +18A9 ; Alphabetic # Mn MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI DAGALGA +18AA ; Alphabetic # Lo MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI LHA +18B0..18F5 ; Alphabetic # Lo [70] CANADIAN SYLLABICS OY..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER DENTAL S +1900..191E ; Alphabetic # Lo [31] LIMBU VOWEL-CARRIER LETTER..LIMBU LETTER TRA +1920..1922 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN A..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN U +1923..1926 ; Alphabetic # Mc [4] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN EE..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN AU +1927..1928 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN E..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN O +1929..192B ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER WA +1930..1931 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] LIMBU SMALL LETTER KA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER NGA +1932 ; Alphabetic # Mn LIMBU SMALL LETTER ANUSVARA +1933..1938 ; Alphabetic # Mc [6] LIMBU SMALL LETTER TA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER LA +1950..196D ; Alphabetic # Lo [30] TAI LE LETTER KA..TAI LE LETTER AI +1970..1974 ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] TAI LE LETTER TONE-2..TAI LE LETTER TONE-6 +1980..19AB ; Alphabetic # Lo [44] NEW TAI LUE LETTER HIGH QA..NEW TAI LUE LETTER LOW SUA +19B0..19C9 ; Alphabetic # Lo [26] NEW TAI LUE VOWEL SIGN VOWEL SHORTENER..NEW TAI LUE TONE MARK-2 +1A00..1A16 ; Alphabetic # Lo [23] BUGINESE LETTER KA..BUGINESE LETTER HA +1A17..1A18 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN I..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN U +1A19..1A1A ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN E..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN O +1A1B ; Alphabetic # Mn BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN AE +1A20..1A54 ; Alphabetic # Lo [53] TAI THAM LETTER HIGH KA..TAI THAM LETTER GREAT SA +1A55 ; Alphabetic # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +1A56 ; Alphabetic # Mn TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA +1A57 ; Alphabetic # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN LA TANG LAI +1A58..1A5E ; Alphabetic # Mn [7] TAI THAM SIGN MAI KANG LAI..TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN SA +1A61 ; Alphabetic # Mc TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN A +1A62 ; Alphabetic # Mn TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN MAI SAT +1A63..1A64 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN AA..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN TALL AA +1A65..1A6C ; Alphabetic # Mn [8] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN I..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA BELOW +1A6D..1A72 ; Alphabetic # Mc [6] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OY..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN THAM AI +1A73..1A74 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA ABOVE..TAI THAM SIGN MAI KANG +1AA7 ; Alphabetic # Lm TAI THAM SIGN MAI YAMOK +1ABF..1AC0 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER W BELOW..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED W BELOW +1ACC..1ACE ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +1B00..1B03 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] BALINESE SIGN ULU RICEM..BALINESE SIGN SURANG +1B04 ; Alphabetic # Mc BALINESE SIGN BISAH +1B05..1B33 ; Alphabetic # Lo [47] BALINESE LETTER AKARA..BALINESE LETTER HA +1B35 ; Alphabetic # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TEDUNG +1B36..1B3A ; Alphabetic # Mn [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN ULU..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA +1B3B ; Alphabetic # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA TEDUNG +1B3C ; Alphabetic # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA +1B3D..1B41 ; Alphabetic # Mc [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA TEDUNG..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TALING REPA TEDUNG +1B42 ; Alphabetic # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET +1B43 ; Alphabetic # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET TEDUNG +1B45..1B4C ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] BALINESE LETTER KAF SASAK..BALINESE LETTER ARCHAIC JNYA +1B80..1B81 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] SUNDANESE SIGN PANYECEK..SUNDANESE SIGN PANGLAYAR +1B82 ; Alphabetic # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PANGWISAD +1B83..1BA0 ; Alphabetic # Lo [30] SUNDANESE LETTER A..SUNDANESE LETTER HA +1BA1 ; Alphabetic # Mc SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PAMINGKAL +1BA2..1BA5 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PANYAKRA..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANYUKU +1BA6..1BA7 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANAELAENG..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANOLONG +1BA8..1BA9 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PAMEPET..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANEULEUNG +1BAC..1BAD ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PASANGAN MA..SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PASANGAN WA +1BAE..1BAF ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] SUNDANESE LETTER KHA..SUNDANESE LETTER SYA +1BBA..1BE5 ; Alphabetic # Lo [44] SUNDANESE AVAGRAHA..BATAK LETTER U +1BE7 ; Alphabetic # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN E +1BE8..1BE9 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] BATAK VOWEL SIGN PAKPAK E..BATAK VOWEL SIGN EE +1BEA..1BEC ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN I..BATAK VOWEL SIGN O +1BED ; Alphabetic # Mn BATAK VOWEL SIGN KARO O +1BEE ; Alphabetic # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN U +1BEF..1BF1 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN U FOR SIMALUNGUN SA..BATAK CONSONANT SIGN H +1C00..1C23 ; Alphabetic # Lo [36] LEPCHA LETTER KA..LEPCHA LETTER A +1C24..1C2B ; Alphabetic # Mc [8] LEPCHA SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN UU +1C2C..1C33 ; Alphabetic # Mn [8] LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN E..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN T +1C34..1C35 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN NYIN-DO..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN KANG +1C36 ; Alphabetic # Mn LEPCHA SIGN RAN +1C4D..1C4F ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] LEPCHA LETTER TTA..LEPCHA LETTER DDA +1C5A..1C77 ; Alphabetic # Lo [30] OL CHIKI LETTER LA..OL CHIKI LETTER OH +1C78..1C7D ; Alphabetic # Lm [6] OL CHIKI MU TTUDDAG..OL CHIKI AHAD +1C80..1C88 ; Alphabetic # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1C90..1CBA ; Alphabetic # L& [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; Alphabetic # L& [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1CE9..1CEC ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA..VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA VAMAGOMUKHA WITH TAIL +1CEE..1CF3 ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] VEDIC SIGN HEXIFORM LONG ANUSVARA..VEDIC SIGN ROTATED ARDHAVISARGA +1CF5..1CF6 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] VEDIC SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..VEDIC SIGN UPADHMANIYA +1CFA ; Alphabetic # Lo VEDIC SIGN DOUBLE ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA +1D00..1D2B ; Alphabetic # L& [44] LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL A..CYRILLIC LETTER SMALL CAPITAL EL +1D2C..1D6A ; Alphabetic # Lm [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1D6B..1D77 ; Alphabetic # L& [13] LATIN SMALL LETTER UE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED G +1D78 ; Alphabetic # Lm MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC EN +1D79..1D9A ; Alphabetic # L& [34] LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1D9B..1DBF ; Alphabetic # Lm [37] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED ALPHA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL THETA +1DE7..1DF4 ; Alphabetic # Mn [14] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER ALPHA..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS +1E00..1F15 ; Alphabetic # L& [278] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F18..1F1D ; Alphabetic # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F45 ; Alphabetic # L& [38] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F48..1F4D ; Alphabetic # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; Alphabetic # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F59 ; Alphabetic # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; Alphabetic # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; Alphabetic # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F..1F7D ; Alphabetic # L& [31] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1FB4 ; Alphabetic # L& [53] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FBC ; Alphabetic # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBE ; Alphabetic # L& GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; Alphabetic # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FCC ; Alphabetic # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; Alphabetic # L& [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FDB ; Alphabetic # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE0..1FEC ; Alphabetic # L& [13] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF2..1FF4 ; Alphabetic # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FFC ; Alphabetic # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +2071 ; Alphabetic # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +207F ; Alphabetic # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER N +2090..209C ; Alphabetic # Lm [13] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER T +2102 ; Alphabetic # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL C +2107 ; Alphabetic # L& EULER CONSTANT +210A..2113 ; Alphabetic # L& [10] SCRIPT SMALL G..SCRIPT SMALL L +2115 ; Alphabetic # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL N +2119..211D ; Alphabetic # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL P..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL R +2124 ; Alphabetic # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Z +2126 ; Alphabetic # L& OHM SIGN +2128 ; Alphabetic # L& BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL Z +212A..212D ; Alphabetic # L& [4] KELVIN SIGN..BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL C +212F..2134 ; Alphabetic # L& [6] SCRIPT SMALL E..SCRIPT SMALL O +2135..2138 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ALEF SYMBOL..DALET SYMBOL +2139 ; Alphabetic # L& INFORMATION SOURCE +213C..213F ; Alphabetic # L& [4] DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL PI..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL PI +2145..2149 ; Alphabetic # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC CAPITAL D..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +214E ; Alphabetic # L& TURNED SMALL F +2160..2182 ; Alphabetic # Nl [35] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..ROMAN NUMERAL TEN THOUSAND +2183..2184 ; Alphabetic # L& [2] ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +2185..2188 ; Alphabetic # Nl [4] ROMAN NUMERAL SIX LATE FORM..ROMAN NUMERAL ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND +24B6..24E9 ; Alphabetic # So [52] CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +2C00..2C7B ; Alphabetic # L& [124] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED E +2C7C..2C7D ; Alphabetic # Lm [2] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL V +2C7E..2CE4 ; Alphabetic # L& [103] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC SYMBOL KAI +2CEB..2CEE ; Alphabetic # L& [4] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF2..2CF3 ; Alphabetic # L& [2] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2D00..2D25 ; Alphabetic # L& [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; Alphabetic # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; Alphabetic # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +2D30..2D67 ; Alphabetic # Lo [56] TIFINAGH LETTER YA..TIFINAGH LETTER YO +2D6F ; Alphabetic # Lm TIFINAGH MODIFIER LETTER LABIALIZATION MARK +2D80..2D96 ; Alphabetic # Lo [23] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE LOA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGWE +2DA0..2DA6 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSO +2DA8..2DAE ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCO +2DB0..2DB6 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZO +2DB8..2DBE ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHO +2DC0..2DC6 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYO +2DC8..2DCE ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYO +2DD0..2DD6 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYO +2DD8..2DDE ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYO +2DE0..2DFF ; Alphabetic # Mn [32] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER BE..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +2E2F ; Alphabetic # Lm VERTICAL TILDE +3005 ; Alphabetic # Lm IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +3006 ; Alphabetic # Lo IDEOGRAPHIC CLOSING MARK +3007 ; Alphabetic # Nl IDEOGRAPHIC NUMBER ZERO +3021..3029 ; Alphabetic # Nl [9] HANGZHOU NUMERAL ONE..HANGZHOU NUMERAL NINE +3031..3035 ; Alphabetic # Lm [5] VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK..VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK LOWER HALF +3038..303A ; Alphabetic # Nl [3] HANGZHOU NUMERAL TEN..HANGZHOU NUMERAL THIRTY +303B ; Alphabetic # Lm VERTICAL IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +303C ; Alphabetic # Lo MASU MARK +3041..3096 ; Alphabetic # Lo [86] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL A..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL KE +309D..309E ; Alphabetic # Lm [2] HIRAGANA ITERATION MARK..HIRAGANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +309F ; Alphabetic # Lo HIRAGANA DIGRAPH YORI +30A1..30FA ; Alphabetic # Lo [90] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL A..KATAKANA LETTER VO +30FC..30FE ; Alphabetic # Lm [3] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +30FF ; Alphabetic # Lo KATAKANA DIGRAPH KOTO +3105..312F ; Alphabetic # Lo [43] BOPOMOFO LETTER B..BOPOMOFO LETTER NN +3131..318E ; Alphabetic # Lo [94] HANGUL LETTER KIYEOK..HANGUL LETTER ARAEAE +31A0..31BF ; Alphabetic # Lo [32] BOPOMOFO LETTER BU..BOPOMOFO LETTER AH +31F0..31FF ; Alphabetic # Lo [16] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL KU..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL RO +3400..4DBF ; Alphabetic # Lo [6592] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3400..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4DBF +4E00..A014 ; Alphabetic # Lo [21013] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4E00..YI SYLLABLE E +A015 ; Alphabetic # Lm YI SYLLABLE WU +A016..A48C ; Alphabetic # Lo [1143] YI SYLLABLE BIT..YI SYLLABLE YYR +A4D0..A4F7 ; Alphabetic # Lo [40] LISU LETTER BA..LISU LETTER OE +A4F8..A4FD ; Alphabetic # Lm [6] LISU LETTER TONE MYA TI..LISU LETTER TONE MYA JEU +A500..A60B ; Alphabetic # Lo [268] VAI SYLLABLE EE..VAI SYLLABLE NG +A60C ; Alphabetic # Lm VAI SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +A610..A61F ; Alphabetic # Lo [16] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE FA..VAI SYMBOL JONG +A62A..A62B ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE MA..VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE DO +A640..A66D ; Alphabetic # L& [46] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A66E ; Alphabetic # Lo CYRILLIC LETTER MULTIOCULAR O +A674..A67B ; Alphabetic # Mn [8] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER UKRAINIAN IE..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER OMEGA +A67F ; Alphabetic # Lm CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A680..A69B ; Alphabetic # L& [28] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A69C..A69D ; Alphabetic # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A69E..A69F ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER EF..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED E +A6A0..A6E5 ; Alphabetic # Lo [70] BAMUM LETTER A..BAMUM LETTER KI +A6E6..A6EF ; Alphabetic # Nl [10] BAMUM LETTER MO..BAMUM LETTER KOGHOM +A717..A71F ; Alphabetic # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER DOT VERTICAL BAR..MODIFIER LETTER LOW INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +A722..A76F ; Alphabetic # L& [78] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF..LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A770 ; Alphabetic # Lm MODIFIER LETTER US +A771..A787 ; Alphabetic # L& [23] LATIN SMALL LETTER DUM..LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A788 ; Alphabetic # Lm MODIFIER LETTER LOW CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +A78B..A78E ; Alphabetic # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH RETROFLEX HOOK AND BELT +A78F ; Alphabetic # Lo LATIN LETTER SINOLOGICAL DOT +A790..A7CA ; Alphabetic # L& [59] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0..A7D1 ; Alphabetic # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D3 ; Alphabetic # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE THORN +A7D5..A7D9 ; Alphabetic # L& [5] LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE WYNN..LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F2..A7F4 ; Alphabetic # Lm [3] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL C..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL Q +A7F5..A7F6 ; Alphabetic # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +A7F7 ; Alphabetic # Lo LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER SIDEWAYS I +A7F8..A7F9 ; Alphabetic # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +A7FA ; Alphabetic # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED M +A7FB..A801 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER REVERSED F..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER I +A802 ; Alphabetic # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN DVISVARA +A803..A805 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER U..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER O +A807..A80A ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER KO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER GHO +A80B ; Alphabetic # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ANUSVARA +A80C..A822 ; Alphabetic # Lo [23] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER CO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER HO +A823..A824 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN A..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN I +A825..A826 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN U..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN E +A827 ; Alphabetic # Mc SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN OO +A840..A873 ; Alphabetic # Lo [52] PHAGS-PA LETTER KA..PHAGS-PA LETTER CANDRABINDU +A880..A881 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN ANUSVARA..SAURASHTRA SIGN VISARGA +A882..A8B3 ; Alphabetic # Lo [50] SAURASHTRA LETTER A..SAURASHTRA LETTER LLA +A8B4..A8C3 ; Alphabetic # Mc [16] SAURASHTRA CONSONANT SIGN HAARU..SAURASHTRA VOWEL SIGN AU +A8C5 ; Alphabetic # Mn SAURASHTRA SIGN CANDRABINDU +A8F2..A8F7 ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] DEVANAGARI SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU..DEVANAGARI SIGN CANDRABINDU AVAGRAHA +A8FB ; Alphabetic # Lo DEVANAGARI HEADSTROKE +A8FD..A8FE ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] DEVANAGARI JAIN OM..DEVANAGARI LETTER AY +A8FF ; Alphabetic # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AY +A90A..A925 ; Alphabetic # Lo [28] KAYAH LI LETTER KA..KAYAH LI LETTER OO +A926..A92A ; Alphabetic # Mn [5] KAYAH LI VOWEL UE..KAYAH LI VOWEL O +A930..A946 ; Alphabetic # Lo [23] REJANG LETTER KA..REJANG LETTER A +A947..A951 ; Alphabetic # Mn [11] REJANG VOWEL SIGN I..REJANG CONSONANT SIGN R +A952 ; Alphabetic # Mc REJANG CONSONANT SIGN H +A960..A97C ; Alphabetic # Lo [29] HANGUL CHOSEONG TIKEUT-MIEUM..HANGUL CHOSEONG SSANGYEORINHIEUH +A980..A982 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] JAVANESE SIGN PANYANGGA..JAVANESE SIGN LAYAR +A983 ; Alphabetic # Mc JAVANESE SIGN WIGNYAN +A984..A9B2 ; Alphabetic # Lo [47] JAVANESE LETTER A..JAVANESE LETTER HA +A9B4..A9B5 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TARUNG..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TOLONG +A9B6..A9B9 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN WULU..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN SUKU MENDUT +A9BA..A9BB ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TALING..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN DIRGA MURE +A9BC..A9BD ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET..JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN KERET +A9BE..A9BF ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN PENGKAL..JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN CAKRA +A9CF ; Alphabetic # Lm JAVANESE PANGRANGKEP +A9E0..A9E4 ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN GHA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN BHA +A9E5 ; Alphabetic # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN SAW +A9E6 ; Alphabetic # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER SHAN REDUPLICATION +A9E7..A9EF ; Alphabetic # Lo [9] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NYA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NNA +A9FA..A9FE ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING LLA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING BHA +AA00..AA28 ; Alphabetic # Lo [41] CHAM LETTER A..CHAM LETTER HA +AA29..AA2E ; Alphabetic # Mn [6] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAM VOWEL SIGN OE +AA2F..AA30 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN O..CHAM VOWEL SIGN AI +AA31..AA32 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AU..CHAM VOWEL SIGN UE +AA33..AA34 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN YA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN RA +AA35..AA36 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN LA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN WA +AA40..AA42 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] CHAM LETTER FINAL K..CHAM LETTER FINAL NG +AA43 ; Alphabetic # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL NG +AA44..AA4B ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] CHAM LETTER FINAL CH..CHAM LETTER FINAL SS +AA4C ; Alphabetic # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL M +AA4D ; Alphabetic # Mc CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL H +AA60..AA6F ; Alphabetic # Lo [16] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI GA..MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI FA +AA70 ; Alphabetic # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER KHAMTI REDUPLICATION +AA71..AA76 ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI XA..MYANMAR LOGOGRAM KHAMTI HM +AA7A ; Alphabetic # Lo MYANMAR LETTER AITON RA +AA7B ; Alphabetic # Mc MYANMAR SIGN PAO KAREN TONE +AA7C ; Alphabetic # Mn MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-2 +AA7D ; Alphabetic # Mc MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-5 +AA7E..AAAF ; Alphabetic # Lo [50] MYANMAR LETTER SHWE PALAUNG CHA..TAI VIET LETTER HIGH O +AAB0 ; Alphabetic # Mn TAI VIET MAI KANG +AAB1 ; Alphabetic # Lo TAI VIET VOWEL AA +AAB2..AAB4 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] TAI VIET VOWEL I..TAI VIET VOWEL U +AAB5..AAB6 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] TAI VIET VOWEL E..TAI VIET VOWEL O +AAB7..AAB8 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] TAI VIET MAI KHIT..TAI VIET VOWEL IA +AAB9..AABD ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] TAI VIET VOWEL UEA..TAI VIET VOWEL AN +AABE ; Alphabetic # Mn TAI VIET VOWEL AM +AAC0 ; Alphabetic # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI NUENG +AAC2 ; Alphabetic # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI SONG +AADB..AADC ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] TAI VIET SYMBOL KON..TAI VIET SYMBOL NUENG +AADD ; Alphabetic # Lm TAI VIET SYMBOL SAM +AAE0..AAEA ; Alphabetic # Lo [11] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER E..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER SSA +AAEB ; Alphabetic # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN II +AAEC..AAED ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAI +AAEE..AAEF ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAU +AAF2 ; Alphabetic # Lo MEETEI MAYEK ANJI +AAF3..AAF4 ; Alphabetic # Lm [2] MEETEI MAYEK SYLLABLE REPETITION MARK..MEETEI MAYEK WORD REPETITION MARK +AAF5 ; Alphabetic # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN VISARGA +AB01..AB06 ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHO +AB09..AB0E ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHO +AB11..AB16 ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZO +AB20..AB26 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHO +AB28..AB2E ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBO +AB30..AB5A ; Alphabetic # L& [43] LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED ALPHA..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH SHORT RIGHT LEG +AB5C..AB5F ; Alphabetic # Lm [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +AB60..AB68 ; Alphabetic # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER SAKHA YAT..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED R WITH MIDDLE TILDE +AB69 ; Alphabetic # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED W +AB70..ABBF ; Alphabetic # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +ABC0..ABE2 ; Alphabetic # Lo [35] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER KOK..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER I LONSUM +ABE3..ABE4 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ONAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN INAP +ABE5 ; Alphabetic # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ANAP +ABE6..ABE7 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN YENAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN SOUNAP +ABE8 ; Alphabetic # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UNAP +ABE9..ABEA ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN CHEINAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN NUNG +AC00..D7A3 ; Alphabetic # Lo [11172] HANGUL SYLLABLE GA..HANGUL SYLLABLE HIH +D7B0..D7C6 ; Alphabetic # Lo [23] HANGUL JUNGSEONG O-YEO..HANGUL JUNGSEONG ARAEA-E +D7CB..D7FB ; Alphabetic # Lo [49] HANGUL JONGSEONG NIEUN-RIEUL..HANGUL JONGSEONG PHIEUPH-THIEUTH +F900..FA6D ; Alphabetic # Lo [366] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-F900..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA6D +FA70..FAD9 ; Alphabetic # Lo [106] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA70..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FAD9 +FB00..FB06 ; Alphabetic # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; Alphabetic # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FB1D ; Alphabetic # Lo HEBREW LETTER YOD WITH HIRIQ +FB1E ; Alphabetic # Mn HEBREW POINT JUDEO-SPANISH VARIKA +FB1F..FB28 ; Alphabetic # Lo [10] HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH YOD YOD PATAH..HEBREW LETTER WIDE TAV +FB2A..FB36 ; Alphabetic # Lo [13] HEBREW LETTER SHIN WITH SHIN DOT..HEBREW LETTER ZAYIN WITH DAGESH +FB38..FB3C ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] HEBREW LETTER TET WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER LAMED WITH DAGESH +FB3E ; Alphabetic # Lo HEBREW LETTER MEM WITH DAGESH +FB40..FB41 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER NUN WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER SAMEKH WITH DAGESH +FB43..FB44 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER FINAL PE WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER PE WITH DAGESH +FB46..FBB1 ; Alphabetic # Lo [108] HEBREW LETTER TSADI WITH DAGESH..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE FINAL FORM +FBD3..FD3D ; Alphabetic # Lo [363] ARABIC LETTER NG ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE ALEF WITH FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM +FD50..FD8F ; Alphabetic # Lo [64] ARABIC LIGATURE TEH WITH JEEM WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH KHAH WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM +FD92..FDC7 ; Alphabetic # Lo [54] ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH JEEM WITH KHAH INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE NOON WITH JEEM WITH YEH FINAL FORM +FDF0..FDFB ; Alphabetic # Lo [12] ARABIC LIGATURE SALLA USED AS KORANIC STOP SIGN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE JALLAJALALOUHOU +FE70..FE74 ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] ARABIC FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC KASRATAN ISOLATED FORM +FE76..FEFC ; Alphabetic # Lo [135] ARABIC FATHA ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE LAM WITH ALEF FINAL FORM +FF21..FF3A ; Alphabetic # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +FF41..FF5A ; Alphabetic # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +FF66..FF6F ; Alphabetic # Lo [10] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER WO..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER SMALL TU +FF70 ; Alphabetic # Lm HALFWIDTH KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK +FF71..FF9D ; Alphabetic # Lo [45] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER A..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER N +FF9E..FF9F ; Alphabetic # Lm [2] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA VOICED SOUND MARK..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +FFA0..FFBE ; Alphabetic # Lo [31] HALFWIDTH HANGUL FILLER..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER HIEUH +FFC2..FFC7 ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER A..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER E +FFCA..FFCF ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YEO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER OE +FFD2..FFD7 ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YU +FFDA..FFDC ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER EU..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER I +10000..1000B ; Alphabetic # Lo [12] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B008 A..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B046 JE +1000D..10026 ; Alphabetic # Lo [26] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B036 JO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B032 QO +10028..1003A ; Alphabetic # Lo [19] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B060 RA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B042 WO +1003C..1003D ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B017 ZA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B074 ZE +1003F..1004D ; Alphabetic # Lo [15] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B020 ZO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B091 TWO +10050..1005D ; Alphabetic # Lo [14] LINEAR B SYMBOL B018..LINEAR B SYMBOL B089 +10080..100FA ; Alphabetic # Lo [123] LINEAR B IDEOGRAM B100 MAN..LINEAR B IDEOGRAM VESSEL B305 +10140..10174 ; Alphabetic # Nl [53] GREEK ACROPHONIC ATTIC ONE QUARTER..GREEK ACROPHONIC STRATIAN FIFTY MNAS +10280..1029C ; Alphabetic # Lo [29] LYCIAN LETTER A..LYCIAN LETTER X +102A0..102D0 ; Alphabetic # Lo [49] CARIAN LETTER A..CARIAN LETTER UUU3 +10300..1031F ; Alphabetic # Lo [32] OLD ITALIC LETTER A..OLD ITALIC LETTER ESS +1032D..10340 ; Alphabetic # Lo [20] OLD ITALIC LETTER YE..GOTHIC LETTER PAIRTHRA +10341 ; Alphabetic # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINETY +10342..10349 ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] GOTHIC LETTER RAIDA..GOTHIC LETTER OTHAL +1034A ; Alphabetic # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINE HUNDRED +10350..10375 ; Alphabetic # Lo [38] OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..OLD PERMIC LETTER IA +10376..1037A ; Alphabetic # Mn [5] COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER SII +10380..1039D ; Alphabetic # Lo [30] UGARITIC LETTER ALPA..UGARITIC LETTER SSU +103A0..103C3 ; Alphabetic # Lo [36] OLD PERSIAN SIGN A..OLD PERSIAN SIGN HA +103C8..103CF ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] OLD PERSIAN SIGN AURAMAZDAA..OLD PERSIAN SIGN BUUMISH +103D1..103D5 ; Alphabetic # Nl [5] OLD PERSIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD PERSIAN NUMBER HUNDRED +10400..1044F ; Alphabetic # L& [80] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +10450..1049D ; Alphabetic # Lo [78] SHAVIAN LETTER PEEP..OSMANYA LETTER OO +104B0..104D3 ; Alphabetic # L& [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +104D8..104FB ; Alphabetic # L& [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10500..10527 ; Alphabetic # Lo [40] ELBASAN LETTER A..ELBASAN LETTER KHE +10530..10563 ; Alphabetic # Lo [52] CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER ALT..CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER KIW +10570..1057A ; Alphabetic # L& [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; Alphabetic # L& [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; Alphabetic # L& [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; Alphabetic # L& [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10597..105A1 ; Alphabetic # L& [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; Alphabetic # L& [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; Alphabetic # L& [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; Alphabetic # L& [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10600..10736 ; Alphabetic # Lo [311] LINEAR A SIGN AB001..LINEAR A SIGN A664 +10740..10755 ; Alphabetic # Lo [22] LINEAR A SIGN A701 A..LINEAR A SIGN A732 JE +10760..10767 ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] LINEAR A SIGN A800..LINEAR A SIGN A807 +10780..10785 ; Alphabetic # Lm [6] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; Alphabetic # Lm [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; Alphabetic # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL +10800..10805 ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE A..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JA +10808 ; Alphabetic # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JO +1080A..10835 ; Alphabetic # Lo [44] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE KA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE WO +10837..10838 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XE +1083C ; Alphabetic # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZA +1083F..10855 ; Alphabetic # Lo [23] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZO..IMPERIAL ARAMAIC LETTER TAW +10860..10876 ; Alphabetic # Lo [23] PALMYRENE LETTER ALEPH..PALMYRENE LETTER TAW +10880..1089E ; Alphabetic # Lo [31] NABATAEAN LETTER FINAL ALEPH..NABATAEAN LETTER TAW +108E0..108F2 ; Alphabetic # Lo [19] HATRAN LETTER ALEPH..HATRAN LETTER QOPH +108F4..108F5 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] HATRAN LETTER SHIN..HATRAN LETTER TAW +10900..10915 ; Alphabetic # Lo [22] PHOENICIAN LETTER ALF..PHOENICIAN LETTER TAU +10920..10939 ; Alphabetic # Lo [26] LYDIAN LETTER A..LYDIAN LETTER C +10980..109B7 ; Alphabetic # Lo [56] MEROITIC HIEROGLYPHIC LETTER A..MEROITIC CURSIVE LETTER DA +109BE..109BF ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM RMT..MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM IMN +10A00 ; Alphabetic # Lo KHAROSHTHI LETTER A +10A01..10A03 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN I..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +10A05..10A06 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN E..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN O +10A0C..10A0F ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL LENGTH MARK..KHAROSHTHI SIGN VISARGA +10A10..10A13 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] KHAROSHTHI LETTER KA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER GHA +10A15..10A17 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] KHAROSHTHI LETTER CA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER JA +10A19..10A35 ; Alphabetic # Lo [29] KHAROSHTHI LETTER NYA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER VHA +10A60..10A7C ; Alphabetic # Lo [29] OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER HE..OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER THETH +10A80..10A9C ; Alphabetic # Lo [29] OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER HEH..OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER ZAH +10AC0..10AC7 ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] MANICHAEAN LETTER ALEPH..MANICHAEAN LETTER WAW +10AC9..10AE4 ; Alphabetic # Lo [28] MANICHAEAN LETTER ZAYIN..MANICHAEAN LETTER TAW +10B00..10B35 ; Alphabetic # Lo [54] AVESTAN LETTER A..AVESTAN LETTER HE +10B40..10B55 ; Alphabetic # Lo [22] INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER TAW +10B60..10B72 ; Alphabetic # Lo [19] INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10B80..10B91 ; Alphabetic # Lo [18] PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10C00..10C48 ; Alphabetic # Lo [73] OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON A..OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON BASH +10C80..10CB2 ; Alphabetic # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +10CC0..10CF2 ; Alphabetic # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +10D00..10D23 ; Alphabetic # Lo [36] HANIFI ROHINGYA LETTER A..HANIFI ROHINGYA MARK NA KHONNA +10D24..10D27 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN HARBAHAY..HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN TASSI +10E80..10EA9 ; Alphabetic # Lo [42] YEZIDI LETTER ELIF..YEZIDI LETTER ET +10EAB..10EAC ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] YEZIDI COMBINING HAMZA MARK..YEZIDI COMBINING MADDA MARK +10EB0..10EB1 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] YEZIDI LETTER LAM WITH DOT ABOVE..YEZIDI LETTER YOT WITH CIRCUMFLEX ABOVE +10F00..10F1C ; Alphabetic # Lo [29] OLD SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..OLD SOGDIAN LETTER FINAL TAW WITH VERTICAL TAIL +10F27 ; Alphabetic # Lo OLD SOGDIAN LIGATURE AYIN-DALETH +10F30..10F45 ; Alphabetic # Lo [22] SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..SOGDIAN INDEPENDENT SHIN +10F70..10F81 ; Alphabetic # Lo [18] OLD UYGHUR LETTER ALEPH..OLD UYGHUR LETTER LESH +10FB0..10FC4 ; Alphabetic # Lo [21] CHORASMIAN LETTER ALEPH..CHORASMIAN LETTER TAW +10FE0..10FF6 ; Alphabetic # Lo [23] ELYMAIC LETTER ALEPH..ELYMAIC LIGATURE ZAYIN-YODH +11000 ; Alphabetic # Mc BRAHMI SIGN CANDRABINDU +11001 ; Alphabetic # Mn BRAHMI SIGN ANUSVARA +11002 ; Alphabetic # Mc BRAHMI SIGN VISARGA +11003..11037 ; Alphabetic # Lo [53] BRAHMI SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL NNNA +11038..11045 ; Alphabetic # Mn [14] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN AA..BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN AU +11071..11072 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT O +11073..11074 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT O +11075 ; Alphabetic # Lo BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL LLA +11082 ; Alphabetic # Mc KAITHI SIGN VISARGA +11083..110AF ; Alphabetic # Lo [45] KAITHI LETTER A..KAITHI LETTER HA +110B0..110B2 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AA..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN II +110B3..110B6 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN U..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AI +110B7..110B8 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN O..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AU +110C2 ; Alphabetic # Mn KAITHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +110D0..110E8 ; Alphabetic # Lo [25] SORA SOMPENG LETTER SAH..SORA SOMPENG LETTER MAE +11100..11102 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] CHAKMA SIGN CANDRABINDU..CHAKMA SIGN VISARGA +11103..11126 ; Alphabetic # Lo [36] CHAKMA LETTER AA..CHAKMA LETTER HAA +11127..1112B ; Alphabetic # Mn [5] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN A..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN UU +1112C ; Alphabetic # Mc CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN E +1112D..11132 ; Alphabetic # Mn [6] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AI..CHAKMA AU MARK +11144 ; Alphabetic # Lo CHAKMA LETTER LHAA +11145..11146 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN EI +11147 ; Alphabetic # Lo CHAKMA LETTER VAA +11150..11172 ; Alphabetic # Lo [35] MAHAJANI LETTER A..MAHAJANI LETTER RRA +11176 ; Alphabetic # Lo MAHAJANI LIGATURE SHRI +11180..11181 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] SHARADA SIGN CANDRABINDU..SHARADA SIGN ANUSVARA +11182 ; Alphabetic # Mc SHARADA SIGN VISARGA +11183..111B2 ; Alphabetic # Lo [48] SHARADA LETTER A..SHARADA LETTER HA +111B3..111B5 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AA..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN II +111B6..111BE ; Alphabetic # Mn [9] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN U..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN O +111BF ; Alphabetic # Mc SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AU +111C1..111C4 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] SHARADA SIGN AVAGRAHA..SHARADA OM +111CE ; Alphabetic # Mc SHARADA VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +111CF ; Alphabetic # Mn SHARADA SIGN INVERTED CANDRABINDU +111DA ; Alphabetic # Lo SHARADA EKAM +111DC ; Alphabetic # Lo SHARADA HEADSTROKE +11200..11211 ; Alphabetic # Lo [18] KHOJKI LETTER A..KHOJKI LETTER JJA +11213..1122B ; Alphabetic # Lo [25] KHOJKI LETTER NYA..KHOJKI LETTER LLA +1122C..1122E ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN II +1122F..11231 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN U..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AI +11232..11233 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN O..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AU +11234 ; Alphabetic # Mn KHOJKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11237 ; Alphabetic # Mn KHOJKI SIGN SHADDA +1123E ; Alphabetic # Mn KHOJKI SIGN SUKUN +11280..11286 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] MULTANI LETTER A..MULTANI LETTER GA +11288 ; Alphabetic # Lo MULTANI LETTER GHA +1128A..1128D ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] MULTANI LETTER CA..MULTANI LETTER JJA +1128F..1129D ; Alphabetic # Lo [15] MULTANI LETTER NYA..MULTANI LETTER BA +1129F..112A8 ; Alphabetic # Lo [10] MULTANI LETTER BHA..MULTANI LETTER RHA +112B0..112DE ; Alphabetic # Lo [47] KHUDAWADI LETTER A..KHUDAWADI LETTER HA +112DF ; Alphabetic # Mn KHUDAWADI SIGN ANUSVARA +112E0..112E2 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN II +112E3..112E8 ; Alphabetic # Mn [6] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN U..KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN AU +11300..11301 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] GRANTHA SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..GRANTHA SIGN CANDRABINDU +11302..11303 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] GRANTHA SIGN ANUSVARA..GRANTHA SIGN VISARGA +11305..1130C ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] GRANTHA LETTER A..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC L +1130F..11310 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER EE..GRANTHA LETTER AI +11313..11328 ; Alphabetic # Lo [22] GRANTHA LETTER OO..GRANTHA LETTER NA +1132A..11330 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] GRANTHA LETTER PA..GRANTHA LETTER RA +11332..11333 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER LA..GRANTHA LETTER LLA +11335..11339 ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] GRANTHA LETTER VA..GRANTHA LETTER HA +1133D ; Alphabetic # Lo GRANTHA SIGN AVAGRAHA +1133E..1133F ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AA..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN I +11340 ; Alphabetic # Mn GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN II +11341..11344 ; Alphabetic # Mc [4] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN U..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +11347..11348 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN EE..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AI +1134B..1134C ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN OO..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AU +11350 ; Alphabetic # Lo GRANTHA OM +11357 ; Alphabetic # Mc GRANTHA AU LENGTH MARK +1135D..11361 ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] GRANTHA SIGN PLUTA..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC LL +11362..11363 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +11400..11434 ; Alphabetic # Lo [53] NEWA LETTER A..NEWA LETTER HA +11435..11437 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] NEWA VOWEL SIGN AA..NEWA VOWEL SIGN II +11438..1143F ; Alphabetic # Mn [8] NEWA VOWEL SIGN U..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AI +11440..11441 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] NEWA VOWEL SIGN O..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AU +11443..11444 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] NEWA SIGN CANDRABINDU..NEWA SIGN ANUSVARA +11445 ; Alphabetic # Mc NEWA SIGN VISARGA +11447..1144A ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] NEWA SIGN AVAGRAHA..NEWA SIDDHI +1145F..11461 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] NEWA LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..NEWA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +11480..114AF ; Alphabetic # Lo [48] TIRHUTA ANJI..TIRHUTA LETTER HA +114B0..114B2 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AA..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN II +114B3..114B8 ; Alphabetic # Mn [6] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN U..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +114B9 ; Alphabetic # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN E +114BA ; Alphabetic # Mn TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN SHORT E +114BB..114BE ; Alphabetic # Mc [4] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AI..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AU +114BF..114C0 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN CANDRABINDU..TIRHUTA SIGN ANUSVARA +114C1 ; Alphabetic # Mc TIRHUTA SIGN VISARGA +114C4..114C5 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] TIRHUTA SIGN AVAGRAHA..TIRHUTA GVANG +114C7 ; Alphabetic # Lo TIRHUTA OM +11580..115AE ; Alphabetic # Lo [47] SIDDHAM LETTER A..SIDDHAM LETTER HA +115AF..115B1 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN II +115B2..115B5 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +115B8..115BB ; Alphabetic # Mc [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN E..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AU +115BC..115BD ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN CANDRABINDU..SIDDHAM SIGN ANUSVARA +115BE ; Alphabetic # Mc SIDDHAM SIGN VISARGA +115D8..115DB ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] SIDDHAM LETTER THREE-CIRCLE ALTERNATE I..SIDDHAM LETTER ALTERNATE U +115DC..115DD ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE UU +11600..1162F ; Alphabetic # Lo [48] MODI LETTER A..MODI LETTER LLA +11630..11632 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] MODI VOWEL SIGN AA..MODI VOWEL SIGN II +11633..1163A ; Alphabetic # Mn [8] MODI VOWEL SIGN U..MODI VOWEL SIGN AI +1163B..1163C ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] MODI VOWEL SIGN O..MODI VOWEL SIGN AU +1163D ; Alphabetic # Mn MODI SIGN ANUSVARA +1163E ; Alphabetic # Mc MODI SIGN VISARGA +11640 ; Alphabetic # Mn MODI SIGN ARDHACANDRA +11644 ; Alphabetic # Lo MODI SIGN HUVA +11680..116AA ; Alphabetic # Lo [43] TAKRI LETTER A..TAKRI LETTER RRA +116AB ; Alphabetic # Mn TAKRI SIGN ANUSVARA +116AC ; Alphabetic # Mc TAKRI SIGN VISARGA +116AD ; Alphabetic # Mn TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AA +116AE..116AF ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN I..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN II +116B0..116B5 ; Alphabetic # Mn [6] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN U..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AU +116B8 ; Alphabetic # Lo TAKRI LETTER ARCHAIC KHA +11700..1171A ; Alphabetic # Lo [27] AHOM LETTER KA..AHOM LETTER ALTERNATE BA +1171D..1171F ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA..AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LIGATING RA +11720..11721 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] AHOM VOWEL SIGN A..AHOM VOWEL SIGN AA +11722..11725 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] AHOM VOWEL SIGN I..AHOM VOWEL SIGN UU +11726 ; Alphabetic # Mc AHOM VOWEL SIGN E +11727..1172A ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] AHOM VOWEL SIGN AW..AHOM VOWEL SIGN AM +11740..11746 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] AHOM LETTER CA..AHOM LETTER LLA +11800..1182B ; Alphabetic # Lo [44] DOGRA LETTER A..DOGRA LETTER RRA +1182C..1182E ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN AA..DOGRA VOWEL SIGN II +1182F..11837 ; Alphabetic # Mn [9] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN U..DOGRA SIGN ANUSVARA +11838 ; Alphabetic # Mc DOGRA SIGN VISARGA +118A0..118DF ; Alphabetic # L& [64] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +118FF..11906 ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] WARANG CITI OM..DIVES AKURU LETTER E +11909 ; Alphabetic # Lo DIVES AKURU LETTER O +1190C..11913 ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] DIVES AKURU LETTER KA..DIVES AKURU LETTER JA +11915..11916 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] DIVES AKURU LETTER NYA..DIVES AKURU LETTER TTA +11918..1192F ; Alphabetic # Lo [24] DIVES AKURU LETTER DDA..DIVES AKURU LETTER ZA +11930..11935 ; Alphabetic # Mc [6] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AA..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN E +11937..11938 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AI..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN O +1193B..1193C ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] DIVES AKURU SIGN ANUSVARA..DIVES AKURU SIGN CANDRABINDU +1193F ; Alphabetic # Lo DIVES AKURU PREFIXED NASAL SIGN +11940 ; Alphabetic # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL YA +11941 ; Alphabetic # Lo DIVES AKURU INITIAL RA +11942 ; Alphabetic # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL RA +119A0..119A7 ; Alphabetic # Lo [8] NANDINAGARI LETTER A..NANDINAGARI LETTER VOCALIC RR +119AA..119D0 ; Alphabetic # Lo [39] NANDINAGARI LETTER E..NANDINAGARI LETTER RRA +119D1..119D3 ; Alphabetic # Mc [3] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +119D4..119D7 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +119DA..119DB ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN E..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +119DC..119DF ; Alphabetic # Mc [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN O..NANDINAGARI SIGN VISARGA +119E1 ; Alphabetic # Lo NANDINAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +119E3 ; Alphabetic # Lo NANDINAGARI HEADSTROKE +119E4 ; Alphabetic # Mc NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +11A00 ; Alphabetic # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER A +11A01..11A0A ; Alphabetic # Mn [10] ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN I..ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A0B..11A32 ; Alphabetic # Lo [40] ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KSSA +11A35..11A38 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN CANDRABINDU..ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN ANUSVARA +11A39 ; Alphabetic # Mc ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN VISARGA +11A3A ; Alphabetic # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER RA +11A3B..11A3E ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER YA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER VA +11A50 ; Alphabetic # Lo SOYOMBO LETTER A +11A51..11A56 ; Alphabetic # Mn [6] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN I..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN OE +11A57..11A58 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AI..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AU +11A59..11A5B ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..SOYOMBO VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A5C..11A89 ; Alphabetic # Lo [46] SOYOMBO LETTER KA..SOYOMBO CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER SA +11A8A..11A96 ; Alphabetic # Mn [13] SOYOMBO FINAL CONSONANT SIGN G..SOYOMBO SIGN ANUSVARA +11A97 ; Alphabetic # Mc SOYOMBO SIGN VISARGA +11A9D ; Alphabetic # Lo SOYOMBO MARK PLUTA +11AB0..11AF8 ; Alphabetic # Lo [73] CANADIAN SYLLABICS NATTILIK HI..PAU CIN HAU GLOTTAL STOP FINAL +11C00..11C08 ; Alphabetic # Lo [9] BHAIKSUKI LETTER A..BHAIKSUKI LETTER VOCALIC L +11C0A..11C2E ; Alphabetic # Lo [37] BHAIKSUKI LETTER E..BHAIKSUKI LETTER HA +11C2F ; Alphabetic # Mc BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN AA +11C30..11C36 ; Alphabetic # Mn [7] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN I..BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L +11C38..11C3D ; Alphabetic # Mn [6] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN E..BHAIKSUKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11C3E ; Alphabetic # Mc BHAIKSUKI SIGN VISARGA +11C40 ; Alphabetic # Lo BHAIKSUKI SIGN AVAGRAHA +11C72..11C8F ; Alphabetic # Lo [30] MARCHEN LETTER KA..MARCHEN LETTER A +11C92..11CA7 ; Alphabetic # Mn [22] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER KA..MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER ZA +11CA9 ; Alphabetic # Mc MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER YA +11CAA..11CB0 ; Alphabetic # Mn [7] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER RA..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN AA +11CB1 ; Alphabetic # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN I +11CB2..11CB3 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN U..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN E +11CB4 ; Alphabetic # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN O +11CB5..11CB6 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] MARCHEN SIGN ANUSVARA..MARCHEN SIGN CANDRABINDU +11D00..11D06 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] MASARAM GONDI LETTER A..MASARAM GONDI LETTER E +11D08..11D09 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AI..MASARAM GONDI LETTER O +11D0B..11D30 ; Alphabetic # Lo [38] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AU..MASARAM GONDI LETTER TRA +11D31..11D36 ; Alphabetic # Mn [6] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11D3A ; Alphabetic # Mn MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN E +11D3C..11D3D ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN O +11D3F..11D41 ; Alphabetic # Mn [3] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU..MASARAM GONDI SIGN VISARGA +11D43 ; Alphabetic # Mn MASARAM GONDI SIGN CANDRA +11D46 ; Alphabetic # Lo MASARAM GONDI REPHA +11D47 ; Alphabetic # Mn MASARAM GONDI RA-KARA +11D60..11D65 ; Alphabetic # Lo [6] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER A..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER UU +11D67..11D68 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER EE..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER AI +11D6A..11D89 ; Alphabetic # Lo [32] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER OO..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER SA +11D8A..11D8E ; Alphabetic # Mc [5] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN UU +11D90..11D91 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN EE..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI +11D93..11D94 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN OO..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU +11D95 ; Alphabetic # Mn GUNJALA GONDI SIGN ANUSVARA +11D96 ; Alphabetic # Mc GUNJALA GONDI SIGN VISARGA +11D98 ; Alphabetic # Lo GUNJALA GONDI OM +11EE0..11EF2 ; Alphabetic # Lo [19] MAKASAR LETTER KA..MAKASAR ANGKA +11EF3..11EF4 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN I..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN U +11EF5..11EF6 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN E..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN O +11FB0 ; Alphabetic # Lo LISU LETTER YHA +12000..12399 ; Alphabetic # Lo [922] CUNEIFORM SIGN A..CUNEIFORM SIGN U U +12400..1246E ; Alphabetic # Nl [111] CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN TWO ASH..CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN NINE U VARIANT FORM +12480..12543 ; Alphabetic # Lo [196] CUNEIFORM SIGN AB TIMES NUN TENU..CUNEIFORM SIGN ZU5 TIMES THREE DISH TENU +12F90..12FF0 ; Alphabetic # Lo [97] CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM001..CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM114 +13000..1342E ; Alphabetic # Lo [1071] EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH AA032 +14400..14646 ; Alphabetic # Lo [583] ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A530 +16800..16A38 ; Alphabetic # Lo [569] BAMUM LETTER PHASE-A NGKUE MFON..BAMUM LETTER PHASE-F VUEQ +16A40..16A5E ; Alphabetic # Lo [31] MRO LETTER TA..MRO LETTER TEK +16A70..16ABE ; Alphabetic # Lo [79] TANGSA LETTER OZ..TANGSA LETTER ZA +16AD0..16AED ; Alphabetic # Lo [30] BASSA VAH LETTER ENNI..BASSA VAH LETTER I +16B00..16B2F ; Alphabetic # Lo [48] PAHAWH HMONG VOWEL KEEB..PAHAWH HMONG CONSONANT CAU +16B40..16B43 ; Alphabetic # Lm [4] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS SEEV..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN IB YAM +16B63..16B77 ; Alphabetic # Lo [21] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS LUB..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN CIM NRES TOS +16B7D..16B8F ; Alphabetic # Lo [19] PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN TSHEEJ..PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN VWJ +16E40..16E7F ; Alphabetic # L& [64] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +16F00..16F4A ; Alphabetic # Lo [75] MIAO LETTER PA..MIAO LETTER RTE +16F4F ; Alphabetic # Mn MIAO SIGN CONSONANT MODIFIER BAR +16F50 ; Alphabetic # Lo MIAO LETTER NASALIZATION +16F51..16F87 ; Alphabetic # Mc [55] MIAO SIGN ASPIRATION..MIAO VOWEL SIGN UI +16F8F..16F92 ; Alphabetic # Mn [4] MIAO TONE RIGHT..MIAO TONE BELOW +16F93..16F9F ; Alphabetic # Lm [13] MIAO LETTER TONE-2..MIAO LETTER REFORMED TONE-8 +16FE0..16FE1 ; Alphabetic # Lm [2] TANGUT ITERATION MARK..NUSHU ITERATION MARK +16FE3 ; Alphabetic # Lm OLD CHINESE ITERATION MARK +16FF0..16FF1 ; Alphabetic # Mc [2] VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK CA..VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK NHAY +17000..187F7 ; Alphabetic # Lo [6136] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-17000..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-187F7 +18800..18CD5 ; Alphabetic # Lo [1238] TANGUT COMPONENT-001..KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT CHARACTER-18CD5 +18D00..18D08 ; Alphabetic # Lo [9] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D00..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D08 +1AFF0..1AFF3 ; Alphabetic # Lm [4] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-2..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-5 +1AFF5..1AFFB ; Alphabetic # Lm [7] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-5 +1AFFD..1AFFE ; Alphabetic # Lm [2] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-8 +1B000..1B122 ; Alphabetic # Lo [291] KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC E..KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC WU +1B150..1B152 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WI..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WO +1B164..1B167 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL WI..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL N +1B170..1B2FB ; Alphabetic # Lo [396] NUSHU CHARACTER-1B170..NUSHU CHARACTER-1B2FB +1BC00..1BC6A ; Alphabetic # Lo [107] DUPLOYAN LETTER H..DUPLOYAN LETTER VOCALIC M +1BC70..1BC7C ; Alphabetic # Lo [13] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LEFT HORIZONTAL SECANT..DUPLOYAN AFFIX ATTACHED TANGENT HOOK +1BC80..1BC88 ; Alphabetic # Lo [9] DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH VERTICAL +1BC90..1BC99 ; Alphabetic # Lo [10] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ARROW +1BC9E ; Alphabetic # Mn DUPLOYAN DOUBLE MARK +1D400..1D454 ; Alphabetic # L& [85] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL G +1D456..1D49C ; Alphabetic # L& [71] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A +1D49E..1D49F ; Alphabetic # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D +1D4A2 ; Alphabetic # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL G +1D4A5..1D4A6 ; Alphabetic # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K +1D4A9..1D4AC ; Alphabetic # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Q +1D4AE..1D4B9 ; Alphabetic # L& [12] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL D +1D4BB ; Alphabetic # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL F +1D4BD..1D4C3 ; Alphabetic # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL H..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL N +1D4C5..1D505 ; Alphabetic # L& [65] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL P..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL B +1D507..1D50A ; Alphabetic # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL G +1D50D..1D514 ; Alphabetic # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Q +1D516..1D51C ; Alphabetic # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Y +1D51E..1D539 ; Alphabetic # L& [28] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL B +1D53B..1D53E ; Alphabetic # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL G +1D540..1D544 ; Alphabetic # L& [5] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M +1D546 ; Alphabetic # L& MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL O +1D54A..1D550 ; Alphabetic # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Y +1D552..1D6A5 ; Alphabetic # L& [340] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL DOTLESS J +1D6A8..1D6C0 ; Alphabetic # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6C2..1D6DA ; Alphabetic # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D6DC..1D6FA ; Alphabetic # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6FC..1D714 ; Alphabetic # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D716..1D734 ; Alphabetic # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D736..1D74E ; Alphabetic # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D750..1D76E ; Alphabetic # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D770..1D788 ; Alphabetic # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D78A..1D7A8 ; Alphabetic # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D7AA..1D7C2 ; Alphabetic # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D7C4..1D7CB ; Alphabetic # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL DIGAMMA +1DF00..1DF09 ; Alphabetic # L& [10] LATIN SMALL LETTER FENG DIGRAPH WITH TRILL..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK AND RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0A ; Alphabetic # Lo LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0B..1DF1E ; Alphabetic # L& [20] LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH WITH DOUBLE BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CURL +1E000..1E006 ; Alphabetic # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER AZU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZHIVETE +1E008..1E018 ; Alphabetic # Mn [17] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZEMLJA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER HERU +1E01B..1E021 ; Alphabetic # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SHTA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YATI +1E023..1E024 ; Alphabetic # Mn [2] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SMALL YUS +1E026..1E02A ; Alphabetic # Mn [5] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YO..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER FITA +1E100..1E12C ; Alphabetic # Lo [45] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER MA..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER W +1E137..1E13D ; Alphabetic # Lm [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SIGN FOR PERSON..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +1E14E ; Alphabetic # Lo NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LOGOGRAM NYAJ +1E290..1E2AD ; Alphabetic # Lo [30] TOTO LETTER PA..TOTO LETTER A +1E2C0..1E2EB ; Alphabetic # Lo [44] WANCHO LETTER AA..WANCHO LETTER YIH +1E7E0..1E7E6 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYO +1E7E8..1E7EB ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE HHWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHWE +1E7ED..1E7EE ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWEE +1E7F0..1E7FE ; Alphabetic # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE PWEE +1E800..1E8C4 ; Alphabetic # Lo [197] MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M001 KI..MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M060 NYON +1E900..1E943 ; Alphabetic # L& [68] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA +1E947 ; Alphabetic # Mn ADLAM HAMZA +1E94B ; Alphabetic # Lm ADLAM NASALIZATION MARK +1EE00..1EE03 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DAL +1EE05..1EE1F ; Alphabetic # Lo [27] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOTLESS QAF +1EE21..1EE22 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL JEEM +1EE24 ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HEH +1EE27 ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HAH +1EE29..1EE32 ; Alphabetic # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL YEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL QAF +1EE34..1EE37 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL KHAH +1EE39 ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL DAD +1EE3B ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL GHAIN +1EE42 ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED JEEM +1EE47 ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED HAH +1EE49 ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED YEH +1EE4B ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED LAM +1EE4D..1EE4F ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED NOON..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED AIN +1EE51..1EE52 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED QAF +1EE54 ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SHEEN +1EE57 ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED KHAH +1EE59 ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DAD +1EE5B ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED GHAIN +1EE5D ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS NOON +1EE5F ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS QAF +1EE61..1EE62 ; Alphabetic # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED JEEM +1EE64 ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HEH +1EE67..1EE6A ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HAH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KAF +1EE6C..1EE72 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED MEEM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED QAF +1EE74..1EE77 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KHAH +1EE79..1EE7C ; Alphabetic # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS BEH +1EE7E ; Alphabetic # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS FEH +1EE80..1EE89 ; Alphabetic # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED YEH +1EE8B..1EE9B ; Alphabetic # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED GHAIN +1EEA1..1EEA3 ; Alphabetic # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK DAL +1EEA5..1EEA9 ; Alphabetic # Lo [5] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK YEH +1EEAB..1EEBB ; Alphabetic # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK GHAIN +1F130..1F149 ; Alphabetic # So [26] SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +1F150..1F169 ; Alphabetic # So [26] NEGATIVE CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..NEGATIVE CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +1F170..1F189 ; Alphabetic # So [26] NEGATIVE SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..NEGATIVE SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +20000..2A6DF ; Alphabetic # Lo [42720] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-20000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A6DF +2A700..2B738 ; Alphabetic # Lo [4153] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A700..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B738 +2B740..2B81D ; Alphabetic # Lo [222] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B740..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B81D +2B820..2CEA1 ; Alphabetic # Lo [5762] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B820..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEA1 +2CEB0..2EBE0 ; Alphabetic # Lo [7473] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEB0..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2EBE0 +2F800..2FA1D ; Alphabetic # Lo [542] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2F800..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2FA1D +30000..3134A ; Alphabetic # Lo [4939] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-30000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3134A + +# Total code points: 133396 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Lowercase +# Generated from: Ll + Other_Lowercase + +0061..007A ; Lowercase # L& [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +00AA ; Lowercase # Lo FEMININE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00B5 ; Lowercase # L& MICRO SIGN +00BA ; Lowercase # Lo MASCULINE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00DF..00F6 ; Lowercase # L& [24] LATIN SMALL LETTER SHARP S..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F8..00FF ; Lowercase # L& [8] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DIAERESIS +0101 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH MACRON +0103 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE +0105 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH OGONEK +0107 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH ACUTE +0109 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CIRCUMFLEX +010B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH DOT ABOVE +010D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CARON +010F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CARON +0111 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH STROKE +0113 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH MACRON +0115 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH BREVE +0117 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH DOT ABOVE +0119 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH OGONEK +011B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CARON +011D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH CIRCUMFLEX +011F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH BREVE +0121 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH DOT ABOVE +0123 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH CEDILLA +0125 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0127 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH STROKE +0129 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH TILDE +012B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH MACRON +012D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH BREVE +012F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH OGONEK +0131 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOTLESS I +0133 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LIGATURE IJ +0135 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0137..0138 ; Lowercase # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH CEDILLA..LATIN SMALL LETTER KRA +013A ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH ACUTE +013C ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH CEDILLA +013E ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH CARON +0140 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE DOT +0142 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH STROKE +0144 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH ACUTE +0146 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH CEDILLA +0148..0149 ; Lowercase # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER N PRECEDED BY APOSTROPHE +014B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER ENG +014D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON +014F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH BREVE +0151 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0153 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LIGATURE OE +0155 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH ACUTE +0157 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH CEDILLA +0159 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH CARON +015B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH ACUTE +015D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CIRCUMFLEX +015F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CEDILLA +0161 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CARON +0163 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH CEDILLA +0165 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH CARON +0167 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH STROKE +0169 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH TILDE +016B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH MACRON +016D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH BREVE +016F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH RING ABOVE +0171 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0173 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH OGONEK +0175 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0177 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH CIRCUMFLEX +017A ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH ACUTE +017C ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH DOT ABOVE +017E..0180 ; Lowercase # L& [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH STROKE +0183 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH TOPBAR +0185 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE SIX +0188 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH HOOK +018C..018D ; Lowercase # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH TOPBAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED DELTA +0192 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER F WITH HOOK +0195 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER HV +0199..019B ; Lowercase # L& [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER LAMBDA WITH STROKE +019E ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH LONG RIGHT LEG +01A1 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN +01A3 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OI +01A5 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH HOOK +01A8 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE TWO +01AA..01AB ; Lowercase # L& [2] LATIN LETTER REVERSED ESH LOOP..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH PALATAL HOOK +01AD ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK +01B0 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN +01B4 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH HOOK +01B6 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH STROKE +01B9..01BA ; Lowercase # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH REVERSED..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH TAIL +01BD..01BF ; Lowercase # L& [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE FIVE..LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C6 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DZ WITH CARON +01C9 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER LJ +01CC ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER NJ +01CE ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CARON +01D0 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH CARON +01D2 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CARON +01D4 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH CARON +01D6 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01D8 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +01DA ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND CARON +01DC..01DD ; Lowercase # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND GRAVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED E +01DF ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01E1 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +01E3 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AE WITH MACRON +01E5 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH STROKE +01E7 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH CARON +01E9 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH CARON +01EB ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH OGONEK +01ED ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH OGONEK AND MACRON +01EF..01F0 ; Lowercase # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH CARON +01F3 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DZ +01F5 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH ACUTE +01F9 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH GRAVE +01FB ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH RING ABOVE AND ACUTE +01FD ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AE WITH ACUTE +01FF ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE AND ACUTE +0201 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0203 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH INVERTED BREVE +0205 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0207 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH INVERTED BREVE +0209 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH INVERTED BREVE +020D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH INVERTED BREVE +0211 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0213 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH INVERTED BREVE +0215 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0217 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH INVERTED BREVE +0219 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH COMMA BELOW +021B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH COMMA BELOW +021D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER YOGH +021F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH CARON +0221 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CURL +0223 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OU +0225 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH HOOK +0227 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE +0229 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA +022B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +022D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND MACRON +022F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE +0231 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +0233..0239 ; Lowercase # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH MACRON..LATIN SMALL LETTER QP DIGRAPH +023C ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH STROKE +023F..0240 ; Lowercase # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH SWASH TAIL +0242 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0247 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH STROKE +0249 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH STROKE +024B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Q WITH HOOK TAIL +024D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH STROKE +024F..0293 ; Lowercase # L& [69] LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CURL +0295..02AF ; Lowercase # L& [27] LATIN LETTER PHARYNGEAL VOICED FRICATIVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H WITH FISHHOOK AND TAIL +02B0..02B8 ; Lowercase # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL Y +02C0..02C1 ; Lowercase # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER GLOTTAL STOP..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02E0..02E4 ; Lowercase # Lm [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +0345 ; Lowercase # Mn COMBINING GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +0371 ; Lowercase # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER HETA +0373 ; Lowercase # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0377 ; Lowercase # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037A ; Lowercase # Lm GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +037B..037D ; Lowercase # L& [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +0390 ; Lowercase # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND TONOS +03AC..03CE ; Lowercase # L& [35] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH TONOS +03D0..03D1 ; Lowercase # L& [2] GREEK BETA SYMBOL..GREEK THETA SYMBOL +03D5..03D7 ; Lowercase # L& [3] GREEK PHI SYMBOL..GREEK KAI SYMBOL +03D9 ; Lowercase # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC KOPPA +03DB ; Lowercase # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER STIGMA +03DD ; Lowercase # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER DIGAMMA +03DF ; Lowercase # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER KOPPA +03E1 ; Lowercase # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER SAMPI +03E3 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SHEI +03E5 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER FEI +03E7 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER KHEI +03E9 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER HORI +03EB ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER GANGIA +03ED ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SHIMA +03EF..03F3 ; Lowercase # L& [5] COPTIC SMALL LETTER DEI..GREEK LETTER YOT +03F5 ; Lowercase # L& GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F8 ; Lowercase # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER SHO +03FB..03FC ; Lowercase # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER SAN..GREEK RHO WITH STROKE SYMBOL +0430..045F ; Lowercase # L& [48] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZHE +0461 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER OMEGA +0463 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YAT +0465 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED E +0467 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER LITTLE YUS +0469 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED LITTLE YUS +046B ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BIG YUS +046D ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +046F ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KSI +0471 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PSI +0473 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER FITA +0475 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IZHITSA +0477 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IZHITSA WITH DOUBLE GRAVE ACCENT +0479 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UK +047B ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUND OMEGA +047D ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH TITLO +047F ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER OT +0481 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +048B ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL +048D ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SEMISOFT SIGN +048F ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ER WITH TICK +0491 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH UPTURN +0493 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE +0495 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0497 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHE WITH DESCENDER +0499 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZE WITH DESCENDER +049B ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH DESCENDER +049D ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH VERTICAL STROKE +049F ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH STROKE +04A1 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BASHKIR KA +04A3 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH DESCENDER +04A5 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LIGATURE EN GHE +04A7 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +04A9 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN HA +04AB ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ES WITH DESCENDER +04AD ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TE WITH DESCENDER +04AF ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER STRAIGHT U +04B1 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER STRAIGHT U WITH STROKE +04B3 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HA WITH DESCENDER +04B5 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LIGATURE TE TSE +04B7 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CHE WITH DESCENDER +04B9 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CHE WITH VERTICAL STROKE +04BB ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHHA +04BD ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE +04BF ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE WITH DESCENDER +04C2 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHE WITH BREVE +04C4 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH HOOK +04C6 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH TAIL +04C8 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH HOOK +04CA ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH TAIL +04CC ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KHAKASSIAN CHE +04CE..04CF ; Lowercase # L& [2] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EM WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PALOCHKA +04D1 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE +04D3 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS +04D5 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LIGATURE A IE +04D7 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IE WITH BREVE +04D9 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SCHWA +04DB ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SCHWA WITH DIAERESIS +04DD ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHE WITH DIAERESIS +04DF ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZE WITH DIAERESIS +04E1 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN DZE +04E3 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER I WITH MACRON +04E5 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS +04E7 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +04E9 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BARRED O +04EB ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BARRED O WITH DIAERESIS +04ED ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER E WITH DIAERESIS +04EF ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER U WITH MACRON +04F1 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS +04F3 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +04F5 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CHE WITH DIAERESIS +04F7 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH DESCENDER +04F9 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YERU WITH DIAERESIS +04FB ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE AND HOOK +04FD ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HA WITH HOOK +04FF ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HA WITH STROKE +0501 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI DE +0503 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI DJE +0505 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI ZJE +0507 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI DZJE +0509 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI LJE +050B ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI NJE +050D ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI SJE +050F ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI TJE +0511 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED ZE +0513 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH HOOK +0515 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER LHA +0517 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER RHA +0519 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YAE +051B ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER QA +051D ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER WE +051F ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ALEUT KA +0521 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0523 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0525 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PE WITH DESCENDER +0527 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHHA WITH DESCENDER +0529 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH LEFT HOOK +052B ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZZHE +052D ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DCHE +052F ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0560..0588 ; Lowercase # L& [41] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER TURNED AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER YI WITH STROKE +10D0..10FA ; Lowercase # L& [43] GEORGIAN LETTER AN..GEORGIAN LETTER AIN +10FD..10FF ; Lowercase # L& [3] GEORGIAN LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN LETTER LABIAL SIGN +13F8..13FD ; Lowercase # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1C80..1C88 ; Lowercase # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1D00..1D2B ; Lowercase # L& [44] LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL A..CYRILLIC LETTER SMALL CAPITAL EL +1D2C..1D6A ; Lowercase # Lm [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1D6B..1D77 ; Lowercase # L& [13] LATIN SMALL LETTER UE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED G +1D78 ; Lowercase # Lm MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC EN +1D79..1D9A ; Lowercase # L& [34] LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1D9B..1DBF ; Lowercase # Lm [37] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED ALPHA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL THETA +1E01 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW +1E03 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH DOT ABOVE +1E05 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH DOT BELOW +1E07 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH LINE BELOW +1E09 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CEDILLA AND ACUTE +1E0B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH DOT ABOVE +1E0D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH DOT BELOW +1E0F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH LINE BELOW +1E11 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CEDILLA +1E13 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E15 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E17 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E19 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E1B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH TILDE BELOW +1E1D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA AND BREVE +1E1F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER F WITH DOT ABOVE +1E21 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH MACRON +1E23 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DOT ABOVE +1E25 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DOT BELOW +1E27 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DIAERESIS +1E29 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH CEDILLA +1E2B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH BREVE BELOW +1E2D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH TILDE BELOW +1E2F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +1E31 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH ACUTE +1E33 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH DOT BELOW +1E35 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH LINE BELOW +1E37 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW +1E39 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E3B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH LINE BELOW +1E3D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E3F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH ACUTE +1E41 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH DOT ABOVE +1E43 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH DOT BELOW +1E45 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH DOT ABOVE +1E47 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH DOT BELOW +1E49 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH LINE BELOW +1E4B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E4D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E4F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND DIAERESIS +1E51 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E53 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E55 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH ACUTE +1E57 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH DOT ABOVE +1E59 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOT ABOVE +1E5B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW +1E5D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E5F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH LINE BELOW +1E61 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH DOT ABOVE +1E63 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW +1E65 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH ACUTE AND DOT ABOVE +1E67 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CARON AND DOT ABOVE +1E69 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW AND DOT ABOVE +1E6B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DOT ABOVE +1E6D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DOT BELOW +1E6F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH LINE BELOW +1E71 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E73 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS BELOW +1E75 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH TILDE BELOW +1E77 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E79 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E7B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH MACRON AND DIAERESIS +1E7D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH TILDE +1E7F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH DOT BELOW +1E81 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH GRAVE +1E83 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH ACUTE +1E85 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH DIAERESIS +1E87 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH DOT ABOVE +1E89 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH DOT BELOW +1E8B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER X WITH DOT ABOVE +1E8D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER X WITH DIAERESIS +1E8F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DOT ABOVE +1E91 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH CIRCUMFLEX +1E93 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH DOT BELOW +1E95..1E9D ; Lowercase # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH LINE BELOW..LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S WITH HIGH STROKE +1E9F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DELTA +1EA1 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOT BELOW +1EA3 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EA5 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EA7 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EA9 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EAB ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EAD ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EAF ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND ACUTE +1EB1 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND GRAVE +1EB3 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND HOOK ABOVE +1EB5 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND TILDE +1EB7 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND DOT BELOW +1EB9 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH DOT BELOW +1EBB ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EBD ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH TILDE +1EBF ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EC1 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EC3 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EC5 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EC7 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EC9 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ECB ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DOT BELOW +1ECD ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOT BELOW +1ECF ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ED1 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1ED3 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1ED5 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1ED7 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1ED9 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EDB ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EDD ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EDF ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EE1 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EE3 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EE5 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DOT BELOW +1EE7 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EE9 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EEB ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EED ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EEF ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EF1 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EF3 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH GRAVE +1EF5 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DOT BELOW +1EF7 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EF9 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH TILDE +1EFB ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH LL +1EFD ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH V +1EFF..1F07 ; Lowercase # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH LOOP..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F10..1F15 ; Lowercase # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F27 ; Lowercase # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F30..1F37 ; Lowercase # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F40..1F45 ; Lowercase # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; Lowercase # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F60..1F67 ; Lowercase # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F70..1F7D ; Lowercase # L& [14] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1F87 ; Lowercase # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F90..1F97 ; Lowercase # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FA0..1FA7 ; Lowercase # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB0..1FB4 ; Lowercase # L& [5] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FB7 ; Lowercase # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FBE ; Lowercase # L& GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; Lowercase # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FC7 ; Lowercase # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; Lowercase # L& [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FD7 ; Lowercase # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FE0..1FE7 ; Lowercase # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FF2..1FF4 ; Lowercase # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FF7 ; Lowercase # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +2071 ; Lowercase # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +207F ; Lowercase # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER N +2090..209C ; Lowercase # Lm [13] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER T +210A ; Lowercase # L& SCRIPT SMALL G +210E..210F ; Lowercase # L& [2] PLANCK CONSTANT..PLANCK CONSTANT OVER TWO PI +2113 ; Lowercase # L& SCRIPT SMALL L +212F ; Lowercase # L& SCRIPT SMALL E +2134 ; Lowercase # L& SCRIPT SMALL O +2139 ; Lowercase # L& INFORMATION SOURCE +213C..213D ; Lowercase # L& [2] DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL PI..DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL GAMMA +2146..2149 ; Lowercase # L& [4] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL D..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +214E ; Lowercase # L& TURNED SMALL F +2170..217F ; Lowercase # Nl [16] SMALL ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..SMALL ROMAN NUMERAL ONE THOUSAND +2184 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +24D0..24E9 ; Lowercase # So [26] CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +2C30..2C5F ; Lowercase # L& [48] GLAGOLITIC SMALL LETTER AZU..GLAGOLITIC SMALL LETTER CAUDATE CHRIVI +2C61 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH DOUBLE BAR +2C65..2C66 ; Lowercase # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +2C68 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DESCENDER +2C6A ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH DESCENDER +2C6C ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH DESCENDER +2C71 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH RIGHT HOOK +2C73..2C74 ; Lowercase # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH CURL +2C76..2C7B ; Lowercase # L& [6] LATIN SMALL LETTER HALF H..LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED E +2C7C..2C7D ; Lowercase # Lm [2] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL V +2C81 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER ALFA +2C83 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER VIDA +2C85 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER GAMMA +2C87 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DALDA +2C89 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER EIE +2C8B ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SOU +2C8D ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER ZATA +2C8F ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER HATE +2C91 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER THETHE +2C93 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER IAUDA +2C95 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER KAPA +2C97 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER LAULA +2C99 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER MI +2C9B ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER NI +2C9D ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER KSI +2C9F ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER O +2CA1 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER PI +2CA3 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER RO +2CA5 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SIMA +2CA7 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER TAU +2CA9 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER UA +2CAB ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER FI +2CAD ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER KHI +2CAF ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER PSI +2CB1 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OOU +2CB3 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P ALEF +2CB5 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC AIN +2CB7 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC EIE +2CB9 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P KAPA +2CBB ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P NI +2CBD ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC NI +2CBF ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC OOU +2CC1 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SAMPI +2CC3 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED SHEI +2CC5 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHEI +2CC7 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC ESH +2CC9 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER AKHMIMIC KHEI +2CCB ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P HORI +2CCD ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HORI +2CCF ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HA +2CD1 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER L-SHAPED HA +2CD3 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HEI +2CD5 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HAT +2CD7 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC GANGIA +2CD9 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC DJA +2CDB ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHIMA +2CDD ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN SHIMA +2CDF ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NGI +2CE1 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NYI +2CE3..2CE4 ; Lowercase # L& [2] COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN WAU..COPTIC SYMBOL KAI +2CEC ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI +2CEE ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF3 ; Lowercase # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2D00..2D25 ; Lowercase # L& [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; Lowercase # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; Lowercase # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +A641 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZEMLYA +A643 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZELO +A645 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED DZE +A647 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTA +A649 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DJERV +A64B ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER MONOGRAPH UK +A64D ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BROAD OMEGA +A64F ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER NEUTRAL YER +A651 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YERU WITH BACK YER +A653 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED YAT +A655 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED YU +A657 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED A +A659 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65B ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BLENDED YUS +A65D ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65F ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YN +A661 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED TSE +A663 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SOFT DE +A665 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SOFT EL +A667 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SOFT EM +A669 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER MONOCULAR O +A66B ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BINOCULAR O +A66D ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A681 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DWE +A683 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZWE +A685 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHWE +A687 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CCHE +A689 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZZE +A68B ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +A68D ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TWE +A68F ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TSWE +A691 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TSSE +A693 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TCHE +A695 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HWE +A697 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHWE +A699 ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE O +A69B ; Lowercase # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A69C..A69D ; Lowercase # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A723 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF +A725 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL AIN +A727 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER HENG +A729 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TZ +A72B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TRESILLO +A72D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CUATRILLO +A72F..A731 ; Lowercase # L& [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER CUATRILLO WITH COMMA..LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL S +A733 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AA +A735 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AO +A737 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AU +A739 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AV +A73B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AV WITH HORIZONTAL BAR +A73D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AY +A73F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C WITH DOT +A741 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH STROKE +A743 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A745 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH STROKE AND DIAGONAL STROKE +A747 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER BROKEN L +A749 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH HIGH STROKE +A74B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH LONG STROKE OVERLAY +A74D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH LOOP +A74F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OO +A751 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A753 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH FLOURISH +A755 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH SQUIRREL TAIL +A757 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Q WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A759 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Q WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A75B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R ROTUNDA +A75D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER RUM ROTUNDA +A75F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A761 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VY +A763 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VISIGOTHIC Z +A765 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE +A767 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A769 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VEND +A76B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER ET +A76D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER IS +A76F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A770 ; Lowercase # Lm MODIFIER LETTER US +A771..A778 ; Lowercase # L& [8] LATIN SMALL LETTER DUM..LATIN SMALL LETTER UM +A77A ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR D +A77C ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR F +A77F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED INSULAR G +A781 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED L +A783 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR R +A785 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR S +A787 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A78C ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER SALTILLO +A78E ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH RETROFLEX HOOK AND BELT +A791 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER +A793..A795 ; Lowercase # L& [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH PALATAL HOOK +A797 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH FLOURISH +A799 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER F WITH STROKE +A79B ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VOLAPUK AE +A79D ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VOLAPUK OE +A79F ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VOLAPUK UE +A7A1 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A3 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A5 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A7 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A9 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7AF ; Lowercase # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Q +A7B5 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER BETA +A7B7 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OMEGA +A7B9 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH STROKE +A7BB ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL A +A7BD ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL I +A7BF ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL U +A7C1 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OLD POLISH O +A7C3 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER ANGLICANA W +A7C8 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7CA ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D1 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D3 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE THORN +A7D5 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE WYNN +A7D7 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER MIDDLE SCOTS S +A7D9 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F6 ; Lowercase # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +A7F8..A7F9 ; Lowercase # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +A7FA ; Lowercase # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED M +AB30..AB5A ; Lowercase # L& [43] LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED ALPHA..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH SHORT RIGHT LEG +AB5C..AB5F ; Lowercase # Lm [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +AB60..AB68 ; Lowercase # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER SAKHA YAT..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED R WITH MIDDLE TILDE +AB70..ABBF ; Lowercase # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +FB00..FB06 ; Lowercase # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; Lowercase # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FF41..FF5A ; Lowercase # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +10428..1044F ; Lowercase # L& [40] DESERET SMALL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +104D8..104FB ; Lowercase # L& [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10597..105A1 ; Lowercase # L& [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; Lowercase # L& [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; Lowercase # L& [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; Lowercase # L& [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10780 ; Lowercase # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA +10783..10785 ; Lowercase # Lm [3] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL AE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; Lowercase # Lm [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; Lowercase # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL +10CC0..10CF2 ; Lowercase # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +118C0..118DF ; Lowercase # L& [32] WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +16E60..16E7F ; Lowercase # L& [32] MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +1D41A..1D433 ; Lowercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL Z +1D44E..1D454 ; Lowercase # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL G +1D456..1D467 ; Lowercase # L& [18] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL Z +1D482..1D49B ; Lowercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL Z +1D4B6..1D4B9 ; Lowercase # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL D +1D4BB ; Lowercase # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL F +1D4BD..1D4C3 ; Lowercase # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL H..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL N +1D4C5..1D4CF ; Lowercase # L& [11] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL P..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL Z +1D4EA..1D503 ; Lowercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SCRIPT SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SCRIPT SMALL Z +1D51E..1D537 ; Lowercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL Z +1D552..1D56B ; Lowercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL Z +1D586..1D59F ; Lowercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD FRAKTUR SMALL Z +1D5BA..1D5D3 ; Lowercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF SMALL Z +1D5EE..1D607 ; Lowercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL Z +1D622..1D63B ; Lowercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF ITALIC SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF ITALIC SMALL Z +1D656..1D66F ; Lowercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL Z +1D68A..1D6A5 ; Lowercase # L& [28] MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL DOTLESS J +1D6C2..1D6DA ; Lowercase # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D6DC..1D6E1 ; Lowercase # L& [6] MATHEMATICAL BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD PI SYMBOL +1D6FC..1D714 ; Lowercase # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D716..1D71B ; Lowercase # L& [6] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC PI SYMBOL +1D736..1D74E ; Lowercase # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D750..1D755 ; Lowercase # L& [6] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC PI SYMBOL +1D770..1D788 ; Lowercase # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D78A..1D78F ; Lowercase # L& [6] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD PI SYMBOL +1D7AA..1D7C2 ; Lowercase # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D7C4..1D7C9 ; Lowercase # L& [6] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC PI SYMBOL +1D7CB ; Lowercase # L& MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL DIGAMMA +1DF00..1DF09 ; Lowercase # L& [10] LATIN SMALL LETTER FENG DIGRAPH WITH TRILL..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK AND RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0B..1DF1E ; Lowercase # L& [20] LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH WITH DOUBLE BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CURL +1E922..1E943 ; Lowercase # L& [34] ADLAM SMALL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA + +# Total code points: 2471 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Uppercase +# Generated from: Lu + Other_Uppercase + +0041..005A ; Uppercase # L& [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +00C0..00D6 ; Uppercase # L& [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8..00DE ; Uppercase # L& [7] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN +0100 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH MACRON +0102 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE +0104 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH OGONEK +0106 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH ACUTE +0108 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CIRCUMFLEX +010A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH DOT ABOVE +010C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CARON +010E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CARON +0110 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH STROKE +0112 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON +0114 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH BREVE +0116 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOT ABOVE +0118 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH OGONEK +011A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CARON +011C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CIRCUMFLEX +011E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH BREVE +0120 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH DOT ABOVE +0122 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CEDILLA +0124 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0126 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH STROKE +0128 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH TILDE +012A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH MACRON +012C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH BREVE +012E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH OGONEK +0130 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOT ABOVE +0132 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LIGATURE IJ +0134 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0136 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH CEDILLA +0139 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH ACUTE +013B ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CEDILLA +013D ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CARON +013F ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE DOT +0141 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH STROKE +0143 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH ACUTE +0145 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CEDILLA +0147 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CARON +014A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ENG +014C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON +014E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH BREVE +0150 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0152 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LIGATURE OE +0154 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH ACUTE +0156 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH CEDILLA +0158 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH CARON +015A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH ACUTE +015C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CIRCUMFLEX +015E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CEDILLA +0160 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CARON +0162 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CEDILLA +0164 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CARON +0166 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH STROKE +0168 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE +016A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON +016C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH BREVE +016E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH RING ABOVE +0170 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0172 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH OGONEK +0174 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0176 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0178..0179 ; Uppercase # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DIAERESIS..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH ACUTE +017B ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DOT ABOVE +017D ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH CARON +0181..0182 ; Uppercase # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH TOPBAR +0184 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE SIX +0186..0187 ; Uppercase # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OPEN O..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH HOOK +0189..018B ; Uppercase # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AFRICAN D..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH TOPBAR +018E..0191 ; Uppercase # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED E..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH HOOK +0193..0194 ; Uppercase # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GAMMA +0196..0198 ; Uppercase # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER IOTA..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH HOOK +019C..019D ; Uppercase # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED M..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LEFT HOOK +019F..01A0 ; Uppercase # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MIDDLE TILDE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN +01A2 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OI +01A4 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH HOOK +01A6..01A7 ; Uppercase # L& [2] LATIN LETTER YR..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE TWO +01A9 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ESH +01AC ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH HOOK +01AE..01AF ; Uppercase # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH RETROFLEX HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN +01B1..01B3 ; Uppercase # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH HOOK +01B5 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH STROKE +01B7..01B8 ; Uppercase # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH REVERSED +01BC ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE +01C4 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON +01C7 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER LJ +01CA ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER NJ +01CD ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CARON +01CF ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH CARON +01D1 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CARON +01D3 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH CARON +01D5 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01D7 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +01D9 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND CARON +01DB ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND GRAVE +01DE ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01E0 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +01E2 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AE WITH MACRON +01E4 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH STROKE +01E6 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CARON +01E8 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH CARON +01EA ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH OGONEK +01EC ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH OGONEK AND MACRON +01EE ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH WITH CARON +01F1 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ +01F4 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH ACUTE +01F6..01F8 ; Uppercase # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HWAIR..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH GRAVE +01FA ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING ABOVE AND ACUTE +01FC ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AE WITH ACUTE +01FE ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE AND ACUTE +0200 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0202 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH INVERTED BREVE +0204 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0206 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH INVERTED BREVE +0208 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH INVERTED BREVE +020C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH INVERTED BREVE +0210 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0212 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH INVERTED BREVE +0214 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0216 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH INVERTED BREVE +0218 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH COMMA BELOW +021A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH COMMA BELOW +021C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER YOGH +021E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CARON +0220 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LONG RIGHT LEG +0222 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OU +0224 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH HOOK +0226 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE +0228 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA +022A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +022C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND MACRON +022E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE +0230 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +0232 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH MACRON +023A..023B ; Uppercase # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH STROKE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH STROKE +023D..023E ; Uppercase # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH BAR..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +0241 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0243..0246 ; Uppercase # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH STROKE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH STROKE +0248 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J WITH STROKE +024A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SMALL Q WITH HOOK TAIL +024C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH STROKE +024E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH STROKE +0370 ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA +0372 ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0376 ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037F ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386 ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0388..038A ; Uppercase # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..038F ; Uppercase # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH TONOS +0391..03A1 ; Uppercase # L& [17] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03AB ; Uppercase # L& [9] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA +03CF ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL KAI SYMBOL +03D2..03D4 ; Uppercase # L& [3] GREEK UPSILON WITH HOOK SYMBOL..GREEK UPSILON WITH DIAERESIS AND HOOK SYMBOL +03D8 ; Uppercase # L& GREEK LETTER ARCHAIC KOPPA +03DA ; Uppercase # L& GREEK LETTER STIGMA +03DC ; Uppercase # L& GREEK LETTER DIGAMMA +03DE ; Uppercase # L& GREEK LETTER KOPPA +03E0 ; Uppercase # L& GREEK LETTER SAMPI +03E2 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SHEI +03E4 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER FEI +03E6 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KHEI +03E8 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER HORI +03EA ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER GANGIA +03EC ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SHIMA +03EE ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DEI +03F4 ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL THETA SYMBOL +03F7 ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO +03F9..03FA ; Uppercase # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SAN +03FD..042F ; Uppercase # L& [51] GREEK CAPITAL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YA +0460 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA +0462 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YAT +0464 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED E +0466 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER LITTLE YUS +0468 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED LITTLE YUS +046A ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BIG YUS +046C ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +046E ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KSI +0470 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PSI +0472 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER FITA +0474 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IZHITSA +0476 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IZHITSA WITH DOUBLE GRAVE ACCENT +0478 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER UK +047A ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ROUND OMEGA +047C ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH TITLO +047E ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OT +0480 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOPPA +048A ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL +048C ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SEMISOFT SIGN +048E ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ER WITH TICK +0490 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH UPTURN +0492 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE +0494 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0496 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH DESCENDER +0498 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZE WITH DESCENDER +049A ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH DESCENDER +049C ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH VERTICAL STROKE +049E ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH STROKE +04A0 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BASHKIR KA +04A2 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH DESCENDER +04A4 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE EN GHE +04A6 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +04A8 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN HA +04AA ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ES WITH DESCENDER +04AC ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TE WITH DESCENDER +04AE ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER STRAIGHT U +04B0 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER STRAIGHT U WITH STROKE +04B2 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH DESCENDER +04B4 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE TE TSE +04B6 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH DESCENDER +04B8 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH VERTICAL STROKE +04BA ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHHA +04BC ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE +04BE ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE WITH DESCENDER +04C0..04C1 ; Uppercase # L& [2] CYRILLIC LETTER PALOCHKA..CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH BREVE +04C3 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH HOOK +04C5 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH TAIL +04C7 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH HOOK +04C9 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH TAIL +04CB ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KHAKASSIAN CHE +04CD ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EM WITH TAIL +04D0 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE +04D2 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS +04D4 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE A IE +04D6 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IE WITH BREVE +04D8 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SCHWA +04DA ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SCHWA WITH DIAERESIS +04DC ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH DIAERESIS +04DE ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZE WITH DIAERESIS +04E0 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN DZE +04E2 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I WITH MACRON +04E4 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS +04E6 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +04E8 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BARRED O +04EA ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BARRED O WITH DIAERESIS +04EC ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DIAERESIS +04EE ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON +04F0 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS +04F2 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +04F4 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH DIAERESIS +04F6 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH DESCENDER +04F8 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YERU WITH DIAERESIS +04FA ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE AND HOOK +04FC ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH HOOK +04FE ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH STROKE +0500 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DE +0502 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DJE +0504 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI ZJE +0506 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DZJE +0508 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI LJE +050A ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI NJE +050C ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI SJE +050E ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI TJE +0510 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED ZE +0512 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH HOOK +0514 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER LHA +0516 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER RHA +0518 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YAE +051A ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER QA +051C ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER WE +051E ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ALEUT KA +0520 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0522 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0524 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PE WITH DESCENDER +0526 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHHA WITH DESCENDER +0528 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH LEFT HOOK +052A ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZZHE +052C ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DCHE +052E ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; Uppercase # L& [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +10A0..10C5 ; Uppercase # L& [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; Uppercase # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; Uppercase # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +13A0..13F5 ; Uppercase # L& [86] CHEROKEE LETTER A..CHEROKEE LETTER MV +1C90..1CBA ; Uppercase # L& [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; Uppercase # L& [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1E00 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW +1E02 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH DOT ABOVE +1E04 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH DOT BELOW +1E06 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH LINE BELOW +1E08 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CEDILLA AND ACUTE +1E0A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH DOT ABOVE +1E0C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH DOT BELOW +1E0E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH LINE BELOW +1E10 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CEDILLA +1E12 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E14 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E16 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E18 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E1A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH TILDE BELOW +1E1C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA AND BREVE +1E1E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH DOT ABOVE +1E20 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH MACRON +1E22 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DOT ABOVE +1E24 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DOT BELOW +1E26 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DIAERESIS +1E28 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CEDILLA +1E2A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH BREVE BELOW +1E2C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH TILDE BELOW +1E2E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +1E30 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH ACUTE +1E32 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DOT BELOW +1E34 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH LINE BELOW +1E36 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW +1E38 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E3A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH LINE BELOW +1E3C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E3E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH ACUTE +1E40 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH DOT ABOVE +1E42 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH DOT BELOW +1E44 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DOT ABOVE +1E46 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DOT BELOW +1E48 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LINE BELOW +1E4A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E4C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E4E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND DIAERESIS +1E50 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E52 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E54 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH ACUTE +1E56 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH DOT ABOVE +1E58 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT ABOVE +1E5A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW +1E5C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E5E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH LINE BELOW +1E60 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT ABOVE +1E62 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW +1E64 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH ACUTE AND DOT ABOVE +1E66 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CARON AND DOT ABOVE +1E68 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW AND DOT ABOVE +1E6A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DOT ABOVE +1E6C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DOT BELOW +1E6E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH LINE BELOW +1E70 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E72 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS BELOW +1E74 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE BELOW +1E76 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E78 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E7A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON AND DIAERESIS +1E7C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH TILDE +1E7E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH DOT BELOW +1E80 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH GRAVE +1E82 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH ACUTE +1E84 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DIAERESIS +1E86 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DOT ABOVE +1E88 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DOT BELOW +1E8A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X WITH DOT ABOVE +1E8C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X WITH DIAERESIS +1E8E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DOT ABOVE +1E90 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH CIRCUMFLEX +1E92 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DOT BELOW +1E94 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH LINE BELOW +1E9E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SHARP S +1EA0 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT BELOW +1EA2 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EA4 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EA6 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EA8 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EAA ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EAC ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EAE ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND ACUTE +1EB0 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND GRAVE +1EB2 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND HOOK ABOVE +1EB4 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND TILDE +1EB6 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND DOT BELOW +1EB8 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOT BELOW +1EBA ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EBC ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH TILDE +1EBE ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EC0 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EC2 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EC4 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EC6 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EC8 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ECA ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOT BELOW +1ECC ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT BELOW +1ECE ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ED0 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1ED2 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1ED4 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1ED6 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1ED8 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EDA ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EDC ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EDE ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EE0 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EE2 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EE4 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOT BELOW +1EE6 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EE8 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EEA ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EEC ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EEE ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EF0 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EF2 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH GRAVE +1EF4 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DOT BELOW +1EF6 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EF8 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH TILDE +1EFA ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH LL +1EFC ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH V +1EFE ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH LOOP +1F08..1F0F ; Uppercase # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F18..1F1D ; Uppercase # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F28..1F2F ; Uppercase # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F38..1F3F ; Uppercase # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F48..1F4D ; Uppercase # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F59 ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F ; Uppercase # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F68..1F6F ; Uppercase # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1FB8..1FBB ; Uppercase # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA +1FC8..1FCB ; Uppercase # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA +1FD8..1FDB ; Uppercase # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE8..1FEC ; Uppercase # L& [5] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF8..1FFB ; Uppercase # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +2102 ; Uppercase # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL C +2107 ; Uppercase # L& EULER CONSTANT +210B..210D ; Uppercase # L& [3] SCRIPT CAPITAL H..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL H +2110..2112 ; Uppercase # L& [3] SCRIPT CAPITAL I..SCRIPT CAPITAL L +2115 ; Uppercase # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL N +2119..211D ; Uppercase # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL P..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL R +2124 ; Uppercase # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Z +2126 ; Uppercase # L& OHM SIGN +2128 ; Uppercase # L& BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL Z +212A..212D ; Uppercase # L& [4] KELVIN SIGN..BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL C +2130..2133 ; Uppercase # L& [4] SCRIPT CAPITAL E..SCRIPT CAPITAL M +213E..213F ; Uppercase # L& [2] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL GAMMA..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL PI +2145 ; Uppercase # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC CAPITAL D +2160..216F ; Uppercase # Nl [16] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..ROMAN NUMERAL ONE THOUSAND +2183 ; Uppercase # L& ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED +24B6..24CF ; Uppercase # So [26] CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +2C00..2C2F ; Uppercase # L& [48] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER CAUDATE CHRIVI +2C60 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOUBLE BAR +2C62..2C64 ; Uppercase # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE TILDE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH TAIL +2C67 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DESCENDER +2C69 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DESCENDER +2C6B ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DESCENDER +2C6D..2C70 ; Uppercase # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED ALPHA +2C72 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH HOOK +2C75 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HALF H +2C7E..2C80 ; Uppercase # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER ALFA +2C82 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER VIDA +2C84 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER GAMMA +2C86 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DALDA +2C88 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER EIE +2C8A ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SOU +2C8C ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER ZATA +2C8E ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER HATE +2C90 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER THETHE +2C92 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER IAUDA +2C94 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KAPA +2C96 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER LAULA +2C98 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER MI +2C9A ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER NI +2C9C ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KSI +2C9E ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER O +2CA0 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER PI +2CA2 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER RO +2CA4 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SIMA +2CA6 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER TAU +2CA8 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER UA +2CAA ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER FI +2CAC ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KHI +2CAE ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER PSI +2CB0 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OOU +2CB2 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P ALEF +2CB4 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC AIN +2CB6 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC EIE +2CB8 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P KAPA +2CBA ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P NI +2CBC ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC NI +2CBE ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC OOU +2CC0 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SAMPI +2CC2 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CROSSED SHEI +2CC4 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHEI +2CC6 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC ESH +2CC8 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER AKHMIMIC KHEI +2CCA ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P HORI +2CCC ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HORI +2CCE ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HA +2CD0 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER L-SHAPED HA +2CD2 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HEI +2CD4 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HAT +2CD6 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC GANGIA +2CD8 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC DJA +2CDA ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHIMA +2CDC ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN SHIMA +2CDE ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NGI +2CE0 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NYI +2CE2 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN WAU +2CEB ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI +2CED ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF2 ; Uppercase # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +A640 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA +A642 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZELO +A644 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED DZE +A646 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTA +A648 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DJERV +A64A ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER MONOGRAPH UK +A64C ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BROAD OMEGA +A64E ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER NEUTRAL YER +A650 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YERU WITH BACK YER +A652 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED YAT +A654 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED YU +A656 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED A +A658 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65A ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BLENDED YUS +A65C ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65E ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YN +A660 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED TSE +A662 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT DE +A664 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT EL +A666 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT EM +A668 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER MONOCULAR O +A66A ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BINOCULAR O +A66C ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A680 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE +A682 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZWE +A684 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHWE +A686 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CCHE +A688 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZZE +A68A ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +A68C ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TWE +A68E ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TSWE +A690 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TSSE +A692 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TCHE +A694 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HWE +A696 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHWE +A698 ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DOUBLE O +A69A ; Uppercase # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CROSSED O +A722 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF +A724 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL AIN +A726 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HENG +A728 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TZ +A72A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TRESILLO +A72C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CUATRILLO +A72E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CUATRILLO WITH COMMA +A732 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AA +A734 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AO +A736 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AU +A738 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AV +A73A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AV WITH HORIZONTAL BAR +A73C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AY +A73E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED C WITH DOT +A740 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH STROKE +A742 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A744 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH STROKE AND DIAGONAL STROKE +A746 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER BROKEN L +A748 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH HIGH STROKE +A74A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH LONG STROKE OVERLAY +A74C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH LOOP +A74E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OO +A750 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A752 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH FLOURISH +A754 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH SQUIRREL TAIL +A756 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A758 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A75A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R ROTUNDA +A75C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER RUM ROTUNDA +A75E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A760 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VY +A762 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VISIGOTHIC Z +A764 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE +A766 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A768 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VEND +A76A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ET +A76C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER IS +A76E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CON +A779 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR D +A77B ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR F +A77D..A77E ; Uppercase # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED INSULAR G +A780 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED L +A782 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR R +A784 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR S +A786 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR T +A78B ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO +A78D ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED H +A790 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER +A792 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH BAR +A796 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH FLOURISH +A798 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH STROKE +A79A ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK AE +A79C ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK OE +A79E ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK UE +A7A0 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A2 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A4 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A6 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A8 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7AA..A7AE ; Uppercase # L& [5] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SMALL CAPITAL I +A7B0..A7B4 ; Uppercase # L& [5] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED K..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER BETA +A7B6 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA +A7B8 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH STROKE +A7BA ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL A +A7BC ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL I +A7BE ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL U +A7C0 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OLD POLISH O +A7C2 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ANGLICANA W +A7C4..A7C7 ; Uppercase # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH PALATAL HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7C9 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D6 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE SCOTS S +A7D8 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F5 ; Uppercase # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +FF21..FF3A ; Uppercase # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +10400..10427 ; Uppercase # L& [40] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET CAPITAL LETTER EW +104B0..104D3 ; Uppercase # L& [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +10570..1057A ; Uppercase # L& [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; Uppercase # L& [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; Uppercase # L& [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; Uppercase # L& [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10C80..10CB2 ; Uppercase # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +118A0..118BF ; Uppercase # L& [32] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER VIYO +16E40..16E5F ; Uppercase # L& [32] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER Y +1D400..1D419 ; Uppercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL Z +1D434..1D44D ; Uppercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL Z +1D468..1D481 ; Uppercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL Z +1D49C ; Uppercase # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A +1D49E..1D49F ; Uppercase # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D +1D4A2 ; Uppercase # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL G +1D4A5..1D4A6 ; Uppercase # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K +1D4A9..1D4AC ; Uppercase # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Q +1D4AE..1D4B5 ; Uppercase # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Z +1D4D0..1D4E9 ; Uppercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SCRIPT CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SCRIPT CAPITAL Z +1D504..1D505 ; Uppercase # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL B +1D507..1D50A ; Uppercase # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL G +1D50D..1D514 ; Uppercase # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Q +1D516..1D51C ; Uppercase # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Y +1D538..1D539 ; Uppercase # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL B +1D53B..1D53E ; Uppercase # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL G +1D540..1D544 ; Uppercase # L& [5] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M +1D546 ; Uppercase # L& MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL O +1D54A..1D550 ; Uppercase # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Y +1D56C..1D585 ; Uppercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD FRAKTUR CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD FRAKTUR CAPITAL Z +1D5A0..1D5B9 ; Uppercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF CAPITAL Z +1D5D4..1D5ED ; Uppercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL Z +1D608..1D621 ; Uppercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF ITALIC CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF ITALIC CAPITAL Z +1D63C..1D655 ; Uppercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL Z +1D670..1D689 ; Uppercase # L& [26] MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE CAPITAL Z +1D6A8..1D6C0 ; Uppercase # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6E2..1D6FA ; Uppercase # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D71C..1D734 ; Uppercase # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D756..1D76E ; Uppercase # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D790..1D7A8 ; Uppercase # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D7CA ; Uppercase # L& MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL DIGAMMA +1E900..1E921 ; Uppercase # L& [34] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER SHA +1F130..1F149 ; Uppercase # So [26] SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +1F150..1F169 ; Uppercase # So [26] NEGATIVE CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..NEGATIVE CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +1F170..1F189 ; Uppercase # So [26] NEGATIVE SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..NEGATIVE SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z + +# Total code points: 1951 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Cased (Cased) +# As defined by Unicode Standard Definition D135 +# C has the Lowercase or Uppercase property or has a General_Category value of Titlecase_Letter. + +0041..005A ; Cased # L& [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +0061..007A ; Cased # L& [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +00AA ; Cased # Lo FEMININE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00B5 ; Cased # L& MICRO SIGN +00BA ; Cased # Lo MASCULINE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00C0..00D6 ; Cased # L& [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8..00F6 ; Cased # L& [31] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F8..01BA ; Cased # L& [195] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH TAIL +01BC..01BF ; Cased # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE..LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C4..0293 ; Cased # L& [208] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CURL +0295..02AF ; Cased # L& [27] LATIN LETTER PHARYNGEAL VOICED FRICATIVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H WITH FISHHOOK AND TAIL +02B0..02B8 ; Cased # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL Y +02C0..02C1 ; Cased # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER GLOTTAL STOP..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02E0..02E4 ; Cased # Lm [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +0345 ; Cased # Mn COMBINING GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +0370..0373 ; Cased # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA..GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0376..0377 ; Cased # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA..GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037A ; Cased # Lm GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +037B..037D ; Cased # L& [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +037F ; Cased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386 ; Cased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0388..038A ; Cased # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; Cased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..03A1 ; Cased # L& [20] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03F5 ; Cased # L& [83] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F7..0481 ; Cased # L& [139] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +048A..052F ; Cased # L& [166] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; Cased # L& [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +0560..0588 ; Cased # L& [41] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER TURNED AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER YI WITH STROKE +10A0..10C5 ; Cased # L& [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; Cased # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; Cased # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +10D0..10FA ; Cased # L& [43] GEORGIAN LETTER AN..GEORGIAN LETTER AIN +10FD..10FF ; Cased # L& [3] GEORGIAN LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN LETTER LABIAL SIGN +13A0..13F5 ; Cased # L& [86] CHEROKEE LETTER A..CHEROKEE LETTER MV +13F8..13FD ; Cased # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1C80..1C88 ; Cased # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1C90..1CBA ; Cased # L& [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; Cased # L& [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1D00..1D2B ; Cased # L& [44] LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL A..CYRILLIC LETTER SMALL CAPITAL EL +1D2C..1D6A ; Cased # Lm [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1D6B..1D77 ; Cased # L& [13] LATIN SMALL LETTER UE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED G +1D78 ; Cased # Lm MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC EN +1D79..1D9A ; Cased # L& [34] LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1D9B..1DBF ; Cased # Lm [37] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED ALPHA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL THETA +1E00..1F15 ; Cased # L& [278] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F18..1F1D ; Cased # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F45 ; Cased # L& [38] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F48..1F4D ; Cased # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; Cased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F59 ; Cased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; Cased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; Cased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F..1F7D ; Cased # L& [31] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1FB4 ; Cased # L& [53] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FBC ; Cased # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBE ; Cased # L& GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; Cased # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FCC ; Cased # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; Cased # L& [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FDB ; Cased # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE0..1FEC ; Cased # L& [13] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF2..1FF4 ; Cased # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FFC ; Cased # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +2071 ; Cased # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +207F ; Cased # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER N +2090..209C ; Cased # Lm [13] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER T +2102 ; Cased # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL C +2107 ; Cased # L& EULER CONSTANT +210A..2113 ; Cased # L& [10] SCRIPT SMALL G..SCRIPT SMALL L +2115 ; Cased # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL N +2119..211D ; Cased # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL P..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL R +2124 ; Cased # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Z +2126 ; Cased # L& OHM SIGN +2128 ; Cased # L& BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL Z +212A..212D ; Cased # L& [4] KELVIN SIGN..BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL C +212F..2134 ; Cased # L& [6] SCRIPT SMALL E..SCRIPT SMALL O +2139 ; Cased # L& INFORMATION SOURCE +213C..213F ; Cased # L& [4] DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL PI..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL PI +2145..2149 ; Cased # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC CAPITAL D..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +214E ; Cased # L& TURNED SMALL F +2160..217F ; Cased # Nl [32] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..SMALL ROMAN NUMERAL ONE THOUSAND +2183..2184 ; Cased # L& [2] ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +24B6..24E9 ; Cased # So [52] CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +2C00..2C7B ; Cased # L& [124] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED E +2C7C..2C7D ; Cased # Lm [2] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL V +2C7E..2CE4 ; Cased # L& [103] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC SYMBOL KAI +2CEB..2CEE ; Cased # L& [4] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF2..2CF3 ; Cased # L& [2] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2D00..2D25 ; Cased # L& [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; Cased # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; Cased # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +A640..A66D ; Cased # L& [46] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A680..A69B ; Cased # L& [28] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A69C..A69D ; Cased # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A722..A76F ; Cased # L& [78] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF..LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A770 ; Cased # Lm MODIFIER LETTER US +A771..A787 ; Cased # L& [23] LATIN SMALL LETTER DUM..LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A78B..A78E ; Cased # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH RETROFLEX HOOK AND BELT +A790..A7CA ; Cased # L& [59] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0..A7D1 ; Cased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D3 ; Cased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE THORN +A7D5..A7D9 ; Cased # L& [5] LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE WYNN..LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F5..A7F6 ; Cased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +A7F8..A7F9 ; Cased # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +A7FA ; Cased # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED M +AB30..AB5A ; Cased # L& [43] LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED ALPHA..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH SHORT RIGHT LEG +AB5C..AB5F ; Cased # Lm [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +AB60..AB68 ; Cased # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER SAKHA YAT..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED R WITH MIDDLE TILDE +AB70..ABBF ; Cased # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +FB00..FB06 ; Cased # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; Cased # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FF21..FF3A ; Cased # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +FF41..FF5A ; Cased # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +10400..1044F ; Cased # L& [80] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +104B0..104D3 ; Cased # L& [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +104D8..104FB ; Cased # L& [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10570..1057A ; Cased # L& [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; Cased # L& [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; Cased # L& [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; Cased # L& [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10597..105A1 ; Cased # L& [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; Cased # L& [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; Cased # L& [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; Cased # L& [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10780 ; Cased # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA +10783..10785 ; Cased # Lm [3] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL AE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; Cased # Lm [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; Cased # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL +10C80..10CB2 ; Cased # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +10CC0..10CF2 ; Cased # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +118A0..118DF ; Cased # L& [64] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +16E40..16E7F ; Cased # L& [64] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +1D400..1D454 ; Cased # L& [85] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL G +1D456..1D49C ; Cased # L& [71] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A +1D49E..1D49F ; Cased # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D +1D4A2 ; Cased # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL G +1D4A5..1D4A6 ; Cased # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K +1D4A9..1D4AC ; Cased # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Q +1D4AE..1D4B9 ; Cased # L& [12] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL D +1D4BB ; Cased # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL F +1D4BD..1D4C3 ; Cased # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL H..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL N +1D4C5..1D505 ; Cased # L& [65] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL P..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL B +1D507..1D50A ; Cased # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL G +1D50D..1D514 ; Cased # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Q +1D516..1D51C ; Cased # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Y +1D51E..1D539 ; Cased # L& [28] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL B +1D53B..1D53E ; Cased # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL G +1D540..1D544 ; Cased # L& [5] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M +1D546 ; Cased # L& MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL O +1D54A..1D550 ; Cased # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Y +1D552..1D6A5 ; Cased # L& [340] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL DOTLESS J +1D6A8..1D6C0 ; Cased # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6C2..1D6DA ; Cased # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D6DC..1D6FA ; Cased # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6FC..1D714 ; Cased # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D716..1D734 ; Cased # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D736..1D74E ; Cased # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D750..1D76E ; Cased # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D770..1D788 ; Cased # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D78A..1D7A8 ; Cased # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D7AA..1D7C2 ; Cased # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D7C4..1D7CB ; Cased # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL DIGAMMA +1DF00..1DF09 ; Cased # L& [10] LATIN SMALL LETTER FENG DIGRAPH WITH TRILL..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK AND RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0B..1DF1E ; Cased # L& [20] LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH WITH DOUBLE BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CURL +1E900..1E943 ; Cased # L& [68] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA +1F130..1F149 ; Cased # So [26] SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +1F150..1F169 ; Cased # So [26] NEGATIVE CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..NEGATIVE CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +1F170..1F189 ; Cased # So [26] NEGATIVE SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..NEGATIVE SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z + +# Total code points: 4453 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Case_Ignorable (CI) +# As defined by Unicode Standard Definition D136 +# C is defined to be case-ignorable if +# Word_Break(C) = MidLetter or MidNumLet or Single_Quote, or +# General_Category(C) = Nonspacing_Mark (Mn), Enclosing_Mark (Me), Format (Cf), Modifier_Letter (Lm), or Modifier_Symbol (Sk). + +0027 ; Case_Ignorable # Po APOSTROPHE +002E ; Case_Ignorable # Po FULL STOP +003A ; Case_Ignorable # Po COLON +005E ; Case_Ignorable # Sk CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +0060 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk GRAVE ACCENT +00A8 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk DIAERESIS +00AD ; Case_Ignorable # Cf SOFT HYPHEN +00AF ; Case_Ignorable # Sk MACRON +00B4 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk ACUTE ACCENT +00B7 ; Case_Ignorable # Po MIDDLE DOT +00B8 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk CEDILLA +02B0..02C1 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [18] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02C2..02C5 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [4] MODIFIER LETTER LEFT ARROWHEAD..MODIFIER LETTER DOWN ARROWHEAD +02C6..02D1 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [12] MODIFIER LETTER CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..MODIFIER LETTER HALF TRIANGULAR COLON +02D2..02DF ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [14] MODIFIER LETTER CENTRED RIGHT HALF RING..MODIFIER LETTER CROSS ACCENT +02E0..02E4 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02E5..02EB ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [7] MODIFIER LETTER EXTRA-HIGH TONE BAR..MODIFIER LETTER YANG DEPARTING TONE MARK +02EC ; Case_Ignorable # Lm MODIFIER LETTER VOICING +02ED ; Case_Ignorable # Sk MODIFIER LETTER UNASPIRATED +02EE ; Case_Ignorable # Lm MODIFIER LETTER DOUBLE APOSTROPHE +02EF..02FF ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [17] MODIFIER LETTER LOW DOWN ARROWHEAD..MODIFIER LETTER LOW LEFT ARROW +0300..036F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [112] COMBINING GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER X +0374 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm GREEK NUMERAL SIGN +0375 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk GREEK LOWER NUMERAL SIGN +037A ; Case_Ignorable # Lm GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +0384..0385 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [2] GREEK TONOS..GREEK DIALYTIKA TONOS +0387 ; Case_Ignorable # Po GREEK ANO TELEIA +0483..0487 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [5] COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO..COMBINING CYRILLIC POKRYTIE +0488..0489 ; Case_Ignorable # Me [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC HUNDRED THOUSANDS SIGN..COMBINING CYRILLIC MILLIONS SIGN +0559 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm ARMENIAN MODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RING +055F ; Case_Ignorable # Po ARMENIAN ABBREVIATION MARK +0591..05BD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [45] HEBREW ACCENT ETNAHTA..HEBREW POINT METEG +05BF ; Case_Ignorable # Mn HEBREW POINT RAFE +05C1..05C2 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] HEBREW POINT SHIN DOT..HEBREW POINT SIN DOT +05C4..05C5 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] HEBREW MARK UPPER DOT..HEBREW MARK LOWER DOT +05C7 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn HEBREW POINT QAMATS QATAN +05F4 ; Case_Ignorable # Po HEBREW PUNCTUATION GERSHAYIM +0600..0605 ; Case_Ignorable # Cf [6] ARABIC NUMBER SIGN..ARABIC NUMBER MARK ABOVE +0610..061A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [11] ARABIC SIGN SALLALLAHOU ALAYHE WASSALLAM..ARABIC SMALL KASRA +061C ; Case_Ignorable # Cf ARABIC LETTER MARK +0640 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm ARABIC TATWEEL +064B..065F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [21] ARABIC FATHATAN..ARABIC WAVY HAMZA BELOW +0670 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn ARABIC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALEF +06D6..06DC ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] ARABIC SMALL HIGH LIGATURE SAD WITH LAM WITH ALEF MAKSURA..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SEEN +06DD ; Case_Ignorable # Cf ARABIC END OF AYAH +06DF..06E4 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [6] ARABIC SMALL HIGH ROUNDED ZERO..ARABIC SMALL HIGH MADDA +06E5..06E6 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [2] ARABIC SMALL WAW..ARABIC SMALL YEH +06E7..06E8 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] ARABIC SMALL HIGH YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH NOON +06EA..06ED ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] ARABIC EMPTY CENTRE LOW STOP..ARABIC SMALL LOW MEEM +070F ; Case_Ignorable # Cf SYRIAC ABBREVIATION MARK +0711 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn SYRIAC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALAPH +0730..074A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [27] SYRIAC PTHAHA ABOVE..SYRIAC BARREKH +07A6..07B0 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [11] THAANA ABAFILI..THAANA SUKUN +07EB..07F3 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [9] NKO COMBINING SHORT HIGH TONE..NKO COMBINING DOUBLE DOT ABOVE +07F4..07F5 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [2] NKO HIGH TONE APOSTROPHE..NKO LOW TONE APOSTROPHE +07FA ; Case_Ignorable # Lm NKO LAJANYALAN +07FD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn NKO DANTAYALAN +0816..0819 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] SAMARITAN MARK IN..SAMARITAN MARK DAGESH +081A ; Case_Ignorable # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER EPENTHETIC YUT +081B..0823 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [9] SAMARITAN MARK EPENTHETIC YUT..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN A +0824 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER SHORT A +0825..0827 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN SHORT A..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN U +0828 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER I +0829..082D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [5] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN LONG I..SAMARITAN MARK NEQUDAA +0859..085B ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] MANDAIC AFFRICATION MARK..MANDAIC GEMINATION MARK +0888 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk ARABIC RAISED ROUND DOT +0890..0891 ; Case_Ignorable # Cf [2] ARABIC POUND MARK ABOVE..ARABIC PIASTRE MARK ABOVE +0898..089F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [8] ARABIC SMALL HIGH WORD AL-JUZ..ARABIC HALF MADDA OVER MADDA +08C9 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm ARABIC SMALL FARSI YEH +08CA..08E1 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [24] ARABIC SMALL HIGH FARSI YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SIGN SAFHA +08E2 ; Case_Ignorable # Cf ARABIC DISPUTED END OF AYAH +08E3..0902 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [32] ARABIC TURNED DAMMA BELOW..DEVANAGARI SIGN ANUSVARA +093A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OE +093C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN NUKTA +0941..0948 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [8] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +094D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +0951..0957 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] DEVANAGARI STRESS SIGN UDATTA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN UUE +0962..0963 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0971 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm DEVANAGARI SIGN HIGH SPACING DOT +0981 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BENGALI SIGN CANDRABINDU +09BC ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BENGALI SIGN NUKTA +09C1..09C4 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN U..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +09CD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BENGALI SIGN VIRAMA +09E2..09E3 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +09FE ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BENGALI SANDHI MARK +0A01..0A02 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] GURMUKHI SIGN ADAK BINDI..GURMUKHI SIGN BINDI +0A3C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN NUKTA +0A41..0A42 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN U..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN UU +0A47..0A48 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN EE..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AI +0A4B..0A4D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN OO..GURMUKHI SIGN VIRAMA +0A51 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN UDAAT +0A70..0A71 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] GURMUKHI TIPPI..GURMUKHI ADDAK +0A75 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN YAKASH +0A81..0A82 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] GUJARATI SIGN CANDRABINDU..GUJARATI SIGN ANUSVARA +0ABC ; Case_Ignorable # Mn GUJARATI SIGN NUKTA +0AC1..0AC5 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [5] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN U..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA E +0AC7..0AC8 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN E..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AI +0ACD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn GUJARATI SIGN VIRAMA +0AE2..0AE3 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0AFA..0AFF ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [6] GUJARATI SIGN SUKUN..GUJARATI SIGN TWO-CIRCLE NUKTA ABOVE +0B01 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn ORIYA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0B3C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn ORIYA SIGN NUKTA +0B3F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn ORIYA VOWEL SIGN I +0B41..0B44 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN U..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0B4D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn ORIYA SIGN VIRAMA +0B55..0B56 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] ORIYA SIGN OVERLINE..ORIYA AI LENGTH MARK +0B62..0B63 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0B82 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TAMIL SIGN ANUSVARA +0BC0 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TAMIL VOWEL SIGN II +0BCD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TAMIL SIGN VIRAMA +0C00 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING CANDRABINDU ABOVE +0C04 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE +0C3C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TELUGU SIGN NUKTA +0C3E..0C40 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AA..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN II +0C46..0C48 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN E..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AI +0C4A..0C4D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN O..TELUGU SIGN VIRAMA +0C55..0C56 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] TELUGU LENGTH MARK..TELUGU AI LENGTH MARK +0C62..0C63 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0C81 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn KANNADA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0CBC ; Case_Ignorable # Mn KANNADA SIGN NUKTA +0CBF ; Case_Ignorable # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN I +0CC6 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN E +0CCC..0CCD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AU..KANNADA SIGN VIRAMA +0CE2..0CE3 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D00..0D01 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..MALAYALAM SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D3B..0D3C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN VERTICAL BAR VIRAMA..MALAYALAM SIGN CIRCULAR VIRAMA +0D41..0D44 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN U..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0D4D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MALAYALAM SIGN VIRAMA +0D62..0D63 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D81 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn SINHALA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0DCA ; Case_Ignorable # Mn SINHALA SIGN AL-LAKUNA +0DD2..0DD4 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI IS-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI PAA-PILLA +0DD6 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA PAA-PILLA +0E31 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn THAI CHARACTER MAI HAN-AKAT +0E34..0E3A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] THAI CHARACTER SARA I..THAI CHARACTER PHINTHU +0E46 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm THAI CHARACTER MAIYAMOK +0E47..0E4E ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [8] THAI CHARACTER MAITAIKHU..THAI CHARACTER YAMAKKAN +0EB1 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn LAO VOWEL SIGN MAI KAN +0EB4..0EBC ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [9] LAO VOWEL SIGN I..LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN LO +0EC6 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm LAO KO LA +0EC8..0ECD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [6] LAO TONE MAI EK..LAO NIGGAHITA +0F18..0F19 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN -KHYUD PA..TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN SDONG TSHUGS +0F35 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG NYI ZLA +0F37 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG SGOR RTAGS +0F39 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TIBETAN MARK TSA -PHRU +0F71..0F7E ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [14] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN AA..TIBETAN SIGN RJES SU NGA RO +0F80..0F84 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [5] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN REVERSED I..TIBETAN MARK HALANTA +0F86..0F87 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] TIBETAN SIGN LCI RTAGS..TIBETAN SIGN YANG RTAGS +0F8D..0F97 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [11] TIBETAN SUBJOINED SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER JA +0F99..0FBC ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [36] TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER NYA..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER FIXED-FORM RA +0FC6 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TIBETAN SYMBOL PADMA GDAN +102D..1030 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN UU +1032..1037 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [6] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AI..MYANMAR SIGN DOT BELOW +1039..103A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MYANMAR SIGN VIRAMA..MYANMAR SIGN ASAT +103D..103E ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL WA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL HA +1058..1059 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +105E..1060 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL NA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL LA +1071..1074 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN GEBA KAREN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN KAYAH EE +1082 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN SHAN MEDIAL WA +1085..1086 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E ABOVE..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN FINAL Y +108D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL EMPHATIC TONE +109D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON AI +10FC ; Case_Ignorable # Lm MODIFIER LETTER GEORGIAN NAR +135D..135F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION AND VOWEL LENGTH MARK..ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION MARK +1712..1714 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] TAGALOG VOWEL SIGN I..TAGALOG SIGN VIRAMA +1732..1733 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN I..HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN U +1752..1753 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] BUHID VOWEL SIGN I..BUHID VOWEL SIGN U +1772..1773 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN I..TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN U +17B4..17B5 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AQ..KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AA +17B7..17BD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] KHMER VOWEL SIGN I..KHMER VOWEL SIGN UA +17C6 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn KHMER SIGN NIKAHIT +17C9..17D3 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [11] KHMER SIGN MUUSIKATOAN..KHMER SIGN BATHAMASAT +17D7 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm KHMER SIGN LEK TOO +17DD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn KHMER SIGN ATTHACAN +180B..180D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR ONE..MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR THREE +180E ; Case_Ignorable # Cf MONGOLIAN VOWEL SEPARATOR +180F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR FOUR +1843 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO LONG VOWEL SIGN +1885..1886 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI BALUDA..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI THREE BALUDA +18A9 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI DAGALGA +1920..1922 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN A..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN U +1927..1928 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN E..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN O +1932 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn LIMBU SMALL LETTER ANUSVARA +1939..193B ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] LIMBU SIGN MUKPHRENG..LIMBU SIGN SA-I +1A17..1A18 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN I..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN U +1A1B ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN AE +1A56 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA +1A58..1A5E ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] TAI THAM SIGN MAI KANG LAI..TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN SA +1A60 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TAI THAM SIGN SAKOT +1A62 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN MAI SAT +1A65..1A6C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [8] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN I..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA BELOW +1A73..1A7C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [10] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA ABOVE..TAI THAM SIGN KHUEN-LUE KARAN +1A7F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TAI THAM COMBINING CRYPTOGRAMMIC DOT +1AA7 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm TAI THAM SIGN MAI YAMOK +1AB0..1ABD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [14] COMBINING DOUBLED CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..COMBINING PARENTHESES BELOW +1ABE ; Case_Ignorable # Me COMBINING PARENTHESES OVERLAY +1ABF..1ACE ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [16] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER W BELOW..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +1B00..1B03 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] BALINESE SIGN ULU RICEM..BALINESE SIGN SURANG +1B34 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BALINESE SIGN REREKAN +1B36..1B3A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN ULU..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA +1B3C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA +1B42 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET +1B6B..1B73 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [9] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TEGEH..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING GONG +1B80..1B81 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] SUNDANESE SIGN PANYECEK..SUNDANESE SIGN PANGLAYAR +1BA2..1BA5 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PANYAKRA..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANYUKU +1BA8..1BA9 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PAMEPET..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANEULEUNG +1BAB..1BAD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] SUNDANESE SIGN VIRAMA..SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PASANGAN WA +1BE6 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BATAK SIGN TOMPI +1BE8..1BE9 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] BATAK VOWEL SIGN PAKPAK E..BATAK VOWEL SIGN EE +1BED ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BATAK VOWEL SIGN KARO O +1BEF..1BF1 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN U FOR SIMALUNGUN SA..BATAK CONSONANT SIGN H +1C2C..1C33 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [8] LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN E..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN T +1C36..1C37 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] LEPCHA SIGN RAN..LEPCHA SIGN NUKTA +1C78..1C7D ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [6] OL CHIKI MU TTUDDAG..OL CHIKI AHAD +1CD0..1CD2 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] VEDIC TONE KARSHANA..VEDIC TONE PRENKHA +1CD4..1CE0 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [13] VEDIC SIGN YAJURVEDIC MIDLINE SVARITA..VEDIC TONE RIGVEDIC KASHMIRI INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE2..1CE8 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] VEDIC SIGN VISARGA SVARITA..VEDIC SIGN VISARGA ANUDATTA WITH TAIL +1CED ; Case_Ignorable # Mn VEDIC SIGN TIRYAK +1CF4 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn VEDIC TONE CANDRA ABOVE +1CF8..1CF9 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] VEDIC TONE RING ABOVE..VEDIC TONE DOUBLE RING ABOVE +1D2C..1D6A ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1D78 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC EN +1D9B..1DBF ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [37] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED ALPHA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL THETA +1DC0..1DFF ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [64] COMBINING DOTTED GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING RIGHT ARROWHEAD AND DOWN ARROWHEAD BELOW +1FBD ; Case_Ignorable # Sk GREEK KORONIS +1FBF..1FC1 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [3] GREEK PSILI..GREEK DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FCD..1FCF ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [3] GREEK PSILI AND VARIA..GREEK PSILI AND PERISPOMENI +1FDD..1FDF ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [3] GREEK DASIA AND VARIA..GREEK DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1FED..1FEF ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [3] GREEK DIALYTIKA AND VARIA..GREEK VARIA +1FFD..1FFE ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [2] GREEK OXIA..GREEK DASIA +200B..200F ; Case_Ignorable # Cf [5] ZERO WIDTH SPACE..RIGHT-TO-LEFT MARK +2018 ; Case_Ignorable # Pi LEFT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK +2019 ; Case_Ignorable # Pf RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK +2024 ; Case_Ignorable # Po ONE DOT LEADER +2027 ; Case_Ignorable # Po HYPHENATION POINT +202A..202E ; Case_Ignorable # Cf [5] LEFT-TO-RIGHT EMBEDDING..RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE +2060..2064 ; Case_Ignorable # Cf [5] WORD JOINER..INVISIBLE PLUS +2066..206F ; Case_Ignorable # Cf [10] LEFT-TO-RIGHT ISOLATE..NOMINAL DIGIT SHAPES +2071 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +207F ; Case_Ignorable # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER N +2090..209C ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [13] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER T +20D0..20DC ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [13] COMBINING LEFT HARPOON ABOVE..COMBINING FOUR DOTS ABOVE +20DD..20E0 ; Case_Ignorable # Me [4] COMBINING ENCLOSING CIRCLE..COMBINING ENCLOSING CIRCLE BACKSLASH +20E1 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn COMBINING LEFT RIGHT ARROW ABOVE +20E2..20E4 ; Case_Ignorable # Me [3] COMBINING ENCLOSING SCREEN..COMBINING ENCLOSING UPWARD POINTING TRIANGLE +20E5..20F0 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [12] COMBINING REVERSE SOLIDUS OVERLAY..COMBINING ASTERISK ABOVE +2C7C..2C7D ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [2] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL V +2CEF..2CF1 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] COPTIC COMBINING NI ABOVE..COPTIC COMBINING SPIRITUS LENIS +2D6F ; Case_Ignorable # Lm TIFINAGH MODIFIER LETTER LABIALIZATION MARK +2D7F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TIFINAGH CONSONANT JOINER +2DE0..2DFF ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [32] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER BE..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +2E2F ; Case_Ignorable # Lm VERTICAL TILDE +3005 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +302A..302D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] IDEOGRAPHIC LEVEL TONE MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ENTERING TONE MARK +3031..3035 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [5] VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK..VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK LOWER HALF +303B ; Case_Ignorable # Lm VERTICAL IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +3099..309A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +309B..309C ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [2] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +309D..309E ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [2] HIRAGANA ITERATION MARK..HIRAGANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +30FC..30FE ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [3] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +A015 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm YI SYLLABLE WU +A4F8..A4FD ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [6] LISU LETTER TONE MYA TI..LISU LETTER TONE MYA JEU +A60C ; Case_Ignorable # Lm VAI SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +A66F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn COMBINING CYRILLIC VZMET +A670..A672 ; Case_Ignorable # Me [3] COMBINING CYRILLIC TEN MILLIONS SIGN..COMBINING CYRILLIC THOUSAND MILLIONS SIGN +A674..A67D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [10] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER UKRAINIAN IE..COMBINING CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A67F ; Case_Ignorable # Lm CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A69C..A69D ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A69E..A69F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER EF..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED E +A6F0..A6F1 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] BAMUM COMBINING MARK KOQNDON..BAMUM COMBINING MARK TUKWENTIS +A700..A716 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [23] MODIFIER LETTER CHINESE TONE YIN PING..MODIFIER LETTER EXTRA-LOW LEFT-STEM TONE BAR +A717..A71F ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER DOT VERTICAL BAR..MODIFIER LETTER LOW INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +A720..A721 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [2] MODIFIER LETTER STRESS AND HIGH TONE..MODIFIER LETTER STRESS AND LOW TONE +A770 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm MODIFIER LETTER US +A788 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm MODIFIER LETTER LOW CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +A789..A78A ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [2] MODIFIER LETTER COLON..MODIFIER LETTER SHORT EQUALS SIGN +A7F2..A7F4 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [3] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL C..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL Q +A7F8..A7F9 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +A802 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN DVISVARA +A806 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN HASANTA +A80B ; Case_Ignorable # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ANUSVARA +A825..A826 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN U..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN E +A82C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ALTERNATE HASANTA +A8C4..A8C5 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN VIRAMA..SAURASHTRA SIGN CANDRABINDU +A8E0..A8F1 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [18] COMBINING DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +A8FF ; Case_Ignorable # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AY +A926..A92D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [8] KAYAH LI VOWEL UE..KAYAH LI TONE CALYA PLOPHU +A947..A951 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [11] REJANG VOWEL SIGN I..REJANG CONSONANT SIGN R +A980..A982 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] JAVANESE SIGN PANYANGGA..JAVANESE SIGN LAYAR +A9B3 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn JAVANESE SIGN CECAK TELU +A9B6..A9B9 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN WULU..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN SUKU MENDUT +A9BC..A9BD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET..JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN KERET +A9CF ; Case_Ignorable # Lm JAVANESE PANGRANGKEP +A9E5 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN SAW +A9E6 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER SHAN REDUPLICATION +AA29..AA2E ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [6] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAM VOWEL SIGN OE +AA31..AA32 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AU..CHAM VOWEL SIGN UE +AA35..AA36 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN LA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN WA +AA43 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL NG +AA4C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL M +AA70 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER KHAMTI REDUPLICATION +AA7C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-2 +AAB0 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TAI VIET MAI KANG +AAB2..AAB4 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] TAI VIET VOWEL I..TAI VIET VOWEL U +AAB7..AAB8 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] TAI VIET MAI KHIT..TAI VIET VOWEL IA +AABE..AABF ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] TAI VIET VOWEL AM..TAI VIET TONE MAI EK +AAC1 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TAI VIET TONE MAI THO +AADD ; Case_Ignorable # Lm TAI VIET SYMBOL SAM +AAEC..AAED ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAI +AAF3..AAF4 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [2] MEETEI MAYEK SYLLABLE REPETITION MARK..MEETEI MAYEK WORD REPETITION MARK +AAF6 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VIRAMA +AB5B ; Case_Ignorable # Sk MODIFIER BREVE WITH INVERTED BREVE +AB5C..AB5F ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +AB69 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED W +AB6A..AB6B ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [2] MODIFIER LETTER LEFT TACK..MODIFIER LETTER RIGHT TACK +ABE5 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ANAP +ABE8 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UNAP +ABED ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MEETEI MAYEK APUN IYEK +FB1E ; Case_Ignorable # Mn HEBREW POINT JUDEO-SPANISH VARIKA +FBB2..FBC2 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [17] ARABIC SYMBOL DOT ABOVE..ARABIC SYMBOL WASLA ABOVE +FE00..FE0F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [16] VARIATION SELECTOR-1..VARIATION SELECTOR-16 +FE13 ; Case_Ignorable # Po PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL COLON +FE20..FE2F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [16] COMBINING LIGATURE LEFT HALF..COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO RIGHT HALF +FE52 ; Case_Ignorable # Po SMALL FULL STOP +FE55 ; Case_Ignorable # Po SMALL COLON +FEFF ; Case_Ignorable # Cf ZERO WIDTH NO-BREAK SPACE +FF07 ; Case_Ignorable # Po FULLWIDTH APOSTROPHE +FF0E ; Case_Ignorable # Po FULLWIDTH FULL STOP +FF1A ; Case_Ignorable # Po FULLWIDTH COLON +FF3E ; Case_Ignorable # Sk FULLWIDTH CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +FF40 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk FULLWIDTH GRAVE ACCENT +FF70 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm HALFWIDTH KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK +FF9E..FF9F ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [2] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA VOICED SOUND MARK..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +FFE3 ; Case_Ignorable # Sk FULLWIDTH MACRON +FFF9..FFFB ; Case_Ignorable # Cf [3] INTERLINEAR ANNOTATION ANCHOR..INTERLINEAR ANNOTATION TERMINATOR +101FD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn PHAISTOS DISC SIGN COMBINING OBLIQUE STROKE +102E0 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn COPTIC EPACT THOUSANDS MARK +10376..1037A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [5] COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER SII +10780..10785 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [6] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL +10A01..10A03 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN I..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +10A05..10A06 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN E..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN O +10A0C..10A0F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL LENGTH MARK..KHAROSHTHI SIGN VISARGA +10A38..10A3A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI SIGN BAR ABOVE..KHAROSHTHI SIGN DOT BELOW +10A3F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn KHAROSHTHI VIRAMA +10AE5..10AE6 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK ABOVE..MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK BELOW +10D24..10D27 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN HARBAHAY..HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN TASSI +10EAB..10EAC ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] YEZIDI COMBINING HAMZA MARK..YEZIDI COMBINING MADDA MARK +10F46..10F50 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [11] SOGDIAN COMBINING DOT BELOW..SOGDIAN COMBINING STROKE BELOW +10F82..10F85 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] OLD UYGHUR COMBINING DOT ABOVE..OLD UYGHUR COMBINING TWO DOTS BELOW +11001 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BRAHMI SIGN ANUSVARA +11038..11046 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [15] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN AA..BRAHMI VIRAMA +11070 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BRAHMI SIGN OLD TAMIL VIRAMA +11073..11074 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT O +1107F..11081 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] BRAHMI NUMBER JOINER..KAITHI SIGN ANUSVARA +110B3..110B6 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN U..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AI +110B9..110BA ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] KAITHI SIGN VIRAMA..KAITHI SIGN NUKTA +110BD ; Case_Ignorable # Cf KAITHI NUMBER SIGN +110C2 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn KAITHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +110CD ; Case_Ignorable # Cf KAITHI NUMBER SIGN ABOVE +11100..11102 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] CHAKMA SIGN CANDRABINDU..CHAKMA SIGN VISARGA +11127..1112B ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [5] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN A..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN UU +1112D..11134 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [8] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AI..CHAKMA MAAYYAA +11173 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MAHAJANI SIGN NUKTA +11180..11181 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] SHARADA SIGN CANDRABINDU..SHARADA SIGN ANUSVARA +111B6..111BE ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [9] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN U..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN O +111C9..111CC ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] SHARADA SANDHI MARK..SHARADA EXTRA SHORT VOWEL MARK +111CF ; Case_Ignorable # Mn SHARADA SIGN INVERTED CANDRABINDU +1122F..11231 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN U..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AI +11234 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn KHOJKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11236..11237 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] KHOJKI SIGN NUKTA..KHOJKI SIGN SHADDA +1123E ; Case_Ignorable # Mn KHOJKI SIGN SUKUN +112DF ; Case_Ignorable # Mn KHUDAWADI SIGN ANUSVARA +112E3..112EA ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [8] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN U..KHUDAWADI SIGN VIRAMA +11300..11301 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] GRANTHA SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..GRANTHA SIGN CANDRABINDU +1133B..1133C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] COMBINING BINDU BELOW..GRANTHA SIGN NUKTA +11340 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN II +11366..1136C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT SIX +11370..11374 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [5] COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER A..COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER PA +11438..1143F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [8] NEWA VOWEL SIGN U..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AI +11442..11444 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] NEWA SIGN VIRAMA..NEWA SIGN ANUSVARA +11446 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn NEWA SIGN NUKTA +1145E ; Case_Ignorable # Mn NEWA SANDHI MARK +114B3..114B8 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [6] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN U..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +114BA ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN SHORT E +114BF..114C0 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN CANDRABINDU..TIRHUTA SIGN ANUSVARA +114C2..114C3 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN VIRAMA..TIRHUTA SIGN NUKTA +115B2..115B5 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +115BC..115BD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN CANDRABINDU..SIDDHAM SIGN ANUSVARA +115BF..115C0 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN VIRAMA..SIDDHAM SIGN NUKTA +115DC..115DD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE UU +11633..1163A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [8] MODI VOWEL SIGN U..MODI VOWEL SIGN AI +1163D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MODI SIGN ANUSVARA +1163F..11640 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MODI SIGN VIRAMA..MODI SIGN ARDHACANDRA +116AB ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TAKRI SIGN ANUSVARA +116AD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AA +116B0..116B5 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [6] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN U..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AU +116B7 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TAKRI SIGN NUKTA +1171D..1171F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA..AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LIGATING RA +11722..11725 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] AHOM VOWEL SIGN I..AHOM VOWEL SIGN UU +11727..1172B ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [5] AHOM VOWEL SIGN AW..AHOM SIGN KILLER +1182F..11837 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [9] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN U..DOGRA SIGN ANUSVARA +11839..1183A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] DOGRA SIGN VIRAMA..DOGRA SIGN NUKTA +1193B..1193C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] DIVES AKURU SIGN ANUSVARA..DIVES AKURU SIGN CANDRABINDU +1193E ; Case_Ignorable # Mn DIVES AKURU VIRAMA +11943 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn DIVES AKURU SIGN NUKTA +119D4..119D7 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +119DA..119DB ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN E..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +119E0 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn NANDINAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +11A01..11A0A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [10] ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN I..ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A33..11A38 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [6] ZANABAZAR SQUARE FINAL CONSONANT MARK..ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN ANUSVARA +11A3B..11A3E ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER YA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER VA +11A47 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn ZANABAZAR SQUARE SUBJOINER +11A51..11A56 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [6] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN I..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN OE +11A59..11A5B ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..SOYOMBO VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A8A..11A96 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [13] SOYOMBO FINAL CONSONANT SIGN G..SOYOMBO SIGN ANUSVARA +11A98..11A99 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] SOYOMBO GEMINATION MARK..SOYOMBO SUBJOINER +11C30..11C36 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN I..BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L +11C38..11C3D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [6] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN E..BHAIKSUKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11C3F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn BHAIKSUKI SIGN VIRAMA +11C92..11CA7 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [22] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER KA..MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER ZA +11CAA..11CB0 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER RA..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN AA +11CB2..11CB3 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN U..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN E +11CB5..11CB6 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MARCHEN SIGN ANUSVARA..MARCHEN SIGN CANDRABINDU +11D31..11D36 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [6] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11D3A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN E +11D3C..11D3D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN O +11D3F..11D45 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU..MASARAM GONDI VIRAMA +11D47 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MASARAM GONDI RA-KARA +11D90..11D91 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN EE..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI +11D95 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn GUNJALA GONDI SIGN ANUSVARA +11D97 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn GUNJALA GONDI VIRAMA +11EF3..11EF4 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN I..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN U +13430..13438 ; Case_Ignorable # Cf [9] EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH VERTICAL JOINER..EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH END SEGMENT +16AF0..16AF4 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [5] BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH TONE..BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH-LOW TONE +16B30..16B36 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TUB..PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TAUM +16B40..16B43 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [4] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS SEEV..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN IB YAM +16F4F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn MIAO SIGN CONSONANT MODIFIER BAR +16F8F..16F92 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] MIAO TONE RIGHT..MIAO TONE BELOW +16F93..16F9F ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [13] MIAO LETTER TONE-2..MIAO LETTER REFORMED TONE-8 +16FE0..16FE1 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [2] TANGUT ITERATION MARK..NUSHU ITERATION MARK +16FE3 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm OLD CHINESE ITERATION MARK +16FE4 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT FILLER +1AFF0..1AFF3 ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [4] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-2..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-5 +1AFF5..1AFFB ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [7] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-5 +1AFFD..1AFFE ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [2] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-8 +1BC9D..1BC9E ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] DUPLOYAN THICK LETTER SELECTOR..DUPLOYAN DOUBLE MARK +1BCA0..1BCA3 ; Case_Ignorable # Cf [4] SHORTHAND FORMAT LETTER OVERLAP..SHORTHAND FORMAT UP STEP +1CF00..1CF2D ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [46] ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK GORAZDO NIZKO S KRYZHEM ON LEFT..ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK KRYZH ON LEFT +1CF30..1CF46 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [23] ZNAMENNY COMBINING TONAL RANGE MARK MRACHNO..ZNAMENNY PRIZNAK MODIFIER ROG +1D167..1D169 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-3 +1D173..1D17A ; Case_Ignorable # Cf [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL BEGIN BEAM..MUSICAL SYMBOL END PHRASE +1D17B..1D182 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING ACCENT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING LOURE +1D185..1D18B ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOIT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TRIPLE TONGUE +1D1AA..1D1AD ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOWN BOW..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SNAP PIZZICATO +1D242..1D244 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [3] COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL TRISEME..COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL PENTASEME +1DA00..1DA36 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [55] SIGNWRITING HEAD RIM..SIGNWRITING AIR SUCKING IN +1DA3B..1DA6C ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [50] SIGNWRITING MOUTH CLOSED NEUTRAL..SIGNWRITING EXCITEMENT +1DA75 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn SIGNWRITING UPPER BODY TILTING FROM HIP JOINTS +1DA84 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn SIGNWRITING LOCATION HEAD NECK +1DA9B..1DA9F ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [5] SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-6 +1DAA1..1DAAF ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [15] SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-16 +1E000..1E006 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER AZU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZHIVETE +1E008..1E018 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [17] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZEMLJA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER HERU +1E01B..1E021 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SHTA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YATI +1E023..1E024 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [2] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SMALL YUS +1E026..1E02A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [5] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YO..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER FITA +1E130..1E136 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-B..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-D +1E137..1E13D ; Case_Ignorable # Lm [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SIGN FOR PERSON..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +1E2AE ; Case_Ignorable # Mn TOTO SIGN RISING TONE +1E2EC..1E2EF ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [4] WANCHO TONE TUP..WANCHO TONE KOINI +1E8D0..1E8D6 ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER TEENS..MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER MILLIONS +1E944..1E94A ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [7] ADLAM ALIF LENGTHENER..ADLAM NUKTA +1E94B ; Case_Ignorable # Lm ADLAM NASALIZATION MARK +1F3FB..1F3FF ; Case_Ignorable # Sk [5] EMOJI MODIFIER FITZPATRICK TYPE-1-2..EMOJI MODIFIER FITZPATRICK TYPE-6 +E0001 ; Case_Ignorable # Cf LANGUAGE TAG +E0020..E007F ; Case_Ignorable # Cf [96] TAG SPACE..CANCEL TAG +E0100..E01EF ; Case_Ignorable # Mn [240] VARIATION SELECTOR-17..VARIATION SELECTOR-256 + +# Total code points: 2602 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Changes_When_Lowercased (CWL) +# Characters whose normalized forms are not stable under a toLowercase mapping. +# For more information, see D139 in Section 3.13, "Default Case Algorithms". +# Changes_When_Lowercased(X) is true when toLowercase(toNFD(X)) != toNFD(X) + +0041..005A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +00C0..00D6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8..00DE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [7] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN +0100 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH MACRON +0102 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE +0104 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH OGONEK +0106 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH ACUTE +0108 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CIRCUMFLEX +010A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH DOT ABOVE +010C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CARON +010E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CARON +0110 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH STROKE +0112 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON +0114 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH BREVE +0116 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOT ABOVE +0118 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH OGONEK +011A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CARON +011C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CIRCUMFLEX +011E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH BREVE +0120 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH DOT ABOVE +0122 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CEDILLA +0124 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0126 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH STROKE +0128 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH TILDE +012A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH MACRON +012C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH BREVE +012E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH OGONEK +0130 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOT ABOVE +0132 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LIGATURE IJ +0134 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0136 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH CEDILLA +0139 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH ACUTE +013B ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CEDILLA +013D ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CARON +013F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE DOT +0141 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH STROKE +0143 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH ACUTE +0145 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CEDILLA +0147 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CARON +014A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ENG +014C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON +014E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH BREVE +0150 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0152 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LIGATURE OE +0154 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH ACUTE +0156 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH CEDILLA +0158 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH CARON +015A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH ACUTE +015C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CIRCUMFLEX +015E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CEDILLA +0160 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CARON +0162 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CEDILLA +0164 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CARON +0166 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH STROKE +0168 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE +016A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON +016C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH BREVE +016E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH RING ABOVE +0170 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0172 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH OGONEK +0174 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0176 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0178..0179 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DIAERESIS..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH ACUTE +017B ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DOT ABOVE +017D ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH CARON +0181..0182 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH TOPBAR +0184 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE SIX +0186..0187 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OPEN O..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH HOOK +0189..018B ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AFRICAN D..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH TOPBAR +018E..0191 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED E..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH HOOK +0193..0194 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GAMMA +0196..0198 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER IOTA..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH HOOK +019C..019D ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED M..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LEFT HOOK +019F..01A0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MIDDLE TILDE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN +01A2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OI +01A4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH HOOK +01A6..01A7 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN LETTER YR..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE TWO +01A9 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ESH +01AC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH HOOK +01AE..01AF ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH RETROFLEX HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN +01B1..01B3 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH HOOK +01B5 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH STROKE +01B7..01B8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH REVERSED +01BC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE +01C4..01C5 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SMALL LETTER Z WITH CARON +01C7..01C8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER LJ..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH SMALL LETTER J +01CA..01CB ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER NJ..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH SMALL LETTER J +01CD ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CARON +01CF ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH CARON +01D1 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CARON +01D3 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH CARON +01D5 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01D7 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +01D9 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND CARON +01DB ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND GRAVE +01DE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01E0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +01E2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AE WITH MACRON +01E4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH STROKE +01E6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CARON +01E8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH CARON +01EA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH OGONEK +01EC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH OGONEK AND MACRON +01EE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH WITH CARON +01F1..01F2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SMALL LETTER Z +01F4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH ACUTE +01F6..01F8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HWAIR..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH GRAVE +01FA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING ABOVE AND ACUTE +01FC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AE WITH ACUTE +01FE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE AND ACUTE +0200 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0202 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH INVERTED BREVE +0204 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0206 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH INVERTED BREVE +0208 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH INVERTED BREVE +020C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH INVERTED BREVE +0210 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0212 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH INVERTED BREVE +0214 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0216 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH INVERTED BREVE +0218 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH COMMA BELOW +021A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH COMMA BELOW +021C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER YOGH +021E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CARON +0220 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LONG RIGHT LEG +0222 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OU +0224 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH HOOK +0226 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE +0228 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA +022A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +022C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND MACRON +022E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE +0230 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +0232 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH MACRON +023A..023B ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH STROKE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH STROKE +023D..023E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH BAR..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +0241 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0243..0246 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH STROKE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH STROKE +0248 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J WITH STROKE +024A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SMALL Q WITH HOOK TAIL +024C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH STROKE +024E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH STROKE +0370 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA +0372 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0376 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0388..038A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..038F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH TONOS +0391..03A1 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [17] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03AB ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [9] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA +03CF ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL KAI SYMBOL +03D8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK LETTER ARCHAIC KOPPA +03DA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK LETTER STIGMA +03DC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK LETTER DIGAMMA +03DE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK LETTER KOPPA +03E0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK LETTER SAMPI +03E2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SHEI +03E4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER FEI +03E6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KHEI +03E8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER HORI +03EA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER GANGIA +03EC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SHIMA +03EE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DEI +03F4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL THETA SYMBOL +03F7 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO +03F9..03FA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SAN +03FD..042F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [51] GREEK CAPITAL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YA +0460 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA +0462 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YAT +0464 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED E +0466 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER LITTLE YUS +0468 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED LITTLE YUS +046A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BIG YUS +046C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +046E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KSI +0470 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PSI +0472 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER FITA +0474 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IZHITSA +0476 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IZHITSA WITH DOUBLE GRAVE ACCENT +0478 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER UK +047A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ROUND OMEGA +047C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH TITLO +047E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OT +0480 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOPPA +048A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL +048C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SEMISOFT SIGN +048E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ER WITH TICK +0490 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH UPTURN +0492 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE +0494 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0496 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH DESCENDER +0498 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZE WITH DESCENDER +049A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH DESCENDER +049C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH VERTICAL STROKE +049E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH STROKE +04A0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BASHKIR KA +04A2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH DESCENDER +04A4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE EN GHE +04A6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +04A8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN HA +04AA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ES WITH DESCENDER +04AC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TE WITH DESCENDER +04AE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER STRAIGHT U +04B0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER STRAIGHT U WITH STROKE +04B2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH DESCENDER +04B4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE TE TSE +04B6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH DESCENDER +04B8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH VERTICAL STROKE +04BA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHHA +04BC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE +04BE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE WITH DESCENDER +04C0..04C1 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] CYRILLIC LETTER PALOCHKA..CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH BREVE +04C3 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH HOOK +04C5 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH TAIL +04C7 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH HOOK +04C9 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH TAIL +04CB ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KHAKASSIAN CHE +04CD ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EM WITH TAIL +04D0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE +04D2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS +04D4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE A IE +04D6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IE WITH BREVE +04D8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SCHWA +04DA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SCHWA WITH DIAERESIS +04DC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH DIAERESIS +04DE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZE WITH DIAERESIS +04E0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN DZE +04E2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I WITH MACRON +04E4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS +04E6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +04E8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BARRED O +04EA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BARRED O WITH DIAERESIS +04EC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DIAERESIS +04EE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON +04F0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS +04F2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +04F4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH DIAERESIS +04F6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH DESCENDER +04F8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YERU WITH DIAERESIS +04FA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE AND HOOK +04FC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH HOOK +04FE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH STROKE +0500 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DE +0502 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DJE +0504 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI ZJE +0506 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DZJE +0508 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI LJE +050A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI NJE +050C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI SJE +050E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI TJE +0510 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED ZE +0512 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH HOOK +0514 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER LHA +0516 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER RHA +0518 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YAE +051A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER QA +051C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER WE +051E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ALEUT KA +0520 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0522 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0524 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PE WITH DESCENDER +0526 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHHA WITH DESCENDER +0528 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH LEFT HOOK +052A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZZHE +052C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DCHE +052E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +10A0..10C5 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +13A0..13F5 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [86] CHEROKEE LETTER A..CHEROKEE LETTER MV +1C90..1CBA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1E00 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW +1E02 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH DOT ABOVE +1E04 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH DOT BELOW +1E06 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH LINE BELOW +1E08 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CEDILLA AND ACUTE +1E0A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH DOT ABOVE +1E0C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH DOT BELOW +1E0E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH LINE BELOW +1E10 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CEDILLA +1E12 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E14 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E16 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E18 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E1A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH TILDE BELOW +1E1C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA AND BREVE +1E1E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH DOT ABOVE +1E20 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH MACRON +1E22 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DOT ABOVE +1E24 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DOT BELOW +1E26 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DIAERESIS +1E28 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CEDILLA +1E2A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH BREVE BELOW +1E2C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH TILDE BELOW +1E2E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +1E30 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH ACUTE +1E32 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DOT BELOW +1E34 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH LINE BELOW +1E36 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW +1E38 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E3A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH LINE BELOW +1E3C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E3E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH ACUTE +1E40 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH DOT ABOVE +1E42 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH DOT BELOW +1E44 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DOT ABOVE +1E46 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DOT BELOW +1E48 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LINE BELOW +1E4A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E4C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E4E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND DIAERESIS +1E50 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E52 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E54 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH ACUTE +1E56 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH DOT ABOVE +1E58 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT ABOVE +1E5A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW +1E5C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E5E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH LINE BELOW +1E60 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT ABOVE +1E62 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW +1E64 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH ACUTE AND DOT ABOVE +1E66 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CARON AND DOT ABOVE +1E68 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW AND DOT ABOVE +1E6A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DOT ABOVE +1E6C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DOT BELOW +1E6E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH LINE BELOW +1E70 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E72 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS BELOW +1E74 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE BELOW +1E76 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E78 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E7A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON AND DIAERESIS +1E7C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH TILDE +1E7E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH DOT BELOW +1E80 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH GRAVE +1E82 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH ACUTE +1E84 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DIAERESIS +1E86 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DOT ABOVE +1E88 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DOT BELOW +1E8A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X WITH DOT ABOVE +1E8C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X WITH DIAERESIS +1E8E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DOT ABOVE +1E90 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH CIRCUMFLEX +1E92 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DOT BELOW +1E94 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH LINE BELOW +1E9E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SHARP S +1EA0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT BELOW +1EA2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EA4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EA6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EA8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EAA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EAC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EAE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND ACUTE +1EB0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND GRAVE +1EB2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND HOOK ABOVE +1EB4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND TILDE +1EB6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND DOT BELOW +1EB8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOT BELOW +1EBA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EBC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH TILDE +1EBE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EC0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EC2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EC4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EC6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EC8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ECA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOT BELOW +1ECC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT BELOW +1ECE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ED0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1ED2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1ED4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1ED6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1ED8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EDA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EDC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EDE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EE0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EE2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EE4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOT BELOW +1EE6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EE8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EEA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EEC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EEE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EF0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EF2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH GRAVE +1EF4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DOT BELOW +1EF6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EF8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH TILDE +1EFA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH LL +1EFC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH V +1EFE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH LOOP +1F08..1F0F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F18..1F1D ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F28..1F2F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F38..1F3F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F48..1F4D ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F59 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F68..1F6F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F88..1F8F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F98..1F9F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FA8..1FAF ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FB8..1FBC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [5] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC8..1FCC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [5] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FD8..1FDB ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE8..1FEC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [5] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF8..1FFC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [5] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +2126 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& OHM SIGN +212A..212B ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] KELVIN SIGN..ANGSTROM SIGN +2132 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& TURNED CAPITAL F +2160..216F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # Nl [16] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..ROMAN NUMERAL ONE THOUSAND +2183 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED +24B6..24CF ; Changes_When_Lowercased # So [26] CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +2C00..2C2F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [48] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER CAUDATE CHRIVI +2C60 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOUBLE BAR +2C62..2C64 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE TILDE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH TAIL +2C67 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DESCENDER +2C69 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DESCENDER +2C6B ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DESCENDER +2C6D..2C70 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED ALPHA +2C72 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH HOOK +2C75 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HALF H +2C7E..2C80 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER ALFA +2C82 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER VIDA +2C84 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER GAMMA +2C86 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DALDA +2C88 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER EIE +2C8A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SOU +2C8C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER ZATA +2C8E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER HATE +2C90 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER THETHE +2C92 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER IAUDA +2C94 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KAPA +2C96 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER LAULA +2C98 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER MI +2C9A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER NI +2C9C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KSI +2C9E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER O +2CA0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER PI +2CA2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER RO +2CA4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SIMA +2CA6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER TAU +2CA8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER UA +2CAA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER FI +2CAC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KHI +2CAE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER PSI +2CB0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OOU +2CB2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P ALEF +2CB4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC AIN +2CB6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC EIE +2CB8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P KAPA +2CBA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P NI +2CBC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC NI +2CBE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC OOU +2CC0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SAMPI +2CC2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CROSSED SHEI +2CC4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHEI +2CC6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC ESH +2CC8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER AKHMIMIC KHEI +2CCA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P HORI +2CCC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HORI +2CCE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HA +2CD0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER L-SHAPED HA +2CD2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HEI +2CD4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HAT +2CD6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC GANGIA +2CD8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC DJA +2CDA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHIMA +2CDC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN SHIMA +2CDE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NGI +2CE0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NYI +2CE2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN WAU +2CEB ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI +2CED ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +A640 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA +A642 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZELO +A644 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED DZE +A646 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTA +A648 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DJERV +A64A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER MONOGRAPH UK +A64C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BROAD OMEGA +A64E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER NEUTRAL YER +A650 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YERU WITH BACK YER +A652 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED YAT +A654 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED YU +A656 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED A +A658 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BLENDED YUS +A65C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YN +A660 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED TSE +A662 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT DE +A664 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT EL +A666 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT EM +A668 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER MONOCULAR O +A66A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BINOCULAR O +A66C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A680 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE +A682 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZWE +A684 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHWE +A686 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CCHE +A688 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZZE +A68A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +A68C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TWE +A68E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TSWE +A690 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TSSE +A692 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TCHE +A694 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HWE +A696 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHWE +A698 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DOUBLE O +A69A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CROSSED O +A722 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF +A724 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL AIN +A726 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HENG +A728 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TZ +A72A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TRESILLO +A72C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CUATRILLO +A72E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CUATRILLO WITH COMMA +A732 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AA +A734 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AO +A736 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AU +A738 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AV +A73A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AV WITH HORIZONTAL BAR +A73C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AY +A73E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED C WITH DOT +A740 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH STROKE +A742 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A744 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH STROKE AND DIAGONAL STROKE +A746 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER BROKEN L +A748 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH HIGH STROKE +A74A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH LONG STROKE OVERLAY +A74C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH LOOP +A74E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OO +A750 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A752 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH FLOURISH +A754 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH SQUIRREL TAIL +A756 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A758 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A75A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R ROTUNDA +A75C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER RUM ROTUNDA +A75E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A760 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VY +A762 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VISIGOTHIC Z +A764 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE +A766 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A768 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VEND +A76A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ET +A76C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER IS +A76E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CON +A779 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR D +A77B ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR F +A77D..A77E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED INSULAR G +A780 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED L +A782 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR R +A784 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR S +A786 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR T +A78B ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO +A78D ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED H +A790 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER +A792 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH BAR +A796 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH FLOURISH +A798 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH STROKE +A79A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK AE +A79C ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK OE +A79E ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK UE +A7A0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7AA..A7AE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [5] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SMALL CAPITAL I +A7B0..A7B4 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [5] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED K..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER BETA +A7B6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA +A7B8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH STROKE +A7BA ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL A +A7BC ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL I +A7BE ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL U +A7C0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OLD POLISH O +A7C2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ANGLICANA W +A7C4..A7C7 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH PALATAL HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7C9 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D6 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE SCOTS S +A7D8 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F5 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +FF21..FF3A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +10400..10427 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [40] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET CAPITAL LETTER EW +104B0..104D3 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +10570..1057A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10C80..10CB2 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +118A0..118BF ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [32] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER VIYO +16E40..16E5F ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [32] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER Y +1E900..1E921 ; Changes_When_Lowercased # L& [34] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER SHA + +# Total code points: 1433 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Changes_When_Uppercased (CWU) +# Characters whose normalized forms are not stable under a toUppercase mapping. +# For more information, see D140 in Section 3.13, "Default Case Algorithms". +# Changes_When_Uppercased(X) is true when toUppercase(toNFD(X)) != toNFD(X) + +0061..007A ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +00B5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& MICRO SIGN +00DF..00F6 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [24] LATIN SMALL LETTER SHARP S..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F8..00FF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [8] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DIAERESIS +0101 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH MACRON +0103 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE +0105 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH OGONEK +0107 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH ACUTE +0109 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CIRCUMFLEX +010B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH DOT ABOVE +010D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CARON +010F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CARON +0111 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH STROKE +0113 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH MACRON +0115 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH BREVE +0117 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH DOT ABOVE +0119 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH OGONEK +011B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CARON +011D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH CIRCUMFLEX +011F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH BREVE +0121 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH DOT ABOVE +0123 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH CEDILLA +0125 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0127 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH STROKE +0129 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH TILDE +012B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH MACRON +012D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH BREVE +012F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH OGONEK +0131 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOTLESS I +0133 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LIGATURE IJ +0135 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0137 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH CEDILLA +013A ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH ACUTE +013C ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH CEDILLA +013E ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH CARON +0140 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE DOT +0142 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH STROKE +0144 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH ACUTE +0146 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH CEDILLA +0148..0149 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER N PRECEDED BY APOSTROPHE +014B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER ENG +014D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON +014F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH BREVE +0151 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0153 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LIGATURE OE +0155 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH ACUTE +0157 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH CEDILLA +0159 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH CARON +015B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH ACUTE +015D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CIRCUMFLEX +015F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CEDILLA +0161 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CARON +0163 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH CEDILLA +0165 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH CARON +0167 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH STROKE +0169 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH TILDE +016B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH MACRON +016D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH BREVE +016F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH RING ABOVE +0171 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0173 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH OGONEK +0175 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0177 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH CIRCUMFLEX +017A ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH ACUTE +017C ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH DOT ABOVE +017E..0180 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH STROKE +0183 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH TOPBAR +0185 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE SIX +0188 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH HOOK +018C ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH TOPBAR +0192 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER F WITH HOOK +0195 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER HV +0199..019A ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH BAR +019E ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH LONG RIGHT LEG +01A1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN +01A3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OI +01A5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH HOOK +01A8 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE TWO +01AD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK +01B0 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN +01B4 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH HOOK +01B6 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH STROKE +01B9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH REVERSED +01BD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE FIVE +01BF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C5..01C6 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SMALL LETTER Z WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER DZ WITH CARON +01C8..01C9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH SMALL LETTER J..LATIN SMALL LETTER LJ +01CB..01CC ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH SMALL LETTER J..LATIN SMALL LETTER NJ +01CE ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CARON +01D0 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH CARON +01D2 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CARON +01D4 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH CARON +01D6 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01D8 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +01DA ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND CARON +01DC..01DD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND GRAVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED E +01DF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01E1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +01E3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AE WITH MACRON +01E5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH STROKE +01E7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH CARON +01E9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH CARON +01EB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH OGONEK +01ED ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH OGONEK AND MACRON +01EF..01F0 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH CARON +01F2..01F3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SMALL LETTER Z..LATIN SMALL LETTER DZ +01F5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH ACUTE +01F9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH GRAVE +01FB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH RING ABOVE AND ACUTE +01FD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AE WITH ACUTE +01FF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE AND ACUTE +0201 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0203 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH INVERTED BREVE +0205 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0207 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH INVERTED BREVE +0209 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH INVERTED BREVE +020D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH INVERTED BREVE +0211 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0213 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH INVERTED BREVE +0215 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0217 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH INVERTED BREVE +0219 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH COMMA BELOW +021B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH COMMA BELOW +021D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER YOGH +021F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH CARON +0223 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OU +0225 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH HOOK +0227 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE +0229 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA +022B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +022D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND MACRON +022F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE +0231 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +0233 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH MACRON +023C ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH STROKE +023F..0240 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH SWASH TAIL +0242 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0247 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH STROKE +0249 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH STROKE +024B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Q WITH HOOK TAIL +024D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH STROKE +024F..0254 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [6] LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER OPEN O +0256..0257 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH TAIL..LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH HOOK +0259 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER SCHWA +025B..025C ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER OPEN E..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED OPEN E +0260..0261 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER SCRIPT G +0263 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GAMMA +0265..0266 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H..LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH HOOK +0268..026C ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [5] LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH BELT +026F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED M +0271..0272 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH LEFT HOOK +0275 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED O +027D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH TAIL +0280 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL R +0282..0283 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH +0287..028C ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [6] LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED T..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED V +0292 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH +029D..029E ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH CROSSED-TAIL..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED K +0345 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # Mn COMBINING GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +0371 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER HETA +0373 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0377 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037B..037D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +0390 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND TONOS +03AC..03CE ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [35] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH TONOS +03D0..03D1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] GREEK BETA SYMBOL..GREEK THETA SYMBOL +03D5..03D7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [3] GREEK PHI SYMBOL..GREEK KAI SYMBOL +03D9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC KOPPA +03DB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER STIGMA +03DD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER DIGAMMA +03DF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER KOPPA +03E1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER SAMPI +03E3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SHEI +03E5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER FEI +03E7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER KHEI +03E9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER HORI +03EB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER GANGIA +03ED ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SHIMA +03EF..03F3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [5] COPTIC SMALL LETTER DEI..GREEK LETTER YOT +03F5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F8 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER SHO +03FB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER SAN +0430..045F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [48] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZHE +0461 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER OMEGA +0463 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YAT +0465 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED E +0467 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER LITTLE YUS +0469 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED LITTLE YUS +046B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BIG YUS +046D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +046F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KSI +0471 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PSI +0473 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER FITA +0475 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IZHITSA +0477 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IZHITSA WITH DOUBLE GRAVE ACCENT +0479 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UK +047B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUND OMEGA +047D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH TITLO +047F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER OT +0481 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +048B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL +048D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SEMISOFT SIGN +048F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ER WITH TICK +0491 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH UPTURN +0493 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE +0495 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0497 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHE WITH DESCENDER +0499 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZE WITH DESCENDER +049B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH DESCENDER +049D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH VERTICAL STROKE +049F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH STROKE +04A1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BASHKIR KA +04A3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH DESCENDER +04A5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LIGATURE EN GHE +04A7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +04A9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN HA +04AB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ES WITH DESCENDER +04AD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TE WITH DESCENDER +04AF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER STRAIGHT U +04B1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER STRAIGHT U WITH STROKE +04B3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HA WITH DESCENDER +04B5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LIGATURE TE TSE +04B7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CHE WITH DESCENDER +04B9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CHE WITH VERTICAL STROKE +04BB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHHA +04BD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE +04BF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE WITH DESCENDER +04C2 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHE WITH BREVE +04C4 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH HOOK +04C6 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH TAIL +04C8 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH HOOK +04CA ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH TAIL +04CC ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KHAKASSIAN CHE +04CE..04CF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EM WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PALOCHKA +04D1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE +04D3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS +04D5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LIGATURE A IE +04D7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IE WITH BREVE +04D9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SCHWA +04DB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SCHWA WITH DIAERESIS +04DD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHE WITH DIAERESIS +04DF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZE WITH DIAERESIS +04E1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN DZE +04E3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER I WITH MACRON +04E5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS +04E7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +04E9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BARRED O +04EB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BARRED O WITH DIAERESIS +04ED ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER E WITH DIAERESIS +04EF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER U WITH MACRON +04F1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS +04F3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +04F5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CHE WITH DIAERESIS +04F7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH DESCENDER +04F9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YERU WITH DIAERESIS +04FB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE AND HOOK +04FD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HA WITH HOOK +04FF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HA WITH STROKE +0501 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI DE +0503 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI DJE +0505 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI ZJE +0507 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI DZJE +0509 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI LJE +050B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI NJE +050D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI SJE +050F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI TJE +0511 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED ZE +0513 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH HOOK +0515 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER LHA +0517 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER RHA +0519 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YAE +051B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER QA +051D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER WE +051F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ALEUT KA +0521 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0523 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0525 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PE WITH DESCENDER +0527 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHHA WITH DESCENDER +0529 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH LEFT HOOK +052B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZZHE +052D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DCHE +052F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0561..0587 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [39] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE ECH YIWN +10D0..10FA ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [43] GEORGIAN LETTER AN..GEORGIAN LETTER AIN +10FD..10FF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [3] GEORGIAN LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN LETTER LABIAL SIGN +13F8..13FD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1C80..1C88 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1D79 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G +1D7D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH STROKE +1D8E ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH PALATAL HOOK +1E01 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW +1E03 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH DOT ABOVE +1E05 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH DOT BELOW +1E07 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH LINE BELOW +1E09 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CEDILLA AND ACUTE +1E0B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH DOT ABOVE +1E0D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH DOT BELOW +1E0F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH LINE BELOW +1E11 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CEDILLA +1E13 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E15 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E17 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E19 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E1B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH TILDE BELOW +1E1D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA AND BREVE +1E1F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER F WITH DOT ABOVE +1E21 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH MACRON +1E23 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DOT ABOVE +1E25 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DOT BELOW +1E27 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DIAERESIS +1E29 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH CEDILLA +1E2B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH BREVE BELOW +1E2D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH TILDE BELOW +1E2F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +1E31 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH ACUTE +1E33 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH DOT BELOW +1E35 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH LINE BELOW +1E37 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW +1E39 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E3B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH LINE BELOW +1E3D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E3F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH ACUTE +1E41 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH DOT ABOVE +1E43 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH DOT BELOW +1E45 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH DOT ABOVE +1E47 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH DOT BELOW +1E49 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH LINE BELOW +1E4B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E4D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E4F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND DIAERESIS +1E51 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E53 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E55 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH ACUTE +1E57 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH DOT ABOVE +1E59 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOT ABOVE +1E5B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW +1E5D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E5F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH LINE BELOW +1E61 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH DOT ABOVE +1E63 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW +1E65 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH ACUTE AND DOT ABOVE +1E67 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CARON AND DOT ABOVE +1E69 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW AND DOT ABOVE +1E6B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DOT ABOVE +1E6D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DOT BELOW +1E6F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH LINE BELOW +1E71 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E73 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS BELOW +1E75 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH TILDE BELOW +1E77 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E79 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E7B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH MACRON AND DIAERESIS +1E7D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH TILDE +1E7F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH DOT BELOW +1E81 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH GRAVE +1E83 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH ACUTE +1E85 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH DIAERESIS +1E87 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH DOT ABOVE +1E89 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH DOT BELOW +1E8B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER X WITH DOT ABOVE +1E8D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER X WITH DIAERESIS +1E8F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DOT ABOVE +1E91 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH CIRCUMFLEX +1E93 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH DOT BELOW +1E95..1E9B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH LINE BELOW..LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S WITH DOT ABOVE +1EA1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOT BELOW +1EA3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EA5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EA7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EA9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EAB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EAD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EAF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND ACUTE +1EB1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND GRAVE +1EB3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND HOOK ABOVE +1EB5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND TILDE +1EB7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND DOT BELOW +1EB9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH DOT BELOW +1EBB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EBD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH TILDE +1EBF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EC1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EC3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EC5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EC7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EC9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ECB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DOT BELOW +1ECD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOT BELOW +1ECF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ED1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1ED3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1ED5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1ED7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1ED9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EDB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EDD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EDF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EE1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EE3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EE5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DOT BELOW +1EE7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EE9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EEB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EED ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EEF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EF1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EF3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH GRAVE +1EF5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DOT BELOW +1EF7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EF9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH TILDE +1EFB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH LL +1EFD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH V +1EFF..1F07 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH LOOP..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F10..1F15 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F27 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F30..1F37 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F40..1F45 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F60..1F67 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F70..1F7D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [14] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1FB4 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [53] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FB7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FBC ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBE ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FC7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FCC ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FD7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FE0..1FE7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FF2..1FF4 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FF7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FFC ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +214E ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& TURNED SMALL F +2170..217F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # Nl [16] SMALL ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..SMALL ROMAN NUMERAL ONE THOUSAND +2184 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +24D0..24E9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # So [26] CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +2C30..2C5F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [48] GLAGOLITIC SMALL LETTER AZU..GLAGOLITIC SMALL LETTER CAUDATE CHRIVI +2C61 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH DOUBLE BAR +2C65..2C66 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +2C68 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DESCENDER +2C6A ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH DESCENDER +2C6C ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH DESCENDER +2C73 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH HOOK +2C76 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER HALF H +2C81 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER ALFA +2C83 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER VIDA +2C85 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER GAMMA +2C87 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DALDA +2C89 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER EIE +2C8B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SOU +2C8D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER ZATA +2C8F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER HATE +2C91 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER THETHE +2C93 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER IAUDA +2C95 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER KAPA +2C97 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER LAULA +2C99 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER MI +2C9B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER NI +2C9D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER KSI +2C9F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER O +2CA1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER PI +2CA3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER RO +2CA5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SIMA +2CA7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER TAU +2CA9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER UA +2CAB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER FI +2CAD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER KHI +2CAF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER PSI +2CB1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OOU +2CB3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P ALEF +2CB5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC AIN +2CB7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC EIE +2CB9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P KAPA +2CBB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P NI +2CBD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC NI +2CBF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC OOU +2CC1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SAMPI +2CC3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED SHEI +2CC5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHEI +2CC7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC ESH +2CC9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER AKHMIMIC KHEI +2CCB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P HORI +2CCD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HORI +2CCF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HA +2CD1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER L-SHAPED HA +2CD3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HEI +2CD5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HAT +2CD7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC GANGIA +2CD9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC DJA +2CDB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHIMA +2CDD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN SHIMA +2CDF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NGI +2CE1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NYI +2CE3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN WAU +2CEC ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI +2CEE ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2D00..2D25 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +A641 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZEMLYA +A643 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZELO +A645 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED DZE +A647 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTA +A649 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DJERV +A64B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER MONOGRAPH UK +A64D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BROAD OMEGA +A64F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER NEUTRAL YER +A651 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YERU WITH BACK YER +A653 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED YAT +A655 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED YU +A657 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED A +A659 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BLENDED YUS +A65D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YN +A661 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED TSE +A663 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SOFT DE +A665 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SOFT EL +A667 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SOFT EM +A669 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER MONOCULAR O +A66B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BINOCULAR O +A66D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A681 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DWE +A683 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZWE +A685 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHWE +A687 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CCHE +A689 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZZE +A68B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +A68D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TWE +A68F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TSWE +A691 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TSSE +A693 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TCHE +A695 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HWE +A697 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHWE +A699 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE O +A69B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A723 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF +A725 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL AIN +A727 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER HENG +A729 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TZ +A72B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TRESILLO +A72D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CUATRILLO +A72F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CUATRILLO WITH COMMA +A733 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AA +A735 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AO +A737 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AU +A739 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AV +A73B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AV WITH HORIZONTAL BAR +A73D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AY +A73F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C WITH DOT +A741 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH STROKE +A743 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A745 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH STROKE AND DIAGONAL STROKE +A747 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER BROKEN L +A749 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH HIGH STROKE +A74B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH LONG STROKE OVERLAY +A74D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH LOOP +A74F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OO +A751 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A753 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH FLOURISH +A755 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH SQUIRREL TAIL +A757 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Q WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A759 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Q WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A75B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R ROTUNDA +A75D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER RUM ROTUNDA +A75F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A761 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VY +A763 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VISIGOTHIC Z +A765 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE +A767 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A769 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VEND +A76B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER ET +A76D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER IS +A76F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A77A ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR D +A77C ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR F +A77F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED INSULAR G +A781 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED L +A783 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR R +A785 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR S +A787 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A78C ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER SALTILLO +A791 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER +A793..A794 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH PALATAL HOOK +A797 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH FLOURISH +A799 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER F WITH STROKE +A79B ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VOLAPUK AE +A79D ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VOLAPUK OE +A79F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VOLAPUK UE +A7A1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7B5 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER BETA +A7B7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OMEGA +A7B9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH STROKE +A7BB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL A +A7BD ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL I +A7BF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL U +A7C1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OLD POLISH O +A7C3 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER ANGLICANA W +A7C8 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7CA ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D7 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER MIDDLE SCOTS S +A7D9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F6 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +AB53 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CHI +AB70..ABBF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +FB00..FB06 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FF41..FF5A ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +10428..1044F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [40] DESERET SMALL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +104D8..104FB ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10597..105A1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10CC0..10CF2 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +118C0..118DF ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [32] WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +16E60..16E7F ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [32] MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +1E922..1E943 ; Changes_When_Uppercased # L& [34] ADLAM SMALL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA + +# Total code points: 1525 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Changes_When_Titlecased (CWT) +# Characters whose normalized forms are not stable under a toTitlecase mapping. +# For more information, see D141 in Section 3.13, "Default Case Algorithms". +# Changes_When_Titlecased(X) is true when toTitlecase(toNFD(X)) != toNFD(X) + +0061..007A ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +00B5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& MICRO SIGN +00DF..00F6 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [24] LATIN SMALL LETTER SHARP S..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F8..00FF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [8] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DIAERESIS +0101 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH MACRON +0103 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE +0105 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH OGONEK +0107 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH ACUTE +0109 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CIRCUMFLEX +010B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH DOT ABOVE +010D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CARON +010F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CARON +0111 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH STROKE +0113 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH MACRON +0115 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH BREVE +0117 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH DOT ABOVE +0119 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH OGONEK +011B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CARON +011D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH CIRCUMFLEX +011F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH BREVE +0121 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH DOT ABOVE +0123 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH CEDILLA +0125 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0127 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH STROKE +0129 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH TILDE +012B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH MACRON +012D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH BREVE +012F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH OGONEK +0131 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOTLESS I +0133 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LIGATURE IJ +0135 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0137 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH CEDILLA +013A ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH ACUTE +013C ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH CEDILLA +013E ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH CARON +0140 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE DOT +0142 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH STROKE +0144 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH ACUTE +0146 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH CEDILLA +0148..0149 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER N PRECEDED BY APOSTROPHE +014B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER ENG +014D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON +014F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH BREVE +0151 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0153 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LIGATURE OE +0155 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH ACUTE +0157 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH CEDILLA +0159 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH CARON +015B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH ACUTE +015D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CIRCUMFLEX +015F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CEDILLA +0161 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CARON +0163 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH CEDILLA +0165 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH CARON +0167 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH STROKE +0169 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH TILDE +016B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH MACRON +016D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH BREVE +016F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH RING ABOVE +0171 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0173 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH OGONEK +0175 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0177 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH CIRCUMFLEX +017A ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH ACUTE +017C ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH DOT ABOVE +017E..0180 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH STROKE +0183 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH TOPBAR +0185 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE SIX +0188 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH HOOK +018C ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH TOPBAR +0192 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER F WITH HOOK +0195 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER HV +0199..019A ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH BAR +019E ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH LONG RIGHT LEG +01A1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN +01A3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OI +01A5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH HOOK +01A8 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE TWO +01AD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK +01B0 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN +01B4 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH HOOK +01B6 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH STROKE +01B9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH REVERSED +01BD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE FIVE +01BF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C4 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON +01C6..01C7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER DZ WITH CARON..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER LJ +01C9..01CA ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER LJ..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER NJ +01CC ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER NJ +01CE ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CARON +01D0 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH CARON +01D2 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CARON +01D4 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH CARON +01D6 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01D8 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +01DA ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND CARON +01DC..01DD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND GRAVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED E +01DF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01E1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +01E3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AE WITH MACRON +01E5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH STROKE +01E7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH CARON +01E9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH CARON +01EB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH OGONEK +01ED ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH OGONEK AND MACRON +01EF..01F1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CARON..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ +01F3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DZ +01F5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH ACUTE +01F9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH GRAVE +01FB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH RING ABOVE AND ACUTE +01FD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AE WITH ACUTE +01FF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE AND ACUTE +0201 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0203 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH INVERTED BREVE +0205 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0207 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH INVERTED BREVE +0209 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH INVERTED BREVE +020D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH INVERTED BREVE +0211 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0213 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH INVERTED BREVE +0215 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0217 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH INVERTED BREVE +0219 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH COMMA BELOW +021B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH COMMA BELOW +021D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER YOGH +021F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH CARON +0223 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OU +0225 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH HOOK +0227 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE +0229 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA +022B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +022D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND MACRON +022F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE +0231 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +0233 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH MACRON +023C ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH STROKE +023F..0240 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH SWASH TAIL +0242 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0247 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH STROKE +0249 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH STROKE +024B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Q WITH HOOK TAIL +024D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH STROKE +024F..0254 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [6] LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER OPEN O +0256..0257 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH TAIL..LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH HOOK +0259 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER SCHWA +025B..025C ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER OPEN E..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED OPEN E +0260..0261 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER SCRIPT G +0263 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GAMMA +0265..0266 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H..LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH HOOK +0268..026C ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [5] LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH BELT +026F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED M +0271..0272 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH LEFT HOOK +0275 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED O +027D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH TAIL +0280 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL R +0282..0283 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH +0287..028C ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [6] LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED T..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED V +0292 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH +029D..029E ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH CROSSED-TAIL..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED K +0345 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # Mn COMBINING GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +0371 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER HETA +0373 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0377 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037B..037D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +0390 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND TONOS +03AC..03CE ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [35] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH TONOS +03D0..03D1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] GREEK BETA SYMBOL..GREEK THETA SYMBOL +03D5..03D7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [3] GREEK PHI SYMBOL..GREEK KAI SYMBOL +03D9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC KOPPA +03DB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER STIGMA +03DD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER DIGAMMA +03DF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER KOPPA +03E1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER SAMPI +03E3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SHEI +03E5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER FEI +03E7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER KHEI +03E9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER HORI +03EB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER GANGIA +03ED ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SHIMA +03EF..03F3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [5] COPTIC SMALL LETTER DEI..GREEK LETTER YOT +03F5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F8 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER SHO +03FB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER SAN +0430..045F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [48] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZHE +0461 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER OMEGA +0463 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YAT +0465 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED E +0467 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER LITTLE YUS +0469 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED LITTLE YUS +046B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BIG YUS +046D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +046F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KSI +0471 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PSI +0473 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER FITA +0475 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IZHITSA +0477 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IZHITSA WITH DOUBLE GRAVE ACCENT +0479 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UK +047B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUND OMEGA +047D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH TITLO +047F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER OT +0481 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +048B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL +048D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SEMISOFT SIGN +048F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ER WITH TICK +0491 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH UPTURN +0493 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE +0495 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0497 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHE WITH DESCENDER +0499 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZE WITH DESCENDER +049B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH DESCENDER +049D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH VERTICAL STROKE +049F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH STROKE +04A1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BASHKIR KA +04A3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH DESCENDER +04A5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LIGATURE EN GHE +04A7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +04A9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN HA +04AB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ES WITH DESCENDER +04AD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TE WITH DESCENDER +04AF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER STRAIGHT U +04B1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER STRAIGHT U WITH STROKE +04B3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HA WITH DESCENDER +04B5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LIGATURE TE TSE +04B7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CHE WITH DESCENDER +04B9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CHE WITH VERTICAL STROKE +04BB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHHA +04BD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE +04BF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE WITH DESCENDER +04C2 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHE WITH BREVE +04C4 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH HOOK +04C6 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH TAIL +04C8 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH HOOK +04CA ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH TAIL +04CC ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KHAKASSIAN CHE +04CE..04CF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EM WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PALOCHKA +04D1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE +04D3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS +04D5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LIGATURE A IE +04D7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IE WITH BREVE +04D9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SCHWA +04DB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SCHWA WITH DIAERESIS +04DD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHE WITH DIAERESIS +04DF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZE WITH DIAERESIS +04E1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN DZE +04E3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER I WITH MACRON +04E5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS +04E7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +04E9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BARRED O +04EB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BARRED O WITH DIAERESIS +04ED ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER E WITH DIAERESIS +04EF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER U WITH MACRON +04F1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS +04F3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +04F5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CHE WITH DIAERESIS +04F7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH DESCENDER +04F9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YERU WITH DIAERESIS +04FB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE AND HOOK +04FD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HA WITH HOOK +04FF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HA WITH STROKE +0501 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI DE +0503 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI DJE +0505 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI ZJE +0507 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI DZJE +0509 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI LJE +050B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI NJE +050D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI SJE +050F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI TJE +0511 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED ZE +0513 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH HOOK +0515 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER LHA +0517 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER RHA +0519 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YAE +051B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER QA +051D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER WE +051F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ALEUT KA +0521 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0523 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0525 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PE WITH DESCENDER +0527 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHHA WITH DESCENDER +0529 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH LEFT HOOK +052B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZZHE +052D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DCHE +052F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0561..0587 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [39] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE ECH YIWN +13F8..13FD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1C80..1C88 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1D79 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G +1D7D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH STROKE +1D8E ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH PALATAL HOOK +1E01 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW +1E03 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH DOT ABOVE +1E05 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH DOT BELOW +1E07 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH LINE BELOW +1E09 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CEDILLA AND ACUTE +1E0B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH DOT ABOVE +1E0D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH DOT BELOW +1E0F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH LINE BELOW +1E11 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CEDILLA +1E13 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E15 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E17 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E19 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E1B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH TILDE BELOW +1E1D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA AND BREVE +1E1F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER F WITH DOT ABOVE +1E21 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH MACRON +1E23 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DOT ABOVE +1E25 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DOT BELOW +1E27 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DIAERESIS +1E29 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH CEDILLA +1E2B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH BREVE BELOW +1E2D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH TILDE BELOW +1E2F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +1E31 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH ACUTE +1E33 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH DOT BELOW +1E35 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH LINE BELOW +1E37 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW +1E39 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E3B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH LINE BELOW +1E3D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E3F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH ACUTE +1E41 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH DOT ABOVE +1E43 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH DOT BELOW +1E45 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH DOT ABOVE +1E47 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH DOT BELOW +1E49 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH LINE BELOW +1E4B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E4D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E4F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND DIAERESIS +1E51 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E53 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E55 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH ACUTE +1E57 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH DOT ABOVE +1E59 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOT ABOVE +1E5B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW +1E5D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E5F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH LINE BELOW +1E61 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH DOT ABOVE +1E63 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW +1E65 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH ACUTE AND DOT ABOVE +1E67 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CARON AND DOT ABOVE +1E69 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW AND DOT ABOVE +1E6B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DOT ABOVE +1E6D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DOT BELOW +1E6F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH LINE BELOW +1E71 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E73 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS BELOW +1E75 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH TILDE BELOW +1E77 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E79 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E7B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH MACRON AND DIAERESIS +1E7D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH TILDE +1E7F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH DOT BELOW +1E81 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH GRAVE +1E83 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH ACUTE +1E85 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH DIAERESIS +1E87 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH DOT ABOVE +1E89 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH DOT BELOW +1E8B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER X WITH DOT ABOVE +1E8D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER X WITH DIAERESIS +1E8F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DOT ABOVE +1E91 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH CIRCUMFLEX +1E93 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH DOT BELOW +1E95..1E9B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH LINE BELOW..LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S WITH DOT ABOVE +1EA1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOT BELOW +1EA3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EA5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EA7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EA9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EAB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EAD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EAF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND ACUTE +1EB1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND GRAVE +1EB3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND HOOK ABOVE +1EB5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND TILDE +1EB7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND DOT BELOW +1EB9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH DOT BELOW +1EBB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EBD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH TILDE +1EBF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EC1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EC3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EC5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EC7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EC9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ECB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DOT BELOW +1ECD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOT BELOW +1ECF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ED1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1ED3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1ED5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1ED7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1ED9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EDB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EDD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EDF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EE1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EE3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EE5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DOT BELOW +1EE7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EE9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EEB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EED ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EEF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EF1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EF3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH GRAVE +1EF5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DOT BELOW +1EF7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EF9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH TILDE +1EFB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH LL +1EFD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH V +1EFF..1F07 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH LOOP..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F10..1F15 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F27 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F30..1F37 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F40..1F45 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F60..1F67 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F70..1F7D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [14] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1F87 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F90..1F97 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FA0..1FA7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB0..1FB4 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [5] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FB7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FBE ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FC7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FD7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FE0..1FE7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FF2..1FF4 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FF7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +214E ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& TURNED SMALL F +2170..217F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # Nl [16] SMALL ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..SMALL ROMAN NUMERAL ONE THOUSAND +2184 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +24D0..24E9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # So [26] CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +2C30..2C5F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [48] GLAGOLITIC SMALL LETTER AZU..GLAGOLITIC SMALL LETTER CAUDATE CHRIVI +2C61 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH DOUBLE BAR +2C65..2C66 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +2C68 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DESCENDER +2C6A ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH DESCENDER +2C6C ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH DESCENDER +2C73 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH HOOK +2C76 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER HALF H +2C81 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER ALFA +2C83 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER VIDA +2C85 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER GAMMA +2C87 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DALDA +2C89 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER EIE +2C8B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SOU +2C8D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER ZATA +2C8F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER HATE +2C91 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER THETHE +2C93 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER IAUDA +2C95 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER KAPA +2C97 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER LAULA +2C99 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER MI +2C9B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER NI +2C9D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER KSI +2C9F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER O +2CA1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER PI +2CA3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER RO +2CA5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SIMA +2CA7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER TAU +2CA9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER UA +2CAB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER FI +2CAD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER KHI +2CAF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER PSI +2CB1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OOU +2CB3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P ALEF +2CB5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC AIN +2CB7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC EIE +2CB9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P KAPA +2CBB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P NI +2CBD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC NI +2CBF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC OOU +2CC1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER SAMPI +2CC3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED SHEI +2CC5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHEI +2CC7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC ESH +2CC9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER AKHMIMIC KHEI +2CCB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P HORI +2CCD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HORI +2CCF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HA +2CD1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER L-SHAPED HA +2CD3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HEI +2CD5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HAT +2CD7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC GANGIA +2CD9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC DJA +2CDB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHIMA +2CDD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN SHIMA +2CDF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NGI +2CE1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NYI +2CE3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN WAU +2CEC ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI +2CEE ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2D00..2D25 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +A641 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZEMLYA +A643 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZELO +A645 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED DZE +A647 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTA +A649 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DJERV +A64B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER MONOGRAPH UK +A64D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BROAD OMEGA +A64F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER NEUTRAL YER +A651 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YERU WITH BACK YER +A653 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED YAT +A655 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED YU +A657 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED A +A659 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BLENDED YUS +A65D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YN +A661 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED TSE +A663 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SOFT DE +A665 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SOFT EL +A667 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SOFT EM +A669 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER MONOCULAR O +A66B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BINOCULAR O +A66D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A681 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DWE +A683 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZWE +A685 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHWE +A687 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CCHE +A689 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZZE +A68B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +A68D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TWE +A68F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TSWE +A691 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TSSE +A693 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TCHE +A695 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HWE +A697 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHWE +A699 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE O +A69B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A723 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF +A725 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL AIN +A727 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER HENG +A729 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TZ +A72B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TRESILLO +A72D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CUATRILLO +A72F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CUATRILLO WITH COMMA +A733 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AA +A735 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AO +A737 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AU +A739 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AV +A73B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AV WITH HORIZONTAL BAR +A73D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER AY +A73F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C WITH DOT +A741 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH STROKE +A743 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A745 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH STROKE AND DIAGONAL STROKE +A747 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER BROKEN L +A749 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH HIGH STROKE +A74B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH LONG STROKE OVERLAY +A74D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH LOOP +A74F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OO +A751 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A753 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH FLOURISH +A755 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH SQUIRREL TAIL +A757 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Q WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A759 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Q WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A75B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R ROTUNDA +A75D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER RUM ROTUNDA +A75F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A761 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VY +A763 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VISIGOTHIC Z +A765 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE +A767 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A769 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VEND +A76B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER ET +A76D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER IS +A76F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A77A ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR D +A77C ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR F +A77F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED INSULAR G +A781 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED L +A783 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR R +A785 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR S +A787 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A78C ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER SALTILLO +A791 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER +A793..A794 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH PALATAL HOOK +A797 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH FLOURISH +A799 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER F WITH STROKE +A79B ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VOLAPUK AE +A79D ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VOLAPUK OE +A79F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER VOLAPUK UE +A7A1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7B5 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER BETA +A7B7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OMEGA +A7B9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH STROKE +A7BB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL A +A7BD ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL I +A7BF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL U +A7C1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER OLD POLISH O +A7C3 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER ANGLICANA W +A7C8 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7CA ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D7 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER MIDDLE SCOTS S +A7D9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F6 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +AB53 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CHI +AB70..ABBF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +FB00..FB06 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FF41..FF5A ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +10428..1044F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [40] DESERET SMALL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +104D8..104FB ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10597..105A1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10CC0..10CF2 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +118C0..118DF ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [32] WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +16E60..16E7F ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [32] MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +1E922..1E943 ; Changes_When_Titlecased # L& [34] ADLAM SMALL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA + +# Total code points: 1452 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Changes_When_Casefolded (CWCF) +# Characters whose normalized forms are not stable under case folding. +# For more information, see D142 in Section 3.13, "Default Case Algorithms". +# Changes_When_Casefolded(X) is true when toCasefold(toNFD(X)) != toNFD(X) + +0041..005A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +00B5 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& MICRO SIGN +00C0..00D6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8..00DF ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [8] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER SHARP S +0100 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH MACRON +0102 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE +0104 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH OGONEK +0106 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH ACUTE +0108 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CIRCUMFLEX +010A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH DOT ABOVE +010C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CARON +010E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CARON +0110 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH STROKE +0112 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON +0114 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH BREVE +0116 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOT ABOVE +0118 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH OGONEK +011A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CARON +011C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CIRCUMFLEX +011E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH BREVE +0120 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH DOT ABOVE +0122 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CEDILLA +0124 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0126 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH STROKE +0128 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH TILDE +012A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH MACRON +012C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH BREVE +012E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH OGONEK +0130 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOT ABOVE +0132 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LIGATURE IJ +0134 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0136 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH CEDILLA +0139 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH ACUTE +013B ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CEDILLA +013D ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CARON +013F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE DOT +0141 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH STROKE +0143 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH ACUTE +0145 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CEDILLA +0147 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CARON +0149..014A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER N PRECEDED BY APOSTROPHE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ENG +014C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON +014E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH BREVE +0150 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0152 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LIGATURE OE +0154 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH ACUTE +0156 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH CEDILLA +0158 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH CARON +015A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH ACUTE +015C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CIRCUMFLEX +015E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CEDILLA +0160 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CARON +0162 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CEDILLA +0164 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CARON +0166 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH STROKE +0168 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE +016A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON +016C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH BREVE +016E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH RING ABOVE +0170 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0172 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH OGONEK +0174 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0176 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0178..0179 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DIAERESIS..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH ACUTE +017B ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DOT ABOVE +017D ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH CARON +017F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S +0181..0182 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH TOPBAR +0184 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE SIX +0186..0187 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OPEN O..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH HOOK +0189..018B ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AFRICAN D..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH TOPBAR +018E..0191 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED E..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH HOOK +0193..0194 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GAMMA +0196..0198 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER IOTA..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH HOOK +019C..019D ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED M..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LEFT HOOK +019F..01A0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MIDDLE TILDE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN +01A2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OI +01A4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH HOOK +01A6..01A7 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN LETTER YR..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE TWO +01A9 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ESH +01AC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH HOOK +01AE..01AF ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH RETROFLEX HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN +01B1..01B3 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH HOOK +01B5 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH STROKE +01B7..01B8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH REVERSED +01BC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE +01C4..01C5 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SMALL LETTER Z WITH CARON +01C7..01C8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER LJ..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH SMALL LETTER J +01CA..01CB ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER NJ..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH SMALL LETTER J +01CD ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CARON +01CF ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH CARON +01D1 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CARON +01D3 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH CARON +01D5 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01D7 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +01D9 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND CARON +01DB ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND GRAVE +01DE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01E0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +01E2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AE WITH MACRON +01E4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH STROKE +01E6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CARON +01E8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH CARON +01EA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH OGONEK +01EC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH OGONEK AND MACRON +01EE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH WITH CARON +01F1..01F2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SMALL LETTER Z +01F4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH ACUTE +01F6..01F8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HWAIR..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH GRAVE +01FA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING ABOVE AND ACUTE +01FC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AE WITH ACUTE +01FE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE AND ACUTE +0200 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0202 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH INVERTED BREVE +0204 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0206 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH INVERTED BREVE +0208 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH INVERTED BREVE +020C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH INVERTED BREVE +0210 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0212 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH INVERTED BREVE +0214 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0216 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH INVERTED BREVE +0218 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH COMMA BELOW +021A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH COMMA BELOW +021C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER YOGH +021E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CARON +0220 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LONG RIGHT LEG +0222 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OU +0224 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH HOOK +0226 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE +0228 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA +022A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +022C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND MACRON +022E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE +0230 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +0232 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH MACRON +023A..023B ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH STROKE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH STROKE +023D..023E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH BAR..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +0241 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0243..0246 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH STROKE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH STROKE +0248 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J WITH STROKE +024A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SMALL Q WITH HOOK TAIL +024C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH STROKE +024E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH STROKE +0345 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # Mn COMBINING GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +0370 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA +0372 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0376 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0388..038A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..038F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH TONOS +0391..03A1 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [17] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03AB ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [9] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA +03C2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK SMALL LETTER FINAL SIGMA +03CF..03D1 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL KAI SYMBOL..GREEK THETA SYMBOL +03D5..03D6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] GREEK PHI SYMBOL..GREEK PI SYMBOL +03D8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK LETTER ARCHAIC KOPPA +03DA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK LETTER STIGMA +03DC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK LETTER DIGAMMA +03DE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK LETTER KOPPA +03E0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK LETTER SAMPI +03E2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SHEI +03E4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER FEI +03E6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KHEI +03E8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER HORI +03EA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER GANGIA +03EC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SHIMA +03EE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DEI +03F0..03F1 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] GREEK KAPPA SYMBOL..GREEK RHO SYMBOL +03F4..03F5 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL THETA SYMBOL..GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F7 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO +03F9..03FA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SAN +03FD..042F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [51] GREEK CAPITAL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YA +0460 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA +0462 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YAT +0464 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED E +0466 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER LITTLE YUS +0468 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED LITTLE YUS +046A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BIG YUS +046C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +046E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KSI +0470 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PSI +0472 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER FITA +0474 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IZHITSA +0476 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IZHITSA WITH DOUBLE GRAVE ACCENT +0478 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER UK +047A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ROUND OMEGA +047C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH TITLO +047E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OT +0480 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOPPA +048A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL +048C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SEMISOFT SIGN +048E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ER WITH TICK +0490 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH UPTURN +0492 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE +0494 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0496 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH DESCENDER +0498 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZE WITH DESCENDER +049A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH DESCENDER +049C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH VERTICAL STROKE +049E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH STROKE +04A0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BASHKIR KA +04A2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH DESCENDER +04A4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE EN GHE +04A6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +04A8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN HA +04AA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ES WITH DESCENDER +04AC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TE WITH DESCENDER +04AE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER STRAIGHT U +04B0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER STRAIGHT U WITH STROKE +04B2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH DESCENDER +04B4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE TE TSE +04B6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH DESCENDER +04B8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH VERTICAL STROKE +04BA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHHA +04BC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE +04BE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE WITH DESCENDER +04C0..04C1 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] CYRILLIC LETTER PALOCHKA..CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH BREVE +04C3 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH HOOK +04C5 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH TAIL +04C7 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH HOOK +04C9 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH TAIL +04CB ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KHAKASSIAN CHE +04CD ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EM WITH TAIL +04D0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE +04D2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS +04D4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE A IE +04D6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IE WITH BREVE +04D8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SCHWA +04DA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SCHWA WITH DIAERESIS +04DC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH DIAERESIS +04DE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZE WITH DIAERESIS +04E0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN DZE +04E2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I WITH MACRON +04E4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS +04E6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +04E8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BARRED O +04EA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BARRED O WITH DIAERESIS +04EC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DIAERESIS +04EE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON +04F0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS +04F2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +04F4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH DIAERESIS +04F6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH DESCENDER +04F8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YERU WITH DIAERESIS +04FA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE AND HOOK +04FC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH HOOK +04FE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH STROKE +0500 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DE +0502 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DJE +0504 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI ZJE +0506 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DZJE +0508 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI LJE +050A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI NJE +050C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI SJE +050E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI TJE +0510 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED ZE +0512 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH HOOK +0514 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER LHA +0516 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER RHA +0518 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YAE +051A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER QA +051C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER WE +051E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ALEUT KA +0520 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0522 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0524 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PE WITH DESCENDER +0526 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHHA WITH DESCENDER +0528 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH LEFT HOOK +052A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZZHE +052C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DCHE +052E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +0587 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE ECH YIWN +10A0..10C5 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +13F8..13FD ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1C80..1C88 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1C90..1CBA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1E00 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW +1E02 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH DOT ABOVE +1E04 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH DOT BELOW +1E06 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH LINE BELOW +1E08 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CEDILLA AND ACUTE +1E0A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH DOT ABOVE +1E0C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH DOT BELOW +1E0E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH LINE BELOW +1E10 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CEDILLA +1E12 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E14 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E16 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E18 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E1A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH TILDE BELOW +1E1C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA AND BREVE +1E1E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH DOT ABOVE +1E20 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH MACRON +1E22 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DOT ABOVE +1E24 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DOT BELOW +1E26 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DIAERESIS +1E28 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CEDILLA +1E2A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH BREVE BELOW +1E2C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH TILDE BELOW +1E2E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +1E30 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH ACUTE +1E32 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DOT BELOW +1E34 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH LINE BELOW +1E36 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW +1E38 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E3A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH LINE BELOW +1E3C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E3E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH ACUTE +1E40 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH DOT ABOVE +1E42 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH DOT BELOW +1E44 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DOT ABOVE +1E46 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DOT BELOW +1E48 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LINE BELOW +1E4A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E4C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E4E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND DIAERESIS +1E50 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E52 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E54 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH ACUTE +1E56 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH DOT ABOVE +1E58 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT ABOVE +1E5A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW +1E5C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E5E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH LINE BELOW +1E60 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT ABOVE +1E62 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW +1E64 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH ACUTE AND DOT ABOVE +1E66 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CARON AND DOT ABOVE +1E68 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW AND DOT ABOVE +1E6A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DOT ABOVE +1E6C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DOT BELOW +1E6E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH LINE BELOW +1E70 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E72 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS BELOW +1E74 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE BELOW +1E76 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E78 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E7A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON AND DIAERESIS +1E7C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH TILDE +1E7E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH DOT BELOW +1E80 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH GRAVE +1E82 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH ACUTE +1E84 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DIAERESIS +1E86 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DOT ABOVE +1E88 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DOT BELOW +1E8A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X WITH DOT ABOVE +1E8C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X WITH DIAERESIS +1E8E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DOT ABOVE +1E90 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH CIRCUMFLEX +1E92 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DOT BELOW +1E94 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH LINE BELOW +1E9A..1E9B ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH RIGHT HALF RING..LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S WITH DOT ABOVE +1E9E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SHARP S +1EA0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT BELOW +1EA2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EA4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EA6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EA8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EAA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EAC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EAE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND ACUTE +1EB0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND GRAVE +1EB2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND HOOK ABOVE +1EB4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND TILDE +1EB6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND DOT BELOW +1EB8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOT BELOW +1EBA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EBC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH TILDE +1EBE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EC0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EC2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EC4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EC6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EC8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ECA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOT BELOW +1ECC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT BELOW +1ECE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ED0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1ED2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1ED4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1ED6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1ED8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EDA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EDC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EDE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EE0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EE2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EE4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOT BELOW +1EE6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EE8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EEA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EEC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EEE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EF0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EF2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH GRAVE +1EF4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DOT BELOW +1EF6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EF8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH TILDE +1EFA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH LL +1EFC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH V +1EFE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH LOOP +1F08..1F0F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F18..1F1D ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F28..1F2F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F38..1F3F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F48..1F4D ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F59 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F68..1F6F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F80..1FAF ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [48] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FB2..1FB4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB7..1FBC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC7..1FCC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FD8..1FDB ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE8..1FEC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [5] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF2..1FF4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF7..1FFC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +2126 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& OHM SIGN +212A..212B ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] KELVIN SIGN..ANGSTROM SIGN +2132 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& TURNED CAPITAL F +2160..216F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # Nl [16] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..ROMAN NUMERAL ONE THOUSAND +2183 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED +24B6..24CF ; Changes_When_Casefolded # So [26] CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +2C00..2C2F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [48] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER CAUDATE CHRIVI +2C60 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOUBLE BAR +2C62..2C64 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE TILDE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH TAIL +2C67 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DESCENDER +2C69 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DESCENDER +2C6B ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DESCENDER +2C6D..2C70 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED ALPHA +2C72 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH HOOK +2C75 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HALF H +2C7E..2C80 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER ALFA +2C82 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER VIDA +2C84 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER GAMMA +2C86 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DALDA +2C88 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER EIE +2C8A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SOU +2C8C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER ZATA +2C8E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER HATE +2C90 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER THETHE +2C92 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER IAUDA +2C94 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KAPA +2C96 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER LAULA +2C98 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER MI +2C9A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER NI +2C9C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KSI +2C9E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER O +2CA0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER PI +2CA2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER RO +2CA4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SIMA +2CA6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER TAU +2CA8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER UA +2CAA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER FI +2CAC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KHI +2CAE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER PSI +2CB0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OOU +2CB2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P ALEF +2CB4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC AIN +2CB6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC EIE +2CB8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P KAPA +2CBA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P NI +2CBC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC NI +2CBE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC OOU +2CC0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SAMPI +2CC2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CROSSED SHEI +2CC4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHEI +2CC6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC ESH +2CC8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER AKHMIMIC KHEI +2CCA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P HORI +2CCC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HORI +2CCE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HA +2CD0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER L-SHAPED HA +2CD2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HEI +2CD4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HAT +2CD6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC GANGIA +2CD8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC DJA +2CDA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHIMA +2CDC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN SHIMA +2CDE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NGI +2CE0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NYI +2CE2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN WAU +2CEB ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI +2CED ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +A640 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA +A642 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZELO +A644 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED DZE +A646 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTA +A648 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DJERV +A64A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER MONOGRAPH UK +A64C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BROAD OMEGA +A64E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER NEUTRAL YER +A650 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YERU WITH BACK YER +A652 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED YAT +A654 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED YU +A656 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED A +A658 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BLENDED YUS +A65C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YN +A660 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED TSE +A662 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT DE +A664 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT EL +A666 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT EM +A668 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER MONOCULAR O +A66A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BINOCULAR O +A66C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A680 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE +A682 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZWE +A684 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHWE +A686 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CCHE +A688 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZZE +A68A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +A68C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TWE +A68E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TSWE +A690 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TSSE +A692 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TCHE +A694 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HWE +A696 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHWE +A698 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DOUBLE O +A69A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CROSSED O +A722 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF +A724 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL AIN +A726 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HENG +A728 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TZ +A72A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TRESILLO +A72C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CUATRILLO +A72E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CUATRILLO WITH COMMA +A732 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AA +A734 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AO +A736 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AU +A738 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AV +A73A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AV WITH HORIZONTAL BAR +A73C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AY +A73E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED C WITH DOT +A740 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH STROKE +A742 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A744 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH STROKE AND DIAGONAL STROKE +A746 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER BROKEN L +A748 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH HIGH STROKE +A74A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH LONG STROKE OVERLAY +A74C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH LOOP +A74E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OO +A750 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A752 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH FLOURISH +A754 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH SQUIRREL TAIL +A756 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A758 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A75A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R ROTUNDA +A75C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER RUM ROTUNDA +A75E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A760 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VY +A762 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VISIGOTHIC Z +A764 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE +A766 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A768 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VEND +A76A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ET +A76C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER IS +A76E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CON +A779 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR D +A77B ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR F +A77D..A77E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED INSULAR G +A780 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED L +A782 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR R +A784 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR S +A786 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR T +A78B ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO +A78D ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED H +A790 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER +A792 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH BAR +A796 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH FLOURISH +A798 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH STROKE +A79A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK AE +A79C ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK OE +A79E ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK UE +A7A0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7AA..A7AE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [5] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SMALL CAPITAL I +A7B0..A7B4 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [5] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED K..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER BETA +A7B6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA +A7B8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH STROKE +A7BA ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL A +A7BC ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL I +A7BE ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL U +A7C0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OLD POLISH O +A7C2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ANGLICANA W +A7C4..A7C7 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH PALATAL HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7C9 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D6 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE SCOTS S +A7D8 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F5 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +AB70..ABBF ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +FB00..FB06 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FF21..FF3A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +10400..10427 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [40] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET CAPITAL LETTER EW +104B0..104D3 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +10570..1057A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10C80..10CB2 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +118A0..118BF ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [32] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER VIYO +16E40..16E5F ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [32] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER Y +1E900..1E921 ; Changes_When_Casefolded # L& [34] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER SHA + +# Total code points: 1506 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Changes_When_Casemapped (CWCM) +# Characters whose normalized forms are not stable under case mapping. +# For more information, see D143 in Section 3.13, "Default Case Algorithms". +# Changes_When_Casemapped(X) is true when CWL(X), or CWT(X), or CWU(X) + +0041..005A ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +0061..007A ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +00B5 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& MICRO SIGN +00C0..00D6 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8..00F6 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [31] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F8..0137 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [64] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH CEDILLA +0139..018C ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [84] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH ACUTE..LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH TOPBAR +018E..019A ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [13] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED E..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH BAR +019C..01A9 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [14] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED M..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ESH +01AC..01B9 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [14] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH REVERSED +01BC..01BD ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE FIVE +01BF ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C4..0220 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [93] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LONG RIGHT LEG +0222..0233 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [18] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OU..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH MACRON +023A..0254 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [27] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER OPEN O +0256..0257 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH TAIL..LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH HOOK +0259 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER SCHWA +025B..025C ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER OPEN E..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED OPEN E +0260..0261 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER SCRIPT G +0263 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER GAMMA +0265..0266 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H..LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH HOOK +0268..026C ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [5] LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH BELT +026F ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED M +0271..0272 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH LEFT HOOK +0275 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED O +027D ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH TAIL +0280 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL R +0282..0283 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH +0287..028C ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [6] LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED T..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED V +0292 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH +029D..029E ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH CROSSED-TAIL..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED K +0345 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # Mn COMBINING GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +0370..0373 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA..GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0376..0377 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA..GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037B..037D ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +037F ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0388..038A ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..03A1 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [20] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03D1 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [47] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK THETA SYMBOL +03D5..03F5 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [33] GREEK PHI SYMBOL..GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F7..03FB ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [5] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO..GREEK SMALL LETTER SAN +03FD..0481 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [133] GREEK CAPITAL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +048A..052F ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [166] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +0561..0587 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [39] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE ECH YIWN +10A0..10C5 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +10D0..10FA ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [43] GEORGIAN LETTER AN..GEORGIAN LETTER AIN +10FD..10FF ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [3] GEORGIAN LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN LETTER LABIAL SIGN +13A0..13F5 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [86] CHEROKEE LETTER A..CHEROKEE LETTER MV +13F8..13FD ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1C80..1C88 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1C90..1CBA ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1D79 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G +1D7D ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH STROKE +1D8E ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH PALATAL HOOK +1E00..1E9B ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [156] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW..LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S WITH DOT ABOVE +1E9E ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SHARP S +1EA0..1F15 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [118] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT BELOW..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F18..1F1D ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F45 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [38] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F48..1F4D ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F59 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F..1F7D ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [31] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1FB4 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [53] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FBC ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBE ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FCC ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FDB ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE0..1FEC ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [13] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF2..1FF4 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FFC ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +2126 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& OHM SIGN +212A..212B ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] KELVIN SIGN..ANGSTROM SIGN +2132 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& TURNED CAPITAL F +214E ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& TURNED SMALL F +2160..217F ; Changes_When_Casemapped # Nl [32] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..SMALL ROMAN NUMERAL ONE THOUSAND +2183..2184 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +24B6..24E9 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # So [52] CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +2C00..2C70 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [113] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED ALPHA +2C72..2C73 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH HOOK +2C75..2C76 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HALF H..LATIN SMALL LETTER HALF H +2C7E..2CE3 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [102] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN WAU +2CEB..2CEE ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [4] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF2..2CF3 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2D00..2D25 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +A640..A66D ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [46] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A680..A69B ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [28] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A722..A72F ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [14] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF..LATIN SMALL LETTER CUATRILLO WITH COMMA +A732..A76F ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [62] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AA..LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A779..A787 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [15] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR D..LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A78B..A78D ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED H +A790..A794 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [5] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER..LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH PALATAL HOOK +A796..A7AE ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [25] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH FLOURISH..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SMALL CAPITAL I +A7B0..A7CA ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [27] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED K..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0..A7D1 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D6..A7D9 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE SCOTS S..LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F5..A7F6 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +AB53 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER CHI +AB70..ABBF ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +FB00..FB06 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FF21..FF3A ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +FF41..FF5A ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +10400..1044F ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [80] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +104B0..104D3 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +104D8..104FB ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10570..1057A ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10597..105A1 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10C80..10CB2 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +10CC0..10CF2 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +118A0..118DF ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [64] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +16E40..16E7F ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [64] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +1E900..1E943 ; Changes_When_Casemapped # L& [68] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA + +# Total code points: 2927 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: ID_Start +# Characters that can start an identifier. +# Generated from: +# Lu + Ll + Lt + Lm + Lo + Nl +# + Other_ID_Start +# - Pattern_Syntax +# - Pattern_White_Space +# NOTE: See UAX #31 for more information + +0041..005A ; ID_Start # L& [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +0061..007A ; ID_Start # L& [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +00AA ; ID_Start # Lo FEMININE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00B5 ; ID_Start # L& MICRO SIGN +00BA ; ID_Start # Lo MASCULINE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00C0..00D6 ; ID_Start # L& [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8..00F6 ; ID_Start # L& [31] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F8..01BA ; ID_Start # L& [195] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH TAIL +01BB ; ID_Start # Lo LATIN LETTER TWO WITH STROKE +01BC..01BF ; ID_Start # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE..LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C0..01C3 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] LATIN LETTER DENTAL CLICK..LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK +01C4..0293 ; ID_Start # L& [208] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CURL +0294 ; ID_Start # Lo LATIN LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0295..02AF ; ID_Start # L& [27] LATIN LETTER PHARYNGEAL VOICED FRICATIVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H WITH FISHHOOK AND TAIL +02B0..02C1 ; ID_Start # Lm [18] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02C6..02D1 ; ID_Start # Lm [12] MODIFIER LETTER CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..MODIFIER LETTER HALF TRIANGULAR COLON +02E0..02E4 ; ID_Start # Lm [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02EC ; ID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER VOICING +02EE ; ID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER DOUBLE APOSTROPHE +0370..0373 ; ID_Start # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA..GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0374 ; ID_Start # Lm GREEK NUMERAL SIGN +0376..0377 ; ID_Start # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA..GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037A ; ID_Start # Lm GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +037B..037D ; ID_Start # L& [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +037F ; ID_Start # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386 ; ID_Start # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0388..038A ; ID_Start # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; ID_Start # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..03A1 ; ID_Start # L& [20] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03F5 ; ID_Start # L& [83] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F7..0481 ; ID_Start # L& [139] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +048A..052F ; ID_Start # L& [166] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; ID_Start # L& [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +0559 ; ID_Start # Lm ARMENIAN MODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RING +0560..0588 ; ID_Start # L& [41] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER TURNED AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER YI WITH STROKE +05D0..05EA ; ID_Start # Lo [27] HEBREW LETTER ALEF..HEBREW LETTER TAV +05EF..05F2 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] HEBREW YOD TRIANGLE..HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH DOUBLE YOD +0620..063F ; ID_Start # Lo [32] ARABIC LETTER KASHMIRI YEH..ARABIC LETTER FARSI YEH WITH THREE DOTS ABOVE +0640 ; ID_Start # Lm ARABIC TATWEEL +0641..064A ; ID_Start # Lo [10] ARABIC LETTER FEH..ARABIC LETTER YEH +066E..066F ; ID_Start # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS BEH..ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS QAF +0671..06D3 ; ID_Start # Lo [99] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WASLA..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE +06D5 ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC LETTER AE +06E5..06E6 ; ID_Start # Lm [2] ARABIC SMALL WAW..ARABIC SMALL YEH +06EE..06EF ; ID_Start # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DAL WITH INVERTED V..ARABIC LETTER REH WITH INVERTED V +06FA..06FC ; ID_Start # Lo [3] ARABIC LETTER SHEEN WITH DOT BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GHAIN WITH DOT BELOW +06FF ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC LETTER HEH WITH INVERTED V +0710 ; ID_Start # Lo SYRIAC LETTER ALAPH +0712..072F ; ID_Start # Lo [30] SYRIAC LETTER BETH..SYRIAC LETTER PERSIAN DHALATH +074D..07A5 ; ID_Start # Lo [89] SYRIAC LETTER SOGDIAN ZHAIN..THAANA LETTER WAAVU +07B1 ; ID_Start # Lo THAANA LETTER NAA +07CA..07EA ; ID_Start # Lo [33] NKO LETTER A..NKO LETTER JONA RA +07F4..07F5 ; ID_Start # Lm [2] NKO HIGH TONE APOSTROPHE..NKO LOW TONE APOSTROPHE +07FA ; ID_Start # Lm NKO LAJANYALAN +0800..0815 ; ID_Start # Lo [22] SAMARITAN LETTER ALAF..SAMARITAN LETTER TAAF +081A ; ID_Start # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER EPENTHETIC YUT +0824 ; ID_Start # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER SHORT A +0828 ; ID_Start # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER I +0840..0858 ; ID_Start # Lo [25] MANDAIC LETTER HALQA..MANDAIC LETTER AIN +0860..086A ; ID_Start # Lo [11] SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM NGA..SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM SSA +0870..0887 ; ID_Start # Lo [24] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WITH ATTACHED FATHA..ARABIC BASELINE ROUND DOT +0889..088E ; ID_Start # Lo [6] ARABIC LETTER NOON WITH INVERTED SMALL V..ARABIC VERTICAL TAIL +08A0..08C8 ; ID_Start # Lo [41] ARABIC LETTER BEH WITH SMALL V BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GRAF +08C9 ; ID_Start # Lm ARABIC SMALL FARSI YEH +0904..0939 ; ID_Start # Lo [54] DEVANAGARI LETTER SHORT A..DEVANAGARI LETTER HA +093D ; ID_Start # Lo DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +0950 ; ID_Start # Lo DEVANAGARI OM +0958..0961 ; ID_Start # Lo [10] DEVANAGARI LETTER QA..DEVANAGARI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0971 ; ID_Start # Lm DEVANAGARI SIGN HIGH SPACING DOT +0972..0980 ; ID_Start # Lo [15] DEVANAGARI LETTER CANDRA A..BENGALI ANJI +0985..098C ; ID_Start # Lo [8] BENGALI LETTER A..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC L +098F..0990 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER E..BENGALI LETTER AI +0993..09A8 ; ID_Start # Lo [22] BENGALI LETTER O..BENGALI LETTER NA +09AA..09B0 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] BENGALI LETTER PA..BENGALI LETTER RA +09B2 ; ID_Start # Lo BENGALI LETTER LA +09B6..09B9 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] BENGALI LETTER SHA..BENGALI LETTER HA +09BD ; ID_Start # Lo BENGALI SIGN AVAGRAHA +09CE ; ID_Start # Lo BENGALI LETTER KHANDA TA +09DC..09DD ; ID_Start # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RRA..BENGALI LETTER RHA +09DF..09E1 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] BENGALI LETTER YYA..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC LL +09F0..09F1 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RA WITH MIDDLE DIAGONAL..BENGALI LETTER RA WITH LOWER DIAGONAL +09FC ; ID_Start # Lo BENGALI LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA +0A05..0A0A ; ID_Start # Lo [6] GURMUKHI LETTER A..GURMUKHI LETTER UU +0A0F..0A10 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER EE..GURMUKHI LETTER AI +0A13..0A28 ; ID_Start # Lo [22] GURMUKHI LETTER OO..GURMUKHI LETTER NA +0A2A..0A30 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] GURMUKHI LETTER PA..GURMUKHI LETTER RA +0A32..0A33 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER LA..GURMUKHI LETTER LLA +0A35..0A36 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER VA..GURMUKHI LETTER SHA +0A38..0A39 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER SA..GURMUKHI LETTER HA +0A59..0A5C ; ID_Start # Lo [4] GURMUKHI LETTER KHHA..GURMUKHI LETTER RRA +0A5E ; ID_Start # Lo GURMUKHI LETTER FA +0A72..0A74 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] GURMUKHI IRI..GURMUKHI EK ONKAR +0A85..0A8D ; ID_Start # Lo [9] GUJARATI LETTER A..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA E +0A8F..0A91 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] GUJARATI LETTER E..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA O +0A93..0AA8 ; ID_Start # Lo [22] GUJARATI LETTER O..GUJARATI LETTER NA +0AAA..0AB0 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] GUJARATI LETTER PA..GUJARATI LETTER RA +0AB2..0AB3 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER LA..GUJARATI LETTER LLA +0AB5..0AB9 ; ID_Start # Lo [5] GUJARATI LETTER VA..GUJARATI LETTER HA +0ABD ; ID_Start # Lo GUJARATI SIGN AVAGRAHA +0AD0 ; ID_Start # Lo GUJARATI OM +0AE0..0AE1 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC RR..GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0AF9 ; ID_Start # Lo GUJARATI LETTER ZHA +0B05..0B0C ; ID_Start # Lo [8] ORIYA LETTER A..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC L +0B0F..0B10 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER E..ORIYA LETTER AI +0B13..0B28 ; ID_Start # Lo [22] ORIYA LETTER O..ORIYA LETTER NA +0B2A..0B30 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ORIYA LETTER PA..ORIYA LETTER RA +0B32..0B33 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER LA..ORIYA LETTER LLA +0B35..0B39 ; ID_Start # Lo [5] ORIYA LETTER VA..ORIYA LETTER HA +0B3D ; ID_Start # Lo ORIYA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0B5C..0B5D ; ID_Start # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER RRA..ORIYA LETTER RHA +0B5F..0B61 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] ORIYA LETTER YYA..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0B71 ; ID_Start # Lo ORIYA LETTER WA +0B83 ; ID_Start # Lo TAMIL SIGN VISARGA +0B85..0B8A ; ID_Start # Lo [6] TAMIL LETTER A..TAMIL LETTER UU +0B8E..0B90 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER E..TAMIL LETTER AI +0B92..0B95 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] TAMIL LETTER O..TAMIL LETTER KA +0B99..0B9A ; ID_Start # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NGA..TAMIL LETTER CA +0B9C ; ID_Start # Lo TAMIL LETTER JA +0B9E..0B9F ; ID_Start # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NYA..TAMIL LETTER TTA +0BA3..0BA4 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NNA..TAMIL LETTER TA +0BA8..0BAA ; ID_Start # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER NA..TAMIL LETTER PA +0BAE..0BB9 ; ID_Start # Lo [12] TAMIL LETTER MA..TAMIL LETTER HA +0BD0 ; ID_Start # Lo TAMIL OM +0C05..0C0C ; ID_Start # Lo [8] TELUGU LETTER A..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC L +0C0E..0C10 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER E..TELUGU LETTER AI +0C12..0C28 ; ID_Start # Lo [23] TELUGU LETTER O..TELUGU LETTER NA +0C2A..0C39 ; ID_Start # Lo [16] TELUGU LETTER PA..TELUGU LETTER HA +0C3D ; ID_Start # Lo TELUGU SIGN AVAGRAHA +0C58..0C5A ; ID_Start # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER TSA..TELUGU LETTER RRRA +0C5D ; ID_Start # Lo TELUGU LETTER NAKAARA POLLU +0C60..0C61 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC RR..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC LL +0C80 ; ID_Start # Lo KANNADA SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU +0C85..0C8C ; ID_Start # Lo [8] KANNADA LETTER A..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC L +0C8E..0C90 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] KANNADA LETTER E..KANNADA LETTER AI +0C92..0CA8 ; ID_Start # Lo [23] KANNADA LETTER O..KANNADA LETTER NA +0CAA..0CB3 ; ID_Start # Lo [10] KANNADA LETTER PA..KANNADA LETTER LLA +0CB5..0CB9 ; ID_Start # Lo [5] KANNADA LETTER VA..KANNADA LETTER HA +0CBD ; ID_Start # Lo KANNADA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0CDD..0CDE ; ID_Start # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER NAKAARA POLLU..KANNADA LETTER FA +0CE0..0CE1 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC RR..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0CF1..0CF2 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] KANNADA SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..KANNADA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +0D04..0D0C ; ID_Start # Lo [9] MALAYALAM LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC L +0D0E..0D10 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER E..MALAYALAM LETTER AI +0D12..0D3A ; ID_Start # Lo [41] MALAYALAM LETTER O..MALAYALAM LETTER TTTA +0D3D ; ID_Start # Lo MALAYALAM SIGN AVAGRAHA +0D4E ; ID_Start # Lo MALAYALAM LETTER DOT REPH +0D54..0D56 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU M..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU LLL +0D5F..0D61 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER ARCHAIC II..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC LL +0D7A..0D7F ; ID_Start # Lo [6] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU NN..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU K +0D85..0D96 ; ID_Start # Lo [18] SINHALA LETTER AYANNA..SINHALA LETTER AUYANNA +0D9A..0DB1 ; ID_Start # Lo [24] SINHALA LETTER ALPAPRAANA KAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA NAYANNA +0DB3..0DBB ; ID_Start # Lo [9] SINHALA LETTER SANYAKA DAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER RAYANNA +0DBD ; ID_Start # Lo SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA LAYANNA +0DC0..0DC6 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] SINHALA LETTER VAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER FAYANNA +0E01..0E30 ; ID_Start # Lo [48] THAI CHARACTER KO KAI..THAI CHARACTER SARA A +0E32..0E33 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] THAI CHARACTER SARA AA..THAI CHARACTER SARA AM +0E40..0E45 ; ID_Start # Lo [6] THAI CHARACTER SARA E..THAI CHARACTER LAKKHANGYAO +0E46 ; ID_Start # Lm THAI CHARACTER MAIYAMOK +0E81..0E82 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] LAO LETTER KO..LAO LETTER KHO SUNG +0E84 ; ID_Start # Lo LAO LETTER KHO TAM +0E86..0E8A ; ID_Start # Lo [5] LAO LETTER PALI GHA..LAO LETTER SO TAM +0E8C..0EA3 ; ID_Start # Lo [24] LAO LETTER PALI JHA..LAO LETTER LO LING +0EA5 ; ID_Start # Lo LAO LETTER LO LOOT +0EA7..0EB0 ; ID_Start # Lo [10] LAO LETTER WO..LAO VOWEL SIGN A +0EB2..0EB3 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] LAO VOWEL SIGN AA..LAO VOWEL SIGN AM +0EBD ; ID_Start # Lo LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN NYO +0EC0..0EC4 ; ID_Start # Lo [5] LAO VOWEL SIGN E..LAO VOWEL SIGN AI +0EC6 ; ID_Start # Lm LAO KO LA +0EDC..0EDF ; ID_Start # Lo [4] LAO HO NO..LAO LETTER KHMU NYO +0F00 ; ID_Start # Lo TIBETAN SYLLABLE OM +0F40..0F47 ; ID_Start # Lo [8] TIBETAN LETTER KA..TIBETAN LETTER JA +0F49..0F6C ; ID_Start # Lo [36] TIBETAN LETTER NYA..TIBETAN LETTER RRA +0F88..0F8C ; ID_Start # Lo [5] TIBETAN SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SIGN INVERTED MCHU CAN +1000..102A ; ID_Start # Lo [43] MYANMAR LETTER KA..MYANMAR LETTER AU +103F ; ID_Start # Lo MYANMAR LETTER GREAT SA +1050..1055 ; ID_Start # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER SHA..MYANMAR LETTER VOCALIC LL +105A..105D ; ID_Start # Lo [4] MYANMAR LETTER MON NGA..MYANMAR LETTER MON BBE +1061 ; ID_Start # Lo MYANMAR LETTER SGAW KAREN SHA +1065..1066 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN THA..MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN PWA +106E..1070 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN NNA..MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN GHWA +1075..1081 ; ID_Start # Lo [13] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN KA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN HA +108E ; ID_Start # Lo MYANMAR LETTER RUMAI PALAUNG FA +10A0..10C5 ; ID_Start # L& [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; ID_Start # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; ID_Start # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +10D0..10FA ; ID_Start # L& [43] GEORGIAN LETTER AN..GEORGIAN LETTER AIN +10FC ; ID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER GEORGIAN NAR +10FD..10FF ; ID_Start # L& [3] GEORGIAN LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1100..1248 ; ID_Start # Lo [329] HANGUL CHOSEONG KIYEOK..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWA +124A..124D ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWE +1250..1256 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHO +1258 ; ID_Start # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWA +125A..125D ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWE +1260..1288 ; ID_Start # Lo [41] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWA +128A..128D ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWE +1290..12B0 ; ID_Start # Lo [33] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE NA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWA +12B2..12B5 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWE +12B8..12BE ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXO +12C0 ; ID_Start # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWA +12C2..12C5 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWE +12C8..12D6 ; ID_Start # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE WA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PHARYNGEAL O +12D8..1310 ; ID_Start # Lo [57] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWA +1312..1315 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWE +1318..135A ; ID_Start # Lo [67] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE FYA +1380..138F ; ID_Start # Lo [16] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SEBATBEIT MWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PWE +13A0..13F5 ; ID_Start # L& [86] CHEROKEE LETTER A..CHEROKEE LETTER MV +13F8..13FD ; ID_Start # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1401..166C ; ID_Start # Lo [620] CANADIAN SYLLABICS E..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER TTSA +166F..167F ; ID_Start # Lo [17] CANADIAN SYLLABICS QAI..CANADIAN SYLLABICS BLACKFOOT W +1681..169A ; ID_Start # Lo [26] OGHAM LETTER BEITH..OGHAM LETTER PEITH +16A0..16EA ; ID_Start # Lo [75] RUNIC LETTER FEHU FEOH FE F..RUNIC LETTER X +16EE..16F0 ; ID_Start # Nl [3] RUNIC ARLAUG SYMBOL..RUNIC BELGTHOR SYMBOL +16F1..16F8 ; ID_Start # Lo [8] RUNIC LETTER K..RUNIC LETTER FRANKS CASKET AESC +1700..1711 ; ID_Start # Lo [18] TAGALOG LETTER A..TAGALOG LETTER HA +171F..1731 ; ID_Start # Lo [19] TAGALOG LETTER ARCHAIC RA..HANUNOO LETTER HA +1740..1751 ; ID_Start # Lo [18] BUHID LETTER A..BUHID LETTER HA +1760..176C ; ID_Start # Lo [13] TAGBANWA LETTER A..TAGBANWA LETTER YA +176E..1770 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] TAGBANWA LETTER LA..TAGBANWA LETTER SA +1780..17B3 ; ID_Start # Lo [52] KHMER LETTER KA..KHMER INDEPENDENT VOWEL QAU +17D7 ; ID_Start # Lm KHMER SIGN LEK TOO +17DC ; ID_Start # Lo KHMER SIGN AVAKRAHASANYA +1820..1842 ; ID_Start # Lo [35] MONGOLIAN LETTER A..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHI +1843 ; ID_Start # Lm MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO LONG VOWEL SIGN +1844..1878 ; ID_Start # Lo [53] MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO E..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHA WITH TWO DOTS +1880..1884 ; ID_Start # Lo [5] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI ANUSVARA ONE..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI INVERTED UBADAMA +1885..1886 ; ID_Start # Mn [2] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI BALUDA..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI THREE BALUDA +1887..18A8 ; ID_Start # Lo [34] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI A..MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI BHA +18AA ; ID_Start # Lo MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI LHA +18B0..18F5 ; ID_Start # Lo [70] CANADIAN SYLLABICS OY..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER DENTAL S +1900..191E ; ID_Start # Lo [31] LIMBU VOWEL-CARRIER LETTER..LIMBU LETTER TRA +1950..196D ; ID_Start # Lo [30] TAI LE LETTER KA..TAI LE LETTER AI +1970..1974 ; ID_Start # Lo [5] TAI LE LETTER TONE-2..TAI LE LETTER TONE-6 +1980..19AB ; ID_Start # Lo [44] NEW TAI LUE LETTER HIGH QA..NEW TAI LUE LETTER LOW SUA +19B0..19C9 ; ID_Start # Lo [26] NEW TAI LUE VOWEL SIGN VOWEL SHORTENER..NEW TAI LUE TONE MARK-2 +1A00..1A16 ; ID_Start # Lo [23] BUGINESE LETTER KA..BUGINESE LETTER HA +1A20..1A54 ; ID_Start # Lo [53] TAI THAM LETTER HIGH KA..TAI THAM LETTER GREAT SA +1AA7 ; ID_Start # Lm TAI THAM SIGN MAI YAMOK +1B05..1B33 ; ID_Start # Lo [47] BALINESE LETTER AKARA..BALINESE LETTER HA +1B45..1B4C ; ID_Start # Lo [8] BALINESE LETTER KAF SASAK..BALINESE LETTER ARCHAIC JNYA +1B83..1BA0 ; ID_Start # Lo [30] SUNDANESE LETTER A..SUNDANESE LETTER HA +1BAE..1BAF ; ID_Start # Lo [2] SUNDANESE LETTER KHA..SUNDANESE LETTER SYA +1BBA..1BE5 ; ID_Start # Lo [44] SUNDANESE AVAGRAHA..BATAK LETTER U +1C00..1C23 ; ID_Start # Lo [36] LEPCHA LETTER KA..LEPCHA LETTER A +1C4D..1C4F ; ID_Start # Lo [3] LEPCHA LETTER TTA..LEPCHA LETTER DDA +1C5A..1C77 ; ID_Start # Lo [30] OL CHIKI LETTER LA..OL CHIKI LETTER OH +1C78..1C7D ; ID_Start # Lm [6] OL CHIKI MU TTUDDAG..OL CHIKI AHAD +1C80..1C88 ; ID_Start # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1C90..1CBA ; ID_Start # L& [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; ID_Start # L& [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1CE9..1CEC ; ID_Start # Lo [4] VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA..VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA VAMAGOMUKHA WITH TAIL +1CEE..1CF3 ; ID_Start # Lo [6] VEDIC SIGN HEXIFORM LONG ANUSVARA..VEDIC SIGN ROTATED ARDHAVISARGA +1CF5..1CF6 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] VEDIC SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..VEDIC SIGN UPADHMANIYA +1CFA ; ID_Start # Lo VEDIC SIGN DOUBLE ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA +1D00..1D2B ; ID_Start # L& [44] LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL A..CYRILLIC LETTER SMALL CAPITAL EL +1D2C..1D6A ; ID_Start # Lm [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1D6B..1D77 ; ID_Start # L& [13] LATIN SMALL LETTER UE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED G +1D78 ; ID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC EN +1D79..1D9A ; ID_Start # L& [34] LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1D9B..1DBF ; ID_Start # Lm [37] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED ALPHA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL THETA +1E00..1F15 ; ID_Start # L& [278] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F18..1F1D ; ID_Start # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F45 ; ID_Start # L& [38] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F48..1F4D ; ID_Start # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; ID_Start # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F59 ; ID_Start # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; ID_Start # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; ID_Start # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F..1F7D ; ID_Start # L& [31] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1FB4 ; ID_Start # L& [53] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FBC ; ID_Start # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBE ; ID_Start # L& GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; ID_Start # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FCC ; ID_Start # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; ID_Start # L& [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FDB ; ID_Start # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE0..1FEC ; ID_Start # L& [13] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF2..1FF4 ; ID_Start # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FFC ; ID_Start # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +2071 ; ID_Start # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +207F ; ID_Start # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER N +2090..209C ; ID_Start # Lm [13] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER T +2102 ; ID_Start # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL C +2107 ; ID_Start # L& EULER CONSTANT +210A..2113 ; ID_Start # L& [10] SCRIPT SMALL G..SCRIPT SMALL L +2115 ; ID_Start # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL N +2118 ; ID_Start # Sm SCRIPT CAPITAL P +2119..211D ; ID_Start # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL P..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL R +2124 ; ID_Start # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Z +2126 ; ID_Start # L& OHM SIGN +2128 ; ID_Start # L& BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL Z +212A..212D ; ID_Start # L& [4] KELVIN SIGN..BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL C +212E ; ID_Start # So ESTIMATED SYMBOL +212F..2134 ; ID_Start # L& [6] SCRIPT SMALL E..SCRIPT SMALL O +2135..2138 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ALEF SYMBOL..DALET SYMBOL +2139 ; ID_Start # L& INFORMATION SOURCE +213C..213F ; ID_Start # L& [4] DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL PI..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL PI +2145..2149 ; ID_Start # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC CAPITAL D..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +214E ; ID_Start # L& TURNED SMALL F +2160..2182 ; ID_Start # Nl [35] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..ROMAN NUMERAL TEN THOUSAND +2183..2184 ; ID_Start # L& [2] ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +2185..2188 ; ID_Start # Nl [4] ROMAN NUMERAL SIX LATE FORM..ROMAN NUMERAL ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND +2C00..2C7B ; ID_Start # L& [124] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED E +2C7C..2C7D ; ID_Start # Lm [2] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL V +2C7E..2CE4 ; ID_Start # L& [103] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC SYMBOL KAI +2CEB..2CEE ; ID_Start # L& [4] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF2..2CF3 ; ID_Start # L& [2] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2D00..2D25 ; ID_Start # L& [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; ID_Start # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; ID_Start # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +2D30..2D67 ; ID_Start # Lo [56] TIFINAGH LETTER YA..TIFINAGH LETTER YO +2D6F ; ID_Start # Lm TIFINAGH MODIFIER LETTER LABIALIZATION MARK +2D80..2D96 ; ID_Start # Lo [23] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE LOA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGWE +2DA0..2DA6 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSO +2DA8..2DAE ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCO +2DB0..2DB6 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZO +2DB8..2DBE ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHO +2DC0..2DC6 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYO +2DC8..2DCE ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYO +2DD0..2DD6 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYO +2DD8..2DDE ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYO +3005 ; ID_Start # Lm IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +3006 ; ID_Start # Lo IDEOGRAPHIC CLOSING MARK +3007 ; ID_Start # Nl IDEOGRAPHIC NUMBER ZERO +3021..3029 ; ID_Start # Nl [9] HANGZHOU NUMERAL ONE..HANGZHOU NUMERAL NINE +3031..3035 ; ID_Start # Lm [5] VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK..VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK LOWER HALF +3038..303A ; ID_Start # Nl [3] HANGZHOU NUMERAL TEN..HANGZHOU NUMERAL THIRTY +303B ; ID_Start # Lm VERTICAL IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +303C ; ID_Start # Lo MASU MARK +3041..3096 ; ID_Start # Lo [86] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL A..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL KE +309B..309C ; ID_Start # Sk [2] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +309D..309E ; ID_Start # Lm [2] HIRAGANA ITERATION MARK..HIRAGANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +309F ; ID_Start # Lo HIRAGANA DIGRAPH YORI +30A1..30FA ; ID_Start # Lo [90] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL A..KATAKANA LETTER VO +30FC..30FE ; ID_Start # Lm [3] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +30FF ; ID_Start # Lo KATAKANA DIGRAPH KOTO +3105..312F ; ID_Start # Lo [43] BOPOMOFO LETTER B..BOPOMOFO LETTER NN +3131..318E ; ID_Start # Lo [94] HANGUL LETTER KIYEOK..HANGUL LETTER ARAEAE +31A0..31BF ; ID_Start # Lo [32] BOPOMOFO LETTER BU..BOPOMOFO LETTER AH +31F0..31FF ; ID_Start # Lo [16] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL KU..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL RO +3400..4DBF ; ID_Start # Lo [6592] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3400..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4DBF +4E00..A014 ; ID_Start # Lo [21013] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4E00..YI SYLLABLE E +A015 ; ID_Start # Lm YI SYLLABLE WU +A016..A48C ; ID_Start # Lo [1143] YI SYLLABLE BIT..YI SYLLABLE YYR +A4D0..A4F7 ; ID_Start # Lo [40] LISU LETTER BA..LISU LETTER OE +A4F8..A4FD ; ID_Start # Lm [6] LISU LETTER TONE MYA TI..LISU LETTER TONE MYA JEU +A500..A60B ; ID_Start # Lo [268] VAI SYLLABLE EE..VAI SYLLABLE NG +A60C ; ID_Start # Lm VAI SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +A610..A61F ; ID_Start # Lo [16] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE FA..VAI SYMBOL JONG +A62A..A62B ; ID_Start # Lo [2] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE MA..VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE DO +A640..A66D ; ID_Start # L& [46] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A66E ; ID_Start # Lo CYRILLIC LETTER MULTIOCULAR O +A67F ; ID_Start # Lm CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A680..A69B ; ID_Start # L& [28] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A69C..A69D ; ID_Start # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A6A0..A6E5 ; ID_Start # Lo [70] BAMUM LETTER A..BAMUM LETTER KI +A6E6..A6EF ; ID_Start # Nl [10] BAMUM LETTER MO..BAMUM LETTER KOGHOM +A717..A71F ; ID_Start # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER DOT VERTICAL BAR..MODIFIER LETTER LOW INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +A722..A76F ; ID_Start # L& [78] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF..LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A770 ; ID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER US +A771..A787 ; ID_Start # L& [23] LATIN SMALL LETTER DUM..LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A788 ; ID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER LOW CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +A78B..A78E ; ID_Start # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH RETROFLEX HOOK AND BELT +A78F ; ID_Start # Lo LATIN LETTER SINOLOGICAL DOT +A790..A7CA ; ID_Start # L& [59] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0..A7D1 ; ID_Start # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D3 ; ID_Start # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE THORN +A7D5..A7D9 ; ID_Start # L& [5] LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE WYNN..LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F2..A7F4 ; ID_Start # Lm [3] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL C..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL Q +A7F5..A7F6 ; ID_Start # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +A7F7 ; ID_Start # Lo LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER SIDEWAYS I +A7F8..A7F9 ; ID_Start # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +A7FA ; ID_Start # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED M +A7FB..A801 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER REVERSED F..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER I +A803..A805 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER U..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER O +A807..A80A ; ID_Start # Lo [4] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER KO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER GHO +A80C..A822 ; ID_Start # Lo [23] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER CO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER HO +A840..A873 ; ID_Start # Lo [52] PHAGS-PA LETTER KA..PHAGS-PA LETTER CANDRABINDU +A882..A8B3 ; ID_Start # Lo [50] SAURASHTRA LETTER A..SAURASHTRA LETTER LLA +A8F2..A8F7 ; ID_Start # Lo [6] DEVANAGARI SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU..DEVANAGARI SIGN CANDRABINDU AVAGRAHA +A8FB ; ID_Start # Lo DEVANAGARI HEADSTROKE +A8FD..A8FE ; ID_Start # Lo [2] DEVANAGARI JAIN OM..DEVANAGARI LETTER AY +A90A..A925 ; ID_Start # Lo [28] KAYAH LI LETTER KA..KAYAH LI LETTER OO +A930..A946 ; ID_Start # Lo [23] REJANG LETTER KA..REJANG LETTER A +A960..A97C ; ID_Start # Lo [29] HANGUL CHOSEONG TIKEUT-MIEUM..HANGUL CHOSEONG SSANGYEORINHIEUH +A984..A9B2 ; ID_Start # Lo [47] JAVANESE LETTER A..JAVANESE LETTER HA +A9CF ; ID_Start # Lm JAVANESE PANGRANGKEP +A9E0..A9E4 ; ID_Start # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN GHA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN BHA +A9E6 ; ID_Start # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER SHAN REDUPLICATION +A9E7..A9EF ; ID_Start # Lo [9] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NYA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NNA +A9FA..A9FE ; ID_Start # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING LLA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING BHA +AA00..AA28 ; ID_Start # Lo [41] CHAM LETTER A..CHAM LETTER HA +AA40..AA42 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] CHAM LETTER FINAL K..CHAM LETTER FINAL NG +AA44..AA4B ; ID_Start # Lo [8] CHAM LETTER FINAL CH..CHAM LETTER FINAL SS +AA60..AA6F ; ID_Start # Lo [16] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI GA..MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI FA +AA70 ; ID_Start # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER KHAMTI REDUPLICATION +AA71..AA76 ; ID_Start # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI XA..MYANMAR LOGOGRAM KHAMTI HM +AA7A ; ID_Start # Lo MYANMAR LETTER AITON RA +AA7E..AAAF ; ID_Start # Lo [50] MYANMAR LETTER SHWE PALAUNG CHA..TAI VIET LETTER HIGH O +AAB1 ; ID_Start # Lo TAI VIET VOWEL AA +AAB5..AAB6 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] TAI VIET VOWEL E..TAI VIET VOWEL O +AAB9..AABD ; ID_Start # Lo [5] TAI VIET VOWEL UEA..TAI VIET VOWEL AN +AAC0 ; ID_Start # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI NUENG +AAC2 ; ID_Start # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI SONG +AADB..AADC ; ID_Start # Lo [2] TAI VIET SYMBOL KON..TAI VIET SYMBOL NUENG +AADD ; ID_Start # Lm TAI VIET SYMBOL SAM +AAE0..AAEA ; ID_Start # Lo [11] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER E..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER SSA +AAF2 ; ID_Start # Lo MEETEI MAYEK ANJI +AAF3..AAF4 ; ID_Start # Lm [2] MEETEI MAYEK SYLLABLE REPETITION MARK..MEETEI MAYEK WORD REPETITION MARK +AB01..AB06 ; ID_Start # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHO +AB09..AB0E ; ID_Start # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHO +AB11..AB16 ; ID_Start # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZO +AB20..AB26 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHO +AB28..AB2E ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBO +AB30..AB5A ; ID_Start # L& [43] LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED ALPHA..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH SHORT RIGHT LEG +AB5C..AB5F ; ID_Start # Lm [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +AB60..AB68 ; ID_Start # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER SAKHA YAT..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED R WITH MIDDLE TILDE +AB69 ; ID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED W +AB70..ABBF ; ID_Start # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +ABC0..ABE2 ; ID_Start # Lo [35] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER KOK..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER I LONSUM +AC00..D7A3 ; ID_Start # Lo [11172] HANGUL SYLLABLE GA..HANGUL SYLLABLE HIH +D7B0..D7C6 ; ID_Start # Lo [23] HANGUL JUNGSEONG O-YEO..HANGUL JUNGSEONG ARAEA-E +D7CB..D7FB ; ID_Start # Lo [49] HANGUL JONGSEONG NIEUN-RIEUL..HANGUL JONGSEONG PHIEUPH-THIEUTH +F900..FA6D ; ID_Start # Lo [366] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-F900..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA6D +FA70..FAD9 ; ID_Start # Lo [106] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA70..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FAD9 +FB00..FB06 ; ID_Start # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; ID_Start # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FB1D ; ID_Start # Lo HEBREW LETTER YOD WITH HIRIQ +FB1F..FB28 ; ID_Start # Lo [10] HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH YOD YOD PATAH..HEBREW LETTER WIDE TAV +FB2A..FB36 ; ID_Start # Lo [13] HEBREW LETTER SHIN WITH SHIN DOT..HEBREW LETTER ZAYIN WITH DAGESH +FB38..FB3C ; ID_Start # Lo [5] HEBREW LETTER TET WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER LAMED WITH DAGESH +FB3E ; ID_Start # Lo HEBREW LETTER MEM WITH DAGESH +FB40..FB41 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER NUN WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER SAMEKH WITH DAGESH +FB43..FB44 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER FINAL PE WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER PE WITH DAGESH +FB46..FBB1 ; ID_Start # Lo [108] HEBREW LETTER TSADI WITH DAGESH..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE FINAL FORM +FBD3..FD3D ; ID_Start # Lo [363] ARABIC LETTER NG ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE ALEF WITH FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM +FD50..FD8F ; ID_Start # Lo [64] ARABIC LIGATURE TEH WITH JEEM WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH KHAH WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM +FD92..FDC7 ; ID_Start # Lo [54] ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH JEEM WITH KHAH INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE NOON WITH JEEM WITH YEH FINAL FORM +FDF0..FDFB ; ID_Start # Lo [12] ARABIC LIGATURE SALLA USED AS KORANIC STOP SIGN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE JALLAJALALOUHOU +FE70..FE74 ; ID_Start # Lo [5] ARABIC FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC KASRATAN ISOLATED FORM +FE76..FEFC ; ID_Start # Lo [135] ARABIC FATHA ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE LAM WITH ALEF FINAL FORM +FF21..FF3A ; ID_Start # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +FF41..FF5A ; ID_Start # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +FF66..FF6F ; ID_Start # Lo [10] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER WO..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER SMALL TU +FF70 ; ID_Start # Lm HALFWIDTH KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK +FF71..FF9D ; ID_Start # Lo [45] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER A..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER N +FF9E..FF9F ; ID_Start # Lm [2] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA VOICED SOUND MARK..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +FFA0..FFBE ; ID_Start # Lo [31] HALFWIDTH HANGUL FILLER..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER HIEUH +FFC2..FFC7 ; ID_Start # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER A..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER E +FFCA..FFCF ; ID_Start # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YEO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER OE +FFD2..FFD7 ; ID_Start # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YU +FFDA..FFDC ; ID_Start # Lo [3] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER EU..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER I +10000..1000B ; ID_Start # Lo [12] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B008 A..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B046 JE +1000D..10026 ; ID_Start # Lo [26] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B036 JO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B032 QO +10028..1003A ; ID_Start # Lo [19] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B060 RA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B042 WO +1003C..1003D ; ID_Start # Lo [2] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B017 ZA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B074 ZE +1003F..1004D ; ID_Start # Lo [15] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B020 ZO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B091 TWO +10050..1005D ; ID_Start # Lo [14] LINEAR B SYMBOL B018..LINEAR B SYMBOL B089 +10080..100FA ; ID_Start # Lo [123] LINEAR B IDEOGRAM B100 MAN..LINEAR B IDEOGRAM VESSEL B305 +10140..10174 ; ID_Start # Nl [53] GREEK ACROPHONIC ATTIC ONE QUARTER..GREEK ACROPHONIC STRATIAN FIFTY MNAS +10280..1029C ; ID_Start # Lo [29] LYCIAN LETTER A..LYCIAN LETTER X +102A0..102D0 ; ID_Start # Lo [49] CARIAN LETTER A..CARIAN LETTER UUU3 +10300..1031F ; ID_Start # Lo [32] OLD ITALIC LETTER A..OLD ITALIC LETTER ESS +1032D..10340 ; ID_Start # Lo [20] OLD ITALIC LETTER YE..GOTHIC LETTER PAIRTHRA +10341 ; ID_Start # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINETY +10342..10349 ; ID_Start # Lo [8] GOTHIC LETTER RAIDA..GOTHIC LETTER OTHAL +1034A ; ID_Start # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINE HUNDRED +10350..10375 ; ID_Start # Lo [38] OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..OLD PERMIC LETTER IA +10380..1039D ; ID_Start # Lo [30] UGARITIC LETTER ALPA..UGARITIC LETTER SSU +103A0..103C3 ; ID_Start # Lo [36] OLD PERSIAN SIGN A..OLD PERSIAN SIGN HA +103C8..103CF ; ID_Start # Lo [8] OLD PERSIAN SIGN AURAMAZDAA..OLD PERSIAN SIGN BUUMISH +103D1..103D5 ; ID_Start # Nl [5] OLD PERSIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD PERSIAN NUMBER HUNDRED +10400..1044F ; ID_Start # L& [80] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +10450..1049D ; ID_Start # Lo [78] SHAVIAN LETTER PEEP..OSMANYA LETTER OO +104B0..104D3 ; ID_Start # L& [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +104D8..104FB ; ID_Start # L& [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10500..10527 ; ID_Start # Lo [40] ELBASAN LETTER A..ELBASAN LETTER KHE +10530..10563 ; ID_Start # Lo [52] CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER ALT..CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER KIW +10570..1057A ; ID_Start # L& [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; ID_Start # L& [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; ID_Start # L& [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; ID_Start # L& [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10597..105A1 ; ID_Start # L& [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; ID_Start # L& [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; ID_Start # L& [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; ID_Start # L& [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10600..10736 ; ID_Start # Lo [311] LINEAR A SIGN AB001..LINEAR A SIGN A664 +10740..10755 ; ID_Start # Lo [22] LINEAR A SIGN A701 A..LINEAR A SIGN A732 JE +10760..10767 ; ID_Start # Lo [8] LINEAR A SIGN A800..LINEAR A SIGN A807 +10780..10785 ; ID_Start # Lm [6] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; ID_Start # Lm [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; ID_Start # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL +10800..10805 ; ID_Start # Lo [6] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE A..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JA +10808 ; ID_Start # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JO +1080A..10835 ; ID_Start # Lo [44] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE KA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE WO +10837..10838 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XE +1083C ; ID_Start # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZA +1083F..10855 ; ID_Start # Lo [23] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZO..IMPERIAL ARAMAIC LETTER TAW +10860..10876 ; ID_Start # Lo [23] PALMYRENE LETTER ALEPH..PALMYRENE LETTER TAW +10880..1089E ; ID_Start # Lo [31] NABATAEAN LETTER FINAL ALEPH..NABATAEAN LETTER TAW +108E0..108F2 ; ID_Start # Lo [19] HATRAN LETTER ALEPH..HATRAN LETTER QOPH +108F4..108F5 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] HATRAN LETTER SHIN..HATRAN LETTER TAW +10900..10915 ; ID_Start # Lo [22] PHOENICIAN LETTER ALF..PHOENICIAN LETTER TAU +10920..10939 ; ID_Start # Lo [26] LYDIAN LETTER A..LYDIAN LETTER C +10980..109B7 ; ID_Start # Lo [56] MEROITIC HIEROGLYPHIC LETTER A..MEROITIC CURSIVE LETTER DA +109BE..109BF ; ID_Start # Lo [2] MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM RMT..MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM IMN +10A00 ; ID_Start # Lo KHAROSHTHI LETTER A +10A10..10A13 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] KHAROSHTHI LETTER KA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER GHA +10A15..10A17 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] KHAROSHTHI LETTER CA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER JA +10A19..10A35 ; ID_Start # Lo [29] KHAROSHTHI LETTER NYA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER VHA +10A60..10A7C ; ID_Start # Lo [29] OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER HE..OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER THETH +10A80..10A9C ; ID_Start # Lo [29] OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER HEH..OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER ZAH +10AC0..10AC7 ; ID_Start # Lo [8] MANICHAEAN LETTER ALEPH..MANICHAEAN LETTER WAW +10AC9..10AE4 ; ID_Start # Lo [28] MANICHAEAN LETTER ZAYIN..MANICHAEAN LETTER TAW +10B00..10B35 ; ID_Start # Lo [54] AVESTAN LETTER A..AVESTAN LETTER HE +10B40..10B55 ; ID_Start # Lo [22] INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER TAW +10B60..10B72 ; ID_Start # Lo [19] INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10B80..10B91 ; ID_Start # Lo [18] PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10C00..10C48 ; ID_Start # Lo [73] OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON A..OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON BASH +10C80..10CB2 ; ID_Start # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +10CC0..10CF2 ; ID_Start # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +10D00..10D23 ; ID_Start # Lo [36] HANIFI ROHINGYA LETTER A..HANIFI ROHINGYA MARK NA KHONNA +10E80..10EA9 ; ID_Start # Lo [42] YEZIDI LETTER ELIF..YEZIDI LETTER ET +10EB0..10EB1 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] YEZIDI LETTER LAM WITH DOT ABOVE..YEZIDI LETTER YOT WITH CIRCUMFLEX ABOVE +10F00..10F1C ; ID_Start # Lo [29] OLD SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..OLD SOGDIAN LETTER FINAL TAW WITH VERTICAL TAIL +10F27 ; ID_Start # Lo OLD SOGDIAN LIGATURE AYIN-DALETH +10F30..10F45 ; ID_Start # Lo [22] SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..SOGDIAN INDEPENDENT SHIN +10F70..10F81 ; ID_Start # Lo [18] OLD UYGHUR LETTER ALEPH..OLD UYGHUR LETTER LESH +10FB0..10FC4 ; ID_Start # Lo [21] CHORASMIAN LETTER ALEPH..CHORASMIAN LETTER TAW +10FE0..10FF6 ; ID_Start # Lo [23] ELYMAIC LETTER ALEPH..ELYMAIC LIGATURE ZAYIN-YODH +11003..11037 ; ID_Start # Lo [53] BRAHMI SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL NNNA +11071..11072 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT O +11075 ; ID_Start # Lo BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL LLA +11083..110AF ; ID_Start # Lo [45] KAITHI LETTER A..KAITHI LETTER HA +110D0..110E8 ; ID_Start # Lo [25] SORA SOMPENG LETTER SAH..SORA SOMPENG LETTER MAE +11103..11126 ; ID_Start # Lo [36] CHAKMA LETTER AA..CHAKMA LETTER HAA +11144 ; ID_Start # Lo CHAKMA LETTER LHAA +11147 ; ID_Start # Lo CHAKMA LETTER VAA +11150..11172 ; ID_Start # Lo [35] MAHAJANI LETTER A..MAHAJANI LETTER RRA +11176 ; ID_Start # Lo MAHAJANI LIGATURE SHRI +11183..111B2 ; ID_Start # Lo [48] SHARADA LETTER A..SHARADA LETTER HA +111C1..111C4 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] SHARADA SIGN AVAGRAHA..SHARADA OM +111DA ; ID_Start # Lo SHARADA EKAM +111DC ; ID_Start # Lo SHARADA HEADSTROKE +11200..11211 ; ID_Start # Lo [18] KHOJKI LETTER A..KHOJKI LETTER JJA +11213..1122B ; ID_Start # Lo [25] KHOJKI LETTER NYA..KHOJKI LETTER LLA +11280..11286 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] MULTANI LETTER A..MULTANI LETTER GA +11288 ; ID_Start # Lo MULTANI LETTER GHA +1128A..1128D ; ID_Start # Lo [4] MULTANI LETTER CA..MULTANI LETTER JJA +1128F..1129D ; ID_Start # Lo [15] MULTANI LETTER NYA..MULTANI LETTER BA +1129F..112A8 ; ID_Start # Lo [10] MULTANI LETTER BHA..MULTANI LETTER RHA +112B0..112DE ; ID_Start # Lo [47] KHUDAWADI LETTER A..KHUDAWADI LETTER HA +11305..1130C ; ID_Start # Lo [8] GRANTHA LETTER A..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC L +1130F..11310 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER EE..GRANTHA LETTER AI +11313..11328 ; ID_Start # Lo [22] GRANTHA LETTER OO..GRANTHA LETTER NA +1132A..11330 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] GRANTHA LETTER PA..GRANTHA LETTER RA +11332..11333 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER LA..GRANTHA LETTER LLA +11335..11339 ; ID_Start # Lo [5] GRANTHA LETTER VA..GRANTHA LETTER HA +1133D ; ID_Start # Lo GRANTHA SIGN AVAGRAHA +11350 ; ID_Start # Lo GRANTHA OM +1135D..11361 ; ID_Start # Lo [5] GRANTHA SIGN PLUTA..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC LL +11400..11434 ; ID_Start # Lo [53] NEWA LETTER A..NEWA LETTER HA +11447..1144A ; ID_Start # Lo [4] NEWA SIGN AVAGRAHA..NEWA SIDDHI +1145F..11461 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] NEWA LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..NEWA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +11480..114AF ; ID_Start # Lo [48] TIRHUTA ANJI..TIRHUTA LETTER HA +114C4..114C5 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] TIRHUTA SIGN AVAGRAHA..TIRHUTA GVANG +114C7 ; ID_Start # Lo TIRHUTA OM +11580..115AE ; ID_Start # Lo [47] SIDDHAM LETTER A..SIDDHAM LETTER HA +115D8..115DB ; ID_Start # Lo [4] SIDDHAM LETTER THREE-CIRCLE ALTERNATE I..SIDDHAM LETTER ALTERNATE U +11600..1162F ; ID_Start # Lo [48] MODI LETTER A..MODI LETTER LLA +11644 ; ID_Start # Lo MODI SIGN HUVA +11680..116AA ; ID_Start # Lo [43] TAKRI LETTER A..TAKRI LETTER RRA +116B8 ; ID_Start # Lo TAKRI LETTER ARCHAIC KHA +11700..1171A ; ID_Start # Lo [27] AHOM LETTER KA..AHOM LETTER ALTERNATE BA +11740..11746 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] AHOM LETTER CA..AHOM LETTER LLA +11800..1182B ; ID_Start # Lo [44] DOGRA LETTER A..DOGRA LETTER RRA +118A0..118DF ; ID_Start # L& [64] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +118FF..11906 ; ID_Start # Lo [8] WARANG CITI OM..DIVES AKURU LETTER E +11909 ; ID_Start # Lo DIVES AKURU LETTER O +1190C..11913 ; ID_Start # Lo [8] DIVES AKURU LETTER KA..DIVES AKURU LETTER JA +11915..11916 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] DIVES AKURU LETTER NYA..DIVES AKURU LETTER TTA +11918..1192F ; ID_Start # Lo [24] DIVES AKURU LETTER DDA..DIVES AKURU LETTER ZA +1193F ; ID_Start # Lo DIVES AKURU PREFIXED NASAL SIGN +11941 ; ID_Start # Lo DIVES AKURU INITIAL RA +119A0..119A7 ; ID_Start # Lo [8] NANDINAGARI LETTER A..NANDINAGARI LETTER VOCALIC RR +119AA..119D0 ; ID_Start # Lo [39] NANDINAGARI LETTER E..NANDINAGARI LETTER RRA +119E1 ; ID_Start # Lo NANDINAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +119E3 ; ID_Start # Lo NANDINAGARI HEADSTROKE +11A00 ; ID_Start # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER A +11A0B..11A32 ; ID_Start # Lo [40] ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KSSA +11A3A ; ID_Start # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER RA +11A50 ; ID_Start # Lo SOYOMBO LETTER A +11A5C..11A89 ; ID_Start # Lo [46] SOYOMBO LETTER KA..SOYOMBO CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER SA +11A9D ; ID_Start # Lo SOYOMBO MARK PLUTA +11AB0..11AF8 ; ID_Start # Lo [73] CANADIAN SYLLABICS NATTILIK HI..PAU CIN HAU GLOTTAL STOP FINAL +11C00..11C08 ; ID_Start # Lo [9] BHAIKSUKI LETTER A..BHAIKSUKI LETTER VOCALIC L +11C0A..11C2E ; ID_Start # Lo [37] BHAIKSUKI LETTER E..BHAIKSUKI LETTER HA +11C40 ; ID_Start # Lo BHAIKSUKI SIGN AVAGRAHA +11C72..11C8F ; ID_Start # Lo [30] MARCHEN LETTER KA..MARCHEN LETTER A +11D00..11D06 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] MASARAM GONDI LETTER A..MASARAM GONDI LETTER E +11D08..11D09 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AI..MASARAM GONDI LETTER O +11D0B..11D30 ; ID_Start # Lo [38] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AU..MASARAM GONDI LETTER TRA +11D46 ; ID_Start # Lo MASARAM GONDI REPHA +11D60..11D65 ; ID_Start # Lo [6] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER A..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER UU +11D67..11D68 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER EE..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER AI +11D6A..11D89 ; ID_Start # Lo [32] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER OO..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER SA +11D98 ; ID_Start # Lo GUNJALA GONDI OM +11EE0..11EF2 ; ID_Start # Lo [19] MAKASAR LETTER KA..MAKASAR ANGKA +11FB0 ; ID_Start # Lo LISU LETTER YHA +12000..12399 ; ID_Start # Lo [922] CUNEIFORM SIGN A..CUNEIFORM SIGN U U +12400..1246E ; ID_Start # Nl [111] CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN TWO ASH..CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN NINE U VARIANT FORM +12480..12543 ; ID_Start # Lo [196] CUNEIFORM SIGN AB TIMES NUN TENU..CUNEIFORM SIGN ZU5 TIMES THREE DISH TENU +12F90..12FF0 ; ID_Start # Lo [97] CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM001..CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM114 +13000..1342E ; ID_Start # Lo [1071] EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH AA032 +14400..14646 ; ID_Start # Lo [583] ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A530 +16800..16A38 ; ID_Start # Lo [569] BAMUM LETTER PHASE-A NGKUE MFON..BAMUM LETTER PHASE-F VUEQ +16A40..16A5E ; ID_Start # Lo [31] MRO LETTER TA..MRO LETTER TEK +16A70..16ABE ; ID_Start # Lo [79] TANGSA LETTER OZ..TANGSA LETTER ZA +16AD0..16AED ; ID_Start # Lo [30] BASSA VAH LETTER ENNI..BASSA VAH LETTER I +16B00..16B2F ; ID_Start # Lo [48] PAHAWH HMONG VOWEL KEEB..PAHAWH HMONG CONSONANT CAU +16B40..16B43 ; ID_Start # Lm [4] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS SEEV..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN IB YAM +16B63..16B77 ; ID_Start # Lo [21] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS LUB..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN CIM NRES TOS +16B7D..16B8F ; ID_Start # Lo [19] PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN TSHEEJ..PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN VWJ +16E40..16E7F ; ID_Start # L& [64] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +16F00..16F4A ; ID_Start # Lo [75] MIAO LETTER PA..MIAO LETTER RTE +16F50 ; ID_Start # Lo MIAO LETTER NASALIZATION +16F93..16F9F ; ID_Start # Lm [13] MIAO LETTER TONE-2..MIAO LETTER REFORMED TONE-8 +16FE0..16FE1 ; ID_Start # Lm [2] TANGUT ITERATION MARK..NUSHU ITERATION MARK +16FE3 ; ID_Start # Lm OLD CHINESE ITERATION MARK +17000..187F7 ; ID_Start # Lo [6136] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-17000..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-187F7 +18800..18CD5 ; ID_Start # Lo [1238] TANGUT COMPONENT-001..KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT CHARACTER-18CD5 +18D00..18D08 ; ID_Start # Lo [9] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D00..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D08 +1AFF0..1AFF3 ; ID_Start # Lm [4] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-2..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-5 +1AFF5..1AFFB ; ID_Start # Lm [7] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-5 +1AFFD..1AFFE ; ID_Start # Lm [2] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-8 +1B000..1B122 ; ID_Start # Lo [291] KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC E..KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC WU +1B150..1B152 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WI..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WO +1B164..1B167 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL WI..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL N +1B170..1B2FB ; ID_Start # Lo [396] NUSHU CHARACTER-1B170..NUSHU CHARACTER-1B2FB +1BC00..1BC6A ; ID_Start # Lo [107] DUPLOYAN LETTER H..DUPLOYAN LETTER VOCALIC M +1BC70..1BC7C ; ID_Start # Lo [13] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LEFT HORIZONTAL SECANT..DUPLOYAN AFFIX ATTACHED TANGENT HOOK +1BC80..1BC88 ; ID_Start # Lo [9] DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH VERTICAL +1BC90..1BC99 ; ID_Start # Lo [10] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ARROW +1D400..1D454 ; ID_Start # L& [85] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL G +1D456..1D49C ; ID_Start # L& [71] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A +1D49E..1D49F ; ID_Start # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D +1D4A2 ; ID_Start # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL G +1D4A5..1D4A6 ; ID_Start # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K +1D4A9..1D4AC ; ID_Start # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Q +1D4AE..1D4B9 ; ID_Start # L& [12] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL D +1D4BB ; ID_Start # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL F +1D4BD..1D4C3 ; ID_Start # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL H..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL N +1D4C5..1D505 ; ID_Start # L& [65] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL P..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL B +1D507..1D50A ; ID_Start # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL G +1D50D..1D514 ; ID_Start # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Q +1D516..1D51C ; ID_Start # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Y +1D51E..1D539 ; ID_Start # L& [28] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL B +1D53B..1D53E ; ID_Start # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL G +1D540..1D544 ; ID_Start # L& [5] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M +1D546 ; ID_Start # L& MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL O +1D54A..1D550 ; ID_Start # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Y +1D552..1D6A5 ; ID_Start # L& [340] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL DOTLESS J +1D6A8..1D6C0 ; ID_Start # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6C2..1D6DA ; ID_Start # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D6DC..1D6FA ; ID_Start # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6FC..1D714 ; ID_Start # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D716..1D734 ; ID_Start # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D736..1D74E ; ID_Start # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D750..1D76E ; ID_Start # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D770..1D788 ; ID_Start # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D78A..1D7A8 ; ID_Start # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D7AA..1D7C2 ; ID_Start # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D7C4..1D7CB ; ID_Start # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL DIGAMMA +1DF00..1DF09 ; ID_Start # L& [10] LATIN SMALL LETTER FENG DIGRAPH WITH TRILL..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK AND RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0A ; ID_Start # Lo LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0B..1DF1E ; ID_Start # L& [20] LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH WITH DOUBLE BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CURL +1E100..1E12C ; ID_Start # Lo [45] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER MA..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER W +1E137..1E13D ; ID_Start # Lm [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SIGN FOR PERSON..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +1E14E ; ID_Start # Lo NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LOGOGRAM NYAJ +1E290..1E2AD ; ID_Start # Lo [30] TOTO LETTER PA..TOTO LETTER A +1E2C0..1E2EB ; ID_Start # Lo [44] WANCHO LETTER AA..WANCHO LETTER YIH +1E7E0..1E7E6 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYO +1E7E8..1E7EB ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE HHWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHWE +1E7ED..1E7EE ; ID_Start # Lo [2] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWEE +1E7F0..1E7FE ; ID_Start # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE PWEE +1E800..1E8C4 ; ID_Start # Lo [197] MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M001 KI..MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M060 NYON +1E900..1E943 ; ID_Start # L& [68] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA +1E94B ; ID_Start # Lm ADLAM NASALIZATION MARK +1EE00..1EE03 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DAL +1EE05..1EE1F ; ID_Start # Lo [27] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOTLESS QAF +1EE21..1EE22 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL JEEM +1EE24 ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HEH +1EE27 ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HAH +1EE29..1EE32 ; ID_Start # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL YEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL QAF +1EE34..1EE37 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL KHAH +1EE39 ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL DAD +1EE3B ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL GHAIN +1EE42 ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED JEEM +1EE47 ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED HAH +1EE49 ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED YEH +1EE4B ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED LAM +1EE4D..1EE4F ; ID_Start # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED NOON..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED AIN +1EE51..1EE52 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED QAF +1EE54 ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SHEEN +1EE57 ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED KHAH +1EE59 ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DAD +1EE5B ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED GHAIN +1EE5D ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS NOON +1EE5F ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS QAF +1EE61..1EE62 ; ID_Start # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED JEEM +1EE64 ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HEH +1EE67..1EE6A ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HAH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KAF +1EE6C..1EE72 ; ID_Start # Lo [7] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED MEEM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED QAF +1EE74..1EE77 ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KHAH +1EE79..1EE7C ; ID_Start # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS BEH +1EE7E ; ID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS FEH +1EE80..1EE89 ; ID_Start # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED YEH +1EE8B..1EE9B ; ID_Start # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED GHAIN +1EEA1..1EEA3 ; ID_Start # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK DAL +1EEA5..1EEA9 ; ID_Start # Lo [5] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK YEH +1EEAB..1EEBB ; ID_Start # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK GHAIN +20000..2A6DF ; ID_Start # Lo [42720] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-20000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A6DF +2A700..2B738 ; ID_Start # Lo [4153] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A700..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B738 +2B740..2B81D ; ID_Start # Lo [222] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B740..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B81D +2B820..2CEA1 ; ID_Start # Lo [5762] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B820..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEA1 +2CEB0..2EBE0 ; ID_Start # Lo [7473] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEB0..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2EBE0 +2F800..2FA1D ; ID_Start # Lo [542] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2F800..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2FA1D +30000..3134A ; ID_Start # Lo [4939] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-30000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3134A + +# Total code points: 131997 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: ID_Continue +# Characters that can continue an identifier. +# Generated from: +# ID_Start +# + Mn + Mc + Nd + Pc +# + Other_ID_Continue +# - Pattern_Syntax +# - Pattern_White_Space +# NOTE: See UAX #31 for more information + +0030..0039 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] DIGIT ZERO..DIGIT NINE +0041..005A ; ID_Continue # L& [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +005F ; ID_Continue # Pc LOW LINE +0061..007A ; ID_Continue # L& [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +00AA ; ID_Continue # Lo FEMININE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00B5 ; ID_Continue # L& MICRO SIGN +00B7 ; ID_Continue # Po MIDDLE DOT +00BA ; ID_Continue # Lo MASCULINE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00C0..00D6 ; ID_Continue # L& [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8..00F6 ; ID_Continue # L& [31] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F8..01BA ; ID_Continue # L& [195] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH TAIL +01BB ; ID_Continue # Lo LATIN LETTER TWO WITH STROKE +01BC..01BF ; ID_Continue # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE..LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C0..01C3 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] LATIN LETTER DENTAL CLICK..LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK +01C4..0293 ; ID_Continue # L& [208] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CURL +0294 ; ID_Continue # Lo LATIN LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0295..02AF ; ID_Continue # L& [27] LATIN LETTER PHARYNGEAL VOICED FRICATIVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H WITH FISHHOOK AND TAIL +02B0..02C1 ; ID_Continue # Lm [18] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02C6..02D1 ; ID_Continue # Lm [12] MODIFIER LETTER CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..MODIFIER LETTER HALF TRIANGULAR COLON +02E0..02E4 ; ID_Continue # Lm [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02EC ; ID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER VOICING +02EE ; ID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER DOUBLE APOSTROPHE +0300..036F ; ID_Continue # Mn [112] COMBINING GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER X +0370..0373 ; ID_Continue # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA..GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0374 ; ID_Continue # Lm GREEK NUMERAL SIGN +0376..0377 ; ID_Continue # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA..GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037A ; ID_Continue # Lm GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +037B..037D ; ID_Continue # L& [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +037F ; ID_Continue # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386 ; ID_Continue # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0387 ; ID_Continue # Po GREEK ANO TELEIA +0388..038A ; ID_Continue # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; ID_Continue # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..03A1 ; ID_Continue # L& [20] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03F5 ; ID_Continue # L& [83] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F7..0481 ; ID_Continue # L& [139] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +0483..0487 ; ID_Continue # Mn [5] COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO..COMBINING CYRILLIC POKRYTIE +048A..052F ; ID_Continue # L& [166] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; ID_Continue # L& [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +0559 ; ID_Continue # Lm ARMENIAN MODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RING +0560..0588 ; ID_Continue # L& [41] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER TURNED AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER YI WITH STROKE +0591..05BD ; ID_Continue # Mn [45] HEBREW ACCENT ETNAHTA..HEBREW POINT METEG +05BF ; ID_Continue # Mn HEBREW POINT RAFE +05C1..05C2 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] HEBREW POINT SHIN DOT..HEBREW POINT SIN DOT +05C4..05C5 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] HEBREW MARK UPPER DOT..HEBREW MARK LOWER DOT +05C7 ; ID_Continue # Mn HEBREW POINT QAMATS QATAN +05D0..05EA ; ID_Continue # Lo [27] HEBREW LETTER ALEF..HEBREW LETTER TAV +05EF..05F2 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] HEBREW YOD TRIANGLE..HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH DOUBLE YOD +0610..061A ; ID_Continue # Mn [11] ARABIC SIGN SALLALLAHOU ALAYHE WASSALLAM..ARABIC SMALL KASRA +0620..063F ; ID_Continue # Lo [32] ARABIC LETTER KASHMIRI YEH..ARABIC LETTER FARSI YEH WITH THREE DOTS ABOVE +0640 ; ID_Continue # Lm ARABIC TATWEEL +0641..064A ; ID_Continue # Lo [10] ARABIC LETTER FEH..ARABIC LETTER YEH +064B..065F ; ID_Continue # Mn [21] ARABIC FATHATAN..ARABIC WAVY HAMZA BELOW +0660..0669 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT ZERO..ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT NINE +066E..066F ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS BEH..ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS QAF +0670 ; ID_Continue # Mn ARABIC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALEF +0671..06D3 ; ID_Continue # Lo [99] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WASLA..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE +06D5 ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC LETTER AE +06D6..06DC ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] ARABIC SMALL HIGH LIGATURE SAD WITH LAM WITH ALEF MAKSURA..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SEEN +06DF..06E4 ; ID_Continue # Mn [6] ARABIC SMALL HIGH ROUNDED ZERO..ARABIC SMALL HIGH MADDA +06E5..06E6 ; ID_Continue # Lm [2] ARABIC SMALL WAW..ARABIC SMALL YEH +06E7..06E8 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] ARABIC SMALL HIGH YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH NOON +06EA..06ED ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] ARABIC EMPTY CENTRE LOW STOP..ARABIC SMALL LOW MEEM +06EE..06EF ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DAL WITH INVERTED V..ARABIC LETTER REH WITH INVERTED V +06F0..06F9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] EXTENDED ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT ZERO..EXTENDED ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT NINE +06FA..06FC ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] ARABIC LETTER SHEEN WITH DOT BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GHAIN WITH DOT BELOW +06FF ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC LETTER HEH WITH INVERTED V +0710 ; ID_Continue # Lo SYRIAC LETTER ALAPH +0711 ; ID_Continue # Mn SYRIAC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALAPH +0712..072F ; ID_Continue # Lo [30] SYRIAC LETTER BETH..SYRIAC LETTER PERSIAN DHALATH +0730..074A ; ID_Continue # Mn [27] SYRIAC PTHAHA ABOVE..SYRIAC BARREKH +074D..07A5 ; ID_Continue # Lo [89] SYRIAC LETTER SOGDIAN ZHAIN..THAANA LETTER WAAVU +07A6..07B0 ; ID_Continue # Mn [11] THAANA ABAFILI..THAANA SUKUN +07B1 ; ID_Continue # Lo THAANA LETTER NAA +07C0..07C9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] NKO DIGIT ZERO..NKO DIGIT NINE +07CA..07EA ; ID_Continue # Lo [33] NKO LETTER A..NKO LETTER JONA RA +07EB..07F3 ; ID_Continue # Mn [9] NKO COMBINING SHORT HIGH TONE..NKO COMBINING DOUBLE DOT ABOVE +07F4..07F5 ; ID_Continue # Lm [2] NKO HIGH TONE APOSTROPHE..NKO LOW TONE APOSTROPHE +07FA ; ID_Continue # Lm NKO LAJANYALAN +07FD ; ID_Continue # Mn NKO DANTAYALAN +0800..0815 ; ID_Continue # Lo [22] SAMARITAN LETTER ALAF..SAMARITAN LETTER TAAF +0816..0819 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] SAMARITAN MARK IN..SAMARITAN MARK DAGESH +081A ; ID_Continue # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER EPENTHETIC YUT +081B..0823 ; ID_Continue # Mn [9] SAMARITAN MARK EPENTHETIC YUT..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN A +0824 ; ID_Continue # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER SHORT A +0825..0827 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN SHORT A..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN U +0828 ; ID_Continue # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER I +0829..082D ; ID_Continue # Mn [5] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN LONG I..SAMARITAN MARK NEQUDAA +0840..0858 ; ID_Continue # Lo [25] MANDAIC LETTER HALQA..MANDAIC LETTER AIN +0859..085B ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] MANDAIC AFFRICATION MARK..MANDAIC GEMINATION MARK +0860..086A ; ID_Continue # Lo [11] SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM NGA..SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM SSA +0870..0887 ; ID_Continue # Lo [24] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WITH ATTACHED FATHA..ARABIC BASELINE ROUND DOT +0889..088E ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] ARABIC LETTER NOON WITH INVERTED SMALL V..ARABIC VERTICAL TAIL +0898..089F ; ID_Continue # Mn [8] ARABIC SMALL HIGH WORD AL-JUZ..ARABIC HALF MADDA OVER MADDA +08A0..08C8 ; ID_Continue # Lo [41] ARABIC LETTER BEH WITH SMALL V BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GRAF +08C9 ; ID_Continue # Lm ARABIC SMALL FARSI YEH +08CA..08E1 ; ID_Continue # Mn [24] ARABIC SMALL HIGH FARSI YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SIGN SAFHA +08E3..0902 ; ID_Continue # Mn [32] ARABIC TURNED DAMMA BELOW..DEVANAGARI SIGN ANUSVARA +0903 ; ID_Continue # Mc DEVANAGARI SIGN VISARGA +0904..0939 ; ID_Continue # Lo [54] DEVANAGARI LETTER SHORT A..DEVANAGARI LETTER HA +093A ; ID_Continue # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OE +093B ; ID_Continue # Mc DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OOE +093C ; ID_Continue # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN NUKTA +093D ; ID_Continue # Lo DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +093E..0940 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +0941..0948 ; ID_Continue # Mn [8] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +0949..094C ; ID_Continue # Mc [4] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AU +094D ; ID_Continue # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +094E..094F ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AW +0950 ; ID_Continue # Lo DEVANAGARI OM +0951..0957 ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] DEVANAGARI STRESS SIGN UDATTA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN UUE +0958..0961 ; ID_Continue # Lo [10] DEVANAGARI LETTER QA..DEVANAGARI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0962..0963 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0966..096F ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..DEVANAGARI DIGIT NINE +0971 ; ID_Continue # Lm DEVANAGARI SIGN HIGH SPACING DOT +0972..0980 ; ID_Continue # Lo [15] DEVANAGARI LETTER CANDRA A..BENGALI ANJI +0981 ; ID_Continue # Mn BENGALI SIGN CANDRABINDU +0982..0983 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] BENGALI SIGN ANUSVARA..BENGALI SIGN VISARGA +0985..098C ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] BENGALI LETTER A..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC L +098F..0990 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER E..BENGALI LETTER AI +0993..09A8 ; ID_Continue # Lo [22] BENGALI LETTER O..BENGALI LETTER NA +09AA..09B0 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] BENGALI LETTER PA..BENGALI LETTER RA +09B2 ; ID_Continue # Lo BENGALI LETTER LA +09B6..09B9 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] BENGALI LETTER SHA..BENGALI LETTER HA +09BC ; ID_Continue # Mn BENGALI SIGN NUKTA +09BD ; ID_Continue # Lo BENGALI SIGN AVAGRAHA +09BE..09C0 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AA..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN II +09C1..09C4 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN U..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +09C7..09C8 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN E..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AI +09CB..09CC ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN O..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AU +09CD ; ID_Continue # Mn BENGALI SIGN VIRAMA +09CE ; ID_Continue # Lo BENGALI LETTER KHANDA TA +09D7 ; ID_Continue # Mc BENGALI AU LENGTH MARK +09DC..09DD ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RRA..BENGALI LETTER RHA +09DF..09E1 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] BENGALI LETTER YYA..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC LL +09E2..09E3 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +09E6..09EF ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] BENGALI DIGIT ZERO..BENGALI DIGIT NINE +09F0..09F1 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RA WITH MIDDLE DIAGONAL..BENGALI LETTER RA WITH LOWER DIAGONAL +09FC ; ID_Continue # Lo BENGALI LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA +09FE ; ID_Continue # Mn BENGALI SANDHI MARK +0A01..0A02 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] GURMUKHI SIGN ADAK BINDI..GURMUKHI SIGN BINDI +0A03 ; ID_Continue # Mc GURMUKHI SIGN VISARGA +0A05..0A0A ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] GURMUKHI LETTER A..GURMUKHI LETTER UU +0A0F..0A10 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER EE..GURMUKHI LETTER AI +0A13..0A28 ; ID_Continue # Lo [22] GURMUKHI LETTER OO..GURMUKHI LETTER NA +0A2A..0A30 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] GURMUKHI LETTER PA..GURMUKHI LETTER RA +0A32..0A33 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER LA..GURMUKHI LETTER LLA +0A35..0A36 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER VA..GURMUKHI LETTER SHA +0A38..0A39 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER SA..GURMUKHI LETTER HA +0A3C ; ID_Continue # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN NUKTA +0A3E..0A40 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AA..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN II +0A41..0A42 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN U..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN UU +0A47..0A48 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN EE..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AI +0A4B..0A4D ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN OO..GURMUKHI SIGN VIRAMA +0A51 ; ID_Continue # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN UDAAT +0A59..0A5C ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] GURMUKHI LETTER KHHA..GURMUKHI LETTER RRA +0A5E ; ID_Continue # Lo GURMUKHI LETTER FA +0A66..0A6F ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] GURMUKHI DIGIT ZERO..GURMUKHI DIGIT NINE +0A70..0A71 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] GURMUKHI TIPPI..GURMUKHI ADDAK +0A72..0A74 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] GURMUKHI IRI..GURMUKHI EK ONKAR +0A75 ; ID_Continue # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN YAKASH +0A81..0A82 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] GUJARATI SIGN CANDRABINDU..GUJARATI SIGN ANUSVARA +0A83 ; ID_Continue # Mc GUJARATI SIGN VISARGA +0A85..0A8D ; ID_Continue # Lo [9] GUJARATI LETTER A..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA E +0A8F..0A91 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] GUJARATI LETTER E..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA O +0A93..0AA8 ; ID_Continue # Lo [22] GUJARATI LETTER O..GUJARATI LETTER NA +0AAA..0AB0 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] GUJARATI LETTER PA..GUJARATI LETTER RA +0AB2..0AB3 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER LA..GUJARATI LETTER LLA +0AB5..0AB9 ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] GUJARATI LETTER VA..GUJARATI LETTER HA +0ABC ; ID_Continue # Mn GUJARATI SIGN NUKTA +0ABD ; ID_Continue # Lo GUJARATI SIGN AVAGRAHA +0ABE..0AC0 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN II +0AC1..0AC5 ; ID_Continue # Mn [5] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN U..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA E +0AC7..0AC8 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN E..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AI +0AC9 ; ID_Continue # Mc GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O +0ACB..0ACC ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN O..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AU +0ACD ; ID_Continue # Mn GUJARATI SIGN VIRAMA +0AD0 ; ID_Continue # Lo GUJARATI OM +0AE0..0AE1 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC RR..GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0AE2..0AE3 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0AE6..0AEF ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] GUJARATI DIGIT ZERO..GUJARATI DIGIT NINE +0AF9 ; ID_Continue # Lo GUJARATI LETTER ZHA +0AFA..0AFF ; ID_Continue # Mn [6] GUJARATI SIGN SUKUN..GUJARATI SIGN TWO-CIRCLE NUKTA ABOVE +0B01 ; ID_Continue # Mn ORIYA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0B02..0B03 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] ORIYA SIGN ANUSVARA..ORIYA SIGN VISARGA +0B05..0B0C ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] ORIYA LETTER A..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC L +0B0F..0B10 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER E..ORIYA LETTER AI +0B13..0B28 ; ID_Continue # Lo [22] ORIYA LETTER O..ORIYA LETTER NA +0B2A..0B30 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ORIYA LETTER PA..ORIYA LETTER RA +0B32..0B33 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER LA..ORIYA LETTER LLA +0B35..0B39 ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] ORIYA LETTER VA..ORIYA LETTER HA +0B3C ; ID_Continue # Mn ORIYA SIGN NUKTA +0B3D ; ID_Continue # Lo ORIYA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0B3E ; ID_Continue # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AA +0B3F ; ID_Continue # Mn ORIYA VOWEL SIGN I +0B40 ; ID_Continue # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN II +0B41..0B44 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN U..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0B47..0B48 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN E..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AI +0B4B..0B4C ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN O..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AU +0B4D ; ID_Continue # Mn ORIYA SIGN VIRAMA +0B55..0B56 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] ORIYA SIGN OVERLINE..ORIYA AI LENGTH MARK +0B57 ; ID_Continue # Mc ORIYA AU LENGTH MARK +0B5C..0B5D ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER RRA..ORIYA LETTER RHA +0B5F..0B61 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] ORIYA LETTER YYA..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0B62..0B63 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0B66..0B6F ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] ORIYA DIGIT ZERO..ORIYA DIGIT NINE +0B71 ; ID_Continue # Lo ORIYA LETTER WA +0B82 ; ID_Continue # Mn TAMIL SIGN ANUSVARA +0B83 ; ID_Continue # Lo TAMIL SIGN VISARGA +0B85..0B8A ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] TAMIL LETTER A..TAMIL LETTER UU +0B8E..0B90 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER E..TAMIL LETTER AI +0B92..0B95 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] TAMIL LETTER O..TAMIL LETTER KA +0B99..0B9A ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NGA..TAMIL LETTER CA +0B9C ; ID_Continue # Lo TAMIL LETTER JA +0B9E..0B9F ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NYA..TAMIL LETTER TTA +0BA3..0BA4 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NNA..TAMIL LETTER TA +0BA8..0BAA ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER NA..TAMIL LETTER PA +0BAE..0BB9 ; ID_Continue # Lo [12] TAMIL LETTER MA..TAMIL LETTER HA +0BBE..0BBF ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AA..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN I +0BC0 ; ID_Continue # Mn TAMIL VOWEL SIGN II +0BC1..0BC2 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN U..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN UU +0BC6..0BC8 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN E..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AI +0BCA..0BCC ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN O..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AU +0BCD ; ID_Continue # Mn TAMIL SIGN VIRAMA +0BD0 ; ID_Continue # Lo TAMIL OM +0BD7 ; ID_Continue # Mc TAMIL AU LENGTH MARK +0BE6..0BEF ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] TAMIL DIGIT ZERO..TAMIL DIGIT NINE +0C00 ; ID_Continue # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING CANDRABINDU ABOVE +0C01..0C03 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] TELUGU SIGN CANDRABINDU..TELUGU SIGN VISARGA +0C04 ; ID_Continue # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE +0C05..0C0C ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] TELUGU LETTER A..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC L +0C0E..0C10 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER E..TELUGU LETTER AI +0C12..0C28 ; ID_Continue # Lo [23] TELUGU LETTER O..TELUGU LETTER NA +0C2A..0C39 ; ID_Continue # Lo [16] TELUGU LETTER PA..TELUGU LETTER HA +0C3C ; ID_Continue # Mn TELUGU SIGN NUKTA +0C3D ; ID_Continue # Lo TELUGU SIGN AVAGRAHA +0C3E..0C40 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AA..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN II +0C41..0C44 ; ID_Continue # Mc [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN U..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0C46..0C48 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN E..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AI +0C4A..0C4D ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN O..TELUGU SIGN VIRAMA +0C55..0C56 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] TELUGU LENGTH MARK..TELUGU AI LENGTH MARK +0C58..0C5A ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER TSA..TELUGU LETTER RRRA +0C5D ; ID_Continue # Lo TELUGU LETTER NAKAARA POLLU +0C60..0C61 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC RR..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC LL +0C62..0C63 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0C66..0C6F ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] TELUGU DIGIT ZERO..TELUGU DIGIT NINE +0C80 ; ID_Continue # Lo KANNADA SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU +0C81 ; ID_Continue # Mn KANNADA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0C82..0C83 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] KANNADA SIGN ANUSVARA..KANNADA SIGN VISARGA +0C85..0C8C ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] KANNADA LETTER A..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC L +0C8E..0C90 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] KANNADA LETTER E..KANNADA LETTER AI +0C92..0CA8 ; ID_Continue # Lo [23] KANNADA LETTER O..KANNADA LETTER NA +0CAA..0CB3 ; ID_Continue # Lo [10] KANNADA LETTER PA..KANNADA LETTER LLA +0CB5..0CB9 ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] KANNADA LETTER VA..KANNADA LETTER HA +0CBC ; ID_Continue # Mn KANNADA SIGN NUKTA +0CBD ; ID_Continue # Lo KANNADA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0CBE ; ID_Continue # Mc KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AA +0CBF ; ID_Continue # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN I +0CC0..0CC4 ; ID_Continue # Mc [5] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN II..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0CC6 ; ID_Continue # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN E +0CC7..0CC8 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN EE..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AI +0CCA..0CCB ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN O..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN OO +0CCC..0CCD ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AU..KANNADA SIGN VIRAMA +0CD5..0CD6 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] KANNADA LENGTH MARK..KANNADA AI LENGTH MARK +0CDD..0CDE ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER NAKAARA POLLU..KANNADA LETTER FA +0CE0..0CE1 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC RR..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0CE2..0CE3 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0CE6..0CEF ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] KANNADA DIGIT ZERO..KANNADA DIGIT NINE +0CF1..0CF2 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] KANNADA SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..KANNADA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +0D00..0D01 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..MALAYALAM SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D02..0D03 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] MALAYALAM SIGN ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM SIGN VISARGA +0D04..0D0C ; ID_Continue # Lo [9] MALAYALAM LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC L +0D0E..0D10 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER E..MALAYALAM LETTER AI +0D12..0D3A ; ID_Continue # Lo [41] MALAYALAM LETTER O..MALAYALAM LETTER TTTA +0D3B..0D3C ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN VERTICAL BAR VIRAMA..MALAYALAM SIGN CIRCULAR VIRAMA +0D3D ; ID_Continue # Lo MALAYALAM SIGN AVAGRAHA +0D3E..0D40 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AA..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN II +0D41..0D44 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN U..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0D46..0D48 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN E..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AI +0D4A..0D4C ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN O..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AU +0D4D ; ID_Continue # Mn MALAYALAM SIGN VIRAMA +0D4E ; ID_Continue # Lo MALAYALAM LETTER DOT REPH +0D54..0D56 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU M..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU LLL +0D57 ; ID_Continue # Mc MALAYALAM AU LENGTH MARK +0D5F..0D61 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER ARCHAIC II..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC LL +0D62..0D63 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D66..0D6F ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] MALAYALAM DIGIT ZERO..MALAYALAM DIGIT NINE +0D7A..0D7F ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU NN..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU K +0D81 ; ID_Continue # Mn SINHALA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D82..0D83 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] SINHALA SIGN ANUSVARAYA..SINHALA SIGN VISARGAYA +0D85..0D96 ; ID_Continue # Lo [18] SINHALA LETTER AYANNA..SINHALA LETTER AUYANNA +0D9A..0DB1 ; ID_Continue # Lo [24] SINHALA LETTER ALPAPRAANA KAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA NAYANNA +0DB3..0DBB ; ID_Continue # Lo [9] SINHALA LETTER SANYAKA DAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER RAYANNA +0DBD ; ID_Continue # Lo SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA LAYANNA +0DC0..0DC6 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] SINHALA LETTER VAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER FAYANNA +0DCA ; ID_Continue # Mn SINHALA SIGN AL-LAKUNA +0DCF..0DD1 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN AELA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA AEDA-PILLA +0DD2..0DD4 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI IS-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI PAA-PILLA +0DD6 ; ID_Continue # Mn SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA PAA-PILLA +0DD8..0DDF ; ID_Continue # Mc [8] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAYANUKITTA +0DE6..0DEF ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] SINHALA LITH DIGIT ZERO..SINHALA LITH DIGIT NINE +0DF2..0DF3 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAYANUKITTA +0E01..0E30 ; ID_Continue # Lo [48] THAI CHARACTER KO KAI..THAI CHARACTER SARA A +0E31 ; ID_Continue # Mn THAI CHARACTER MAI HAN-AKAT +0E32..0E33 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] THAI CHARACTER SARA AA..THAI CHARACTER SARA AM +0E34..0E3A ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] THAI CHARACTER SARA I..THAI CHARACTER PHINTHU +0E40..0E45 ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] THAI CHARACTER SARA E..THAI CHARACTER LAKKHANGYAO +0E46 ; ID_Continue # Lm THAI CHARACTER MAIYAMOK +0E47..0E4E ; ID_Continue # Mn [8] THAI CHARACTER MAITAIKHU..THAI CHARACTER YAMAKKAN +0E50..0E59 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] THAI DIGIT ZERO..THAI DIGIT NINE +0E81..0E82 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] LAO LETTER KO..LAO LETTER KHO SUNG +0E84 ; ID_Continue # Lo LAO LETTER KHO TAM +0E86..0E8A ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] LAO LETTER PALI GHA..LAO LETTER SO TAM +0E8C..0EA3 ; ID_Continue # Lo [24] LAO LETTER PALI JHA..LAO LETTER LO LING +0EA5 ; ID_Continue # Lo LAO LETTER LO LOOT +0EA7..0EB0 ; ID_Continue # Lo [10] LAO LETTER WO..LAO VOWEL SIGN A +0EB1 ; ID_Continue # Mn LAO VOWEL SIGN MAI KAN +0EB2..0EB3 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] LAO VOWEL SIGN AA..LAO VOWEL SIGN AM +0EB4..0EBC ; ID_Continue # Mn [9] LAO VOWEL SIGN I..LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN LO +0EBD ; ID_Continue # Lo LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN NYO +0EC0..0EC4 ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] LAO VOWEL SIGN E..LAO VOWEL SIGN AI +0EC6 ; ID_Continue # Lm LAO KO LA +0EC8..0ECD ; ID_Continue # Mn [6] LAO TONE MAI EK..LAO NIGGAHITA +0ED0..0ED9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] LAO DIGIT ZERO..LAO DIGIT NINE +0EDC..0EDF ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] LAO HO NO..LAO LETTER KHMU NYO +0F00 ; ID_Continue # Lo TIBETAN SYLLABLE OM +0F18..0F19 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN -KHYUD PA..TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN SDONG TSHUGS +0F20..0F29 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] TIBETAN DIGIT ZERO..TIBETAN DIGIT NINE +0F35 ; ID_Continue # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG NYI ZLA +0F37 ; ID_Continue # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG SGOR RTAGS +0F39 ; ID_Continue # Mn TIBETAN MARK TSA -PHRU +0F3E..0F3F ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] TIBETAN SIGN YAR TSHES..TIBETAN SIGN MAR TSHES +0F40..0F47 ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] TIBETAN LETTER KA..TIBETAN LETTER JA +0F49..0F6C ; ID_Continue # Lo [36] TIBETAN LETTER NYA..TIBETAN LETTER RRA +0F71..0F7E ; ID_Continue # Mn [14] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN AA..TIBETAN SIGN RJES SU NGA RO +0F7F ; ID_Continue # Mc TIBETAN SIGN RNAM BCAD +0F80..0F84 ; ID_Continue # Mn [5] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN REVERSED I..TIBETAN MARK HALANTA +0F86..0F87 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] TIBETAN SIGN LCI RTAGS..TIBETAN SIGN YANG RTAGS +0F88..0F8C ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] TIBETAN SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SIGN INVERTED MCHU CAN +0F8D..0F97 ; ID_Continue # Mn [11] TIBETAN SUBJOINED SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER JA +0F99..0FBC ; ID_Continue # Mn [36] TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER NYA..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER FIXED-FORM RA +0FC6 ; ID_Continue # Mn TIBETAN SYMBOL PADMA GDAN +1000..102A ; ID_Continue # Lo [43] MYANMAR LETTER KA..MYANMAR LETTER AU +102B..102C ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN TALL AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AA +102D..1030 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN UU +1031 ; ID_Continue # Mc MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN E +1032..1037 ; ID_Continue # Mn [6] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AI..MYANMAR SIGN DOT BELOW +1038 ; ID_Continue # Mc MYANMAR SIGN VISARGA +1039..103A ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MYANMAR SIGN VIRAMA..MYANMAR SIGN ASAT +103B..103C ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL YA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +103D..103E ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL WA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL HA +103F ; ID_Continue # Lo MYANMAR LETTER GREAT SA +1040..1049 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] MYANMAR DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR DIGIT NINE +1050..1055 ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER SHA..MYANMAR LETTER VOCALIC LL +1056..1057 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +1058..1059 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +105A..105D ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] MYANMAR LETTER MON NGA..MYANMAR LETTER MON BBE +105E..1060 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL NA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL LA +1061 ; ID_Continue # Lo MYANMAR LETTER SGAW KAREN SHA +1062..1064 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SGAW KAREN EU..MYANMAR TONE MARK SGAW KAREN KE PHO +1065..1066 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN THA..MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN PWA +1067..106D ; ID_Continue # Mc [7] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN EU..MYANMAR SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN TONE-5 +106E..1070 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN NNA..MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN GHWA +1071..1074 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN GEBA KAREN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN KAYAH EE +1075..1081 ; ID_Continue # Lo [13] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN KA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN HA +1082 ; ID_Continue # Mn MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN SHAN MEDIAL WA +1083..1084 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E +1085..1086 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E ABOVE..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN FINAL Y +1087..108C ; ID_Continue # Mc [6] MYANMAR SIGN SHAN TONE-2..MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL TONE-3 +108D ; ID_Continue # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL EMPHATIC TONE +108E ; ID_Continue # Lo MYANMAR LETTER RUMAI PALAUNG FA +108F ; ID_Continue # Mc MYANMAR SIGN RUMAI PALAUNG TONE-5 +1090..1099 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] MYANMAR SHAN DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR SHAN DIGIT NINE +109A..109C ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] MYANMAR SIGN KHAMTI TONE-1..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON A +109D ; ID_Continue # Mn MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON AI +10A0..10C5 ; ID_Continue # L& [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; ID_Continue # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; ID_Continue # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +10D0..10FA ; ID_Continue # L& [43] GEORGIAN LETTER AN..GEORGIAN LETTER AIN +10FC ; ID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER GEORGIAN NAR +10FD..10FF ; ID_Continue # L& [3] GEORGIAN LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1100..1248 ; ID_Continue # Lo [329] HANGUL CHOSEONG KIYEOK..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWA +124A..124D ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWE +1250..1256 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHO +1258 ; ID_Continue # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWA +125A..125D ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWE +1260..1288 ; ID_Continue # Lo [41] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWA +128A..128D ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWE +1290..12B0 ; ID_Continue # Lo [33] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE NA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWA +12B2..12B5 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWE +12B8..12BE ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXO +12C0 ; ID_Continue # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWA +12C2..12C5 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWE +12C8..12D6 ; ID_Continue # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE WA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PHARYNGEAL O +12D8..1310 ; ID_Continue # Lo [57] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWA +1312..1315 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWE +1318..135A ; ID_Continue # Lo [67] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE FYA +135D..135F ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION AND VOWEL LENGTH MARK..ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION MARK +1369..1371 ; ID_Continue # No [9] ETHIOPIC DIGIT ONE..ETHIOPIC DIGIT NINE +1380..138F ; ID_Continue # Lo [16] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SEBATBEIT MWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PWE +13A0..13F5 ; ID_Continue # L& [86] CHEROKEE LETTER A..CHEROKEE LETTER MV +13F8..13FD ; ID_Continue # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1401..166C ; ID_Continue # Lo [620] CANADIAN SYLLABICS E..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER TTSA +166F..167F ; ID_Continue # Lo [17] CANADIAN SYLLABICS QAI..CANADIAN SYLLABICS BLACKFOOT W +1681..169A ; ID_Continue # Lo [26] OGHAM LETTER BEITH..OGHAM LETTER PEITH +16A0..16EA ; ID_Continue # Lo [75] RUNIC LETTER FEHU FEOH FE F..RUNIC LETTER X +16EE..16F0 ; ID_Continue # Nl [3] RUNIC ARLAUG SYMBOL..RUNIC BELGTHOR SYMBOL +16F1..16F8 ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] RUNIC LETTER K..RUNIC LETTER FRANKS CASKET AESC +1700..1711 ; ID_Continue # Lo [18] TAGALOG LETTER A..TAGALOG LETTER HA +1712..1714 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] TAGALOG VOWEL SIGN I..TAGALOG SIGN VIRAMA +1715 ; ID_Continue # Mc TAGALOG SIGN PAMUDPOD +171F..1731 ; ID_Continue # Lo [19] TAGALOG LETTER ARCHAIC RA..HANUNOO LETTER HA +1732..1733 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN I..HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN U +1734 ; ID_Continue # Mc HANUNOO SIGN PAMUDPOD +1740..1751 ; ID_Continue # Lo [18] BUHID LETTER A..BUHID LETTER HA +1752..1753 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] BUHID VOWEL SIGN I..BUHID VOWEL SIGN U +1760..176C ; ID_Continue # Lo [13] TAGBANWA LETTER A..TAGBANWA LETTER YA +176E..1770 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] TAGBANWA LETTER LA..TAGBANWA LETTER SA +1772..1773 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN I..TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN U +1780..17B3 ; ID_Continue # Lo [52] KHMER LETTER KA..KHMER INDEPENDENT VOWEL QAU +17B4..17B5 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AQ..KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AA +17B6 ; ID_Continue # Mc KHMER VOWEL SIGN AA +17B7..17BD ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] KHMER VOWEL SIGN I..KHMER VOWEL SIGN UA +17BE..17C5 ; ID_Continue # Mc [8] KHMER VOWEL SIGN OE..KHMER VOWEL SIGN AU +17C6 ; ID_Continue # Mn KHMER SIGN NIKAHIT +17C7..17C8 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] KHMER SIGN REAHMUK..KHMER SIGN YUUKALEAPINTU +17C9..17D3 ; ID_Continue # Mn [11] KHMER SIGN MUUSIKATOAN..KHMER SIGN BATHAMASAT +17D7 ; ID_Continue # Lm KHMER SIGN LEK TOO +17DC ; ID_Continue # Lo KHMER SIGN AVAKRAHASANYA +17DD ; ID_Continue # Mn KHMER SIGN ATTHACAN +17E0..17E9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] KHMER DIGIT ZERO..KHMER DIGIT NINE +180B..180D ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR ONE..MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR THREE +180F ; ID_Continue # Mn MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR FOUR +1810..1819 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] MONGOLIAN DIGIT ZERO..MONGOLIAN DIGIT NINE +1820..1842 ; ID_Continue # Lo [35] MONGOLIAN LETTER A..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHI +1843 ; ID_Continue # Lm MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO LONG VOWEL SIGN +1844..1878 ; ID_Continue # Lo [53] MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO E..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHA WITH TWO DOTS +1880..1884 ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI ANUSVARA ONE..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI INVERTED UBADAMA +1885..1886 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI BALUDA..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI THREE BALUDA +1887..18A8 ; ID_Continue # Lo [34] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI A..MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI BHA +18A9 ; ID_Continue # Mn MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI DAGALGA +18AA ; ID_Continue # Lo MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI LHA +18B0..18F5 ; ID_Continue # Lo [70] CANADIAN SYLLABICS OY..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER DENTAL S +1900..191E ; ID_Continue # Lo [31] LIMBU VOWEL-CARRIER LETTER..LIMBU LETTER TRA +1920..1922 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN A..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN U +1923..1926 ; ID_Continue # Mc [4] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN EE..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN AU +1927..1928 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN E..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN O +1929..192B ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER WA +1930..1931 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] LIMBU SMALL LETTER KA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER NGA +1932 ; ID_Continue # Mn LIMBU SMALL LETTER ANUSVARA +1933..1938 ; ID_Continue # Mc [6] LIMBU SMALL LETTER TA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER LA +1939..193B ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] LIMBU SIGN MUKPHRENG..LIMBU SIGN SA-I +1946..194F ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] LIMBU DIGIT ZERO..LIMBU DIGIT NINE +1950..196D ; ID_Continue # Lo [30] TAI LE LETTER KA..TAI LE LETTER AI +1970..1974 ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] TAI LE LETTER TONE-2..TAI LE LETTER TONE-6 +1980..19AB ; ID_Continue # Lo [44] NEW TAI LUE LETTER HIGH QA..NEW TAI LUE LETTER LOW SUA +19B0..19C9 ; ID_Continue # Lo [26] NEW TAI LUE VOWEL SIGN VOWEL SHORTENER..NEW TAI LUE TONE MARK-2 +19D0..19D9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] NEW TAI LUE DIGIT ZERO..NEW TAI LUE DIGIT NINE +19DA ; ID_Continue # No NEW TAI LUE THAM DIGIT ONE +1A00..1A16 ; ID_Continue # Lo [23] BUGINESE LETTER KA..BUGINESE LETTER HA +1A17..1A18 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN I..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN U +1A19..1A1A ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN E..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN O +1A1B ; ID_Continue # Mn BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN AE +1A20..1A54 ; ID_Continue # Lo [53] TAI THAM LETTER HIGH KA..TAI THAM LETTER GREAT SA +1A55 ; ID_Continue # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +1A56 ; ID_Continue # Mn TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA +1A57 ; ID_Continue # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN LA TANG LAI +1A58..1A5E ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] TAI THAM SIGN MAI KANG LAI..TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN SA +1A60 ; ID_Continue # Mn TAI THAM SIGN SAKOT +1A61 ; ID_Continue # Mc TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN A +1A62 ; ID_Continue # Mn TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN MAI SAT +1A63..1A64 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN AA..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN TALL AA +1A65..1A6C ; ID_Continue # Mn [8] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN I..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA BELOW +1A6D..1A72 ; ID_Continue # Mc [6] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OY..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN THAM AI +1A73..1A7C ; ID_Continue # Mn [10] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA ABOVE..TAI THAM SIGN KHUEN-LUE KARAN +1A7F ; ID_Continue # Mn TAI THAM COMBINING CRYPTOGRAMMIC DOT +1A80..1A89 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] TAI THAM HORA DIGIT ZERO..TAI THAM HORA DIGIT NINE +1A90..1A99 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] TAI THAM THAM DIGIT ZERO..TAI THAM THAM DIGIT NINE +1AA7 ; ID_Continue # Lm TAI THAM SIGN MAI YAMOK +1AB0..1ABD ; ID_Continue # Mn [14] COMBINING DOUBLED CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..COMBINING PARENTHESES BELOW +1ABF..1ACE ; ID_Continue # Mn [16] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER W BELOW..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +1B00..1B03 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] BALINESE SIGN ULU RICEM..BALINESE SIGN SURANG +1B04 ; ID_Continue # Mc BALINESE SIGN BISAH +1B05..1B33 ; ID_Continue # Lo [47] BALINESE LETTER AKARA..BALINESE LETTER HA +1B34 ; ID_Continue # Mn BALINESE SIGN REREKAN +1B35 ; ID_Continue # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TEDUNG +1B36..1B3A ; ID_Continue # Mn [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN ULU..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA +1B3B ; ID_Continue # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA TEDUNG +1B3C ; ID_Continue # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA +1B3D..1B41 ; ID_Continue # Mc [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA TEDUNG..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TALING REPA TEDUNG +1B42 ; ID_Continue # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET +1B43..1B44 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET TEDUNG..BALINESE ADEG ADEG +1B45..1B4C ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] BALINESE LETTER KAF SASAK..BALINESE LETTER ARCHAIC JNYA +1B50..1B59 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] BALINESE DIGIT ZERO..BALINESE DIGIT NINE +1B6B..1B73 ; ID_Continue # Mn [9] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TEGEH..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING GONG +1B80..1B81 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] SUNDANESE SIGN PANYECEK..SUNDANESE SIGN PANGLAYAR +1B82 ; ID_Continue # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PANGWISAD +1B83..1BA0 ; ID_Continue # Lo [30] SUNDANESE LETTER A..SUNDANESE LETTER HA +1BA1 ; ID_Continue # Mc SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PAMINGKAL +1BA2..1BA5 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PANYAKRA..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANYUKU +1BA6..1BA7 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANAELAENG..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANOLONG +1BA8..1BA9 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PAMEPET..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANEULEUNG +1BAA ; ID_Continue # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PAMAAEH +1BAB..1BAD ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] SUNDANESE SIGN VIRAMA..SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PASANGAN WA +1BAE..1BAF ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] SUNDANESE LETTER KHA..SUNDANESE LETTER SYA +1BB0..1BB9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] SUNDANESE DIGIT ZERO..SUNDANESE DIGIT NINE +1BBA..1BE5 ; ID_Continue # Lo [44] SUNDANESE AVAGRAHA..BATAK LETTER U +1BE6 ; ID_Continue # Mn BATAK SIGN TOMPI +1BE7 ; ID_Continue # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN E +1BE8..1BE9 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] BATAK VOWEL SIGN PAKPAK E..BATAK VOWEL SIGN EE +1BEA..1BEC ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN I..BATAK VOWEL SIGN O +1BED ; ID_Continue # Mn BATAK VOWEL SIGN KARO O +1BEE ; ID_Continue # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN U +1BEF..1BF1 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN U FOR SIMALUNGUN SA..BATAK CONSONANT SIGN H +1BF2..1BF3 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] BATAK PANGOLAT..BATAK PANONGONAN +1C00..1C23 ; ID_Continue # Lo [36] LEPCHA LETTER KA..LEPCHA LETTER A +1C24..1C2B ; ID_Continue # Mc [8] LEPCHA SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN UU +1C2C..1C33 ; ID_Continue # Mn [8] LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN E..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN T +1C34..1C35 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN NYIN-DO..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN KANG +1C36..1C37 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] LEPCHA SIGN RAN..LEPCHA SIGN NUKTA +1C40..1C49 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] LEPCHA DIGIT ZERO..LEPCHA DIGIT NINE +1C4D..1C4F ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] LEPCHA LETTER TTA..LEPCHA LETTER DDA +1C50..1C59 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] OL CHIKI DIGIT ZERO..OL CHIKI DIGIT NINE +1C5A..1C77 ; ID_Continue # Lo [30] OL CHIKI LETTER LA..OL CHIKI LETTER OH +1C78..1C7D ; ID_Continue # Lm [6] OL CHIKI MU TTUDDAG..OL CHIKI AHAD +1C80..1C88 ; ID_Continue # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1C90..1CBA ; ID_Continue # L& [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; ID_Continue # L& [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1CD0..1CD2 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] VEDIC TONE KARSHANA..VEDIC TONE PRENKHA +1CD4..1CE0 ; ID_Continue # Mn [13] VEDIC SIGN YAJURVEDIC MIDLINE SVARITA..VEDIC TONE RIGVEDIC KASHMIRI INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE1 ; ID_Continue # Mc VEDIC TONE ATHARVAVEDIC INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE2..1CE8 ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] VEDIC SIGN VISARGA SVARITA..VEDIC SIGN VISARGA ANUDATTA WITH TAIL +1CE9..1CEC ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA..VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA VAMAGOMUKHA WITH TAIL +1CED ; ID_Continue # Mn VEDIC SIGN TIRYAK +1CEE..1CF3 ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] VEDIC SIGN HEXIFORM LONG ANUSVARA..VEDIC SIGN ROTATED ARDHAVISARGA +1CF4 ; ID_Continue # Mn VEDIC TONE CANDRA ABOVE +1CF5..1CF6 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] VEDIC SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..VEDIC SIGN UPADHMANIYA +1CF7 ; ID_Continue # Mc VEDIC SIGN ATIKRAMA +1CF8..1CF9 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] VEDIC TONE RING ABOVE..VEDIC TONE DOUBLE RING ABOVE +1CFA ; ID_Continue # Lo VEDIC SIGN DOUBLE ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA +1D00..1D2B ; ID_Continue # L& [44] LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL A..CYRILLIC LETTER SMALL CAPITAL EL +1D2C..1D6A ; ID_Continue # Lm [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1D6B..1D77 ; ID_Continue # L& [13] LATIN SMALL LETTER UE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED G +1D78 ; ID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC EN +1D79..1D9A ; ID_Continue # L& [34] LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1D9B..1DBF ; ID_Continue # Lm [37] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED ALPHA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL THETA +1DC0..1DFF ; ID_Continue # Mn [64] COMBINING DOTTED GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING RIGHT ARROWHEAD AND DOWN ARROWHEAD BELOW +1E00..1F15 ; ID_Continue # L& [278] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F18..1F1D ; ID_Continue # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F45 ; ID_Continue # L& [38] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F48..1F4D ; ID_Continue # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; ID_Continue # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F59 ; ID_Continue # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; ID_Continue # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; ID_Continue # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F..1F7D ; ID_Continue # L& [31] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1FB4 ; ID_Continue # L& [53] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FBC ; ID_Continue # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBE ; ID_Continue # L& GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; ID_Continue # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FCC ; ID_Continue # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; ID_Continue # L& [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FDB ; ID_Continue # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE0..1FEC ; ID_Continue # L& [13] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF2..1FF4 ; ID_Continue # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FFC ; ID_Continue # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +203F..2040 ; ID_Continue # Pc [2] UNDERTIE..CHARACTER TIE +2054 ; ID_Continue # Pc INVERTED UNDERTIE +2071 ; ID_Continue # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +207F ; ID_Continue # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER N +2090..209C ; ID_Continue # Lm [13] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER T +20D0..20DC ; ID_Continue # Mn [13] COMBINING LEFT HARPOON ABOVE..COMBINING FOUR DOTS ABOVE +20E1 ; ID_Continue # Mn COMBINING LEFT RIGHT ARROW ABOVE +20E5..20F0 ; ID_Continue # Mn [12] COMBINING REVERSE SOLIDUS OVERLAY..COMBINING ASTERISK ABOVE +2102 ; ID_Continue # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL C +2107 ; ID_Continue # L& EULER CONSTANT +210A..2113 ; ID_Continue # L& [10] SCRIPT SMALL G..SCRIPT SMALL L +2115 ; ID_Continue # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL N +2118 ; ID_Continue # Sm SCRIPT CAPITAL P +2119..211D ; ID_Continue # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL P..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL R +2124 ; ID_Continue # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Z +2126 ; ID_Continue # L& OHM SIGN +2128 ; ID_Continue # L& BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL Z +212A..212D ; ID_Continue # L& [4] KELVIN SIGN..BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL C +212E ; ID_Continue # So ESTIMATED SYMBOL +212F..2134 ; ID_Continue # L& [6] SCRIPT SMALL E..SCRIPT SMALL O +2135..2138 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ALEF SYMBOL..DALET SYMBOL +2139 ; ID_Continue # L& INFORMATION SOURCE +213C..213F ; ID_Continue # L& [4] DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL PI..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL PI +2145..2149 ; ID_Continue # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC CAPITAL D..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +214E ; ID_Continue # L& TURNED SMALL F +2160..2182 ; ID_Continue # Nl [35] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..ROMAN NUMERAL TEN THOUSAND +2183..2184 ; ID_Continue # L& [2] ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +2185..2188 ; ID_Continue # Nl [4] ROMAN NUMERAL SIX LATE FORM..ROMAN NUMERAL ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND +2C00..2C7B ; ID_Continue # L& [124] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED E +2C7C..2C7D ; ID_Continue # Lm [2] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL V +2C7E..2CE4 ; ID_Continue # L& [103] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC SYMBOL KAI +2CEB..2CEE ; ID_Continue # L& [4] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CEF..2CF1 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] COPTIC COMBINING NI ABOVE..COPTIC COMBINING SPIRITUS LENIS +2CF2..2CF3 ; ID_Continue # L& [2] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2D00..2D25 ; ID_Continue # L& [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; ID_Continue # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; ID_Continue # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +2D30..2D67 ; ID_Continue # Lo [56] TIFINAGH LETTER YA..TIFINAGH LETTER YO +2D6F ; ID_Continue # Lm TIFINAGH MODIFIER LETTER LABIALIZATION MARK +2D7F ; ID_Continue # Mn TIFINAGH CONSONANT JOINER +2D80..2D96 ; ID_Continue # Lo [23] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE LOA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGWE +2DA0..2DA6 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSO +2DA8..2DAE ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCO +2DB0..2DB6 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZO +2DB8..2DBE ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHO +2DC0..2DC6 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYO +2DC8..2DCE ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYO +2DD0..2DD6 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYO +2DD8..2DDE ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYO +2DE0..2DFF ; ID_Continue # Mn [32] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER BE..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +3005 ; ID_Continue # Lm IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +3006 ; ID_Continue # Lo IDEOGRAPHIC CLOSING MARK +3007 ; ID_Continue # Nl IDEOGRAPHIC NUMBER ZERO +3021..3029 ; ID_Continue # Nl [9] HANGZHOU NUMERAL ONE..HANGZHOU NUMERAL NINE +302A..302D ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] IDEOGRAPHIC LEVEL TONE MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ENTERING TONE MARK +302E..302F ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] HANGUL SINGLE DOT TONE MARK..HANGUL DOUBLE DOT TONE MARK +3031..3035 ; ID_Continue # Lm [5] VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK..VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK LOWER HALF +3038..303A ; ID_Continue # Nl [3] HANGZHOU NUMERAL TEN..HANGZHOU NUMERAL THIRTY +303B ; ID_Continue # Lm VERTICAL IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +303C ; ID_Continue # Lo MASU MARK +3041..3096 ; ID_Continue # Lo [86] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL A..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL KE +3099..309A ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +309B..309C ; ID_Continue # Sk [2] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +309D..309E ; ID_Continue # Lm [2] HIRAGANA ITERATION MARK..HIRAGANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +309F ; ID_Continue # Lo HIRAGANA DIGRAPH YORI +30A1..30FA ; ID_Continue # Lo [90] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL A..KATAKANA LETTER VO +30FC..30FE ; ID_Continue # Lm [3] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +30FF ; ID_Continue # Lo KATAKANA DIGRAPH KOTO +3105..312F ; ID_Continue # Lo [43] BOPOMOFO LETTER B..BOPOMOFO LETTER NN +3131..318E ; ID_Continue # Lo [94] HANGUL LETTER KIYEOK..HANGUL LETTER ARAEAE +31A0..31BF ; ID_Continue # Lo [32] BOPOMOFO LETTER BU..BOPOMOFO LETTER AH +31F0..31FF ; ID_Continue # Lo [16] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL KU..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL RO +3400..4DBF ; ID_Continue # Lo [6592] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3400..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4DBF +4E00..A014 ; ID_Continue # Lo [21013] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4E00..YI SYLLABLE E +A015 ; ID_Continue # Lm YI SYLLABLE WU +A016..A48C ; ID_Continue # Lo [1143] YI SYLLABLE BIT..YI SYLLABLE YYR +A4D0..A4F7 ; ID_Continue # Lo [40] LISU LETTER BA..LISU LETTER OE +A4F8..A4FD ; ID_Continue # Lm [6] LISU LETTER TONE MYA TI..LISU LETTER TONE MYA JEU +A500..A60B ; ID_Continue # Lo [268] VAI SYLLABLE EE..VAI SYLLABLE NG +A60C ; ID_Continue # Lm VAI SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +A610..A61F ; ID_Continue # Lo [16] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE FA..VAI SYMBOL JONG +A620..A629 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] VAI DIGIT ZERO..VAI DIGIT NINE +A62A..A62B ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE MA..VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE DO +A640..A66D ; ID_Continue # L& [46] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A66E ; ID_Continue # Lo CYRILLIC LETTER MULTIOCULAR O +A66F ; ID_Continue # Mn COMBINING CYRILLIC VZMET +A674..A67D ; ID_Continue # Mn [10] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER UKRAINIAN IE..COMBINING CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A67F ; ID_Continue # Lm CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A680..A69B ; ID_Continue # L& [28] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A69C..A69D ; ID_Continue # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A69E..A69F ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER EF..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED E +A6A0..A6E5 ; ID_Continue # Lo [70] BAMUM LETTER A..BAMUM LETTER KI +A6E6..A6EF ; ID_Continue # Nl [10] BAMUM LETTER MO..BAMUM LETTER KOGHOM +A6F0..A6F1 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] BAMUM COMBINING MARK KOQNDON..BAMUM COMBINING MARK TUKWENTIS +A717..A71F ; ID_Continue # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER DOT VERTICAL BAR..MODIFIER LETTER LOW INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +A722..A76F ; ID_Continue # L& [78] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF..LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A770 ; ID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER US +A771..A787 ; ID_Continue # L& [23] LATIN SMALL LETTER DUM..LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A788 ; ID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER LOW CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +A78B..A78E ; ID_Continue # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH RETROFLEX HOOK AND BELT +A78F ; ID_Continue # Lo LATIN LETTER SINOLOGICAL DOT +A790..A7CA ; ID_Continue # L& [59] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0..A7D1 ; ID_Continue # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D3 ; ID_Continue # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE THORN +A7D5..A7D9 ; ID_Continue # L& [5] LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE WYNN..LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F2..A7F4 ; ID_Continue # Lm [3] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL C..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL Q +A7F5..A7F6 ; ID_Continue # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +A7F7 ; ID_Continue # Lo LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER SIDEWAYS I +A7F8..A7F9 ; ID_Continue # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +A7FA ; ID_Continue # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED M +A7FB..A801 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER REVERSED F..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER I +A802 ; ID_Continue # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN DVISVARA +A803..A805 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER U..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER O +A806 ; ID_Continue # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN HASANTA +A807..A80A ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER KO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER GHO +A80B ; ID_Continue # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ANUSVARA +A80C..A822 ; ID_Continue # Lo [23] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER CO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER HO +A823..A824 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN A..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN I +A825..A826 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN U..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN E +A827 ; ID_Continue # Mc SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN OO +A82C ; ID_Continue # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ALTERNATE HASANTA +A840..A873 ; ID_Continue # Lo [52] PHAGS-PA LETTER KA..PHAGS-PA LETTER CANDRABINDU +A880..A881 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN ANUSVARA..SAURASHTRA SIGN VISARGA +A882..A8B3 ; ID_Continue # Lo [50] SAURASHTRA LETTER A..SAURASHTRA LETTER LLA +A8B4..A8C3 ; ID_Continue # Mc [16] SAURASHTRA CONSONANT SIGN HAARU..SAURASHTRA VOWEL SIGN AU +A8C4..A8C5 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN VIRAMA..SAURASHTRA SIGN CANDRABINDU +A8D0..A8D9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] SAURASHTRA DIGIT ZERO..SAURASHTRA DIGIT NINE +A8E0..A8F1 ; ID_Continue # Mn [18] COMBINING DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +A8F2..A8F7 ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] DEVANAGARI SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU..DEVANAGARI SIGN CANDRABINDU AVAGRAHA +A8FB ; ID_Continue # Lo DEVANAGARI HEADSTROKE +A8FD..A8FE ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] DEVANAGARI JAIN OM..DEVANAGARI LETTER AY +A8FF ; ID_Continue # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AY +A900..A909 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] KAYAH LI DIGIT ZERO..KAYAH LI DIGIT NINE +A90A..A925 ; ID_Continue # Lo [28] KAYAH LI LETTER KA..KAYAH LI LETTER OO +A926..A92D ; ID_Continue # Mn [8] KAYAH LI VOWEL UE..KAYAH LI TONE CALYA PLOPHU +A930..A946 ; ID_Continue # Lo [23] REJANG LETTER KA..REJANG LETTER A +A947..A951 ; ID_Continue # Mn [11] REJANG VOWEL SIGN I..REJANG CONSONANT SIGN R +A952..A953 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] REJANG CONSONANT SIGN H..REJANG VIRAMA +A960..A97C ; ID_Continue # Lo [29] HANGUL CHOSEONG TIKEUT-MIEUM..HANGUL CHOSEONG SSANGYEORINHIEUH +A980..A982 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] JAVANESE SIGN PANYANGGA..JAVANESE SIGN LAYAR +A983 ; ID_Continue # Mc JAVANESE SIGN WIGNYAN +A984..A9B2 ; ID_Continue # Lo [47] JAVANESE LETTER A..JAVANESE LETTER HA +A9B3 ; ID_Continue # Mn JAVANESE SIGN CECAK TELU +A9B4..A9B5 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TARUNG..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TOLONG +A9B6..A9B9 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN WULU..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN SUKU MENDUT +A9BA..A9BB ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TALING..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN DIRGA MURE +A9BC..A9BD ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET..JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN KERET +A9BE..A9C0 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN PENGKAL..JAVANESE PANGKON +A9CF ; ID_Continue # Lm JAVANESE PANGRANGKEP +A9D0..A9D9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] JAVANESE DIGIT ZERO..JAVANESE DIGIT NINE +A9E0..A9E4 ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN GHA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN BHA +A9E5 ; ID_Continue # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN SAW +A9E6 ; ID_Continue # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER SHAN REDUPLICATION +A9E7..A9EF ; ID_Continue # Lo [9] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NYA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NNA +A9F0..A9F9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] MYANMAR TAI LAING DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR TAI LAING DIGIT NINE +A9FA..A9FE ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING LLA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING BHA +AA00..AA28 ; ID_Continue # Lo [41] CHAM LETTER A..CHAM LETTER HA +AA29..AA2E ; ID_Continue # Mn [6] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAM VOWEL SIGN OE +AA2F..AA30 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN O..CHAM VOWEL SIGN AI +AA31..AA32 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AU..CHAM VOWEL SIGN UE +AA33..AA34 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN YA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN RA +AA35..AA36 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN LA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN WA +AA40..AA42 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] CHAM LETTER FINAL K..CHAM LETTER FINAL NG +AA43 ; ID_Continue # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL NG +AA44..AA4B ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] CHAM LETTER FINAL CH..CHAM LETTER FINAL SS +AA4C ; ID_Continue # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL M +AA4D ; ID_Continue # Mc CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL H +AA50..AA59 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] CHAM DIGIT ZERO..CHAM DIGIT NINE +AA60..AA6F ; ID_Continue # Lo [16] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI GA..MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI FA +AA70 ; ID_Continue # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER KHAMTI REDUPLICATION +AA71..AA76 ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI XA..MYANMAR LOGOGRAM KHAMTI HM +AA7A ; ID_Continue # Lo MYANMAR LETTER AITON RA +AA7B ; ID_Continue # Mc MYANMAR SIGN PAO KAREN TONE +AA7C ; ID_Continue # Mn MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-2 +AA7D ; ID_Continue # Mc MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-5 +AA7E..AAAF ; ID_Continue # Lo [50] MYANMAR LETTER SHWE PALAUNG CHA..TAI VIET LETTER HIGH O +AAB0 ; ID_Continue # Mn TAI VIET MAI KANG +AAB1 ; ID_Continue # Lo TAI VIET VOWEL AA +AAB2..AAB4 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] TAI VIET VOWEL I..TAI VIET VOWEL U +AAB5..AAB6 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] TAI VIET VOWEL E..TAI VIET VOWEL O +AAB7..AAB8 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] TAI VIET MAI KHIT..TAI VIET VOWEL IA +AAB9..AABD ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] TAI VIET VOWEL UEA..TAI VIET VOWEL AN +AABE..AABF ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] TAI VIET VOWEL AM..TAI VIET TONE MAI EK +AAC0 ; ID_Continue # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI NUENG +AAC1 ; ID_Continue # Mn TAI VIET TONE MAI THO +AAC2 ; ID_Continue # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI SONG +AADB..AADC ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] TAI VIET SYMBOL KON..TAI VIET SYMBOL NUENG +AADD ; ID_Continue # Lm TAI VIET SYMBOL SAM +AAE0..AAEA ; ID_Continue # Lo [11] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER E..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER SSA +AAEB ; ID_Continue # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN II +AAEC..AAED ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAI +AAEE..AAEF ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAU +AAF2 ; ID_Continue # Lo MEETEI MAYEK ANJI +AAF3..AAF4 ; ID_Continue # Lm [2] MEETEI MAYEK SYLLABLE REPETITION MARK..MEETEI MAYEK WORD REPETITION MARK +AAF5 ; ID_Continue # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN VISARGA +AAF6 ; ID_Continue # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VIRAMA +AB01..AB06 ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHO +AB09..AB0E ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHO +AB11..AB16 ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZO +AB20..AB26 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHO +AB28..AB2E ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBO +AB30..AB5A ; ID_Continue # L& [43] LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED ALPHA..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH SHORT RIGHT LEG +AB5C..AB5F ; ID_Continue # Lm [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +AB60..AB68 ; ID_Continue # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER SAKHA YAT..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED R WITH MIDDLE TILDE +AB69 ; ID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED W +AB70..ABBF ; ID_Continue # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +ABC0..ABE2 ; ID_Continue # Lo [35] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER KOK..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER I LONSUM +ABE3..ABE4 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ONAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN INAP +ABE5 ; ID_Continue # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ANAP +ABE6..ABE7 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN YENAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN SOUNAP +ABE8 ; ID_Continue # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UNAP +ABE9..ABEA ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN CHEINAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN NUNG +ABEC ; ID_Continue # Mc MEETEI MAYEK LUM IYEK +ABED ; ID_Continue # Mn MEETEI MAYEK APUN IYEK +ABF0..ABF9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] MEETEI MAYEK DIGIT ZERO..MEETEI MAYEK DIGIT NINE +AC00..D7A3 ; ID_Continue # Lo [11172] HANGUL SYLLABLE GA..HANGUL SYLLABLE HIH +D7B0..D7C6 ; ID_Continue # Lo [23] HANGUL JUNGSEONG O-YEO..HANGUL JUNGSEONG ARAEA-E +D7CB..D7FB ; ID_Continue # Lo [49] HANGUL JONGSEONG NIEUN-RIEUL..HANGUL JONGSEONG PHIEUPH-THIEUTH +F900..FA6D ; ID_Continue # Lo [366] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-F900..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA6D +FA70..FAD9 ; ID_Continue # Lo [106] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA70..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FAD9 +FB00..FB06 ; ID_Continue # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; ID_Continue # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FB1D ; ID_Continue # Lo HEBREW LETTER YOD WITH HIRIQ +FB1E ; ID_Continue # Mn HEBREW POINT JUDEO-SPANISH VARIKA +FB1F..FB28 ; ID_Continue # Lo [10] HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH YOD YOD PATAH..HEBREW LETTER WIDE TAV +FB2A..FB36 ; ID_Continue # Lo [13] HEBREW LETTER SHIN WITH SHIN DOT..HEBREW LETTER ZAYIN WITH DAGESH +FB38..FB3C ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] HEBREW LETTER TET WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER LAMED WITH DAGESH +FB3E ; ID_Continue # Lo HEBREW LETTER MEM WITH DAGESH +FB40..FB41 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER NUN WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER SAMEKH WITH DAGESH +FB43..FB44 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER FINAL PE WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER PE WITH DAGESH +FB46..FBB1 ; ID_Continue # Lo [108] HEBREW LETTER TSADI WITH DAGESH..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE FINAL FORM +FBD3..FD3D ; ID_Continue # Lo [363] ARABIC LETTER NG ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE ALEF WITH FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM +FD50..FD8F ; ID_Continue # Lo [64] ARABIC LIGATURE TEH WITH JEEM WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH KHAH WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM +FD92..FDC7 ; ID_Continue # Lo [54] ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH JEEM WITH KHAH INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE NOON WITH JEEM WITH YEH FINAL FORM +FDF0..FDFB ; ID_Continue # Lo [12] ARABIC LIGATURE SALLA USED AS KORANIC STOP SIGN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE JALLAJALALOUHOU +FE00..FE0F ; ID_Continue # Mn [16] VARIATION SELECTOR-1..VARIATION SELECTOR-16 +FE20..FE2F ; ID_Continue # Mn [16] COMBINING LIGATURE LEFT HALF..COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO RIGHT HALF +FE33..FE34 ; ID_Continue # Pc [2] PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LOW LINE..PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL WAVY LOW LINE +FE4D..FE4F ; ID_Continue # Pc [3] DASHED LOW LINE..WAVY LOW LINE +FE70..FE74 ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] ARABIC FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC KASRATAN ISOLATED FORM +FE76..FEFC ; ID_Continue # Lo [135] ARABIC FATHA ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE LAM WITH ALEF FINAL FORM +FF10..FF19 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] FULLWIDTH DIGIT ZERO..FULLWIDTH DIGIT NINE +FF21..FF3A ; ID_Continue # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +FF3F ; ID_Continue # Pc FULLWIDTH LOW LINE +FF41..FF5A ; ID_Continue # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +FF66..FF6F ; ID_Continue # Lo [10] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER WO..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER SMALL TU +FF70 ; ID_Continue # Lm HALFWIDTH KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK +FF71..FF9D ; ID_Continue # Lo [45] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER A..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER N +FF9E..FF9F ; ID_Continue # Lm [2] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA VOICED SOUND MARK..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +FFA0..FFBE ; ID_Continue # Lo [31] HALFWIDTH HANGUL FILLER..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER HIEUH +FFC2..FFC7 ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER A..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER E +FFCA..FFCF ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YEO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER OE +FFD2..FFD7 ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YU +FFDA..FFDC ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER EU..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER I +10000..1000B ; ID_Continue # Lo [12] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B008 A..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B046 JE +1000D..10026 ; ID_Continue # Lo [26] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B036 JO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B032 QO +10028..1003A ; ID_Continue # Lo [19] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B060 RA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B042 WO +1003C..1003D ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B017 ZA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B074 ZE +1003F..1004D ; ID_Continue # Lo [15] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B020 ZO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B091 TWO +10050..1005D ; ID_Continue # Lo [14] LINEAR B SYMBOL B018..LINEAR B SYMBOL B089 +10080..100FA ; ID_Continue # Lo [123] LINEAR B IDEOGRAM B100 MAN..LINEAR B IDEOGRAM VESSEL B305 +10140..10174 ; ID_Continue # Nl [53] GREEK ACROPHONIC ATTIC ONE QUARTER..GREEK ACROPHONIC STRATIAN FIFTY MNAS +101FD ; ID_Continue # Mn PHAISTOS DISC SIGN COMBINING OBLIQUE STROKE +10280..1029C ; ID_Continue # Lo [29] LYCIAN LETTER A..LYCIAN LETTER X +102A0..102D0 ; ID_Continue # Lo [49] CARIAN LETTER A..CARIAN LETTER UUU3 +102E0 ; ID_Continue # Mn COPTIC EPACT THOUSANDS MARK +10300..1031F ; ID_Continue # Lo [32] OLD ITALIC LETTER A..OLD ITALIC LETTER ESS +1032D..10340 ; ID_Continue # Lo [20] OLD ITALIC LETTER YE..GOTHIC LETTER PAIRTHRA +10341 ; ID_Continue # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINETY +10342..10349 ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] GOTHIC LETTER RAIDA..GOTHIC LETTER OTHAL +1034A ; ID_Continue # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINE HUNDRED +10350..10375 ; ID_Continue # Lo [38] OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..OLD PERMIC LETTER IA +10376..1037A ; ID_Continue # Mn [5] COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER SII +10380..1039D ; ID_Continue # Lo [30] UGARITIC LETTER ALPA..UGARITIC LETTER SSU +103A0..103C3 ; ID_Continue # Lo [36] OLD PERSIAN SIGN A..OLD PERSIAN SIGN HA +103C8..103CF ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] OLD PERSIAN SIGN AURAMAZDAA..OLD PERSIAN SIGN BUUMISH +103D1..103D5 ; ID_Continue # Nl [5] OLD PERSIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD PERSIAN NUMBER HUNDRED +10400..1044F ; ID_Continue # L& [80] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +10450..1049D ; ID_Continue # Lo [78] SHAVIAN LETTER PEEP..OSMANYA LETTER OO +104A0..104A9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] OSMANYA DIGIT ZERO..OSMANYA DIGIT NINE +104B0..104D3 ; ID_Continue # L& [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +104D8..104FB ; ID_Continue # L& [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10500..10527 ; ID_Continue # Lo [40] ELBASAN LETTER A..ELBASAN LETTER KHE +10530..10563 ; ID_Continue # Lo [52] CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER ALT..CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER KIW +10570..1057A ; ID_Continue # L& [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; ID_Continue # L& [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; ID_Continue # L& [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; ID_Continue # L& [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10597..105A1 ; ID_Continue # L& [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; ID_Continue # L& [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; ID_Continue # L& [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; ID_Continue # L& [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10600..10736 ; ID_Continue # Lo [311] LINEAR A SIGN AB001..LINEAR A SIGN A664 +10740..10755 ; ID_Continue # Lo [22] LINEAR A SIGN A701 A..LINEAR A SIGN A732 JE +10760..10767 ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] LINEAR A SIGN A800..LINEAR A SIGN A807 +10780..10785 ; ID_Continue # Lm [6] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; ID_Continue # Lm [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; ID_Continue # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL +10800..10805 ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE A..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JA +10808 ; ID_Continue # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JO +1080A..10835 ; ID_Continue # Lo [44] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE KA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE WO +10837..10838 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XE +1083C ; ID_Continue # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZA +1083F..10855 ; ID_Continue # Lo [23] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZO..IMPERIAL ARAMAIC LETTER TAW +10860..10876 ; ID_Continue # Lo [23] PALMYRENE LETTER ALEPH..PALMYRENE LETTER TAW +10880..1089E ; ID_Continue # Lo [31] NABATAEAN LETTER FINAL ALEPH..NABATAEAN LETTER TAW +108E0..108F2 ; ID_Continue # Lo [19] HATRAN LETTER ALEPH..HATRAN LETTER QOPH +108F4..108F5 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] HATRAN LETTER SHIN..HATRAN LETTER TAW +10900..10915 ; ID_Continue # Lo [22] PHOENICIAN LETTER ALF..PHOENICIAN LETTER TAU +10920..10939 ; ID_Continue # Lo [26] LYDIAN LETTER A..LYDIAN LETTER C +10980..109B7 ; ID_Continue # Lo [56] MEROITIC HIEROGLYPHIC LETTER A..MEROITIC CURSIVE LETTER DA +109BE..109BF ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM RMT..MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM IMN +10A00 ; ID_Continue # Lo KHAROSHTHI LETTER A +10A01..10A03 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN I..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +10A05..10A06 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN E..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN O +10A0C..10A0F ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL LENGTH MARK..KHAROSHTHI SIGN VISARGA +10A10..10A13 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] KHAROSHTHI LETTER KA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER GHA +10A15..10A17 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] KHAROSHTHI LETTER CA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER JA +10A19..10A35 ; ID_Continue # Lo [29] KHAROSHTHI LETTER NYA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER VHA +10A38..10A3A ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI SIGN BAR ABOVE..KHAROSHTHI SIGN DOT BELOW +10A3F ; ID_Continue # Mn KHAROSHTHI VIRAMA +10A60..10A7C ; ID_Continue # Lo [29] OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER HE..OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER THETH +10A80..10A9C ; ID_Continue # Lo [29] OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER HEH..OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER ZAH +10AC0..10AC7 ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] MANICHAEAN LETTER ALEPH..MANICHAEAN LETTER WAW +10AC9..10AE4 ; ID_Continue # Lo [28] MANICHAEAN LETTER ZAYIN..MANICHAEAN LETTER TAW +10AE5..10AE6 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK ABOVE..MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK BELOW +10B00..10B35 ; ID_Continue # Lo [54] AVESTAN LETTER A..AVESTAN LETTER HE +10B40..10B55 ; ID_Continue # Lo [22] INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER TAW +10B60..10B72 ; ID_Continue # Lo [19] INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10B80..10B91 ; ID_Continue # Lo [18] PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10C00..10C48 ; ID_Continue # Lo [73] OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON A..OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON BASH +10C80..10CB2 ; ID_Continue # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +10CC0..10CF2 ; ID_Continue # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +10D00..10D23 ; ID_Continue # Lo [36] HANIFI ROHINGYA LETTER A..HANIFI ROHINGYA MARK NA KHONNA +10D24..10D27 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN HARBAHAY..HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN TASSI +10D30..10D39 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] HANIFI ROHINGYA DIGIT ZERO..HANIFI ROHINGYA DIGIT NINE +10E80..10EA9 ; ID_Continue # Lo [42] YEZIDI LETTER ELIF..YEZIDI LETTER ET +10EAB..10EAC ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] YEZIDI COMBINING HAMZA MARK..YEZIDI COMBINING MADDA MARK +10EB0..10EB1 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] YEZIDI LETTER LAM WITH DOT ABOVE..YEZIDI LETTER YOT WITH CIRCUMFLEX ABOVE +10F00..10F1C ; ID_Continue # Lo [29] OLD SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..OLD SOGDIAN LETTER FINAL TAW WITH VERTICAL TAIL +10F27 ; ID_Continue # Lo OLD SOGDIAN LIGATURE AYIN-DALETH +10F30..10F45 ; ID_Continue # Lo [22] SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..SOGDIAN INDEPENDENT SHIN +10F46..10F50 ; ID_Continue # Mn [11] SOGDIAN COMBINING DOT BELOW..SOGDIAN COMBINING STROKE BELOW +10F70..10F81 ; ID_Continue # Lo [18] OLD UYGHUR LETTER ALEPH..OLD UYGHUR LETTER LESH +10F82..10F85 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] OLD UYGHUR COMBINING DOT ABOVE..OLD UYGHUR COMBINING TWO DOTS BELOW +10FB0..10FC4 ; ID_Continue # Lo [21] CHORASMIAN LETTER ALEPH..CHORASMIAN LETTER TAW +10FE0..10FF6 ; ID_Continue # Lo [23] ELYMAIC LETTER ALEPH..ELYMAIC LIGATURE ZAYIN-YODH +11000 ; ID_Continue # Mc BRAHMI SIGN CANDRABINDU +11001 ; ID_Continue # Mn BRAHMI SIGN ANUSVARA +11002 ; ID_Continue # Mc BRAHMI SIGN VISARGA +11003..11037 ; ID_Continue # Lo [53] BRAHMI SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL NNNA +11038..11046 ; ID_Continue # Mn [15] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN AA..BRAHMI VIRAMA +11066..1106F ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] BRAHMI DIGIT ZERO..BRAHMI DIGIT NINE +11070 ; ID_Continue # Mn BRAHMI SIGN OLD TAMIL VIRAMA +11071..11072 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT O +11073..11074 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT O +11075 ; ID_Continue # Lo BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL LLA +1107F..11081 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] BRAHMI NUMBER JOINER..KAITHI SIGN ANUSVARA +11082 ; ID_Continue # Mc KAITHI SIGN VISARGA +11083..110AF ; ID_Continue # Lo [45] KAITHI LETTER A..KAITHI LETTER HA +110B0..110B2 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AA..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN II +110B3..110B6 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN U..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AI +110B7..110B8 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN O..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AU +110B9..110BA ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] KAITHI SIGN VIRAMA..KAITHI SIGN NUKTA +110C2 ; ID_Continue # Mn KAITHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +110D0..110E8 ; ID_Continue # Lo [25] SORA SOMPENG LETTER SAH..SORA SOMPENG LETTER MAE +110F0..110F9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] SORA SOMPENG DIGIT ZERO..SORA SOMPENG DIGIT NINE +11100..11102 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] CHAKMA SIGN CANDRABINDU..CHAKMA SIGN VISARGA +11103..11126 ; ID_Continue # Lo [36] CHAKMA LETTER AA..CHAKMA LETTER HAA +11127..1112B ; ID_Continue # Mn [5] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN A..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN UU +1112C ; ID_Continue # Mc CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN E +1112D..11134 ; ID_Continue # Mn [8] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AI..CHAKMA MAAYYAA +11136..1113F ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] CHAKMA DIGIT ZERO..CHAKMA DIGIT NINE +11144 ; ID_Continue # Lo CHAKMA LETTER LHAA +11145..11146 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN EI +11147 ; ID_Continue # Lo CHAKMA LETTER VAA +11150..11172 ; ID_Continue # Lo [35] MAHAJANI LETTER A..MAHAJANI LETTER RRA +11173 ; ID_Continue # Mn MAHAJANI SIGN NUKTA +11176 ; ID_Continue # Lo MAHAJANI LIGATURE SHRI +11180..11181 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] SHARADA SIGN CANDRABINDU..SHARADA SIGN ANUSVARA +11182 ; ID_Continue # Mc SHARADA SIGN VISARGA +11183..111B2 ; ID_Continue # Lo [48] SHARADA LETTER A..SHARADA LETTER HA +111B3..111B5 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AA..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN II +111B6..111BE ; ID_Continue # Mn [9] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN U..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN O +111BF..111C0 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AU..SHARADA SIGN VIRAMA +111C1..111C4 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] SHARADA SIGN AVAGRAHA..SHARADA OM +111C9..111CC ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] SHARADA SANDHI MARK..SHARADA EXTRA SHORT VOWEL MARK +111CE ; ID_Continue # Mc SHARADA VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +111CF ; ID_Continue # Mn SHARADA SIGN INVERTED CANDRABINDU +111D0..111D9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] SHARADA DIGIT ZERO..SHARADA DIGIT NINE +111DA ; ID_Continue # Lo SHARADA EKAM +111DC ; ID_Continue # Lo SHARADA HEADSTROKE +11200..11211 ; ID_Continue # Lo [18] KHOJKI LETTER A..KHOJKI LETTER JJA +11213..1122B ; ID_Continue # Lo [25] KHOJKI LETTER NYA..KHOJKI LETTER LLA +1122C..1122E ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN II +1122F..11231 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN U..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AI +11232..11233 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN O..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AU +11234 ; ID_Continue # Mn KHOJKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11235 ; ID_Continue # Mc KHOJKI SIGN VIRAMA +11236..11237 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] KHOJKI SIGN NUKTA..KHOJKI SIGN SHADDA +1123E ; ID_Continue # Mn KHOJKI SIGN SUKUN +11280..11286 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] MULTANI LETTER A..MULTANI LETTER GA +11288 ; ID_Continue # Lo MULTANI LETTER GHA +1128A..1128D ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] MULTANI LETTER CA..MULTANI LETTER JJA +1128F..1129D ; ID_Continue # Lo [15] MULTANI LETTER NYA..MULTANI LETTER BA +1129F..112A8 ; ID_Continue # Lo [10] MULTANI LETTER BHA..MULTANI LETTER RHA +112B0..112DE ; ID_Continue # Lo [47] KHUDAWADI LETTER A..KHUDAWADI LETTER HA +112DF ; ID_Continue # Mn KHUDAWADI SIGN ANUSVARA +112E0..112E2 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN II +112E3..112EA ; ID_Continue # Mn [8] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN U..KHUDAWADI SIGN VIRAMA +112F0..112F9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] KHUDAWADI DIGIT ZERO..KHUDAWADI DIGIT NINE +11300..11301 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] GRANTHA SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..GRANTHA SIGN CANDRABINDU +11302..11303 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] GRANTHA SIGN ANUSVARA..GRANTHA SIGN VISARGA +11305..1130C ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] GRANTHA LETTER A..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC L +1130F..11310 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER EE..GRANTHA LETTER AI +11313..11328 ; ID_Continue # Lo [22] GRANTHA LETTER OO..GRANTHA LETTER NA +1132A..11330 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] GRANTHA LETTER PA..GRANTHA LETTER RA +11332..11333 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER LA..GRANTHA LETTER LLA +11335..11339 ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] GRANTHA LETTER VA..GRANTHA LETTER HA +1133B..1133C ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] COMBINING BINDU BELOW..GRANTHA SIGN NUKTA +1133D ; ID_Continue # Lo GRANTHA SIGN AVAGRAHA +1133E..1133F ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AA..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN I +11340 ; ID_Continue # Mn GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN II +11341..11344 ; ID_Continue # Mc [4] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN U..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +11347..11348 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN EE..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AI +1134B..1134D ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN OO..GRANTHA SIGN VIRAMA +11350 ; ID_Continue # Lo GRANTHA OM +11357 ; ID_Continue # Mc GRANTHA AU LENGTH MARK +1135D..11361 ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] GRANTHA SIGN PLUTA..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC LL +11362..11363 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +11366..1136C ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT SIX +11370..11374 ; ID_Continue # Mn [5] COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER A..COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER PA +11400..11434 ; ID_Continue # Lo [53] NEWA LETTER A..NEWA LETTER HA +11435..11437 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] NEWA VOWEL SIGN AA..NEWA VOWEL SIGN II +11438..1143F ; ID_Continue # Mn [8] NEWA VOWEL SIGN U..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AI +11440..11441 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] NEWA VOWEL SIGN O..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AU +11442..11444 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] NEWA SIGN VIRAMA..NEWA SIGN ANUSVARA +11445 ; ID_Continue # Mc NEWA SIGN VISARGA +11446 ; ID_Continue # Mn NEWA SIGN NUKTA +11447..1144A ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] NEWA SIGN AVAGRAHA..NEWA SIDDHI +11450..11459 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] NEWA DIGIT ZERO..NEWA DIGIT NINE +1145E ; ID_Continue # Mn NEWA SANDHI MARK +1145F..11461 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] NEWA LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..NEWA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +11480..114AF ; ID_Continue # Lo [48] TIRHUTA ANJI..TIRHUTA LETTER HA +114B0..114B2 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AA..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN II +114B3..114B8 ; ID_Continue # Mn [6] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN U..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +114B9 ; ID_Continue # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN E +114BA ; ID_Continue # Mn TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN SHORT E +114BB..114BE ; ID_Continue # Mc [4] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AI..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AU +114BF..114C0 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN CANDRABINDU..TIRHUTA SIGN ANUSVARA +114C1 ; ID_Continue # Mc TIRHUTA SIGN VISARGA +114C2..114C3 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN VIRAMA..TIRHUTA SIGN NUKTA +114C4..114C5 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] TIRHUTA SIGN AVAGRAHA..TIRHUTA GVANG +114C7 ; ID_Continue # Lo TIRHUTA OM +114D0..114D9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] TIRHUTA DIGIT ZERO..TIRHUTA DIGIT NINE +11580..115AE ; ID_Continue # Lo [47] SIDDHAM LETTER A..SIDDHAM LETTER HA +115AF..115B1 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN II +115B2..115B5 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +115B8..115BB ; ID_Continue # Mc [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN E..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AU +115BC..115BD ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN CANDRABINDU..SIDDHAM SIGN ANUSVARA +115BE ; ID_Continue # Mc SIDDHAM SIGN VISARGA +115BF..115C0 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN VIRAMA..SIDDHAM SIGN NUKTA +115D8..115DB ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] SIDDHAM LETTER THREE-CIRCLE ALTERNATE I..SIDDHAM LETTER ALTERNATE U +115DC..115DD ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE UU +11600..1162F ; ID_Continue # Lo [48] MODI LETTER A..MODI LETTER LLA +11630..11632 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] MODI VOWEL SIGN AA..MODI VOWEL SIGN II +11633..1163A ; ID_Continue # Mn [8] MODI VOWEL SIGN U..MODI VOWEL SIGN AI +1163B..1163C ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] MODI VOWEL SIGN O..MODI VOWEL SIGN AU +1163D ; ID_Continue # Mn MODI SIGN ANUSVARA +1163E ; ID_Continue # Mc MODI SIGN VISARGA +1163F..11640 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MODI SIGN VIRAMA..MODI SIGN ARDHACANDRA +11644 ; ID_Continue # Lo MODI SIGN HUVA +11650..11659 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] MODI DIGIT ZERO..MODI DIGIT NINE +11680..116AA ; ID_Continue # Lo [43] TAKRI LETTER A..TAKRI LETTER RRA +116AB ; ID_Continue # Mn TAKRI SIGN ANUSVARA +116AC ; ID_Continue # Mc TAKRI SIGN VISARGA +116AD ; ID_Continue # Mn TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AA +116AE..116AF ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN I..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN II +116B0..116B5 ; ID_Continue # Mn [6] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN U..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AU +116B6 ; ID_Continue # Mc TAKRI SIGN VIRAMA +116B7 ; ID_Continue # Mn TAKRI SIGN NUKTA +116B8 ; ID_Continue # Lo TAKRI LETTER ARCHAIC KHA +116C0..116C9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] TAKRI DIGIT ZERO..TAKRI DIGIT NINE +11700..1171A ; ID_Continue # Lo [27] AHOM LETTER KA..AHOM LETTER ALTERNATE BA +1171D..1171F ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA..AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LIGATING RA +11720..11721 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] AHOM VOWEL SIGN A..AHOM VOWEL SIGN AA +11722..11725 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] AHOM VOWEL SIGN I..AHOM VOWEL SIGN UU +11726 ; ID_Continue # Mc AHOM VOWEL SIGN E +11727..1172B ; ID_Continue # Mn [5] AHOM VOWEL SIGN AW..AHOM SIGN KILLER +11730..11739 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] AHOM DIGIT ZERO..AHOM DIGIT NINE +11740..11746 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] AHOM LETTER CA..AHOM LETTER LLA +11800..1182B ; ID_Continue # Lo [44] DOGRA LETTER A..DOGRA LETTER RRA +1182C..1182E ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN AA..DOGRA VOWEL SIGN II +1182F..11837 ; ID_Continue # Mn [9] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN U..DOGRA SIGN ANUSVARA +11838 ; ID_Continue # Mc DOGRA SIGN VISARGA +11839..1183A ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] DOGRA SIGN VIRAMA..DOGRA SIGN NUKTA +118A0..118DF ; ID_Continue # L& [64] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +118E0..118E9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] WARANG CITI DIGIT ZERO..WARANG CITI DIGIT NINE +118FF..11906 ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] WARANG CITI OM..DIVES AKURU LETTER E +11909 ; ID_Continue # Lo DIVES AKURU LETTER O +1190C..11913 ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] DIVES AKURU LETTER KA..DIVES AKURU LETTER JA +11915..11916 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] DIVES AKURU LETTER NYA..DIVES AKURU LETTER TTA +11918..1192F ; ID_Continue # Lo [24] DIVES AKURU LETTER DDA..DIVES AKURU LETTER ZA +11930..11935 ; ID_Continue # Mc [6] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AA..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN E +11937..11938 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AI..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN O +1193B..1193C ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] DIVES AKURU SIGN ANUSVARA..DIVES AKURU SIGN CANDRABINDU +1193D ; ID_Continue # Mc DIVES AKURU SIGN HALANTA +1193E ; ID_Continue # Mn DIVES AKURU VIRAMA +1193F ; ID_Continue # Lo DIVES AKURU PREFIXED NASAL SIGN +11940 ; ID_Continue # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL YA +11941 ; ID_Continue # Lo DIVES AKURU INITIAL RA +11942 ; ID_Continue # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL RA +11943 ; ID_Continue # Mn DIVES AKURU SIGN NUKTA +11950..11959 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] DIVES AKURU DIGIT ZERO..DIVES AKURU DIGIT NINE +119A0..119A7 ; ID_Continue # Lo [8] NANDINAGARI LETTER A..NANDINAGARI LETTER VOCALIC RR +119AA..119D0 ; ID_Continue # Lo [39] NANDINAGARI LETTER E..NANDINAGARI LETTER RRA +119D1..119D3 ; ID_Continue # Mc [3] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +119D4..119D7 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +119DA..119DB ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN E..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +119DC..119DF ; ID_Continue # Mc [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN O..NANDINAGARI SIGN VISARGA +119E0 ; ID_Continue # Mn NANDINAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +119E1 ; ID_Continue # Lo NANDINAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +119E3 ; ID_Continue # Lo NANDINAGARI HEADSTROKE +119E4 ; ID_Continue # Mc NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +11A00 ; ID_Continue # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER A +11A01..11A0A ; ID_Continue # Mn [10] ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN I..ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A0B..11A32 ; ID_Continue # Lo [40] ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KSSA +11A33..11A38 ; ID_Continue # Mn [6] ZANABAZAR SQUARE FINAL CONSONANT MARK..ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN ANUSVARA +11A39 ; ID_Continue # Mc ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN VISARGA +11A3A ; ID_Continue # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER RA +11A3B..11A3E ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER YA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER VA +11A47 ; ID_Continue # Mn ZANABAZAR SQUARE SUBJOINER +11A50 ; ID_Continue # Lo SOYOMBO LETTER A +11A51..11A56 ; ID_Continue # Mn [6] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN I..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN OE +11A57..11A58 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AI..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AU +11A59..11A5B ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..SOYOMBO VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A5C..11A89 ; ID_Continue # Lo [46] SOYOMBO LETTER KA..SOYOMBO CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER SA +11A8A..11A96 ; ID_Continue # Mn [13] SOYOMBO FINAL CONSONANT SIGN G..SOYOMBO SIGN ANUSVARA +11A97 ; ID_Continue # Mc SOYOMBO SIGN VISARGA +11A98..11A99 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] SOYOMBO GEMINATION MARK..SOYOMBO SUBJOINER +11A9D ; ID_Continue # Lo SOYOMBO MARK PLUTA +11AB0..11AF8 ; ID_Continue # Lo [73] CANADIAN SYLLABICS NATTILIK HI..PAU CIN HAU GLOTTAL STOP FINAL +11C00..11C08 ; ID_Continue # Lo [9] BHAIKSUKI LETTER A..BHAIKSUKI LETTER VOCALIC L +11C0A..11C2E ; ID_Continue # Lo [37] BHAIKSUKI LETTER E..BHAIKSUKI LETTER HA +11C2F ; ID_Continue # Mc BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN AA +11C30..11C36 ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN I..BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L +11C38..11C3D ; ID_Continue # Mn [6] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN E..BHAIKSUKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11C3E ; ID_Continue # Mc BHAIKSUKI SIGN VISARGA +11C3F ; ID_Continue # Mn BHAIKSUKI SIGN VIRAMA +11C40 ; ID_Continue # Lo BHAIKSUKI SIGN AVAGRAHA +11C50..11C59 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] BHAIKSUKI DIGIT ZERO..BHAIKSUKI DIGIT NINE +11C72..11C8F ; ID_Continue # Lo [30] MARCHEN LETTER KA..MARCHEN LETTER A +11C92..11CA7 ; ID_Continue # Mn [22] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER KA..MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER ZA +11CA9 ; ID_Continue # Mc MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER YA +11CAA..11CB0 ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER RA..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN AA +11CB1 ; ID_Continue # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN I +11CB2..11CB3 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN U..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN E +11CB4 ; ID_Continue # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN O +11CB5..11CB6 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MARCHEN SIGN ANUSVARA..MARCHEN SIGN CANDRABINDU +11D00..11D06 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] MASARAM GONDI LETTER A..MASARAM GONDI LETTER E +11D08..11D09 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AI..MASARAM GONDI LETTER O +11D0B..11D30 ; ID_Continue # Lo [38] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AU..MASARAM GONDI LETTER TRA +11D31..11D36 ; ID_Continue # Mn [6] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11D3A ; ID_Continue # Mn MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN E +11D3C..11D3D ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN O +11D3F..11D45 ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU..MASARAM GONDI VIRAMA +11D46 ; ID_Continue # Lo MASARAM GONDI REPHA +11D47 ; ID_Continue # Mn MASARAM GONDI RA-KARA +11D50..11D59 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] MASARAM GONDI DIGIT ZERO..MASARAM GONDI DIGIT NINE +11D60..11D65 ; ID_Continue # Lo [6] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER A..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER UU +11D67..11D68 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER EE..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER AI +11D6A..11D89 ; ID_Continue # Lo [32] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER OO..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER SA +11D8A..11D8E ; ID_Continue # Mc [5] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN UU +11D90..11D91 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN EE..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI +11D93..11D94 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN OO..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU +11D95 ; ID_Continue # Mn GUNJALA GONDI SIGN ANUSVARA +11D96 ; ID_Continue # Mc GUNJALA GONDI SIGN VISARGA +11D97 ; ID_Continue # Mn GUNJALA GONDI VIRAMA +11D98 ; ID_Continue # Lo GUNJALA GONDI OM +11DA0..11DA9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] GUNJALA GONDI DIGIT ZERO..GUNJALA GONDI DIGIT NINE +11EE0..11EF2 ; ID_Continue # Lo [19] MAKASAR LETTER KA..MAKASAR ANGKA +11EF3..11EF4 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN I..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN U +11EF5..11EF6 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN E..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN O +11FB0 ; ID_Continue # Lo LISU LETTER YHA +12000..12399 ; ID_Continue # Lo [922] CUNEIFORM SIGN A..CUNEIFORM SIGN U U +12400..1246E ; ID_Continue # Nl [111] CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN TWO ASH..CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN NINE U VARIANT FORM +12480..12543 ; ID_Continue # Lo [196] CUNEIFORM SIGN AB TIMES NUN TENU..CUNEIFORM SIGN ZU5 TIMES THREE DISH TENU +12F90..12FF0 ; ID_Continue # Lo [97] CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM001..CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM114 +13000..1342E ; ID_Continue # Lo [1071] EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH AA032 +14400..14646 ; ID_Continue # Lo [583] ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A530 +16800..16A38 ; ID_Continue # Lo [569] BAMUM LETTER PHASE-A NGKUE MFON..BAMUM LETTER PHASE-F VUEQ +16A40..16A5E ; ID_Continue # Lo [31] MRO LETTER TA..MRO LETTER TEK +16A60..16A69 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] MRO DIGIT ZERO..MRO DIGIT NINE +16A70..16ABE ; ID_Continue # Lo [79] TANGSA LETTER OZ..TANGSA LETTER ZA +16AC0..16AC9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] TANGSA DIGIT ZERO..TANGSA DIGIT NINE +16AD0..16AED ; ID_Continue # Lo [30] BASSA VAH LETTER ENNI..BASSA VAH LETTER I +16AF0..16AF4 ; ID_Continue # Mn [5] BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH TONE..BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH-LOW TONE +16B00..16B2F ; ID_Continue # Lo [48] PAHAWH HMONG VOWEL KEEB..PAHAWH HMONG CONSONANT CAU +16B30..16B36 ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TUB..PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TAUM +16B40..16B43 ; ID_Continue # Lm [4] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS SEEV..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN IB YAM +16B50..16B59 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] PAHAWH HMONG DIGIT ZERO..PAHAWH HMONG DIGIT NINE +16B63..16B77 ; ID_Continue # Lo [21] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS LUB..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN CIM NRES TOS +16B7D..16B8F ; ID_Continue # Lo [19] PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN TSHEEJ..PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN VWJ +16E40..16E7F ; ID_Continue # L& [64] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +16F00..16F4A ; ID_Continue # Lo [75] MIAO LETTER PA..MIAO LETTER RTE +16F4F ; ID_Continue # Mn MIAO SIGN CONSONANT MODIFIER BAR +16F50 ; ID_Continue # Lo MIAO LETTER NASALIZATION +16F51..16F87 ; ID_Continue # Mc [55] MIAO SIGN ASPIRATION..MIAO VOWEL SIGN UI +16F8F..16F92 ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] MIAO TONE RIGHT..MIAO TONE BELOW +16F93..16F9F ; ID_Continue # Lm [13] MIAO LETTER TONE-2..MIAO LETTER REFORMED TONE-8 +16FE0..16FE1 ; ID_Continue # Lm [2] TANGUT ITERATION MARK..NUSHU ITERATION MARK +16FE3 ; ID_Continue # Lm OLD CHINESE ITERATION MARK +16FE4 ; ID_Continue # Mn KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT FILLER +16FF0..16FF1 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK CA..VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK NHAY +17000..187F7 ; ID_Continue # Lo [6136] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-17000..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-187F7 +18800..18CD5 ; ID_Continue # Lo [1238] TANGUT COMPONENT-001..KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT CHARACTER-18CD5 +18D00..18D08 ; ID_Continue # Lo [9] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D00..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D08 +1AFF0..1AFF3 ; ID_Continue # Lm [4] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-2..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-5 +1AFF5..1AFFB ; ID_Continue # Lm [7] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-5 +1AFFD..1AFFE ; ID_Continue # Lm [2] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-8 +1B000..1B122 ; ID_Continue # Lo [291] KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC E..KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC WU +1B150..1B152 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WI..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WO +1B164..1B167 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL WI..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL N +1B170..1B2FB ; ID_Continue # Lo [396] NUSHU CHARACTER-1B170..NUSHU CHARACTER-1B2FB +1BC00..1BC6A ; ID_Continue # Lo [107] DUPLOYAN LETTER H..DUPLOYAN LETTER VOCALIC M +1BC70..1BC7C ; ID_Continue # Lo [13] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LEFT HORIZONTAL SECANT..DUPLOYAN AFFIX ATTACHED TANGENT HOOK +1BC80..1BC88 ; ID_Continue # Lo [9] DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH VERTICAL +1BC90..1BC99 ; ID_Continue # Lo [10] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ARROW +1BC9D..1BC9E ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] DUPLOYAN THICK LETTER SELECTOR..DUPLOYAN DOUBLE MARK +1CF00..1CF2D ; ID_Continue # Mn [46] ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK GORAZDO NIZKO S KRYZHEM ON LEFT..ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK KRYZH ON LEFT +1CF30..1CF46 ; ID_Continue # Mn [23] ZNAMENNY COMBINING TONAL RANGE MARK MRACHNO..ZNAMENNY PRIZNAK MODIFIER ROG +1D165..1D166 ; ID_Continue # Mc [2] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING STEM..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SPRECHGESANG STEM +1D167..1D169 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-3 +1D16D..1D172 ; ID_Continue # Mc [6] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING AUGMENTATION DOT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING FLAG-5 +1D17B..1D182 ; ID_Continue # Mn [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING ACCENT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING LOURE +1D185..1D18B ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOIT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TRIPLE TONGUE +1D1AA..1D1AD ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOWN BOW..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SNAP PIZZICATO +1D242..1D244 ; ID_Continue # Mn [3] COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL TRISEME..COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL PENTASEME +1D400..1D454 ; ID_Continue # L& [85] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL G +1D456..1D49C ; ID_Continue # L& [71] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A +1D49E..1D49F ; ID_Continue # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D +1D4A2 ; ID_Continue # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL G +1D4A5..1D4A6 ; ID_Continue # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K +1D4A9..1D4AC ; ID_Continue # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Q +1D4AE..1D4B9 ; ID_Continue # L& [12] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL D +1D4BB ; ID_Continue # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL F +1D4BD..1D4C3 ; ID_Continue # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL H..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL N +1D4C5..1D505 ; ID_Continue # L& [65] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL P..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL B +1D507..1D50A ; ID_Continue # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL G +1D50D..1D514 ; ID_Continue # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Q +1D516..1D51C ; ID_Continue # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Y +1D51E..1D539 ; ID_Continue # L& [28] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL B +1D53B..1D53E ; ID_Continue # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL G +1D540..1D544 ; ID_Continue # L& [5] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M +1D546 ; ID_Continue # L& MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL O +1D54A..1D550 ; ID_Continue # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Y +1D552..1D6A5 ; ID_Continue # L& [340] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL DOTLESS J +1D6A8..1D6C0 ; ID_Continue # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6C2..1D6DA ; ID_Continue # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D6DC..1D6FA ; ID_Continue # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6FC..1D714 ; ID_Continue # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D716..1D734 ; ID_Continue # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D736..1D74E ; ID_Continue # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D750..1D76E ; ID_Continue # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D770..1D788 ; ID_Continue # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D78A..1D7A8 ; ID_Continue # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D7AA..1D7C2 ; ID_Continue # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D7C4..1D7CB ; ID_Continue # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL DIGAMMA +1D7CE..1D7FF ; ID_Continue # Nd [50] MATHEMATICAL BOLD DIGIT ZERO..MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE DIGIT NINE +1DA00..1DA36 ; ID_Continue # Mn [55] SIGNWRITING HEAD RIM..SIGNWRITING AIR SUCKING IN +1DA3B..1DA6C ; ID_Continue # Mn [50] SIGNWRITING MOUTH CLOSED NEUTRAL..SIGNWRITING EXCITEMENT +1DA75 ; ID_Continue # Mn SIGNWRITING UPPER BODY TILTING FROM HIP JOINTS +1DA84 ; ID_Continue # Mn SIGNWRITING LOCATION HEAD NECK +1DA9B..1DA9F ; ID_Continue # Mn [5] SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-6 +1DAA1..1DAAF ; ID_Continue # Mn [15] SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-16 +1DF00..1DF09 ; ID_Continue # L& [10] LATIN SMALL LETTER FENG DIGRAPH WITH TRILL..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK AND RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0A ; ID_Continue # Lo LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0B..1DF1E ; ID_Continue # L& [20] LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH WITH DOUBLE BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CURL +1E000..1E006 ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER AZU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZHIVETE +1E008..1E018 ; ID_Continue # Mn [17] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZEMLJA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER HERU +1E01B..1E021 ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SHTA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YATI +1E023..1E024 ; ID_Continue # Mn [2] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SMALL YUS +1E026..1E02A ; ID_Continue # Mn [5] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YO..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER FITA +1E100..1E12C ; ID_Continue # Lo [45] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER MA..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER W +1E130..1E136 ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-B..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-D +1E137..1E13D ; ID_Continue # Lm [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SIGN FOR PERSON..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +1E140..1E149 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG DIGIT ZERO..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG DIGIT NINE +1E14E ; ID_Continue # Lo NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LOGOGRAM NYAJ +1E290..1E2AD ; ID_Continue # Lo [30] TOTO LETTER PA..TOTO LETTER A +1E2AE ; ID_Continue # Mn TOTO SIGN RISING TONE +1E2C0..1E2EB ; ID_Continue # Lo [44] WANCHO LETTER AA..WANCHO LETTER YIH +1E2EC..1E2EF ; ID_Continue # Mn [4] WANCHO TONE TUP..WANCHO TONE KOINI +1E2F0..1E2F9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] WANCHO DIGIT ZERO..WANCHO DIGIT NINE +1E7E0..1E7E6 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYO +1E7E8..1E7EB ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE HHWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHWE +1E7ED..1E7EE ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWEE +1E7F0..1E7FE ; ID_Continue # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE PWEE +1E800..1E8C4 ; ID_Continue # Lo [197] MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M001 KI..MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M060 NYON +1E8D0..1E8D6 ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER TEENS..MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER MILLIONS +1E900..1E943 ; ID_Continue # L& [68] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA +1E944..1E94A ; ID_Continue # Mn [7] ADLAM ALIF LENGTHENER..ADLAM NUKTA +1E94B ; ID_Continue # Lm ADLAM NASALIZATION MARK +1E950..1E959 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] ADLAM DIGIT ZERO..ADLAM DIGIT NINE +1EE00..1EE03 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DAL +1EE05..1EE1F ; ID_Continue # Lo [27] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOTLESS QAF +1EE21..1EE22 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL JEEM +1EE24 ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HEH +1EE27 ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HAH +1EE29..1EE32 ; ID_Continue # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL YEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL QAF +1EE34..1EE37 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL KHAH +1EE39 ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL DAD +1EE3B ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL GHAIN +1EE42 ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED JEEM +1EE47 ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED HAH +1EE49 ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED YEH +1EE4B ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED LAM +1EE4D..1EE4F ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED NOON..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED AIN +1EE51..1EE52 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED QAF +1EE54 ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SHEEN +1EE57 ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED KHAH +1EE59 ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DAD +1EE5B ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED GHAIN +1EE5D ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS NOON +1EE5F ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS QAF +1EE61..1EE62 ; ID_Continue # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED JEEM +1EE64 ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HEH +1EE67..1EE6A ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HAH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KAF +1EE6C..1EE72 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED MEEM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED QAF +1EE74..1EE77 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KHAH +1EE79..1EE7C ; ID_Continue # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS BEH +1EE7E ; ID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS FEH +1EE80..1EE89 ; ID_Continue # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED YEH +1EE8B..1EE9B ; ID_Continue # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED GHAIN +1EEA1..1EEA3 ; ID_Continue # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK DAL +1EEA5..1EEA9 ; ID_Continue # Lo [5] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK YEH +1EEAB..1EEBB ; ID_Continue # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK GHAIN +1FBF0..1FBF9 ; ID_Continue # Nd [10] SEGMENTED DIGIT ZERO..SEGMENTED DIGIT NINE +20000..2A6DF ; ID_Continue # Lo [42720] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-20000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A6DF +2A700..2B738 ; ID_Continue # Lo [4153] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A700..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B738 +2B740..2B81D ; ID_Continue # Lo [222] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B740..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B81D +2B820..2CEA1 ; ID_Continue # Lo [5762] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B820..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEA1 +2CEB0..2EBE0 ; ID_Continue # Lo [7473] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEB0..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2EBE0 +2F800..2FA1D ; ID_Continue # Lo [542] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2F800..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2FA1D +30000..3134A ; ID_Continue # Lo [4939] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-30000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3134A +E0100..E01EF ; ID_Continue # Mn [240] VARIATION SELECTOR-17..VARIATION SELECTOR-256 + +# Total code points: 135072 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: XID_Start +# ID_Start modified for closure under NFKx +# Modified as described in UAX #15 +# NOTE: Does NOT remove the non-NFKx characters. +# Merely ensures that if isIdentifer(string) then isIdentifier(NFKx(string)) +# NOTE: See UAX #31 for more information + +0041..005A ; XID_Start # L& [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +0061..007A ; XID_Start # L& [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +00AA ; XID_Start # Lo FEMININE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00B5 ; XID_Start # L& MICRO SIGN +00BA ; XID_Start # Lo MASCULINE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00C0..00D6 ; XID_Start # L& [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8..00F6 ; XID_Start # L& [31] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F8..01BA ; XID_Start # L& [195] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH TAIL +01BB ; XID_Start # Lo LATIN LETTER TWO WITH STROKE +01BC..01BF ; XID_Start # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE..LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C0..01C3 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] LATIN LETTER DENTAL CLICK..LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK +01C4..0293 ; XID_Start # L& [208] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CURL +0294 ; XID_Start # Lo LATIN LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0295..02AF ; XID_Start # L& [27] LATIN LETTER PHARYNGEAL VOICED FRICATIVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H WITH FISHHOOK AND TAIL +02B0..02C1 ; XID_Start # Lm [18] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02C6..02D1 ; XID_Start # Lm [12] MODIFIER LETTER CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..MODIFIER LETTER HALF TRIANGULAR COLON +02E0..02E4 ; XID_Start # Lm [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02EC ; XID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER VOICING +02EE ; XID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER DOUBLE APOSTROPHE +0370..0373 ; XID_Start # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA..GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0374 ; XID_Start # Lm GREEK NUMERAL SIGN +0376..0377 ; XID_Start # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA..GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037B..037D ; XID_Start # L& [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +037F ; XID_Start # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386 ; XID_Start # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0388..038A ; XID_Start # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; XID_Start # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..03A1 ; XID_Start # L& [20] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03F5 ; XID_Start # L& [83] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F7..0481 ; XID_Start # L& [139] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +048A..052F ; XID_Start # L& [166] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; XID_Start # L& [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +0559 ; XID_Start # Lm ARMENIAN MODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RING +0560..0588 ; XID_Start # L& [41] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER TURNED AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER YI WITH STROKE +05D0..05EA ; XID_Start # Lo [27] HEBREW LETTER ALEF..HEBREW LETTER TAV +05EF..05F2 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] HEBREW YOD TRIANGLE..HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH DOUBLE YOD +0620..063F ; XID_Start # Lo [32] ARABIC LETTER KASHMIRI YEH..ARABIC LETTER FARSI YEH WITH THREE DOTS ABOVE +0640 ; XID_Start # Lm ARABIC TATWEEL +0641..064A ; XID_Start # Lo [10] ARABIC LETTER FEH..ARABIC LETTER YEH +066E..066F ; XID_Start # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS BEH..ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS QAF +0671..06D3 ; XID_Start # Lo [99] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WASLA..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE +06D5 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC LETTER AE +06E5..06E6 ; XID_Start # Lm [2] ARABIC SMALL WAW..ARABIC SMALL YEH +06EE..06EF ; XID_Start # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DAL WITH INVERTED V..ARABIC LETTER REH WITH INVERTED V +06FA..06FC ; XID_Start # Lo [3] ARABIC LETTER SHEEN WITH DOT BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GHAIN WITH DOT BELOW +06FF ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC LETTER HEH WITH INVERTED V +0710 ; XID_Start # Lo SYRIAC LETTER ALAPH +0712..072F ; XID_Start # Lo [30] SYRIAC LETTER BETH..SYRIAC LETTER PERSIAN DHALATH +074D..07A5 ; XID_Start # Lo [89] SYRIAC LETTER SOGDIAN ZHAIN..THAANA LETTER WAAVU +07B1 ; XID_Start # Lo THAANA LETTER NAA +07CA..07EA ; XID_Start # Lo [33] NKO LETTER A..NKO LETTER JONA RA +07F4..07F5 ; XID_Start # Lm [2] NKO HIGH TONE APOSTROPHE..NKO LOW TONE APOSTROPHE +07FA ; XID_Start # Lm NKO LAJANYALAN +0800..0815 ; XID_Start # Lo [22] SAMARITAN LETTER ALAF..SAMARITAN LETTER TAAF +081A ; XID_Start # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER EPENTHETIC YUT +0824 ; XID_Start # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER SHORT A +0828 ; XID_Start # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER I +0840..0858 ; XID_Start # Lo [25] MANDAIC LETTER HALQA..MANDAIC LETTER AIN +0860..086A ; XID_Start # Lo [11] SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM NGA..SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM SSA +0870..0887 ; XID_Start # Lo [24] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WITH ATTACHED FATHA..ARABIC BASELINE ROUND DOT +0889..088E ; XID_Start # Lo [6] ARABIC LETTER NOON WITH INVERTED SMALL V..ARABIC VERTICAL TAIL +08A0..08C8 ; XID_Start # Lo [41] ARABIC LETTER BEH WITH SMALL V BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GRAF +08C9 ; XID_Start # Lm ARABIC SMALL FARSI YEH +0904..0939 ; XID_Start # Lo [54] DEVANAGARI LETTER SHORT A..DEVANAGARI LETTER HA +093D ; XID_Start # Lo DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +0950 ; XID_Start # Lo DEVANAGARI OM +0958..0961 ; XID_Start # Lo [10] DEVANAGARI LETTER QA..DEVANAGARI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0971 ; XID_Start # Lm DEVANAGARI SIGN HIGH SPACING DOT +0972..0980 ; XID_Start # Lo [15] DEVANAGARI LETTER CANDRA A..BENGALI ANJI +0985..098C ; XID_Start # Lo [8] BENGALI LETTER A..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC L +098F..0990 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER E..BENGALI LETTER AI +0993..09A8 ; XID_Start # Lo [22] BENGALI LETTER O..BENGALI LETTER NA +09AA..09B0 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] BENGALI LETTER PA..BENGALI LETTER RA +09B2 ; XID_Start # Lo BENGALI LETTER LA +09B6..09B9 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] BENGALI LETTER SHA..BENGALI LETTER HA +09BD ; XID_Start # Lo BENGALI SIGN AVAGRAHA +09CE ; XID_Start # Lo BENGALI LETTER KHANDA TA +09DC..09DD ; XID_Start # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RRA..BENGALI LETTER RHA +09DF..09E1 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] BENGALI LETTER YYA..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC LL +09F0..09F1 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RA WITH MIDDLE DIAGONAL..BENGALI LETTER RA WITH LOWER DIAGONAL +09FC ; XID_Start # Lo BENGALI LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA +0A05..0A0A ; XID_Start # Lo [6] GURMUKHI LETTER A..GURMUKHI LETTER UU +0A0F..0A10 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER EE..GURMUKHI LETTER AI +0A13..0A28 ; XID_Start # Lo [22] GURMUKHI LETTER OO..GURMUKHI LETTER NA +0A2A..0A30 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] GURMUKHI LETTER PA..GURMUKHI LETTER RA +0A32..0A33 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER LA..GURMUKHI LETTER LLA +0A35..0A36 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER VA..GURMUKHI LETTER SHA +0A38..0A39 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER SA..GURMUKHI LETTER HA +0A59..0A5C ; XID_Start # Lo [4] GURMUKHI LETTER KHHA..GURMUKHI LETTER RRA +0A5E ; XID_Start # Lo GURMUKHI LETTER FA +0A72..0A74 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] GURMUKHI IRI..GURMUKHI EK ONKAR +0A85..0A8D ; XID_Start # Lo [9] GUJARATI LETTER A..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA E +0A8F..0A91 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] GUJARATI LETTER E..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA O +0A93..0AA8 ; XID_Start # Lo [22] GUJARATI LETTER O..GUJARATI LETTER NA +0AAA..0AB0 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] GUJARATI LETTER PA..GUJARATI LETTER RA +0AB2..0AB3 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER LA..GUJARATI LETTER LLA +0AB5..0AB9 ; XID_Start # Lo [5] GUJARATI LETTER VA..GUJARATI LETTER HA +0ABD ; XID_Start # Lo GUJARATI SIGN AVAGRAHA +0AD0 ; XID_Start # Lo GUJARATI OM +0AE0..0AE1 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC RR..GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0AF9 ; XID_Start # Lo GUJARATI LETTER ZHA +0B05..0B0C ; XID_Start # Lo [8] ORIYA LETTER A..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC L +0B0F..0B10 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER E..ORIYA LETTER AI +0B13..0B28 ; XID_Start # Lo [22] ORIYA LETTER O..ORIYA LETTER NA +0B2A..0B30 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ORIYA LETTER PA..ORIYA LETTER RA +0B32..0B33 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER LA..ORIYA LETTER LLA +0B35..0B39 ; XID_Start # Lo [5] ORIYA LETTER VA..ORIYA LETTER HA +0B3D ; XID_Start # Lo ORIYA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0B5C..0B5D ; XID_Start # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER RRA..ORIYA LETTER RHA +0B5F..0B61 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] ORIYA LETTER YYA..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0B71 ; XID_Start # Lo ORIYA LETTER WA +0B83 ; XID_Start # Lo TAMIL SIGN VISARGA +0B85..0B8A ; XID_Start # Lo [6] TAMIL LETTER A..TAMIL LETTER UU +0B8E..0B90 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER E..TAMIL LETTER AI +0B92..0B95 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] TAMIL LETTER O..TAMIL LETTER KA +0B99..0B9A ; XID_Start # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NGA..TAMIL LETTER CA +0B9C ; XID_Start # Lo TAMIL LETTER JA +0B9E..0B9F ; XID_Start # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NYA..TAMIL LETTER TTA +0BA3..0BA4 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NNA..TAMIL LETTER TA +0BA8..0BAA ; XID_Start # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER NA..TAMIL LETTER PA +0BAE..0BB9 ; XID_Start # Lo [12] TAMIL LETTER MA..TAMIL LETTER HA +0BD0 ; XID_Start # Lo TAMIL OM +0C05..0C0C ; XID_Start # Lo [8] TELUGU LETTER A..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC L +0C0E..0C10 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER E..TELUGU LETTER AI +0C12..0C28 ; XID_Start # Lo [23] TELUGU LETTER O..TELUGU LETTER NA +0C2A..0C39 ; XID_Start # Lo [16] TELUGU LETTER PA..TELUGU LETTER HA +0C3D ; XID_Start # Lo TELUGU SIGN AVAGRAHA +0C58..0C5A ; XID_Start # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER TSA..TELUGU LETTER RRRA +0C5D ; XID_Start # Lo TELUGU LETTER NAKAARA POLLU +0C60..0C61 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC RR..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC LL +0C80 ; XID_Start # Lo KANNADA SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU +0C85..0C8C ; XID_Start # Lo [8] KANNADA LETTER A..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC L +0C8E..0C90 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] KANNADA LETTER E..KANNADA LETTER AI +0C92..0CA8 ; XID_Start # Lo [23] KANNADA LETTER O..KANNADA LETTER NA +0CAA..0CB3 ; XID_Start # Lo [10] KANNADA LETTER PA..KANNADA LETTER LLA +0CB5..0CB9 ; XID_Start # Lo [5] KANNADA LETTER VA..KANNADA LETTER HA +0CBD ; XID_Start # Lo KANNADA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0CDD..0CDE ; XID_Start # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER NAKAARA POLLU..KANNADA LETTER FA +0CE0..0CE1 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC RR..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0CF1..0CF2 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] KANNADA SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..KANNADA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +0D04..0D0C ; XID_Start # Lo [9] MALAYALAM LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC L +0D0E..0D10 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER E..MALAYALAM LETTER AI +0D12..0D3A ; XID_Start # Lo [41] MALAYALAM LETTER O..MALAYALAM LETTER TTTA +0D3D ; XID_Start # Lo MALAYALAM SIGN AVAGRAHA +0D4E ; XID_Start # Lo MALAYALAM LETTER DOT REPH +0D54..0D56 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU M..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU LLL +0D5F..0D61 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER ARCHAIC II..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC LL +0D7A..0D7F ; XID_Start # Lo [6] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU NN..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU K +0D85..0D96 ; XID_Start # Lo [18] SINHALA LETTER AYANNA..SINHALA LETTER AUYANNA +0D9A..0DB1 ; XID_Start # Lo [24] SINHALA LETTER ALPAPRAANA KAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA NAYANNA +0DB3..0DBB ; XID_Start # Lo [9] SINHALA LETTER SANYAKA DAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER RAYANNA +0DBD ; XID_Start # Lo SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA LAYANNA +0DC0..0DC6 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] SINHALA LETTER VAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER FAYANNA +0E01..0E30 ; XID_Start # Lo [48] THAI CHARACTER KO KAI..THAI CHARACTER SARA A +0E32 ; XID_Start # Lo THAI CHARACTER SARA AA +0E40..0E45 ; XID_Start # Lo [6] THAI CHARACTER SARA E..THAI CHARACTER LAKKHANGYAO +0E46 ; XID_Start # Lm THAI CHARACTER MAIYAMOK +0E81..0E82 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] LAO LETTER KO..LAO LETTER KHO SUNG +0E84 ; XID_Start # Lo LAO LETTER KHO TAM +0E86..0E8A ; XID_Start # Lo [5] LAO LETTER PALI GHA..LAO LETTER SO TAM +0E8C..0EA3 ; XID_Start # Lo [24] LAO LETTER PALI JHA..LAO LETTER LO LING +0EA5 ; XID_Start # Lo LAO LETTER LO LOOT +0EA7..0EB0 ; XID_Start # Lo [10] LAO LETTER WO..LAO VOWEL SIGN A +0EB2 ; XID_Start # Lo LAO VOWEL SIGN AA +0EBD ; XID_Start # Lo LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN NYO +0EC0..0EC4 ; XID_Start # Lo [5] LAO VOWEL SIGN E..LAO VOWEL SIGN AI +0EC6 ; XID_Start # Lm LAO KO LA +0EDC..0EDF ; XID_Start # Lo [4] LAO HO NO..LAO LETTER KHMU NYO +0F00 ; XID_Start # Lo TIBETAN SYLLABLE OM +0F40..0F47 ; XID_Start # Lo [8] TIBETAN LETTER KA..TIBETAN LETTER JA +0F49..0F6C ; XID_Start # Lo [36] TIBETAN LETTER NYA..TIBETAN LETTER RRA +0F88..0F8C ; XID_Start # Lo [5] TIBETAN SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SIGN INVERTED MCHU CAN +1000..102A ; XID_Start # Lo [43] MYANMAR LETTER KA..MYANMAR LETTER AU +103F ; XID_Start # Lo MYANMAR LETTER GREAT SA +1050..1055 ; XID_Start # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER SHA..MYANMAR LETTER VOCALIC LL +105A..105D ; XID_Start # Lo [4] MYANMAR LETTER MON NGA..MYANMAR LETTER MON BBE +1061 ; XID_Start # Lo MYANMAR LETTER SGAW KAREN SHA +1065..1066 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN THA..MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN PWA +106E..1070 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN NNA..MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN GHWA +1075..1081 ; XID_Start # Lo [13] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN KA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN HA +108E ; XID_Start # Lo MYANMAR LETTER RUMAI PALAUNG FA +10A0..10C5 ; XID_Start # L& [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; XID_Start # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; XID_Start # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +10D0..10FA ; XID_Start # L& [43] GEORGIAN LETTER AN..GEORGIAN LETTER AIN +10FC ; XID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER GEORGIAN NAR +10FD..10FF ; XID_Start # L& [3] GEORGIAN LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1100..1248 ; XID_Start # Lo [329] HANGUL CHOSEONG KIYEOK..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWA +124A..124D ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWE +1250..1256 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHO +1258 ; XID_Start # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWA +125A..125D ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWE +1260..1288 ; XID_Start # Lo [41] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWA +128A..128D ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWE +1290..12B0 ; XID_Start # Lo [33] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE NA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWA +12B2..12B5 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWE +12B8..12BE ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXO +12C0 ; XID_Start # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWA +12C2..12C5 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWE +12C8..12D6 ; XID_Start # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE WA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PHARYNGEAL O +12D8..1310 ; XID_Start # Lo [57] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWA +1312..1315 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWE +1318..135A ; XID_Start # Lo [67] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE FYA +1380..138F ; XID_Start # Lo [16] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SEBATBEIT MWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PWE +13A0..13F5 ; XID_Start # L& [86] CHEROKEE LETTER A..CHEROKEE LETTER MV +13F8..13FD ; XID_Start # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1401..166C ; XID_Start # Lo [620] CANADIAN SYLLABICS E..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER TTSA +166F..167F ; XID_Start # Lo [17] CANADIAN SYLLABICS QAI..CANADIAN SYLLABICS BLACKFOOT W +1681..169A ; XID_Start # Lo [26] OGHAM LETTER BEITH..OGHAM LETTER PEITH +16A0..16EA ; XID_Start # Lo [75] RUNIC LETTER FEHU FEOH FE F..RUNIC LETTER X +16EE..16F0 ; XID_Start # Nl [3] RUNIC ARLAUG SYMBOL..RUNIC BELGTHOR SYMBOL +16F1..16F8 ; XID_Start # Lo [8] RUNIC LETTER K..RUNIC LETTER FRANKS CASKET AESC +1700..1711 ; XID_Start # Lo [18] TAGALOG LETTER A..TAGALOG LETTER HA +171F..1731 ; XID_Start # Lo [19] TAGALOG LETTER ARCHAIC RA..HANUNOO LETTER HA +1740..1751 ; XID_Start # Lo [18] BUHID LETTER A..BUHID LETTER HA +1760..176C ; XID_Start # Lo [13] TAGBANWA LETTER A..TAGBANWA LETTER YA +176E..1770 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] TAGBANWA LETTER LA..TAGBANWA LETTER SA +1780..17B3 ; XID_Start # Lo [52] KHMER LETTER KA..KHMER INDEPENDENT VOWEL QAU +17D7 ; XID_Start # Lm KHMER SIGN LEK TOO +17DC ; XID_Start # Lo KHMER SIGN AVAKRAHASANYA +1820..1842 ; XID_Start # Lo [35] MONGOLIAN LETTER A..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHI +1843 ; XID_Start # Lm MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO LONG VOWEL SIGN +1844..1878 ; XID_Start # Lo [53] MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO E..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHA WITH TWO DOTS +1880..1884 ; XID_Start # Lo [5] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI ANUSVARA ONE..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI INVERTED UBADAMA +1885..1886 ; XID_Start # Mn [2] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI BALUDA..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI THREE BALUDA +1887..18A8 ; XID_Start # Lo [34] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI A..MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI BHA +18AA ; XID_Start # Lo MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI LHA +18B0..18F5 ; XID_Start # Lo [70] CANADIAN SYLLABICS OY..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER DENTAL S +1900..191E ; XID_Start # Lo [31] LIMBU VOWEL-CARRIER LETTER..LIMBU LETTER TRA +1950..196D ; XID_Start # Lo [30] TAI LE LETTER KA..TAI LE LETTER AI +1970..1974 ; XID_Start # Lo [5] TAI LE LETTER TONE-2..TAI LE LETTER TONE-6 +1980..19AB ; XID_Start # Lo [44] NEW TAI LUE LETTER HIGH QA..NEW TAI LUE LETTER LOW SUA +19B0..19C9 ; XID_Start # Lo [26] NEW TAI LUE VOWEL SIGN VOWEL SHORTENER..NEW TAI LUE TONE MARK-2 +1A00..1A16 ; XID_Start # Lo [23] BUGINESE LETTER KA..BUGINESE LETTER HA +1A20..1A54 ; XID_Start # Lo [53] TAI THAM LETTER HIGH KA..TAI THAM LETTER GREAT SA +1AA7 ; XID_Start # Lm TAI THAM SIGN MAI YAMOK +1B05..1B33 ; XID_Start # Lo [47] BALINESE LETTER AKARA..BALINESE LETTER HA +1B45..1B4C ; XID_Start # Lo [8] BALINESE LETTER KAF SASAK..BALINESE LETTER ARCHAIC JNYA +1B83..1BA0 ; XID_Start # Lo [30] SUNDANESE LETTER A..SUNDANESE LETTER HA +1BAE..1BAF ; XID_Start # Lo [2] SUNDANESE LETTER KHA..SUNDANESE LETTER SYA +1BBA..1BE5 ; XID_Start # Lo [44] SUNDANESE AVAGRAHA..BATAK LETTER U +1C00..1C23 ; XID_Start # Lo [36] LEPCHA LETTER KA..LEPCHA LETTER A +1C4D..1C4F ; XID_Start # Lo [3] LEPCHA LETTER TTA..LEPCHA LETTER DDA +1C5A..1C77 ; XID_Start # Lo [30] OL CHIKI LETTER LA..OL CHIKI LETTER OH +1C78..1C7D ; XID_Start # Lm [6] OL CHIKI MU TTUDDAG..OL CHIKI AHAD +1C80..1C88 ; XID_Start # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1C90..1CBA ; XID_Start # L& [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; XID_Start # L& [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1CE9..1CEC ; XID_Start # Lo [4] VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA..VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA VAMAGOMUKHA WITH TAIL +1CEE..1CF3 ; XID_Start # Lo [6] VEDIC SIGN HEXIFORM LONG ANUSVARA..VEDIC SIGN ROTATED ARDHAVISARGA +1CF5..1CF6 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] VEDIC SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..VEDIC SIGN UPADHMANIYA +1CFA ; XID_Start # Lo VEDIC SIGN DOUBLE ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA +1D00..1D2B ; XID_Start # L& [44] LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL A..CYRILLIC LETTER SMALL CAPITAL EL +1D2C..1D6A ; XID_Start # Lm [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1D6B..1D77 ; XID_Start # L& [13] LATIN SMALL LETTER UE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED G +1D78 ; XID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC EN +1D79..1D9A ; XID_Start # L& [34] LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1D9B..1DBF ; XID_Start # Lm [37] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED ALPHA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL THETA +1E00..1F15 ; XID_Start # L& [278] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F18..1F1D ; XID_Start # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F45 ; XID_Start # L& [38] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F48..1F4D ; XID_Start # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; XID_Start # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F59 ; XID_Start # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; XID_Start # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; XID_Start # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F..1F7D ; XID_Start # L& [31] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1FB4 ; XID_Start # L& [53] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FBC ; XID_Start # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBE ; XID_Start # L& GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; XID_Start # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FCC ; XID_Start # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; XID_Start # L& [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FDB ; XID_Start # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE0..1FEC ; XID_Start # L& [13] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF2..1FF4 ; XID_Start # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FFC ; XID_Start # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +2071 ; XID_Start # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +207F ; XID_Start # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER N +2090..209C ; XID_Start # Lm [13] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER T +2102 ; XID_Start # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL C +2107 ; XID_Start # L& EULER CONSTANT +210A..2113 ; XID_Start # L& [10] SCRIPT SMALL G..SCRIPT SMALL L +2115 ; XID_Start # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL N +2118 ; XID_Start # Sm SCRIPT CAPITAL P +2119..211D ; XID_Start # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL P..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL R +2124 ; XID_Start # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Z +2126 ; XID_Start # L& OHM SIGN +2128 ; XID_Start # L& BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL Z +212A..212D ; XID_Start # L& [4] KELVIN SIGN..BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL C +212E ; XID_Start # So ESTIMATED SYMBOL +212F..2134 ; XID_Start # L& [6] SCRIPT SMALL E..SCRIPT SMALL O +2135..2138 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ALEF SYMBOL..DALET SYMBOL +2139 ; XID_Start # L& INFORMATION SOURCE +213C..213F ; XID_Start # L& [4] DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL PI..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL PI +2145..2149 ; XID_Start # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC CAPITAL D..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +214E ; XID_Start # L& TURNED SMALL F +2160..2182 ; XID_Start # Nl [35] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..ROMAN NUMERAL TEN THOUSAND +2183..2184 ; XID_Start # L& [2] ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +2185..2188 ; XID_Start # Nl [4] ROMAN NUMERAL SIX LATE FORM..ROMAN NUMERAL ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND +2C00..2C7B ; XID_Start # L& [124] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED E +2C7C..2C7D ; XID_Start # Lm [2] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL V +2C7E..2CE4 ; XID_Start # L& [103] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC SYMBOL KAI +2CEB..2CEE ; XID_Start # L& [4] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF2..2CF3 ; XID_Start # L& [2] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2D00..2D25 ; XID_Start # L& [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; XID_Start # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; XID_Start # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +2D30..2D67 ; XID_Start # Lo [56] TIFINAGH LETTER YA..TIFINAGH LETTER YO +2D6F ; XID_Start # Lm TIFINAGH MODIFIER LETTER LABIALIZATION MARK +2D80..2D96 ; XID_Start # Lo [23] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE LOA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGWE +2DA0..2DA6 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSO +2DA8..2DAE ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCO +2DB0..2DB6 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZO +2DB8..2DBE ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHO +2DC0..2DC6 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYO +2DC8..2DCE ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYO +2DD0..2DD6 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYO +2DD8..2DDE ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYO +3005 ; XID_Start # Lm IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +3006 ; XID_Start # Lo IDEOGRAPHIC CLOSING MARK +3007 ; XID_Start # Nl IDEOGRAPHIC NUMBER ZERO +3021..3029 ; XID_Start # Nl [9] HANGZHOU NUMERAL ONE..HANGZHOU NUMERAL NINE +3031..3035 ; XID_Start # Lm [5] VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK..VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK LOWER HALF +3038..303A ; XID_Start # Nl [3] HANGZHOU NUMERAL TEN..HANGZHOU NUMERAL THIRTY +303B ; XID_Start # Lm VERTICAL IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +303C ; XID_Start # Lo MASU MARK +3041..3096 ; XID_Start # Lo [86] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL A..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL KE +309D..309E ; XID_Start # Lm [2] HIRAGANA ITERATION MARK..HIRAGANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +309F ; XID_Start # Lo HIRAGANA DIGRAPH YORI +30A1..30FA ; XID_Start # Lo [90] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL A..KATAKANA LETTER VO +30FC..30FE ; XID_Start # Lm [3] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +30FF ; XID_Start # Lo KATAKANA DIGRAPH KOTO +3105..312F ; XID_Start # Lo [43] BOPOMOFO LETTER B..BOPOMOFO LETTER NN +3131..318E ; XID_Start # Lo [94] HANGUL LETTER KIYEOK..HANGUL LETTER ARAEAE +31A0..31BF ; XID_Start # Lo [32] BOPOMOFO LETTER BU..BOPOMOFO LETTER AH +31F0..31FF ; XID_Start # Lo [16] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL KU..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL RO +3400..4DBF ; XID_Start # Lo [6592] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3400..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4DBF +4E00..A014 ; XID_Start # Lo [21013] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4E00..YI SYLLABLE E +A015 ; XID_Start # Lm YI SYLLABLE WU +A016..A48C ; XID_Start # Lo [1143] YI SYLLABLE BIT..YI SYLLABLE YYR +A4D0..A4F7 ; XID_Start # Lo [40] LISU LETTER BA..LISU LETTER OE +A4F8..A4FD ; XID_Start # Lm [6] LISU LETTER TONE MYA TI..LISU LETTER TONE MYA JEU +A500..A60B ; XID_Start # Lo [268] VAI SYLLABLE EE..VAI SYLLABLE NG +A60C ; XID_Start # Lm VAI SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +A610..A61F ; XID_Start # Lo [16] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE FA..VAI SYMBOL JONG +A62A..A62B ; XID_Start # Lo [2] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE MA..VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE DO +A640..A66D ; XID_Start # L& [46] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A66E ; XID_Start # Lo CYRILLIC LETTER MULTIOCULAR O +A67F ; XID_Start # Lm CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A680..A69B ; XID_Start # L& [28] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A69C..A69D ; XID_Start # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A6A0..A6E5 ; XID_Start # Lo [70] BAMUM LETTER A..BAMUM LETTER KI +A6E6..A6EF ; XID_Start # Nl [10] BAMUM LETTER MO..BAMUM LETTER KOGHOM +A717..A71F ; XID_Start # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER DOT VERTICAL BAR..MODIFIER LETTER LOW INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +A722..A76F ; XID_Start # L& [78] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF..LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A770 ; XID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER US +A771..A787 ; XID_Start # L& [23] LATIN SMALL LETTER DUM..LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A788 ; XID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER LOW CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +A78B..A78E ; XID_Start # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH RETROFLEX HOOK AND BELT +A78F ; XID_Start # Lo LATIN LETTER SINOLOGICAL DOT +A790..A7CA ; XID_Start # L& [59] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0..A7D1 ; XID_Start # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D3 ; XID_Start # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE THORN +A7D5..A7D9 ; XID_Start # L& [5] LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE WYNN..LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F2..A7F4 ; XID_Start # Lm [3] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL C..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL Q +A7F5..A7F6 ; XID_Start # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +A7F7 ; XID_Start # Lo LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER SIDEWAYS I +A7F8..A7F9 ; XID_Start # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +A7FA ; XID_Start # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED M +A7FB..A801 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER REVERSED F..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER I +A803..A805 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER U..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER O +A807..A80A ; XID_Start # Lo [4] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER KO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER GHO +A80C..A822 ; XID_Start # Lo [23] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER CO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER HO +A840..A873 ; XID_Start # Lo [52] PHAGS-PA LETTER KA..PHAGS-PA LETTER CANDRABINDU +A882..A8B3 ; XID_Start # Lo [50] SAURASHTRA LETTER A..SAURASHTRA LETTER LLA +A8F2..A8F7 ; XID_Start # Lo [6] DEVANAGARI SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU..DEVANAGARI SIGN CANDRABINDU AVAGRAHA +A8FB ; XID_Start # Lo DEVANAGARI HEADSTROKE +A8FD..A8FE ; XID_Start # Lo [2] DEVANAGARI JAIN OM..DEVANAGARI LETTER AY +A90A..A925 ; XID_Start # Lo [28] KAYAH LI LETTER KA..KAYAH LI LETTER OO +A930..A946 ; XID_Start # Lo [23] REJANG LETTER KA..REJANG LETTER A +A960..A97C ; XID_Start # Lo [29] HANGUL CHOSEONG TIKEUT-MIEUM..HANGUL CHOSEONG SSANGYEORINHIEUH +A984..A9B2 ; XID_Start # Lo [47] JAVANESE LETTER A..JAVANESE LETTER HA +A9CF ; XID_Start # Lm JAVANESE PANGRANGKEP +A9E0..A9E4 ; XID_Start # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN GHA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN BHA +A9E6 ; XID_Start # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER SHAN REDUPLICATION +A9E7..A9EF ; XID_Start # Lo [9] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NYA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NNA +A9FA..A9FE ; XID_Start # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING LLA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING BHA +AA00..AA28 ; XID_Start # Lo [41] CHAM LETTER A..CHAM LETTER HA +AA40..AA42 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] CHAM LETTER FINAL K..CHAM LETTER FINAL NG +AA44..AA4B ; XID_Start # Lo [8] CHAM LETTER FINAL CH..CHAM LETTER FINAL SS +AA60..AA6F ; XID_Start # Lo [16] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI GA..MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI FA +AA70 ; XID_Start # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER KHAMTI REDUPLICATION +AA71..AA76 ; XID_Start # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI XA..MYANMAR LOGOGRAM KHAMTI HM +AA7A ; XID_Start # Lo MYANMAR LETTER AITON RA +AA7E..AAAF ; XID_Start # Lo [50] MYANMAR LETTER SHWE PALAUNG CHA..TAI VIET LETTER HIGH O +AAB1 ; XID_Start # Lo TAI VIET VOWEL AA +AAB5..AAB6 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] TAI VIET VOWEL E..TAI VIET VOWEL O +AAB9..AABD ; XID_Start # Lo [5] TAI VIET VOWEL UEA..TAI VIET VOWEL AN +AAC0 ; XID_Start # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI NUENG +AAC2 ; XID_Start # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI SONG +AADB..AADC ; XID_Start # Lo [2] TAI VIET SYMBOL KON..TAI VIET SYMBOL NUENG +AADD ; XID_Start # Lm TAI VIET SYMBOL SAM +AAE0..AAEA ; XID_Start # Lo [11] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER E..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER SSA +AAF2 ; XID_Start # Lo MEETEI MAYEK ANJI +AAF3..AAF4 ; XID_Start # Lm [2] MEETEI MAYEK SYLLABLE REPETITION MARK..MEETEI MAYEK WORD REPETITION MARK +AB01..AB06 ; XID_Start # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHO +AB09..AB0E ; XID_Start # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHO +AB11..AB16 ; XID_Start # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZO +AB20..AB26 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHO +AB28..AB2E ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBO +AB30..AB5A ; XID_Start # L& [43] LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED ALPHA..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH SHORT RIGHT LEG +AB5C..AB5F ; XID_Start # Lm [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +AB60..AB68 ; XID_Start # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER SAKHA YAT..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED R WITH MIDDLE TILDE +AB69 ; XID_Start # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED W +AB70..ABBF ; XID_Start # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +ABC0..ABE2 ; XID_Start # Lo [35] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER KOK..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER I LONSUM +AC00..D7A3 ; XID_Start # Lo [11172] HANGUL SYLLABLE GA..HANGUL SYLLABLE HIH +D7B0..D7C6 ; XID_Start # Lo [23] HANGUL JUNGSEONG O-YEO..HANGUL JUNGSEONG ARAEA-E +D7CB..D7FB ; XID_Start # Lo [49] HANGUL JONGSEONG NIEUN-RIEUL..HANGUL JONGSEONG PHIEUPH-THIEUTH +F900..FA6D ; XID_Start # Lo [366] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-F900..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA6D +FA70..FAD9 ; XID_Start # Lo [106] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA70..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FAD9 +FB00..FB06 ; XID_Start # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; XID_Start # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FB1D ; XID_Start # Lo HEBREW LETTER YOD WITH HIRIQ +FB1F..FB28 ; XID_Start # Lo [10] HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH YOD YOD PATAH..HEBREW LETTER WIDE TAV +FB2A..FB36 ; XID_Start # Lo [13] HEBREW LETTER SHIN WITH SHIN DOT..HEBREW LETTER ZAYIN WITH DAGESH +FB38..FB3C ; XID_Start # Lo [5] HEBREW LETTER TET WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER LAMED WITH DAGESH +FB3E ; XID_Start # Lo HEBREW LETTER MEM WITH DAGESH +FB40..FB41 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER NUN WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER SAMEKH WITH DAGESH +FB43..FB44 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER FINAL PE WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER PE WITH DAGESH +FB46..FBB1 ; XID_Start # Lo [108] HEBREW LETTER TSADI WITH DAGESH..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE FINAL FORM +FBD3..FC5D ; XID_Start # Lo [139] ARABIC LETTER NG ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE ALEF MAKSURA WITH SUPERSCRIPT ALEF ISOLATED FORM +FC64..FD3D ; XID_Start # Lo [218] ARABIC LIGATURE YEH WITH HAMZA ABOVE WITH REH FINAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE ALEF WITH FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM +FD50..FD8F ; XID_Start # Lo [64] ARABIC LIGATURE TEH WITH JEEM WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH KHAH WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM +FD92..FDC7 ; XID_Start # Lo [54] ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH JEEM WITH KHAH INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE NOON WITH JEEM WITH YEH FINAL FORM +FDF0..FDF9 ; XID_Start # Lo [10] ARABIC LIGATURE SALLA USED AS KORANIC STOP SIGN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE SALLA ISOLATED FORM +FE71 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC TATWEEL WITH FATHATAN ABOVE +FE73 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC TAIL FRAGMENT +FE77 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC FATHA MEDIAL FORM +FE79 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC DAMMA MEDIAL FORM +FE7B ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC KASRA MEDIAL FORM +FE7D ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC SHADDA MEDIAL FORM +FE7F..FEFC ; XID_Start # Lo [126] ARABIC SUKUN MEDIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE LAM WITH ALEF FINAL FORM +FF21..FF3A ; XID_Start # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +FF41..FF5A ; XID_Start # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +FF66..FF6F ; XID_Start # Lo [10] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER WO..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER SMALL TU +FF70 ; XID_Start # Lm HALFWIDTH KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK +FF71..FF9D ; XID_Start # Lo [45] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER A..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER N +FFA0..FFBE ; XID_Start # Lo [31] HALFWIDTH HANGUL FILLER..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER HIEUH +FFC2..FFC7 ; XID_Start # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER A..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER E +FFCA..FFCF ; XID_Start # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YEO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER OE +FFD2..FFD7 ; XID_Start # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YU +FFDA..FFDC ; XID_Start # Lo [3] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER EU..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER I +10000..1000B ; XID_Start # Lo [12] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B008 A..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B046 JE +1000D..10026 ; XID_Start # Lo [26] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B036 JO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B032 QO +10028..1003A ; XID_Start # Lo [19] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B060 RA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B042 WO +1003C..1003D ; XID_Start # Lo [2] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B017 ZA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B074 ZE +1003F..1004D ; XID_Start # Lo [15] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B020 ZO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B091 TWO +10050..1005D ; XID_Start # Lo [14] LINEAR B SYMBOL B018..LINEAR B SYMBOL B089 +10080..100FA ; XID_Start # Lo [123] LINEAR B IDEOGRAM B100 MAN..LINEAR B IDEOGRAM VESSEL B305 +10140..10174 ; XID_Start # Nl [53] GREEK ACROPHONIC ATTIC ONE QUARTER..GREEK ACROPHONIC STRATIAN FIFTY MNAS +10280..1029C ; XID_Start # Lo [29] LYCIAN LETTER A..LYCIAN LETTER X +102A0..102D0 ; XID_Start # Lo [49] CARIAN LETTER A..CARIAN LETTER UUU3 +10300..1031F ; XID_Start # Lo [32] OLD ITALIC LETTER A..OLD ITALIC LETTER ESS +1032D..10340 ; XID_Start # Lo [20] OLD ITALIC LETTER YE..GOTHIC LETTER PAIRTHRA +10341 ; XID_Start # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINETY +10342..10349 ; XID_Start # Lo [8] GOTHIC LETTER RAIDA..GOTHIC LETTER OTHAL +1034A ; XID_Start # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINE HUNDRED +10350..10375 ; XID_Start # Lo [38] OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..OLD PERMIC LETTER IA +10380..1039D ; XID_Start # Lo [30] UGARITIC LETTER ALPA..UGARITIC LETTER SSU +103A0..103C3 ; XID_Start # Lo [36] OLD PERSIAN SIGN A..OLD PERSIAN SIGN HA +103C8..103CF ; XID_Start # Lo [8] OLD PERSIAN SIGN AURAMAZDAA..OLD PERSIAN SIGN BUUMISH +103D1..103D5 ; XID_Start # Nl [5] OLD PERSIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD PERSIAN NUMBER HUNDRED +10400..1044F ; XID_Start # L& [80] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +10450..1049D ; XID_Start # Lo [78] SHAVIAN LETTER PEEP..OSMANYA LETTER OO +104B0..104D3 ; XID_Start # L& [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +104D8..104FB ; XID_Start # L& [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10500..10527 ; XID_Start # Lo [40] ELBASAN LETTER A..ELBASAN LETTER KHE +10530..10563 ; XID_Start # Lo [52] CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER ALT..CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER KIW +10570..1057A ; XID_Start # L& [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; XID_Start # L& [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; XID_Start # L& [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; XID_Start # L& [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10597..105A1 ; XID_Start # L& [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; XID_Start # L& [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; XID_Start # L& [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; XID_Start # L& [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10600..10736 ; XID_Start # Lo [311] LINEAR A SIGN AB001..LINEAR A SIGN A664 +10740..10755 ; XID_Start # Lo [22] LINEAR A SIGN A701 A..LINEAR A SIGN A732 JE +10760..10767 ; XID_Start # Lo [8] LINEAR A SIGN A800..LINEAR A SIGN A807 +10780..10785 ; XID_Start # Lm [6] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; XID_Start # Lm [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; XID_Start # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL +10800..10805 ; XID_Start # Lo [6] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE A..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JA +10808 ; XID_Start # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JO +1080A..10835 ; XID_Start # Lo [44] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE KA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE WO +10837..10838 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XE +1083C ; XID_Start # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZA +1083F..10855 ; XID_Start # Lo [23] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZO..IMPERIAL ARAMAIC LETTER TAW +10860..10876 ; XID_Start # Lo [23] PALMYRENE LETTER ALEPH..PALMYRENE LETTER TAW +10880..1089E ; XID_Start # Lo [31] NABATAEAN LETTER FINAL ALEPH..NABATAEAN LETTER TAW +108E0..108F2 ; XID_Start # Lo [19] HATRAN LETTER ALEPH..HATRAN LETTER QOPH +108F4..108F5 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] HATRAN LETTER SHIN..HATRAN LETTER TAW +10900..10915 ; XID_Start # Lo [22] PHOENICIAN LETTER ALF..PHOENICIAN LETTER TAU +10920..10939 ; XID_Start # Lo [26] LYDIAN LETTER A..LYDIAN LETTER C +10980..109B7 ; XID_Start # Lo [56] MEROITIC HIEROGLYPHIC LETTER A..MEROITIC CURSIVE LETTER DA +109BE..109BF ; XID_Start # Lo [2] MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM RMT..MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM IMN +10A00 ; XID_Start # Lo KHAROSHTHI LETTER A +10A10..10A13 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] KHAROSHTHI LETTER KA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER GHA +10A15..10A17 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] KHAROSHTHI LETTER CA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER JA +10A19..10A35 ; XID_Start # Lo [29] KHAROSHTHI LETTER NYA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER VHA +10A60..10A7C ; XID_Start # Lo [29] OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER HE..OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER THETH +10A80..10A9C ; XID_Start # Lo [29] OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER HEH..OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER ZAH +10AC0..10AC7 ; XID_Start # Lo [8] MANICHAEAN LETTER ALEPH..MANICHAEAN LETTER WAW +10AC9..10AE4 ; XID_Start # Lo [28] MANICHAEAN LETTER ZAYIN..MANICHAEAN LETTER TAW +10B00..10B35 ; XID_Start # Lo [54] AVESTAN LETTER A..AVESTAN LETTER HE +10B40..10B55 ; XID_Start # Lo [22] INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER TAW +10B60..10B72 ; XID_Start # Lo [19] INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10B80..10B91 ; XID_Start # Lo [18] PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10C00..10C48 ; XID_Start # Lo [73] OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON A..OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON BASH +10C80..10CB2 ; XID_Start # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +10CC0..10CF2 ; XID_Start # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +10D00..10D23 ; XID_Start # Lo [36] HANIFI ROHINGYA LETTER A..HANIFI ROHINGYA MARK NA KHONNA +10E80..10EA9 ; XID_Start # Lo [42] YEZIDI LETTER ELIF..YEZIDI LETTER ET +10EB0..10EB1 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] YEZIDI LETTER LAM WITH DOT ABOVE..YEZIDI LETTER YOT WITH CIRCUMFLEX ABOVE +10F00..10F1C ; XID_Start # Lo [29] OLD SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..OLD SOGDIAN LETTER FINAL TAW WITH VERTICAL TAIL +10F27 ; XID_Start # Lo OLD SOGDIAN LIGATURE AYIN-DALETH +10F30..10F45 ; XID_Start # Lo [22] SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..SOGDIAN INDEPENDENT SHIN +10F70..10F81 ; XID_Start # Lo [18] OLD UYGHUR LETTER ALEPH..OLD UYGHUR LETTER LESH +10FB0..10FC4 ; XID_Start # Lo [21] CHORASMIAN LETTER ALEPH..CHORASMIAN LETTER TAW +10FE0..10FF6 ; XID_Start # Lo [23] ELYMAIC LETTER ALEPH..ELYMAIC LIGATURE ZAYIN-YODH +11003..11037 ; XID_Start # Lo [53] BRAHMI SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL NNNA +11071..11072 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT O +11075 ; XID_Start # Lo BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL LLA +11083..110AF ; XID_Start # Lo [45] KAITHI LETTER A..KAITHI LETTER HA +110D0..110E8 ; XID_Start # Lo [25] SORA SOMPENG LETTER SAH..SORA SOMPENG LETTER MAE +11103..11126 ; XID_Start # Lo [36] CHAKMA LETTER AA..CHAKMA LETTER HAA +11144 ; XID_Start # Lo CHAKMA LETTER LHAA +11147 ; XID_Start # Lo CHAKMA LETTER VAA +11150..11172 ; XID_Start # Lo [35] MAHAJANI LETTER A..MAHAJANI LETTER RRA +11176 ; XID_Start # Lo MAHAJANI LIGATURE SHRI +11183..111B2 ; XID_Start # Lo [48] SHARADA LETTER A..SHARADA LETTER HA +111C1..111C4 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] SHARADA SIGN AVAGRAHA..SHARADA OM +111DA ; XID_Start # Lo SHARADA EKAM +111DC ; XID_Start # Lo SHARADA HEADSTROKE +11200..11211 ; XID_Start # Lo [18] KHOJKI LETTER A..KHOJKI LETTER JJA +11213..1122B ; XID_Start # Lo [25] KHOJKI LETTER NYA..KHOJKI LETTER LLA +11280..11286 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] MULTANI LETTER A..MULTANI LETTER GA +11288 ; XID_Start # Lo MULTANI LETTER GHA +1128A..1128D ; XID_Start # Lo [4] MULTANI LETTER CA..MULTANI LETTER JJA +1128F..1129D ; XID_Start # Lo [15] MULTANI LETTER NYA..MULTANI LETTER BA +1129F..112A8 ; XID_Start # Lo [10] MULTANI LETTER BHA..MULTANI LETTER RHA +112B0..112DE ; XID_Start # Lo [47] KHUDAWADI LETTER A..KHUDAWADI LETTER HA +11305..1130C ; XID_Start # Lo [8] GRANTHA LETTER A..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC L +1130F..11310 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER EE..GRANTHA LETTER AI +11313..11328 ; XID_Start # Lo [22] GRANTHA LETTER OO..GRANTHA LETTER NA +1132A..11330 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] GRANTHA LETTER PA..GRANTHA LETTER RA +11332..11333 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER LA..GRANTHA LETTER LLA +11335..11339 ; XID_Start # Lo [5] GRANTHA LETTER VA..GRANTHA LETTER HA +1133D ; XID_Start # Lo GRANTHA SIGN AVAGRAHA +11350 ; XID_Start # Lo GRANTHA OM +1135D..11361 ; XID_Start # Lo [5] GRANTHA SIGN PLUTA..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC LL +11400..11434 ; XID_Start # Lo [53] NEWA LETTER A..NEWA LETTER HA +11447..1144A ; XID_Start # Lo [4] NEWA SIGN AVAGRAHA..NEWA SIDDHI +1145F..11461 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] NEWA LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..NEWA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +11480..114AF ; XID_Start # Lo [48] TIRHUTA ANJI..TIRHUTA LETTER HA +114C4..114C5 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] TIRHUTA SIGN AVAGRAHA..TIRHUTA GVANG +114C7 ; XID_Start # Lo TIRHUTA OM +11580..115AE ; XID_Start # Lo [47] SIDDHAM LETTER A..SIDDHAM LETTER HA +115D8..115DB ; XID_Start # Lo [4] SIDDHAM LETTER THREE-CIRCLE ALTERNATE I..SIDDHAM LETTER ALTERNATE U +11600..1162F ; XID_Start # Lo [48] MODI LETTER A..MODI LETTER LLA +11644 ; XID_Start # Lo MODI SIGN HUVA +11680..116AA ; XID_Start # Lo [43] TAKRI LETTER A..TAKRI LETTER RRA +116B8 ; XID_Start # Lo TAKRI LETTER ARCHAIC KHA +11700..1171A ; XID_Start # Lo [27] AHOM LETTER KA..AHOM LETTER ALTERNATE BA +11740..11746 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] AHOM LETTER CA..AHOM LETTER LLA +11800..1182B ; XID_Start # Lo [44] DOGRA LETTER A..DOGRA LETTER RRA +118A0..118DF ; XID_Start # L& [64] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +118FF..11906 ; XID_Start # Lo [8] WARANG CITI OM..DIVES AKURU LETTER E +11909 ; XID_Start # Lo DIVES AKURU LETTER O +1190C..11913 ; XID_Start # Lo [8] DIVES AKURU LETTER KA..DIVES AKURU LETTER JA +11915..11916 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] DIVES AKURU LETTER NYA..DIVES AKURU LETTER TTA +11918..1192F ; XID_Start # Lo [24] DIVES AKURU LETTER DDA..DIVES AKURU LETTER ZA +1193F ; XID_Start # Lo DIVES AKURU PREFIXED NASAL SIGN +11941 ; XID_Start # Lo DIVES AKURU INITIAL RA +119A0..119A7 ; XID_Start # Lo [8] NANDINAGARI LETTER A..NANDINAGARI LETTER VOCALIC RR +119AA..119D0 ; XID_Start # Lo [39] NANDINAGARI LETTER E..NANDINAGARI LETTER RRA +119E1 ; XID_Start # Lo NANDINAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +119E3 ; XID_Start # Lo NANDINAGARI HEADSTROKE +11A00 ; XID_Start # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER A +11A0B..11A32 ; XID_Start # Lo [40] ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KSSA +11A3A ; XID_Start # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER RA +11A50 ; XID_Start # Lo SOYOMBO LETTER A +11A5C..11A89 ; XID_Start # Lo [46] SOYOMBO LETTER KA..SOYOMBO CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER SA +11A9D ; XID_Start # Lo SOYOMBO MARK PLUTA +11AB0..11AF8 ; XID_Start # Lo [73] CANADIAN SYLLABICS NATTILIK HI..PAU CIN HAU GLOTTAL STOP FINAL +11C00..11C08 ; XID_Start # Lo [9] BHAIKSUKI LETTER A..BHAIKSUKI LETTER VOCALIC L +11C0A..11C2E ; XID_Start # Lo [37] BHAIKSUKI LETTER E..BHAIKSUKI LETTER HA +11C40 ; XID_Start # Lo BHAIKSUKI SIGN AVAGRAHA +11C72..11C8F ; XID_Start # Lo [30] MARCHEN LETTER KA..MARCHEN LETTER A +11D00..11D06 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] MASARAM GONDI LETTER A..MASARAM GONDI LETTER E +11D08..11D09 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AI..MASARAM GONDI LETTER O +11D0B..11D30 ; XID_Start # Lo [38] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AU..MASARAM GONDI LETTER TRA +11D46 ; XID_Start # Lo MASARAM GONDI REPHA +11D60..11D65 ; XID_Start # Lo [6] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER A..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER UU +11D67..11D68 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER EE..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER AI +11D6A..11D89 ; XID_Start # Lo [32] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER OO..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER SA +11D98 ; XID_Start # Lo GUNJALA GONDI OM +11EE0..11EF2 ; XID_Start # Lo [19] MAKASAR LETTER KA..MAKASAR ANGKA +11FB0 ; XID_Start # Lo LISU LETTER YHA +12000..12399 ; XID_Start # Lo [922] CUNEIFORM SIGN A..CUNEIFORM SIGN U U +12400..1246E ; XID_Start # Nl [111] CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN TWO ASH..CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN NINE U VARIANT FORM +12480..12543 ; XID_Start # Lo [196] CUNEIFORM SIGN AB TIMES NUN TENU..CUNEIFORM SIGN ZU5 TIMES THREE DISH TENU +12F90..12FF0 ; XID_Start # Lo [97] CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM001..CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM114 +13000..1342E ; XID_Start # Lo [1071] EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH AA032 +14400..14646 ; XID_Start # Lo [583] ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A530 +16800..16A38 ; XID_Start # Lo [569] BAMUM LETTER PHASE-A NGKUE MFON..BAMUM LETTER PHASE-F VUEQ +16A40..16A5E ; XID_Start # Lo [31] MRO LETTER TA..MRO LETTER TEK +16A70..16ABE ; XID_Start # Lo [79] TANGSA LETTER OZ..TANGSA LETTER ZA +16AD0..16AED ; XID_Start # Lo [30] BASSA VAH LETTER ENNI..BASSA VAH LETTER I +16B00..16B2F ; XID_Start # Lo [48] PAHAWH HMONG VOWEL KEEB..PAHAWH HMONG CONSONANT CAU +16B40..16B43 ; XID_Start # Lm [4] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS SEEV..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN IB YAM +16B63..16B77 ; XID_Start # Lo [21] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS LUB..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN CIM NRES TOS +16B7D..16B8F ; XID_Start # Lo [19] PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN TSHEEJ..PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN VWJ +16E40..16E7F ; XID_Start # L& [64] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +16F00..16F4A ; XID_Start # Lo [75] MIAO LETTER PA..MIAO LETTER RTE +16F50 ; XID_Start # Lo MIAO LETTER NASALIZATION +16F93..16F9F ; XID_Start # Lm [13] MIAO LETTER TONE-2..MIAO LETTER REFORMED TONE-8 +16FE0..16FE1 ; XID_Start # Lm [2] TANGUT ITERATION MARK..NUSHU ITERATION MARK +16FE3 ; XID_Start # Lm OLD CHINESE ITERATION MARK +17000..187F7 ; XID_Start # Lo [6136] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-17000..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-187F7 +18800..18CD5 ; XID_Start # Lo [1238] TANGUT COMPONENT-001..KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT CHARACTER-18CD5 +18D00..18D08 ; XID_Start # Lo [9] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D00..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D08 +1AFF0..1AFF3 ; XID_Start # Lm [4] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-2..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-5 +1AFF5..1AFFB ; XID_Start # Lm [7] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-5 +1AFFD..1AFFE ; XID_Start # Lm [2] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-8 +1B000..1B122 ; XID_Start # Lo [291] KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC E..KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC WU +1B150..1B152 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WI..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WO +1B164..1B167 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL WI..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL N +1B170..1B2FB ; XID_Start # Lo [396] NUSHU CHARACTER-1B170..NUSHU CHARACTER-1B2FB +1BC00..1BC6A ; XID_Start # Lo [107] DUPLOYAN LETTER H..DUPLOYAN LETTER VOCALIC M +1BC70..1BC7C ; XID_Start # Lo [13] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LEFT HORIZONTAL SECANT..DUPLOYAN AFFIX ATTACHED TANGENT HOOK +1BC80..1BC88 ; XID_Start # Lo [9] DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH VERTICAL +1BC90..1BC99 ; XID_Start # Lo [10] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ARROW +1D400..1D454 ; XID_Start # L& [85] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL G +1D456..1D49C ; XID_Start # L& [71] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A +1D49E..1D49F ; XID_Start # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D +1D4A2 ; XID_Start # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL G +1D4A5..1D4A6 ; XID_Start # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K +1D4A9..1D4AC ; XID_Start # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Q +1D4AE..1D4B9 ; XID_Start # L& [12] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL D +1D4BB ; XID_Start # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL F +1D4BD..1D4C3 ; XID_Start # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL H..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL N +1D4C5..1D505 ; XID_Start # L& [65] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL P..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL B +1D507..1D50A ; XID_Start # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL G +1D50D..1D514 ; XID_Start # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Q +1D516..1D51C ; XID_Start # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Y +1D51E..1D539 ; XID_Start # L& [28] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL B +1D53B..1D53E ; XID_Start # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL G +1D540..1D544 ; XID_Start # L& [5] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M +1D546 ; XID_Start # L& MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL O +1D54A..1D550 ; XID_Start # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Y +1D552..1D6A5 ; XID_Start # L& [340] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL DOTLESS J +1D6A8..1D6C0 ; XID_Start # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6C2..1D6DA ; XID_Start # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D6DC..1D6FA ; XID_Start # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6FC..1D714 ; XID_Start # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D716..1D734 ; XID_Start # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D736..1D74E ; XID_Start # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D750..1D76E ; XID_Start # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D770..1D788 ; XID_Start # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D78A..1D7A8 ; XID_Start # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D7AA..1D7C2 ; XID_Start # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D7C4..1D7CB ; XID_Start # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL DIGAMMA +1DF00..1DF09 ; XID_Start # L& [10] LATIN SMALL LETTER FENG DIGRAPH WITH TRILL..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK AND RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0A ; XID_Start # Lo LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0B..1DF1E ; XID_Start # L& [20] LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH WITH DOUBLE BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CURL +1E100..1E12C ; XID_Start # Lo [45] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER MA..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER W +1E137..1E13D ; XID_Start # Lm [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SIGN FOR PERSON..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +1E14E ; XID_Start # Lo NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LOGOGRAM NYAJ +1E290..1E2AD ; XID_Start # Lo [30] TOTO LETTER PA..TOTO LETTER A +1E2C0..1E2EB ; XID_Start # Lo [44] WANCHO LETTER AA..WANCHO LETTER YIH +1E7E0..1E7E6 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYO +1E7E8..1E7EB ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE HHWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHWE +1E7ED..1E7EE ; XID_Start # Lo [2] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWEE +1E7F0..1E7FE ; XID_Start # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE PWEE +1E800..1E8C4 ; XID_Start # Lo [197] MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M001 KI..MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M060 NYON +1E900..1E943 ; XID_Start # L& [68] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA +1E94B ; XID_Start # Lm ADLAM NASALIZATION MARK +1EE00..1EE03 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DAL +1EE05..1EE1F ; XID_Start # Lo [27] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOTLESS QAF +1EE21..1EE22 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL JEEM +1EE24 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HEH +1EE27 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HAH +1EE29..1EE32 ; XID_Start # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL YEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL QAF +1EE34..1EE37 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL KHAH +1EE39 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL DAD +1EE3B ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL GHAIN +1EE42 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED JEEM +1EE47 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED HAH +1EE49 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED YEH +1EE4B ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED LAM +1EE4D..1EE4F ; XID_Start # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED NOON..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED AIN +1EE51..1EE52 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED QAF +1EE54 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SHEEN +1EE57 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED KHAH +1EE59 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DAD +1EE5B ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED GHAIN +1EE5D ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS NOON +1EE5F ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS QAF +1EE61..1EE62 ; XID_Start # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED JEEM +1EE64 ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HEH +1EE67..1EE6A ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HAH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KAF +1EE6C..1EE72 ; XID_Start # Lo [7] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED MEEM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED QAF +1EE74..1EE77 ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KHAH +1EE79..1EE7C ; XID_Start # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS BEH +1EE7E ; XID_Start # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS FEH +1EE80..1EE89 ; XID_Start # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED YEH +1EE8B..1EE9B ; XID_Start # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED GHAIN +1EEA1..1EEA3 ; XID_Start # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK DAL +1EEA5..1EEA9 ; XID_Start # Lo [5] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK YEH +1EEAB..1EEBB ; XID_Start # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK GHAIN +20000..2A6DF ; XID_Start # Lo [42720] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-20000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A6DF +2A700..2B738 ; XID_Start # Lo [4153] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A700..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B738 +2B740..2B81D ; XID_Start # Lo [222] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B740..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B81D +2B820..2CEA1 ; XID_Start # Lo [5762] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B820..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEA1 +2CEB0..2EBE0 ; XID_Start # Lo [7473] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEB0..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2EBE0 +2F800..2FA1D ; XID_Start # Lo [542] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2F800..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2FA1D +30000..3134A ; XID_Start # Lo [4939] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-30000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3134A + +# Total code points: 131974 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: XID_Continue +# Mod_ID_Continue modified for closure under NFKx +# Modified as described in UAX #15 +# NOTE: Does NOT remove the non-NFKx characters. +# Merely ensures that if isIdentifer(string) then isIdentifier(NFKx(string)) +# NOTE: See UAX #31 for more information + +0030..0039 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] DIGIT ZERO..DIGIT NINE +0041..005A ; XID_Continue # L& [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +005F ; XID_Continue # Pc LOW LINE +0061..007A ; XID_Continue # L& [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +00AA ; XID_Continue # Lo FEMININE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00B5 ; XID_Continue # L& MICRO SIGN +00B7 ; XID_Continue # Po MIDDLE DOT +00BA ; XID_Continue # Lo MASCULINE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00C0..00D6 ; XID_Continue # L& [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8..00F6 ; XID_Continue # L& [31] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F8..01BA ; XID_Continue # L& [195] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH TAIL +01BB ; XID_Continue # Lo LATIN LETTER TWO WITH STROKE +01BC..01BF ; XID_Continue # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE..LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C0..01C3 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] LATIN LETTER DENTAL CLICK..LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK +01C4..0293 ; XID_Continue # L& [208] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CURL +0294 ; XID_Continue # Lo LATIN LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0295..02AF ; XID_Continue # L& [27] LATIN LETTER PHARYNGEAL VOICED FRICATIVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H WITH FISHHOOK AND TAIL +02B0..02C1 ; XID_Continue # Lm [18] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02C6..02D1 ; XID_Continue # Lm [12] MODIFIER LETTER CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..MODIFIER LETTER HALF TRIANGULAR COLON +02E0..02E4 ; XID_Continue # Lm [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02EC ; XID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER VOICING +02EE ; XID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER DOUBLE APOSTROPHE +0300..036F ; XID_Continue # Mn [112] COMBINING GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER X +0370..0373 ; XID_Continue # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA..GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0374 ; XID_Continue # Lm GREEK NUMERAL SIGN +0376..0377 ; XID_Continue # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA..GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037B..037D ; XID_Continue # L& [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +037F ; XID_Continue # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386 ; XID_Continue # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0387 ; XID_Continue # Po GREEK ANO TELEIA +0388..038A ; XID_Continue # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; XID_Continue # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..03A1 ; XID_Continue # L& [20] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03F5 ; XID_Continue # L& [83] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F7..0481 ; XID_Continue # L& [139] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +0483..0487 ; XID_Continue # Mn [5] COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO..COMBINING CYRILLIC POKRYTIE +048A..052F ; XID_Continue # L& [166] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; XID_Continue # L& [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +0559 ; XID_Continue # Lm ARMENIAN MODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RING +0560..0588 ; XID_Continue # L& [41] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER TURNED AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER YI WITH STROKE +0591..05BD ; XID_Continue # Mn [45] HEBREW ACCENT ETNAHTA..HEBREW POINT METEG +05BF ; XID_Continue # Mn HEBREW POINT RAFE +05C1..05C2 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] HEBREW POINT SHIN DOT..HEBREW POINT SIN DOT +05C4..05C5 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] HEBREW MARK UPPER DOT..HEBREW MARK LOWER DOT +05C7 ; XID_Continue # Mn HEBREW POINT QAMATS QATAN +05D0..05EA ; XID_Continue # Lo [27] HEBREW LETTER ALEF..HEBREW LETTER TAV +05EF..05F2 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] HEBREW YOD TRIANGLE..HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH DOUBLE YOD +0610..061A ; XID_Continue # Mn [11] ARABIC SIGN SALLALLAHOU ALAYHE WASSALLAM..ARABIC SMALL KASRA +0620..063F ; XID_Continue # Lo [32] ARABIC LETTER KASHMIRI YEH..ARABIC LETTER FARSI YEH WITH THREE DOTS ABOVE +0640 ; XID_Continue # Lm ARABIC TATWEEL +0641..064A ; XID_Continue # Lo [10] ARABIC LETTER FEH..ARABIC LETTER YEH +064B..065F ; XID_Continue # Mn [21] ARABIC FATHATAN..ARABIC WAVY HAMZA BELOW +0660..0669 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT ZERO..ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT NINE +066E..066F ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS BEH..ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS QAF +0670 ; XID_Continue # Mn ARABIC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALEF +0671..06D3 ; XID_Continue # Lo [99] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WASLA..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE +06D5 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC LETTER AE +06D6..06DC ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] ARABIC SMALL HIGH LIGATURE SAD WITH LAM WITH ALEF MAKSURA..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SEEN +06DF..06E4 ; XID_Continue # Mn [6] ARABIC SMALL HIGH ROUNDED ZERO..ARABIC SMALL HIGH MADDA +06E5..06E6 ; XID_Continue # Lm [2] ARABIC SMALL WAW..ARABIC SMALL YEH +06E7..06E8 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] ARABIC SMALL HIGH YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH NOON +06EA..06ED ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] ARABIC EMPTY CENTRE LOW STOP..ARABIC SMALL LOW MEEM +06EE..06EF ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DAL WITH INVERTED V..ARABIC LETTER REH WITH INVERTED V +06F0..06F9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] EXTENDED ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT ZERO..EXTENDED ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT NINE +06FA..06FC ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] ARABIC LETTER SHEEN WITH DOT BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GHAIN WITH DOT BELOW +06FF ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC LETTER HEH WITH INVERTED V +0710 ; XID_Continue # Lo SYRIAC LETTER ALAPH +0711 ; XID_Continue # Mn SYRIAC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALAPH +0712..072F ; XID_Continue # Lo [30] SYRIAC LETTER BETH..SYRIAC LETTER PERSIAN DHALATH +0730..074A ; XID_Continue # Mn [27] SYRIAC PTHAHA ABOVE..SYRIAC BARREKH +074D..07A5 ; XID_Continue # Lo [89] SYRIAC LETTER SOGDIAN ZHAIN..THAANA LETTER WAAVU +07A6..07B0 ; XID_Continue # Mn [11] THAANA ABAFILI..THAANA SUKUN +07B1 ; XID_Continue # Lo THAANA LETTER NAA +07C0..07C9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] NKO DIGIT ZERO..NKO DIGIT NINE +07CA..07EA ; XID_Continue # Lo [33] NKO LETTER A..NKO LETTER JONA RA +07EB..07F3 ; XID_Continue # Mn [9] NKO COMBINING SHORT HIGH TONE..NKO COMBINING DOUBLE DOT ABOVE +07F4..07F5 ; XID_Continue # Lm [2] NKO HIGH TONE APOSTROPHE..NKO LOW TONE APOSTROPHE +07FA ; XID_Continue # Lm NKO LAJANYALAN +07FD ; XID_Continue # Mn NKO DANTAYALAN +0800..0815 ; XID_Continue # Lo [22] SAMARITAN LETTER ALAF..SAMARITAN LETTER TAAF +0816..0819 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] SAMARITAN MARK IN..SAMARITAN MARK DAGESH +081A ; XID_Continue # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER EPENTHETIC YUT +081B..0823 ; XID_Continue # Mn [9] SAMARITAN MARK EPENTHETIC YUT..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN A +0824 ; XID_Continue # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER SHORT A +0825..0827 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN SHORT A..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN U +0828 ; XID_Continue # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER I +0829..082D ; XID_Continue # Mn [5] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN LONG I..SAMARITAN MARK NEQUDAA +0840..0858 ; XID_Continue # Lo [25] MANDAIC LETTER HALQA..MANDAIC LETTER AIN +0859..085B ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] MANDAIC AFFRICATION MARK..MANDAIC GEMINATION MARK +0860..086A ; XID_Continue # Lo [11] SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM NGA..SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM SSA +0870..0887 ; XID_Continue # Lo [24] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WITH ATTACHED FATHA..ARABIC BASELINE ROUND DOT +0889..088E ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] ARABIC LETTER NOON WITH INVERTED SMALL V..ARABIC VERTICAL TAIL +0898..089F ; XID_Continue # Mn [8] ARABIC SMALL HIGH WORD AL-JUZ..ARABIC HALF MADDA OVER MADDA +08A0..08C8 ; XID_Continue # Lo [41] ARABIC LETTER BEH WITH SMALL V BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GRAF +08C9 ; XID_Continue # Lm ARABIC SMALL FARSI YEH +08CA..08E1 ; XID_Continue # Mn [24] ARABIC SMALL HIGH FARSI YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SIGN SAFHA +08E3..0902 ; XID_Continue # Mn [32] ARABIC TURNED DAMMA BELOW..DEVANAGARI SIGN ANUSVARA +0903 ; XID_Continue # Mc DEVANAGARI SIGN VISARGA +0904..0939 ; XID_Continue # Lo [54] DEVANAGARI LETTER SHORT A..DEVANAGARI LETTER HA +093A ; XID_Continue # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OE +093B ; XID_Continue # Mc DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OOE +093C ; XID_Continue # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN NUKTA +093D ; XID_Continue # Lo DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +093E..0940 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +0941..0948 ; XID_Continue # Mn [8] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +0949..094C ; XID_Continue # Mc [4] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AU +094D ; XID_Continue # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +094E..094F ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AW +0950 ; XID_Continue # Lo DEVANAGARI OM +0951..0957 ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] DEVANAGARI STRESS SIGN UDATTA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN UUE +0958..0961 ; XID_Continue # Lo [10] DEVANAGARI LETTER QA..DEVANAGARI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0962..0963 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0966..096F ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..DEVANAGARI DIGIT NINE +0971 ; XID_Continue # Lm DEVANAGARI SIGN HIGH SPACING DOT +0972..0980 ; XID_Continue # Lo [15] DEVANAGARI LETTER CANDRA A..BENGALI ANJI +0981 ; XID_Continue # Mn BENGALI SIGN CANDRABINDU +0982..0983 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] BENGALI SIGN ANUSVARA..BENGALI SIGN VISARGA +0985..098C ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] BENGALI LETTER A..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC L +098F..0990 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER E..BENGALI LETTER AI +0993..09A8 ; XID_Continue # Lo [22] BENGALI LETTER O..BENGALI LETTER NA +09AA..09B0 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] BENGALI LETTER PA..BENGALI LETTER RA +09B2 ; XID_Continue # Lo BENGALI LETTER LA +09B6..09B9 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] BENGALI LETTER SHA..BENGALI LETTER HA +09BC ; XID_Continue # Mn BENGALI SIGN NUKTA +09BD ; XID_Continue # Lo BENGALI SIGN AVAGRAHA +09BE..09C0 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AA..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN II +09C1..09C4 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN U..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +09C7..09C8 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN E..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AI +09CB..09CC ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN O..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AU +09CD ; XID_Continue # Mn BENGALI SIGN VIRAMA +09CE ; XID_Continue # Lo BENGALI LETTER KHANDA TA +09D7 ; XID_Continue # Mc BENGALI AU LENGTH MARK +09DC..09DD ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RRA..BENGALI LETTER RHA +09DF..09E1 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] BENGALI LETTER YYA..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC LL +09E2..09E3 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +09E6..09EF ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] BENGALI DIGIT ZERO..BENGALI DIGIT NINE +09F0..09F1 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RA WITH MIDDLE DIAGONAL..BENGALI LETTER RA WITH LOWER DIAGONAL +09FC ; XID_Continue # Lo BENGALI LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA +09FE ; XID_Continue # Mn BENGALI SANDHI MARK +0A01..0A02 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] GURMUKHI SIGN ADAK BINDI..GURMUKHI SIGN BINDI +0A03 ; XID_Continue # Mc GURMUKHI SIGN VISARGA +0A05..0A0A ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] GURMUKHI LETTER A..GURMUKHI LETTER UU +0A0F..0A10 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER EE..GURMUKHI LETTER AI +0A13..0A28 ; XID_Continue # Lo [22] GURMUKHI LETTER OO..GURMUKHI LETTER NA +0A2A..0A30 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] GURMUKHI LETTER PA..GURMUKHI LETTER RA +0A32..0A33 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER LA..GURMUKHI LETTER LLA +0A35..0A36 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER VA..GURMUKHI LETTER SHA +0A38..0A39 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER SA..GURMUKHI LETTER HA +0A3C ; XID_Continue # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN NUKTA +0A3E..0A40 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AA..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN II +0A41..0A42 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN U..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN UU +0A47..0A48 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN EE..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AI +0A4B..0A4D ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN OO..GURMUKHI SIGN VIRAMA +0A51 ; XID_Continue # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN UDAAT +0A59..0A5C ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] GURMUKHI LETTER KHHA..GURMUKHI LETTER RRA +0A5E ; XID_Continue # Lo GURMUKHI LETTER FA +0A66..0A6F ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] GURMUKHI DIGIT ZERO..GURMUKHI DIGIT NINE +0A70..0A71 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] GURMUKHI TIPPI..GURMUKHI ADDAK +0A72..0A74 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] GURMUKHI IRI..GURMUKHI EK ONKAR +0A75 ; XID_Continue # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN YAKASH +0A81..0A82 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] GUJARATI SIGN CANDRABINDU..GUJARATI SIGN ANUSVARA +0A83 ; XID_Continue # Mc GUJARATI SIGN VISARGA +0A85..0A8D ; XID_Continue # Lo [9] GUJARATI LETTER A..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA E +0A8F..0A91 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] GUJARATI LETTER E..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA O +0A93..0AA8 ; XID_Continue # Lo [22] GUJARATI LETTER O..GUJARATI LETTER NA +0AAA..0AB0 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] GUJARATI LETTER PA..GUJARATI LETTER RA +0AB2..0AB3 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER LA..GUJARATI LETTER LLA +0AB5..0AB9 ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] GUJARATI LETTER VA..GUJARATI LETTER HA +0ABC ; XID_Continue # Mn GUJARATI SIGN NUKTA +0ABD ; XID_Continue # Lo GUJARATI SIGN AVAGRAHA +0ABE..0AC0 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN II +0AC1..0AC5 ; XID_Continue # Mn [5] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN U..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA E +0AC7..0AC8 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN E..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AI +0AC9 ; XID_Continue # Mc GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O +0ACB..0ACC ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN O..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AU +0ACD ; XID_Continue # Mn GUJARATI SIGN VIRAMA +0AD0 ; XID_Continue # Lo GUJARATI OM +0AE0..0AE1 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC RR..GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0AE2..0AE3 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0AE6..0AEF ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] GUJARATI DIGIT ZERO..GUJARATI DIGIT NINE +0AF9 ; XID_Continue # Lo GUJARATI LETTER ZHA +0AFA..0AFF ; XID_Continue # Mn [6] GUJARATI SIGN SUKUN..GUJARATI SIGN TWO-CIRCLE NUKTA ABOVE +0B01 ; XID_Continue # Mn ORIYA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0B02..0B03 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] ORIYA SIGN ANUSVARA..ORIYA SIGN VISARGA +0B05..0B0C ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] ORIYA LETTER A..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC L +0B0F..0B10 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER E..ORIYA LETTER AI +0B13..0B28 ; XID_Continue # Lo [22] ORIYA LETTER O..ORIYA LETTER NA +0B2A..0B30 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ORIYA LETTER PA..ORIYA LETTER RA +0B32..0B33 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER LA..ORIYA LETTER LLA +0B35..0B39 ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] ORIYA LETTER VA..ORIYA LETTER HA +0B3C ; XID_Continue # Mn ORIYA SIGN NUKTA +0B3D ; XID_Continue # Lo ORIYA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0B3E ; XID_Continue # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AA +0B3F ; XID_Continue # Mn ORIYA VOWEL SIGN I +0B40 ; XID_Continue # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN II +0B41..0B44 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN U..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0B47..0B48 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN E..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AI +0B4B..0B4C ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN O..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AU +0B4D ; XID_Continue # Mn ORIYA SIGN VIRAMA +0B55..0B56 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] ORIYA SIGN OVERLINE..ORIYA AI LENGTH MARK +0B57 ; XID_Continue # Mc ORIYA AU LENGTH MARK +0B5C..0B5D ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER RRA..ORIYA LETTER RHA +0B5F..0B61 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] ORIYA LETTER YYA..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0B62..0B63 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0B66..0B6F ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] ORIYA DIGIT ZERO..ORIYA DIGIT NINE +0B71 ; XID_Continue # Lo ORIYA LETTER WA +0B82 ; XID_Continue # Mn TAMIL SIGN ANUSVARA +0B83 ; XID_Continue # Lo TAMIL SIGN VISARGA +0B85..0B8A ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] TAMIL LETTER A..TAMIL LETTER UU +0B8E..0B90 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER E..TAMIL LETTER AI +0B92..0B95 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] TAMIL LETTER O..TAMIL LETTER KA +0B99..0B9A ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NGA..TAMIL LETTER CA +0B9C ; XID_Continue # Lo TAMIL LETTER JA +0B9E..0B9F ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NYA..TAMIL LETTER TTA +0BA3..0BA4 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NNA..TAMIL LETTER TA +0BA8..0BAA ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER NA..TAMIL LETTER PA +0BAE..0BB9 ; XID_Continue # Lo [12] TAMIL LETTER MA..TAMIL LETTER HA +0BBE..0BBF ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AA..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN I +0BC0 ; XID_Continue # Mn TAMIL VOWEL SIGN II +0BC1..0BC2 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN U..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN UU +0BC6..0BC8 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN E..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AI +0BCA..0BCC ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN O..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AU +0BCD ; XID_Continue # Mn TAMIL SIGN VIRAMA +0BD0 ; XID_Continue # Lo TAMIL OM +0BD7 ; XID_Continue # Mc TAMIL AU LENGTH MARK +0BE6..0BEF ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] TAMIL DIGIT ZERO..TAMIL DIGIT NINE +0C00 ; XID_Continue # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING CANDRABINDU ABOVE +0C01..0C03 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] TELUGU SIGN CANDRABINDU..TELUGU SIGN VISARGA +0C04 ; XID_Continue # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE +0C05..0C0C ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] TELUGU LETTER A..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC L +0C0E..0C10 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER E..TELUGU LETTER AI +0C12..0C28 ; XID_Continue # Lo [23] TELUGU LETTER O..TELUGU LETTER NA +0C2A..0C39 ; XID_Continue # Lo [16] TELUGU LETTER PA..TELUGU LETTER HA +0C3C ; XID_Continue # Mn TELUGU SIGN NUKTA +0C3D ; XID_Continue # Lo TELUGU SIGN AVAGRAHA +0C3E..0C40 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AA..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN II +0C41..0C44 ; XID_Continue # Mc [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN U..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0C46..0C48 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN E..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AI +0C4A..0C4D ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN O..TELUGU SIGN VIRAMA +0C55..0C56 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] TELUGU LENGTH MARK..TELUGU AI LENGTH MARK +0C58..0C5A ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER TSA..TELUGU LETTER RRRA +0C5D ; XID_Continue # Lo TELUGU LETTER NAKAARA POLLU +0C60..0C61 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC RR..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC LL +0C62..0C63 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0C66..0C6F ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] TELUGU DIGIT ZERO..TELUGU DIGIT NINE +0C80 ; XID_Continue # Lo KANNADA SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU +0C81 ; XID_Continue # Mn KANNADA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0C82..0C83 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] KANNADA SIGN ANUSVARA..KANNADA SIGN VISARGA +0C85..0C8C ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] KANNADA LETTER A..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC L +0C8E..0C90 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] KANNADA LETTER E..KANNADA LETTER AI +0C92..0CA8 ; XID_Continue # Lo [23] KANNADA LETTER O..KANNADA LETTER NA +0CAA..0CB3 ; XID_Continue # Lo [10] KANNADA LETTER PA..KANNADA LETTER LLA +0CB5..0CB9 ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] KANNADA LETTER VA..KANNADA LETTER HA +0CBC ; XID_Continue # Mn KANNADA SIGN NUKTA +0CBD ; XID_Continue # Lo KANNADA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0CBE ; XID_Continue # Mc KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AA +0CBF ; XID_Continue # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN I +0CC0..0CC4 ; XID_Continue # Mc [5] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN II..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0CC6 ; XID_Continue # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN E +0CC7..0CC8 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN EE..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AI +0CCA..0CCB ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN O..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN OO +0CCC..0CCD ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AU..KANNADA SIGN VIRAMA +0CD5..0CD6 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] KANNADA LENGTH MARK..KANNADA AI LENGTH MARK +0CDD..0CDE ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER NAKAARA POLLU..KANNADA LETTER FA +0CE0..0CE1 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC RR..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0CE2..0CE3 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0CE6..0CEF ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] KANNADA DIGIT ZERO..KANNADA DIGIT NINE +0CF1..0CF2 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] KANNADA SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..KANNADA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +0D00..0D01 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..MALAYALAM SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D02..0D03 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] MALAYALAM SIGN ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM SIGN VISARGA +0D04..0D0C ; XID_Continue # Lo [9] MALAYALAM LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC L +0D0E..0D10 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER E..MALAYALAM LETTER AI +0D12..0D3A ; XID_Continue # Lo [41] MALAYALAM LETTER O..MALAYALAM LETTER TTTA +0D3B..0D3C ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN VERTICAL BAR VIRAMA..MALAYALAM SIGN CIRCULAR VIRAMA +0D3D ; XID_Continue # Lo MALAYALAM SIGN AVAGRAHA +0D3E..0D40 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AA..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN II +0D41..0D44 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN U..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0D46..0D48 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN E..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AI +0D4A..0D4C ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN O..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AU +0D4D ; XID_Continue # Mn MALAYALAM SIGN VIRAMA +0D4E ; XID_Continue # Lo MALAYALAM LETTER DOT REPH +0D54..0D56 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU M..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU LLL +0D57 ; XID_Continue # Mc MALAYALAM AU LENGTH MARK +0D5F..0D61 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER ARCHAIC II..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC LL +0D62..0D63 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D66..0D6F ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] MALAYALAM DIGIT ZERO..MALAYALAM DIGIT NINE +0D7A..0D7F ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU NN..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU K +0D81 ; XID_Continue # Mn SINHALA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D82..0D83 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] SINHALA SIGN ANUSVARAYA..SINHALA SIGN VISARGAYA +0D85..0D96 ; XID_Continue # Lo [18] SINHALA LETTER AYANNA..SINHALA LETTER AUYANNA +0D9A..0DB1 ; XID_Continue # Lo [24] SINHALA LETTER ALPAPRAANA KAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA NAYANNA +0DB3..0DBB ; XID_Continue # Lo [9] SINHALA LETTER SANYAKA DAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER RAYANNA +0DBD ; XID_Continue # Lo SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA LAYANNA +0DC0..0DC6 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] SINHALA LETTER VAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER FAYANNA +0DCA ; XID_Continue # Mn SINHALA SIGN AL-LAKUNA +0DCF..0DD1 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN AELA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA AEDA-PILLA +0DD2..0DD4 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI IS-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI PAA-PILLA +0DD6 ; XID_Continue # Mn SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA PAA-PILLA +0DD8..0DDF ; XID_Continue # Mc [8] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAYANUKITTA +0DE6..0DEF ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] SINHALA LITH DIGIT ZERO..SINHALA LITH DIGIT NINE +0DF2..0DF3 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAYANUKITTA +0E01..0E30 ; XID_Continue # Lo [48] THAI CHARACTER KO KAI..THAI CHARACTER SARA A +0E31 ; XID_Continue # Mn THAI CHARACTER MAI HAN-AKAT +0E32..0E33 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] THAI CHARACTER SARA AA..THAI CHARACTER SARA AM +0E34..0E3A ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] THAI CHARACTER SARA I..THAI CHARACTER PHINTHU +0E40..0E45 ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] THAI CHARACTER SARA E..THAI CHARACTER LAKKHANGYAO +0E46 ; XID_Continue # Lm THAI CHARACTER MAIYAMOK +0E47..0E4E ; XID_Continue # Mn [8] THAI CHARACTER MAITAIKHU..THAI CHARACTER YAMAKKAN +0E50..0E59 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] THAI DIGIT ZERO..THAI DIGIT NINE +0E81..0E82 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] LAO LETTER KO..LAO LETTER KHO SUNG +0E84 ; XID_Continue # Lo LAO LETTER KHO TAM +0E86..0E8A ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] LAO LETTER PALI GHA..LAO LETTER SO TAM +0E8C..0EA3 ; XID_Continue # Lo [24] LAO LETTER PALI JHA..LAO LETTER LO LING +0EA5 ; XID_Continue # Lo LAO LETTER LO LOOT +0EA7..0EB0 ; XID_Continue # Lo [10] LAO LETTER WO..LAO VOWEL SIGN A +0EB1 ; XID_Continue # Mn LAO VOWEL SIGN MAI KAN +0EB2..0EB3 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] LAO VOWEL SIGN AA..LAO VOWEL SIGN AM +0EB4..0EBC ; XID_Continue # Mn [9] LAO VOWEL SIGN I..LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN LO +0EBD ; XID_Continue # Lo LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN NYO +0EC0..0EC4 ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] LAO VOWEL SIGN E..LAO VOWEL SIGN AI +0EC6 ; XID_Continue # Lm LAO KO LA +0EC8..0ECD ; XID_Continue # Mn [6] LAO TONE MAI EK..LAO NIGGAHITA +0ED0..0ED9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] LAO DIGIT ZERO..LAO DIGIT NINE +0EDC..0EDF ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] LAO HO NO..LAO LETTER KHMU NYO +0F00 ; XID_Continue # Lo TIBETAN SYLLABLE OM +0F18..0F19 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN -KHYUD PA..TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN SDONG TSHUGS +0F20..0F29 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] TIBETAN DIGIT ZERO..TIBETAN DIGIT NINE +0F35 ; XID_Continue # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG NYI ZLA +0F37 ; XID_Continue # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG SGOR RTAGS +0F39 ; XID_Continue # Mn TIBETAN MARK TSA -PHRU +0F3E..0F3F ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] TIBETAN SIGN YAR TSHES..TIBETAN SIGN MAR TSHES +0F40..0F47 ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] TIBETAN LETTER KA..TIBETAN LETTER JA +0F49..0F6C ; XID_Continue # Lo [36] TIBETAN LETTER NYA..TIBETAN LETTER RRA +0F71..0F7E ; XID_Continue # Mn [14] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN AA..TIBETAN SIGN RJES SU NGA RO +0F7F ; XID_Continue # Mc TIBETAN SIGN RNAM BCAD +0F80..0F84 ; XID_Continue # Mn [5] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN REVERSED I..TIBETAN MARK HALANTA +0F86..0F87 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] TIBETAN SIGN LCI RTAGS..TIBETAN SIGN YANG RTAGS +0F88..0F8C ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] TIBETAN SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SIGN INVERTED MCHU CAN +0F8D..0F97 ; XID_Continue # Mn [11] TIBETAN SUBJOINED SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER JA +0F99..0FBC ; XID_Continue # Mn [36] TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER NYA..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER FIXED-FORM RA +0FC6 ; XID_Continue # Mn TIBETAN SYMBOL PADMA GDAN +1000..102A ; XID_Continue # Lo [43] MYANMAR LETTER KA..MYANMAR LETTER AU +102B..102C ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN TALL AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AA +102D..1030 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN UU +1031 ; XID_Continue # Mc MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN E +1032..1037 ; XID_Continue # Mn [6] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AI..MYANMAR SIGN DOT BELOW +1038 ; XID_Continue # Mc MYANMAR SIGN VISARGA +1039..103A ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MYANMAR SIGN VIRAMA..MYANMAR SIGN ASAT +103B..103C ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL YA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +103D..103E ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL WA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL HA +103F ; XID_Continue # Lo MYANMAR LETTER GREAT SA +1040..1049 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] MYANMAR DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR DIGIT NINE +1050..1055 ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER SHA..MYANMAR LETTER VOCALIC LL +1056..1057 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +1058..1059 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +105A..105D ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] MYANMAR LETTER MON NGA..MYANMAR LETTER MON BBE +105E..1060 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL NA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL LA +1061 ; XID_Continue # Lo MYANMAR LETTER SGAW KAREN SHA +1062..1064 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SGAW KAREN EU..MYANMAR TONE MARK SGAW KAREN KE PHO +1065..1066 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN THA..MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN PWA +1067..106D ; XID_Continue # Mc [7] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN EU..MYANMAR SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN TONE-5 +106E..1070 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN NNA..MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN GHWA +1071..1074 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN GEBA KAREN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN KAYAH EE +1075..1081 ; XID_Continue # Lo [13] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN KA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN HA +1082 ; XID_Continue # Mn MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN SHAN MEDIAL WA +1083..1084 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E +1085..1086 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E ABOVE..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN FINAL Y +1087..108C ; XID_Continue # Mc [6] MYANMAR SIGN SHAN TONE-2..MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL TONE-3 +108D ; XID_Continue # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL EMPHATIC TONE +108E ; XID_Continue # Lo MYANMAR LETTER RUMAI PALAUNG FA +108F ; XID_Continue # Mc MYANMAR SIGN RUMAI PALAUNG TONE-5 +1090..1099 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] MYANMAR SHAN DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR SHAN DIGIT NINE +109A..109C ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] MYANMAR SIGN KHAMTI TONE-1..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON A +109D ; XID_Continue # Mn MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON AI +10A0..10C5 ; XID_Continue # L& [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; XID_Continue # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; XID_Continue # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +10D0..10FA ; XID_Continue # L& [43] GEORGIAN LETTER AN..GEORGIAN LETTER AIN +10FC ; XID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER GEORGIAN NAR +10FD..10FF ; XID_Continue # L& [3] GEORGIAN LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1100..1248 ; XID_Continue # Lo [329] HANGUL CHOSEONG KIYEOK..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWA +124A..124D ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWE +1250..1256 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHO +1258 ; XID_Continue # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWA +125A..125D ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWE +1260..1288 ; XID_Continue # Lo [41] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWA +128A..128D ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWE +1290..12B0 ; XID_Continue # Lo [33] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE NA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWA +12B2..12B5 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWE +12B8..12BE ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXO +12C0 ; XID_Continue # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWA +12C2..12C5 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWE +12C8..12D6 ; XID_Continue # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE WA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PHARYNGEAL O +12D8..1310 ; XID_Continue # Lo [57] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWA +1312..1315 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWE +1318..135A ; XID_Continue # Lo [67] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE FYA +135D..135F ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION AND VOWEL LENGTH MARK..ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION MARK +1369..1371 ; XID_Continue # No [9] ETHIOPIC DIGIT ONE..ETHIOPIC DIGIT NINE +1380..138F ; XID_Continue # Lo [16] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SEBATBEIT MWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PWE +13A0..13F5 ; XID_Continue # L& [86] CHEROKEE LETTER A..CHEROKEE LETTER MV +13F8..13FD ; XID_Continue # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1401..166C ; XID_Continue # Lo [620] CANADIAN SYLLABICS E..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER TTSA +166F..167F ; XID_Continue # Lo [17] CANADIAN SYLLABICS QAI..CANADIAN SYLLABICS BLACKFOOT W +1681..169A ; XID_Continue # Lo [26] OGHAM LETTER BEITH..OGHAM LETTER PEITH +16A0..16EA ; XID_Continue # Lo [75] RUNIC LETTER FEHU FEOH FE F..RUNIC LETTER X +16EE..16F0 ; XID_Continue # Nl [3] RUNIC ARLAUG SYMBOL..RUNIC BELGTHOR SYMBOL +16F1..16F8 ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] RUNIC LETTER K..RUNIC LETTER FRANKS CASKET AESC +1700..1711 ; XID_Continue # Lo [18] TAGALOG LETTER A..TAGALOG LETTER HA +1712..1714 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] TAGALOG VOWEL SIGN I..TAGALOG SIGN VIRAMA +1715 ; XID_Continue # Mc TAGALOG SIGN PAMUDPOD +171F..1731 ; XID_Continue # Lo [19] TAGALOG LETTER ARCHAIC RA..HANUNOO LETTER HA +1732..1733 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN I..HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN U +1734 ; XID_Continue # Mc HANUNOO SIGN PAMUDPOD +1740..1751 ; XID_Continue # Lo [18] BUHID LETTER A..BUHID LETTER HA +1752..1753 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] BUHID VOWEL SIGN I..BUHID VOWEL SIGN U +1760..176C ; XID_Continue # Lo [13] TAGBANWA LETTER A..TAGBANWA LETTER YA +176E..1770 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] TAGBANWA LETTER LA..TAGBANWA LETTER SA +1772..1773 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN I..TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN U +1780..17B3 ; XID_Continue # Lo [52] KHMER LETTER KA..KHMER INDEPENDENT VOWEL QAU +17B4..17B5 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AQ..KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AA +17B6 ; XID_Continue # Mc KHMER VOWEL SIGN AA +17B7..17BD ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] KHMER VOWEL SIGN I..KHMER VOWEL SIGN UA +17BE..17C5 ; XID_Continue # Mc [8] KHMER VOWEL SIGN OE..KHMER VOWEL SIGN AU +17C6 ; XID_Continue # Mn KHMER SIGN NIKAHIT +17C7..17C8 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] KHMER SIGN REAHMUK..KHMER SIGN YUUKALEAPINTU +17C9..17D3 ; XID_Continue # Mn [11] KHMER SIGN MUUSIKATOAN..KHMER SIGN BATHAMASAT +17D7 ; XID_Continue # Lm KHMER SIGN LEK TOO +17DC ; XID_Continue # Lo KHMER SIGN AVAKRAHASANYA +17DD ; XID_Continue # Mn KHMER SIGN ATTHACAN +17E0..17E9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] KHMER DIGIT ZERO..KHMER DIGIT NINE +180B..180D ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR ONE..MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR THREE +180F ; XID_Continue # Mn MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR FOUR +1810..1819 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] MONGOLIAN DIGIT ZERO..MONGOLIAN DIGIT NINE +1820..1842 ; XID_Continue # Lo [35] MONGOLIAN LETTER A..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHI +1843 ; XID_Continue # Lm MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO LONG VOWEL SIGN +1844..1878 ; XID_Continue # Lo [53] MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO E..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHA WITH TWO DOTS +1880..1884 ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI ANUSVARA ONE..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI INVERTED UBADAMA +1885..1886 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI BALUDA..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI THREE BALUDA +1887..18A8 ; XID_Continue # Lo [34] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI A..MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI BHA +18A9 ; XID_Continue # Mn MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI DAGALGA +18AA ; XID_Continue # Lo MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI LHA +18B0..18F5 ; XID_Continue # Lo [70] CANADIAN SYLLABICS OY..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER DENTAL S +1900..191E ; XID_Continue # Lo [31] LIMBU VOWEL-CARRIER LETTER..LIMBU LETTER TRA +1920..1922 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN A..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN U +1923..1926 ; XID_Continue # Mc [4] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN EE..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN AU +1927..1928 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN E..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN O +1929..192B ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER WA +1930..1931 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] LIMBU SMALL LETTER KA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER NGA +1932 ; XID_Continue # Mn LIMBU SMALL LETTER ANUSVARA +1933..1938 ; XID_Continue # Mc [6] LIMBU SMALL LETTER TA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER LA +1939..193B ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] LIMBU SIGN MUKPHRENG..LIMBU SIGN SA-I +1946..194F ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] LIMBU DIGIT ZERO..LIMBU DIGIT NINE +1950..196D ; XID_Continue # Lo [30] TAI LE LETTER KA..TAI LE LETTER AI +1970..1974 ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] TAI LE LETTER TONE-2..TAI LE LETTER TONE-6 +1980..19AB ; XID_Continue # Lo [44] NEW TAI LUE LETTER HIGH QA..NEW TAI LUE LETTER LOW SUA +19B0..19C9 ; XID_Continue # Lo [26] NEW TAI LUE VOWEL SIGN VOWEL SHORTENER..NEW TAI LUE TONE MARK-2 +19D0..19D9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] NEW TAI LUE DIGIT ZERO..NEW TAI LUE DIGIT NINE +19DA ; XID_Continue # No NEW TAI LUE THAM DIGIT ONE +1A00..1A16 ; XID_Continue # Lo [23] BUGINESE LETTER KA..BUGINESE LETTER HA +1A17..1A18 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN I..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN U +1A19..1A1A ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN E..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN O +1A1B ; XID_Continue # Mn BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN AE +1A20..1A54 ; XID_Continue # Lo [53] TAI THAM LETTER HIGH KA..TAI THAM LETTER GREAT SA +1A55 ; XID_Continue # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +1A56 ; XID_Continue # Mn TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA +1A57 ; XID_Continue # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN LA TANG LAI +1A58..1A5E ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] TAI THAM SIGN MAI KANG LAI..TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN SA +1A60 ; XID_Continue # Mn TAI THAM SIGN SAKOT +1A61 ; XID_Continue # Mc TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN A +1A62 ; XID_Continue # Mn TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN MAI SAT +1A63..1A64 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN AA..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN TALL AA +1A65..1A6C ; XID_Continue # Mn [8] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN I..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA BELOW +1A6D..1A72 ; XID_Continue # Mc [6] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OY..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN THAM AI +1A73..1A7C ; XID_Continue # Mn [10] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA ABOVE..TAI THAM SIGN KHUEN-LUE KARAN +1A7F ; XID_Continue # Mn TAI THAM COMBINING CRYPTOGRAMMIC DOT +1A80..1A89 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] TAI THAM HORA DIGIT ZERO..TAI THAM HORA DIGIT NINE +1A90..1A99 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] TAI THAM THAM DIGIT ZERO..TAI THAM THAM DIGIT NINE +1AA7 ; XID_Continue # Lm TAI THAM SIGN MAI YAMOK +1AB0..1ABD ; XID_Continue # Mn [14] COMBINING DOUBLED CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..COMBINING PARENTHESES BELOW +1ABF..1ACE ; XID_Continue # Mn [16] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER W BELOW..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +1B00..1B03 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] BALINESE SIGN ULU RICEM..BALINESE SIGN SURANG +1B04 ; XID_Continue # Mc BALINESE SIGN BISAH +1B05..1B33 ; XID_Continue # Lo [47] BALINESE LETTER AKARA..BALINESE LETTER HA +1B34 ; XID_Continue # Mn BALINESE SIGN REREKAN +1B35 ; XID_Continue # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TEDUNG +1B36..1B3A ; XID_Continue # Mn [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN ULU..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA +1B3B ; XID_Continue # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA TEDUNG +1B3C ; XID_Continue # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA +1B3D..1B41 ; XID_Continue # Mc [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA TEDUNG..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TALING REPA TEDUNG +1B42 ; XID_Continue # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET +1B43..1B44 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET TEDUNG..BALINESE ADEG ADEG +1B45..1B4C ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] BALINESE LETTER KAF SASAK..BALINESE LETTER ARCHAIC JNYA +1B50..1B59 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] BALINESE DIGIT ZERO..BALINESE DIGIT NINE +1B6B..1B73 ; XID_Continue # Mn [9] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TEGEH..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING GONG +1B80..1B81 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] SUNDANESE SIGN PANYECEK..SUNDANESE SIGN PANGLAYAR +1B82 ; XID_Continue # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PANGWISAD +1B83..1BA0 ; XID_Continue # Lo [30] SUNDANESE LETTER A..SUNDANESE LETTER HA +1BA1 ; XID_Continue # Mc SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PAMINGKAL +1BA2..1BA5 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PANYAKRA..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANYUKU +1BA6..1BA7 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANAELAENG..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANOLONG +1BA8..1BA9 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PAMEPET..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANEULEUNG +1BAA ; XID_Continue # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PAMAAEH +1BAB..1BAD ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] SUNDANESE SIGN VIRAMA..SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PASANGAN WA +1BAE..1BAF ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] SUNDANESE LETTER KHA..SUNDANESE LETTER SYA +1BB0..1BB9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] SUNDANESE DIGIT ZERO..SUNDANESE DIGIT NINE +1BBA..1BE5 ; XID_Continue # Lo [44] SUNDANESE AVAGRAHA..BATAK LETTER U +1BE6 ; XID_Continue # Mn BATAK SIGN TOMPI +1BE7 ; XID_Continue # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN E +1BE8..1BE9 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] BATAK VOWEL SIGN PAKPAK E..BATAK VOWEL SIGN EE +1BEA..1BEC ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN I..BATAK VOWEL SIGN O +1BED ; XID_Continue # Mn BATAK VOWEL SIGN KARO O +1BEE ; XID_Continue # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN U +1BEF..1BF1 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN U FOR SIMALUNGUN SA..BATAK CONSONANT SIGN H +1BF2..1BF3 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] BATAK PANGOLAT..BATAK PANONGONAN +1C00..1C23 ; XID_Continue # Lo [36] LEPCHA LETTER KA..LEPCHA LETTER A +1C24..1C2B ; XID_Continue # Mc [8] LEPCHA SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN UU +1C2C..1C33 ; XID_Continue # Mn [8] LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN E..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN T +1C34..1C35 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN NYIN-DO..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN KANG +1C36..1C37 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] LEPCHA SIGN RAN..LEPCHA SIGN NUKTA +1C40..1C49 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] LEPCHA DIGIT ZERO..LEPCHA DIGIT NINE +1C4D..1C4F ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] LEPCHA LETTER TTA..LEPCHA LETTER DDA +1C50..1C59 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] OL CHIKI DIGIT ZERO..OL CHIKI DIGIT NINE +1C5A..1C77 ; XID_Continue # Lo [30] OL CHIKI LETTER LA..OL CHIKI LETTER OH +1C78..1C7D ; XID_Continue # Lm [6] OL CHIKI MU TTUDDAG..OL CHIKI AHAD +1C80..1C88 ; XID_Continue # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1C90..1CBA ; XID_Continue # L& [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; XID_Continue # L& [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1CD0..1CD2 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] VEDIC TONE KARSHANA..VEDIC TONE PRENKHA +1CD4..1CE0 ; XID_Continue # Mn [13] VEDIC SIGN YAJURVEDIC MIDLINE SVARITA..VEDIC TONE RIGVEDIC KASHMIRI INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE1 ; XID_Continue # Mc VEDIC TONE ATHARVAVEDIC INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE2..1CE8 ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] VEDIC SIGN VISARGA SVARITA..VEDIC SIGN VISARGA ANUDATTA WITH TAIL +1CE9..1CEC ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA..VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA VAMAGOMUKHA WITH TAIL +1CED ; XID_Continue # Mn VEDIC SIGN TIRYAK +1CEE..1CF3 ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] VEDIC SIGN HEXIFORM LONG ANUSVARA..VEDIC SIGN ROTATED ARDHAVISARGA +1CF4 ; XID_Continue # Mn VEDIC TONE CANDRA ABOVE +1CF5..1CF6 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] VEDIC SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..VEDIC SIGN UPADHMANIYA +1CF7 ; XID_Continue # Mc VEDIC SIGN ATIKRAMA +1CF8..1CF9 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] VEDIC TONE RING ABOVE..VEDIC TONE DOUBLE RING ABOVE +1CFA ; XID_Continue # Lo VEDIC SIGN DOUBLE ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA +1D00..1D2B ; XID_Continue # L& [44] LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL A..CYRILLIC LETTER SMALL CAPITAL EL +1D2C..1D6A ; XID_Continue # Lm [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1D6B..1D77 ; XID_Continue # L& [13] LATIN SMALL LETTER UE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED G +1D78 ; XID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC EN +1D79..1D9A ; XID_Continue # L& [34] LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1D9B..1DBF ; XID_Continue # Lm [37] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED ALPHA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL THETA +1DC0..1DFF ; XID_Continue # Mn [64] COMBINING DOTTED GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING RIGHT ARROWHEAD AND DOWN ARROWHEAD BELOW +1E00..1F15 ; XID_Continue # L& [278] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F18..1F1D ; XID_Continue # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F45 ; XID_Continue # L& [38] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F48..1F4D ; XID_Continue # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; XID_Continue # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F59 ; XID_Continue # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; XID_Continue # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; XID_Continue # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F..1F7D ; XID_Continue # L& [31] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1FB4 ; XID_Continue # L& [53] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FBC ; XID_Continue # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBE ; XID_Continue # L& GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; XID_Continue # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FCC ; XID_Continue # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; XID_Continue # L& [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FDB ; XID_Continue # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE0..1FEC ; XID_Continue # L& [13] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF2..1FF4 ; XID_Continue # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FFC ; XID_Continue # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +203F..2040 ; XID_Continue # Pc [2] UNDERTIE..CHARACTER TIE +2054 ; XID_Continue # Pc INVERTED UNDERTIE +2071 ; XID_Continue # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +207F ; XID_Continue # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER N +2090..209C ; XID_Continue # Lm [13] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER T +20D0..20DC ; XID_Continue # Mn [13] COMBINING LEFT HARPOON ABOVE..COMBINING FOUR DOTS ABOVE +20E1 ; XID_Continue # Mn COMBINING LEFT RIGHT ARROW ABOVE +20E5..20F0 ; XID_Continue # Mn [12] COMBINING REVERSE SOLIDUS OVERLAY..COMBINING ASTERISK ABOVE +2102 ; XID_Continue # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL C +2107 ; XID_Continue # L& EULER CONSTANT +210A..2113 ; XID_Continue # L& [10] SCRIPT SMALL G..SCRIPT SMALL L +2115 ; XID_Continue # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL N +2118 ; XID_Continue # Sm SCRIPT CAPITAL P +2119..211D ; XID_Continue # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL P..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL R +2124 ; XID_Continue # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Z +2126 ; XID_Continue # L& OHM SIGN +2128 ; XID_Continue # L& BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL Z +212A..212D ; XID_Continue # L& [4] KELVIN SIGN..BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL C +212E ; XID_Continue # So ESTIMATED SYMBOL +212F..2134 ; XID_Continue # L& [6] SCRIPT SMALL E..SCRIPT SMALL O +2135..2138 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ALEF SYMBOL..DALET SYMBOL +2139 ; XID_Continue # L& INFORMATION SOURCE +213C..213F ; XID_Continue # L& [4] DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL PI..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL PI +2145..2149 ; XID_Continue # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC CAPITAL D..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +214E ; XID_Continue # L& TURNED SMALL F +2160..2182 ; XID_Continue # Nl [35] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..ROMAN NUMERAL TEN THOUSAND +2183..2184 ; XID_Continue # L& [2] ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +2185..2188 ; XID_Continue # Nl [4] ROMAN NUMERAL SIX LATE FORM..ROMAN NUMERAL ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND +2C00..2C7B ; XID_Continue # L& [124] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED E +2C7C..2C7D ; XID_Continue # Lm [2] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL V +2C7E..2CE4 ; XID_Continue # L& [103] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC SYMBOL KAI +2CEB..2CEE ; XID_Continue # L& [4] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CEF..2CF1 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] COPTIC COMBINING NI ABOVE..COPTIC COMBINING SPIRITUS LENIS +2CF2..2CF3 ; XID_Continue # L& [2] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2D00..2D25 ; XID_Continue # L& [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; XID_Continue # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; XID_Continue # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +2D30..2D67 ; XID_Continue # Lo [56] TIFINAGH LETTER YA..TIFINAGH LETTER YO +2D6F ; XID_Continue # Lm TIFINAGH MODIFIER LETTER LABIALIZATION MARK +2D7F ; XID_Continue # Mn TIFINAGH CONSONANT JOINER +2D80..2D96 ; XID_Continue # Lo [23] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE LOA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGWE +2DA0..2DA6 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSO +2DA8..2DAE ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCO +2DB0..2DB6 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZO +2DB8..2DBE ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHO +2DC0..2DC6 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYO +2DC8..2DCE ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYO +2DD0..2DD6 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYO +2DD8..2DDE ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYO +2DE0..2DFF ; XID_Continue # Mn [32] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER BE..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +3005 ; XID_Continue # Lm IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +3006 ; XID_Continue # Lo IDEOGRAPHIC CLOSING MARK +3007 ; XID_Continue # Nl IDEOGRAPHIC NUMBER ZERO +3021..3029 ; XID_Continue # Nl [9] HANGZHOU NUMERAL ONE..HANGZHOU NUMERAL NINE +302A..302D ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] IDEOGRAPHIC LEVEL TONE MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ENTERING TONE MARK +302E..302F ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] HANGUL SINGLE DOT TONE MARK..HANGUL DOUBLE DOT TONE MARK +3031..3035 ; XID_Continue # Lm [5] VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK..VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK LOWER HALF +3038..303A ; XID_Continue # Nl [3] HANGZHOU NUMERAL TEN..HANGZHOU NUMERAL THIRTY +303B ; XID_Continue # Lm VERTICAL IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +303C ; XID_Continue # Lo MASU MARK +3041..3096 ; XID_Continue # Lo [86] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL A..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL KE +3099..309A ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +309D..309E ; XID_Continue # Lm [2] HIRAGANA ITERATION MARK..HIRAGANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +309F ; XID_Continue # Lo HIRAGANA DIGRAPH YORI +30A1..30FA ; XID_Continue # Lo [90] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL A..KATAKANA LETTER VO +30FC..30FE ; XID_Continue # Lm [3] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +30FF ; XID_Continue # Lo KATAKANA DIGRAPH KOTO +3105..312F ; XID_Continue # Lo [43] BOPOMOFO LETTER B..BOPOMOFO LETTER NN +3131..318E ; XID_Continue # Lo [94] HANGUL LETTER KIYEOK..HANGUL LETTER ARAEAE +31A0..31BF ; XID_Continue # Lo [32] BOPOMOFO LETTER BU..BOPOMOFO LETTER AH +31F0..31FF ; XID_Continue # Lo [16] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL KU..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL RO +3400..4DBF ; XID_Continue # Lo [6592] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3400..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4DBF +4E00..A014 ; XID_Continue # Lo [21013] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4E00..YI SYLLABLE E +A015 ; XID_Continue # Lm YI SYLLABLE WU +A016..A48C ; XID_Continue # Lo [1143] YI SYLLABLE BIT..YI SYLLABLE YYR +A4D0..A4F7 ; XID_Continue # Lo [40] LISU LETTER BA..LISU LETTER OE +A4F8..A4FD ; XID_Continue # Lm [6] LISU LETTER TONE MYA TI..LISU LETTER TONE MYA JEU +A500..A60B ; XID_Continue # Lo [268] VAI SYLLABLE EE..VAI SYLLABLE NG +A60C ; XID_Continue # Lm VAI SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +A610..A61F ; XID_Continue # Lo [16] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE FA..VAI SYMBOL JONG +A620..A629 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] VAI DIGIT ZERO..VAI DIGIT NINE +A62A..A62B ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE MA..VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE DO +A640..A66D ; XID_Continue # L& [46] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A66E ; XID_Continue # Lo CYRILLIC LETTER MULTIOCULAR O +A66F ; XID_Continue # Mn COMBINING CYRILLIC VZMET +A674..A67D ; XID_Continue # Mn [10] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER UKRAINIAN IE..COMBINING CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A67F ; XID_Continue # Lm CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A680..A69B ; XID_Continue # L& [28] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A69C..A69D ; XID_Continue # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A69E..A69F ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER EF..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED E +A6A0..A6E5 ; XID_Continue # Lo [70] BAMUM LETTER A..BAMUM LETTER KI +A6E6..A6EF ; XID_Continue # Nl [10] BAMUM LETTER MO..BAMUM LETTER KOGHOM +A6F0..A6F1 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] BAMUM COMBINING MARK KOQNDON..BAMUM COMBINING MARK TUKWENTIS +A717..A71F ; XID_Continue # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER DOT VERTICAL BAR..MODIFIER LETTER LOW INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +A722..A76F ; XID_Continue # L& [78] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF..LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A770 ; XID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER US +A771..A787 ; XID_Continue # L& [23] LATIN SMALL LETTER DUM..LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A788 ; XID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER LOW CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +A78B..A78E ; XID_Continue # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH RETROFLEX HOOK AND BELT +A78F ; XID_Continue # Lo LATIN LETTER SINOLOGICAL DOT +A790..A7CA ; XID_Continue # L& [59] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0..A7D1 ; XID_Continue # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D3 ; XID_Continue # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE THORN +A7D5..A7D9 ; XID_Continue # L& [5] LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE WYNN..LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F2..A7F4 ; XID_Continue # Lm [3] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL C..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL Q +A7F5..A7F6 ; XID_Continue # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +A7F7 ; XID_Continue # Lo LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER SIDEWAYS I +A7F8..A7F9 ; XID_Continue # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +A7FA ; XID_Continue # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED M +A7FB..A801 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER REVERSED F..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER I +A802 ; XID_Continue # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN DVISVARA +A803..A805 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER U..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER O +A806 ; XID_Continue # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN HASANTA +A807..A80A ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER KO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER GHO +A80B ; XID_Continue # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ANUSVARA +A80C..A822 ; XID_Continue # Lo [23] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER CO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER HO +A823..A824 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN A..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN I +A825..A826 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN U..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN E +A827 ; XID_Continue # Mc SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN OO +A82C ; XID_Continue # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ALTERNATE HASANTA +A840..A873 ; XID_Continue # Lo [52] PHAGS-PA LETTER KA..PHAGS-PA LETTER CANDRABINDU +A880..A881 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN ANUSVARA..SAURASHTRA SIGN VISARGA +A882..A8B3 ; XID_Continue # Lo [50] SAURASHTRA LETTER A..SAURASHTRA LETTER LLA +A8B4..A8C3 ; XID_Continue # Mc [16] SAURASHTRA CONSONANT SIGN HAARU..SAURASHTRA VOWEL SIGN AU +A8C4..A8C5 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN VIRAMA..SAURASHTRA SIGN CANDRABINDU +A8D0..A8D9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] SAURASHTRA DIGIT ZERO..SAURASHTRA DIGIT NINE +A8E0..A8F1 ; XID_Continue # Mn [18] COMBINING DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +A8F2..A8F7 ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] DEVANAGARI SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU..DEVANAGARI SIGN CANDRABINDU AVAGRAHA +A8FB ; XID_Continue # Lo DEVANAGARI HEADSTROKE +A8FD..A8FE ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] DEVANAGARI JAIN OM..DEVANAGARI LETTER AY +A8FF ; XID_Continue # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AY +A900..A909 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] KAYAH LI DIGIT ZERO..KAYAH LI DIGIT NINE +A90A..A925 ; XID_Continue # Lo [28] KAYAH LI LETTER KA..KAYAH LI LETTER OO +A926..A92D ; XID_Continue # Mn [8] KAYAH LI VOWEL UE..KAYAH LI TONE CALYA PLOPHU +A930..A946 ; XID_Continue # Lo [23] REJANG LETTER KA..REJANG LETTER A +A947..A951 ; XID_Continue # Mn [11] REJANG VOWEL SIGN I..REJANG CONSONANT SIGN R +A952..A953 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] REJANG CONSONANT SIGN H..REJANG VIRAMA +A960..A97C ; XID_Continue # Lo [29] HANGUL CHOSEONG TIKEUT-MIEUM..HANGUL CHOSEONG SSANGYEORINHIEUH +A980..A982 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] JAVANESE SIGN PANYANGGA..JAVANESE SIGN LAYAR +A983 ; XID_Continue # Mc JAVANESE SIGN WIGNYAN +A984..A9B2 ; XID_Continue # Lo [47] JAVANESE LETTER A..JAVANESE LETTER HA +A9B3 ; XID_Continue # Mn JAVANESE SIGN CECAK TELU +A9B4..A9B5 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TARUNG..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TOLONG +A9B6..A9B9 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN WULU..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN SUKU MENDUT +A9BA..A9BB ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TALING..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN DIRGA MURE +A9BC..A9BD ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET..JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN KERET +A9BE..A9C0 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN PENGKAL..JAVANESE PANGKON +A9CF ; XID_Continue # Lm JAVANESE PANGRANGKEP +A9D0..A9D9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] JAVANESE DIGIT ZERO..JAVANESE DIGIT NINE +A9E0..A9E4 ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN GHA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN BHA +A9E5 ; XID_Continue # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN SAW +A9E6 ; XID_Continue # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER SHAN REDUPLICATION +A9E7..A9EF ; XID_Continue # Lo [9] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NYA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NNA +A9F0..A9F9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] MYANMAR TAI LAING DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR TAI LAING DIGIT NINE +A9FA..A9FE ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING LLA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING BHA +AA00..AA28 ; XID_Continue # Lo [41] CHAM LETTER A..CHAM LETTER HA +AA29..AA2E ; XID_Continue # Mn [6] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAM VOWEL SIGN OE +AA2F..AA30 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN O..CHAM VOWEL SIGN AI +AA31..AA32 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AU..CHAM VOWEL SIGN UE +AA33..AA34 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN YA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN RA +AA35..AA36 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN LA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN WA +AA40..AA42 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] CHAM LETTER FINAL K..CHAM LETTER FINAL NG +AA43 ; XID_Continue # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL NG +AA44..AA4B ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] CHAM LETTER FINAL CH..CHAM LETTER FINAL SS +AA4C ; XID_Continue # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL M +AA4D ; XID_Continue # Mc CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL H +AA50..AA59 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] CHAM DIGIT ZERO..CHAM DIGIT NINE +AA60..AA6F ; XID_Continue # Lo [16] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI GA..MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI FA +AA70 ; XID_Continue # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER KHAMTI REDUPLICATION +AA71..AA76 ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI XA..MYANMAR LOGOGRAM KHAMTI HM +AA7A ; XID_Continue # Lo MYANMAR LETTER AITON RA +AA7B ; XID_Continue # Mc MYANMAR SIGN PAO KAREN TONE +AA7C ; XID_Continue # Mn MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-2 +AA7D ; XID_Continue # Mc MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-5 +AA7E..AAAF ; XID_Continue # Lo [50] MYANMAR LETTER SHWE PALAUNG CHA..TAI VIET LETTER HIGH O +AAB0 ; XID_Continue # Mn TAI VIET MAI KANG +AAB1 ; XID_Continue # Lo TAI VIET VOWEL AA +AAB2..AAB4 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] TAI VIET VOWEL I..TAI VIET VOWEL U +AAB5..AAB6 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] TAI VIET VOWEL E..TAI VIET VOWEL O +AAB7..AAB8 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] TAI VIET MAI KHIT..TAI VIET VOWEL IA +AAB9..AABD ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] TAI VIET VOWEL UEA..TAI VIET VOWEL AN +AABE..AABF ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] TAI VIET VOWEL AM..TAI VIET TONE MAI EK +AAC0 ; XID_Continue # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI NUENG +AAC1 ; XID_Continue # Mn TAI VIET TONE MAI THO +AAC2 ; XID_Continue # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI SONG +AADB..AADC ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] TAI VIET SYMBOL KON..TAI VIET SYMBOL NUENG +AADD ; XID_Continue # Lm TAI VIET SYMBOL SAM +AAE0..AAEA ; XID_Continue # Lo [11] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER E..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER SSA +AAEB ; XID_Continue # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN II +AAEC..AAED ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAI +AAEE..AAEF ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAU +AAF2 ; XID_Continue # Lo MEETEI MAYEK ANJI +AAF3..AAF4 ; XID_Continue # Lm [2] MEETEI MAYEK SYLLABLE REPETITION MARK..MEETEI MAYEK WORD REPETITION MARK +AAF5 ; XID_Continue # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN VISARGA +AAF6 ; XID_Continue # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VIRAMA +AB01..AB06 ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHO +AB09..AB0E ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHO +AB11..AB16 ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZO +AB20..AB26 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHO +AB28..AB2E ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBO +AB30..AB5A ; XID_Continue # L& [43] LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED ALPHA..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH SHORT RIGHT LEG +AB5C..AB5F ; XID_Continue # Lm [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +AB60..AB68 ; XID_Continue # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER SAKHA YAT..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED R WITH MIDDLE TILDE +AB69 ; XID_Continue # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED W +AB70..ABBF ; XID_Continue # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +ABC0..ABE2 ; XID_Continue # Lo [35] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER KOK..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER I LONSUM +ABE3..ABE4 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ONAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN INAP +ABE5 ; XID_Continue # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ANAP +ABE6..ABE7 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN YENAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN SOUNAP +ABE8 ; XID_Continue # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UNAP +ABE9..ABEA ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN CHEINAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN NUNG +ABEC ; XID_Continue # Mc MEETEI MAYEK LUM IYEK +ABED ; XID_Continue # Mn MEETEI MAYEK APUN IYEK +ABF0..ABF9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] MEETEI MAYEK DIGIT ZERO..MEETEI MAYEK DIGIT NINE +AC00..D7A3 ; XID_Continue # Lo [11172] HANGUL SYLLABLE GA..HANGUL SYLLABLE HIH +D7B0..D7C6 ; XID_Continue # Lo [23] HANGUL JUNGSEONG O-YEO..HANGUL JUNGSEONG ARAEA-E +D7CB..D7FB ; XID_Continue # Lo [49] HANGUL JONGSEONG NIEUN-RIEUL..HANGUL JONGSEONG PHIEUPH-THIEUTH +F900..FA6D ; XID_Continue # Lo [366] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-F900..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA6D +FA70..FAD9 ; XID_Continue # Lo [106] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA70..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FAD9 +FB00..FB06 ; XID_Continue # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; XID_Continue # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FB1D ; XID_Continue # Lo HEBREW LETTER YOD WITH HIRIQ +FB1E ; XID_Continue # Mn HEBREW POINT JUDEO-SPANISH VARIKA +FB1F..FB28 ; XID_Continue # Lo [10] HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH YOD YOD PATAH..HEBREW LETTER WIDE TAV +FB2A..FB36 ; XID_Continue # Lo [13] HEBREW LETTER SHIN WITH SHIN DOT..HEBREW LETTER ZAYIN WITH DAGESH +FB38..FB3C ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] HEBREW LETTER TET WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER LAMED WITH DAGESH +FB3E ; XID_Continue # Lo HEBREW LETTER MEM WITH DAGESH +FB40..FB41 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER NUN WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER SAMEKH WITH DAGESH +FB43..FB44 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER FINAL PE WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER PE WITH DAGESH +FB46..FBB1 ; XID_Continue # Lo [108] HEBREW LETTER TSADI WITH DAGESH..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE FINAL FORM +FBD3..FC5D ; XID_Continue # Lo [139] ARABIC LETTER NG ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE ALEF MAKSURA WITH SUPERSCRIPT ALEF ISOLATED FORM +FC64..FD3D ; XID_Continue # Lo [218] ARABIC LIGATURE YEH WITH HAMZA ABOVE WITH REH FINAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE ALEF WITH FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM +FD50..FD8F ; XID_Continue # Lo [64] ARABIC LIGATURE TEH WITH JEEM WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH KHAH WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM +FD92..FDC7 ; XID_Continue # Lo [54] ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH JEEM WITH KHAH INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE NOON WITH JEEM WITH YEH FINAL FORM +FDF0..FDF9 ; XID_Continue # Lo [10] ARABIC LIGATURE SALLA USED AS KORANIC STOP SIGN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE SALLA ISOLATED FORM +FE00..FE0F ; XID_Continue # Mn [16] VARIATION SELECTOR-1..VARIATION SELECTOR-16 +FE20..FE2F ; XID_Continue # Mn [16] COMBINING LIGATURE LEFT HALF..COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO RIGHT HALF +FE33..FE34 ; XID_Continue # Pc [2] PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LOW LINE..PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL WAVY LOW LINE +FE4D..FE4F ; XID_Continue # Pc [3] DASHED LOW LINE..WAVY LOW LINE +FE71 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC TATWEEL WITH FATHATAN ABOVE +FE73 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC TAIL FRAGMENT +FE77 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC FATHA MEDIAL FORM +FE79 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC DAMMA MEDIAL FORM +FE7B ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC KASRA MEDIAL FORM +FE7D ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC SHADDA MEDIAL FORM +FE7F..FEFC ; XID_Continue # Lo [126] ARABIC SUKUN MEDIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE LAM WITH ALEF FINAL FORM +FF10..FF19 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] FULLWIDTH DIGIT ZERO..FULLWIDTH DIGIT NINE +FF21..FF3A ; XID_Continue # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +FF3F ; XID_Continue # Pc FULLWIDTH LOW LINE +FF41..FF5A ; XID_Continue # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +FF66..FF6F ; XID_Continue # Lo [10] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER WO..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER SMALL TU +FF70 ; XID_Continue # Lm HALFWIDTH KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK +FF71..FF9D ; XID_Continue # Lo [45] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER A..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER N +FF9E..FF9F ; XID_Continue # Lm [2] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA VOICED SOUND MARK..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +FFA0..FFBE ; XID_Continue # Lo [31] HALFWIDTH HANGUL FILLER..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER HIEUH +FFC2..FFC7 ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER A..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER E +FFCA..FFCF ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YEO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER OE +FFD2..FFD7 ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YU +FFDA..FFDC ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER EU..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER I +10000..1000B ; XID_Continue # Lo [12] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B008 A..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B046 JE +1000D..10026 ; XID_Continue # Lo [26] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B036 JO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B032 QO +10028..1003A ; XID_Continue # Lo [19] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B060 RA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B042 WO +1003C..1003D ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B017 ZA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B074 ZE +1003F..1004D ; XID_Continue # Lo [15] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B020 ZO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B091 TWO +10050..1005D ; XID_Continue # Lo [14] LINEAR B SYMBOL B018..LINEAR B SYMBOL B089 +10080..100FA ; XID_Continue # Lo [123] LINEAR B IDEOGRAM B100 MAN..LINEAR B IDEOGRAM VESSEL B305 +10140..10174 ; XID_Continue # Nl [53] GREEK ACROPHONIC ATTIC ONE QUARTER..GREEK ACROPHONIC STRATIAN FIFTY MNAS +101FD ; XID_Continue # Mn PHAISTOS DISC SIGN COMBINING OBLIQUE STROKE +10280..1029C ; XID_Continue # Lo [29] LYCIAN LETTER A..LYCIAN LETTER X +102A0..102D0 ; XID_Continue # Lo [49] CARIAN LETTER A..CARIAN LETTER UUU3 +102E0 ; XID_Continue # Mn COPTIC EPACT THOUSANDS MARK +10300..1031F ; XID_Continue # Lo [32] OLD ITALIC LETTER A..OLD ITALIC LETTER ESS +1032D..10340 ; XID_Continue # Lo [20] OLD ITALIC LETTER YE..GOTHIC LETTER PAIRTHRA +10341 ; XID_Continue # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINETY +10342..10349 ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] GOTHIC LETTER RAIDA..GOTHIC LETTER OTHAL +1034A ; XID_Continue # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINE HUNDRED +10350..10375 ; XID_Continue # Lo [38] OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..OLD PERMIC LETTER IA +10376..1037A ; XID_Continue # Mn [5] COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER SII +10380..1039D ; XID_Continue # Lo [30] UGARITIC LETTER ALPA..UGARITIC LETTER SSU +103A0..103C3 ; XID_Continue # Lo [36] OLD PERSIAN SIGN A..OLD PERSIAN SIGN HA +103C8..103CF ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] OLD PERSIAN SIGN AURAMAZDAA..OLD PERSIAN SIGN BUUMISH +103D1..103D5 ; XID_Continue # Nl [5] OLD PERSIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD PERSIAN NUMBER HUNDRED +10400..1044F ; XID_Continue # L& [80] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +10450..1049D ; XID_Continue # Lo [78] SHAVIAN LETTER PEEP..OSMANYA LETTER OO +104A0..104A9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] OSMANYA DIGIT ZERO..OSMANYA DIGIT NINE +104B0..104D3 ; XID_Continue # L& [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +104D8..104FB ; XID_Continue # L& [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10500..10527 ; XID_Continue # Lo [40] ELBASAN LETTER A..ELBASAN LETTER KHE +10530..10563 ; XID_Continue # Lo [52] CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER ALT..CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER KIW +10570..1057A ; XID_Continue # L& [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; XID_Continue # L& [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; XID_Continue # L& [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; XID_Continue # L& [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10597..105A1 ; XID_Continue # L& [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; XID_Continue # L& [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; XID_Continue # L& [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; XID_Continue # L& [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10600..10736 ; XID_Continue # Lo [311] LINEAR A SIGN AB001..LINEAR A SIGN A664 +10740..10755 ; XID_Continue # Lo [22] LINEAR A SIGN A701 A..LINEAR A SIGN A732 JE +10760..10767 ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] LINEAR A SIGN A800..LINEAR A SIGN A807 +10780..10785 ; XID_Continue # Lm [6] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; XID_Continue # Lm [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; XID_Continue # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL +10800..10805 ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE A..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JA +10808 ; XID_Continue # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JO +1080A..10835 ; XID_Continue # Lo [44] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE KA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE WO +10837..10838 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XE +1083C ; XID_Continue # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZA +1083F..10855 ; XID_Continue # Lo [23] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZO..IMPERIAL ARAMAIC LETTER TAW +10860..10876 ; XID_Continue # Lo [23] PALMYRENE LETTER ALEPH..PALMYRENE LETTER TAW +10880..1089E ; XID_Continue # Lo [31] NABATAEAN LETTER FINAL ALEPH..NABATAEAN LETTER TAW +108E0..108F2 ; XID_Continue # Lo [19] HATRAN LETTER ALEPH..HATRAN LETTER QOPH +108F4..108F5 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] HATRAN LETTER SHIN..HATRAN LETTER TAW +10900..10915 ; XID_Continue # Lo [22] PHOENICIAN LETTER ALF..PHOENICIAN LETTER TAU +10920..10939 ; XID_Continue # Lo [26] LYDIAN LETTER A..LYDIAN LETTER C +10980..109B7 ; XID_Continue # Lo [56] MEROITIC HIEROGLYPHIC LETTER A..MEROITIC CURSIVE LETTER DA +109BE..109BF ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM RMT..MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM IMN +10A00 ; XID_Continue # Lo KHAROSHTHI LETTER A +10A01..10A03 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN I..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +10A05..10A06 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN E..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN O +10A0C..10A0F ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL LENGTH MARK..KHAROSHTHI SIGN VISARGA +10A10..10A13 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] KHAROSHTHI LETTER KA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER GHA +10A15..10A17 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] KHAROSHTHI LETTER CA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER JA +10A19..10A35 ; XID_Continue # Lo [29] KHAROSHTHI LETTER NYA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER VHA +10A38..10A3A ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI SIGN BAR ABOVE..KHAROSHTHI SIGN DOT BELOW +10A3F ; XID_Continue # Mn KHAROSHTHI VIRAMA +10A60..10A7C ; XID_Continue # Lo [29] OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER HE..OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER THETH +10A80..10A9C ; XID_Continue # Lo [29] OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER HEH..OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER ZAH +10AC0..10AC7 ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] MANICHAEAN LETTER ALEPH..MANICHAEAN LETTER WAW +10AC9..10AE4 ; XID_Continue # Lo [28] MANICHAEAN LETTER ZAYIN..MANICHAEAN LETTER TAW +10AE5..10AE6 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK ABOVE..MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK BELOW +10B00..10B35 ; XID_Continue # Lo [54] AVESTAN LETTER A..AVESTAN LETTER HE +10B40..10B55 ; XID_Continue # Lo [22] INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER TAW +10B60..10B72 ; XID_Continue # Lo [19] INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10B80..10B91 ; XID_Continue # Lo [18] PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10C00..10C48 ; XID_Continue # Lo [73] OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON A..OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON BASH +10C80..10CB2 ; XID_Continue # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +10CC0..10CF2 ; XID_Continue # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +10D00..10D23 ; XID_Continue # Lo [36] HANIFI ROHINGYA LETTER A..HANIFI ROHINGYA MARK NA KHONNA +10D24..10D27 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN HARBAHAY..HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN TASSI +10D30..10D39 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] HANIFI ROHINGYA DIGIT ZERO..HANIFI ROHINGYA DIGIT NINE +10E80..10EA9 ; XID_Continue # Lo [42] YEZIDI LETTER ELIF..YEZIDI LETTER ET +10EAB..10EAC ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] YEZIDI COMBINING HAMZA MARK..YEZIDI COMBINING MADDA MARK +10EB0..10EB1 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] YEZIDI LETTER LAM WITH DOT ABOVE..YEZIDI LETTER YOT WITH CIRCUMFLEX ABOVE +10F00..10F1C ; XID_Continue # Lo [29] OLD SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..OLD SOGDIAN LETTER FINAL TAW WITH VERTICAL TAIL +10F27 ; XID_Continue # Lo OLD SOGDIAN LIGATURE AYIN-DALETH +10F30..10F45 ; XID_Continue # Lo [22] SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..SOGDIAN INDEPENDENT SHIN +10F46..10F50 ; XID_Continue # Mn [11] SOGDIAN COMBINING DOT BELOW..SOGDIAN COMBINING STROKE BELOW +10F70..10F81 ; XID_Continue # Lo [18] OLD UYGHUR LETTER ALEPH..OLD UYGHUR LETTER LESH +10F82..10F85 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] OLD UYGHUR COMBINING DOT ABOVE..OLD UYGHUR COMBINING TWO DOTS BELOW +10FB0..10FC4 ; XID_Continue # Lo [21] CHORASMIAN LETTER ALEPH..CHORASMIAN LETTER TAW +10FE0..10FF6 ; XID_Continue # Lo [23] ELYMAIC LETTER ALEPH..ELYMAIC LIGATURE ZAYIN-YODH +11000 ; XID_Continue # Mc BRAHMI SIGN CANDRABINDU +11001 ; XID_Continue # Mn BRAHMI SIGN ANUSVARA +11002 ; XID_Continue # Mc BRAHMI SIGN VISARGA +11003..11037 ; XID_Continue # Lo [53] BRAHMI SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL NNNA +11038..11046 ; XID_Continue # Mn [15] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN AA..BRAHMI VIRAMA +11066..1106F ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] BRAHMI DIGIT ZERO..BRAHMI DIGIT NINE +11070 ; XID_Continue # Mn BRAHMI SIGN OLD TAMIL VIRAMA +11071..11072 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT O +11073..11074 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT O +11075 ; XID_Continue # Lo BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL LLA +1107F..11081 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] BRAHMI NUMBER JOINER..KAITHI SIGN ANUSVARA +11082 ; XID_Continue # Mc KAITHI SIGN VISARGA +11083..110AF ; XID_Continue # Lo [45] KAITHI LETTER A..KAITHI LETTER HA +110B0..110B2 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AA..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN II +110B3..110B6 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN U..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AI +110B7..110B8 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN O..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AU +110B9..110BA ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] KAITHI SIGN VIRAMA..KAITHI SIGN NUKTA +110C2 ; XID_Continue # Mn KAITHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +110D0..110E8 ; XID_Continue # Lo [25] SORA SOMPENG LETTER SAH..SORA SOMPENG LETTER MAE +110F0..110F9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] SORA SOMPENG DIGIT ZERO..SORA SOMPENG DIGIT NINE +11100..11102 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] CHAKMA SIGN CANDRABINDU..CHAKMA SIGN VISARGA +11103..11126 ; XID_Continue # Lo [36] CHAKMA LETTER AA..CHAKMA LETTER HAA +11127..1112B ; XID_Continue # Mn [5] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN A..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN UU +1112C ; XID_Continue # Mc CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN E +1112D..11134 ; XID_Continue # Mn [8] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AI..CHAKMA MAAYYAA +11136..1113F ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] CHAKMA DIGIT ZERO..CHAKMA DIGIT NINE +11144 ; XID_Continue # Lo CHAKMA LETTER LHAA +11145..11146 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN EI +11147 ; XID_Continue # Lo CHAKMA LETTER VAA +11150..11172 ; XID_Continue # Lo [35] MAHAJANI LETTER A..MAHAJANI LETTER RRA +11173 ; XID_Continue # Mn MAHAJANI SIGN NUKTA +11176 ; XID_Continue # Lo MAHAJANI LIGATURE SHRI +11180..11181 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] SHARADA SIGN CANDRABINDU..SHARADA SIGN ANUSVARA +11182 ; XID_Continue # Mc SHARADA SIGN VISARGA +11183..111B2 ; XID_Continue # Lo [48] SHARADA LETTER A..SHARADA LETTER HA +111B3..111B5 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AA..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN II +111B6..111BE ; XID_Continue # Mn [9] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN U..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN O +111BF..111C0 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AU..SHARADA SIGN VIRAMA +111C1..111C4 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] SHARADA SIGN AVAGRAHA..SHARADA OM +111C9..111CC ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] SHARADA SANDHI MARK..SHARADA EXTRA SHORT VOWEL MARK +111CE ; XID_Continue # Mc SHARADA VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +111CF ; XID_Continue # Mn SHARADA SIGN INVERTED CANDRABINDU +111D0..111D9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] SHARADA DIGIT ZERO..SHARADA DIGIT NINE +111DA ; XID_Continue # Lo SHARADA EKAM +111DC ; XID_Continue # Lo SHARADA HEADSTROKE +11200..11211 ; XID_Continue # Lo [18] KHOJKI LETTER A..KHOJKI LETTER JJA +11213..1122B ; XID_Continue # Lo [25] KHOJKI LETTER NYA..KHOJKI LETTER LLA +1122C..1122E ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN II +1122F..11231 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN U..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AI +11232..11233 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN O..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AU +11234 ; XID_Continue # Mn KHOJKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11235 ; XID_Continue # Mc KHOJKI SIGN VIRAMA +11236..11237 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] KHOJKI SIGN NUKTA..KHOJKI SIGN SHADDA +1123E ; XID_Continue # Mn KHOJKI SIGN SUKUN +11280..11286 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] MULTANI LETTER A..MULTANI LETTER GA +11288 ; XID_Continue # Lo MULTANI LETTER GHA +1128A..1128D ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] MULTANI LETTER CA..MULTANI LETTER JJA +1128F..1129D ; XID_Continue # Lo [15] MULTANI LETTER NYA..MULTANI LETTER BA +1129F..112A8 ; XID_Continue # Lo [10] MULTANI LETTER BHA..MULTANI LETTER RHA +112B0..112DE ; XID_Continue # Lo [47] KHUDAWADI LETTER A..KHUDAWADI LETTER HA +112DF ; XID_Continue # Mn KHUDAWADI SIGN ANUSVARA +112E0..112E2 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN II +112E3..112EA ; XID_Continue # Mn [8] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN U..KHUDAWADI SIGN VIRAMA +112F0..112F9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] KHUDAWADI DIGIT ZERO..KHUDAWADI DIGIT NINE +11300..11301 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] GRANTHA SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..GRANTHA SIGN CANDRABINDU +11302..11303 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] GRANTHA SIGN ANUSVARA..GRANTHA SIGN VISARGA +11305..1130C ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] GRANTHA LETTER A..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC L +1130F..11310 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER EE..GRANTHA LETTER AI +11313..11328 ; XID_Continue # Lo [22] GRANTHA LETTER OO..GRANTHA LETTER NA +1132A..11330 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] GRANTHA LETTER PA..GRANTHA LETTER RA +11332..11333 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER LA..GRANTHA LETTER LLA +11335..11339 ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] GRANTHA LETTER VA..GRANTHA LETTER HA +1133B..1133C ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] COMBINING BINDU BELOW..GRANTHA SIGN NUKTA +1133D ; XID_Continue # Lo GRANTHA SIGN AVAGRAHA +1133E..1133F ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AA..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN I +11340 ; XID_Continue # Mn GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN II +11341..11344 ; XID_Continue # Mc [4] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN U..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +11347..11348 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN EE..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AI +1134B..1134D ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN OO..GRANTHA SIGN VIRAMA +11350 ; XID_Continue # Lo GRANTHA OM +11357 ; XID_Continue # Mc GRANTHA AU LENGTH MARK +1135D..11361 ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] GRANTHA SIGN PLUTA..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC LL +11362..11363 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +11366..1136C ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT SIX +11370..11374 ; XID_Continue # Mn [5] COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER A..COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER PA +11400..11434 ; XID_Continue # Lo [53] NEWA LETTER A..NEWA LETTER HA +11435..11437 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] NEWA VOWEL SIGN AA..NEWA VOWEL SIGN II +11438..1143F ; XID_Continue # Mn [8] NEWA VOWEL SIGN U..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AI +11440..11441 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] NEWA VOWEL SIGN O..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AU +11442..11444 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] NEWA SIGN VIRAMA..NEWA SIGN ANUSVARA +11445 ; XID_Continue # Mc NEWA SIGN VISARGA +11446 ; XID_Continue # Mn NEWA SIGN NUKTA +11447..1144A ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] NEWA SIGN AVAGRAHA..NEWA SIDDHI +11450..11459 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] NEWA DIGIT ZERO..NEWA DIGIT NINE +1145E ; XID_Continue # Mn NEWA SANDHI MARK +1145F..11461 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] NEWA LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..NEWA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +11480..114AF ; XID_Continue # Lo [48] TIRHUTA ANJI..TIRHUTA LETTER HA +114B0..114B2 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AA..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN II +114B3..114B8 ; XID_Continue # Mn [6] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN U..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +114B9 ; XID_Continue # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN E +114BA ; XID_Continue # Mn TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN SHORT E +114BB..114BE ; XID_Continue # Mc [4] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AI..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AU +114BF..114C0 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN CANDRABINDU..TIRHUTA SIGN ANUSVARA +114C1 ; XID_Continue # Mc TIRHUTA SIGN VISARGA +114C2..114C3 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN VIRAMA..TIRHUTA SIGN NUKTA +114C4..114C5 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] TIRHUTA SIGN AVAGRAHA..TIRHUTA GVANG +114C7 ; XID_Continue # Lo TIRHUTA OM +114D0..114D9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] TIRHUTA DIGIT ZERO..TIRHUTA DIGIT NINE +11580..115AE ; XID_Continue # Lo [47] SIDDHAM LETTER A..SIDDHAM LETTER HA +115AF..115B1 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN II +115B2..115B5 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +115B8..115BB ; XID_Continue # Mc [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN E..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AU +115BC..115BD ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN CANDRABINDU..SIDDHAM SIGN ANUSVARA +115BE ; XID_Continue # Mc SIDDHAM SIGN VISARGA +115BF..115C0 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN VIRAMA..SIDDHAM SIGN NUKTA +115D8..115DB ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] SIDDHAM LETTER THREE-CIRCLE ALTERNATE I..SIDDHAM LETTER ALTERNATE U +115DC..115DD ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE UU +11600..1162F ; XID_Continue # Lo [48] MODI LETTER A..MODI LETTER LLA +11630..11632 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] MODI VOWEL SIGN AA..MODI VOWEL SIGN II +11633..1163A ; XID_Continue # Mn [8] MODI VOWEL SIGN U..MODI VOWEL SIGN AI +1163B..1163C ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] MODI VOWEL SIGN O..MODI VOWEL SIGN AU +1163D ; XID_Continue # Mn MODI SIGN ANUSVARA +1163E ; XID_Continue # Mc MODI SIGN VISARGA +1163F..11640 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MODI SIGN VIRAMA..MODI SIGN ARDHACANDRA +11644 ; XID_Continue # Lo MODI SIGN HUVA +11650..11659 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] MODI DIGIT ZERO..MODI DIGIT NINE +11680..116AA ; XID_Continue # Lo [43] TAKRI LETTER A..TAKRI LETTER RRA +116AB ; XID_Continue # Mn TAKRI SIGN ANUSVARA +116AC ; XID_Continue # Mc TAKRI SIGN VISARGA +116AD ; XID_Continue # Mn TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AA +116AE..116AF ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN I..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN II +116B0..116B5 ; XID_Continue # Mn [6] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN U..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AU +116B6 ; XID_Continue # Mc TAKRI SIGN VIRAMA +116B7 ; XID_Continue # Mn TAKRI SIGN NUKTA +116B8 ; XID_Continue # Lo TAKRI LETTER ARCHAIC KHA +116C0..116C9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] TAKRI DIGIT ZERO..TAKRI DIGIT NINE +11700..1171A ; XID_Continue # Lo [27] AHOM LETTER KA..AHOM LETTER ALTERNATE BA +1171D..1171F ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA..AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LIGATING RA +11720..11721 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] AHOM VOWEL SIGN A..AHOM VOWEL SIGN AA +11722..11725 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] AHOM VOWEL SIGN I..AHOM VOWEL SIGN UU +11726 ; XID_Continue # Mc AHOM VOWEL SIGN E +11727..1172B ; XID_Continue # Mn [5] AHOM VOWEL SIGN AW..AHOM SIGN KILLER +11730..11739 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] AHOM DIGIT ZERO..AHOM DIGIT NINE +11740..11746 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] AHOM LETTER CA..AHOM LETTER LLA +11800..1182B ; XID_Continue # Lo [44] DOGRA LETTER A..DOGRA LETTER RRA +1182C..1182E ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN AA..DOGRA VOWEL SIGN II +1182F..11837 ; XID_Continue # Mn [9] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN U..DOGRA SIGN ANUSVARA +11838 ; XID_Continue # Mc DOGRA SIGN VISARGA +11839..1183A ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] DOGRA SIGN VIRAMA..DOGRA SIGN NUKTA +118A0..118DF ; XID_Continue # L& [64] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +118E0..118E9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] WARANG CITI DIGIT ZERO..WARANG CITI DIGIT NINE +118FF..11906 ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] WARANG CITI OM..DIVES AKURU LETTER E +11909 ; XID_Continue # Lo DIVES AKURU LETTER O +1190C..11913 ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] DIVES AKURU LETTER KA..DIVES AKURU LETTER JA +11915..11916 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] DIVES AKURU LETTER NYA..DIVES AKURU LETTER TTA +11918..1192F ; XID_Continue # Lo [24] DIVES AKURU LETTER DDA..DIVES AKURU LETTER ZA +11930..11935 ; XID_Continue # Mc [6] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AA..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN E +11937..11938 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AI..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN O +1193B..1193C ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] DIVES AKURU SIGN ANUSVARA..DIVES AKURU SIGN CANDRABINDU +1193D ; XID_Continue # Mc DIVES AKURU SIGN HALANTA +1193E ; XID_Continue # Mn DIVES AKURU VIRAMA +1193F ; XID_Continue # Lo DIVES AKURU PREFIXED NASAL SIGN +11940 ; XID_Continue # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL YA +11941 ; XID_Continue # Lo DIVES AKURU INITIAL RA +11942 ; XID_Continue # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL RA +11943 ; XID_Continue # Mn DIVES AKURU SIGN NUKTA +11950..11959 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] DIVES AKURU DIGIT ZERO..DIVES AKURU DIGIT NINE +119A0..119A7 ; XID_Continue # Lo [8] NANDINAGARI LETTER A..NANDINAGARI LETTER VOCALIC RR +119AA..119D0 ; XID_Continue # Lo [39] NANDINAGARI LETTER E..NANDINAGARI LETTER RRA +119D1..119D3 ; XID_Continue # Mc [3] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +119D4..119D7 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +119DA..119DB ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN E..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +119DC..119DF ; XID_Continue # Mc [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN O..NANDINAGARI SIGN VISARGA +119E0 ; XID_Continue # Mn NANDINAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +119E1 ; XID_Continue # Lo NANDINAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +119E3 ; XID_Continue # Lo NANDINAGARI HEADSTROKE +119E4 ; XID_Continue # Mc NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +11A00 ; XID_Continue # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER A +11A01..11A0A ; XID_Continue # Mn [10] ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN I..ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A0B..11A32 ; XID_Continue # Lo [40] ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KSSA +11A33..11A38 ; XID_Continue # Mn [6] ZANABAZAR SQUARE FINAL CONSONANT MARK..ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN ANUSVARA +11A39 ; XID_Continue # Mc ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN VISARGA +11A3A ; XID_Continue # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER RA +11A3B..11A3E ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER YA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER VA +11A47 ; XID_Continue # Mn ZANABAZAR SQUARE SUBJOINER +11A50 ; XID_Continue # Lo SOYOMBO LETTER A +11A51..11A56 ; XID_Continue # Mn [6] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN I..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN OE +11A57..11A58 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AI..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AU +11A59..11A5B ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..SOYOMBO VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A5C..11A89 ; XID_Continue # Lo [46] SOYOMBO LETTER KA..SOYOMBO CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER SA +11A8A..11A96 ; XID_Continue # Mn [13] SOYOMBO FINAL CONSONANT SIGN G..SOYOMBO SIGN ANUSVARA +11A97 ; XID_Continue # Mc SOYOMBO SIGN VISARGA +11A98..11A99 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] SOYOMBO GEMINATION MARK..SOYOMBO SUBJOINER +11A9D ; XID_Continue # Lo SOYOMBO MARK PLUTA +11AB0..11AF8 ; XID_Continue # Lo [73] CANADIAN SYLLABICS NATTILIK HI..PAU CIN HAU GLOTTAL STOP FINAL +11C00..11C08 ; XID_Continue # Lo [9] BHAIKSUKI LETTER A..BHAIKSUKI LETTER VOCALIC L +11C0A..11C2E ; XID_Continue # Lo [37] BHAIKSUKI LETTER E..BHAIKSUKI LETTER HA +11C2F ; XID_Continue # Mc BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN AA +11C30..11C36 ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN I..BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L +11C38..11C3D ; XID_Continue # Mn [6] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN E..BHAIKSUKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11C3E ; XID_Continue # Mc BHAIKSUKI SIGN VISARGA +11C3F ; XID_Continue # Mn BHAIKSUKI SIGN VIRAMA +11C40 ; XID_Continue # Lo BHAIKSUKI SIGN AVAGRAHA +11C50..11C59 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] BHAIKSUKI DIGIT ZERO..BHAIKSUKI DIGIT NINE +11C72..11C8F ; XID_Continue # Lo [30] MARCHEN LETTER KA..MARCHEN LETTER A +11C92..11CA7 ; XID_Continue # Mn [22] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER KA..MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER ZA +11CA9 ; XID_Continue # Mc MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER YA +11CAA..11CB0 ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER RA..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN AA +11CB1 ; XID_Continue # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN I +11CB2..11CB3 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN U..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN E +11CB4 ; XID_Continue # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN O +11CB5..11CB6 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MARCHEN SIGN ANUSVARA..MARCHEN SIGN CANDRABINDU +11D00..11D06 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] MASARAM GONDI LETTER A..MASARAM GONDI LETTER E +11D08..11D09 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AI..MASARAM GONDI LETTER O +11D0B..11D30 ; XID_Continue # Lo [38] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AU..MASARAM GONDI LETTER TRA +11D31..11D36 ; XID_Continue # Mn [6] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11D3A ; XID_Continue # Mn MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN E +11D3C..11D3D ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN O +11D3F..11D45 ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU..MASARAM GONDI VIRAMA +11D46 ; XID_Continue # Lo MASARAM GONDI REPHA +11D47 ; XID_Continue # Mn MASARAM GONDI RA-KARA +11D50..11D59 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] MASARAM GONDI DIGIT ZERO..MASARAM GONDI DIGIT NINE +11D60..11D65 ; XID_Continue # Lo [6] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER A..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER UU +11D67..11D68 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER EE..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER AI +11D6A..11D89 ; XID_Continue # Lo [32] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER OO..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER SA +11D8A..11D8E ; XID_Continue # Mc [5] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN UU +11D90..11D91 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN EE..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI +11D93..11D94 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN OO..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU +11D95 ; XID_Continue # Mn GUNJALA GONDI SIGN ANUSVARA +11D96 ; XID_Continue # Mc GUNJALA GONDI SIGN VISARGA +11D97 ; XID_Continue # Mn GUNJALA GONDI VIRAMA +11D98 ; XID_Continue # Lo GUNJALA GONDI OM +11DA0..11DA9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] GUNJALA GONDI DIGIT ZERO..GUNJALA GONDI DIGIT NINE +11EE0..11EF2 ; XID_Continue # Lo [19] MAKASAR LETTER KA..MAKASAR ANGKA +11EF3..11EF4 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN I..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN U +11EF5..11EF6 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN E..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN O +11FB0 ; XID_Continue # Lo LISU LETTER YHA +12000..12399 ; XID_Continue # Lo [922] CUNEIFORM SIGN A..CUNEIFORM SIGN U U +12400..1246E ; XID_Continue # Nl [111] CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN TWO ASH..CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN NINE U VARIANT FORM +12480..12543 ; XID_Continue # Lo [196] CUNEIFORM SIGN AB TIMES NUN TENU..CUNEIFORM SIGN ZU5 TIMES THREE DISH TENU +12F90..12FF0 ; XID_Continue # Lo [97] CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM001..CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM114 +13000..1342E ; XID_Continue # Lo [1071] EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH AA032 +14400..14646 ; XID_Continue # Lo [583] ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A530 +16800..16A38 ; XID_Continue # Lo [569] BAMUM LETTER PHASE-A NGKUE MFON..BAMUM LETTER PHASE-F VUEQ +16A40..16A5E ; XID_Continue # Lo [31] MRO LETTER TA..MRO LETTER TEK +16A60..16A69 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] MRO DIGIT ZERO..MRO DIGIT NINE +16A70..16ABE ; XID_Continue # Lo [79] TANGSA LETTER OZ..TANGSA LETTER ZA +16AC0..16AC9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] TANGSA DIGIT ZERO..TANGSA DIGIT NINE +16AD0..16AED ; XID_Continue # Lo [30] BASSA VAH LETTER ENNI..BASSA VAH LETTER I +16AF0..16AF4 ; XID_Continue # Mn [5] BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH TONE..BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH-LOW TONE +16B00..16B2F ; XID_Continue # Lo [48] PAHAWH HMONG VOWEL KEEB..PAHAWH HMONG CONSONANT CAU +16B30..16B36 ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TUB..PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TAUM +16B40..16B43 ; XID_Continue # Lm [4] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS SEEV..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN IB YAM +16B50..16B59 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] PAHAWH HMONG DIGIT ZERO..PAHAWH HMONG DIGIT NINE +16B63..16B77 ; XID_Continue # Lo [21] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS LUB..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN CIM NRES TOS +16B7D..16B8F ; XID_Continue # Lo [19] PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN TSHEEJ..PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN VWJ +16E40..16E7F ; XID_Continue # L& [64] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +16F00..16F4A ; XID_Continue # Lo [75] MIAO LETTER PA..MIAO LETTER RTE +16F4F ; XID_Continue # Mn MIAO SIGN CONSONANT MODIFIER BAR +16F50 ; XID_Continue # Lo MIAO LETTER NASALIZATION +16F51..16F87 ; XID_Continue # Mc [55] MIAO SIGN ASPIRATION..MIAO VOWEL SIGN UI +16F8F..16F92 ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] MIAO TONE RIGHT..MIAO TONE BELOW +16F93..16F9F ; XID_Continue # Lm [13] MIAO LETTER TONE-2..MIAO LETTER REFORMED TONE-8 +16FE0..16FE1 ; XID_Continue # Lm [2] TANGUT ITERATION MARK..NUSHU ITERATION MARK +16FE3 ; XID_Continue # Lm OLD CHINESE ITERATION MARK +16FE4 ; XID_Continue # Mn KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT FILLER +16FF0..16FF1 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK CA..VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK NHAY +17000..187F7 ; XID_Continue # Lo [6136] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-17000..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-187F7 +18800..18CD5 ; XID_Continue # Lo [1238] TANGUT COMPONENT-001..KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT CHARACTER-18CD5 +18D00..18D08 ; XID_Continue # Lo [9] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D00..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D08 +1AFF0..1AFF3 ; XID_Continue # Lm [4] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-2..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-5 +1AFF5..1AFFB ; XID_Continue # Lm [7] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-5 +1AFFD..1AFFE ; XID_Continue # Lm [2] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-8 +1B000..1B122 ; XID_Continue # Lo [291] KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC E..KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC WU +1B150..1B152 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WI..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WO +1B164..1B167 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL WI..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL N +1B170..1B2FB ; XID_Continue # Lo [396] NUSHU CHARACTER-1B170..NUSHU CHARACTER-1B2FB +1BC00..1BC6A ; XID_Continue # Lo [107] DUPLOYAN LETTER H..DUPLOYAN LETTER VOCALIC M +1BC70..1BC7C ; XID_Continue # Lo [13] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LEFT HORIZONTAL SECANT..DUPLOYAN AFFIX ATTACHED TANGENT HOOK +1BC80..1BC88 ; XID_Continue # Lo [9] DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH VERTICAL +1BC90..1BC99 ; XID_Continue # Lo [10] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ARROW +1BC9D..1BC9E ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] DUPLOYAN THICK LETTER SELECTOR..DUPLOYAN DOUBLE MARK +1CF00..1CF2D ; XID_Continue # Mn [46] ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK GORAZDO NIZKO S KRYZHEM ON LEFT..ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK KRYZH ON LEFT +1CF30..1CF46 ; XID_Continue # Mn [23] ZNAMENNY COMBINING TONAL RANGE MARK MRACHNO..ZNAMENNY PRIZNAK MODIFIER ROG +1D165..1D166 ; XID_Continue # Mc [2] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING STEM..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SPRECHGESANG STEM +1D167..1D169 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-3 +1D16D..1D172 ; XID_Continue # Mc [6] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING AUGMENTATION DOT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING FLAG-5 +1D17B..1D182 ; XID_Continue # Mn [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING ACCENT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING LOURE +1D185..1D18B ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOIT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TRIPLE TONGUE +1D1AA..1D1AD ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOWN BOW..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SNAP PIZZICATO +1D242..1D244 ; XID_Continue # Mn [3] COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL TRISEME..COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL PENTASEME +1D400..1D454 ; XID_Continue # L& [85] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL G +1D456..1D49C ; XID_Continue # L& [71] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A +1D49E..1D49F ; XID_Continue # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D +1D4A2 ; XID_Continue # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL G +1D4A5..1D4A6 ; XID_Continue # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K +1D4A9..1D4AC ; XID_Continue # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Q +1D4AE..1D4B9 ; XID_Continue # L& [12] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL D +1D4BB ; XID_Continue # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL F +1D4BD..1D4C3 ; XID_Continue # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL H..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL N +1D4C5..1D505 ; XID_Continue # L& [65] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL P..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL B +1D507..1D50A ; XID_Continue # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL G +1D50D..1D514 ; XID_Continue # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Q +1D516..1D51C ; XID_Continue # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Y +1D51E..1D539 ; XID_Continue # L& [28] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL B +1D53B..1D53E ; XID_Continue # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL G +1D540..1D544 ; XID_Continue # L& [5] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M +1D546 ; XID_Continue # L& MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL O +1D54A..1D550 ; XID_Continue # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Y +1D552..1D6A5 ; XID_Continue # L& [340] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL DOTLESS J +1D6A8..1D6C0 ; XID_Continue # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6C2..1D6DA ; XID_Continue # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D6DC..1D6FA ; XID_Continue # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6FC..1D714 ; XID_Continue # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D716..1D734 ; XID_Continue # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D736..1D74E ; XID_Continue # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D750..1D76E ; XID_Continue # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D770..1D788 ; XID_Continue # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D78A..1D7A8 ; XID_Continue # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D7AA..1D7C2 ; XID_Continue # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D7C4..1D7CB ; XID_Continue # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL DIGAMMA +1D7CE..1D7FF ; XID_Continue # Nd [50] MATHEMATICAL BOLD DIGIT ZERO..MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE DIGIT NINE +1DA00..1DA36 ; XID_Continue # Mn [55] SIGNWRITING HEAD RIM..SIGNWRITING AIR SUCKING IN +1DA3B..1DA6C ; XID_Continue # Mn [50] SIGNWRITING MOUTH CLOSED NEUTRAL..SIGNWRITING EXCITEMENT +1DA75 ; XID_Continue # Mn SIGNWRITING UPPER BODY TILTING FROM HIP JOINTS +1DA84 ; XID_Continue # Mn SIGNWRITING LOCATION HEAD NECK +1DA9B..1DA9F ; XID_Continue # Mn [5] SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-6 +1DAA1..1DAAF ; XID_Continue # Mn [15] SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-16 +1DF00..1DF09 ; XID_Continue # L& [10] LATIN SMALL LETTER FENG DIGRAPH WITH TRILL..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK AND RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0A ; XID_Continue # Lo LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0B..1DF1E ; XID_Continue # L& [20] LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH WITH DOUBLE BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CURL +1E000..1E006 ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER AZU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZHIVETE +1E008..1E018 ; XID_Continue # Mn [17] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZEMLJA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER HERU +1E01B..1E021 ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SHTA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YATI +1E023..1E024 ; XID_Continue # Mn [2] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SMALL YUS +1E026..1E02A ; XID_Continue # Mn [5] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YO..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER FITA +1E100..1E12C ; XID_Continue # Lo [45] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER MA..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER W +1E130..1E136 ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-B..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-D +1E137..1E13D ; XID_Continue # Lm [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SIGN FOR PERSON..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +1E140..1E149 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG DIGIT ZERO..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG DIGIT NINE +1E14E ; XID_Continue # Lo NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LOGOGRAM NYAJ +1E290..1E2AD ; XID_Continue # Lo [30] TOTO LETTER PA..TOTO LETTER A +1E2AE ; XID_Continue # Mn TOTO SIGN RISING TONE +1E2C0..1E2EB ; XID_Continue # Lo [44] WANCHO LETTER AA..WANCHO LETTER YIH +1E2EC..1E2EF ; XID_Continue # Mn [4] WANCHO TONE TUP..WANCHO TONE KOINI +1E2F0..1E2F9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] WANCHO DIGIT ZERO..WANCHO DIGIT NINE +1E7E0..1E7E6 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYO +1E7E8..1E7EB ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE HHWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHWE +1E7ED..1E7EE ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWEE +1E7F0..1E7FE ; XID_Continue # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE PWEE +1E800..1E8C4 ; XID_Continue # Lo [197] MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M001 KI..MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M060 NYON +1E8D0..1E8D6 ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER TEENS..MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER MILLIONS +1E900..1E943 ; XID_Continue # L& [68] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA +1E944..1E94A ; XID_Continue # Mn [7] ADLAM ALIF LENGTHENER..ADLAM NUKTA +1E94B ; XID_Continue # Lm ADLAM NASALIZATION MARK +1E950..1E959 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] ADLAM DIGIT ZERO..ADLAM DIGIT NINE +1EE00..1EE03 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DAL +1EE05..1EE1F ; XID_Continue # Lo [27] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOTLESS QAF +1EE21..1EE22 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL JEEM +1EE24 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HEH +1EE27 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HAH +1EE29..1EE32 ; XID_Continue # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL YEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL QAF +1EE34..1EE37 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL KHAH +1EE39 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL DAD +1EE3B ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL GHAIN +1EE42 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED JEEM +1EE47 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED HAH +1EE49 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED YEH +1EE4B ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED LAM +1EE4D..1EE4F ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED NOON..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED AIN +1EE51..1EE52 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED QAF +1EE54 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SHEEN +1EE57 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED KHAH +1EE59 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DAD +1EE5B ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED GHAIN +1EE5D ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS NOON +1EE5F ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS QAF +1EE61..1EE62 ; XID_Continue # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED JEEM +1EE64 ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HEH +1EE67..1EE6A ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HAH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KAF +1EE6C..1EE72 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED MEEM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED QAF +1EE74..1EE77 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KHAH +1EE79..1EE7C ; XID_Continue # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS BEH +1EE7E ; XID_Continue # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS FEH +1EE80..1EE89 ; XID_Continue # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED YEH +1EE8B..1EE9B ; XID_Continue # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED GHAIN +1EEA1..1EEA3 ; XID_Continue # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK DAL +1EEA5..1EEA9 ; XID_Continue # Lo [5] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK YEH +1EEAB..1EEBB ; XID_Continue # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK GHAIN +1FBF0..1FBF9 ; XID_Continue # Nd [10] SEGMENTED DIGIT ZERO..SEGMENTED DIGIT NINE +20000..2A6DF ; XID_Continue # Lo [42720] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-20000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A6DF +2A700..2B738 ; XID_Continue # Lo [4153] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A700..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B738 +2B740..2B81D ; XID_Continue # Lo [222] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B740..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B81D +2B820..2CEA1 ; XID_Continue # Lo [5762] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B820..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEA1 +2CEB0..2EBE0 ; XID_Continue # Lo [7473] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEB0..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2EBE0 +2F800..2FA1D ; XID_Continue # Lo [542] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2F800..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2FA1D +30000..3134A ; XID_Continue # Lo [4939] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-30000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3134A +E0100..E01EF ; XID_Continue # Mn [240] VARIATION SELECTOR-17..VARIATION SELECTOR-256 + +# Total code points: 135053 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Default_Ignorable_Code_Point +# Generated from +# Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point +# + Cf (Format characters) +# + Variation_Selector +# - White_Space +# - FFF9..FFFB (Interlinear annotation format characters) +# - 13430..13438 (Egyptian hieroglyph format characters) +# - Prepended_Concatenation_Mark (Exceptional format characters that should be visible) + +00AD ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cf SOFT HYPHEN +034F ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Mn COMBINING GRAPHEME JOINER +061C ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cf ARABIC LETTER MARK +115F..1160 ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Lo [2] HANGUL CHOSEONG FILLER..HANGUL JUNGSEONG FILLER +17B4..17B5 ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Mn [2] KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AQ..KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AA +180B..180D ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Mn [3] MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR ONE..MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR THREE +180E ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cf MONGOLIAN VOWEL SEPARATOR +180F ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Mn MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR FOUR +200B..200F ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cf [5] ZERO WIDTH SPACE..RIGHT-TO-LEFT MARK +202A..202E ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cf [5] LEFT-TO-RIGHT EMBEDDING..RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE +2060..2064 ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cf [5] WORD JOINER..INVISIBLE PLUS +2065 ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cn +2066..206F ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cf [10] LEFT-TO-RIGHT ISOLATE..NOMINAL DIGIT SHAPES +3164 ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Lo HANGUL FILLER +FE00..FE0F ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Mn [16] VARIATION SELECTOR-1..VARIATION SELECTOR-16 +FEFF ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cf ZERO WIDTH NO-BREAK SPACE +FFA0 ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Lo HALFWIDTH HANGUL FILLER +FFF0..FFF8 ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cn [9] .. +1BCA0..1BCA3 ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cf [4] SHORTHAND FORMAT LETTER OVERLAP..SHORTHAND FORMAT UP STEP +1D173..1D17A ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cf [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL BEGIN BEAM..MUSICAL SYMBOL END PHRASE +E0000 ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cn +E0001 ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cf LANGUAGE TAG +E0002..E001F ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cn [30] .. +E0020..E007F ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cf [96] TAG SPACE..CANCEL TAG +E0080..E00FF ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cn [128] .. +E0100..E01EF ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Mn [240] VARIATION SELECTOR-17..VARIATION SELECTOR-256 +E01F0..E0FFF ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cn [3600] .. + +# Total code points: 4174 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Grapheme_Extend +# Generated from: Me + Mn + Other_Grapheme_Extend +# Note: depending on an application's interpretation of Co (private use), +# they may be either in Grapheme_Base, or in Grapheme_Extend, or in neither. + +0300..036F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [112] COMBINING GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER X +0483..0487 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [5] COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO..COMBINING CYRILLIC POKRYTIE +0488..0489 ; Grapheme_Extend # Me [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC HUNDRED THOUSANDS SIGN..COMBINING CYRILLIC MILLIONS SIGN +0591..05BD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [45] HEBREW ACCENT ETNAHTA..HEBREW POINT METEG +05BF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn HEBREW POINT RAFE +05C1..05C2 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] HEBREW POINT SHIN DOT..HEBREW POINT SIN DOT +05C4..05C5 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] HEBREW MARK UPPER DOT..HEBREW MARK LOWER DOT +05C7 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn HEBREW POINT QAMATS QATAN +0610..061A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [11] ARABIC SIGN SALLALLAHOU ALAYHE WASSALLAM..ARABIC SMALL KASRA +064B..065F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [21] ARABIC FATHATAN..ARABIC WAVY HAMZA BELOW +0670 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn ARABIC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALEF +06D6..06DC ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] ARABIC SMALL HIGH LIGATURE SAD WITH LAM WITH ALEF MAKSURA..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SEEN +06DF..06E4 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [6] ARABIC SMALL HIGH ROUNDED ZERO..ARABIC SMALL HIGH MADDA +06E7..06E8 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] ARABIC SMALL HIGH YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH NOON +06EA..06ED ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] ARABIC EMPTY CENTRE LOW STOP..ARABIC SMALL LOW MEEM +0711 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn SYRIAC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALAPH +0730..074A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [27] SYRIAC PTHAHA ABOVE..SYRIAC BARREKH +07A6..07B0 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [11] THAANA ABAFILI..THAANA SUKUN +07EB..07F3 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [9] NKO COMBINING SHORT HIGH TONE..NKO COMBINING DOUBLE DOT ABOVE +07FD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn NKO DANTAYALAN +0816..0819 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] SAMARITAN MARK IN..SAMARITAN MARK DAGESH +081B..0823 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [9] SAMARITAN MARK EPENTHETIC YUT..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN A +0825..0827 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN SHORT A..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN U +0829..082D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [5] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN LONG I..SAMARITAN MARK NEQUDAA +0859..085B ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] MANDAIC AFFRICATION MARK..MANDAIC GEMINATION MARK +0898..089F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [8] ARABIC SMALL HIGH WORD AL-JUZ..ARABIC HALF MADDA OVER MADDA +08CA..08E1 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [24] ARABIC SMALL HIGH FARSI YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SIGN SAFHA +08E3..0902 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [32] ARABIC TURNED DAMMA BELOW..DEVANAGARI SIGN ANUSVARA +093A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OE +093C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN NUKTA +0941..0948 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [8] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +094D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +0951..0957 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] DEVANAGARI STRESS SIGN UDATTA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN UUE +0962..0963 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0981 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BENGALI SIGN CANDRABINDU +09BC ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BENGALI SIGN NUKTA +09BE ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AA +09C1..09C4 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN U..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +09CD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BENGALI SIGN VIRAMA +09D7 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc BENGALI AU LENGTH MARK +09E2..09E3 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +09FE ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BENGALI SANDHI MARK +0A01..0A02 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] GURMUKHI SIGN ADAK BINDI..GURMUKHI SIGN BINDI +0A3C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN NUKTA +0A41..0A42 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN U..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN UU +0A47..0A48 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN EE..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AI +0A4B..0A4D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN OO..GURMUKHI SIGN VIRAMA +0A51 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN UDAAT +0A70..0A71 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] GURMUKHI TIPPI..GURMUKHI ADDAK +0A75 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN YAKASH +0A81..0A82 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] GUJARATI SIGN CANDRABINDU..GUJARATI SIGN ANUSVARA +0ABC ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn GUJARATI SIGN NUKTA +0AC1..0AC5 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [5] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN U..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA E +0AC7..0AC8 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN E..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AI +0ACD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn GUJARATI SIGN VIRAMA +0AE2..0AE3 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0AFA..0AFF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [6] GUJARATI SIGN SUKUN..GUJARATI SIGN TWO-CIRCLE NUKTA ABOVE +0B01 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn ORIYA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0B3C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn ORIYA SIGN NUKTA +0B3E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AA +0B3F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn ORIYA VOWEL SIGN I +0B41..0B44 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN U..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0B4D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn ORIYA SIGN VIRAMA +0B55..0B56 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] ORIYA SIGN OVERLINE..ORIYA AI LENGTH MARK +0B57 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc ORIYA AU LENGTH MARK +0B62..0B63 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0B82 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TAMIL SIGN ANUSVARA +0BBE ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AA +0BC0 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TAMIL VOWEL SIGN II +0BCD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TAMIL SIGN VIRAMA +0BD7 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc TAMIL AU LENGTH MARK +0C00 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING CANDRABINDU ABOVE +0C04 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE +0C3C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TELUGU SIGN NUKTA +0C3E..0C40 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AA..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN II +0C46..0C48 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN E..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AI +0C4A..0C4D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN O..TELUGU SIGN VIRAMA +0C55..0C56 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] TELUGU LENGTH MARK..TELUGU AI LENGTH MARK +0C62..0C63 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0C81 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn KANNADA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0CBC ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn KANNADA SIGN NUKTA +0CBF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN I +0CC2 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc KANNADA VOWEL SIGN UU +0CC6 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN E +0CCC..0CCD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AU..KANNADA SIGN VIRAMA +0CD5..0CD6 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc [2] KANNADA LENGTH MARK..KANNADA AI LENGTH MARK +0CE2..0CE3 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D00..0D01 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..MALAYALAM SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D3B..0D3C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN VERTICAL BAR VIRAMA..MALAYALAM SIGN CIRCULAR VIRAMA +0D3E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AA +0D41..0D44 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN U..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0D4D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MALAYALAM SIGN VIRAMA +0D57 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc MALAYALAM AU LENGTH MARK +0D62..0D63 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D81 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn SINHALA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0DCA ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn SINHALA SIGN AL-LAKUNA +0DCF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc SINHALA VOWEL SIGN AELA-PILLA +0DD2..0DD4 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI IS-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI PAA-PILLA +0DD6 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA PAA-PILLA +0DDF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAYANUKITTA +0E31 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn THAI CHARACTER MAI HAN-AKAT +0E34..0E3A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] THAI CHARACTER SARA I..THAI CHARACTER PHINTHU +0E47..0E4E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [8] THAI CHARACTER MAITAIKHU..THAI CHARACTER YAMAKKAN +0EB1 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn LAO VOWEL SIGN MAI KAN +0EB4..0EBC ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [9] LAO VOWEL SIGN I..LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN LO +0EC8..0ECD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [6] LAO TONE MAI EK..LAO NIGGAHITA +0F18..0F19 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN -KHYUD PA..TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN SDONG TSHUGS +0F35 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG NYI ZLA +0F37 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG SGOR RTAGS +0F39 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TIBETAN MARK TSA -PHRU +0F71..0F7E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [14] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN AA..TIBETAN SIGN RJES SU NGA RO +0F80..0F84 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [5] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN REVERSED I..TIBETAN MARK HALANTA +0F86..0F87 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] TIBETAN SIGN LCI RTAGS..TIBETAN SIGN YANG RTAGS +0F8D..0F97 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [11] TIBETAN SUBJOINED SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER JA +0F99..0FBC ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [36] TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER NYA..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER FIXED-FORM RA +0FC6 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TIBETAN SYMBOL PADMA GDAN +102D..1030 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN UU +1032..1037 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [6] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AI..MYANMAR SIGN DOT BELOW +1039..103A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MYANMAR SIGN VIRAMA..MYANMAR SIGN ASAT +103D..103E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL WA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL HA +1058..1059 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +105E..1060 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL NA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL LA +1071..1074 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN GEBA KAREN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN KAYAH EE +1082 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN SHAN MEDIAL WA +1085..1086 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E ABOVE..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN FINAL Y +108D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL EMPHATIC TONE +109D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON AI +135D..135F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION AND VOWEL LENGTH MARK..ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION MARK +1712..1714 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] TAGALOG VOWEL SIGN I..TAGALOG SIGN VIRAMA +1732..1733 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN I..HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN U +1752..1753 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] BUHID VOWEL SIGN I..BUHID VOWEL SIGN U +1772..1773 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN I..TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN U +17B4..17B5 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AQ..KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AA +17B7..17BD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] KHMER VOWEL SIGN I..KHMER VOWEL SIGN UA +17C6 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn KHMER SIGN NIKAHIT +17C9..17D3 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [11] KHMER SIGN MUUSIKATOAN..KHMER SIGN BATHAMASAT +17DD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn KHMER SIGN ATTHACAN +180B..180D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR ONE..MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR THREE +180F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR FOUR +1885..1886 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI BALUDA..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI THREE BALUDA +18A9 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI DAGALGA +1920..1922 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN A..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN U +1927..1928 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN E..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN O +1932 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn LIMBU SMALL LETTER ANUSVARA +1939..193B ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] LIMBU SIGN MUKPHRENG..LIMBU SIGN SA-I +1A17..1A18 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN I..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN U +1A1B ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN AE +1A56 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA +1A58..1A5E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] TAI THAM SIGN MAI KANG LAI..TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN SA +1A60 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TAI THAM SIGN SAKOT +1A62 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN MAI SAT +1A65..1A6C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [8] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN I..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA BELOW +1A73..1A7C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [10] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA ABOVE..TAI THAM SIGN KHUEN-LUE KARAN +1A7F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TAI THAM COMBINING CRYPTOGRAMMIC DOT +1AB0..1ABD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [14] COMBINING DOUBLED CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..COMBINING PARENTHESES BELOW +1ABE ; Grapheme_Extend # Me COMBINING PARENTHESES OVERLAY +1ABF..1ACE ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [16] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER W BELOW..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +1B00..1B03 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] BALINESE SIGN ULU RICEM..BALINESE SIGN SURANG +1B34 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BALINESE SIGN REREKAN +1B35 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TEDUNG +1B36..1B3A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN ULU..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA +1B3C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA +1B42 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET +1B6B..1B73 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [9] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TEGEH..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING GONG +1B80..1B81 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] SUNDANESE SIGN PANYECEK..SUNDANESE SIGN PANGLAYAR +1BA2..1BA5 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PANYAKRA..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANYUKU +1BA8..1BA9 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PAMEPET..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANEULEUNG +1BAB..1BAD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] SUNDANESE SIGN VIRAMA..SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PASANGAN WA +1BE6 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BATAK SIGN TOMPI +1BE8..1BE9 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] BATAK VOWEL SIGN PAKPAK E..BATAK VOWEL SIGN EE +1BED ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BATAK VOWEL SIGN KARO O +1BEF..1BF1 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN U FOR SIMALUNGUN SA..BATAK CONSONANT SIGN H +1C2C..1C33 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [8] LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN E..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN T +1C36..1C37 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] LEPCHA SIGN RAN..LEPCHA SIGN NUKTA +1CD0..1CD2 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] VEDIC TONE KARSHANA..VEDIC TONE PRENKHA +1CD4..1CE0 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [13] VEDIC SIGN YAJURVEDIC MIDLINE SVARITA..VEDIC TONE RIGVEDIC KASHMIRI INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE2..1CE8 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] VEDIC SIGN VISARGA SVARITA..VEDIC SIGN VISARGA ANUDATTA WITH TAIL +1CED ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn VEDIC SIGN TIRYAK +1CF4 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn VEDIC TONE CANDRA ABOVE +1CF8..1CF9 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] VEDIC TONE RING ABOVE..VEDIC TONE DOUBLE RING ABOVE +1DC0..1DFF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [64] COMBINING DOTTED GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING RIGHT ARROWHEAD AND DOWN ARROWHEAD BELOW +200C ; Grapheme_Extend # Cf ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER +20D0..20DC ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [13] COMBINING LEFT HARPOON ABOVE..COMBINING FOUR DOTS ABOVE +20DD..20E0 ; Grapheme_Extend # Me [4] COMBINING ENCLOSING CIRCLE..COMBINING ENCLOSING CIRCLE BACKSLASH +20E1 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn COMBINING LEFT RIGHT ARROW ABOVE +20E2..20E4 ; Grapheme_Extend # Me [3] COMBINING ENCLOSING SCREEN..COMBINING ENCLOSING UPWARD POINTING TRIANGLE +20E5..20F0 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [12] COMBINING REVERSE SOLIDUS OVERLAY..COMBINING ASTERISK ABOVE +2CEF..2CF1 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] COPTIC COMBINING NI ABOVE..COPTIC COMBINING SPIRITUS LENIS +2D7F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TIFINAGH CONSONANT JOINER +2DE0..2DFF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [32] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER BE..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +302A..302D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] IDEOGRAPHIC LEVEL TONE MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ENTERING TONE MARK +302E..302F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc [2] HANGUL SINGLE DOT TONE MARK..HANGUL DOUBLE DOT TONE MARK +3099..309A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +A66F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn COMBINING CYRILLIC VZMET +A670..A672 ; Grapheme_Extend # Me [3] COMBINING CYRILLIC TEN MILLIONS SIGN..COMBINING CYRILLIC THOUSAND MILLIONS SIGN +A674..A67D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [10] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER UKRAINIAN IE..COMBINING CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A69E..A69F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER EF..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED E +A6F0..A6F1 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] BAMUM COMBINING MARK KOQNDON..BAMUM COMBINING MARK TUKWENTIS +A802 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN DVISVARA +A806 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN HASANTA +A80B ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ANUSVARA +A825..A826 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN U..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN E +A82C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ALTERNATE HASANTA +A8C4..A8C5 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN VIRAMA..SAURASHTRA SIGN CANDRABINDU +A8E0..A8F1 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [18] COMBINING DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +A8FF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AY +A926..A92D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [8] KAYAH LI VOWEL UE..KAYAH LI TONE CALYA PLOPHU +A947..A951 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [11] REJANG VOWEL SIGN I..REJANG CONSONANT SIGN R +A980..A982 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] JAVANESE SIGN PANYANGGA..JAVANESE SIGN LAYAR +A9B3 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn JAVANESE SIGN CECAK TELU +A9B6..A9B9 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN WULU..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN SUKU MENDUT +A9BC..A9BD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET..JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN KERET +A9E5 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN SAW +AA29..AA2E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [6] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAM VOWEL SIGN OE +AA31..AA32 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AU..CHAM VOWEL SIGN UE +AA35..AA36 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN LA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN WA +AA43 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL NG +AA4C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL M +AA7C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-2 +AAB0 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TAI VIET MAI KANG +AAB2..AAB4 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] TAI VIET VOWEL I..TAI VIET VOWEL U +AAB7..AAB8 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] TAI VIET MAI KHIT..TAI VIET VOWEL IA +AABE..AABF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] TAI VIET VOWEL AM..TAI VIET TONE MAI EK +AAC1 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TAI VIET TONE MAI THO +AAEC..AAED ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAI +AAF6 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VIRAMA +ABE5 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ANAP +ABE8 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UNAP +ABED ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MEETEI MAYEK APUN IYEK +FB1E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn HEBREW POINT JUDEO-SPANISH VARIKA +FE00..FE0F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [16] VARIATION SELECTOR-1..VARIATION SELECTOR-16 +FE20..FE2F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [16] COMBINING LIGATURE LEFT HALF..COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO RIGHT HALF +FF9E..FF9F ; Grapheme_Extend # Lm [2] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA VOICED SOUND MARK..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +101FD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn PHAISTOS DISC SIGN COMBINING OBLIQUE STROKE +102E0 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn COPTIC EPACT THOUSANDS MARK +10376..1037A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [5] COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER SII +10A01..10A03 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN I..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +10A05..10A06 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN E..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN O +10A0C..10A0F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL LENGTH MARK..KHAROSHTHI SIGN VISARGA +10A38..10A3A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI SIGN BAR ABOVE..KHAROSHTHI SIGN DOT BELOW +10A3F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn KHAROSHTHI VIRAMA +10AE5..10AE6 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK ABOVE..MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK BELOW +10D24..10D27 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN HARBAHAY..HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN TASSI +10EAB..10EAC ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] YEZIDI COMBINING HAMZA MARK..YEZIDI COMBINING MADDA MARK +10F46..10F50 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [11] SOGDIAN COMBINING DOT BELOW..SOGDIAN COMBINING STROKE BELOW +10F82..10F85 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] OLD UYGHUR COMBINING DOT ABOVE..OLD UYGHUR COMBINING TWO DOTS BELOW +11001 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BRAHMI SIGN ANUSVARA +11038..11046 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [15] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN AA..BRAHMI VIRAMA +11070 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BRAHMI SIGN OLD TAMIL VIRAMA +11073..11074 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT O +1107F..11081 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] BRAHMI NUMBER JOINER..KAITHI SIGN ANUSVARA +110B3..110B6 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN U..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AI +110B9..110BA ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] KAITHI SIGN VIRAMA..KAITHI SIGN NUKTA +110C2 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn KAITHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11100..11102 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] CHAKMA SIGN CANDRABINDU..CHAKMA SIGN VISARGA +11127..1112B ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [5] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN A..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN UU +1112D..11134 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [8] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AI..CHAKMA MAAYYAA +11173 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MAHAJANI SIGN NUKTA +11180..11181 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] SHARADA SIGN CANDRABINDU..SHARADA SIGN ANUSVARA +111B6..111BE ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [9] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN U..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN O +111C9..111CC ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] SHARADA SANDHI MARK..SHARADA EXTRA SHORT VOWEL MARK +111CF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn SHARADA SIGN INVERTED CANDRABINDU +1122F..11231 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN U..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AI +11234 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn KHOJKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11236..11237 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] KHOJKI SIGN NUKTA..KHOJKI SIGN SHADDA +1123E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn KHOJKI SIGN SUKUN +112DF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn KHUDAWADI SIGN ANUSVARA +112E3..112EA ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [8] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN U..KHUDAWADI SIGN VIRAMA +11300..11301 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] GRANTHA SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..GRANTHA SIGN CANDRABINDU +1133B..1133C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] COMBINING BINDU BELOW..GRANTHA SIGN NUKTA +1133E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AA +11340 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN II +11357 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc GRANTHA AU LENGTH MARK +11366..1136C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT SIX +11370..11374 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [5] COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER A..COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER PA +11438..1143F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [8] NEWA VOWEL SIGN U..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AI +11442..11444 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] NEWA SIGN VIRAMA..NEWA SIGN ANUSVARA +11446 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn NEWA SIGN NUKTA +1145E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn NEWA SANDHI MARK +114B0 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AA +114B3..114B8 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [6] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN U..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +114BA ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN SHORT E +114BD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN SHORT O +114BF..114C0 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN CANDRABINDU..TIRHUTA SIGN ANUSVARA +114C2..114C3 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN VIRAMA..TIRHUTA SIGN NUKTA +115AF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AA +115B2..115B5 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +115BC..115BD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN CANDRABINDU..SIDDHAM SIGN ANUSVARA +115BF..115C0 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN VIRAMA..SIDDHAM SIGN NUKTA +115DC..115DD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE UU +11633..1163A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [8] MODI VOWEL SIGN U..MODI VOWEL SIGN AI +1163D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MODI SIGN ANUSVARA +1163F..11640 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MODI SIGN VIRAMA..MODI SIGN ARDHACANDRA +116AB ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TAKRI SIGN ANUSVARA +116AD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AA +116B0..116B5 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [6] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN U..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AU +116B7 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TAKRI SIGN NUKTA +1171D..1171F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA..AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LIGATING RA +11722..11725 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] AHOM VOWEL SIGN I..AHOM VOWEL SIGN UU +11727..1172B ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [5] AHOM VOWEL SIGN AW..AHOM SIGN KILLER +1182F..11837 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [9] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN U..DOGRA SIGN ANUSVARA +11839..1183A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] DOGRA SIGN VIRAMA..DOGRA SIGN NUKTA +11930 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AA +1193B..1193C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] DIVES AKURU SIGN ANUSVARA..DIVES AKURU SIGN CANDRABINDU +1193E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn DIVES AKURU VIRAMA +11943 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn DIVES AKURU SIGN NUKTA +119D4..119D7 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +119DA..119DB ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN E..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +119E0 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn NANDINAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +11A01..11A0A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [10] ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN I..ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A33..11A38 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [6] ZANABAZAR SQUARE FINAL CONSONANT MARK..ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN ANUSVARA +11A3B..11A3E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER YA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER VA +11A47 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn ZANABAZAR SQUARE SUBJOINER +11A51..11A56 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [6] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN I..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN OE +11A59..11A5B ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..SOYOMBO VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A8A..11A96 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [13] SOYOMBO FINAL CONSONANT SIGN G..SOYOMBO SIGN ANUSVARA +11A98..11A99 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] SOYOMBO GEMINATION MARK..SOYOMBO SUBJOINER +11C30..11C36 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN I..BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L +11C38..11C3D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [6] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN E..BHAIKSUKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11C3F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn BHAIKSUKI SIGN VIRAMA +11C92..11CA7 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [22] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER KA..MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER ZA +11CAA..11CB0 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER RA..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN AA +11CB2..11CB3 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN U..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN E +11CB5..11CB6 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MARCHEN SIGN ANUSVARA..MARCHEN SIGN CANDRABINDU +11D31..11D36 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [6] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11D3A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN E +11D3C..11D3D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN O +11D3F..11D45 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU..MASARAM GONDI VIRAMA +11D47 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MASARAM GONDI RA-KARA +11D90..11D91 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN EE..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI +11D95 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn GUNJALA GONDI SIGN ANUSVARA +11D97 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn GUNJALA GONDI VIRAMA +11EF3..11EF4 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN I..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN U +16AF0..16AF4 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [5] BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH TONE..BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH-LOW TONE +16B30..16B36 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TUB..PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TAUM +16F4F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn MIAO SIGN CONSONANT MODIFIER BAR +16F8F..16F92 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] MIAO TONE RIGHT..MIAO TONE BELOW +16FE4 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT FILLER +1BC9D..1BC9E ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] DUPLOYAN THICK LETTER SELECTOR..DUPLOYAN DOUBLE MARK +1CF00..1CF2D ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [46] ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK GORAZDO NIZKO S KRYZHEM ON LEFT..ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK KRYZH ON LEFT +1CF30..1CF46 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [23] ZNAMENNY COMBINING TONAL RANGE MARK MRACHNO..ZNAMENNY PRIZNAK MODIFIER ROG +1D165 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING STEM +1D167..1D169 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-3 +1D16E..1D172 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mc [5] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING FLAG-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING FLAG-5 +1D17B..1D182 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING ACCENT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING LOURE +1D185..1D18B ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOIT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TRIPLE TONGUE +1D1AA..1D1AD ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOWN BOW..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SNAP PIZZICATO +1D242..1D244 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [3] COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL TRISEME..COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL PENTASEME +1DA00..1DA36 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [55] SIGNWRITING HEAD RIM..SIGNWRITING AIR SUCKING IN +1DA3B..1DA6C ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [50] SIGNWRITING MOUTH CLOSED NEUTRAL..SIGNWRITING EXCITEMENT +1DA75 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn SIGNWRITING UPPER BODY TILTING FROM HIP JOINTS +1DA84 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn SIGNWRITING LOCATION HEAD NECK +1DA9B..1DA9F ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [5] SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-6 +1DAA1..1DAAF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [15] SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-16 +1E000..1E006 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER AZU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZHIVETE +1E008..1E018 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [17] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZEMLJA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER HERU +1E01B..1E021 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SHTA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YATI +1E023..1E024 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [2] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SMALL YUS +1E026..1E02A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [5] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YO..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER FITA +1E130..1E136 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-B..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-D +1E2AE ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn TOTO SIGN RISING TONE +1E2EC..1E2EF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [4] WANCHO TONE TUP..WANCHO TONE KOINI +1E8D0..1E8D6 ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER TEENS..MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER MILLIONS +1E944..1E94A ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [7] ADLAM ALIF LENGTHENER..ADLAM NUKTA +E0020..E007F ; Grapheme_Extend # Cf [96] TAG SPACE..CANCEL TAG +E0100..E01EF ; Grapheme_Extend # Mn [240] VARIATION SELECTOR-17..VARIATION SELECTOR-256 + +# Total code points: 2090 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Grapheme_Base +# Generated from: [0..10FFFF] - Cc - Cf - Cs - Co - Cn - Zl - Zp - Grapheme_Extend +# Note: depending on an application's interpretation of Co (private use), +# they may be either in Grapheme_Base, or in Grapheme_Extend, or in neither. + +0020 ; Grapheme_Base # Zs SPACE +0021..0023 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] EXCLAMATION MARK..NUMBER SIGN +0024 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc DOLLAR SIGN +0025..0027 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] PERCENT SIGN..APOSTROPHE +0028 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT PARENTHESIS +0029 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT PARENTHESIS +002A ; Grapheme_Base # Po ASTERISK +002B ; Grapheme_Base # Sm PLUS SIGN +002C ; Grapheme_Base # Po COMMA +002D ; Grapheme_Base # Pd HYPHEN-MINUS +002E..002F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] FULL STOP..SOLIDUS +0030..0039 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] DIGIT ZERO..DIGIT NINE +003A..003B ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] COLON..SEMICOLON +003C..003E ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [3] LESS-THAN SIGN..GREATER-THAN SIGN +003F..0040 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] QUESTION MARK..COMMERCIAL AT +0041..005A ; Grapheme_Base # L& [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +005B ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET +005C ; Grapheme_Base # Po REVERSE SOLIDUS +005D ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET +005E ; Grapheme_Base # Sk CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +005F ; Grapheme_Base # Pc LOW LINE +0060 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk GRAVE ACCENT +0061..007A ; Grapheme_Base # L& [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +007B ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT CURLY BRACKET +007C ; Grapheme_Base # Sm VERTICAL LINE +007D ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +007E ; Grapheme_Base # Sm TILDE +00A0 ; Grapheme_Base # Zs NO-BREAK SPACE +00A1 ; Grapheme_Base # Po INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +00A2..00A5 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc [4] CENT SIGN..YEN SIGN +00A6 ; Grapheme_Base # So BROKEN BAR +00A7 ; Grapheme_Base # Po SECTION SIGN +00A8 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk DIAERESIS +00A9 ; Grapheme_Base # So COPYRIGHT SIGN +00AA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo FEMININE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00AB ; Grapheme_Base # Pi LEFT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +00AC ; Grapheme_Base # Sm NOT SIGN +00AE ; Grapheme_Base # So REGISTERED SIGN +00AF ; Grapheme_Base # Sk MACRON +00B0 ; Grapheme_Base # So DEGREE SIGN +00B1 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm PLUS-MINUS SIGN +00B2..00B3 ; Grapheme_Base # No [2] SUPERSCRIPT TWO..SUPERSCRIPT THREE +00B4 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk ACUTE ACCENT +00B5 ; Grapheme_Base # L& MICRO SIGN +00B6..00B7 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] PILCROW SIGN..MIDDLE DOT +00B8 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk CEDILLA +00B9 ; Grapheme_Base # No SUPERSCRIPT ONE +00BA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MASCULINE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00BB ; Grapheme_Base # Pf RIGHT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +00BC..00BE ; Grapheme_Base # No [3] VULGAR FRACTION ONE QUARTER..VULGAR FRACTION THREE QUARTERS +00BF ; Grapheme_Base # Po INVERTED QUESTION MARK +00C0..00D6 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D7 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm MULTIPLICATION SIGN +00D8..00F6 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [31] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F7 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm DIVISION SIGN +00F8..01BA ; Grapheme_Base # L& [195] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH TAIL +01BB ; Grapheme_Base # Lo LATIN LETTER TWO WITH STROKE +01BC..01BF ; Grapheme_Base # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE..LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C0..01C3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] LATIN LETTER DENTAL CLICK..LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK +01C4..0293 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [208] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CURL +0294 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo LATIN LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0295..02AF ; Grapheme_Base # L& [27] LATIN LETTER PHARYNGEAL VOICED FRICATIVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H WITH FISHHOOK AND TAIL +02B0..02C1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [18] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02C2..02C5 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [4] MODIFIER LETTER LEFT ARROWHEAD..MODIFIER LETTER DOWN ARROWHEAD +02C6..02D1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [12] MODIFIER LETTER CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..MODIFIER LETTER HALF TRIANGULAR COLON +02D2..02DF ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [14] MODIFIER LETTER CENTRED RIGHT HALF RING..MODIFIER LETTER CROSS ACCENT +02E0..02E4 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02E5..02EB ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [7] MODIFIER LETTER EXTRA-HIGH TONE BAR..MODIFIER LETTER YANG DEPARTING TONE MARK +02EC ; Grapheme_Base # Lm MODIFIER LETTER VOICING +02ED ; Grapheme_Base # Sk MODIFIER LETTER UNASPIRATED +02EE ; Grapheme_Base # Lm MODIFIER LETTER DOUBLE APOSTROPHE +02EF..02FF ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [17] MODIFIER LETTER LOW DOWN ARROWHEAD..MODIFIER LETTER LOW LEFT ARROW +0370..0373 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA..GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0374 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm GREEK NUMERAL SIGN +0375 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk GREEK LOWER NUMERAL SIGN +0376..0377 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA..GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037A ; Grapheme_Base # Lm GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +037B..037D ; Grapheme_Base # L& [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +037E ; Grapheme_Base # Po GREEK QUESTION MARK +037F ; Grapheme_Base # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0384..0385 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [2] GREEK TONOS..GREEK DIALYTIKA TONOS +0386 ; Grapheme_Base # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0387 ; Grapheme_Base # Po GREEK ANO TELEIA +0388..038A ; Grapheme_Base # L& [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; Grapheme_Base # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..03A1 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [20] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03F5 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [83] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F6 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm GREEK REVERSED LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F7..0481 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [139] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +0482 ; Grapheme_Base # So CYRILLIC THOUSANDS SIGN +048A..052F ; Grapheme_Base # L& [166] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +0559 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm ARMENIAN MODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RING +055A..055F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [6] ARMENIAN APOSTROPHE..ARMENIAN ABBREVIATION MARK +0560..0588 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [41] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER TURNED AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER YI WITH STROKE +0589 ; Grapheme_Base # Po ARMENIAN FULL STOP +058A ; Grapheme_Base # Pd ARMENIAN HYPHEN +058D..058E ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] RIGHT-FACING ARMENIAN ETERNITY SIGN..LEFT-FACING ARMENIAN ETERNITY SIGN +058F ; Grapheme_Base # Sc ARMENIAN DRAM SIGN +05BE ; Grapheme_Base # Pd HEBREW PUNCTUATION MAQAF +05C0 ; Grapheme_Base # Po HEBREW PUNCTUATION PASEQ +05C3 ; Grapheme_Base # Po HEBREW PUNCTUATION SOF PASUQ +05C6 ; Grapheme_Base # Po HEBREW PUNCTUATION NUN HAFUKHA +05D0..05EA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [27] HEBREW LETTER ALEF..HEBREW LETTER TAV +05EF..05F2 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] HEBREW YOD TRIANGLE..HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH DOUBLE YOD +05F3..05F4 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] HEBREW PUNCTUATION GERESH..HEBREW PUNCTUATION GERSHAYIM +0606..0608 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [3] ARABIC-INDIC CUBE ROOT..ARABIC RAY +0609..060A ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] ARABIC-INDIC PER MILLE SIGN..ARABIC-INDIC PER TEN THOUSAND SIGN +060B ; Grapheme_Base # Sc AFGHANI SIGN +060C..060D ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] ARABIC COMMA..ARABIC DATE SEPARATOR +060E..060F ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] ARABIC POETIC VERSE SIGN..ARABIC SIGN MISRA +061B ; Grapheme_Base # Po ARABIC SEMICOLON +061D..061F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] ARABIC END OF TEXT MARK..ARABIC QUESTION MARK +0620..063F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [32] ARABIC LETTER KASHMIRI YEH..ARABIC LETTER FARSI YEH WITH THREE DOTS ABOVE +0640 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm ARABIC TATWEEL +0641..064A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [10] ARABIC LETTER FEH..ARABIC LETTER YEH +0660..0669 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT ZERO..ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT NINE +066A..066D ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] ARABIC PERCENT SIGN..ARABIC FIVE POINTED STAR +066E..066F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS BEH..ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS QAF +0671..06D3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [99] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WASLA..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE +06D4 ; Grapheme_Base # Po ARABIC FULL STOP +06D5 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC LETTER AE +06DE ; Grapheme_Base # So ARABIC START OF RUB EL HIZB +06E5..06E6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [2] ARABIC SMALL WAW..ARABIC SMALL YEH +06E9 ; Grapheme_Base # So ARABIC PLACE OF SAJDAH +06EE..06EF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] ARABIC LETTER DAL WITH INVERTED V..ARABIC LETTER REH WITH INVERTED V +06F0..06F9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] EXTENDED ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT ZERO..EXTENDED ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT NINE +06FA..06FC ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] ARABIC LETTER SHEEN WITH DOT BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GHAIN WITH DOT BELOW +06FD..06FE ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] ARABIC SIGN SINDHI AMPERSAND..ARABIC SIGN SINDHI POSTPOSITION MEN +06FF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC LETTER HEH WITH INVERTED V +0700..070D ; Grapheme_Base # Po [14] SYRIAC END OF PARAGRAPH..SYRIAC HARKLEAN ASTERISCUS +0710 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo SYRIAC LETTER ALAPH +0712..072F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [30] SYRIAC LETTER BETH..SYRIAC LETTER PERSIAN DHALATH +074D..07A5 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [89] SYRIAC LETTER SOGDIAN ZHAIN..THAANA LETTER WAAVU +07B1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo THAANA LETTER NAA +07C0..07C9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] NKO DIGIT ZERO..NKO DIGIT NINE +07CA..07EA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [33] NKO LETTER A..NKO LETTER JONA RA +07F4..07F5 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [2] NKO HIGH TONE APOSTROPHE..NKO LOW TONE APOSTROPHE +07F6 ; Grapheme_Base # So NKO SYMBOL OO DENNEN +07F7..07F9 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] NKO SYMBOL GBAKURUNEN..NKO EXCLAMATION MARK +07FA ; Grapheme_Base # Lm NKO LAJANYALAN +07FE..07FF ; Grapheme_Base # Sc [2] NKO DOROME SIGN..NKO TAMAN SIGN +0800..0815 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [22] SAMARITAN LETTER ALAF..SAMARITAN LETTER TAAF +081A ; Grapheme_Base # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER EPENTHETIC YUT +0824 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER SHORT A +0828 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER I +0830..083E ; Grapheme_Base # Po [15] SAMARITAN PUNCTUATION NEQUDAA..SAMARITAN PUNCTUATION ANNAAU +0840..0858 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [25] MANDAIC LETTER HALQA..MANDAIC LETTER AIN +085E ; Grapheme_Base # Po MANDAIC PUNCTUATION +0860..086A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [11] SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM NGA..SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM SSA +0870..0887 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [24] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WITH ATTACHED FATHA..ARABIC BASELINE ROUND DOT +0888 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk ARABIC RAISED ROUND DOT +0889..088E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] ARABIC LETTER NOON WITH INVERTED SMALL V..ARABIC VERTICAL TAIL +08A0..08C8 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [41] ARABIC LETTER BEH WITH SMALL V BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GRAF +08C9 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm ARABIC SMALL FARSI YEH +0903 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc DEVANAGARI SIGN VISARGA +0904..0939 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [54] DEVANAGARI LETTER SHORT A..DEVANAGARI LETTER HA +093B ; Grapheme_Base # Mc DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OOE +093D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +093E..0940 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +0949..094C ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [4] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AU +094E..094F ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AW +0950 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo DEVANAGARI OM +0958..0961 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [10] DEVANAGARI LETTER QA..DEVANAGARI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0964..0965 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] DEVANAGARI DANDA..DEVANAGARI DOUBLE DANDA +0966..096F ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..DEVANAGARI DIGIT NINE +0970 ; Grapheme_Base # Po DEVANAGARI ABBREVIATION SIGN +0971 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm DEVANAGARI SIGN HIGH SPACING DOT +0972..0980 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [15] DEVANAGARI LETTER CANDRA A..BENGALI ANJI +0982..0983 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] BENGALI SIGN ANUSVARA..BENGALI SIGN VISARGA +0985..098C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] BENGALI LETTER A..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC L +098F..0990 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER E..BENGALI LETTER AI +0993..09A8 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [22] BENGALI LETTER O..BENGALI LETTER NA +09AA..09B0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] BENGALI LETTER PA..BENGALI LETTER RA +09B2 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo BENGALI LETTER LA +09B6..09B9 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] BENGALI LETTER SHA..BENGALI LETTER HA +09BD ; Grapheme_Base # Lo BENGALI SIGN AVAGRAHA +09BF..09C0 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN I..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN II +09C7..09C8 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN E..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AI +09CB..09CC ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN O..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AU +09CE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo BENGALI LETTER KHANDA TA +09DC..09DD ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RRA..BENGALI LETTER RHA +09DF..09E1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] BENGALI LETTER YYA..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC LL +09E6..09EF ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] BENGALI DIGIT ZERO..BENGALI DIGIT NINE +09F0..09F1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] BENGALI LETTER RA WITH MIDDLE DIAGONAL..BENGALI LETTER RA WITH LOWER DIAGONAL +09F2..09F3 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc [2] BENGALI RUPEE MARK..BENGALI RUPEE SIGN +09F4..09F9 ; Grapheme_Base # No [6] BENGALI CURRENCY NUMERATOR ONE..BENGALI CURRENCY DENOMINATOR SIXTEEN +09FA ; Grapheme_Base # So BENGALI ISSHAR +09FB ; Grapheme_Base # Sc BENGALI GANDA MARK +09FC ; Grapheme_Base # Lo BENGALI LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA +09FD ; Grapheme_Base # Po BENGALI ABBREVIATION SIGN +0A03 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc GURMUKHI SIGN VISARGA +0A05..0A0A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] GURMUKHI LETTER A..GURMUKHI LETTER UU +0A0F..0A10 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER EE..GURMUKHI LETTER AI +0A13..0A28 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [22] GURMUKHI LETTER OO..GURMUKHI LETTER NA +0A2A..0A30 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] GURMUKHI LETTER PA..GURMUKHI LETTER RA +0A32..0A33 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER LA..GURMUKHI LETTER LLA +0A35..0A36 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER VA..GURMUKHI LETTER SHA +0A38..0A39 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] GURMUKHI LETTER SA..GURMUKHI LETTER HA +0A3E..0A40 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AA..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN II +0A59..0A5C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] GURMUKHI LETTER KHHA..GURMUKHI LETTER RRA +0A5E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo GURMUKHI LETTER FA +0A66..0A6F ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] GURMUKHI DIGIT ZERO..GURMUKHI DIGIT NINE +0A72..0A74 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] GURMUKHI IRI..GURMUKHI EK ONKAR +0A76 ; Grapheme_Base # Po GURMUKHI ABBREVIATION SIGN +0A83 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc GUJARATI SIGN VISARGA +0A85..0A8D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [9] GUJARATI LETTER A..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA E +0A8F..0A91 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] GUJARATI LETTER E..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA O +0A93..0AA8 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [22] GUJARATI LETTER O..GUJARATI LETTER NA +0AAA..0AB0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] GUJARATI LETTER PA..GUJARATI LETTER RA +0AB2..0AB3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER LA..GUJARATI LETTER LLA +0AB5..0AB9 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] GUJARATI LETTER VA..GUJARATI LETTER HA +0ABD ; Grapheme_Base # Lo GUJARATI SIGN AVAGRAHA +0ABE..0AC0 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN II +0AC9 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O +0ACB..0ACC ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN O..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AU +0AD0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo GUJARATI OM +0AE0..0AE1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC RR..GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0AE6..0AEF ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] GUJARATI DIGIT ZERO..GUJARATI DIGIT NINE +0AF0 ; Grapheme_Base # Po GUJARATI ABBREVIATION SIGN +0AF1 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc GUJARATI RUPEE SIGN +0AF9 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo GUJARATI LETTER ZHA +0B02..0B03 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] ORIYA SIGN ANUSVARA..ORIYA SIGN VISARGA +0B05..0B0C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] ORIYA LETTER A..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC L +0B0F..0B10 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER E..ORIYA LETTER AI +0B13..0B28 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [22] ORIYA LETTER O..ORIYA LETTER NA +0B2A..0B30 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ORIYA LETTER PA..ORIYA LETTER RA +0B32..0B33 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER LA..ORIYA LETTER LLA +0B35..0B39 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] ORIYA LETTER VA..ORIYA LETTER HA +0B3D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ORIYA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0B40 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN II +0B47..0B48 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN E..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AI +0B4B..0B4C ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN O..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AU +0B5C..0B5D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] ORIYA LETTER RRA..ORIYA LETTER RHA +0B5F..0B61 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] ORIYA LETTER YYA..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0B66..0B6F ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] ORIYA DIGIT ZERO..ORIYA DIGIT NINE +0B70 ; Grapheme_Base # So ORIYA ISSHAR +0B71 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ORIYA LETTER WA +0B72..0B77 ; Grapheme_Base # No [6] ORIYA FRACTION ONE QUARTER..ORIYA FRACTION THREE SIXTEENTHS +0B83 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo TAMIL SIGN VISARGA +0B85..0B8A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] TAMIL LETTER A..TAMIL LETTER UU +0B8E..0B90 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER E..TAMIL LETTER AI +0B92..0B95 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] TAMIL LETTER O..TAMIL LETTER KA +0B99..0B9A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NGA..TAMIL LETTER CA +0B9C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo TAMIL LETTER JA +0B9E..0B9F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NYA..TAMIL LETTER TTA +0BA3..0BA4 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] TAMIL LETTER NNA..TAMIL LETTER TA +0BA8..0BAA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] TAMIL LETTER NA..TAMIL LETTER PA +0BAE..0BB9 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [12] TAMIL LETTER MA..TAMIL LETTER HA +0BBF ; Grapheme_Base # Mc TAMIL VOWEL SIGN I +0BC1..0BC2 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN U..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN UU +0BC6..0BC8 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN E..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AI +0BCA..0BCC ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN O..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AU +0BD0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo TAMIL OM +0BE6..0BEF ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] TAMIL DIGIT ZERO..TAMIL DIGIT NINE +0BF0..0BF2 ; Grapheme_Base # No [3] TAMIL NUMBER TEN..TAMIL NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +0BF3..0BF8 ; Grapheme_Base # So [6] TAMIL DAY SIGN..TAMIL AS ABOVE SIGN +0BF9 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc TAMIL RUPEE SIGN +0BFA ; Grapheme_Base # So TAMIL NUMBER SIGN +0C01..0C03 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] TELUGU SIGN CANDRABINDU..TELUGU SIGN VISARGA +0C05..0C0C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] TELUGU LETTER A..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC L +0C0E..0C10 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER E..TELUGU LETTER AI +0C12..0C28 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [23] TELUGU LETTER O..TELUGU LETTER NA +0C2A..0C39 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [16] TELUGU LETTER PA..TELUGU LETTER HA +0C3D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo TELUGU SIGN AVAGRAHA +0C41..0C44 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN U..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0C58..0C5A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] TELUGU LETTER TSA..TELUGU LETTER RRRA +0C5D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo TELUGU LETTER NAKAARA POLLU +0C60..0C61 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC RR..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC LL +0C66..0C6F ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] TELUGU DIGIT ZERO..TELUGU DIGIT NINE +0C77 ; Grapheme_Base # Po TELUGU SIGN SIDDHAM +0C78..0C7E ; Grapheme_Base # No [7] TELUGU FRACTION DIGIT ZERO FOR ODD POWERS OF FOUR..TELUGU FRACTION DIGIT THREE FOR EVEN POWERS OF FOUR +0C7F ; Grapheme_Base # So TELUGU SIGN TUUMU +0C80 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo KANNADA SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU +0C82..0C83 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] KANNADA SIGN ANUSVARA..KANNADA SIGN VISARGA +0C84 ; Grapheme_Base # Po KANNADA SIGN SIDDHAM +0C85..0C8C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] KANNADA LETTER A..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC L +0C8E..0C90 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] KANNADA LETTER E..KANNADA LETTER AI +0C92..0CA8 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [23] KANNADA LETTER O..KANNADA LETTER NA +0CAA..0CB3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [10] KANNADA LETTER PA..KANNADA LETTER LLA +0CB5..0CB9 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] KANNADA LETTER VA..KANNADA LETTER HA +0CBD ; Grapheme_Base # Lo KANNADA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0CBE ; Grapheme_Base # Mc KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AA +0CC0..0CC1 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN II..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN U +0CC3..0CC4 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0CC7..0CC8 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN EE..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AI +0CCA..0CCB ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN O..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN OO +0CDD..0CDE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER NAKAARA POLLU..KANNADA LETTER FA +0CE0..0CE1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC RR..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0CE6..0CEF ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] KANNADA DIGIT ZERO..KANNADA DIGIT NINE +0CF1..0CF2 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] KANNADA SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..KANNADA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +0D02..0D03 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] MALAYALAM SIGN ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM SIGN VISARGA +0D04..0D0C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [9] MALAYALAM LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC L +0D0E..0D10 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER E..MALAYALAM LETTER AI +0D12..0D3A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [41] MALAYALAM LETTER O..MALAYALAM LETTER TTTA +0D3D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MALAYALAM SIGN AVAGRAHA +0D3F..0D40 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN I..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN II +0D46..0D48 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN E..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AI +0D4A..0D4C ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN O..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AU +0D4E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MALAYALAM LETTER DOT REPH +0D4F ; Grapheme_Base # So MALAYALAM SIGN PARA +0D54..0D56 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU M..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU LLL +0D58..0D5E ; Grapheme_Base # No [7] MALAYALAM FRACTION ONE ONE-HUNDRED-AND-SIXTIETH..MALAYALAM FRACTION ONE FIFTH +0D5F..0D61 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] MALAYALAM LETTER ARCHAIC II..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC LL +0D66..0D6F ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] MALAYALAM DIGIT ZERO..MALAYALAM DIGIT NINE +0D70..0D78 ; Grapheme_Base # No [9] MALAYALAM NUMBER TEN..MALAYALAM FRACTION THREE SIXTEENTHS +0D79 ; Grapheme_Base # So MALAYALAM DATE MARK +0D7A..0D7F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU NN..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU K +0D82..0D83 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] SINHALA SIGN ANUSVARAYA..SINHALA SIGN VISARGAYA +0D85..0D96 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [18] SINHALA LETTER AYANNA..SINHALA LETTER AUYANNA +0D9A..0DB1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [24] SINHALA LETTER ALPAPRAANA KAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA NAYANNA +0DB3..0DBB ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [9] SINHALA LETTER SANYAKA DAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER RAYANNA +0DBD ; Grapheme_Base # Lo SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA LAYANNA +0DC0..0DC6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] SINHALA LETTER VAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER FAYANNA +0DD0..0DD1 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI AEDA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA AEDA-PILLA +0DD8..0DDE ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [7] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KOMBUVA HAA GAYANUKITTA +0DE6..0DEF ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] SINHALA LITH DIGIT ZERO..SINHALA LITH DIGIT NINE +0DF2..0DF3 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAYANUKITTA +0DF4 ; Grapheme_Base # Po SINHALA PUNCTUATION KUNDDALIYA +0E01..0E30 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [48] THAI CHARACTER KO KAI..THAI CHARACTER SARA A +0E32..0E33 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] THAI CHARACTER SARA AA..THAI CHARACTER SARA AM +0E3F ; Grapheme_Base # Sc THAI CURRENCY SYMBOL BAHT +0E40..0E45 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] THAI CHARACTER SARA E..THAI CHARACTER LAKKHANGYAO +0E46 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm THAI CHARACTER MAIYAMOK +0E4F ; Grapheme_Base # Po THAI CHARACTER FONGMAN +0E50..0E59 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] THAI DIGIT ZERO..THAI DIGIT NINE +0E5A..0E5B ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] THAI CHARACTER ANGKHANKHU..THAI CHARACTER KHOMUT +0E81..0E82 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] LAO LETTER KO..LAO LETTER KHO SUNG +0E84 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo LAO LETTER KHO TAM +0E86..0E8A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] LAO LETTER PALI GHA..LAO LETTER SO TAM +0E8C..0EA3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [24] LAO LETTER PALI JHA..LAO LETTER LO LING +0EA5 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo LAO LETTER LO LOOT +0EA7..0EB0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [10] LAO LETTER WO..LAO VOWEL SIGN A +0EB2..0EB3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] LAO VOWEL SIGN AA..LAO VOWEL SIGN AM +0EBD ; Grapheme_Base # Lo LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN NYO +0EC0..0EC4 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] LAO VOWEL SIGN E..LAO VOWEL SIGN AI +0EC6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm LAO KO LA +0ED0..0ED9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] LAO DIGIT ZERO..LAO DIGIT NINE +0EDC..0EDF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] LAO HO NO..LAO LETTER KHMU NYO +0F00 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo TIBETAN SYLLABLE OM +0F01..0F03 ; Grapheme_Base # So [3] TIBETAN MARK GTER YIG MGO TRUNCATED A..TIBETAN MARK GTER YIG MGO -UM GTER TSHEG MA +0F04..0F12 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [15] TIBETAN MARK INITIAL YIG MGO MDUN MA..TIBETAN MARK RGYA GRAM SHAD +0F13 ; Grapheme_Base # So TIBETAN MARK CARET -DZUD RTAGS ME LONG CAN +0F14 ; Grapheme_Base # Po TIBETAN MARK GTER TSHEG +0F15..0F17 ; Grapheme_Base # So [3] TIBETAN LOGOTYPE SIGN CHAD RTAGS..TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN SGRA GCAN -CHAR RTAGS +0F1A..0F1F ; Grapheme_Base # So [6] TIBETAN SIGN RDEL DKAR GCIG..TIBETAN SIGN RDEL DKAR RDEL NAG +0F20..0F29 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] TIBETAN DIGIT ZERO..TIBETAN DIGIT NINE +0F2A..0F33 ; Grapheme_Base # No [10] TIBETAN DIGIT HALF ONE..TIBETAN DIGIT HALF ZERO +0F34 ; Grapheme_Base # So TIBETAN MARK BSDUS RTAGS +0F36 ; Grapheme_Base # So TIBETAN MARK CARET -DZUD RTAGS BZHI MIG CAN +0F38 ; Grapheme_Base # So TIBETAN MARK CHE MGO +0F3A ; Grapheme_Base # Ps TIBETAN MARK GUG RTAGS GYON +0F3B ; Grapheme_Base # Pe TIBETAN MARK GUG RTAGS GYAS +0F3C ; Grapheme_Base # Ps TIBETAN MARK ANG KHANG GYON +0F3D ; Grapheme_Base # Pe TIBETAN MARK ANG KHANG GYAS +0F3E..0F3F ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] TIBETAN SIGN YAR TSHES..TIBETAN SIGN MAR TSHES +0F40..0F47 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] TIBETAN LETTER KA..TIBETAN LETTER JA +0F49..0F6C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [36] TIBETAN LETTER NYA..TIBETAN LETTER RRA +0F7F ; Grapheme_Base # Mc TIBETAN SIGN RNAM BCAD +0F85 ; Grapheme_Base # Po TIBETAN MARK PALUTA +0F88..0F8C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] TIBETAN SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SIGN INVERTED MCHU CAN +0FBE..0FC5 ; Grapheme_Base # So [8] TIBETAN KU RU KHA..TIBETAN SYMBOL RDO RJE +0FC7..0FCC ; Grapheme_Base # So [6] TIBETAN SYMBOL RDO RJE RGYA GRAM..TIBETAN SYMBOL NOR BU BZHI -KHYIL +0FCE..0FCF ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] TIBETAN SIGN RDEL NAG RDEL DKAR..TIBETAN SIGN RDEL NAG GSUM +0FD0..0FD4 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [5] TIBETAN MARK BSKA- SHOG GI MGO RGYAN..TIBETAN MARK CLOSING BRDA RNYING YIG MGO SGAB MA +0FD5..0FD8 ; Grapheme_Base # So [4] RIGHT-FACING SVASTI SIGN..LEFT-FACING SVASTI SIGN WITH DOTS +0FD9..0FDA ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] TIBETAN MARK LEADING MCHAN RTAGS..TIBETAN MARK TRAILING MCHAN RTAGS +1000..102A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [43] MYANMAR LETTER KA..MYANMAR LETTER AU +102B..102C ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN TALL AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AA +1031 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN E +1038 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MYANMAR SIGN VISARGA +103B..103C ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL YA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +103F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MYANMAR LETTER GREAT SA +1040..1049 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] MYANMAR DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR DIGIT NINE +104A..104F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [6] MYANMAR SIGN LITTLE SECTION..MYANMAR SYMBOL GENITIVE +1050..1055 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER SHA..MYANMAR LETTER VOCALIC LL +1056..1057 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +105A..105D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] MYANMAR LETTER MON NGA..MYANMAR LETTER MON BBE +1061 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MYANMAR LETTER SGAW KAREN SHA +1062..1064 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SGAW KAREN EU..MYANMAR TONE MARK SGAW KAREN KE PHO +1065..1066 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN THA..MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN PWA +1067..106D ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [7] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN EU..MYANMAR SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN TONE-5 +106E..1070 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN NNA..MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN GHWA +1075..1081 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [13] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN KA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN HA +1083..1084 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E +1087..108C ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [6] MYANMAR SIGN SHAN TONE-2..MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL TONE-3 +108E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MYANMAR LETTER RUMAI PALAUNG FA +108F ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MYANMAR SIGN RUMAI PALAUNG TONE-5 +1090..1099 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] MYANMAR SHAN DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR SHAN DIGIT NINE +109A..109C ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] MYANMAR SIGN KHAMTI TONE-1..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON A +109E..109F ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] MYANMAR SYMBOL SHAN ONE..MYANMAR SYMBOL SHAN EXCLAMATION +10A0..10C5 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; Grapheme_Base # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; Grapheme_Base # L& GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +10D0..10FA ; Grapheme_Base # L& [43] GEORGIAN LETTER AN..GEORGIAN LETTER AIN +10FB ; Grapheme_Base # Po GEORGIAN PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR +10FC ; Grapheme_Base # Lm MODIFIER LETTER GEORGIAN NAR +10FD..10FF ; Grapheme_Base # L& [3] GEORGIAN LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1100..1248 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [329] HANGUL CHOSEONG KIYEOK..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWA +124A..124D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWE +1250..1256 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHO +1258 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWA +125A..125D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWE +1260..1288 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [41] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWA +128A..128D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWE +1290..12B0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [33] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE NA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWA +12B2..12B5 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWE +12B8..12BE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXO +12C0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWA +12C2..12C5 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWE +12C8..12D6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE WA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PHARYNGEAL O +12D8..1310 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [57] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWA +1312..1315 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWE +1318..135A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [67] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE FYA +1360..1368 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [9] ETHIOPIC SECTION MARK..ETHIOPIC PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR +1369..137C ; Grapheme_Base # No [20] ETHIOPIC DIGIT ONE..ETHIOPIC NUMBER TEN THOUSAND +1380..138F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [16] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SEBATBEIT MWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PWE +1390..1399 ; Grapheme_Base # So [10] ETHIOPIC TONAL MARK YIZET..ETHIOPIC TONAL MARK KURT +13A0..13F5 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [86] CHEROKEE LETTER A..CHEROKEE LETTER MV +13F8..13FD ; Grapheme_Base # L& [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1400 ; Grapheme_Base # Pd CANADIAN SYLLABICS HYPHEN +1401..166C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [620] CANADIAN SYLLABICS E..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER TTSA +166D ; Grapheme_Base # So CANADIAN SYLLABICS CHI SIGN +166E ; Grapheme_Base # Po CANADIAN SYLLABICS FULL STOP +166F..167F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [17] CANADIAN SYLLABICS QAI..CANADIAN SYLLABICS BLACKFOOT W +1680 ; Grapheme_Base # Zs OGHAM SPACE MARK +1681..169A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [26] OGHAM LETTER BEITH..OGHAM LETTER PEITH +169B ; Grapheme_Base # Ps OGHAM FEATHER MARK +169C ; Grapheme_Base # Pe OGHAM REVERSED FEATHER MARK +16A0..16EA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [75] RUNIC LETTER FEHU FEOH FE F..RUNIC LETTER X +16EB..16ED ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] RUNIC SINGLE PUNCTUATION..RUNIC CROSS PUNCTUATION +16EE..16F0 ; Grapheme_Base # Nl [3] RUNIC ARLAUG SYMBOL..RUNIC BELGTHOR SYMBOL +16F1..16F8 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] RUNIC LETTER K..RUNIC LETTER FRANKS CASKET AESC +1700..1711 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [18] TAGALOG LETTER A..TAGALOG LETTER HA +1715 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc TAGALOG SIGN PAMUDPOD +171F..1731 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [19] TAGALOG LETTER ARCHAIC RA..HANUNOO LETTER HA +1734 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc HANUNOO SIGN PAMUDPOD +1735..1736 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] PHILIPPINE SINGLE PUNCTUATION..PHILIPPINE DOUBLE PUNCTUATION +1740..1751 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [18] BUHID LETTER A..BUHID LETTER HA +1760..176C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [13] TAGBANWA LETTER A..TAGBANWA LETTER YA +176E..1770 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] TAGBANWA LETTER LA..TAGBANWA LETTER SA +1780..17B3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [52] KHMER LETTER KA..KHMER INDEPENDENT VOWEL QAU +17B6 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc KHMER VOWEL SIGN AA +17BE..17C5 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [8] KHMER VOWEL SIGN OE..KHMER VOWEL SIGN AU +17C7..17C8 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] KHMER SIGN REAHMUK..KHMER SIGN YUUKALEAPINTU +17D4..17D6 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] KHMER SIGN KHAN..KHMER SIGN CAMNUC PII KUUH +17D7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm KHMER SIGN LEK TOO +17D8..17DA ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] KHMER SIGN BEYYAL..KHMER SIGN KOOMUUT +17DB ; Grapheme_Base # Sc KHMER CURRENCY SYMBOL RIEL +17DC ; Grapheme_Base # Lo KHMER SIGN AVAKRAHASANYA +17E0..17E9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] KHMER DIGIT ZERO..KHMER DIGIT NINE +17F0..17F9 ; Grapheme_Base # No [10] KHMER SYMBOL LEK ATTAK SON..KHMER SYMBOL LEK ATTAK PRAM-BUON +1800..1805 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [6] MONGOLIAN BIRGA..MONGOLIAN FOUR DOTS +1806 ; Grapheme_Base # Pd MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN +1807..180A ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] MONGOLIAN SIBE SYLLABLE BOUNDARY MARKER..MONGOLIAN NIRUGU +1810..1819 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] MONGOLIAN DIGIT ZERO..MONGOLIAN DIGIT NINE +1820..1842 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [35] MONGOLIAN LETTER A..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHI +1843 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO LONG VOWEL SIGN +1844..1878 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [53] MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO E..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHA WITH TWO DOTS +1880..1884 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI ANUSVARA ONE..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI INVERTED UBADAMA +1887..18A8 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [34] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI A..MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI BHA +18AA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI LHA +18B0..18F5 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [70] CANADIAN SYLLABICS OY..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER DENTAL S +1900..191E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [31] LIMBU VOWEL-CARRIER LETTER..LIMBU LETTER TRA +1923..1926 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [4] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN EE..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN AU +1929..192B ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER WA +1930..1931 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] LIMBU SMALL LETTER KA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER NGA +1933..1938 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [6] LIMBU SMALL LETTER TA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER LA +1940 ; Grapheme_Base # So LIMBU SIGN LOO +1944..1945 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] LIMBU EXCLAMATION MARK..LIMBU QUESTION MARK +1946..194F ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] LIMBU DIGIT ZERO..LIMBU DIGIT NINE +1950..196D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [30] TAI LE LETTER KA..TAI LE LETTER AI +1970..1974 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] TAI LE LETTER TONE-2..TAI LE LETTER TONE-6 +1980..19AB ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [44] NEW TAI LUE LETTER HIGH QA..NEW TAI LUE LETTER LOW SUA +19B0..19C9 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [26] NEW TAI LUE VOWEL SIGN VOWEL SHORTENER..NEW TAI LUE TONE MARK-2 +19D0..19D9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] NEW TAI LUE DIGIT ZERO..NEW TAI LUE DIGIT NINE +19DA ; Grapheme_Base # No NEW TAI LUE THAM DIGIT ONE +19DE..19FF ; Grapheme_Base # So [34] NEW TAI LUE SIGN LAE..KHMER SYMBOL DAP-PRAM ROC +1A00..1A16 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [23] BUGINESE LETTER KA..BUGINESE LETTER HA +1A19..1A1A ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN E..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN O +1A1E..1A1F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] BUGINESE PALLAWA..BUGINESE END OF SECTION +1A20..1A54 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [53] TAI THAM LETTER HIGH KA..TAI THAM LETTER GREAT SA +1A55 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +1A57 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN LA TANG LAI +1A61 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN A +1A63..1A64 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN AA..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN TALL AA +1A6D..1A72 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [6] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OY..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN THAM AI +1A80..1A89 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] TAI THAM HORA DIGIT ZERO..TAI THAM HORA DIGIT NINE +1A90..1A99 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] TAI THAM THAM DIGIT ZERO..TAI THAM THAM DIGIT NINE +1AA0..1AA6 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [7] TAI THAM SIGN WIANG..TAI THAM SIGN REVERSED ROTATED RANA +1AA7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm TAI THAM SIGN MAI YAMOK +1AA8..1AAD ; Grapheme_Base # Po [6] TAI THAM SIGN KAAN..TAI THAM SIGN CAANG +1B04 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc BALINESE SIGN BISAH +1B05..1B33 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [47] BALINESE LETTER AKARA..BALINESE LETTER HA +1B3B ; Grapheme_Base # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA TEDUNG +1B3D..1B41 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA TEDUNG..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TALING REPA TEDUNG +1B43..1B44 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET TEDUNG..BALINESE ADEG ADEG +1B45..1B4C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] BALINESE LETTER KAF SASAK..BALINESE LETTER ARCHAIC JNYA +1B50..1B59 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] BALINESE DIGIT ZERO..BALINESE DIGIT NINE +1B5A..1B60 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [7] BALINESE PANTI..BALINESE PAMENENG +1B61..1B6A ; Grapheme_Base # So [10] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL DONG..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL DANG GEDE +1B74..1B7C ; Grapheme_Base # So [9] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL RIGHT-HAND OPEN DUG..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL LEFT-HAND OPEN PING +1B7D..1B7E ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] BALINESE PANTI LANTANG..BALINESE PAMADA LANTANG +1B82 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PANGWISAD +1B83..1BA0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [30] SUNDANESE LETTER A..SUNDANESE LETTER HA +1BA1 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PAMINGKAL +1BA6..1BA7 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANAELAENG..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANOLONG +1BAA ; Grapheme_Base # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PAMAAEH +1BAE..1BAF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] SUNDANESE LETTER KHA..SUNDANESE LETTER SYA +1BB0..1BB9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] SUNDANESE DIGIT ZERO..SUNDANESE DIGIT NINE +1BBA..1BE5 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [44] SUNDANESE AVAGRAHA..BATAK LETTER U +1BE7 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN E +1BEA..1BEC ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN I..BATAK VOWEL SIGN O +1BEE ; Grapheme_Base # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN U +1BF2..1BF3 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] BATAK PANGOLAT..BATAK PANONGONAN +1BFC..1BFF ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] BATAK SYMBOL BINDU NA METEK..BATAK SYMBOL BINDU PANGOLAT +1C00..1C23 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [36] LEPCHA LETTER KA..LEPCHA LETTER A +1C24..1C2B ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [8] LEPCHA SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN UU +1C34..1C35 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN NYIN-DO..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN KANG +1C3B..1C3F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [5] LEPCHA PUNCTUATION TA-ROL..LEPCHA PUNCTUATION TSHOOK +1C40..1C49 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] LEPCHA DIGIT ZERO..LEPCHA DIGIT NINE +1C4D..1C4F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] LEPCHA LETTER TTA..LEPCHA LETTER DDA +1C50..1C59 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] OL CHIKI DIGIT ZERO..OL CHIKI DIGIT NINE +1C5A..1C77 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [30] OL CHIKI LETTER LA..OL CHIKI LETTER OH +1C78..1C7D ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [6] OL CHIKI MU TTUDDAG..OL CHIKI AHAD +1C7E..1C7F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] OL CHIKI PUNCTUATION MUCAAD..OL CHIKI PUNCTUATION DOUBLE MUCAAD +1C80..1C88 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1C90..1CBA ; Grapheme_Base # L& [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; Grapheme_Base # L& [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1CC0..1CC7 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [8] SUNDANESE PUNCTUATION BINDU SURYA..SUNDANESE PUNCTUATION BINDU BA SATANGA +1CD3 ; Grapheme_Base # Po VEDIC SIGN NIHSHVASA +1CE1 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc VEDIC TONE ATHARVAVEDIC INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE9..1CEC ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA..VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA VAMAGOMUKHA WITH TAIL +1CEE..1CF3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] VEDIC SIGN HEXIFORM LONG ANUSVARA..VEDIC SIGN ROTATED ARDHAVISARGA +1CF5..1CF6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] VEDIC SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..VEDIC SIGN UPADHMANIYA +1CF7 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc VEDIC SIGN ATIKRAMA +1CFA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo VEDIC SIGN DOUBLE ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA +1D00..1D2B ; Grapheme_Base # L& [44] LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL A..CYRILLIC LETTER SMALL CAPITAL EL +1D2C..1D6A ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1D6B..1D77 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [13] LATIN SMALL LETTER UE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED G +1D78 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC EN +1D79..1D9A ; Grapheme_Base # L& [34] LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1D9B..1DBF ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [37] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED ALPHA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL THETA +1E00..1F15 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [278] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F18..1F1D ; Grapheme_Base # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F45 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [38] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F48..1F4D ; Grapheme_Base # L& [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F59 ; Grapheme_Base # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; Grapheme_Base # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; Grapheme_Base # L& GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F..1F7D ; Grapheme_Base # L& [31] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1FB4 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [53] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FBC ; Grapheme_Base # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBD ; Grapheme_Base # Sk GREEK KORONIS +1FBE ; Grapheme_Base # L& GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBF..1FC1 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [3] GREEK PSILI..GREEK DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FCC ; Grapheme_Base # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FCD..1FCF ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [3] GREEK PSILI AND VARIA..GREEK PSILI AND PERISPOMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FDB ; Grapheme_Base # L& [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FDD..1FDF ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [3] GREEK DASIA AND VARIA..GREEK DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1FE0..1FEC ; Grapheme_Base # L& [13] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FED..1FEF ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [3] GREEK DIALYTIKA AND VARIA..GREEK VARIA +1FF2..1FF4 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FFC ; Grapheme_Base # L& [7] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FFD..1FFE ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [2] GREEK OXIA..GREEK DASIA +2000..200A ; Grapheme_Base # Zs [11] EN QUAD..HAIR SPACE +2010..2015 ; Grapheme_Base # Pd [6] HYPHEN..HORIZONTAL BAR +2016..2017 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] DOUBLE VERTICAL LINE..DOUBLE LOW LINE +2018 ; Grapheme_Base # Pi LEFT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK +2019 ; Grapheme_Base # Pf RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK +201A ; Grapheme_Base # Ps SINGLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK +201B..201C ; Grapheme_Base # Pi [2] SINGLE HIGH-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK..LEFT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK +201D ; Grapheme_Base # Pf RIGHT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK +201E ; Grapheme_Base # Ps DOUBLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK +201F ; Grapheme_Base # Pi DOUBLE HIGH-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK +2020..2027 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [8] DAGGER..HYPHENATION POINT +202F ; Grapheme_Base # Zs NARROW NO-BREAK SPACE +2030..2038 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [9] PER MILLE SIGN..CARET +2039 ; Grapheme_Base # Pi SINGLE LEFT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +203A ; Grapheme_Base # Pf SINGLE RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +203B..203E ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] REFERENCE MARK..OVERLINE +203F..2040 ; Grapheme_Base # Pc [2] UNDERTIE..CHARACTER TIE +2041..2043 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] CARET INSERTION POINT..HYPHEN BULLET +2044 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm FRACTION SLASH +2045 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH QUILL +2046 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH QUILL +2047..2051 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [11] DOUBLE QUESTION MARK..TWO ASTERISKS ALIGNED VERTICALLY +2052 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm COMMERCIAL MINUS SIGN +2053 ; Grapheme_Base # Po SWUNG DASH +2054 ; Grapheme_Base # Pc INVERTED UNDERTIE +2055..205E ; Grapheme_Base # Po [10] FLOWER PUNCTUATION MARK..VERTICAL FOUR DOTS +205F ; Grapheme_Base # Zs MEDIUM MATHEMATICAL SPACE +2070 ; Grapheme_Base # No SUPERSCRIPT ZERO +2071 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +2074..2079 ; Grapheme_Base # No [6] SUPERSCRIPT FOUR..SUPERSCRIPT NINE +207A..207C ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [3] SUPERSCRIPT PLUS SIGN..SUPERSCRIPT EQUALS SIGN +207D ; Grapheme_Base # Ps SUPERSCRIPT LEFT PARENTHESIS +207E ; Grapheme_Base # Pe SUPERSCRIPT RIGHT PARENTHESIS +207F ; Grapheme_Base # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER N +2080..2089 ; Grapheme_Base # No [10] SUBSCRIPT ZERO..SUBSCRIPT NINE +208A..208C ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [3] SUBSCRIPT PLUS SIGN..SUBSCRIPT EQUALS SIGN +208D ; Grapheme_Base # Ps SUBSCRIPT LEFT PARENTHESIS +208E ; Grapheme_Base # Pe SUBSCRIPT RIGHT PARENTHESIS +2090..209C ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [13] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER T +20A0..20C0 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc [33] EURO-CURRENCY SIGN..SOM SIGN +2100..2101 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] ACCOUNT OF..ADDRESSED TO THE SUBJECT +2102 ; Grapheme_Base # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL C +2103..2106 ; Grapheme_Base # So [4] DEGREE CELSIUS..CADA UNA +2107 ; Grapheme_Base # L& EULER CONSTANT +2108..2109 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] SCRUPLE..DEGREE FAHRENHEIT +210A..2113 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [10] SCRIPT SMALL G..SCRIPT SMALL L +2114 ; Grapheme_Base # So L B BAR SYMBOL +2115 ; Grapheme_Base # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL N +2116..2117 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] NUMERO SIGN..SOUND RECORDING COPYRIGHT +2118 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm SCRIPT CAPITAL P +2119..211D ; Grapheme_Base # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL P..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL R +211E..2123 ; Grapheme_Base # So [6] PRESCRIPTION TAKE..VERSICLE +2124 ; Grapheme_Base # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Z +2125 ; Grapheme_Base # So OUNCE SIGN +2126 ; Grapheme_Base # L& OHM SIGN +2127 ; Grapheme_Base # So INVERTED OHM SIGN +2128 ; Grapheme_Base # L& BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL Z +2129 ; Grapheme_Base # So TURNED GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA +212A..212D ; Grapheme_Base # L& [4] KELVIN SIGN..BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL C +212E ; Grapheme_Base # So ESTIMATED SYMBOL +212F..2134 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [6] SCRIPT SMALL E..SCRIPT SMALL O +2135..2138 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ALEF SYMBOL..DALET SYMBOL +2139 ; Grapheme_Base # L& INFORMATION SOURCE +213A..213B ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] ROTATED CAPITAL Q..FACSIMILE SIGN +213C..213F ; Grapheme_Base # L& [4] DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL PI..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL PI +2140..2144 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK N-ARY SUMMATION..TURNED SANS-SERIF CAPITAL Y +2145..2149 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC CAPITAL D..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +214A ; Grapheme_Base # So PROPERTY LINE +214B ; Grapheme_Base # Sm TURNED AMPERSAND +214C..214D ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] PER SIGN..AKTIESELSKAB +214E ; Grapheme_Base # L& TURNED SMALL F +214F ; Grapheme_Base # So SYMBOL FOR SAMARITAN SOURCE +2150..215F ; Grapheme_Base # No [16] VULGAR FRACTION ONE SEVENTH..FRACTION NUMERATOR ONE +2160..2182 ; Grapheme_Base # Nl [35] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..ROMAN NUMERAL TEN THOUSAND +2183..2184 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [2] ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +2185..2188 ; Grapheme_Base # Nl [4] ROMAN NUMERAL SIX LATE FORM..ROMAN NUMERAL ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND +2189 ; Grapheme_Base # No VULGAR FRACTION ZERO THIRDS +218A..218B ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] TURNED DIGIT TWO..TURNED DIGIT THREE +2190..2194 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [5] LEFTWARDS ARROW..LEFT RIGHT ARROW +2195..2199 ; Grapheme_Base # So [5] UP DOWN ARROW..SOUTH WEST ARROW +219A..219B ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH STROKE..RIGHTWARDS ARROW WITH STROKE +219C..219F ; Grapheme_Base # So [4] LEFTWARDS WAVE ARROW..UPWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW +21A0 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm RIGHTWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW +21A1..21A2 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] DOWNWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW..LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH TAIL +21A3 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm RIGHTWARDS ARROW WITH TAIL +21A4..21A5 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW FROM BAR..UPWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21A6 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm RIGHTWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21A7..21AD ; Grapheme_Base # So [7] DOWNWARDS ARROW FROM BAR..LEFT RIGHT WAVE ARROW +21AE ; Grapheme_Base # Sm LEFT RIGHT ARROW WITH STROKE +21AF..21CD ; Grapheme_Base # So [31] DOWNWARDS ZIGZAG ARROW..LEFTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE +21CE..21CF ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [2] LEFT RIGHT DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE..RIGHTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE +21D0..21D1 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] LEFTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW..UPWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D2 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm RIGHTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D3 ; Grapheme_Base # So DOWNWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D4 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm LEFT RIGHT DOUBLE ARROW +21D5..21F3 ; Grapheme_Base # So [31] UP DOWN DOUBLE ARROW..UP DOWN WHITE ARROW +21F4..22FF ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [268] RIGHT ARROW WITH SMALL CIRCLE..Z NOTATION BAG MEMBERSHIP +2300..2307 ; Grapheme_Base # So [8] DIAMETER SIGN..WAVY LINE +2308 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT CEILING +2309 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT CEILING +230A ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT FLOOR +230B ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT FLOOR +230C..231F ; Grapheme_Base # So [20] BOTTOM RIGHT CROP..BOTTOM RIGHT CORNER +2320..2321 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [2] TOP HALF INTEGRAL..BOTTOM HALF INTEGRAL +2322..2328 ; Grapheme_Base # So [7] FROWN..KEYBOARD +2329 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET +232A ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET +232B..237B ; Grapheme_Base # So [81] ERASE TO THE LEFT..NOT CHECK MARK +237C ; Grapheme_Base # Sm RIGHT ANGLE WITH DOWNWARDS ZIGZAG ARROW +237D..239A ; Grapheme_Base # So [30] SHOULDERED OPEN BOX..CLEAR SCREEN SYMBOL +239B..23B3 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [25] LEFT PARENTHESIS UPPER HOOK..SUMMATION BOTTOM +23B4..23DB ; Grapheme_Base # So [40] TOP SQUARE BRACKET..FUSE +23DC..23E1 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [6] TOP PARENTHESIS..BOTTOM TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +23E2..2426 ; Grapheme_Base # So [69] WHITE TRAPEZIUM..SYMBOL FOR SUBSTITUTE FORM TWO +2440..244A ; Grapheme_Base # So [11] OCR HOOK..OCR DOUBLE BACKSLASH +2460..249B ; Grapheme_Base # No [60] CIRCLED DIGIT ONE..NUMBER TWENTY FULL STOP +249C..24E9 ; Grapheme_Base # So [78] PARENTHESIZED LATIN SMALL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +24EA..24FF ; Grapheme_Base # No [22] CIRCLED DIGIT ZERO..NEGATIVE CIRCLED DIGIT ZERO +2500..25B6 ; Grapheme_Base # So [183] BOX DRAWINGS LIGHT HORIZONTAL..BLACK RIGHT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25B7 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm WHITE RIGHT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25B8..25C0 ; Grapheme_Base # So [9] BLACK RIGHT-POINTING SMALL TRIANGLE..BLACK LEFT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25C1 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm WHITE LEFT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25C2..25F7 ; Grapheme_Base # So [54] BLACK LEFT-POINTING SMALL TRIANGLE..WHITE CIRCLE WITH UPPER RIGHT QUADRANT +25F8..25FF ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [8] UPPER LEFT TRIANGLE..LOWER RIGHT TRIANGLE +2600..266E ; Grapheme_Base # So [111] BLACK SUN WITH RAYS..MUSIC NATURAL SIGN +266F ; Grapheme_Base # Sm MUSIC SHARP SIGN +2670..2767 ; Grapheme_Base # So [248] WEST SYRIAC CROSS..ROTATED FLORAL HEART BULLET +2768 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps MEDIUM LEFT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +2769 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe MEDIUM RIGHT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276A ; Grapheme_Base # Ps MEDIUM FLATTENED LEFT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276B ; Grapheme_Base # Pe MEDIUM FLATTENED RIGHT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276C ; Grapheme_Base # Ps MEDIUM LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +276D ; Grapheme_Base # Pe MEDIUM RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +276E ; Grapheme_Base # Ps HEAVY LEFT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK ORNAMENT +276F ; Grapheme_Base # Pe HEAVY RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK ORNAMENT +2770 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps HEAVY LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +2771 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe HEAVY RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +2772 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LIGHT LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET ORNAMENT +2773 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe LIGHT RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET ORNAMENT +2774 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps MEDIUM LEFT CURLY BRACKET ORNAMENT +2775 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe MEDIUM RIGHT CURLY BRACKET ORNAMENT +2776..2793 ; Grapheme_Base # No [30] DINGBAT NEGATIVE CIRCLED DIGIT ONE..DINGBAT NEGATIVE CIRCLED SANS-SERIF NUMBER TEN +2794..27BF ; Grapheme_Base # So [44] HEAVY WIDE-HEADED RIGHTWARDS ARROW..DOUBLE CURLY LOOP +27C0..27C4 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [5] THREE DIMENSIONAL ANGLE..OPEN SUPERSET +27C5 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27C6 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27C7..27E5 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [31] OR WITH DOT INSIDE..WHITE SQUARE WITH RIGHTWARDS TICK +27E6 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E7 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E8 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +27E9 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +27EA ; Grapheme_Base # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EB ; Grapheme_Base # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EC ; Grapheme_Base # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27ED ; Grapheme_Base # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27EE ; Grapheme_Base # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +27EF ; Grapheme_Base # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +27F0..27FF ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [16] UPWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW..LONG RIGHTWARDS SQUIGGLE ARROW +2800..28FF ; Grapheme_Base # So [256] BRAILLE PATTERN BLANK..BRAILLE PATTERN DOTS-12345678 +2900..2982 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [131] RIGHTWARDS TWO-HEADED ARROW WITH VERTICAL STROKE..Z NOTATION TYPE COLON +2983 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2984 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2985 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2986 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2987 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps Z NOTATION LEFT IMAGE BRACKET +2988 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe Z NOTATION RIGHT IMAGE BRACKET +2989 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps Z NOTATION LEFT BINDING BRACKET +298A ; Grapheme_Base # Pe Z NOTATION RIGHT BINDING BRACKET +298B ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298C ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298D ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +298E ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +298F ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +2990 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +2991 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2992 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2993 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2994 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2995 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps DOUBLE LEFT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2996 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe DOUBLE RIGHT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2997 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +2998 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +2999..29D7 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [63] DOTTED FENCE..BLACK HOURGLASS +29D8 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT WIGGLY FENCE +29D9 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT WIGGLY FENCE +29DA ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29DB ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29DC..29FB ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [32] INCOMPLETE INFINITY..TRIPLE PLUS +29FC ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +29FD ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +29FE..2AFF ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [258] TINY..N-ARY WHITE VERTICAL BAR +2B00..2B2F ; Grapheme_Base # So [48] NORTH EAST WHITE ARROW..WHITE VERTICAL ELLIPSE +2B30..2B44 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [21] LEFT ARROW WITH SMALL CIRCLE..RIGHTWARDS ARROW THROUGH SUPERSET +2B45..2B46 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] LEFTWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW..RIGHTWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW +2B47..2B4C ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [6] REVERSE TILDE OPERATOR ABOVE RIGHTWARDS ARROW..RIGHTWARDS ARROW ABOVE REVERSE TILDE OPERATOR +2B4D..2B73 ; Grapheme_Base # So [39] DOWNWARDS TRIANGLE-HEADED ZIGZAG ARROW..DOWNWARDS TRIANGLE-HEADED ARROW TO BAR +2B76..2B95 ; Grapheme_Base # So [32] NORTH WEST TRIANGLE-HEADED ARROW TO BAR..RIGHTWARDS BLACK ARROW +2B97..2BFF ; Grapheme_Base # So [105] SYMBOL FOR TYPE A ELECTRONICS..HELLSCHREIBER PAUSE SYMBOL +2C00..2C7B ; Grapheme_Base # L& [124] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED E +2C7C..2C7D ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [2] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL V +2C7E..2CE4 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [103] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC SYMBOL KAI +2CE5..2CEA ; Grapheme_Base # So [6] COPTIC SYMBOL MI RO..COPTIC SYMBOL SHIMA SIMA +2CEB..2CEE ; Grapheme_Base # L& [4] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF2..2CF3 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [2] COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI..COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2CF9..2CFC ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] COPTIC OLD NUBIAN FULL STOP..COPTIC OLD NUBIAN VERSE DIVIDER +2CFD ; Grapheme_Base # No COPTIC FRACTION ONE HALF +2CFE..2CFF ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] COPTIC FULL STOP..COPTIC MORPHOLOGICAL DIVIDER +2D00..2D25 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; Grapheme_Base # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; Grapheme_Base # L& GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +2D30..2D67 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [56] TIFINAGH LETTER YA..TIFINAGH LETTER YO +2D6F ; Grapheme_Base # Lm TIFINAGH MODIFIER LETTER LABIALIZATION MARK +2D70 ; Grapheme_Base # Po TIFINAGH SEPARATOR MARK +2D80..2D96 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [23] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE LOA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGWE +2DA0..2DA6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSO +2DA8..2DAE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCO +2DB0..2DB6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZO +2DB8..2DBE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHO +2DC0..2DC6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYO +2DC8..2DCE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYO +2DD0..2DD6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYO +2DD8..2DDE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYO +2E00..2E01 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] RIGHT ANGLE SUBSTITUTION MARKER..RIGHT ANGLE DOTTED SUBSTITUTION MARKER +2E02 ; Grapheme_Base # Pi LEFT SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E03 ; Grapheme_Base # Pf RIGHT SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E04 ; Grapheme_Base # Pi LEFT DOTTED SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E05 ; Grapheme_Base # Pf RIGHT DOTTED SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E06..2E08 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] RAISED INTERPOLATION MARKER..DOTTED TRANSPOSITION MARKER +2E09 ; Grapheme_Base # Pi LEFT TRANSPOSITION BRACKET +2E0A ; Grapheme_Base # Pf RIGHT TRANSPOSITION BRACKET +2E0B ; Grapheme_Base # Po RAISED SQUARE +2E0C ; Grapheme_Base # Pi LEFT RAISED OMISSION BRACKET +2E0D ; Grapheme_Base # Pf RIGHT RAISED OMISSION BRACKET +2E0E..2E16 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [9] EDITORIAL CORONIS..DOTTED RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE +2E17 ; Grapheme_Base # Pd DOUBLE OBLIQUE HYPHEN +2E18..2E19 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] INVERTED INTERROBANG..PALM BRANCH +2E1A ; Grapheme_Base # Pd HYPHEN WITH DIAERESIS +2E1B ; Grapheme_Base # Po TILDE WITH RING ABOVE +2E1C ; Grapheme_Base # Pi LEFT LOW PARAPHRASE BRACKET +2E1D ; Grapheme_Base # Pf RIGHT LOW PARAPHRASE BRACKET +2E1E..2E1F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] TILDE WITH DOT ABOVE..TILDE WITH DOT BELOW +2E20 ; Grapheme_Base # Pi LEFT VERTICAL BAR WITH QUILL +2E21 ; Grapheme_Base # Pf RIGHT VERTICAL BAR WITH QUILL +2E22 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps TOP LEFT HALF BRACKET +2E23 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe TOP RIGHT HALF BRACKET +2E24 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps BOTTOM LEFT HALF BRACKET +2E25 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe BOTTOM RIGHT HALF BRACKET +2E26 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT SIDEWAYS U BRACKET +2E27 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT SIDEWAYS U BRACKET +2E28 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT DOUBLE PARENTHESIS +2E29 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT DOUBLE PARENTHESIS +2E2A..2E2E ; Grapheme_Base # Po [5] TWO DOTS OVER ONE DOT PUNCTUATION..REVERSED QUESTION MARK +2E2F ; Grapheme_Base # Lm VERTICAL TILDE +2E30..2E39 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [10] RING POINT..TOP HALF SECTION SIGN +2E3A..2E3B ; Grapheme_Base # Pd [2] TWO-EM DASH..THREE-EM DASH +2E3C..2E3F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] STENOGRAPHIC FULL STOP..CAPITULUM +2E40 ; Grapheme_Base # Pd DOUBLE HYPHEN +2E41 ; Grapheme_Base # Po REVERSED COMMA +2E42 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps DOUBLE LOW-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK +2E43..2E4F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [13] DASH WITH LEFT UPTURN..CORNISH VERSE DIVIDER +2E50..2E51 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] CROSS PATTY WITH RIGHT CROSSBAR..CROSS PATTY WITH LEFT CROSSBAR +2E52..2E54 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] TIRONIAN SIGN CAPITAL ET..MEDIEVAL QUESTION MARK +2E55 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH STROKE +2E56 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH STROKE +2E57 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH DOUBLE STROKE +2E58 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH DOUBLE STROKE +2E59 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps TOP HALF LEFT PARENTHESIS +2E5A ; Grapheme_Base # Pe TOP HALF RIGHT PARENTHESIS +2E5B ; Grapheme_Base # Ps BOTTOM HALF LEFT PARENTHESIS +2E5C ; Grapheme_Base # Pe BOTTOM HALF RIGHT PARENTHESIS +2E5D ; Grapheme_Base # Pd OBLIQUE HYPHEN +2E80..2E99 ; Grapheme_Base # So [26] CJK RADICAL REPEAT..CJK RADICAL RAP +2E9B..2EF3 ; Grapheme_Base # So [89] CJK RADICAL CHOKE..CJK RADICAL C-SIMPLIFIED TURTLE +2F00..2FD5 ; Grapheme_Base # So [214] KANGXI RADICAL ONE..KANGXI RADICAL FLUTE +2FF0..2FFB ; Grapheme_Base # So [12] IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTER LEFT TO RIGHT..IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTER OVERLAID +3000 ; Grapheme_Base # Zs IDEOGRAPHIC SPACE +3001..3003 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] IDEOGRAPHIC COMMA..DITTO MARK +3004 ; Grapheme_Base # So JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL STANDARD SYMBOL +3005 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +3006 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo IDEOGRAPHIC CLOSING MARK +3007 ; Grapheme_Base # Nl IDEOGRAPHIC NUMBER ZERO +3008 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +3009 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +300A ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +300B ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +300C ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT CORNER BRACKET +300D ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT CORNER BRACKET +300E ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +300F ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +3010 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +3011 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +3012..3013 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] POSTAL MARK..GETA MARK +3014 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3015 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3016 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +3017 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +3018 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3019 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +301A ; Grapheme_Base # Ps LEFT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +301B ; Grapheme_Base # Pe RIGHT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +301C ; Grapheme_Base # Pd WAVE DASH +301D ; Grapheme_Base # Ps REVERSED DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK +301E..301F ; Grapheme_Base # Pe [2] DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK..LOW DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK +3020 ; Grapheme_Base # So POSTAL MARK FACE +3021..3029 ; Grapheme_Base # Nl [9] HANGZHOU NUMERAL ONE..HANGZHOU NUMERAL NINE +3030 ; Grapheme_Base # Pd WAVY DASH +3031..3035 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [5] VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK..VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK LOWER HALF +3036..3037 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] CIRCLED POSTAL MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC TELEGRAPH LINE FEED SEPARATOR SYMBOL +3038..303A ; Grapheme_Base # Nl [3] HANGZHOU NUMERAL TEN..HANGZHOU NUMERAL THIRTY +303B ; Grapheme_Base # Lm VERTICAL IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +303C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MASU MARK +303D ; Grapheme_Base # Po PART ALTERNATION MARK +303E..303F ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] IDEOGRAPHIC VARIATION INDICATOR..IDEOGRAPHIC HALF FILL SPACE +3041..3096 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [86] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL A..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL KE +309B..309C ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [2] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +309D..309E ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [2] HIRAGANA ITERATION MARK..HIRAGANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +309F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo HIRAGANA DIGRAPH YORI +30A0 ; Grapheme_Base # Pd KATAKANA-HIRAGANA DOUBLE HYPHEN +30A1..30FA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [90] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL A..KATAKANA LETTER VO +30FB ; Grapheme_Base # Po KATAKANA MIDDLE DOT +30FC..30FE ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [3] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +30FF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo KATAKANA DIGRAPH KOTO +3105..312F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [43] BOPOMOFO LETTER B..BOPOMOFO LETTER NN +3131..318E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [94] HANGUL LETTER KIYEOK..HANGUL LETTER ARAEAE +3190..3191 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION LINKING MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION REVERSE MARK +3192..3195 ; Grapheme_Base # No [4] IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION ONE MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION FOUR MARK +3196..319F ; Grapheme_Base # So [10] IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION TOP MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION MAN MARK +31A0..31BF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [32] BOPOMOFO LETTER BU..BOPOMOFO LETTER AH +31C0..31E3 ; Grapheme_Base # So [36] CJK STROKE T..CJK STROKE Q +31F0..31FF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [16] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL KU..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL RO +3200..321E ; Grapheme_Base # So [31] PARENTHESIZED HANGUL KIYEOK..PARENTHESIZED KOREAN CHARACTER O HU +3220..3229 ; Grapheme_Base # No [10] PARENTHESIZED IDEOGRAPH ONE..PARENTHESIZED IDEOGRAPH TEN +322A..3247 ; Grapheme_Base # So [30] PARENTHESIZED IDEOGRAPH MOON..CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH KOTO +3248..324F ; Grapheme_Base # No [8] CIRCLED NUMBER TEN ON BLACK SQUARE..CIRCLED NUMBER EIGHTY ON BLACK SQUARE +3250 ; Grapheme_Base # So PARTNERSHIP SIGN +3251..325F ; Grapheme_Base # No [15] CIRCLED NUMBER TWENTY ONE..CIRCLED NUMBER THIRTY FIVE +3260..327F ; Grapheme_Base # So [32] CIRCLED HANGUL KIYEOK..KOREAN STANDARD SYMBOL +3280..3289 ; Grapheme_Base # No [10] CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH ONE..CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH TEN +328A..32B0 ; Grapheme_Base # So [39] CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH MOON..CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH NIGHT +32B1..32BF ; Grapheme_Base # No [15] CIRCLED NUMBER THIRTY SIX..CIRCLED NUMBER FIFTY +32C0..33FF ; Grapheme_Base # So [320] IDEOGRAPHIC TELEGRAPH SYMBOL FOR JANUARY..SQUARE GAL +3400..4DBF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6592] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3400..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4DBF +4DC0..4DFF ; Grapheme_Base # So [64] HEXAGRAM FOR THE CREATIVE HEAVEN..HEXAGRAM FOR BEFORE COMPLETION +4E00..A014 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [21013] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4E00..YI SYLLABLE E +A015 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm YI SYLLABLE WU +A016..A48C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [1143] YI SYLLABLE BIT..YI SYLLABLE YYR +A490..A4C6 ; Grapheme_Base # So [55] YI RADICAL QOT..YI RADICAL KE +A4D0..A4F7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [40] LISU LETTER BA..LISU LETTER OE +A4F8..A4FD ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [6] LISU LETTER TONE MYA TI..LISU LETTER TONE MYA JEU +A4FE..A4FF ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] LISU PUNCTUATION COMMA..LISU PUNCTUATION FULL STOP +A500..A60B ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [268] VAI SYLLABLE EE..VAI SYLLABLE NG +A60C ; Grapheme_Base # Lm VAI SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +A60D..A60F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] VAI COMMA..VAI QUESTION MARK +A610..A61F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [16] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE FA..VAI SYMBOL JONG +A620..A629 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] VAI DIGIT ZERO..VAI DIGIT NINE +A62A..A62B ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE MA..VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE DO +A640..A66D ; Grapheme_Base # L& [46] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A66E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo CYRILLIC LETTER MULTIOCULAR O +A673 ; Grapheme_Base # Po SLAVONIC ASTERISK +A67E ; Grapheme_Base # Po CYRILLIC KAVYKA +A67F ; Grapheme_Base # Lm CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A680..A69B ; Grapheme_Base # L& [28] CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A69C..A69D ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A6A0..A6E5 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [70] BAMUM LETTER A..BAMUM LETTER KI +A6E6..A6EF ; Grapheme_Base # Nl [10] BAMUM LETTER MO..BAMUM LETTER KOGHOM +A6F2..A6F7 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [6] BAMUM NJAEMLI..BAMUM QUESTION MARK +A700..A716 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [23] MODIFIER LETTER CHINESE TONE YIN PING..MODIFIER LETTER EXTRA-LOW LEFT-STEM TONE BAR +A717..A71F ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER DOT VERTICAL BAR..MODIFIER LETTER LOW INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +A720..A721 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [2] MODIFIER LETTER STRESS AND HIGH TONE..MODIFIER LETTER STRESS AND LOW TONE +A722..A76F ; Grapheme_Base # L& [78] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF..LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A770 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm MODIFIER LETTER US +A771..A787 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [23] LATIN SMALL LETTER DUM..LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A788 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm MODIFIER LETTER LOW CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +A789..A78A ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [2] MODIFIER LETTER COLON..MODIFIER LETTER SHORT EQUALS SIGN +A78B..A78E ; Grapheme_Base # L& [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO..LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH RETROFLEX HOOK AND BELT +A78F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo LATIN LETTER SINOLOGICAL DOT +A790..A7CA ; Grapheme_Base # L& [59] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0..A7D1 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D3 ; Grapheme_Base # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE THORN +A7D5..A7D9 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [5] LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE WYNN..LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F2..A7F4 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [3] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL C..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL Q +A7F5..A7F6 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H..LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +A7F7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER SIDEWAYS I +A7F8..A7F9 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +A7FA ; Grapheme_Base # L& LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED M +A7FB..A801 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER REVERSED F..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER I +A803..A805 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER U..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER O +A807..A80A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER KO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER GHO +A80C..A822 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [23] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER CO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER HO +A823..A824 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN A..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN I +A827 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN OO +A828..A82B ; Grapheme_Base # So [4] SYLOTI NAGRI POETRY MARK-1..SYLOTI NAGRI POETRY MARK-4 +A830..A835 ; Grapheme_Base # No [6] NORTH INDIC FRACTION ONE QUARTER..NORTH INDIC FRACTION THREE SIXTEENTHS +A836..A837 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] NORTH INDIC QUARTER MARK..NORTH INDIC PLACEHOLDER MARK +A838 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc NORTH INDIC RUPEE MARK +A839 ; Grapheme_Base # So NORTH INDIC QUANTITY MARK +A840..A873 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [52] PHAGS-PA LETTER KA..PHAGS-PA LETTER CANDRABINDU +A874..A877 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] PHAGS-PA SINGLE HEAD MARK..PHAGS-PA MARK DOUBLE SHAD +A880..A881 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN ANUSVARA..SAURASHTRA SIGN VISARGA +A882..A8B3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [50] SAURASHTRA LETTER A..SAURASHTRA LETTER LLA +A8B4..A8C3 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [16] SAURASHTRA CONSONANT SIGN HAARU..SAURASHTRA VOWEL SIGN AU +A8CE..A8CF ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] SAURASHTRA DANDA..SAURASHTRA DOUBLE DANDA +A8D0..A8D9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] SAURASHTRA DIGIT ZERO..SAURASHTRA DIGIT NINE +A8F2..A8F7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] DEVANAGARI SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU..DEVANAGARI SIGN CANDRABINDU AVAGRAHA +A8F8..A8FA ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] DEVANAGARI SIGN PUSHPIKA..DEVANAGARI CARET +A8FB ; Grapheme_Base # Lo DEVANAGARI HEADSTROKE +A8FC ; Grapheme_Base # Po DEVANAGARI SIGN SIDDHAM +A8FD..A8FE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] DEVANAGARI JAIN OM..DEVANAGARI LETTER AY +A900..A909 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] KAYAH LI DIGIT ZERO..KAYAH LI DIGIT NINE +A90A..A925 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [28] KAYAH LI LETTER KA..KAYAH LI LETTER OO +A92E..A92F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] KAYAH LI SIGN CWI..KAYAH LI SIGN SHYA +A930..A946 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [23] REJANG LETTER KA..REJANG LETTER A +A952..A953 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] REJANG CONSONANT SIGN H..REJANG VIRAMA +A95F ; Grapheme_Base # Po REJANG SECTION MARK +A960..A97C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [29] HANGUL CHOSEONG TIKEUT-MIEUM..HANGUL CHOSEONG SSANGYEORINHIEUH +A983 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc JAVANESE SIGN WIGNYAN +A984..A9B2 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [47] JAVANESE LETTER A..JAVANESE LETTER HA +A9B4..A9B5 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TARUNG..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TOLONG +A9BA..A9BB ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TALING..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN DIRGA MURE +A9BE..A9C0 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN PENGKAL..JAVANESE PANGKON +A9C1..A9CD ; Grapheme_Base # Po [13] JAVANESE LEFT RERENGGAN..JAVANESE TURNED PADA PISELEH +A9CF ; Grapheme_Base # Lm JAVANESE PANGRANGKEP +A9D0..A9D9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] JAVANESE DIGIT ZERO..JAVANESE DIGIT NINE +A9DE..A9DF ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] JAVANESE PADA TIRTA TUMETES..JAVANESE PADA ISEN-ISEN +A9E0..A9E4 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN GHA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN BHA +A9E6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER SHAN REDUPLICATION +A9E7..A9EF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [9] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NYA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NNA +A9F0..A9F9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] MYANMAR TAI LAING DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR TAI LAING DIGIT NINE +A9FA..A9FE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING LLA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING BHA +AA00..AA28 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [41] CHAM LETTER A..CHAM LETTER HA +AA2F..AA30 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN O..CHAM VOWEL SIGN AI +AA33..AA34 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN YA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN RA +AA40..AA42 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] CHAM LETTER FINAL K..CHAM LETTER FINAL NG +AA44..AA4B ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] CHAM LETTER FINAL CH..CHAM LETTER FINAL SS +AA4D ; Grapheme_Base # Mc CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL H +AA50..AA59 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] CHAM DIGIT ZERO..CHAM DIGIT NINE +AA5C..AA5F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] CHAM PUNCTUATION SPIRAL..CHAM PUNCTUATION TRIPLE DANDA +AA60..AA6F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [16] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI GA..MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI FA +AA70 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER KHAMTI REDUPLICATION +AA71..AA76 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI XA..MYANMAR LOGOGRAM KHAMTI HM +AA77..AA79 ; Grapheme_Base # So [3] MYANMAR SYMBOL AITON EXCLAMATION..MYANMAR SYMBOL AITON TWO +AA7A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MYANMAR LETTER AITON RA +AA7B ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MYANMAR SIGN PAO KAREN TONE +AA7D ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-5 +AA7E..AAAF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [50] MYANMAR LETTER SHWE PALAUNG CHA..TAI VIET LETTER HIGH O +AAB1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo TAI VIET VOWEL AA +AAB5..AAB6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] TAI VIET VOWEL E..TAI VIET VOWEL O +AAB9..AABD ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] TAI VIET VOWEL UEA..TAI VIET VOWEL AN +AAC0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI NUENG +AAC2 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI SONG +AADB..AADC ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] TAI VIET SYMBOL KON..TAI VIET SYMBOL NUENG +AADD ; Grapheme_Base # Lm TAI VIET SYMBOL SAM +AADE..AADF ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] TAI VIET SYMBOL HO HOI..TAI VIET SYMBOL KOI KOI +AAE0..AAEA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [11] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER E..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER SSA +AAEB ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN II +AAEE..AAEF ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAU +AAF0..AAF1 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] MEETEI MAYEK CHEIKHAN..MEETEI MAYEK AHANG KHUDAM +AAF2 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MEETEI MAYEK ANJI +AAF3..AAF4 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [2] MEETEI MAYEK SYLLABLE REPETITION MARK..MEETEI MAYEK WORD REPETITION MARK +AAF5 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN VISARGA +AB01..AB06 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHO +AB09..AB0E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHO +AB11..AB16 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZO +AB20..AB26 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHO +AB28..AB2E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBO +AB30..AB5A ; Grapheme_Base # L& [43] LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED ALPHA..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH SHORT RIGHT LEG +AB5B ; Grapheme_Base # Sk MODIFIER BREVE WITH INVERTED BREVE +AB5C..AB5F ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +AB60..AB68 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER SAKHA YAT..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED R WITH MIDDLE TILDE +AB69 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED W +AB6A..AB6B ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [2] MODIFIER LETTER LEFT TACK..MODIFIER LETTER RIGHT TACK +AB70..ABBF ; Grapheme_Base # L& [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +ABC0..ABE2 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [35] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER KOK..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER I LONSUM +ABE3..ABE4 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ONAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN INAP +ABE6..ABE7 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN YENAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN SOUNAP +ABE9..ABEA ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN CHEINAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN NUNG +ABEB ; Grapheme_Base # Po MEETEI MAYEK CHEIKHEI +ABEC ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MEETEI MAYEK LUM IYEK +ABF0..ABF9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] MEETEI MAYEK DIGIT ZERO..MEETEI MAYEK DIGIT NINE +AC00..D7A3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [11172] HANGUL SYLLABLE GA..HANGUL SYLLABLE HIH +D7B0..D7C6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [23] HANGUL JUNGSEONG O-YEO..HANGUL JUNGSEONG ARAEA-E +D7CB..D7FB ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [49] HANGUL JONGSEONG NIEUN-RIEUL..HANGUL JONGSEONG PHIEUPH-THIEUTH +F900..FA6D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [366] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-F900..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA6D +FA70..FAD9 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [106] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA70..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FAD9 +FB00..FB06 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FB1D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo HEBREW LETTER YOD WITH HIRIQ +FB1F..FB28 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [10] HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH YOD YOD PATAH..HEBREW LETTER WIDE TAV +FB29 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm HEBREW LETTER ALTERNATIVE PLUS SIGN +FB2A..FB36 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [13] HEBREW LETTER SHIN WITH SHIN DOT..HEBREW LETTER ZAYIN WITH DAGESH +FB38..FB3C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] HEBREW LETTER TET WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER LAMED WITH DAGESH +FB3E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo HEBREW LETTER MEM WITH DAGESH +FB40..FB41 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER NUN WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER SAMEKH WITH DAGESH +FB43..FB44 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] HEBREW LETTER FINAL PE WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER PE WITH DAGESH +FB46..FBB1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [108] HEBREW LETTER TSADI WITH DAGESH..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE FINAL FORM +FBB2..FBC2 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [17] ARABIC SYMBOL DOT ABOVE..ARABIC SYMBOL WASLA ABOVE +FBD3..FD3D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [363] ARABIC LETTER NG ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE ALEF WITH FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM +FD3E ; Grapheme_Base # Pe ORNATE LEFT PARENTHESIS +FD3F ; Grapheme_Base # Ps ORNATE RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FD40..FD4F ; Grapheme_Base # So [16] ARABIC LIGATURE RAHIMAHU ALLAAH..ARABIC LIGATURE RAHIMAHUM ALLAAH +FD50..FD8F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [64] ARABIC LIGATURE TEH WITH JEEM WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH KHAH WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM +FD92..FDC7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [54] ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH JEEM WITH KHAH INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE NOON WITH JEEM WITH YEH FINAL FORM +FDCF ; Grapheme_Base # So ARABIC LIGATURE SALAAMUHU ALAYNAA +FDF0..FDFB ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [12] ARABIC LIGATURE SALLA USED AS KORANIC STOP SIGN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE JALLAJALALOUHOU +FDFC ; Grapheme_Base # Sc RIAL SIGN +FDFD..FDFF ; Grapheme_Base # So [3] ARABIC LIGATURE BISMILLAH AR-RAHMAN AR-RAHEEM..ARABIC LIGATURE AZZA WA JALL +FE10..FE16 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [7] PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL COMMA..PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL QUESTION MARK +FE17 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +FE18 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT WHITE LENTICULAR BRAKCET +FE19 ; Grapheme_Base # Po PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL HORIZONTAL ELLIPSIS +FE30 ; Grapheme_Base # Po PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL TWO DOT LEADER +FE31..FE32 ; Grapheme_Base # Pd [2] PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL EM DASH..PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL EN DASH +FE33..FE34 ; Grapheme_Base # Pc [2] PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LOW LINE..PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL WAVY LOW LINE +FE35 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT PARENTHESIS +FE36 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FE37 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT CURLY BRACKET +FE38 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +FE39 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FE3A ; Grapheme_Base # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FE3B ; Grapheme_Base # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +FE3C ; Grapheme_Base # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +FE3D ; Grapheme_Base # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +FE3E ; Grapheme_Base # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +FE3F ; Grapheme_Base # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +FE40 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +FE41 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT CORNER BRACKET +FE42 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT CORNER BRACKET +FE43 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +FE44 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +FE45..FE46 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] SESAME DOT..WHITE SESAME DOT +FE47 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT SQUARE BRACKET +FE48 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET +FE49..FE4C ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] DASHED OVERLINE..DOUBLE WAVY OVERLINE +FE4D..FE4F ; Grapheme_Base # Pc [3] DASHED LOW LINE..WAVY LOW LINE +FE50..FE52 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] SMALL COMMA..SMALL FULL STOP +FE54..FE57 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] SMALL SEMICOLON..SMALL EXCLAMATION MARK +FE58 ; Grapheme_Base # Pd SMALL EM DASH +FE59 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps SMALL LEFT PARENTHESIS +FE5A ; Grapheme_Base # Pe SMALL RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FE5B ; Grapheme_Base # Ps SMALL LEFT CURLY BRACKET +FE5C ; Grapheme_Base # Pe SMALL RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +FE5D ; Grapheme_Base # Ps SMALL LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FE5E ; Grapheme_Base # Pe SMALL RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FE5F..FE61 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] SMALL NUMBER SIGN..SMALL ASTERISK +FE62 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm SMALL PLUS SIGN +FE63 ; Grapheme_Base # Pd SMALL HYPHEN-MINUS +FE64..FE66 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [3] SMALL LESS-THAN SIGN..SMALL EQUALS SIGN +FE68 ; Grapheme_Base # Po SMALL REVERSE SOLIDUS +FE69 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc SMALL DOLLAR SIGN +FE6A..FE6B ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] SMALL PERCENT SIGN..SMALL COMMERCIAL AT +FE70..FE74 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] ARABIC FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC KASRATAN ISOLATED FORM +FE76..FEFC ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [135] ARABIC FATHA ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE LAM WITH ALEF FINAL FORM +FF01..FF03 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] FULLWIDTH EXCLAMATION MARK..FULLWIDTH NUMBER SIGN +FF04 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc FULLWIDTH DOLLAR SIGN +FF05..FF07 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] FULLWIDTH PERCENT SIGN..FULLWIDTH APOSTROPHE +FF08 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps FULLWIDTH LEFT PARENTHESIS +FF09 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe FULLWIDTH RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FF0A ; Grapheme_Base # Po FULLWIDTH ASTERISK +FF0B ; Grapheme_Base # Sm FULLWIDTH PLUS SIGN +FF0C ; Grapheme_Base # Po FULLWIDTH COMMA +FF0D ; Grapheme_Base # Pd FULLWIDTH HYPHEN-MINUS +FF0E..FF0F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] FULLWIDTH FULL STOP..FULLWIDTH SOLIDUS +FF10..FF19 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] FULLWIDTH DIGIT ZERO..FULLWIDTH DIGIT NINE +FF1A..FF1B ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] FULLWIDTH COLON..FULLWIDTH SEMICOLON +FF1C..FF1E ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [3] FULLWIDTH LESS-THAN SIGN..FULLWIDTH GREATER-THAN SIGN +FF1F..FF20 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] FULLWIDTH QUESTION MARK..FULLWIDTH COMMERCIAL AT +FF21..FF3A ; Grapheme_Base # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +FF3B ; Grapheme_Base # Ps FULLWIDTH LEFT SQUARE BRACKET +FF3C ; Grapheme_Base # Po FULLWIDTH REVERSE SOLIDUS +FF3D ; Grapheme_Base # Pe FULLWIDTH RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET +FF3E ; Grapheme_Base # Sk FULLWIDTH CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +FF3F ; Grapheme_Base # Pc FULLWIDTH LOW LINE +FF40 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk FULLWIDTH GRAVE ACCENT +FF41..FF5A ; Grapheme_Base # L& [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +FF5B ; Grapheme_Base # Ps FULLWIDTH LEFT CURLY BRACKET +FF5C ; Grapheme_Base # Sm FULLWIDTH VERTICAL LINE +FF5D ; Grapheme_Base # Pe FULLWIDTH RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +FF5E ; Grapheme_Base # Sm FULLWIDTH TILDE +FF5F ; Grapheme_Base # Ps FULLWIDTH LEFT WHITE PARENTHESIS +FF60 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe FULLWIDTH RIGHT WHITE PARENTHESIS +FF61 ; Grapheme_Base # Po HALFWIDTH IDEOGRAPHIC FULL STOP +FF62 ; Grapheme_Base # Ps HALFWIDTH LEFT CORNER BRACKET +FF63 ; Grapheme_Base # Pe HALFWIDTH RIGHT CORNER BRACKET +FF64..FF65 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] HALFWIDTH IDEOGRAPHIC COMMA..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA MIDDLE DOT +FF66..FF6F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [10] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER WO..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER SMALL TU +FF70 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm HALFWIDTH KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK +FF71..FF9D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [45] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER A..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER N +FFA0..FFBE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [31] HALFWIDTH HANGUL FILLER..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER HIEUH +FFC2..FFC7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER A..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER E +FFCA..FFCF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YEO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER OE +FFD2..FFD7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YU +FFDA..FFDC ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER EU..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER I +FFE0..FFE1 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc [2] FULLWIDTH CENT SIGN..FULLWIDTH POUND SIGN +FFE2 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm FULLWIDTH NOT SIGN +FFE3 ; Grapheme_Base # Sk FULLWIDTH MACRON +FFE4 ; Grapheme_Base # So FULLWIDTH BROKEN BAR +FFE5..FFE6 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc [2] FULLWIDTH YEN SIGN..FULLWIDTH WON SIGN +FFE8 ; Grapheme_Base # So HALFWIDTH FORMS LIGHT VERTICAL +FFE9..FFEC ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [4] HALFWIDTH LEFTWARDS ARROW..HALFWIDTH DOWNWARDS ARROW +FFED..FFEE ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] HALFWIDTH BLACK SQUARE..HALFWIDTH WHITE CIRCLE +FFFC..FFFD ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] OBJECT REPLACEMENT CHARACTER..REPLACEMENT CHARACTER +10000..1000B ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [12] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B008 A..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B046 JE +1000D..10026 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [26] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B036 JO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B032 QO +10028..1003A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [19] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B060 RA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B042 WO +1003C..1003D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B017 ZA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B074 ZE +1003F..1004D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [15] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B020 ZO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B091 TWO +10050..1005D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [14] LINEAR B SYMBOL B018..LINEAR B SYMBOL B089 +10080..100FA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [123] LINEAR B IDEOGRAM B100 MAN..LINEAR B IDEOGRAM VESSEL B305 +10100..10102 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] AEGEAN WORD SEPARATOR LINE..AEGEAN CHECK MARK +10107..10133 ; Grapheme_Base # No [45] AEGEAN NUMBER ONE..AEGEAN NUMBER NINETY THOUSAND +10137..1013F ; Grapheme_Base # So [9] AEGEAN WEIGHT BASE UNIT..AEGEAN MEASURE THIRD SUBUNIT +10140..10174 ; Grapheme_Base # Nl [53] GREEK ACROPHONIC ATTIC ONE QUARTER..GREEK ACROPHONIC STRATIAN FIFTY MNAS +10175..10178 ; Grapheme_Base # No [4] GREEK ONE HALF SIGN..GREEK THREE QUARTERS SIGN +10179..10189 ; Grapheme_Base # So [17] GREEK YEAR SIGN..GREEK TRYBLION BASE SIGN +1018A..1018B ; Grapheme_Base # No [2] GREEK ZERO SIGN..GREEK ONE QUARTER SIGN +1018C..1018E ; Grapheme_Base # So [3] GREEK SINUSOID SIGN..NOMISMA SIGN +10190..1019C ; Grapheme_Base # So [13] ROMAN SEXTANS SIGN..ASCIA SYMBOL +101A0 ; Grapheme_Base # So GREEK SYMBOL TAU RHO +101D0..101FC ; Grapheme_Base # So [45] PHAISTOS DISC SIGN PEDESTRIAN..PHAISTOS DISC SIGN WAVY BAND +10280..1029C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [29] LYCIAN LETTER A..LYCIAN LETTER X +102A0..102D0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [49] CARIAN LETTER A..CARIAN LETTER UUU3 +102E1..102FB ; Grapheme_Base # No [27] COPTIC EPACT DIGIT ONE..COPTIC EPACT NUMBER NINE HUNDRED +10300..1031F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [32] OLD ITALIC LETTER A..OLD ITALIC LETTER ESS +10320..10323 ; Grapheme_Base # No [4] OLD ITALIC NUMERAL ONE..OLD ITALIC NUMERAL FIFTY +1032D..10340 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [20] OLD ITALIC LETTER YE..GOTHIC LETTER PAIRTHRA +10341 ; Grapheme_Base # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINETY +10342..10349 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] GOTHIC LETTER RAIDA..GOTHIC LETTER OTHAL +1034A ; Grapheme_Base # Nl GOTHIC LETTER NINE HUNDRED +10350..10375 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [38] OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..OLD PERMIC LETTER IA +10380..1039D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [30] UGARITIC LETTER ALPA..UGARITIC LETTER SSU +1039F ; Grapheme_Base # Po UGARITIC WORD DIVIDER +103A0..103C3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [36] OLD PERSIAN SIGN A..OLD PERSIAN SIGN HA +103C8..103CF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] OLD PERSIAN SIGN AURAMAZDAA..OLD PERSIAN SIGN BUUMISH +103D0 ; Grapheme_Base # Po OLD PERSIAN WORD DIVIDER +103D1..103D5 ; Grapheme_Base # Nl [5] OLD PERSIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD PERSIAN NUMBER HUNDRED +10400..1044F ; Grapheme_Base # L& [80] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +10450..1049D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [78] SHAVIAN LETTER PEEP..OSMANYA LETTER OO +104A0..104A9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] OSMANYA DIGIT ZERO..OSMANYA DIGIT NINE +104B0..104D3 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +104D8..104FB ; Grapheme_Base # L& [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10500..10527 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [40] ELBASAN LETTER A..ELBASAN LETTER KHE +10530..10563 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [52] CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER ALT..CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER KIW +1056F ; Grapheme_Base # Po CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN CITATION MARK +10570..1057A ; Grapheme_Base # L& [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; Grapheme_Base # L& [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10597..105A1 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; Grapheme_Base # L& [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10600..10736 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [311] LINEAR A SIGN AB001..LINEAR A SIGN A664 +10740..10755 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [22] LINEAR A SIGN A701 A..LINEAR A SIGN A732 JE +10760..10767 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] LINEAR A SIGN A800..LINEAR A SIGN A807 +10780..10785 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [6] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL +10800..10805 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE A..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JA +10808 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JO +1080A..10835 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [44] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE KA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE WO +10837..10838 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XE +1083C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZA +1083F..10855 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [23] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZO..IMPERIAL ARAMAIC LETTER TAW +10857 ; Grapheme_Base # Po IMPERIAL ARAMAIC SECTION SIGN +10858..1085F ; Grapheme_Base # No [8] IMPERIAL ARAMAIC NUMBER ONE..IMPERIAL ARAMAIC NUMBER TEN THOUSAND +10860..10876 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [23] PALMYRENE LETTER ALEPH..PALMYRENE LETTER TAW +10877..10878 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] PALMYRENE LEFT-POINTING FLEURON..PALMYRENE RIGHT-POINTING FLEURON +10879..1087F ; Grapheme_Base # No [7] PALMYRENE NUMBER ONE..PALMYRENE NUMBER TWENTY +10880..1089E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [31] NABATAEAN LETTER FINAL ALEPH..NABATAEAN LETTER TAW +108A7..108AF ; Grapheme_Base # No [9] NABATAEAN NUMBER ONE..NABATAEAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +108E0..108F2 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [19] HATRAN LETTER ALEPH..HATRAN LETTER QOPH +108F4..108F5 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] HATRAN LETTER SHIN..HATRAN LETTER TAW +108FB..108FF ; Grapheme_Base # No [5] HATRAN NUMBER ONE..HATRAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10900..10915 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [22] PHOENICIAN LETTER ALF..PHOENICIAN LETTER TAU +10916..1091B ; Grapheme_Base # No [6] PHOENICIAN NUMBER ONE..PHOENICIAN NUMBER THREE +1091F ; Grapheme_Base # Po PHOENICIAN WORD SEPARATOR +10920..10939 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [26] LYDIAN LETTER A..LYDIAN LETTER C +1093F ; Grapheme_Base # Po LYDIAN TRIANGULAR MARK +10980..109B7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [56] MEROITIC HIEROGLYPHIC LETTER A..MEROITIC CURSIVE LETTER DA +109BC..109BD ; Grapheme_Base # No [2] MEROITIC CURSIVE FRACTION ELEVEN TWELFTHS..MEROITIC CURSIVE FRACTION ONE HALF +109BE..109BF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM RMT..MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM IMN +109C0..109CF ; Grapheme_Base # No [16] MEROITIC CURSIVE NUMBER ONE..MEROITIC CURSIVE NUMBER SEVENTY +109D2..109FF ; Grapheme_Base # No [46] MEROITIC CURSIVE NUMBER ONE HUNDRED..MEROITIC CURSIVE FRACTION TEN TWELFTHS +10A00 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo KHAROSHTHI LETTER A +10A10..10A13 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] KHAROSHTHI LETTER KA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER GHA +10A15..10A17 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] KHAROSHTHI LETTER CA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER JA +10A19..10A35 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [29] KHAROSHTHI LETTER NYA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER VHA +10A40..10A48 ; Grapheme_Base # No [9] KHAROSHTHI DIGIT ONE..KHAROSHTHI FRACTION ONE HALF +10A50..10A58 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [9] KHAROSHTHI PUNCTUATION DOT..KHAROSHTHI PUNCTUATION LINES +10A60..10A7C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [29] OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER HE..OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER THETH +10A7D..10A7E ; Grapheme_Base # No [2] OLD SOUTH ARABIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD SOUTH ARABIAN NUMBER FIFTY +10A7F ; Grapheme_Base # Po OLD SOUTH ARABIAN NUMERIC INDICATOR +10A80..10A9C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [29] OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER HEH..OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER ZAH +10A9D..10A9F ; Grapheme_Base # No [3] OLD NORTH ARABIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD NORTH ARABIAN NUMBER TWENTY +10AC0..10AC7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] MANICHAEAN LETTER ALEPH..MANICHAEAN LETTER WAW +10AC8 ; Grapheme_Base # So MANICHAEAN SIGN UD +10AC9..10AE4 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [28] MANICHAEAN LETTER ZAYIN..MANICHAEAN LETTER TAW +10AEB..10AEF ; Grapheme_Base # No [5] MANICHAEAN NUMBER ONE..MANICHAEAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10AF0..10AF6 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [7] MANICHAEAN PUNCTUATION STAR..MANICHAEAN PUNCTUATION LINE FILLER +10B00..10B35 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [54] AVESTAN LETTER A..AVESTAN LETTER HE +10B39..10B3F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [7] AVESTAN ABBREVIATION MARK..LARGE ONE RING OVER TWO RINGS PUNCTUATION +10B40..10B55 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [22] INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER TAW +10B58..10B5F ; Grapheme_Base # No [8] INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN NUMBER ONE..INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +10B60..10B72 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [19] INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10B78..10B7F ; Grapheme_Base # No [8] INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI NUMBER ONE..INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +10B80..10B91 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [18] PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10B99..10B9C ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] PSALTER PAHLAVI SECTION MARK..PSALTER PAHLAVI FOUR DOTS WITH DOT +10BA9..10BAF ; Grapheme_Base # No [7] PSALTER PAHLAVI NUMBER ONE..PSALTER PAHLAVI NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10C00..10C48 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [73] OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON A..OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON BASH +10C80..10CB2 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +10CC0..10CF2 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +10CFA..10CFF ; Grapheme_Base # No [6] OLD HUNGARIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD HUNGARIAN NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +10D00..10D23 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [36] HANIFI ROHINGYA LETTER A..HANIFI ROHINGYA MARK NA KHONNA +10D30..10D39 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] HANIFI ROHINGYA DIGIT ZERO..HANIFI ROHINGYA DIGIT NINE +10E60..10E7E ; Grapheme_Base # No [31] RUMI DIGIT ONE..RUMI FRACTION TWO THIRDS +10E80..10EA9 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [42] YEZIDI LETTER ELIF..YEZIDI LETTER ET +10EAD ; Grapheme_Base # Pd YEZIDI HYPHENATION MARK +10EB0..10EB1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] YEZIDI LETTER LAM WITH DOT ABOVE..YEZIDI LETTER YOT WITH CIRCUMFLEX ABOVE +10F00..10F1C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [29] OLD SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..OLD SOGDIAN LETTER FINAL TAW WITH VERTICAL TAIL +10F1D..10F26 ; Grapheme_Base # No [10] OLD SOGDIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD SOGDIAN FRACTION ONE HALF +10F27 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo OLD SOGDIAN LIGATURE AYIN-DALETH +10F30..10F45 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [22] SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..SOGDIAN INDEPENDENT SHIN +10F51..10F54 ; Grapheme_Base # No [4] SOGDIAN NUMBER ONE..SOGDIAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10F55..10F59 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [5] SOGDIAN PUNCTUATION TWO VERTICAL BARS..SOGDIAN PUNCTUATION HALF CIRCLE WITH DOT +10F70..10F81 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [18] OLD UYGHUR LETTER ALEPH..OLD UYGHUR LETTER LESH +10F86..10F89 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] OLD UYGHUR PUNCTUATION BAR..OLD UYGHUR PUNCTUATION FOUR DOTS +10FB0..10FC4 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [21] CHORASMIAN LETTER ALEPH..CHORASMIAN LETTER TAW +10FC5..10FCB ; Grapheme_Base # No [7] CHORASMIAN NUMBER ONE..CHORASMIAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10FE0..10FF6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [23] ELYMAIC LETTER ALEPH..ELYMAIC LIGATURE ZAYIN-YODH +11000 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc BRAHMI SIGN CANDRABINDU +11002 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc BRAHMI SIGN VISARGA +11003..11037 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [53] BRAHMI SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL NNNA +11047..1104D ; Grapheme_Base # Po [7] BRAHMI DANDA..BRAHMI PUNCTUATION LOTUS +11052..11065 ; Grapheme_Base # No [20] BRAHMI NUMBER ONE..BRAHMI NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +11066..1106F ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] BRAHMI DIGIT ZERO..BRAHMI DIGIT NINE +11071..11072 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT O +11075 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL LLA +11082 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc KAITHI SIGN VISARGA +11083..110AF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [45] KAITHI LETTER A..KAITHI LETTER HA +110B0..110B2 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AA..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN II +110B7..110B8 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN O..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AU +110BB..110BC ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] KAITHI ABBREVIATION SIGN..KAITHI ENUMERATION SIGN +110BE..110C1 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] KAITHI SECTION MARK..KAITHI DOUBLE DANDA +110D0..110E8 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [25] SORA SOMPENG LETTER SAH..SORA SOMPENG LETTER MAE +110F0..110F9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] SORA SOMPENG DIGIT ZERO..SORA SOMPENG DIGIT NINE +11103..11126 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [36] CHAKMA LETTER AA..CHAKMA LETTER HAA +1112C ; Grapheme_Base # Mc CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN E +11136..1113F ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] CHAKMA DIGIT ZERO..CHAKMA DIGIT NINE +11140..11143 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] CHAKMA SECTION MARK..CHAKMA QUESTION MARK +11144 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo CHAKMA LETTER LHAA +11145..11146 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN EI +11147 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo CHAKMA LETTER VAA +11150..11172 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [35] MAHAJANI LETTER A..MAHAJANI LETTER RRA +11174..11175 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] MAHAJANI ABBREVIATION SIGN..MAHAJANI SECTION MARK +11176 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MAHAJANI LIGATURE SHRI +11182 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc SHARADA SIGN VISARGA +11183..111B2 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [48] SHARADA LETTER A..SHARADA LETTER HA +111B3..111B5 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AA..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN II +111BF..111C0 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AU..SHARADA SIGN VIRAMA +111C1..111C4 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] SHARADA SIGN AVAGRAHA..SHARADA OM +111C5..111C8 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] SHARADA DANDA..SHARADA SEPARATOR +111CD ; Grapheme_Base # Po SHARADA SUTRA MARK +111CE ; Grapheme_Base # Mc SHARADA VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +111D0..111D9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] SHARADA DIGIT ZERO..SHARADA DIGIT NINE +111DA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo SHARADA EKAM +111DB ; Grapheme_Base # Po SHARADA SIGN SIDDHAM +111DC ; Grapheme_Base # Lo SHARADA HEADSTROKE +111DD..111DF ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] SHARADA CONTINUATION SIGN..SHARADA SECTION MARK-2 +111E1..111F4 ; Grapheme_Base # No [20] SINHALA ARCHAIC DIGIT ONE..SINHALA ARCHAIC NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +11200..11211 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [18] KHOJKI LETTER A..KHOJKI LETTER JJA +11213..1122B ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [25] KHOJKI LETTER NYA..KHOJKI LETTER LLA +1122C..1122E ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN II +11232..11233 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN O..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AU +11235 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc KHOJKI SIGN VIRAMA +11238..1123D ; Grapheme_Base # Po [6] KHOJKI DANDA..KHOJKI ABBREVIATION SIGN +11280..11286 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] MULTANI LETTER A..MULTANI LETTER GA +11288 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MULTANI LETTER GHA +1128A..1128D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] MULTANI LETTER CA..MULTANI LETTER JJA +1128F..1129D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [15] MULTANI LETTER NYA..MULTANI LETTER BA +1129F..112A8 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [10] MULTANI LETTER BHA..MULTANI LETTER RHA +112A9 ; Grapheme_Base # Po MULTANI SECTION MARK +112B0..112DE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [47] KHUDAWADI LETTER A..KHUDAWADI LETTER HA +112E0..112E2 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN II +112F0..112F9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] KHUDAWADI DIGIT ZERO..KHUDAWADI DIGIT NINE +11302..11303 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] GRANTHA SIGN ANUSVARA..GRANTHA SIGN VISARGA +11305..1130C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] GRANTHA LETTER A..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC L +1130F..11310 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER EE..GRANTHA LETTER AI +11313..11328 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [22] GRANTHA LETTER OO..GRANTHA LETTER NA +1132A..11330 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] GRANTHA LETTER PA..GRANTHA LETTER RA +11332..11333 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] GRANTHA LETTER LA..GRANTHA LETTER LLA +11335..11339 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] GRANTHA LETTER VA..GRANTHA LETTER HA +1133D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo GRANTHA SIGN AVAGRAHA +1133F ; Grapheme_Base # Mc GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN I +11341..11344 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [4] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN U..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +11347..11348 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN EE..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AI +1134B..1134D ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN OO..GRANTHA SIGN VIRAMA +11350 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo GRANTHA OM +1135D..11361 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] GRANTHA SIGN PLUTA..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC LL +11362..11363 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +11400..11434 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [53] NEWA LETTER A..NEWA LETTER HA +11435..11437 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] NEWA VOWEL SIGN AA..NEWA VOWEL SIGN II +11440..11441 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] NEWA VOWEL SIGN O..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AU +11445 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc NEWA SIGN VISARGA +11447..1144A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] NEWA SIGN AVAGRAHA..NEWA SIDDHI +1144B..1144F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [5] NEWA DANDA..NEWA ABBREVIATION SIGN +11450..11459 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] NEWA DIGIT ZERO..NEWA DIGIT NINE +1145A..1145B ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] NEWA DOUBLE COMMA..NEWA PLACEHOLDER MARK +1145D ; Grapheme_Base # Po NEWA INSERTION SIGN +1145F..11461 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] NEWA LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..NEWA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +11480..114AF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [48] TIRHUTA ANJI..TIRHUTA LETTER HA +114B1..114B2 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN I..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN II +114B9 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN E +114BB..114BC ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AI..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN O +114BE ; Grapheme_Base # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AU +114C1 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc TIRHUTA SIGN VISARGA +114C4..114C5 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] TIRHUTA SIGN AVAGRAHA..TIRHUTA GVANG +114C6 ; Grapheme_Base # Po TIRHUTA ABBREVIATION SIGN +114C7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo TIRHUTA OM +114D0..114D9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] TIRHUTA DIGIT ZERO..TIRHUTA DIGIT NINE +11580..115AE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [47] SIDDHAM LETTER A..SIDDHAM LETTER HA +115B0..115B1 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN I..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN II +115B8..115BB ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN E..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AU +115BE ; Grapheme_Base # Mc SIDDHAM SIGN VISARGA +115C1..115D7 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [23] SIDDHAM SIGN SIDDHAM..SIDDHAM SECTION MARK WITH CIRCLES AND FOUR ENCLOSURES +115D8..115DB ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] SIDDHAM LETTER THREE-CIRCLE ALTERNATE I..SIDDHAM LETTER ALTERNATE U +11600..1162F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [48] MODI LETTER A..MODI LETTER LLA +11630..11632 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] MODI VOWEL SIGN AA..MODI VOWEL SIGN II +1163B..1163C ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] MODI VOWEL SIGN O..MODI VOWEL SIGN AU +1163E ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MODI SIGN VISARGA +11641..11643 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] MODI DANDA..MODI ABBREVIATION SIGN +11644 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MODI SIGN HUVA +11650..11659 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] MODI DIGIT ZERO..MODI DIGIT NINE +11660..1166C ; Grapheme_Base # Po [13] MONGOLIAN BIRGA WITH ORNAMENT..MONGOLIAN TURNED SWIRL BIRGA WITH DOUBLE ORNAMENT +11680..116AA ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [43] TAKRI LETTER A..TAKRI LETTER RRA +116AC ; Grapheme_Base # Mc TAKRI SIGN VISARGA +116AE..116AF ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN I..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN II +116B6 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc TAKRI SIGN VIRAMA +116B8 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo TAKRI LETTER ARCHAIC KHA +116B9 ; Grapheme_Base # Po TAKRI ABBREVIATION SIGN +116C0..116C9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] TAKRI DIGIT ZERO..TAKRI DIGIT NINE +11700..1171A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [27] AHOM LETTER KA..AHOM LETTER ALTERNATE BA +11720..11721 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] AHOM VOWEL SIGN A..AHOM VOWEL SIGN AA +11726 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc AHOM VOWEL SIGN E +11730..11739 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] AHOM DIGIT ZERO..AHOM DIGIT NINE +1173A..1173B ; Grapheme_Base # No [2] AHOM NUMBER TEN..AHOM NUMBER TWENTY +1173C..1173E ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] AHOM SIGN SMALL SECTION..AHOM SIGN RULAI +1173F ; Grapheme_Base # So AHOM SYMBOL VI +11740..11746 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] AHOM LETTER CA..AHOM LETTER LLA +11800..1182B ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [44] DOGRA LETTER A..DOGRA LETTER RRA +1182C..1182E ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN AA..DOGRA VOWEL SIGN II +11838 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc DOGRA SIGN VISARGA +1183B ; Grapheme_Base # Po DOGRA ABBREVIATION SIGN +118A0..118DF ; Grapheme_Base # L& [64] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +118E0..118E9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] WARANG CITI DIGIT ZERO..WARANG CITI DIGIT NINE +118EA..118F2 ; Grapheme_Base # No [9] WARANG CITI NUMBER TEN..WARANG CITI NUMBER NINETY +118FF..11906 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] WARANG CITI OM..DIVES AKURU LETTER E +11909 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo DIVES AKURU LETTER O +1190C..11913 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] DIVES AKURU LETTER KA..DIVES AKURU LETTER JA +11915..11916 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] DIVES AKURU LETTER NYA..DIVES AKURU LETTER TTA +11918..1192F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [24] DIVES AKURU LETTER DDA..DIVES AKURU LETTER ZA +11931..11935 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [5] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN I..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN E +11937..11938 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AI..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN O +1193D ; Grapheme_Base # Mc DIVES AKURU SIGN HALANTA +1193F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo DIVES AKURU PREFIXED NASAL SIGN +11940 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL YA +11941 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo DIVES AKURU INITIAL RA +11942 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL RA +11944..11946 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] DIVES AKURU DOUBLE DANDA..DIVES AKURU END OF TEXT MARK +11950..11959 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] DIVES AKURU DIGIT ZERO..DIVES AKURU DIGIT NINE +119A0..119A7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [8] NANDINAGARI LETTER A..NANDINAGARI LETTER VOCALIC RR +119AA..119D0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [39] NANDINAGARI LETTER E..NANDINAGARI LETTER RRA +119D1..119D3 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [3] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +119DC..119DF ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN O..NANDINAGARI SIGN VISARGA +119E1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo NANDINAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +119E2 ; Grapheme_Base # Po NANDINAGARI SIGN SIDDHAM +119E3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo NANDINAGARI HEADSTROKE +119E4 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +11A00 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER A +11A0B..11A32 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [40] ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KSSA +11A39 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN VISARGA +11A3A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER RA +11A3F..11A46 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [8] ZANABAZAR SQUARE INITIAL HEAD MARK..ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLOSING DOUBLE-LINED HEAD MARK +11A50 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo SOYOMBO LETTER A +11A57..11A58 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AI..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AU +11A5C..11A89 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [46] SOYOMBO LETTER KA..SOYOMBO CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER SA +11A97 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc SOYOMBO SIGN VISARGA +11A9A..11A9C ; Grapheme_Base # Po [3] SOYOMBO MARK TSHEG..SOYOMBO MARK DOUBLE SHAD +11A9D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo SOYOMBO MARK PLUTA +11A9E..11AA2 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [5] SOYOMBO HEAD MARK WITH MOON AND SUN AND TRIPLE FLAME..SOYOMBO TERMINAL MARK-2 +11AB0..11AF8 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [73] CANADIAN SYLLABICS NATTILIK HI..PAU CIN HAU GLOTTAL STOP FINAL +11C00..11C08 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [9] BHAIKSUKI LETTER A..BHAIKSUKI LETTER VOCALIC L +11C0A..11C2E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [37] BHAIKSUKI LETTER E..BHAIKSUKI LETTER HA +11C2F ; Grapheme_Base # Mc BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN AA +11C3E ; Grapheme_Base # Mc BHAIKSUKI SIGN VISARGA +11C40 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo BHAIKSUKI SIGN AVAGRAHA +11C41..11C45 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [5] BHAIKSUKI DANDA..BHAIKSUKI GAP FILLER-2 +11C50..11C59 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] BHAIKSUKI DIGIT ZERO..BHAIKSUKI DIGIT NINE +11C5A..11C6C ; Grapheme_Base # No [19] BHAIKSUKI NUMBER ONE..BHAIKSUKI HUNDREDS UNIT MARK +11C70..11C71 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] MARCHEN HEAD MARK..MARCHEN MARK SHAD +11C72..11C8F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [30] MARCHEN LETTER KA..MARCHEN LETTER A +11CA9 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER YA +11CB1 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN I +11CB4 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN O +11D00..11D06 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] MASARAM GONDI LETTER A..MASARAM GONDI LETTER E +11D08..11D09 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AI..MASARAM GONDI LETTER O +11D0B..11D30 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [38] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AU..MASARAM GONDI LETTER TRA +11D46 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MASARAM GONDI REPHA +11D50..11D59 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] MASARAM GONDI DIGIT ZERO..MASARAM GONDI DIGIT NINE +11D60..11D65 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER A..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER UU +11D67..11D68 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER EE..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER AI +11D6A..11D89 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [32] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER OO..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER SA +11D8A..11D8E ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [5] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN UU +11D93..11D94 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN OO..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU +11D96 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc GUNJALA GONDI SIGN VISARGA +11D98 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo GUNJALA GONDI OM +11DA0..11DA9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] GUNJALA GONDI DIGIT ZERO..GUNJALA GONDI DIGIT NINE +11EE0..11EF2 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [19] MAKASAR LETTER KA..MAKASAR ANGKA +11EF5..11EF6 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN E..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN O +11EF7..11EF8 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] MAKASAR PASSIMBANG..MAKASAR END OF SECTION +11FB0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo LISU LETTER YHA +11FC0..11FD4 ; Grapheme_Base # No [21] TAMIL FRACTION ONE THREE-HUNDRED-AND-TWENTIETH..TAMIL FRACTION DOWNSCALING FACTOR KIIZH +11FD5..11FDC ; Grapheme_Base # So [8] TAMIL SIGN NEL..TAMIL SIGN MUKKURUNI +11FDD..11FE0 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc [4] TAMIL SIGN KAACU..TAMIL SIGN VARAAKAN +11FE1..11FF1 ; Grapheme_Base # So [17] TAMIL SIGN PAARAM..TAMIL SIGN VAKAIYARAA +11FFF ; Grapheme_Base # Po TAMIL PUNCTUATION END OF TEXT +12000..12399 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [922] CUNEIFORM SIGN A..CUNEIFORM SIGN U U +12400..1246E ; Grapheme_Base # Nl [111] CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN TWO ASH..CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN NINE U VARIANT FORM +12470..12474 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [5] CUNEIFORM PUNCTUATION SIGN OLD ASSYRIAN WORD DIVIDER..CUNEIFORM PUNCTUATION SIGN DIAGONAL QUADCOLON +12480..12543 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [196] CUNEIFORM SIGN AB TIMES NUN TENU..CUNEIFORM SIGN ZU5 TIMES THREE DISH TENU +12F90..12FF0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [97] CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM001..CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM114 +12FF1..12FF2 ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM301..CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM302 +13000..1342E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [1071] EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH AA032 +14400..14646 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [583] ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A530 +16800..16A38 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [569] BAMUM LETTER PHASE-A NGKUE MFON..BAMUM LETTER PHASE-F VUEQ +16A40..16A5E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [31] MRO LETTER TA..MRO LETTER TEK +16A60..16A69 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] MRO DIGIT ZERO..MRO DIGIT NINE +16A6E..16A6F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] MRO DANDA..MRO DOUBLE DANDA +16A70..16ABE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [79] TANGSA LETTER OZ..TANGSA LETTER ZA +16AC0..16AC9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] TANGSA DIGIT ZERO..TANGSA DIGIT NINE +16AD0..16AED ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [30] BASSA VAH LETTER ENNI..BASSA VAH LETTER I +16AF5 ; Grapheme_Base # Po BASSA VAH FULL STOP +16B00..16B2F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [48] PAHAWH HMONG VOWEL KEEB..PAHAWH HMONG CONSONANT CAU +16B37..16B3B ; Grapheme_Base # Po [5] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS THOM..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS FEEM +16B3C..16B3F ; Grapheme_Base # So [4] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN XYEEM NTXIV..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN XYEEM FAIB +16B40..16B43 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [4] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS SEEV..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN IB YAM +16B44 ; Grapheme_Base # Po PAHAWH HMONG SIGN XAUS +16B45 ; Grapheme_Base # So PAHAWH HMONG SIGN CIM TSOV ROG +16B50..16B59 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] PAHAWH HMONG DIGIT ZERO..PAHAWH HMONG DIGIT NINE +16B5B..16B61 ; Grapheme_Base # No [7] PAHAWH HMONG NUMBER TENS..PAHAWH HMONG NUMBER TRILLIONS +16B63..16B77 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [21] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS LUB..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN CIM NRES TOS +16B7D..16B8F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [19] PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN TSHEEJ..PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN VWJ +16E40..16E7F ; Grapheme_Base # L& [64] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +16E80..16E96 ; Grapheme_Base # No [23] MEDEFAIDRIN DIGIT ZERO..MEDEFAIDRIN DIGIT THREE ALTERNATE FORM +16E97..16E9A ; Grapheme_Base # Po [4] MEDEFAIDRIN COMMA..MEDEFAIDRIN EXCLAMATION OH +16F00..16F4A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [75] MIAO LETTER PA..MIAO LETTER RTE +16F50 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo MIAO LETTER NASALIZATION +16F51..16F87 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [55] MIAO SIGN ASPIRATION..MIAO VOWEL SIGN UI +16F93..16F9F ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [13] MIAO LETTER TONE-2..MIAO LETTER REFORMED TONE-8 +16FE0..16FE1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [2] TANGUT ITERATION MARK..NUSHU ITERATION MARK +16FE2 ; Grapheme_Base # Po OLD CHINESE HOOK MARK +16FE3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm OLD CHINESE ITERATION MARK +16FF0..16FF1 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc [2] VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK CA..VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK NHAY +17000..187F7 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [6136] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-17000..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-187F7 +18800..18CD5 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [1238] TANGUT COMPONENT-001..KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT CHARACTER-18CD5 +18D00..18D08 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [9] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D00..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D08 +1AFF0..1AFF3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [4] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-2..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-5 +1AFF5..1AFFB ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [7] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-5 +1AFFD..1AFFE ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [2] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-8 +1B000..1B122 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [291] KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC E..KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC WU +1B150..1B152 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WI..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WO +1B164..1B167 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL WI..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL N +1B170..1B2FB ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [396] NUSHU CHARACTER-1B170..NUSHU CHARACTER-1B2FB +1BC00..1BC6A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [107] DUPLOYAN LETTER H..DUPLOYAN LETTER VOCALIC M +1BC70..1BC7C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [13] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LEFT HORIZONTAL SECANT..DUPLOYAN AFFIX ATTACHED TANGENT HOOK +1BC80..1BC88 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [9] DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH VERTICAL +1BC90..1BC99 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [10] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ARROW +1BC9C ; Grapheme_Base # So DUPLOYAN SIGN O WITH CROSS +1BC9F ; Grapheme_Base # Po DUPLOYAN PUNCTUATION CHINOOK FULL STOP +1CF50..1CFC3 ; Grapheme_Base # So [116] ZNAMENNY NEUME KRYUK..ZNAMENNY NEUME PAUK +1D000..1D0F5 ; Grapheme_Base # So [246] BYZANTINE MUSICAL SYMBOL PSILI..BYZANTINE MUSICAL SYMBOL GORGON NEO KATO +1D100..1D126 ; Grapheme_Base # So [39] MUSICAL SYMBOL SINGLE BARLINE..MUSICAL SYMBOL DRUM CLEF-2 +1D129..1D164 ; Grapheme_Base # So [60] MUSICAL SYMBOL MULTIPLE MEASURE REST..MUSICAL SYMBOL ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHTH NOTE +1D166 ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SPRECHGESANG STEM +1D16A..1D16C ; Grapheme_Base # So [3] MUSICAL SYMBOL FINGERED TREMOLO-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL FINGERED TREMOLO-3 +1D16D ; Grapheme_Base # Mc MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING AUGMENTATION DOT +1D183..1D184 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] MUSICAL SYMBOL ARPEGGIATO UP..MUSICAL SYMBOL ARPEGGIATO DOWN +1D18C..1D1A9 ; Grapheme_Base # So [30] MUSICAL SYMBOL RINFORZANDO..MUSICAL SYMBOL DEGREE SLASH +1D1AE..1D1EA ; Grapheme_Base # So [61] MUSICAL SYMBOL PEDAL MARK..MUSICAL SYMBOL KORON +1D200..1D241 ; Grapheme_Base # So [66] GREEK VOCAL NOTATION SYMBOL-1..GREEK INSTRUMENTAL NOTATION SYMBOL-54 +1D245 ; Grapheme_Base # So GREEK MUSICAL LEIMMA +1D2E0..1D2F3 ; Grapheme_Base # No [20] MAYAN NUMERAL ZERO..MAYAN NUMERAL NINETEEN +1D300..1D356 ; Grapheme_Base # So [87] MONOGRAM FOR EARTH..TETRAGRAM FOR FOSTERING +1D360..1D378 ; Grapheme_Base # No [25] COUNTING ROD UNIT DIGIT ONE..TALLY MARK FIVE +1D400..1D454 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [85] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL G +1D456..1D49C ; Grapheme_Base # L& [71] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A +1D49E..1D49F ; Grapheme_Base # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D +1D4A2 ; Grapheme_Base # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL G +1D4A5..1D4A6 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K +1D4A9..1D4AC ; Grapheme_Base # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Q +1D4AE..1D4B9 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [12] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL D +1D4BB ; Grapheme_Base # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL F +1D4BD..1D4C3 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL H..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL N +1D4C5..1D505 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [65] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL P..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL B +1D507..1D50A ; Grapheme_Base # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL G +1D50D..1D514 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Q +1D516..1D51C ; Grapheme_Base # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Y +1D51E..1D539 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [28] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL B +1D53B..1D53E ; Grapheme_Base # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL G +1D540..1D544 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [5] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M +1D546 ; Grapheme_Base # L& MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL O +1D54A..1D550 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Y +1D552..1D6A5 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [340] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL DOTLESS J +1D6A8..1D6C0 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6C1 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm MATHEMATICAL BOLD NABLA +1D6C2..1D6DA ; Grapheme_Base # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D6DB ; Grapheme_Base # Sm MATHEMATICAL BOLD PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D6DC..1D6FA ; Grapheme_Base # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6FB ; Grapheme_Base # Sm MATHEMATICAL ITALIC NABLA +1D6FC..1D714 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D715 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm MATHEMATICAL ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D716..1D734 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D735 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC NABLA +1D736..1D74E ; Grapheme_Base # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D74F ; Grapheme_Base # Sm MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D750..1D76E ; Grapheme_Base # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D76F ; Grapheme_Base # Sm MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD NABLA +1D770..1D788 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D789 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D78A..1D7A8 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D7A9 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC NABLA +1D7AA..1D7C2 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D7C3 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D7C4..1D7CB ; Grapheme_Base # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL DIGAMMA +1D7CE..1D7FF ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [50] MATHEMATICAL BOLD DIGIT ZERO..MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE DIGIT NINE +1D800..1D9FF ; Grapheme_Base # So [512] SIGNWRITING HAND-FIST INDEX..SIGNWRITING HEAD +1DA37..1DA3A ; Grapheme_Base # So [4] SIGNWRITING AIR BLOW SMALL ROTATIONS..SIGNWRITING BREATH EXHALE +1DA6D..1DA74 ; Grapheme_Base # So [8] SIGNWRITING SHOULDER HIP SPINE..SIGNWRITING TORSO-FLOORPLANE TWISTING +1DA76..1DA83 ; Grapheme_Base # So [14] SIGNWRITING LIMB COMBINATION..SIGNWRITING LOCATION DEPTH +1DA85..1DA86 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] SIGNWRITING LOCATION TORSO..SIGNWRITING LOCATION LIMBS DIGITS +1DA87..1DA8B ; Grapheme_Base # Po [5] SIGNWRITING COMMA..SIGNWRITING PARENTHESIS +1DF00..1DF09 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [10] LATIN SMALL LETTER FENG DIGRAPH WITH TRILL..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK AND RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0B..1DF1E ; Grapheme_Base # L& [20] LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH WITH DOUBLE BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CURL +1E100..1E12C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [45] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER MA..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER W +1E137..1E13D ; Grapheme_Base # Lm [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SIGN FOR PERSON..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +1E140..1E149 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG DIGIT ZERO..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG DIGIT NINE +1E14E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LOGOGRAM NYAJ +1E14F ; Grapheme_Base # So NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG CIRCLED CA +1E290..1E2AD ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [30] TOTO LETTER PA..TOTO LETTER A +1E2C0..1E2EB ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [44] WANCHO LETTER AA..WANCHO LETTER YIH +1E2F0..1E2F9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] WANCHO DIGIT ZERO..WANCHO DIGIT NINE +1E2FF ; Grapheme_Base # Sc WANCHO NGUN SIGN +1E7E0..1E7E6 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYO +1E7E8..1E7EB ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE HHWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHWE +1E7ED..1E7EE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWEE +1E7F0..1E7FE ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE PWEE +1E800..1E8C4 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [197] MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M001 KI..MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M060 NYON +1E8C7..1E8CF ; Grapheme_Base # No [9] MENDE KIKAKUI DIGIT ONE..MENDE KIKAKUI DIGIT NINE +1E900..1E943 ; Grapheme_Base # L& [68] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA +1E94B ; Grapheme_Base # Lm ADLAM NASALIZATION MARK +1E950..1E959 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] ADLAM DIGIT ZERO..ADLAM DIGIT NINE +1E95E..1E95F ; Grapheme_Base # Po [2] ADLAM INITIAL EXCLAMATION MARK..ADLAM INITIAL QUESTION MARK +1EC71..1ECAB ; Grapheme_Base # No [59] INDIC SIYAQ NUMBER ONE..INDIC SIYAQ NUMBER PREFIXED NINE +1ECAC ; Grapheme_Base # So INDIC SIYAQ PLACEHOLDER +1ECAD..1ECAF ; Grapheme_Base # No [3] INDIC SIYAQ FRACTION ONE QUARTER..INDIC SIYAQ FRACTION THREE QUARTERS +1ECB0 ; Grapheme_Base # Sc INDIC SIYAQ RUPEE MARK +1ECB1..1ECB4 ; Grapheme_Base # No [4] INDIC SIYAQ NUMBER ALTERNATE ONE..INDIC SIYAQ ALTERNATE LAKH MARK +1ED01..1ED2D ; Grapheme_Base # No [45] OTTOMAN SIYAQ NUMBER ONE..OTTOMAN SIYAQ NUMBER NINETY THOUSAND +1ED2E ; Grapheme_Base # So OTTOMAN SIYAQ MARRATAN +1ED2F..1ED3D ; Grapheme_Base # No [15] OTTOMAN SIYAQ ALTERNATE NUMBER TWO..OTTOMAN SIYAQ FRACTION ONE SIXTH +1EE00..1EE03 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DAL +1EE05..1EE1F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [27] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOTLESS QAF +1EE21..1EE22 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL JEEM +1EE24 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HEH +1EE27 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HAH +1EE29..1EE32 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL YEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL QAF +1EE34..1EE37 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL KHAH +1EE39 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL DAD +1EE3B ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL GHAIN +1EE42 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED JEEM +1EE47 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED HAH +1EE49 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED YEH +1EE4B ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED LAM +1EE4D..1EE4F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED NOON..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED AIN +1EE51..1EE52 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED QAF +1EE54 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SHEEN +1EE57 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED KHAH +1EE59 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DAD +1EE5B ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED GHAIN +1EE5D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS NOON +1EE5F ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS QAF +1EE61..1EE62 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED JEEM +1EE64 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HEH +1EE67..1EE6A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HAH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KAF +1EE6C..1EE72 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED MEEM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED QAF +1EE74..1EE77 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KHAH +1EE79..1EE7C ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS BEH +1EE7E ; Grapheme_Base # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS FEH +1EE80..1EE89 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED YEH +1EE8B..1EE9B ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED GHAIN +1EEA1..1EEA3 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK DAL +1EEA5..1EEA9 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK YEH +1EEAB..1EEBB ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK GHAIN +1EEF0..1EEF1 ; Grapheme_Base # Sm [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL OPERATOR MEEM WITH HAH WITH TATWEEL..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL OPERATOR HAH WITH DAL +1F000..1F02B ; Grapheme_Base # So [44] MAHJONG TILE EAST WIND..MAHJONG TILE BACK +1F030..1F093 ; Grapheme_Base # So [100] DOMINO TILE HORIZONTAL BACK..DOMINO TILE VERTICAL-06-06 +1F0A0..1F0AE ; Grapheme_Base # So [15] PLAYING CARD BACK..PLAYING CARD KING OF SPADES +1F0B1..1F0BF ; Grapheme_Base # So [15] PLAYING CARD ACE OF HEARTS..PLAYING CARD RED JOKER +1F0C1..1F0CF ; Grapheme_Base # So [15] PLAYING CARD ACE OF DIAMONDS..PLAYING CARD BLACK JOKER +1F0D1..1F0F5 ; Grapheme_Base # So [37] PLAYING CARD ACE OF CLUBS..PLAYING CARD TRUMP-21 +1F100..1F10C ; Grapheme_Base # No [13] DIGIT ZERO FULL STOP..DINGBAT NEGATIVE CIRCLED SANS-SERIF DIGIT ZERO +1F10D..1F1AD ; Grapheme_Base # So [161] CIRCLED ZERO WITH SLASH..MASK WORK SYMBOL +1F1E6..1F202 ; Grapheme_Base # So [29] REGIONAL INDICATOR SYMBOL LETTER A..SQUARED KATAKANA SA +1F210..1F23B ; Grapheme_Base # So [44] SQUARED CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-624B..SQUARED CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-914D +1F240..1F248 ; Grapheme_Base # So [9] TORTOISE SHELL BRACKETED CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-672C..TORTOISE SHELL BRACKETED CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-6557 +1F250..1F251 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH ADVANTAGE..CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH ACCEPT +1F260..1F265 ; Grapheme_Base # So [6] ROUNDED SYMBOL FOR FU..ROUNDED SYMBOL FOR CAI +1F300..1F3FA ; Grapheme_Base # So [251] CYCLONE..AMPHORA +1F3FB..1F3FF ; Grapheme_Base # Sk [5] EMOJI MODIFIER FITZPATRICK TYPE-1-2..EMOJI MODIFIER FITZPATRICK TYPE-6 +1F400..1F6D7 ; Grapheme_Base # So [728] RAT..ELEVATOR +1F6DD..1F6EC ; Grapheme_Base # So [16] PLAYGROUND SLIDE..AIRPLANE ARRIVING +1F6F0..1F6FC ; Grapheme_Base # So [13] SATELLITE..ROLLER SKATE +1F700..1F773 ; Grapheme_Base # So [116] ALCHEMICAL SYMBOL FOR QUINTESSENCE..ALCHEMICAL SYMBOL FOR HALF OUNCE +1F780..1F7D8 ; Grapheme_Base # So [89] BLACK LEFT-POINTING ISOSCELES RIGHT TRIANGLE..NEGATIVE CIRCLED SQUARE +1F7E0..1F7EB ; Grapheme_Base # So [12] LARGE ORANGE CIRCLE..LARGE BROWN SQUARE +1F7F0 ; Grapheme_Base # So HEAVY EQUALS SIGN +1F800..1F80B ; Grapheme_Base # So [12] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH SMALL TRIANGLE ARROWHEAD..DOWNWARDS ARROW WITH LARGE TRIANGLE ARROWHEAD +1F810..1F847 ; Grapheme_Base # So [56] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH SMALL EQUILATERAL ARROWHEAD..DOWNWARDS HEAVY ARROW +1F850..1F859 ; Grapheme_Base # So [10] LEFTWARDS SANS-SERIF ARROW..UP DOWN SANS-SERIF ARROW +1F860..1F887 ; Grapheme_Base # So [40] WIDE-HEADED LEFTWARDS LIGHT BARB ARROW..WIDE-HEADED SOUTH WEST VERY HEAVY BARB ARROW +1F890..1F8AD ; Grapheme_Base # So [30] LEFTWARDS TRIANGLE ARROWHEAD..WHITE ARROW SHAFT WIDTH TWO THIRDS +1F8B0..1F8B1 ; Grapheme_Base # So [2] ARROW POINTING UPWARDS THEN NORTH WEST..ARROW POINTING RIGHTWARDS THEN CURVING SOUTH WEST +1F900..1FA53 ; Grapheme_Base # So [340] CIRCLED CROSS FORMEE WITH FOUR DOTS..BLACK CHESS KNIGHT-BISHOP +1FA60..1FA6D ; Grapheme_Base # So [14] XIANGQI RED GENERAL..XIANGQI BLACK SOLDIER +1FA70..1FA74 ; Grapheme_Base # So [5] BALLET SHOES..THONG SANDAL +1FA78..1FA7C ; Grapheme_Base # So [5] DROP OF BLOOD..CRUTCH +1FA80..1FA86 ; Grapheme_Base # So [7] YO-YO..NESTING DOLLS +1FA90..1FAAC ; Grapheme_Base # So [29] RINGED PLANET..HAMSA +1FAB0..1FABA ; Grapheme_Base # So [11] FLY..NEST WITH EGGS +1FAC0..1FAC5 ; Grapheme_Base # So [6] ANATOMICAL HEART..PERSON WITH CROWN +1FAD0..1FAD9 ; Grapheme_Base # So [10] BLUEBERRIES..JAR +1FAE0..1FAE7 ; Grapheme_Base # So [8] MELTING FACE..BUBBLES +1FAF0..1FAF6 ; Grapheme_Base # So [7] HAND WITH INDEX FINGER AND THUMB CROSSED..HEART HANDS +1FB00..1FB92 ; Grapheme_Base # So [147] BLOCK SEXTANT-1..UPPER HALF INVERSE MEDIUM SHADE AND LOWER HALF BLOCK +1FB94..1FBCA ; Grapheme_Base # So [55] LEFT HALF INVERSE MEDIUM SHADE AND RIGHT HALF BLOCK..WHITE UP-POINTING CHEVRON +1FBF0..1FBF9 ; Grapheme_Base # Nd [10] SEGMENTED DIGIT ZERO..SEGMENTED DIGIT NINE +20000..2A6DF ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [42720] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-20000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A6DF +2A700..2B738 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4153] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A700..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B738 +2B740..2B81D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [222] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B740..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B81D +2B820..2CEA1 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [5762] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B820..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEA1 +2CEB0..2EBE0 ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [7473] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEB0..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2EBE0 +2F800..2FA1D ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [542] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2F800..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2FA1D +30000..3134A ; Grapheme_Base # Lo [4939] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-30000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3134A + +# Total code points: 142539 + +# ================================================ + +# Derived Property: Grapheme_Link (deprecated) +# Generated from: Canonical_Combining_Class=Virama +# Use Canonical_Combining_Class=Virama directly instead + +094D ; Grapheme_Link # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +09CD ; Grapheme_Link # Mn BENGALI SIGN VIRAMA +0A4D ; Grapheme_Link # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN VIRAMA +0ACD ; Grapheme_Link # Mn GUJARATI SIGN VIRAMA +0B4D ; Grapheme_Link # Mn ORIYA SIGN VIRAMA +0BCD ; Grapheme_Link # Mn TAMIL SIGN VIRAMA +0C4D ; Grapheme_Link # Mn TELUGU SIGN VIRAMA +0CCD ; Grapheme_Link # Mn KANNADA SIGN VIRAMA +0D3B..0D3C ; Grapheme_Link # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN VERTICAL BAR VIRAMA..MALAYALAM SIGN CIRCULAR VIRAMA +0D4D ; Grapheme_Link # Mn MALAYALAM SIGN VIRAMA +0DCA ; Grapheme_Link # Mn SINHALA SIGN AL-LAKUNA +0E3A ; Grapheme_Link # Mn THAI CHARACTER PHINTHU +0EBA ; Grapheme_Link # Mn LAO SIGN PALI VIRAMA +0F84 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn TIBETAN MARK HALANTA +1039..103A ; Grapheme_Link # Mn [2] MYANMAR SIGN VIRAMA..MYANMAR SIGN ASAT +1714 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn TAGALOG SIGN VIRAMA +1715 ; Grapheme_Link # Mc TAGALOG SIGN PAMUDPOD +1734 ; Grapheme_Link # Mc HANUNOO SIGN PAMUDPOD +17D2 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn KHMER SIGN COENG +1A60 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn TAI THAM SIGN SAKOT +1B44 ; Grapheme_Link # Mc BALINESE ADEG ADEG +1BAA ; Grapheme_Link # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PAMAAEH +1BAB ; Grapheme_Link # Mn SUNDANESE SIGN VIRAMA +1BF2..1BF3 ; Grapheme_Link # Mc [2] BATAK PANGOLAT..BATAK PANONGONAN +2D7F ; Grapheme_Link # Mn TIFINAGH CONSONANT JOINER +A806 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN HASANTA +A82C ; Grapheme_Link # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ALTERNATE HASANTA +A8C4 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn SAURASHTRA SIGN VIRAMA +A953 ; Grapheme_Link # Mc REJANG VIRAMA +A9C0 ; Grapheme_Link # Mc JAVANESE PANGKON +AAF6 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VIRAMA +ABED ; Grapheme_Link # Mn MEETEI MAYEK APUN IYEK +10A3F ; Grapheme_Link # Mn KHAROSHTHI VIRAMA +11046 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn BRAHMI VIRAMA +11070 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn BRAHMI SIGN OLD TAMIL VIRAMA +1107F ; Grapheme_Link # Mn BRAHMI NUMBER JOINER +110B9 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn KAITHI SIGN VIRAMA +11133..11134 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn [2] CHAKMA VIRAMA..CHAKMA MAAYYAA +111C0 ; Grapheme_Link # Mc SHARADA SIGN VIRAMA +11235 ; Grapheme_Link # Mc KHOJKI SIGN VIRAMA +112EA ; Grapheme_Link # Mn KHUDAWADI SIGN VIRAMA +1134D ; Grapheme_Link # Mc GRANTHA SIGN VIRAMA +11442 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn NEWA SIGN VIRAMA +114C2 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn TIRHUTA SIGN VIRAMA +115BF ; Grapheme_Link # Mn SIDDHAM SIGN VIRAMA +1163F ; Grapheme_Link # Mn MODI SIGN VIRAMA +116B6 ; Grapheme_Link # Mc TAKRI SIGN VIRAMA +1172B ; Grapheme_Link # Mn AHOM SIGN KILLER +11839 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn DOGRA SIGN VIRAMA +1193D ; Grapheme_Link # Mc DIVES AKURU SIGN HALANTA +1193E ; Grapheme_Link # Mn DIVES AKURU VIRAMA +119E0 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn NANDINAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +11A34 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN VIRAMA +11A47 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn ZANABAZAR SQUARE SUBJOINER +11A99 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn SOYOMBO SUBJOINER +11C3F ; Grapheme_Link # Mn BHAIKSUKI SIGN VIRAMA +11D44..11D45 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn [2] MASARAM GONDI SIGN HALANTA..MASARAM GONDI VIRAMA +11D97 ; Grapheme_Link # Mn GUNJALA GONDI VIRAMA + +# Total code points: 63 + +# EOF diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/DerivedGeneralCategory.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/DerivedGeneralCategory.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a36d42a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/DerivedGeneralCategory.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4192 @@ +# DerivedGeneralCategory-14.0.0.txt +# Date: 2021-07-10, 00:35:08 GMT +# © 2021 Unicode®, Inc. +# Unicode and the Unicode Logo are registered trademarks of Unicode, Inc. in the U.S. and other countries. +# For terms of use, see http://www.unicode.org/terms_of_use.html +# +# Unicode Character Database +# For documentation, see http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr44/ + +# ================================================ + +# Property: General_Category + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Unassigned + +0378..0379 ; Cn # [2] .. +0380..0383 ; Cn # [4] .. +038B ; Cn # +038D ; Cn # +03A2 ; Cn # +0530 ; Cn # +0557..0558 ; Cn # [2] .. +058B..058C ; Cn # [2] .. +0590 ; Cn # +05C8..05CF ; Cn # [8] .. +05EB..05EE ; Cn # [4] .. +05F5..05FF ; Cn # [11] .. +070E ; Cn # +074B..074C ; Cn # [2] .. +07B2..07BF ; Cn # [14] .. +07FB..07FC ; Cn # [2] .. +082E..082F ; Cn # [2] .. +083F ; Cn # +085C..085D ; Cn # [2] .. +085F ; Cn # +086B..086F ; Cn # [5] .. +088F ; Cn # +0892..0897 ; Cn # [6] .. +0984 ; Cn # +098D..098E ; Cn # [2] .. +0991..0992 ; Cn # [2] .. +09A9 ; Cn # +09B1 ; Cn # +09B3..09B5 ; Cn # [3] .. +09BA..09BB ; Cn # [2] .. +09C5..09C6 ; Cn # [2] .. +09C9..09CA ; Cn # [2] .. +09CF..09D6 ; Cn # [8] .. +09D8..09DB ; Cn # [4] .. +09DE ; Cn # +09E4..09E5 ; Cn # [2] .. +09FF..0A00 ; Cn # [2] .. +0A04 ; Cn # +0A0B..0A0E ; Cn # [4] .. +0A11..0A12 ; Cn # [2] .. +0A29 ; Cn # +0A31 ; Cn # +0A34 ; Cn # +0A37 ; Cn # +0A3A..0A3B ; Cn # [2] .. +0A3D ; Cn # +0A43..0A46 ; Cn # [4] .. +0A49..0A4A ; Cn # [2] .. +0A4E..0A50 ; Cn # [3] .. +0A52..0A58 ; Cn # [7] .. +0A5D ; Cn # +0A5F..0A65 ; Cn # [7] .. +0A77..0A80 ; Cn # [10] .. +0A84 ; Cn # +0A8E ; Cn # +0A92 ; Cn # +0AA9 ; Cn # +0AB1 ; Cn # +0AB4 ; Cn # +0ABA..0ABB ; Cn # [2] .. +0AC6 ; Cn # +0ACA ; Cn # +0ACE..0ACF ; Cn # [2] .. +0AD1..0ADF ; Cn # [15] .. +0AE4..0AE5 ; Cn # [2] .. +0AF2..0AF8 ; Cn # [7] .. +0B00 ; Cn # +0B04 ; Cn # +0B0D..0B0E ; Cn # [2] .. +0B11..0B12 ; Cn # [2] .. +0B29 ; Cn # +0B31 ; Cn # +0B34 ; Cn # +0B3A..0B3B ; Cn # [2] .. +0B45..0B46 ; Cn # [2] .. +0B49..0B4A ; Cn # [2] .. +0B4E..0B54 ; Cn # [7] .. +0B58..0B5B ; Cn # [4] .. +0B5E ; Cn # +0B64..0B65 ; Cn # [2] .. +0B78..0B81 ; Cn # [10] .. +0B84 ; Cn # +0B8B..0B8D ; Cn # [3] .. +0B91 ; Cn # +0B96..0B98 ; Cn # [3] .. +0B9B ; Cn # +0B9D ; Cn # +0BA0..0BA2 ; Cn # [3] .. +0BA5..0BA7 ; Cn # [3] .. +0BAB..0BAD ; Cn # [3] .. +0BBA..0BBD ; Cn # [4] .. +0BC3..0BC5 ; Cn # [3] .. +0BC9 ; Cn # +0BCE..0BCF ; Cn # [2] .. +0BD1..0BD6 ; Cn # [6] .. +0BD8..0BE5 ; Cn # [14] .. +0BFB..0BFF ; Cn # [5] .. +0C0D ; Cn # +0C11 ; Cn # +0C29 ; Cn # +0C3A..0C3B ; Cn # [2] .. +0C45 ; Cn # +0C49 ; Cn # +0C4E..0C54 ; Cn # [7] .. +0C57 ; Cn # +0C5B..0C5C ; Cn # [2] .. +0C5E..0C5F ; Cn # [2] .. +0C64..0C65 ; Cn # [2] .. +0C70..0C76 ; Cn # [7] .. +0C8D ; Cn # +0C91 ; Cn # +0CA9 ; Cn # +0CB4 ; Cn # +0CBA..0CBB ; Cn # [2] .. +0CC5 ; Cn # +0CC9 ; Cn # +0CCE..0CD4 ; Cn # [7] .. +0CD7..0CDC ; Cn # [6] .. +0CDF ; Cn # +0CE4..0CE5 ; Cn # [2] .. +0CF0 ; Cn # +0CF3..0CFF ; Cn # [13] .. +0D0D ; Cn # +0D11 ; Cn # +0D45 ; Cn # +0D49 ; Cn # +0D50..0D53 ; Cn # [4] .. +0D64..0D65 ; Cn # [2] .. +0D80 ; Cn # +0D84 ; Cn # +0D97..0D99 ; Cn # [3] .. +0DB2 ; Cn # +0DBC ; Cn # +0DBE..0DBF ; Cn # [2] .. +0DC7..0DC9 ; Cn # [3] .. +0DCB..0DCE ; Cn # [4] .. +0DD5 ; Cn # +0DD7 ; Cn # +0DE0..0DE5 ; Cn # [6] .. +0DF0..0DF1 ; Cn # [2] .. +0DF5..0E00 ; Cn # [12] .. +0E3B..0E3E ; Cn # [4] .. +0E5C..0E80 ; Cn # [37] .. +0E83 ; Cn # +0E85 ; Cn # +0E8B ; Cn # +0EA4 ; Cn # +0EA6 ; Cn # +0EBE..0EBF ; Cn # [2] .. +0EC5 ; Cn # +0EC7 ; Cn # +0ECE..0ECF ; Cn # [2] .. +0EDA..0EDB ; Cn # [2] .. +0EE0..0EFF ; Cn # [32] .. +0F48 ; Cn # +0F6D..0F70 ; Cn # [4] .. +0F98 ; Cn # +0FBD ; Cn # +0FCD ; Cn # +0FDB..0FFF ; Cn # [37] .. +10C6 ; Cn # +10C8..10CC ; Cn # [5] .. +10CE..10CF ; Cn # [2] .. +1249 ; Cn # +124E..124F ; Cn # [2] .. +1257 ; Cn # +1259 ; Cn # +125E..125F ; Cn # [2] .. +1289 ; Cn # +128E..128F ; Cn # [2] .. +12B1 ; Cn # +12B6..12B7 ; Cn # [2] .. +12BF ; Cn # +12C1 ; Cn # +12C6..12C7 ; Cn # [2] .. +12D7 ; Cn # +1311 ; Cn # +1316..1317 ; Cn # [2] .. +135B..135C ; Cn # [2] .. +137D..137F ; Cn # [3] .. +139A..139F ; Cn # [6] .. +13F6..13F7 ; Cn # [2] .. +13FE..13FF ; Cn # [2] .. +169D..169F ; Cn # [3] .. +16F9..16FF ; Cn # [7] .. +1716..171E ; Cn # [9] .. +1737..173F ; Cn # [9] .. +1754..175F ; Cn # [12] .. +176D ; Cn # +1771 ; Cn # +1774..177F ; Cn # [12] .. +17DE..17DF ; Cn # [2] .. +17EA..17EF ; Cn # [6] .. +17FA..17FF ; Cn # [6] .. +181A..181F ; Cn # [6] .. +1879..187F ; Cn # [7] .. +18AB..18AF ; Cn # [5] .. +18F6..18FF ; Cn # [10] .. +191F ; Cn # +192C..192F ; Cn # [4] .. +193C..193F ; Cn # [4] .. +1941..1943 ; Cn # [3] .. +196E..196F ; Cn # [2] .. +1975..197F ; Cn # [11] .. +19AC..19AF ; Cn # [4] .. +19CA..19CF ; Cn # [6] .. +19DB..19DD ; Cn # [3] .. +1A1C..1A1D ; Cn # [2] .. +1A5F ; Cn # +1A7D..1A7E ; Cn # [2] .. +1A8A..1A8F ; Cn # [6] .. +1A9A..1A9F ; Cn # [6] .. +1AAE..1AAF ; Cn # [2] .. +1ACF..1AFF ; Cn # [49] .. +1B4D..1B4F ; Cn # [3] .. +1B7F ; Cn # +1BF4..1BFB ; Cn # [8] .. +1C38..1C3A ; Cn # [3] .. +1C4A..1C4C ; Cn # [3] .. +1C89..1C8F ; Cn # [7] .. +1CBB..1CBC ; Cn # [2] .. +1CC8..1CCF ; Cn # [8] .. +1CFB..1CFF ; Cn # [5] .. +1F16..1F17 ; Cn # [2] .. +1F1E..1F1F ; Cn # [2] .. +1F46..1F47 ; Cn # [2] .. +1F4E..1F4F ; Cn # [2] .. +1F58 ; Cn # +1F5A ; Cn # +1F5C ; Cn # +1F5E ; Cn # +1F7E..1F7F ; Cn # [2] .. +1FB5 ; Cn # +1FC5 ; Cn # +1FD4..1FD5 ; Cn # [2] .. +1FDC ; Cn # +1FF0..1FF1 ; Cn # [2] .. +1FF5 ; Cn # +1FFF ; Cn # +2065 ; Cn # +2072..2073 ; Cn # [2] .. +208F ; Cn # +209D..209F ; Cn # [3] .. +20C1..20CF ; Cn # [15] .. +20F1..20FF ; Cn # [15] .. +218C..218F ; Cn # [4] .. +2427..243F ; Cn # [25] .. +244B..245F ; Cn # [21] .. +2B74..2B75 ; Cn # [2] .. +2B96 ; Cn # +2CF4..2CF8 ; Cn # [5] .. +2D26 ; Cn # +2D28..2D2C ; Cn # [5] .. +2D2E..2D2F ; Cn # [2] .. +2D68..2D6E ; Cn # [7] .. +2D71..2D7E ; Cn # [14] .. +2D97..2D9F ; Cn # [9] .. +2DA7 ; Cn # +2DAF ; Cn # +2DB7 ; Cn # +2DBF ; Cn # +2DC7 ; Cn # +2DCF ; Cn # +2DD7 ; Cn # +2DDF ; Cn # +2E5E..2E7F ; Cn # [34] .. +2E9A ; Cn # +2EF4..2EFF ; Cn # [12] .. +2FD6..2FEF ; Cn # [26] .. +2FFC..2FFF ; Cn # [4] .. +3040 ; Cn # +3097..3098 ; Cn # [2] .. +3100..3104 ; Cn # [5] .. +3130 ; Cn # +318F ; Cn # +31E4..31EF ; Cn # [12] .. +321F ; Cn # +A48D..A48F ; Cn # [3] .. +A4C7..A4CF ; Cn # [9] .. +A62C..A63F ; Cn # [20] .. +A6F8..A6FF ; Cn # [8] .. +A7CB..A7CF ; Cn # [5] .. +A7D2 ; Cn # +A7D4 ; Cn # +A7DA..A7F1 ; Cn # [24] .. +A82D..A82F ; Cn # [3] .. +A83A..A83F ; Cn # [6] .. +A878..A87F ; Cn # [8] .. +A8C6..A8CD ; Cn # [8] .. +A8DA..A8DF ; Cn # [6] .. +A954..A95E ; Cn # [11] .. +A97D..A97F ; Cn # [3] .. +A9CE ; Cn # +A9DA..A9DD ; Cn # [4] .. +A9FF ; Cn # +AA37..AA3F ; Cn # [9] .. +AA4E..AA4F ; Cn # [2] .. +AA5A..AA5B ; Cn # [2] .. +AAC3..AADA ; Cn # [24] .. +AAF7..AB00 ; Cn # [10] .. +AB07..AB08 ; Cn # [2] .. +AB0F..AB10 ; Cn # [2] .. +AB17..AB1F ; Cn # [9] .. +AB27 ; Cn # +AB2F ; Cn # +AB6C..AB6F ; Cn # [4] .. +ABEE..ABEF ; Cn # [2] .. +ABFA..ABFF ; Cn # [6] .. +D7A4..D7AF ; Cn # [12] .. +D7C7..D7CA ; Cn # [4] .. +D7FC..D7FF ; Cn # [4] .. +FA6E..FA6F ; Cn # [2] .. +FADA..FAFF ; Cn # [38] .. +FB07..FB12 ; Cn # [12] .. +FB18..FB1C ; Cn # [5] .. +FB37 ; Cn # +FB3D ; Cn # +FB3F ; Cn # +FB42 ; Cn # +FB45 ; Cn # +FBC3..FBD2 ; Cn # [16] .. +FD90..FD91 ; Cn # [2] .. +FDC8..FDCE ; Cn # [7] .. +FDD0..FDEF ; Cn # [32] .. +FE1A..FE1F ; Cn # [6] .. +FE53 ; Cn # +FE67 ; Cn # +FE6C..FE6F ; Cn # [4] .. +FE75 ; Cn # +FEFD..FEFE ; Cn # [2] .. +FF00 ; Cn # +FFBF..FFC1 ; Cn # [3] .. +FFC8..FFC9 ; Cn # [2] .. +FFD0..FFD1 ; Cn # [2] .. +FFD8..FFD9 ; Cn # [2] .. +FFDD..FFDF ; Cn # [3] .. +FFE7 ; Cn # +FFEF..FFF8 ; Cn # [10] .. +FFFE..FFFF ; Cn # [2] .. +1000C ; Cn # +10027 ; Cn # +1003B ; Cn # +1003E ; Cn # +1004E..1004F ; Cn # [2] .. +1005E..1007F ; Cn # [34] .. +100FB..100FF ; Cn # [5] .. +10103..10106 ; Cn # [4] .. +10134..10136 ; Cn # [3] .. +1018F ; Cn # +1019D..1019F ; Cn # [3] .. +101A1..101CF ; Cn # [47] .. +101FE..1027F ; Cn # [130] .. +1029D..1029F ; Cn # [3] .. +102D1..102DF ; Cn # [15] .. +102FC..102FF ; Cn # [4] .. +10324..1032C ; Cn # [9] .. +1034B..1034F ; Cn # [5] .. +1037B..1037F ; Cn # [5] .. +1039E ; Cn # +103C4..103C7 ; Cn # [4] .. +103D6..103FF ; Cn # [42] .. +1049E..1049F ; Cn # [2] .. +104AA..104AF ; Cn # [6] .. +104D4..104D7 ; Cn # [4] .. +104FC..104FF ; Cn # [4] .. +10528..1052F ; Cn # [8] .. +10564..1056E ; Cn # [11] .. +1057B ; Cn # +1058B ; Cn # +10593 ; Cn # +10596 ; Cn # +105A2 ; Cn # +105B2 ; Cn # +105BA ; Cn # +105BD..105FF ; Cn # [67] .. +10737..1073F ; Cn # [9] .. +10756..1075F ; Cn # [10] .. +10768..1077F ; Cn # [24] .. +10786 ; Cn # +107B1 ; Cn # +107BB..107FF ; Cn # [69] .. +10806..10807 ; Cn # [2] .. +10809 ; Cn # +10836 ; Cn # +10839..1083B ; Cn # [3] .. +1083D..1083E ; Cn # [2] .. +10856 ; Cn # +1089F..108A6 ; Cn # [8] .. +108B0..108DF ; Cn # [48] .. +108F3 ; Cn # +108F6..108FA ; Cn # [5] .. +1091C..1091E ; Cn # [3] .. +1093A..1093E ; Cn # [5] .. +10940..1097F ; Cn # [64] .. +109B8..109BB ; Cn # [4] .. +109D0..109D1 ; Cn # [2] .. +10A04 ; Cn # +10A07..10A0B ; Cn # [5] .. +10A14 ; Cn # +10A18 ; Cn # +10A36..10A37 ; Cn # [2] .. +10A3B..10A3E ; Cn # [4] .. +10A49..10A4F ; Cn # [7] .. +10A59..10A5F ; Cn # [7] .. +10AA0..10ABF ; Cn # [32] .. +10AE7..10AEA ; Cn # [4] .. +10AF7..10AFF ; Cn # [9] .. +10B36..10B38 ; Cn # [3] .. +10B56..10B57 ; Cn # [2] .. +10B73..10B77 ; Cn # [5] .. +10B92..10B98 ; Cn # [7] .. +10B9D..10BA8 ; Cn # [12] .. +10BB0..10BFF ; Cn # [80] .. +10C49..10C7F ; Cn # [55] .. +10CB3..10CBF ; Cn # [13] .. +10CF3..10CF9 ; Cn # [7] .. +10D28..10D2F ; Cn # [8] .. +10D3A..10E5F ; Cn # [294] .. +10E7F ; Cn # +10EAA ; Cn # +10EAE..10EAF ; Cn # [2] .. +10EB2..10EFF ; Cn # [78] .. +10F28..10F2F ; Cn # [8] .. +10F5A..10F6F ; Cn # [22] .. +10F8A..10FAF ; Cn # [38] .. +10FCC..10FDF ; Cn # [20] .. +10FF7..10FFF ; Cn # [9] .. +1104E..11051 ; Cn # [4] .. +11076..1107E ; Cn # [9] .. +110C3..110CC ; Cn # [10] .. +110CE..110CF ; Cn # [2] .. +110E9..110EF ; Cn # [7] .. +110FA..110FF ; Cn # [6] .. +11135 ; Cn # +11148..1114F ; Cn # [8] .. +11177..1117F ; Cn # [9] .. +111E0 ; Cn # +111F5..111FF ; Cn # [11] .. +11212 ; Cn # +1123F..1127F ; Cn # [65] .. +11287 ; Cn # +11289 ; Cn # +1128E ; Cn # +1129E ; Cn # +112AA..112AF ; Cn # [6] .. +112EB..112EF ; Cn # [5] .. +112FA..112FF ; Cn # [6] .. +11304 ; Cn # +1130D..1130E ; Cn # [2] .. +11311..11312 ; Cn # [2] .. +11329 ; Cn # +11331 ; Cn # +11334 ; Cn # +1133A ; Cn # +11345..11346 ; Cn # [2] .. +11349..1134A ; Cn # [2] .. +1134E..1134F ; Cn # [2] .. +11351..11356 ; Cn # [6] .. +11358..1135C ; Cn # [5] .. +11364..11365 ; Cn # [2] .. +1136D..1136F ; Cn # [3] .. +11375..113FF ; Cn # [139] .. +1145C ; Cn # +11462..1147F ; Cn # [30] .. +114C8..114CF ; Cn # [8] .. +114DA..1157F ; Cn # [166] .. +115B6..115B7 ; Cn # [2] .. +115DE..115FF ; Cn # [34] .. +11645..1164F ; Cn # [11] .. +1165A..1165F ; Cn # [6] .. +1166D..1167F ; Cn # [19] .. +116BA..116BF ; Cn # [6] .. +116CA..116FF ; Cn # [54] .. +1171B..1171C ; Cn # [2] .. +1172C..1172F ; Cn # [4] .. +11747..117FF ; Cn # [185] .. +1183C..1189F ; Cn # [100] .. +118F3..118FE ; Cn # [12] .. +11907..11908 ; Cn # [2] .. +1190A..1190B ; Cn # [2] .. +11914 ; Cn # +11917 ; Cn # +11936 ; Cn # +11939..1193A ; Cn # [2] .. +11947..1194F ; Cn # [9] .. +1195A..1199F ; Cn # [70] .. +119A8..119A9 ; Cn # [2] .. +119D8..119D9 ; Cn # [2] .. +119E5..119FF ; Cn # [27] .. +11A48..11A4F ; Cn # [8] .. +11AA3..11AAF ; Cn # [13] .. +11AF9..11BFF ; Cn # [263] .. +11C09 ; Cn # +11C37 ; Cn # +11C46..11C4F ; Cn # [10] .. +11C6D..11C6F ; Cn # [3] .. +11C90..11C91 ; Cn # [2] .. +11CA8 ; Cn # +11CB7..11CFF ; Cn # [73] .. +11D07 ; Cn # +11D0A ; Cn # +11D37..11D39 ; Cn # [3] .. +11D3B ; Cn # +11D3E ; Cn # +11D48..11D4F ; Cn # [8] .. +11D5A..11D5F ; Cn # [6] .. +11D66 ; Cn # +11D69 ; Cn # +11D8F ; Cn # +11D92 ; Cn # +11D99..11D9F ; Cn # [7] .. +11DAA..11EDF ; Cn # [310] .. +11EF9..11FAF ; Cn # [183] .. +11FB1..11FBF ; Cn # [15] .. +11FF2..11FFE ; Cn # [13] .. +1239A..123FF ; Cn # [102] .. +1246F ; Cn # +12475..1247F ; Cn # [11] .. +12544..12F8F ; Cn # [2636] .. +12FF3..12FFF ; Cn # [13] .. +1342F ; Cn # +13439..143FF ; Cn # [4039] .. +14647..167FF ; Cn # [8633] .. +16A39..16A3F ; Cn # [7] .. +16A5F ; Cn # +16A6A..16A6D ; Cn # [4] .. +16ABF ; Cn # +16ACA..16ACF ; Cn # [6] .. +16AEE..16AEF ; Cn # [2] .. +16AF6..16AFF ; Cn # [10] .. +16B46..16B4F ; Cn # [10] .. +16B5A ; Cn # +16B62 ; Cn # +16B78..16B7C ; Cn # [5] .. +16B90..16E3F ; Cn # [688] .. +16E9B..16EFF ; Cn # [101] .. +16F4B..16F4E ; Cn # [4] .. +16F88..16F8E ; Cn # [7] .. +16FA0..16FDF ; Cn # [64] .. +16FE5..16FEF ; Cn # [11] .. +16FF2..16FFF ; Cn # [14] .. +187F8..187FF ; Cn # [8] .. +18CD6..18CFF ; Cn # [42] .. +18D09..1AFEF ; Cn # [8935] .. +1AFF4 ; Cn # +1AFFC ; Cn # +1AFFF ; Cn # +1B123..1B14F ; Cn # [45] .. +1B153..1B163 ; Cn # [17] .. +1B168..1B16F ; Cn # [8] .. +1B2FC..1BBFF ; Cn # [2308] .. +1BC6B..1BC6F ; Cn # [5] .. +1BC7D..1BC7F ; Cn # [3] .. +1BC89..1BC8F ; Cn # [7] .. +1BC9A..1BC9B ; Cn # [2] .. +1BCA4..1CEFF ; Cn # [4700] .. +1CF2E..1CF2F ; Cn # [2] .. +1CF47..1CF4F ; Cn # [9] .. +1CFC4..1CFFF ; Cn # [60] .. +1D0F6..1D0FF ; Cn # [10] .. +1D127..1D128 ; Cn # [2] .. +1D1EB..1D1FF ; Cn # [21] .. +1D246..1D2DF ; Cn # [154] .. +1D2F4..1D2FF ; Cn # [12] .. +1D357..1D35F ; Cn # [9] .. +1D379..1D3FF ; Cn # [135] .. +1D455 ; Cn # +1D49D ; Cn # +1D4A0..1D4A1 ; Cn # [2] .. +1D4A3..1D4A4 ; Cn # [2] .. +1D4A7..1D4A8 ; Cn # [2] .. +1D4AD ; Cn # +1D4BA ; Cn # +1D4BC ; Cn # +1D4C4 ; Cn # +1D506 ; Cn # +1D50B..1D50C ; Cn # [2] .. +1D515 ; Cn # +1D51D ; Cn # +1D53A ; Cn # +1D53F ; Cn # +1D545 ; Cn # +1D547..1D549 ; Cn # [3] .. +1D551 ; Cn # +1D6A6..1D6A7 ; Cn # [2] .. +1D7CC..1D7CD ; Cn # [2] .. +1DA8C..1DA9A ; Cn # [15] .. +1DAA0 ; Cn # +1DAB0..1DEFF ; Cn # [1104] .. +1DF1F..1DFFF ; Cn # [225] .. +1E007 ; Cn # +1E019..1E01A ; Cn # [2] .. +1E022 ; Cn # +1E025 ; Cn # +1E02B..1E0FF ; Cn # [213] .. +1E12D..1E12F ; Cn # [3] .. +1E13E..1E13F ; Cn # [2] .. +1E14A..1E14D ; Cn # [4] .. +1E150..1E28F ; Cn # [320] .. +1E2AF..1E2BF ; Cn # [17] .. +1E2FA..1E2FE ; Cn # [5] .. +1E300..1E7DF ; Cn # [1248] .. +1E7E7 ; Cn # +1E7EC ; Cn # +1E7EF ; Cn # +1E7FF ; Cn # +1E8C5..1E8C6 ; Cn # [2] .. +1E8D7..1E8FF ; Cn # [41] .. +1E94C..1E94F ; Cn # [4] .. +1E95A..1E95D ; Cn # [4] .. +1E960..1EC70 ; Cn # [785] .. +1ECB5..1ED00 ; Cn # [76] .. +1ED3E..1EDFF ; Cn # [194] .. +1EE04 ; Cn # +1EE20 ; Cn # +1EE23 ; Cn # +1EE25..1EE26 ; Cn # [2] .. +1EE28 ; Cn # +1EE33 ; Cn # +1EE38 ; Cn # +1EE3A ; Cn # +1EE3C..1EE41 ; Cn # [6] .. +1EE43..1EE46 ; Cn # [4] .. +1EE48 ; Cn # +1EE4A ; Cn # +1EE4C ; Cn # +1EE50 ; Cn # +1EE53 ; Cn # +1EE55..1EE56 ; Cn # [2] .. +1EE58 ; Cn # +1EE5A ; Cn # +1EE5C ; Cn # +1EE5E ; Cn # +1EE60 ; Cn # +1EE63 ; Cn # +1EE65..1EE66 ; Cn # [2] .. +1EE6B ; Cn # +1EE73 ; Cn # +1EE78 ; Cn # +1EE7D ; Cn # +1EE7F ; Cn # +1EE8A ; Cn # +1EE9C..1EEA0 ; Cn # [5] .. +1EEA4 ; Cn # +1EEAA ; Cn # +1EEBC..1EEEF ; Cn # [52] .. +1EEF2..1EFFF ; Cn # [270] .. +1F02C..1F02F ; Cn # [4] .. +1F094..1F09F ; Cn # [12] .. +1F0AF..1F0B0 ; Cn # [2] .. +1F0C0 ; Cn # +1F0D0 ; Cn # +1F0F6..1F0FF ; Cn # [10] .. +1F1AE..1F1E5 ; Cn # [56] .. +1F203..1F20F ; Cn # [13] .. +1F23C..1F23F ; Cn # [4] .. +1F249..1F24F ; Cn # [7] .. +1F252..1F25F ; Cn # [14] .. +1F266..1F2FF ; Cn # [154] .. +1F6D8..1F6DC ; Cn # [5] .. +1F6ED..1F6EF ; Cn # [3] .. +1F6FD..1F6FF ; Cn # [3] .. +1F774..1F77F ; Cn # [12] .. +1F7D9..1F7DF ; Cn # [7] .. +1F7EC..1F7EF ; Cn # [4] .. +1F7F1..1F7FF ; Cn # [15] .. +1F80C..1F80F ; Cn # [4] .. +1F848..1F84F ; Cn # [8] .. +1F85A..1F85F ; Cn # [6] .. +1F888..1F88F ; Cn # [8] .. +1F8AE..1F8AF ; Cn # [2] .. +1F8B2..1F8FF ; Cn # [78] .. +1FA54..1FA5F ; Cn # [12] .. +1FA6E..1FA6F ; Cn # [2] .. +1FA75..1FA77 ; Cn # [3] .. +1FA7D..1FA7F ; Cn # [3] .. +1FA87..1FA8F ; Cn # [9] .. +1FAAD..1FAAF ; Cn # [3] .. +1FABB..1FABF ; Cn # [5] .. +1FAC6..1FACF ; Cn # [10] .. +1FADA..1FADF ; Cn # [6] .. +1FAE8..1FAEF ; Cn # [8] .. +1FAF7..1FAFF ; Cn # [9] .. +1FB93 ; Cn # +1FBCB..1FBEF ; Cn # [37] .. +1FBFA..1FFFF ; Cn # [1030] .. +2A6E0..2A6FF ; Cn # [32] .. +2B739..2B73F ; Cn # [7] .. +2B81E..2B81F ; Cn # [2] .. +2CEA2..2CEAF ; Cn # [14] .. +2EBE1..2F7FF ; Cn # [3103] .. +2FA1E..2FFFF ; Cn # [1506] .. +3134B..E0000 ; Cn # [715958] .. +E0002..E001F ; Cn # [30] .. +E0080..E00FF ; Cn # [128] .. +E01F0..EFFFF ; Cn # [65040] .. +FFFFE..FFFFF ; Cn # [2] .. +10FFFE..10FFFF; Cn # [2] .. + +# Total code points: 829834 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Uppercase_Letter + +0041..005A ; Lu # [26] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +00C0..00D6 ; Lu # [23] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH GRAVE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00D8..00DE ; Lu # [7] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN +0100 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH MACRON +0102 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE +0104 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH OGONEK +0106 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH ACUTE +0108 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CIRCUMFLEX +010A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH DOT ABOVE +010C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CARON +010E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CARON +0110 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH STROKE +0112 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON +0114 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH BREVE +0116 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOT ABOVE +0118 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH OGONEK +011A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CARON +011C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CIRCUMFLEX +011E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH BREVE +0120 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH DOT ABOVE +0122 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CEDILLA +0124 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0126 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH STROKE +0128 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH TILDE +012A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH MACRON +012C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH BREVE +012E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH OGONEK +0130 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOT ABOVE +0132 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LIGATURE IJ +0134 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0136 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH CEDILLA +0139 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH ACUTE +013B ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CEDILLA +013D ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CARON +013F ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE DOT +0141 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH STROKE +0143 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH ACUTE +0145 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CEDILLA +0147 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CARON +014A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ENG +014C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON +014E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH BREVE +0150 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0152 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LIGATURE OE +0154 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH ACUTE +0156 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH CEDILLA +0158 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH CARON +015A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH ACUTE +015C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CIRCUMFLEX +015E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CEDILLA +0160 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CARON +0162 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CEDILLA +0164 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CARON +0166 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH STROKE +0168 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE +016A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON +016C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH BREVE +016E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH RING ABOVE +0170 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0172 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH OGONEK +0174 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0176 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0178..0179 ; Lu # [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DIAERESIS..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH ACUTE +017B ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DOT ABOVE +017D ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH CARON +0181..0182 ; Lu # [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH TOPBAR +0184 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE SIX +0186..0187 ; Lu # [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OPEN O..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH HOOK +0189..018B ; Lu # [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AFRICAN D..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH TOPBAR +018E..0191 ; Lu # [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED E..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH HOOK +0193..0194 ; Lu # [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GAMMA +0196..0198 ; Lu # [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER IOTA..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH HOOK +019C..019D ; Lu # [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED M..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LEFT HOOK +019F..01A0 ; Lu # [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MIDDLE TILDE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN +01A2 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OI +01A4 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH HOOK +01A6..01A7 ; Lu # [2] LATIN LETTER YR..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE TWO +01A9 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ESH +01AC ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH HOOK +01AE..01AF ; Lu # [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH RETROFLEX HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN +01B1..01B3 ; Lu # [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH HOOK +01B5 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH STROKE +01B7..01B8 ; Lu # [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH REVERSED +01BC ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TONE FIVE +01C4 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ WITH CARON +01C7 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER LJ +01CA ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER NJ +01CD ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CARON +01CF ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH CARON +01D1 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CARON +01D3 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH CARON +01D5 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01D7 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +01D9 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND CARON +01DB ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND GRAVE +01DE ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01E0 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +01E2 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AE WITH MACRON +01E4 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH STROKE +01E6 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH CARON +01E8 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH CARON +01EA ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH OGONEK +01EC ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH OGONEK AND MACRON +01EE ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EZH WITH CARON +01F1 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER DZ +01F4 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH ACUTE +01F6..01F8 ; Lu # [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HWAIR..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH GRAVE +01FA ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING ABOVE AND ACUTE +01FC ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AE WITH ACUTE +01FE ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH STROKE AND ACUTE +0200 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0202 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH INVERTED BREVE +0204 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0206 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH INVERTED BREVE +0208 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH INVERTED BREVE +020C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH INVERTED BREVE +0210 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0212 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH INVERTED BREVE +0214 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0216 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH INVERTED BREVE +0218 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH COMMA BELOW +021A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH COMMA BELOW +021C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER YOGH +021E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CARON +0220 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LONG RIGHT LEG +0222 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OU +0224 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH HOOK +0226 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE +0228 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA +022A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +022C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND MACRON +022E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE +0230 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +0232 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH MACRON +023A..023B ; Lu # [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH STROKE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH STROKE +023D..023E ; Lu # [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH BAR..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +0241 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0243..0246 ; Lu # [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH STROKE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH STROKE +0248 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER J WITH STROKE +024A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SMALL Q WITH HOOK TAIL +024C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH STROKE +024E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH STROKE +0370 ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER HETA +0372 ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0376 ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037F ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER YOT +0386 ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS +0388..038A ; Lu # [3] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH TONOS +038C ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH TONOS +038E..038F ; Lu # [2] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH TONOS..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH TONOS +0391..03A1 ; Lu # [17] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO +03A3..03AB ; Lu # [9] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SIGMA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA +03CF ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL KAI SYMBOL +03D2..03D4 ; Lu # [3] GREEK UPSILON WITH HOOK SYMBOL..GREEK UPSILON WITH DIAERESIS AND HOOK SYMBOL +03D8 ; Lu # GREEK LETTER ARCHAIC KOPPA +03DA ; Lu # GREEK LETTER STIGMA +03DC ; Lu # GREEK LETTER DIGAMMA +03DE ; Lu # GREEK LETTER KOPPA +03E0 ; Lu # GREEK LETTER SAMPI +03E2 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SHEI +03E4 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER FEI +03E6 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KHEI +03E8 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER HORI +03EA ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER GANGIA +03EC ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SHIMA +03EE ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DEI +03F4 ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL THETA SYMBOL +03F7 ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SHO +03F9..03FA ; Lu # [2] GREEK CAPITAL LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER SAN +03FD..042F ; Lu # [51] GREEK CAPITAL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YA +0460 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA +0462 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YAT +0464 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED E +0466 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER LITTLE YUS +0468 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED LITTLE YUS +046A ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BIG YUS +046C ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +046E ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KSI +0470 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PSI +0472 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER FITA +0474 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IZHITSA +0476 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IZHITSA WITH DOUBLE GRAVE ACCENT +0478 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER UK +047A ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ROUND OMEGA +047C ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH TITLO +047E ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER OT +0480 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOPPA +048A ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL +048C ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SEMISOFT SIGN +048E ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ER WITH TICK +0490 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH UPTURN +0492 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE +0494 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0496 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH DESCENDER +0498 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZE WITH DESCENDER +049A ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH DESCENDER +049C ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH VERTICAL STROKE +049E ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH STROKE +04A0 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BASHKIR KA +04A2 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH DESCENDER +04A4 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE EN GHE +04A6 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +04A8 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN HA +04AA ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ES WITH DESCENDER +04AC ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TE WITH DESCENDER +04AE ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER STRAIGHT U +04B0 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER STRAIGHT U WITH STROKE +04B2 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH DESCENDER +04B4 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE TE TSE +04B6 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH DESCENDER +04B8 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH VERTICAL STROKE +04BA ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHHA +04BC ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE +04BE ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE WITH DESCENDER +04C0..04C1 ; Lu # [2] CYRILLIC LETTER PALOCHKA..CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH BREVE +04C3 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KA WITH HOOK +04C5 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH TAIL +04C7 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH HOOK +04C9 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH TAIL +04CB ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KHAKASSIAN CHE +04CD ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EM WITH TAIL +04D0 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE +04D2 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS +04D4 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LIGATURE A IE +04D6 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IE WITH BREVE +04D8 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SCHWA +04DA ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SCHWA WITH DIAERESIS +04DC ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHE WITH DIAERESIS +04DE ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZE WITH DIAERESIS +04E0 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ABKHASIAN DZE +04E2 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I WITH MACRON +04E4 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS +04E6 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +04E8 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BARRED O +04EA ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BARRED O WITH DIAERESIS +04EC ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DIAERESIS +04EE ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON +04F0 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS +04F2 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +04F4 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CHE WITH DIAERESIS +04F6 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH DESCENDER +04F8 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YERU WITH DIAERESIS +04FA ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE AND HOOK +04FC ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH HOOK +04FE ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HA WITH STROKE +0500 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DE +0502 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DJE +0504 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI ZJE +0506 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI DZJE +0508 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI LJE +050A ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI NJE +050C ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI SJE +050E ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER KOMI TJE +0510 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED ZE +0512 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH HOOK +0514 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER LHA +0516 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER RHA +0518 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YAE +051A ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER QA +051C ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER WE +051E ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ALEUT KA +0520 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0522 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0524 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER PE WITH DESCENDER +0526 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHHA WITH DESCENDER +0528 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EN WITH LEFT HOOK +052A ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZZHE +052C ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DCHE +052E ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0531..0556 ; Lu # [38] ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER AYB..ARMENIAN CAPITAL LETTER FEH +10A0..10C5 ; Lu # [38] GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER HOE +10C7 ; Lu # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER YN +10CD ; Lu # GEORGIAN CAPITAL LETTER AEN +13A0..13F5 ; Lu # [86] CHEROKEE LETTER A..CHEROKEE LETTER MV +1C90..1CBA ; Lu # [43] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AIN +1CBD..1CBF ; Lu # [3] GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN MTAVRULI CAPITAL LETTER LABIAL SIGN +1E00 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW +1E02 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH DOT ABOVE +1E04 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH DOT BELOW +1E06 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH LINE BELOW +1E08 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH CEDILLA AND ACUTE +1E0A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH DOT ABOVE +1E0C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH DOT BELOW +1E0E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH LINE BELOW +1E10 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CEDILLA +1E12 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E14 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E16 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E18 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E1A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH TILDE BELOW +1E1C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA AND BREVE +1E1E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH DOT ABOVE +1E20 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH MACRON +1E22 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DOT ABOVE +1E24 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DOT BELOW +1E26 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DIAERESIS +1E28 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH CEDILLA +1E2A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH BREVE BELOW +1E2C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH TILDE BELOW +1E2E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +1E30 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH ACUTE +1E32 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DOT BELOW +1E34 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH LINE BELOW +1E36 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW +1E38 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E3A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH LINE BELOW +1E3C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E3E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH ACUTE +1E40 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH DOT ABOVE +1E42 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER M WITH DOT BELOW +1E44 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DOT ABOVE +1E46 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DOT BELOW +1E48 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH LINE BELOW +1E4A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E4C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E4E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND DIAERESIS +1E50 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E52 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E54 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH ACUTE +1E56 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH DOT ABOVE +1E58 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT ABOVE +1E5A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW +1E5C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E5E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH LINE BELOW +1E60 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT ABOVE +1E62 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW +1E64 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH ACUTE AND DOT ABOVE +1E66 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH CARON AND DOT ABOVE +1E68 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW AND DOT ABOVE +1E6A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DOT ABOVE +1E6C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH DOT BELOW +1E6E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH LINE BELOW +1E70 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER T WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E72 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS BELOW +1E74 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE BELOW +1E76 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E78 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E7A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH MACRON AND DIAERESIS +1E7C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH TILDE +1E7E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH DOT BELOW +1E80 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH GRAVE +1E82 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH ACUTE +1E84 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DIAERESIS +1E86 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DOT ABOVE +1E88 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH DOT BELOW +1E8A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X WITH DOT ABOVE +1E8C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER X WITH DIAERESIS +1E8E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DOT ABOVE +1E90 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH CIRCUMFLEX +1E92 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DOT BELOW +1E94 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH LINE BELOW +1E9E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SHARP S +1EA0 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH DOT BELOW +1EA2 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EA4 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EA6 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EA8 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EAA ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EAC ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EAE ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND ACUTE +1EB0 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND GRAVE +1EB2 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND HOOK ABOVE +1EB4 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND TILDE +1EB6 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND DOT BELOW +1EB8 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH DOT BELOW +1EBA ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EBC ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH TILDE +1EBE ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EC0 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EC2 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EC4 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EC6 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EC8 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ECA ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I WITH DOT BELOW +1ECC ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH DOT BELOW +1ECE ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ED0 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1ED2 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1ED4 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1ED6 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1ED8 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EDA ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EDC ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EDE ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EE0 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EE2 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EE4 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH DOT BELOW +1EE6 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EE8 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EEA ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EEC ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EEE ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EF0 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EF2 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH GRAVE +1EF4 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH DOT BELOW +1EF6 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EF8 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH TILDE +1EFA ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH LL +1EFC ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH V +1EFE ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Y WITH LOOP +1F08..1F0F ; Lu # [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F18..1F1D ; Lu # [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F28..1F2F ; Lu # [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F38..1F3F ; Lu # [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F48..1F4D ; Lu # [6] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F59 ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA +1F5B ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND VARIA +1F5D ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F5F ; Lu # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F68..1F6F ; Lu # [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1FB8..1FBB ; Lu # [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA +1FC8..1FCB ; Lu # [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER EPSILON WITH VARIA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA +1FD8..1FDB ; Lu # [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA +1FE8..1FEC ; Lu # [5] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER RHO WITH DASIA +1FF8..1FFB ; Lu # [4] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMICRON WITH VARIA..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +2102 ; Lu # DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL C +2107 ; Lu # EULER CONSTANT +210B..210D ; Lu # [3] SCRIPT CAPITAL H..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL H +2110..2112 ; Lu # [3] SCRIPT CAPITAL I..SCRIPT CAPITAL L +2115 ; Lu # DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL N +2119..211D ; Lu # [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL P..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL R +2124 ; Lu # DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Z +2126 ; Lu # OHM SIGN +2128 ; Lu # BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL Z +212A..212D ; Lu # [4] KELVIN SIGN..BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL C +2130..2133 ; Lu # [4] SCRIPT CAPITAL E..SCRIPT CAPITAL M +213E..213F ; Lu # [2] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL GAMMA..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL PI +2145 ; Lu # DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC CAPITAL D +2183 ; Lu # ROMAN NUMERAL REVERSED ONE HUNDRED +2C00..2C2F ; Lu # [48] GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER AZU..GLAGOLITIC CAPITAL LETTER CAUDATE CHRIVI +2C60 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH DOUBLE BAR +2C62..2C64 ; Lu # [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE TILDE..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH TAIL +2C67 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH DESCENDER +2C69 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DESCENDER +2C6B ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DESCENDER +2C6D..2C70 ; Lu # [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED ALPHA +2C72 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER W WITH HOOK +2C75 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HALF H +2C7E..2C80 ; Lu # [3] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER ALFA +2C82 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER VIDA +2C84 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER GAMMA +2C86 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DALDA +2C88 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER EIE +2C8A ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SOU +2C8C ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER ZATA +2C8E ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER HATE +2C90 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER THETHE +2C92 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER IAUDA +2C94 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KAPA +2C96 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER LAULA +2C98 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER MI +2C9A ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER NI +2C9C ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KSI +2C9E ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER O +2CA0 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER PI +2CA2 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER RO +2CA4 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SIMA +2CA6 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER TAU +2CA8 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER UA +2CAA ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER FI +2CAC ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER KHI +2CAE ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER PSI +2CB0 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OOU +2CB2 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P ALEF +2CB4 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC AIN +2CB6 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC EIE +2CB8 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P KAPA +2CBA ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P NI +2CBC ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC NI +2CBE ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC OOU +2CC0 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER SAMPI +2CC2 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CROSSED SHEI +2CC4 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHEI +2CC6 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC ESH +2CC8 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER AKHMIMIC KHEI +2CCA ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER DIALECT-P HORI +2CCC ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HORI +2CCE ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HA +2CD0 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER L-SHAPED HA +2CD2 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HEI +2CD4 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC HAT +2CD6 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC GANGIA +2CD8 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC DJA +2CDA ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHIMA +2CDC ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN SHIMA +2CDE ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NGI +2CE0 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NYI +2CE2 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER OLD NUBIAN WAU +2CEB ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI +2CED ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF2 ; Lu # COPTIC CAPITAL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +A640 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZEMLYA +A642 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZELO +A644 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED DZE +A646 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTA +A648 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DJERV +A64A ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER MONOGRAPH UK +A64C ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BROAD OMEGA +A64E ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER NEUTRAL YER +A650 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YERU WITH BACK YER +A652 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED YAT +A654 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED YU +A656 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED A +A658 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65A ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BLENDED YUS +A65C ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER IOTIFIED CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65E ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER YN +A660 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED TSE +A662 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT DE +A664 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT EL +A666 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SOFT EM +A668 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER MONOCULAR O +A66A ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER BINOCULAR O +A66C ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A680 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DWE +A682 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZWE +A684 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER ZHWE +A686 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CCHE +A688 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DZZE +A68A ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +A68C ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TWE +A68E ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TSWE +A690 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TSSE +A692 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER TCHE +A694 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER HWE +A696 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER SHWE +A698 ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER DOUBLE O +A69A ; Lu # CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER CROSSED O +A722 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF +A724 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL AIN +A726 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER HENG +A728 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TZ +A72A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TRESILLO +A72C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CUATRILLO +A72E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CUATRILLO WITH COMMA +A732 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AA +A734 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AO +A736 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AU +A738 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AV +A73A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AV WITH HORIZONTAL BAR +A73C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER AY +A73E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED C WITH DOT +A740 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH STROKE +A742 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A744 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH STROKE AND DIAGONAL STROKE +A746 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER BROKEN L +A748 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH HIGH STROKE +A74A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH LONG STROKE OVERLAY +A74C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER O WITH LOOP +A74E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OO +A750 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A752 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH FLOURISH +A754 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER P WITH SQUIRREL TAIL +A756 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A758 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Q WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A75A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R ROTUNDA +A75C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER RUM ROTUNDA +A75E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A760 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VY +A762 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VISIGOTHIC Z +A764 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE +A766 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A768 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VEND +A76A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ET +A76C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER IS +A76E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CON +A779 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR D +A77B ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR F +A77D..A77E ; Lu # [2] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED INSULAR G +A780 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED L +A782 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR R +A784 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR S +A786 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER INSULAR T +A78B ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO +A78D ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED H +A790 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER +A792 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH BAR +A796 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER B WITH FLOURISH +A798 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F WITH STROKE +A79A ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK AE +A79C ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK OE +A79E ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER VOLAPUK UE +A7A0 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER G WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A2 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER K WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A4 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A6 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER R WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A8 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7AA..A7AE ; Lu # [5] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER H WITH HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SMALL CAPITAL I +A7B0..A7B4 ; Lu # [5] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER TURNED K..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER BETA +A7B6 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA +A7B8 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER U WITH STROKE +A7BA ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL A +A7BC ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL I +A7BE ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER GLOTTAL U +A7C0 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER OLD POLISH O +A7C2 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER ANGLICANA W +A7C4..A7C7 ; Lu # [4] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER C WITH PALATAL HOOK..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7C9 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D0 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D6 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER MIDDLE SCOTS S +A7D8 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F5 ; Lu # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +FF21..FF3A ; Lu # [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +10400..10427 ; Lu # [40] DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I..DESERET CAPITAL LETTER EW +104B0..104D3 ; Lu # [36] OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER A..OSAGE CAPITAL LETTER ZHA +10570..1057A ; Lu # [11] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER A..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER GA +1057C..1058A ; Lu # [15] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER RE +1058C..10592 ; Lu # [7] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER XE +10594..10595 ; Lu # [2] VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI CAPITAL LETTER ZE +10C80..10CB2 ; Lu # [51] OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN CAPITAL LETTER US +118A0..118BF ; Lu # [32] WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI CAPITAL LETTER VIYO +16E40..16E5F ; Lu # [32] MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN CAPITAL LETTER Y +1D400..1D419 ; Lu # [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL Z +1D434..1D44D ; Lu # [26] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL Z +1D468..1D481 ; Lu # [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL Z +1D49C ; Lu # MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A +1D49E..1D49F ; Lu # [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D +1D4A2 ; Lu # MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL G +1D4A5..1D4A6 ; Lu # [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K +1D4A9..1D4AC ; Lu # [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Q +1D4AE..1D4B5 ; Lu # [8] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Z +1D4D0..1D4E9 ; Lu # [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SCRIPT CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SCRIPT CAPITAL Z +1D504..1D505 ; Lu # [2] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL B +1D507..1D50A ; Lu # [4] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL G +1D50D..1D514 ; Lu # [8] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Q +1D516..1D51C ; Lu # [7] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Y +1D538..1D539 ; Lu # [2] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL B +1D53B..1D53E ; Lu # [4] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL G +1D540..1D544 ; Lu # [5] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M +1D546 ; Lu # MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL O +1D54A..1D550 ; Lu # [7] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Y +1D56C..1D585 ; Lu # [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD FRAKTUR CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD FRAKTUR CAPITAL Z +1D5A0..1D5B9 ; Lu # [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF CAPITAL Z +1D5D4..1D5ED ; Lu # [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL Z +1D608..1D621 ; Lu # [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF ITALIC CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF ITALIC CAPITAL Z +1D63C..1D655 ; Lu # [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL Z +1D670..1D689 ; Lu # [26] MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE CAPITAL Z +1D6A8..1D6C0 ; Lu # [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6E2..1D6FA ; Lu # [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D71C..1D734 ; Lu # [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D756..1D76E ; Lu # [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D790..1D7A8 ; Lu # [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D7CA ; Lu # MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL DIGAMMA +1E900..1E921 ; Lu # [34] ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM CAPITAL LETTER SHA + +# Total code points: 1831 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Lowercase_Letter + +0061..007A ; Ll # [26] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +00B5 ; Ll # MICRO SIGN +00DF..00F6 ; Ll # [24] LATIN SMALL LETTER SHARP S..LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +00F8..00FF ; Ll # [8] LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DIAERESIS +0101 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH MACRON +0103 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE +0105 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH OGONEK +0107 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH ACUTE +0109 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CIRCUMFLEX +010B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH DOT ABOVE +010D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CARON +010F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CARON +0111 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH STROKE +0113 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH MACRON +0115 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH BREVE +0117 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH DOT ABOVE +0119 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH OGONEK +011B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CARON +011D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH CIRCUMFLEX +011F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH BREVE +0121 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH DOT ABOVE +0123 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH CEDILLA +0125 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0127 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH STROKE +0129 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH TILDE +012B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH MACRON +012D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH BREVE +012F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH OGONEK +0131 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER DOTLESS I +0133 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LIGATURE IJ +0135 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0137..0138 ; Ll # [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH CEDILLA..LATIN SMALL LETTER KRA +013A ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH ACUTE +013C ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH CEDILLA +013E ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH CARON +0140 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH MIDDLE DOT +0142 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH STROKE +0144 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH ACUTE +0146 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH CEDILLA +0148..0149 ; Ll # [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER N PRECEDED BY APOSTROPHE +014B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER ENG +014D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON +014F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH BREVE +0151 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0153 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LIGATURE OE +0155 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH ACUTE +0157 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH CEDILLA +0159 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH CARON +015B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH ACUTE +015D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CIRCUMFLEX +015F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CEDILLA +0161 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CARON +0163 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH CEDILLA +0165 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH CARON +0167 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH STROKE +0169 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH TILDE +016B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH MACRON +016D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH BREVE +016F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH RING ABOVE +0171 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +0173 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH OGONEK +0175 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH CIRCUMFLEX +0177 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH CIRCUMFLEX +017A ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH ACUTE +017C ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH DOT ABOVE +017E..0180 ; Ll # [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH STROKE +0183 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH TOPBAR +0185 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE SIX +0188 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH HOOK +018C..018D ; Ll # [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH TOPBAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED DELTA +0192 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER F WITH HOOK +0195 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER HV +0199..019B ; Ll # [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER LAMBDA WITH STROKE +019E ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH LONG RIGHT LEG +01A1 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN +01A3 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER OI +01A5 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH HOOK +01A8 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE TWO +01AA..01AB ; Ll # [2] LATIN LETTER REVERSED ESH LOOP..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH PALATAL HOOK +01AD ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK +01B0 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN +01B4 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH HOOK +01B6 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH STROKE +01B9..01BA ; Ll # [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH REVERSED..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH TAIL +01BD..01BF ; Ll # [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER TONE FIVE..LATIN LETTER WYNN +01C6 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER DZ WITH CARON +01C9 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER LJ +01CC ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER NJ +01CE ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CARON +01D0 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH CARON +01D2 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CARON +01D4 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH CARON +01D6 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01D8 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +01DA ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND CARON +01DC..01DD ; Ll # [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS AND GRAVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED E +01DF ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +01E1 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +01E3 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER AE WITH MACRON +01E5 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH STROKE +01E7 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH CARON +01E9 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH CARON +01EB ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH OGONEK +01ED ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH OGONEK AND MACRON +01EF..01F0 ; Ll # [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CARON..LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH CARON +01F3 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER DZ +01F5 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH ACUTE +01F9 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH GRAVE +01FB ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH RING ABOVE AND ACUTE +01FD ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER AE WITH ACUTE +01FF ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH STROKE AND ACUTE +0201 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0203 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH INVERTED BREVE +0205 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0207 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH INVERTED BREVE +0209 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH INVERTED BREVE +020D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +020F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH INVERTED BREVE +0211 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0213 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH INVERTED BREVE +0215 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE GRAVE +0217 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH INVERTED BREVE +0219 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH COMMA BELOW +021B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH COMMA BELOW +021D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER YOGH +021F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH CARON +0221 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CURL +0223 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER OU +0225 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH HOOK +0227 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOT ABOVE +0229 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA +022B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS AND MACRON +022D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND MACRON +022F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE +0231 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOT ABOVE AND MACRON +0233..0239 ; Ll # [7] LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH MACRON..LATIN SMALL LETTER QP DIGRAPH +023C ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH STROKE +023F..0240 ; Ll # [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SWASH TAIL..LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH SWASH TAIL +0242 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +0247 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH STROKE +0249 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH STROKE +024B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Q WITH HOOK TAIL +024D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH STROKE +024F..0293 ; Ll # [69] LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH CURL +0295..02AF ; Ll # [27] LATIN LETTER PHARYNGEAL VOICED FRICATIVE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED H WITH FISHHOOK AND TAIL +0371 ; Ll # GREEK SMALL LETTER HETA +0373 ; Ll # GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC SAMPI +0377 ; Ll # GREEK SMALL LETTER PAMPHYLIAN DIGAMMA +037B..037D ; Ll # [3] GREEK SMALL REVERSED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL..GREEK SMALL REVERSED DOTTED LUNATE SIGMA SYMBOL +0390 ; Ll # GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND TONOS +03AC..03CE ; Ll # [35] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH TONOS..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH TONOS +03D0..03D1 ; Ll # [2] GREEK BETA SYMBOL..GREEK THETA SYMBOL +03D5..03D7 ; Ll # [3] GREEK PHI SYMBOL..GREEK KAI SYMBOL +03D9 ; Ll # GREEK SMALL LETTER ARCHAIC KOPPA +03DB ; Ll # GREEK SMALL LETTER STIGMA +03DD ; Ll # GREEK SMALL LETTER DIGAMMA +03DF ; Ll # GREEK SMALL LETTER KOPPA +03E1 ; Ll # GREEK SMALL LETTER SAMPI +03E3 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER SHEI +03E5 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER FEI +03E7 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER KHEI +03E9 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER HORI +03EB ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER GANGIA +03ED ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER SHIMA +03EF..03F3 ; Ll # [5] COPTIC SMALL LETTER DEI..GREEK LETTER YOT +03F5 ; Ll # GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +03F8 ; Ll # GREEK SMALL LETTER SHO +03FB..03FC ; Ll # [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER SAN..GREEK RHO WITH STROKE SYMBOL +0430..045F ; Ll # [48] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZHE +0461 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER OMEGA +0463 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YAT +0465 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED E +0467 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER LITTLE YUS +0469 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED LITTLE YUS +046B ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BIG YUS +046D ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +046F ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KSI +0471 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PSI +0473 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER FITA +0475 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IZHITSA +0477 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IZHITSA WITH DOUBLE GRAVE ACCENT +0479 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UK +047B ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUND OMEGA +047D ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH TITLO +047F ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER OT +0481 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOPPA +048B ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHORT I WITH TAIL +048D ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SEMISOFT SIGN +048F ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ER WITH TICK +0491 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH UPTURN +0493 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE +0495 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0497 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHE WITH DESCENDER +0499 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZE WITH DESCENDER +049B ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH DESCENDER +049D ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH VERTICAL STROKE +049F ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH STROKE +04A1 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BASHKIR KA +04A3 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH DESCENDER +04A5 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LIGATURE EN GHE +04A7 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +04A9 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN HA +04AB ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ES WITH DESCENDER +04AD ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TE WITH DESCENDER +04AF ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER STRAIGHT U +04B1 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER STRAIGHT U WITH STROKE +04B3 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HA WITH DESCENDER +04B5 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LIGATURE TE TSE +04B7 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CHE WITH DESCENDER +04B9 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CHE WITH VERTICAL STROKE +04BB ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHHA +04BD ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE +04BF ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN CHE WITH DESCENDER +04C2 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHE WITH BREVE +04C4 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KA WITH HOOK +04C6 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH TAIL +04C8 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH HOOK +04CA ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH TAIL +04CC ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KHAKASSIAN CHE +04CE..04CF ; Ll # [2] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EM WITH TAIL..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PALOCHKA +04D1 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE +04D3 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS +04D5 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LIGATURE A IE +04D7 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IE WITH BREVE +04D9 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SCHWA +04DB ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SCHWA WITH DIAERESIS +04DD ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHE WITH DIAERESIS +04DF ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZE WITH DIAERESIS +04E1 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ABKHASIAN DZE +04E3 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER I WITH MACRON +04E5 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS +04E7 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER O WITH DIAERESIS +04E9 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BARRED O +04EB ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BARRED O WITH DIAERESIS +04ED ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER E WITH DIAERESIS +04EF ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER U WITH MACRON +04F1 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS +04F3 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER U WITH DOUBLE ACUTE +04F5 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CHE WITH DIAERESIS +04F7 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH DESCENDER +04F9 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YERU WITH DIAERESIS +04FB ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER GHE WITH STROKE AND HOOK +04FD ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HA WITH HOOK +04FF ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HA WITH STROKE +0501 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI DE +0503 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI DJE +0505 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI ZJE +0507 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI DZJE +0509 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI LJE +050B ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI NJE +050D ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI SJE +050F ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER KOMI TJE +0511 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED ZE +0513 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH HOOK +0515 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER LHA +0517 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER RHA +0519 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YAE +051B ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER QA +051D ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER WE +051F ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ALEUT KA +0521 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0523 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH MIDDLE HOOK +0525 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER PE WITH DESCENDER +0527 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHHA WITH DESCENDER +0529 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EN WITH LEFT HOOK +052B ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZZHE +052D ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DCHE +052F ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER EL WITH DESCENDER +0560..0588 ; Ll # [41] ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER TURNED AYB..ARMENIAN SMALL LETTER YI WITH STROKE +10D0..10FA ; Ll # [43] GEORGIAN LETTER AN..GEORGIAN LETTER AIN +10FD..10FF ; Ll # [3] GEORGIAN LETTER AEN..GEORGIAN LETTER LABIAL SIGN +13F8..13FD ; Ll # [6] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YE..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER MV +1C80..1C88 ; Ll # [9] CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ROUNDED VE..CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER UNBLENDED UK +1D00..1D2B ; Ll # [44] LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL A..CYRILLIC LETTER SMALL CAPITAL EL +1D6B..1D77 ; Ll # [13] LATIN SMALL LETTER UE..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED G +1D79..1D9A ; Ll # [34] LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G..LATIN SMALL LETTER EZH WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1E01 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH RING BELOW +1E03 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH DOT ABOVE +1E05 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH DOT BELOW +1E07 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH LINE BELOW +1E09 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CEDILLA AND ACUTE +1E0B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH DOT ABOVE +1E0D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH DOT BELOW +1E0F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH LINE BELOW +1E11 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CEDILLA +1E13 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E15 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E17 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E19 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E1B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH TILDE BELOW +1E1D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CEDILLA AND BREVE +1E1F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER F WITH DOT ABOVE +1E21 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH MACRON +1E23 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DOT ABOVE +1E25 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DOT BELOW +1E27 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DIAERESIS +1E29 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH CEDILLA +1E2B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH BREVE BELOW +1E2D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH TILDE BELOW +1E2F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS AND ACUTE +1E31 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH ACUTE +1E33 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH DOT BELOW +1E35 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH LINE BELOW +1E37 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW +1E39 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E3B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH LINE BELOW +1E3D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E3F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH ACUTE +1E41 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH DOT ABOVE +1E43 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER M WITH DOT BELOW +1E45 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH DOT ABOVE +1E47 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH DOT BELOW +1E49 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH LINE BELOW +1E4B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E4D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E4F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH TILDE AND DIAERESIS +1E51 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND GRAVE +1E53 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH MACRON AND ACUTE +1E55 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH ACUTE +1E57 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH DOT ABOVE +1E59 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOT ABOVE +1E5B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW +1E5D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH DOT BELOW AND MACRON +1E5F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH LINE BELOW +1E61 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH DOT ABOVE +1E63 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW +1E65 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH ACUTE AND DOT ABOVE +1E67 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CARON AND DOT ABOVE +1E69 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH DOT BELOW AND DOT ABOVE +1E6B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DOT ABOVE +1E6D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DOT BELOW +1E6F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH LINE BELOW +1E71 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E73 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS BELOW +1E75 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH TILDE BELOW +1E77 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH CIRCUMFLEX BELOW +1E79 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH TILDE AND ACUTE +1E7B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH MACRON AND DIAERESIS +1E7D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH TILDE +1E7F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH DOT BELOW +1E81 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH GRAVE +1E83 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH ACUTE +1E85 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH DIAERESIS +1E87 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH DOT ABOVE +1E89 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH DOT BELOW +1E8B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER X WITH DOT ABOVE +1E8D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER X WITH DIAERESIS +1E8F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DOT ABOVE +1E91 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH CIRCUMFLEX +1E93 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH DOT BELOW +1E95..1E9D ; Ll # [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH LINE BELOW..LATIN SMALL LETTER LONG S WITH HIGH STROKE +1E9F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER DELTA +1EA1 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DOT BELOW +1EA3 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EA5 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EA7 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EA9 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EAB ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EAD ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EAF ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND ACUTE +1EB1 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND GRAVE +1EB3 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND HOOK ABOVE +1EB5 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND TILDE +1EB7 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH BREVE AND DOT BELOW +1EB9 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH DOT BELOW +1EBB ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EBD ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH TILDE +1EBF ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1EC1 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1EC3 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1EC5 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1EC7 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EC9 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ECB ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DOT BELOW +1ECD ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH DOT BELOW +1ECF ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HOOK ABOVE +1ED1 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND ACUTE +1ED3 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND GRAVE +1ED5 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND HOOK ABOVE +1ED7 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND TILDE +1ED9 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX AND DOT BELOW +1EDB ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EDD ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EDF ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EE1 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EE3 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EE5 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DOT BELOW +1EE7 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EE9 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND ACUTE +1EEB ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND GRAVE +1EED ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND HOOK ABOVE +1EEF ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND TILDE +1EF1 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH HORN AND DOT BELOW +1EF3 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH GRAVE +1EF5 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH DOT BELOW +1EF7 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH HOOK ABOVE +1EF9 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH TILDE +1EFB ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH LL +1EFD ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER MIDDLE-WELSH V +1EFF..1F07 ; Ll # [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH LOOP..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F10..1F15 ; Ll # [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F20..1F27 ; Ll # [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F30..1F37 ; Ll # [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F40..1F45 ; Ll # [6] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMICRON WITH DASIA AND OXIA +1F50..1F57 ; Ll # [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F60..1F67 ; Ll # [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1F70..1F7D ; Ll # [14] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VARIA..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA +1F80..1F87 ; Ll # [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1F90..1F97 ; Ll # [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FA0..1FA7 ; Ll # [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB0..1FB4 ; Ll # [5] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FB6..1FB7 ; Ll # [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FBE ; Ll # GREEK PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FC2..1FC4 ; Ll # [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FC6..1FC7 ; Ll # [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER ETA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FD0..1FD3 ; Ll # [4] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND OXIA +1FD6..1FD7 ; Ll # [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FE0..1FE7 ; Ll # [8] GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH VRACHY..GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON WITH DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FF2..1FF4 ; Ll # [3] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH VARIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH OXIA AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +1FF6..1FF7 ; Ll # [2] GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI..GREEK SMALL LETTER OMEGA WITH PERISPOMENI AND YPOGEGRAMMENI +210A ; Ll # SCRIPT SMALL G +210E..210F ; Ll # [2] PLANCK CONSTANT..PLANCK CONSTANT OVER TWO PI +2113 ; Ll # SCRIPT SMALL L +212F ; Ll # SCRIPT SMALL E +2134 ; Ll # SCRIPT SMALL O +2139 ; Ll # INFORMATION SOURCE +213C..213D ; Ll # [2] DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL PI..DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL GAMMA +2146..2149 ; Ll # [4] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL D..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +214E ; Ll # TURNED SMALL F +2184 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C +2C30..2C5F ; Ll # [48] GLAGOLITIC SMALL LETTER AZU..GLAGOLITIC SMALL LETTER CAUDATE CHRIVI +2C61 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH DOUBLE BAR +2C65..2C66 ; Ll # [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH STROKE..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +2C68 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH DESCENDER +2C6A ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH DESCENDER +2C6C ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Z WITH DESCENDER +2C71 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH RIGHT HOOK +2C73..2C74 ; Ll # [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER W WITH HOOK..LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH CURL +2C76..2C7B ; Ll # [6] LATIN SMALL LETTER HALF H..LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED E +2C81 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER ALFA +2C83 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER VIDA +2C85 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER GAMMA +2C87 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER DALDA +2C89 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER EIE +2C8B ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER SOU +2C8D ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER ZATA +2C8F ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER HATE +2C91 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER THETHE +2C93 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER IAUDA +2C95 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER KAPA +2C97 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER LAULA +2C99 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER MI +2C9B ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER NI +2C9D ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER KSI +2C9F ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER O +2CA1 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER PI +2CA3 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER RO +2CA5 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER SIMA +2CA7 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER TAU +2CA9 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER UA +2CAB ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER FI +2CAD ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER KHI +2CAF ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER PSI +2CB1 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OOU +2CB3 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P ALEF +2CB5 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC AIN +2CB7 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC EIE +2CB9 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P KAPA +2CBB ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P NI +2CBD ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC NI +2CBF ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC OOU +2CC1 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER SAMPI +2CC3 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED SHEI +2CC5 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHEI +2CC7 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC ESH +2CC9 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER AKHMIMIC KHEI +2CCB ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER DIALECT-P HORI +2CCD ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HORI +2CCF ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HA +2CD1 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER L-SHAPED HA +2CD3 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HEI +2CD5 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC HAT +2CD7 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC GANGIA +2CD9 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC DJA +2CDB ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD COPTIC SHIMA +2CDD ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN SHIMA +2CDF ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NGI +2CE1 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN NYI +2CE3..2CE4 ; Ll # [2] COPTIC SMALL LETTER OLD NUBIAN WAU..COPTIC SYMBOL KAI +2CEC ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC SHEI +2CEE ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER CRYPTOGRAMMIC GANGIA +2CF3 ; Ll # COPTIC SMALL LETTER BOHAIRIC KHEI +2D00..2D25 ; Ll # [38] GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AN..GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER HOE +2D27 ; Ll # GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER YN +2D2D ; Ll # GEORGIAN SMALL LETTER AEN +A641 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZEMLYA +A643 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZELO +A645 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED DZE +A647 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTA +A649 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DJERV +A64B ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER MONOGRAPH UK +A64D ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BROAD OMEGA +A64F ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER NEUTRAL YER +A651 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YERU WITH BACK YER +A653 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED YAT +A655 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED YU +A657 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED A +A659 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65B ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BLENDED YUS +A65D ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER IOTIFIED CLOSED LITTLE YUS +A65F ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER YN +A661 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER REVERSED TSE +A663 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SOFT DE +A665 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SOFT EL +A667 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SOFT EM +A669 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER MONOCULAR O +A66B ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BINOCULAR O +A66D ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE MONOCULAR O +A681 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DWE +A683 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZWE +A685 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER ZHWE +A687 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CCHE +A689 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DZZE +A68B ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TE WITH MIDDLE HOOK +A68D ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TWE +A68F ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TSWE +A691 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TSSE +A693 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER TCHE +A695 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER HWE +A697 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER SHWE +A699 ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER DOUBLE O +A69B ; Ll # CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER CROSSED O +A723 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL ALEF +A725 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER EGYPTOLOGICAL AIN +A727 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER HENG +A729 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER TZ +A72B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER TRESILLO +A72D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER CUATRILLO +A72F..A731 ; Ll # [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER CUATRILLO WITH COMMA..LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL S +A733 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER AA +A735 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER AO +A737 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER AU +A739 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER AV +A73B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER AV WITH HORIZONTAL BAR +A73D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER AY +A73F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED C WITH DOT +A741 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH STROKE +A743 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A745 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH STROKE AND DIAGONAL STROKE +A747 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER BROKEN L +A749 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH HIGH STROKE +A74B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH LONG STROKE OVERLAY +A74D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH LOOP +A74F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER OO +A751 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A753 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH FLOURISH +A755 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER P WITH SQUIRREL TAIL +A757 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Q WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A759 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER Q WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A75B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER R ROTUNDA +A75D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER RUM ROTUNDA +A75F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER V WITH DIAGONAL STROKE +A761 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER VY +A763 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER VISIGOTHIC Z +A765 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE +A767 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER THORN WITH STROKE THROUGH DESCENDER +A769 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER VEND +A76B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER ET +A76D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER IS +A76F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER CON +A771..A778 ; Ll # [8] LATIN SMALL LETTER DUM..LATIN SMALL LETTER UM +A77A ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR D +A77C ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR F +A77F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED INSULAR G +A781 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED L +A783 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR R +A785 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR S +A787 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +A78C ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER SALTILLO +A78E ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER L WITH RETROFLEX HOOK AND BELT +A791 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH DESCENDER +A793..A795 ; Ll # [3] LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER H WITH PALATAL HOOK +A797 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER B WITH FLOURISH +A799 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER F WITH STROKE +A79B ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER VOLAPUK AE +A79D ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER VOLAPUK OE +A79F ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER VOLAPUK UE +A7A1 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER G WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A3 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER K WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A5 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER N WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A7 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER R WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7A9 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH OBLIQUE STROKE +A7AF ; Ll # LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Q +A7B5 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER BETA +A7B7 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER OMEGA +A7B9 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH STROKE +A7BB ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL A +A7BD ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL I +A7BF ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER GLOTTAL U +A7C1 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER OLD POLISH O +A7C3 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER ANGLICANA W +A7C8 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER D WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7CA ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH SHORT STROKE OVERLAY +A7D1 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER CLOSED INSULAR G +A7D3 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE THORN +A7D5 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER DOUBLE WYNN +A7D7 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER MIDDLE SCOTS S +A7D9 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER SIGMOID S +A7F6 ; Ll # LATIN SMALL LETTER REVERSED HALF H +A7FA ; Ll # LATIN LETTER SMALL CAPITAL TURNED M +AB30..AB5A ; Ll # [43] LATIN SMALL LETTER BARRED ALPHA..LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH SHORT RIGHT LEG +AB60..AB68 ; Ll # [9] LATIN SMALL LETTER SAKHA YAT..LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED R WITH MIDDLE TILDE +AB70..ABBF ; Ll # [80] CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER A..CHEROKEE SMALL LETTER YA +FB00..FB06 ; Ll # [7] LATIN SMALL LIGATURE FF..LATIN SMALL LIGATURE ST +FB13..FB17 ; Ll # [5] ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN NOW..ARMENIAN SMALL LIGATURE MEN XEH +FF41..FF5A ; Ll # [26] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +10428..1044F ; Ll # [40] DESERET SMALL LETTER LONG I..DESERET SMALL LETTER EW +104D8..104FB ; Ll # [36] OSAGE SMALL LETTER A..OSAGE SMALL LETTER ZHA +10597..105A1 ; Ll # [11] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER A..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER GA +105A3..105B1 ; Ll # [15] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER HA..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER RE +105B3..105B9 ; Ll # [7] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER SE..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER XE +105BB..105BC ; Ll # [2] VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER Y..VITHKUQI SMALL LETTER ZE +10CC0..10CF2 ; Ll # [51] OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER A..OLD HUNGARIAN SMALL LETTER US +118C0..118DF ; Ll # [32] WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER NGAA..WARANG CITI SMALL LETTER VIYO +16E60..16E7F ; Ll # [32] MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER M..MEDEFAIDRIN SMALL LETTER Y +1D41A..1D433 ; Ll # [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL Z +1D44E..1D454 ; Ll # [7] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL G +1D456..1D467 ; Ll # [18] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL Z +1D482..1D49B ; Ll # [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL Z +1D4B6..1D4B9 ; Ll # [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL D +1D4BB ; Ll # MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL F +1D4BD..1D4C3 ; Ll # [7] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL H..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL N +1D4C5..1D4CF ; Ll # [11] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL P..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL Z +1D4EA..1D503 ; Ll # [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SCRIPT SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SCRIPT SMALL Z +1D51E..1D537 ; Ll # [26] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL Z +1D552..1D56B ; Ll # [26] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL Z +1D586..1D59F ; Ll # [26] MATHEMATICAL BOLD FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL BOLD FRAKTUR SMALL Z +1D5BA..1D5D3 ; Ll # [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF SMALL Z +1D5EE..1D607 ; Ll # [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL Z +1D622..1D63B ; Ll # [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF ITALIC SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF ITALIC SMALL Z +1D656..1D66F ; Ll # [26] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL Z +1D68A..1D6A5 ; Ll # [28] MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL DOTLESS J +1D6C2..1D6DA ; Ll # [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D6DC..1D6E1 ; Ll # [6] MATHEMATICAL BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD PI SYMBOL +1D6FC..1D714 ; Ll # [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D716..1D71B ; Ll # [6] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC PI SYMBOL +1D736..1D74E ; Ll # [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D750..1D755 ; Ll # [6] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC PI SYMBOL +1D770..1D788 ; Ll # [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D78A..1D78F ; Ll # [6] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD PI SYMBOL +1D7AA..1D7C2 ; Ll # [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D7C4..1D7C9 ; Ll # [6] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC PI SYMBOL +1D7CB ; Ll # MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL DIGAMMA +1DF00..1DF09 ; Ll # [10] LATIN SMALL LETTER FENG DIGRAPH WITH TRILL..LATIN SMALL LETTER T WITH HOOK AND RETROFLEX HOOK +1DF0B..1DF1E ; Ll # [20] LATIN SMALL LETTER ESH WITH DOUBLE BAR..LATIN SMALL LETTER S WITH CURL +1E922..1E943 ; Ll # [34] ADLAM SMALL LETTER ALIF..ADLAM SMALL LETTER SHA + +# Total code points: 2227 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Titlecase_Letter + +01C5 ; Lt # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SMALL LETTER Z WITH CARON +01C8 ; Lt # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L WITH SMALL LETTER J +01CB ; Lt # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER N WITH SMALL LETTER J +01F2 ; Lt # LATIN CAPITAL LETTER D WITH SMALL LETTER Z +1F88..1F8F ; Lt # [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PSILI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1F98..1F9F ; Lt # [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PSILI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FA8..1FAF ; Lt # [8] GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PSILI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI..GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH DASIA AND PERISPOMENI AND PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FBC ; Lt # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ALPHA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FCC ; Lt # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER ETA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI +1FFC ; Lt # GREEK CAPITAL LETTER OMEGA WITH PROSGEGRAMMENI + +# Total code points: 31 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Modifier_Letter + +02B0..02C1 ; Lm # [18] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02C6..02D1 ; Lm # [12] MODIFIER LETTER CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..MODIFIER LETTER HALF TRIANGULAR COLON +02E0..02E4 ; Lm # [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02EC ; Lm # MODIFIER LETTER VOICING +02EE ; Lm # MODIFIER LETTER DOUBLE APOSTROPHE +0374 ; Lm # GREEK NUMERAL SIGN +037A ; Lm # GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +0559 ; Lm # ARMENIAN MODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RING +0640 ; Lm # ARABIC TATWEEL +06E5..06E6 ; Lm # [2] ARABIC SMALL WAW..ARABIC SMALL YEH +07F4..07F5 ; Lm # [2] NKO HIGH TONE APOSTROPHE..NKO LOW TONE APOSTROPHE +07FA ; Lm # NKO LAJANYALAN +081A ; Lm # SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER EPENTHETIC YUT +0824 ; Lm # SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER SHORT A +0828 ; Lm # SAMARITAN MODIFIER LETTER I +08C9 ; Lm # ARABIC SMALL FARSI YEH +0971 ; Lm # DEVANAGARI SIGN HIGH SPACING DOT +0E46 ; Lm # THAI CHARACTER MAIYAMOK +0EC6 ; Lm # LAO KO LA +10FC ; Lm # MODIFIER LETTER GEORGIAN NAR +17D7 ; Lm # KHMER SIGN LEK TOO +1843 ; Lm # MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO LONG VOWEL SIGN +1AA7 ; Lm # TAI THAM SIGN MAI YAMOK +1C78..1C7D ; Lm # [6] OL CHIKI MU TTUDDAG..OL CHIKI AHAD +1D2C..1D6A ; Lm # [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1D78 ; Lm # MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC EN +1D9B..1DBF ; Lm # [37] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED ALPHA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL THETA +2071 ; Lm # SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +207F ; Lm # SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER N +2090..209C ; Lm # [13] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER T +2C7C..2C7D ; Lm # [2] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL V +2D6F ; Lm # TIFINAGH MODIFIER LETTER LABIALIZATION MARK +2E2F ; Lm # VERTICAL TILDE +3005 ; Lm # IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +3031..3035 ; Lm # [5] VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK..VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK LOWER HALF +303B ; Lm # VERTICAL IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +309D..309E ; Lm # [2] HIRAGANA ITERATION MARK..HIRAGANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +30FC..30FE ; Lm # [3] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +A015 ; Lm # YI SYLLABLE WU +A4F8..A4FD ; Lm # [6] LISU LETTER TONE MYA TI..LISU LETTER TONE MYA JEU +A60C ; Lm # VAI SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +A67F ; Lm # CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A69C..A69D ; Lm # [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A717..A71F ; Lm # [9] MODIFIER LETTER DOT VERTICAL BAR..MODIFIER LETTER LOW INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +A770 ; Lm # MODIFIER LETTER US +A788 ; Lm # MODIFIER LETTER LOW CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +A7F2..A7F4 ; Lm # [3] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL C..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL Q +A7F8..A7F9 ; Lm # [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +A9CF ; Lm # JAVANESE PANGRANGKEP +A9E6 ; Lm # MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER SHAN REDUPLICATION +AA70 ; Lm # MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER KHAMTI REDUPLICATION +AADD ; Lm # TAI VIET SYMBOL SAM +AAF3..AAF4 ; Lm # [2] MEETEI MAYEK SYLLABLE REPETITION MARK..MEETEI MAYEK WORD REPETITION MARK +AB5C..AB5F ; Lm # [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +AB69 ; Lm # MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED W +FF70 ; Lm # HALFWIDTH KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK +FF9E..FF9F ; Lm # [2] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA VOICED SOUND MARK..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +10780..10785 ; Lm # [6] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; Lm # [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; Lm # [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL +16B40..16B43 ; Lm # [4] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS SEEV..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN IB YAM +16F93..16F9F ; Lm # [13] MIAO LETTER TONE-2..MIAO LETTER REFORMED TONE-8 +16FE0..16FE1 ; Lm # [2] TANGUT ITERATION MARK..NUSHU ITERATION MARK +16FE3 ; Lm # OLD CHINESE ITERATION MARK +1AFF0..1AFF3 ; Lm # [4] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-2..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-5 +1AFF5..1AFFB ; Lm # [7] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-5 +1AFFD..1AFFE ; Lm # [2] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-8 +1E137..1E13D ; Lm # [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SIGN FOR PERSON..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +1E94B ; Lm # ADLAM NASALIZATION MARK + +# Total code points: 334 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Other_Letter + +00AA ; Lo # FEMININE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00BA ; Lo # MASCULINE ORDINAL INDICATOR +01BB ; Lo # LATIN LETTER TWO WITH STROKE +01C0..01C3 ; Lo # [4] LATIN LETTER DENTAL CLICK..LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK +0294 ; Lo # LATIN LETTER GLOTTAL STOP +05D0..05EA ; Lo # [27] HEBREW LETTER ALEF..HEBREW LETTER TAV +05EF..05F2 ; Lo # [4] HEBREW YOD TRIANGLE..HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH DOUBLE YOD +0620..063F ; Lo # [32] ARABIC LETTER KASHMIRI YEH..ARABIC LETTER FARSI YEH WITH THREE DOTS ABOVE +0641..064A ; Lo # [10] ARABIC LETTER FEH..ARABIC LETTER YEH +066E..066F ; Lo # [2] ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS BEH..ARABIC LETTER DOTLESS QAF +0671..06D3 ; Lo # [99] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WASLA..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE +06D5 ; Lo # ARABIC LETTER AE +06EE..06EF ; Lo # [2] ARABIC LETTER DAL WITH INVERTED V..ARABIC LETTER REH WITH INVERTED V +06FA..06FC ; Lo # [3] ARABIC LETTER SHEEN WITH DOT BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GHAIN WITH DOT BELOW +06FF ; Lo # ARABIC LETTER HEH WITH INVERTED V +0710 ; Lo # SYRIAC LETTER ALAPH +0712..072F ; Lo # [30] SYRIAC LETTER BETH..SYRIAC LETTER PERSIAN DHALATH +074D..07A5 ; Lo # [89] SYRIAC LETTER SOGDIAN ZHAIN..THAANA LETTER WAAVU +07B1 ; Lo # THAANA LETTER NAA +07CA..07EA ; Lo # [33] NKO LETTER A..NKO LETTER JONA RA +0800..0815 ; Lo # [22] SAMARITAN LETTER ALAF..SAMARITAN LETTER TAAF +0840..0858 ; Lo # [25] MANDAIC LETTER HALQA..MANDAIC LETTER AIN +0860..086A ; Lo # [11] SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM NGA..SYRIAC LETTER MALAYALAM SSA +0870..0887 ; Lo # [24] ARABIC LETTER ALEF WITH ATTACHED FATHA..ARABIC BASELINE ROUND DOT +0889..088E ; Lo # [6] ARABIC LETTER NOON WITH INVERTED SMALL V..ARABIC VERTICAL TAIL +08A0..08C8 ; Lo # [41] ARABIC LETTER BEH WITH SMALL V BELOW..ARABIC LETTER GRAF +0904..0939 ; Lo # [54] DEVANAGARI LETTER SHORT A..DEVANAGARI LETTER HA +093D ; Lo # DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +0950 ; Lo # DEVANAGARI OM +0958..0961 ; Lo # [10] DEVANAGARI LETTER QA..DEVANAGARI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0972..0980 ; Lo # [15] DEVANAGARI LETTER CANDRA A..BENGALI ANJI +0985..098C ; Lo # [8] BENGALI LETTER A..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC L +098F..0990 ; Lo # [2] BENGALI LETTER E..BENGALI LETTER AI +0993..09A8 ; Lo # [22] BENGALI LETTER O..BENGALI LETTER NA +09AA..09B0 ; Lo # [7] BENGALI LETTER PA..BENGALI LETTER RA +09B2 ; Lo # BENGALI LETTER LA +09B6..09B9 ; Lo # [4] BENGALI LETTER SHA..BENGALI LETTER HA +09BD ; Lo # BENGALI SIGN AVAGRAHA +09CE ; Lo # BENGALI LETTER KHANDA TA +09DC..09DD ; Lo # [2] BENGALI LETTER RRA..BENGALI LETTER RHA +09DF..09E1 ; Lo # [3] BENGALI LETTER YYA..BENGALI LETTER VOCALIC LL +09F0..09F1 ; Lo # [2] BENGALI LETTER RA WITH MIDDLE DIAGONAL..BENGALI LETTER RA WITH LOWER DIAGONAL +09FC ; Lo # BENGALI LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA +0A05..0A0A ; Lo # [6] GURMUKHI LETTER A..GURMUKHI LETTER UU +0A0F..0A10 ; Lo # [2] GURMUKHI LETTER EE..GURMUKHI LETTER AI +0A13..0A28 ; Lo # [22] GURMUKHI LETTER OO..GURMUKHI LETTER NA +0A2A..0A30 ; Lo # [7] GURMUKHI LETTER PA..GURMUKHI LETTER RA +0A32..0A33 ; Lo # [2] GURMUKHI LETTER LA..GURMUKHI LETTER LLA +0A35..0A36 ; Lo # [2] GURMUKHI LETTER VA..GURMUKHI LETTER SHA +0A38..0A39 ; Lo # [2] GURMUKHI LETTER SA..GURMUKHI LETTER HA +0A59..0A5C ; Lo # [4] GURMUKHI LETTER KHHA..GURMUKHI LETTER RRA +0A5E ; Lo # GURMUKHI LETTER FA +0A72..0A74 ; Lo # [3] GURMUKHI IRI..GURMUKHI EK ONKAR +0A85..0A8D ; Lo # [9] GUJARATI LETTER A..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA E +0A8F..0A91 ; Lo # [3] GUJARATI LETTER E..GUJARATI VOWEL CANDRA O +0A93..0AA8 ; Lo # [22] GUJARATI LETTER O..GUJARATI LETTER NA +0AAA..0AB0 ; Lo # [7] GUJARATI LETTER PA..GUJARATI LETTER RA +0AB2..0AB3 ; Lo # [2] GUJARATI LETTER LA..GUJARATI LETTER LLA +0AB5..0AB9 ; Lo # [5] GUJARATI LETTER VA..GUJARATI LETTER HA +0ABD ; Lo # GUJARATI SIGN AVAGRAHA +0AD0 ; Lo # GUJARATI OM +0AE0..0AE1 ; Lo # [2] GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC RR..GUJARATI LETTER VOCALIC LL +0AF9 ; Lo # GUJARATI LETTER ZHA +0B05..0B0C ; Lo # [8] ORIYA LETTER A..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC L +0B0F..0B10 ; Lo # [2] ORIYA LETTER E..ORIYA LETTER AI +0B13..0B28 ; Lo # [22] ORIYA LETTER O..ORIYA LETTER NA +0B2A..0B30 ; Lo # [7] ORIYA LETTER PA..ORIYA LETTER RA +0B32..0B33 ; Lo # [2] ORIYA LETTER LA..ORIYA LETTER LLA +0B35..0B39 ; Lo # [5] ORIYA LETTER VA..ORIYA LETTER HA +0B3D ; Lo # ORIYA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0B5C..0B5D ; Lo # [2] ORIYA LETTER RRA..ORIYA LETTER RHA +0B5F..0B61 ; Lo # [3] ORIYA LETTER YYA..ORIYA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0B71 ; Lo # ORIYA LETTER WA +0B83 ; Lo # TAMIL SIGN VISARGA +0B85..0B8A ; Lo # [6] TAMIL LETTER A..TAMIL LETTER UU +0B8E..0B90 ; Lo # [3] TAMIL LETTER E..TAMIL LETTER AI +0B92..0B95 ; Lo # [4] TAMIL LETTER O..TAMIL LETTER KA +0B99..0B9A ; Lo # [2] TAMIL LETTER NGA..TAMIL LETTER CA +0B9C ; Lo # TAMIL LETTER JA +0B9E..0B9F ; Lo # [2] TAMIL LETTER NYA..TAMIL LETTER TTA +0BA3..0BA4 ; Lo # [2] TAMIL LETTER NNA..TAMIL LETTER TA +0BA8..0BAA ; Lo # [3] TAMIL LETTER NA..TAMIL LETTER PA +0BAE..0BB9 ; Lo # [12] TAMIL LETTER MA..TAMIL LETTER HA +0BD0 ; Lo # TAMIL OM +0C05..0C0C ; Lo # [8] TELUGU LETTER A..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC L +0C0E..0C10 ; Lo # [3] TELUGU LETTER E..TELUGU LETTER AI +0C12..0C28 ; Lo # [23] TELUGU LETTER O..TELUGU LETTER NA +0C2A..0C39 ; Lo # [16] TELUGU LETTER PA..TELUGU LETTER HA +0C3D ; Lo # TELUGU SIGN AVAGRAHA +0C58..0C5A ; Lo # [3] TELUGU LETTER TSA..TELUGU LETTER RRRA +0C5D ; Lo # TELUGU LETTER NAKAARA POLLU +0C60..0C61 ; Lo # [2] TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC RR..TELUGU LETTER VOCALIC LL +0C80 ; Lo # KANNADA SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU +0C85..0C8C ; Lo # [8] KANNADA LETTER A..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC L +0C8E..0C90 ; Lo # [3] KANNADA LETTER E..KANNADA LETTER AI +0C92..0CA8 ; Lo # [23] KANNADA LETTER O..KANNADA LETTER NA +0CAA..0CB3 ; Lo # [10] KANNADA LETTER PA..KANNADA LETTER LLA +0CB5..0CB9 ; Lo # [5] KANNADA LETTER VA..KANNADA LETTER HA +0CBD ; Lo # KANNADA SIGN AVAGRAHA +0CDD..0CDE ; Lo # [2] KANNADA LETTER NAKAARA POLLU..KANNADA LETTER FA +0CE0..0CE1 ; Lo # [2] KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC RR..KANNADA LETTER VOCALIC LL +0CF1..0CF2 ; Lo # [2] KANNADA SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..KANNADA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +0D04..0D0C ; Lo # [9] MALAYALAM LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC L +0D0E..0D10 ; Lo # [3] MALAYALAM LETTER E..MALAYALAM LETTER AI +0D12..0D3A ; Lo # [41] MALAYALAM LETTER O..MALAYALAM LETTER TTTA +0D3D ; Lo # MALAYALAM SIGN AVAGRAHA +0D4E ; Lo # MALAYALAM LETTER DOT REPH +0D54..0D56 ; Lo # [3] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU M..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU LLL +0D5F..0D61 ; Lo # [3] MALAYALAM LETTER ARCHAIC II..MALAYALAM LETTER VOCALIC LL +0D7A..0D7F ; Lo # [6] MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU NN..MALAYALAM LETTER CHILLU K +0D85..0D96 ; Lo # [18] SINHALA LETTER AYANNA..SINHALA LETTER AUYANNA +0D9A..0DB1 ; Lo # [24] SINHALA LETTER ALPAPRAANA KAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA NAYANNA +0DB3..0DBB ; Lo # [9] SINHALA LETTER SANYAKA DAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER RAYANNA +0DBD ; Lo # SINHALA LETTER DANTAJA LAYANNA +0DC0..0DC6 ; Lo # [7] SINHALA LETTER VAYANNA..SINHALA LETTER FAYANNA +0E01..0E30 ; Lo # [48] THAI CHARACTER KO KAI..THAI CHARACTER SARA A +0E32..0E33 ; Lo # [2] THAI CHARACTER SARA AA..THAI CHARACTER SARA AM +0E40..0E45 ; Lo # [6] THAI CHARACTER SARA E..THAI CHARACTER LAKKHANGYAO +0E81..0E82 ; Lo # [2] LAO LETTER KO..LAO LETTER KHO SUNG +0E84 ; Lo # LAO LETTER KHO TAM +0E86..0E8A ; Lo # [5] LAO LETTER PALI GHA..LAO LETTER SO TAM +0E8C..0EA3 ; Lo # [24] LAO LETTER PALI JHA..LAO LETTER LO LING +0EA5 ; Lo # LAO LETTER LO LOOT +0EA7..0EB0 ; Lo # [10] LAO LETTER WO..LAO VOWEL SIGN A +0EB2..0EB3 ; Lo # [2] LAO VOWEL SIGN AA..LAO VOWEL SIGN AM +0EBD ; Lo # LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN NYO +0EC0..0EC4 ; Lo # [5] LAO VOWEL SIGN E..LAO VOWEL SIGN AI +0EDC..0EDF ; Lo # [4] LAO HO NO..LAO LETTER KHMU NYO +0F00 ; Lo # TIBETAN SYLLABLE OM +0F40..0F47 ; Lo # [8] TIBETAN LETTER KA..TIBETAN LETTER JA +0F49..0F6C ; Lo # [36] TIBETAN LETTER NYA..TIBETAN LETTER RRA +0F88..0F8C ; Lo # [5] TIBETAN SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SIGN INVERTED MCHU CAN +1000..102A ; Lo # [43] MYANMAR LETTER KA..MYANMAR LETTER AU +103F ; Lo # MYANMAR LETTER GREAT SA +1050..1055 ; Lo # [6] MYANMAR LETTER SHA..MYANMAR LETTER VOCALIC LL +105A..105D ; Lo # [4] MYANMAR LETTER MON NGA..MYANMAR LETTER MON BBE +1061 ; Lo # MYANMAR LETTER SGAW KAREN SHA +1065..1066 ; Lo # [2] MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN THA..MYANMAR LETTER WESTERN PWO KAREN PWA +106E..1070 ; Lo # [3] MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN NNA..MYANMAR LETTER EASTERN PWO KAREN GHWA +1075..1081 ; Lo # [13] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN KA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN HA +108E ; Lo # MYANMAR LETTER RUMAI PALAUNG FA +1100..1248 ; Lo # [329] HANGUL CHOSEONG KIYEOK..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWA +124A..124D ; Lo # [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QWE +1250..1256 ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHO +1258 ; Lo # ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWA +125A..125D ; Lo # [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QHWE +1260..1288 ; Lo # [41] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWA +128A..128D ; Lo # [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XWE +1290..12B0 ; Lo # [33] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE NA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWA +12B2..12B5 ; Lo # [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KWE +12B8..12BE ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXO +12C0 ; Lo # ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWA +12C2..12C5 ; Lo # [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KXWE +12C8..12D6 ; Lo # [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE WA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PHARYNGEAL O +12D8..1310 ; Lo # [57] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWA +1312..1315 ; Lo # [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GWE +1318..135A ; Lo # [67] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE FYA +1380..138F ; Lo # [16] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SEBATBEIT MWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE PWE +1401..166C ; Lo # [620] CANADIAN SYLLABICS E..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER TTSA +166F..167F ; Lo # [17] CANADIAN SYLLABICS QAI..CANADIAN SYLLABICS BLACKFOOT W +1681..169A ; Lo # [26] OGHAM LETTER BEITH..OGHAM LETTER PEITH +16A0..16EA ; Lo # [75] RUNIC LETTER FEHU FEOH FE F..RUNIC LETTER X +16F1..16F8 ; Lo # [8] RUNIC LETTER K..RUNIC LETTER FRANKS CASKET AESC +1700..1711 ; Lo # [18] TAGALOG LETTER A..TAGALOG LETTER HA +171F..1731 ; Lo # [19] TAGALOG LETTER ARCHAIC RA..HANUNOO LETTER HA +1740..1751 ; Lo # [18] BUHID LETTER A..BUHID LETTER HA +1760..176C ; Lo # [13] TAGBANWA LETTER A..TAGBANWA LETTER YA +176E..1770 ; Lo # [3] TAGBANWA LETTER LA..TAGBANWA LETTER SA +1780..17B3 ; Lo # [52] KHMER LETTER KA..KHMER INDEPENDENT VOWEL QAU +17DC ; Lo # KHMER SIGN AVAKRAHASANYA +1820..1842 ; Lo # [35] MONGOLIAN LETTER A..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHI +1844..1878 ; Lo # [53] MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO E..MONGOLIAN LETTER CHA WITH TWO DOTS +1880..1884 ; Lo # [5] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI ANUSVARA ONE..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI INVERTED UBADAMA +1887..18A8 ; Lo # [34] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI A..MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI BHA +18AA ; Lo # MONGOLIAN LETTER MANCHU ALI GALI LHA +18B0..18F5 ; Lo # [70] CANADIAN SYLLABICS OY..CANADIAN SYLLABICS CARRIER DENTAL S +1900..191E ; Lo # [31] LIMBU VOWEL-CARRIER LETTER..LIMBU LETTER TRA +1950..196D ; Lo # [30] TAI LE LETTER KA..TAI LE LETTER AI +1970..1974 ; Lo # [5] TAI LE LETTER TONE-2..TAI LE LETTER TONE-6 +1980..19AB ; Lo # [44] NEW TAI LUE LETTER HIGH QA..NEW TAI LUE LETTER LOW SUA +19B0..19C9 ; Lo # [26] NEW TAI LUE VOWEL SIGN VOWEL SHORTENER..NEW TAI LUE TONE MARK-2 +1A00..1A16 ; Lo # [23] BUGINESE LETTER KA..BUGINESE LETTER HA +1A20..1A54 ; Lo # [53] TAI THAM LETTER HIGH KA..TAI THAM LETTER GREAT SA +1B05..1B33 ; Lo # [47] BALINESE LETTER AKARA..BALINESE LETTER HA +1B45..1B4C ; Lo # [8] BALINESE LETTER KAF SASAK..BALINESE LETTER ARCHAIC JNYA +1B83..1BA0 ; Lo # [30] SUNDANESE LETTER A..SUNDANESE LETTER HA +1BAE..1BAF ; Lo # [2] SUNDANESE LETTER KHA..SUNDANESE LETTER SYA +1BBA..1BE5 ; Lo # [44] SUNDANESE AVAGRAHA..BATAK LETTER U +1C00..1C23 ; Lo # [36] LEPCHA LETTER KA..LEPCHA LETTER A +1C4D..1C4F ; Lo # [3] LEPCHA LETTER TTA..LEPCHA LETTER DDA +1C5A..1C77 ; Lo # [30] OL CHIKI LETTER LA..OL CHIKI LETTER OH +1CE9..1CEC ; Lo # [4] VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA..VEDIC SIGN ANUSVARA VAMAGOMUKHA WITH TAIL +1CEE..1CF3 ; Lo # [6] VEDIC SIGN HEXIFORM LONG ANUSVARA..VEDIC SIGN ROTATED ARDHAVISARGA +1CF5..1CF6 ; Lo # [2] VEDIC SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..VEDIC SIGN UPADHMANIYA +1CFA ; Lo # VEDIC SIGN DOUBLE ANUSVARA ANTARGOMUKHA +2135..2138 ; Lo # [4] ALEF SYMBOL..DALET SYMBOL +2D30..2D67 ; Lo # [56] TIFINAGH LETTER YA..TIFINAGH LETTER YO +2D80..2D96 ; Lo # [23] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE LOA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GGWE +2DA0..2DA6 ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE SSO +2DA8..2DAE ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCO +2DB0..2DB6 ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE ZZO +2DB8..2DBE ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHO +2DC0..2DC6 ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE QYO +2DC8..2DCE ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE KYO +2DD0..2DD6 ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE XYO +2DD8..2DDE ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GYO +3006 ; Lo # IDEOGRAPHIC CLOSING MARK +303C ; Lo # MASU MARK +3041..3096 ; Lo # [86] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL A..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL KE +309F ; Lo # HIRAGANA DIGRAPH YORI +30A1..30FA ; Lo # [90] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL A..KATAKANA LETTER VO +30FF ; Lo # KATAKANA DIGRAPH KOTO +3105..312F ; Lo # [43] BOPOMOFO LETTER B..BOPOMOFO LETTER NN +3131..318E ; Lo # [94] HANGUL LETTER KIYEOK..HANGUL LETTER ARAEAE +31A0..31BF ; Lo # [32] BOPOMOFO LETTER BU..BOPOMOFO LETTER AH +31F0..31FF ; Lo # [16] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL KU..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL RO +3400..4DBF ; Lo # [6592] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3400..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4DBF +4E00..A014 ; Lo # [21013] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4E00..YI SYLLABLE E +A016..A48C ; Lo # [1143] YI SYLLABLE BIT..YI SYLLABLE YYR +A4D0..A4F7 ; Lo # [40] LISU LETTER BA..LISU LETTER OE +A500..A60B ; Lo # [268] VAI SYLLABLE EE..VAI SYLLABLE NG +A610..A61F ; Lo # [16] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE FA..VAI SYMBOL JONG +A62A..A62B ; Lo # [2] VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE MA..VAI SYLLABLE NDOLE DO +A66E ; Lo # CYRILLIC LETTER MULTIOCULAR O +A6A0..A6E5 ; Lo # [70] BAMUM LETTER A..BAMUM LETTER KI +A78F ; Lo # LATIN LETTER SINOLOGICAL DOT +A7F7 ; Lo # LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER SIDEWAYS I +A7FB..A801 ; Lo # [7] LATIN EPIGRAPHIC LETTER REVERSED F..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER I +A803..A805 ; Lo # [3] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER U..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER O +A807..A80A ; Lo # [4] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER KO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER GHO +A80C..A822 ; Lo # [23] SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER CO..SYLOTI NAGRI LETTER HO +A840..A873 ; Lo # [52] PHAGS-PA LETTER KA..PHAGS-PA LETTER CANDRABINDU +A882..A8B3 ; Lo # [50] SAURASHTRA LETTER A..SAURASHTRA LETTER LLA +A8F2..A8F7 ; Lo # [6] DEVANAGARI SIGN SPACING CANDRABINDU..DEVANAGARI SIGN CANDRABINDU AVAGRAHA +A8FB ; Lo # DEVANAGARI HEADSTROKE +A8FD..A8FE ; Lo # [2] DEVANAGARI JAIN OM..DEVANAGARI LETTER AY +A90A..A925 ; Lo # [28] KAYAH LI LETTER KA..KAYAH LI LETTER OO +A930..A946 ; Lo # [23] REJANG LETTER KA..REJANG LETTER A +A960..A97C ; Lo # [29] HANGUL CHOSEONG TIKEUT-MIEUM..HANGUL CHOSEONG SSANGYEORINHIEUH +A984..A9B2 ; Lo # [47] JAVANESE LETTER A..JAVANESE LETTER HA +A9E0..A9E4 ; Lo # [5] MYANMAR LETTER SHAN GHA..MYANMAR LETTER SHAN BHA +A9E7..A9EF ; Lo # [9] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NYA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING NNA +A9FA..A9FE ; Lo # [5] MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING LLA..MYANMAR LETTER TAI LAING BHA +AA00..AA28 ; Lo # [41] CHAM LETTER A..CHAM LETTER HA +AA40..AA42 ; Lo # [3] CHAM LETTER FINAL K..CHAM LETTER FINAL NG +AA44..AA4B ; Lo # [8] CHAM LETTER FINAL CH..CHAM LETTER FINAL SS +AA60..AA6F ; Lo # [16] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI GA..MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI FA +AA71..AA76 ; Lo # [6] MYANMAR LETTER KHAMTI XA..MYANMAR LOGOGRAM KHAMTI HM +AA7A ; Lo # MYANMAR LETTER AITON RA +AA7E..AAAF ; Lo # [50] MYANMAR LETTER SHWE PALAUNG CHA..TAI VIET LETTER HIGH O +AAB1 ; Lo # TAI VIET VOWEL AA +AAB5..AAB6 ; Lo # [2] TAI VIET VOWEL E..TAI VIET VOWEL O +AAB9..AABD ; Lo # [5] TAI VIET VOWEL UEA..TAI VIET VOWEL AN +AAC0 ; Lo # TAI VIET TONE MAI NUENG +AAC2 ; Lo # TAI VIET TONE MAI SONG +AADB..AADC ; Lo # [2] TAI VIET SYMBOL KON..TAI VIET SYMBOL NUENG +AAE0..AAEA ; Lo # [11] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER E..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER SSA +AAF2 ; Lo # MEETEI MAYEK ANJI +AB01..AB06 ; Lo # [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE TTHO +AB09..AB0E ; Lo # [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DDHO +AB11..AB16 ; Lo # [6] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZU..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE DZO +AB20..AB26 ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE CCHHO +AB28..AB2E ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE BBO +ABC0..ABE2 ; Lo # [35] MEETEI MAYEK LETTER KOK..MEETEI MAYEK LETTER I LONSUM +AC00..D7A3 ; Lo # [11172] HANGUL SYLLABLE GA..HANGUL SYLLABLE HIH +D7B0..D7C6 ; Lo # [23] HANGUL JUNGSEONG O-YEO..HANGUL JUNGSEONG ARAEA-E +D7CB..D7FB ; Lo # [49] HANGUL JONGSEONG NIEUN-RIEUL..HANGUL JONGSEONG PHIEUPH-THIEUTH +F900..FA6D ; Lo # [366] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-F900..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA6D +FA70..FAD9 ; Lo # [106] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA70..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FAD9 +FB1D ; Lo # HEBREW LETTER YOD WITH HIRIQ +FB1F..FB28 ; Lo # [10] HEBREW LIGATURE YIDDISH YOD YOD PATAH..HEBREW LETTER WIDE TAV +FB2A..FB36 ; Lo # [13] HEBREW LETTER SHIN WITH SHIN DOT..HEBREW LETTER ZAYIN WITH DAGESH +FB38..FB3C ; Lo # [5] HEBREW LETTER TET WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER LAMED WITH DAGESH +FB3E ; Lo # HEBREW LETTER MEM WITH DAGESH +FB40..FB41 ; Lo # [2] HEBREW LETTER NUN WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER SAMEKH WITH DAGESH +FB43..FB44 ; Lo # [2] HEBREW LETTER FINAL PE WITH DAGESH..HEBREW LETTER PE WITH DAGESH +FB46..FBB1 ; Lo # [108] HEBREW LETTER TSADI WITH DAGESH..ARABIC LETTER YEH BARREE WITH HAMZA ABOVE FINAL FORM +FBD3..FD3D ; Lo # [363] ARABIC LETTER NG ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE ALEF WITH FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM +FD50..FD8F ; Lo # [64] ARABIC LIGATURE TEH WITH JEEM WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH KHAH WITH MEEM INITIAL FORM +FD92..FDC7 ; Lo # [54] ARABIC LIGATURE MEEM WITH JEEM WITH KHAH INITIAL FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE NOON WITH JEEM WITH YEH FINAL FORM +FDF0..FDFB ; Lo # [12] ARABIC LIGATURE SALLA USED AS KORANIC STOP SIGN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE JALLAJALALOUHOU +FE70..FE74 ; Lo # [5] ARABIC FATHATAN ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC KASRATAN ISOLATED FORM +FE76..FEFC ; Lo # [135] ARABIC FATHA ISOLATED FORM..ARABIC LIGATURE LAM WITH ALEF FINAL FORM +FF66..FF6F ; Lo # [10] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER WO..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER SMALL TU +FF71..FF9D ; Lo # [45] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER A..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA LETTER N +FFA0..FFBE ; Lo # [31] HALFWIDTH HANGUL FILLER..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER HIEUH +FFC2..FFC7 ; Lo # [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER A..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER E +FFCA..FFCF ; Lo # [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YEO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER OE +FFD2..FFD7 ; Lo # [6] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YO..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER YU +FFDA..FFDC ; Lo # [3] HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER EU..HALFWIDTH HANGUL LETTER I +10000..1000B ; Lo # [12] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B008 A..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B046 JE +1000D..10026 ; Lo # [26] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B036 JO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B032 QO +10028..1003A ; Lo # [19] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B060 RA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B042 WO +1003C..1003D ; Lo # [2] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B017 ZA..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B074 ZE +1003F..1004D ; Lo # [15] LINEAR B SYLLABLE B020 ZO..LINEAR B SYLLABLE B091 TWO +10050..1005D ; Lo # [14] LINEAR B SYMBOL B018..LINEAR B SYMBOL B089 +10080..100FA ; Lo # [123] LINEAR B IDEOGRAM B100 MAN..LINEAR B IDEOGRAM VESSEL B305 +10280..1029C ; Lo # [29] LYCIAN LETTER A..LYCIAN LETTER X +102A0..102D0 ; Lo # [49] CARIAN LETTER A..CARIAN LETTER UUU3 +10300..1031F ; Lo # [32] OLD ITALIC LETTER A..OLD ITALIC LETTER ESS +1032D..10340 ; Lo # [20] OLD ITALIC LETTER YE..GOTHIC LETTER PAIRTHRA +10342..10349 ; Lo # [8] GOTHIC LETTER RAIDA..GOTHIC LETTER OTHAL +10350..10375 ; Lo # [38] OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..OLD PERMIC LETTER IA +10380..1039D ; Lo # [30] UGARITIC LETTER ALPA..UGARITIC LETTER SSU +103A0..103C3 ; Lo # [36] OLD PERSIAN SIGN A..OLD PERSIAN SIGN HA +103C8..103CF ; Lo # [8] OLD PERSIAN SIGN AURAMAZDAA..OLD PERSIAN SIGN BUUMISH +10450..1049D ; Lo # [78] SHAVIAN LETTER PEEP..OSMANYA LETTER OO +10500..10527 ; Lo # [40] ELBASAN LETTER A..ELBASAN LETTER KHE +10530..10563 ; Lo # [52] CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER ALT..CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN LETTER KIW +10600..10736 ; Lo # [311] LINEAR A SIGN AB001..LINEAR A SIGN A664 +10740..10755 ; Lo # [22] LINEAR A SIGN A701 A..LINEAR A SIGN A732 JE +10760..10767 ; Lo # [8] LINEAR A SIGN A800..LINEAR A SIGN A807 +10800..10805 ; Lo # [6] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE A..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JA +10808 ; Lo # CYPRIOT SYLLABLE JO +1080A..10835 ; Lo # [44] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE KA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE WO +10837..10838 ; Lo # [2] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XA..CYPRIOT SYLLABLE XE +1083C ; Lo # CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZA +1083F..10855 ; Lo # [23] CYPRIOT SYLLABLE ZO..IMPERIAL ARAMAIC LETTER TAW +10860..10876 ; Lo # [23] PALMYRENE LETTER ALEPH..PALMYRENE LETTER TAW +10880..1089E ; Lo # [31] NABATAEAN LETTER FINAL ALEPH..NABATAEAN LETTER TAW +108E0..108F2 ; Lo # [19] HATRAN LETTER ALEPH..HATRAN LETTER QOPH +108F4..108F5 ; Lo # [2] HATRAN LETTER SHIN..HATRAN LETTER TAW +10900..10915 ; Lo # [22] PHOENICIAN LETTER ALF..PHOENICIAN LETTER TAU +10920..10939 ; Lo # [26] LYDIAN LETTER A..LYDIAN LETTER C +10980..109B7 ; Lo # [56] MEROITIC HIEROGLYPHIC LETTER A..MEROITIC CURSIVE LETTER DA +109BE..109BF ; Lo # [2] MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM RMT..MEROITIC CURSIVE LOGOGRAM IMN +10A00 ; Lo # KHAROSHTHI LETTER A +10A10..10A13 ; Lo # [4] KHAROSHTHI LETTER KA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER GHA +10A15..10A17 ; Lo # [3] KHAROSHTHI LETTER CA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER JA +10A19..10A35 ; Lo # [29] KHAROSHTHI LETTER NYA..KHAROSHTHI LETTER VHA +10A60..10A7C ; Lo # [29] OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER HE..OLD SOUTH ARABIAN LETTER THETH +10A80..10A9C ; Lo # [29] OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER HEH..OLD NORTH ARABIAN LETTER ZAH +10AC0..10AC7 ; Lo # [8] MANICHAEAN LETTER ALEPH..MANICHAEAN LETTER WAW +10AC9..10AE4 ; Lo # [28] MANICHAEAN LETTER ZAYIN..MANICHAEAN LETTER TAW +10B00..10B35 ; Lo # [54] AVESTAN LETTER A..AVESTAN LETTER HE +10B40..10B55 ; Lo # [22] INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN LETTER TAW +10B60..10B72 ; Lo # [19] INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10B80..10B91 ; Lo # [18] PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER ALEPH..PSALTER PAHLAVI LETTER TAW +10C00..10C48 ; Lo # [73] OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON A..OLD TURKIC LETTER ORKHON BASH +10D00..10D23 ; Lo # [36] HANIFI ROHINGYA LETTER A..HANIFI ROHINGYA MARK NA KHONNA +10E80..10EA9 ; Lo # [42] YEZIDI LETTER ELIF..YEZIDI LETTER ET +10EB0..10EB1 ; Lo # [2] YEZIDI LETTER LAM WITH DOT ABOVE..YEZIDI LETTER YOT WITH CIRCUMFLEX ABOVE +10F00..10F1C ; Lo # [29] OLD SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..OLD SOGDIAN LETTER FINAL TAW WITH VERTICAL TAIL +10F27 ; Lo # OLD SOGDIAN LIGATURE AYIN-DALETH +10F30..10F45 ; Lo # [22] SOGDIAN LETTER ALEPH..SOGDIAN INDEPENDENT SHIN +10F70..10F81 ; Lo # [18] OLD UYGHUR LETTER ALEPH..OLD UYGHUR LETTER LESH +10FB0..10FC4 ; Lo # [21] CHORASMIAN LETTER ALEPH..CHORASMIAN LETTER TAW +10FE0..10FF6 ; Lo # [23] ELYMAIC LETTER ALEPH..ELYMAIC LIGATURE ZAYIN-YODH +11003..11037 ; Lo # [53] BRAHMI SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL NNNA +11071..11072 ; Lo # [2] BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL SHORT O +11075 ; Lo # BRAHMI LETTER OLD TAMIL LLA +11083..110AF ; Lo # [45] KAITHI LETTER A..KAITHI LETTER HA +110D0..110E8 ; Lo # [25] SORA SOMPENG LETTER SAH..SORA SOMPENG LETTER MAE +11103..11126 ; Lo # [36] CHAKMA LETTER AA..CHAKMA LETTER HAA +11144 ; Lo # CHAKMA LETTER LHAA +11147 ; Lo # CHAKMA LETTER VAA +11150..11172 ; Lo # [35] MAHAJANI LETTER A..MAHAJANI LETTER RRA +11176 ; Lo # MAHAJANI LIGATURE SHRI +11183..111B2 ; Lo # [48] SHARADA LETTER A..SHARADA LETTER HA +111C1..111C4 ; Lo # [4] SHARADA SIGN AVAGRAHA..SHARADA OM +111DA ; Lo # SHARADA EKAM +111DC ; Lo # SHARADA HEADSTROKE +11200..11211 ; Lo # [18] KHOJKI LETTER A..KHOJKI LETTER JJA +11213..1122B ; Lo # [25] KHOJKI LETTER NYA..KHOJKI LETTER LLA +11280..11286 ; Lo # [7] MULTANI LETTER A..MULTANI LETTER GA +11288 ; Lo # MULTANI LETTER GHA +1128A..1128D ; Lo # [4] MULTANI LETTER CA..MULTANI LETTER JJA +1128F..1129D ; Lo # [15] MULTANI LETTER NYA..MULTANI LETTER BA +1129F..112A8 ; Lo # [10] MULTANI LETTER BHA..MULTANI LETTER RHA +112B0..112DE ; Lo # [47] KHUDAWADI LETTER A..KHUDAWADI LETTER HA +11305..1130C ; Lo # [8] GRANTHA LETTER A..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC L +1130F..11310 ; Lo # [2] GRANTHA LETTER EE..GRANTHA LETTER AI +11313..11328 ; Lo # [22] GRANTHA LETTER OO..GRANTHA LETTER NA +1132A..11330 ; Lo # [7] GRANTHA LETTER PA..GRANTHA LETTER RA +11332..11333 ; Lo # [2] GRANTHA LETTER LA..GRANTHA LETTER LLA +11335..11339 ; Lo # [5] GRANTHA LETTER VA..GRANTHA LETTER HA +1133D ; Lo # GRANTHA SIGN AVAGRAHA +11350 ; Lo # GRANTHA OM +1135D..11361 ; Lo # [5] GRANTHA SIGN PLUTA..GRANTHA LETTER VOCALIC LL +11400..11434 ; Lo # [53] NEWA LETTER A..NEWA LETTER HA +11447..1144A ; Lo # [4] NEWA SIGN AVAGRAHA..NEWA SIDDHI +1145F..11461 ; Lo # [3] NEWA LETTER VEDIC ANUSVARA..NEWA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +11480..114AF ; Lo # [48] TIRHUTA ANJI..TIRHUTA LETTER HA +114C4..114C5 ; Lo # [2] TIRHUTA SIGN AVAGRAHA..TIRHUTA GVANG +114C7 ; Lo # TIRHUTA OM +11580..115AE ; Lo # [47] SIDDHAM LETTER A..SIDDHAM LETTER HA +115D8..115DB ; Lo # [4] SIDDHAM LETTER THREE-CIRCLE ALTERNATE I..SIDDHAM LETTER ALTERNATE U +11600..1162F ; Lo # [48] MODI LETTER A..MODI LETTER LLA +11644 ; Lo # MODI SIGN HUVA +11680..116AA ; Lo # [43] TAKRI LETTER A..TAKRI LETTER RRA +116B8 ; Lo # TAKRI LETTER ARCHAIC KHA +11700..1171A ; Lo # [27] AHOM LETTER KA..AHOM LETTER ALTERNATE BA +11740..11746 ; Lo # [7] AHOM LETTER CA..AHOM LETTER LLA +11800..1182B ; Lo # [44] DOGRA LETTER A..DOGRA LETTER RRA +118FF..11906 ; Lo # [8] WARANG CITI OM..DIVES AKURU LETTER E +11909 ; Lo # DIVES AKURU LETTER O +1190C..11913 ; Lo # [8] DIVES AKURU LETTER KA..DIVES AKURU LETTER JA +11915..11916 ; Lo # [2] DIVES AKURU LETTER NYA..DIVES AKURU LETTER TTA +11918..1192F ; Lo # [24] DIVES AKURU LETTER DDA..DIVES AKURU LETTER ZA +1193F ; Lo # DIVES AKURU PREFIXED NASAL SIGN +11941 ; Lo # DIVES AKURU INITIAL RA +119A0..119A7 ; Lo # [8] NANDINAGARI LETTER A..NANDINAGARI LETTER VOCALIC RR +119AA..119D0 ; Lo # [39] NANDINAGARI LETTER E..NANDINAGARI LETTER RRA +119E1 ; Lo # NANDINAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +119E3 ; Lo # NANDINAGARI HEADSTROKE +11A00 ; Lo # ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER A +11A0B..11A32 ; Lo # [40] ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE LETTER KSSA +11A3A ; Lo # ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER RA +11A50 ; Lo # SOYOMBO LETTER A +11A5C..11A89 ; Lo # [46] SOYOMBO LETTER KA..SOYOMBO CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER SA +11A9D ; Lo # SOYOMBO MARK PLUTA +11AB0..11AF8 ; Lo # [73] CANADIAN SYLLABICS NATTILIK HI..PAU CIN HAU GLOTTAL STOP FINAL +11C00..11C08 ; Lo # [9] BHAIKSUKI LETTER A..BHAIKSUKI LETTER VOCALIC L +11C0A..11C2E ; Lo # [37] BHAIKSUKI LETTER E..BHAIKSUKI LETTER HA +11C40 ; Lo # BHAIKSUKI SIGN AVAGRAHA +11C72..11C8F ; Lo # [30] MARCHEN LETTER KA..MARCHEN LETTER A +11D00..11D06 ; Lo # [7] MASARAM GONDI LETTER A..MASARAM GONDI LETTER E +11D08..11D09 ; Lo # [2] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AI..MASARAM GONDI LETTER O +11D0B..11D30 ; Lo # [38] MASARAM GONDI LETTER AU..MASARAM GONDI LETTER TRA +11D46 ; Lo # MASARAM GONDI REPHA +11D60..11D65 ; Lo # [6] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER A..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER UU +11D67..11D68 ; Lo # [2] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER EE..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER AI +11D6A..11D89 ; Lo # [32] GUNJALA GONDI LETTER OO..GUNJALA GONDI LETTER SA +11D98 ; Lo # GUNJALA GONDI OM +11EE0..11EF2 ; Lo # [19] MAKASAR LETTER KA..MAKASAR ANGKA +11FB0 ; Lo # LISU LETTER YHA +12000..12399 ; Lo # [922] CUNEIFORM SIGN A..CUNEIFORM SIGN U U +12480..12543 ; Lo # [196] CUNEIFORM SIGN AB TIMES NUN TENU..CUNEIFORM SIGN ZU5 TIMES THREE DISH TENU +12F90..12FF0 ; Lo # [97] CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM001..CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM114 +13000..1342E ; Lo # [1071] EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH AA032 +14400..14646 ; Lo # [583] ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A001..ANATOLIAN HIEROGLYPH A530 +16800..16A38 ; Lo # [569] BAMUM LETTER PHASE-A NGKUE MFON..BAMUM LETTER PHASE-F VUEQ +16A40..16A5E ; Lo # [31] MRO LETTER TA..MRO LETTER TEK +16A70..16ABE ; Lo # [79] TANGSA LETTER OZ..TANGSA LETTER ZA +16AD0..16AED ; Lo # [30] BASSA VAH LETTER ENNI..BASSA VAH LETTER I +16B00..16B2F ; Lo # [48] PAHAWH HMONG VOWEL KEEB..PAHAWH HMONG CONSONANT CAU +16B63..16B77 ; Lo # [21] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS LUB..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN CIM NRES TOS +16B7D..16B8F ; Lo # [19] PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN TSHEEJ..PAHAWH HMONG CLAN SIGN VWJ +16F00..16F4A ; Lo # [75] MIAO LETTER PA..MIAO LETTER RTE +16F50 ; Lo # MIAO LETTER NASALIZATION +17000..187F7 ; Lo # [6136] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-17000..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-187F7 +18800..18CD5 ; Lo # [1238] TANGUT COMPONENT-001..KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT CHARACTER-18CD5 +18D00..18D08 ; Lo # [9] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D00..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D08 +1B000..1B122 ; Lo # [291] KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC E..KATAKANA LETTER ARCHAIC WU +1B150..1B152 ; Lo # [3] HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WI..HIRAGANA LETTER SMALL WO +1B164..1B167 ; Lo # [4] KATAKANA LETTER SMALL WI..KATAKANA LETTER SMALL N +1B170..1B2FB ; Lo # [396] NUSHU CHARACTER-1B170..NUSHU CHARACTER-1B2FB +1BC00..1BC6A ; Lo # [107] DUPLOYAN LETTER H..DUPLOYAN LETTER VOCALIC M +1BC70..1BC7C ; Lo # [13] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LEFT HORIZONTAL SECANT..DUPLOYAN AFFIX ATTACHED TANGENT HOOK +1BC80..1BC88 ; Lo # [9] DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX HIGH VERTICAL +1BC90..1BC99 ; Lo # [10] DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ACUTE..DUPLOYAN AFFIX LOW ARROW +1DF0A ; Lo # LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1E100..1E12C ; Lo # [45] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER MA..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LETTER W +1E14E ; Lo # NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG LOGOGRAM NYAJ +1E290..1E2AD ; Lo # [30] TOTO LETTER PA..TOTO LETTER A +1E2C0..1E2EB ; Lo # [44] WANCHO LETTER AA..WANCHO LETTER YIH +1E7E0..1E7E6 ; Lo # [7] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHYO +1E7E8..1E7EB ; Lo # [4] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE HHWA..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE HHWE +1E7ED..1E7EE ; Lo # [2] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE MWEE +1E7F0..1E7FE ; Lo # [15] ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE QWI..ETHIOPIC SYLLABLE GURAGE PWEE +1E800..1E8C4 ; Lo # [197] MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M001 KI..MENDE KIKAKUI SYLLABLE M060 NYON +1EE00..1EE03 ; Lo # [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DAL +1EE05..1EE1F ; Lo # [27] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOTLESS QAF +1EE21..1EE22 ; Lo # [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL JEEM +1EE24 ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HEH +1EE27 ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HAH +1EE29..1EE32 ; Lo # [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL YEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL QAF +1EE34..1EE37 ; Lo # [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL KHAH +1EE39 ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL DAD +1EE3B ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL GHAIN +1EE42 ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED JEEM +1EE47 ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED HAH +1EE49 ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED YEH +1EE4B ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED LAM +1EE4D..1EE4F ; Lo # [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED NOON..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED AIN +1EE51..1EE52 ; Lo # [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED QAF +1EE54 ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SHEEN +1EE57 ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED KHAH +1EE59 ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DAD +1EE5B ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED GHAIN +1EE5D ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS NOON +1EE5F ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS QAF +1EE61..1EE62 ; Lo # [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED JEEM +1EE64 ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HEH +1EE67..1EE6A ; Lo # [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HAH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KAF +1EE6C..1EE72 ; Lo # [7] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED MEEM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED QAF +1EE74..1EE77 ; Lo # [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KHAH +1EE79..1EE7C ; Lo # [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS BEH +1EE7E ; Lo # ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS FEH +1EE80..1EE89 ; Lo # [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED YEH +1EE8B..1EE9B ; Lo # [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED GHAIN +1EEA1..1EEA3 ; Lo # [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK DAL +1EEA5..1EEA9 ; Lo # [5] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK YEH +1EEAB..1EEBB ; Lo # [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK GHAIN +20000..2A6DF ; Lo # [42720] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-20000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A6DF +2A700..2B738 ; Lo # [4153] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A700..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B738 +2B740..2B81D ; Lo # [222] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B740..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B81D +2B820..2CEA1 ; Lo # [5762] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B820..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEA1 +2CEB0..2EBE0 ; Lo # [7473] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEB0..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2EBE0 +2F800..2FA1D ; Lo # [542] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2F800..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2FA1D +30000..3134A ; Lo # [4939] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-30000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3134A + +# Total code points: 127333 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Nonspacing_Mark + +0300..036F ; Mn # [112] COMBINING GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER X +0483..0487 ; Mn # [5] COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO..COMBINING CYRILLIC POKRYTIE +0591..05BD ; Mn # [45] HEBREW ACCENT ETNAHTA..HEBREW POINT METEG +05BF ; Mn # HEBREW POINT RAFE +05C1..05C2 ; Mn # [2] HEBREW POINT SHIN DOT..HEBREW POINT SIN DOT +05C4..05C5 ; Mn # [2] HEBREW MARK UPPER DOT..HEBREW MARK LOWER DOT +05C7 ; Mn # HEBREW POINT QAMATS QATAN +0610..061A ; Mn # [11] ARABIC SIGN SALLALLAHOU ALAYHE WASSALLAM..ARABIC SMALL KASRA +064B..065F ; Mn # [21] ARABIC FATHATAN..ARABIC WAVY HAMZA BELOW +0670 ; Mn # ARABIC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALEF +06D6..06DC ; Mn # [7] ARABIC SMALL HIGH LIGATURE SAD WITH LAM WITH ALEF MAKSURA..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SEEN +06DF..06E4 ; Mn # [6] ARABIC SMALL HIGH ROUNDED ZERO..ARABIC SMALL HIGH MADDA +06E7..06E8 ; Mn # [2] ARABIC SMALL HIGH YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH NOON +06EA..06ED ; Mn # [4] ARABIC EMPTY CENTRE LOW STOP..ARABIC SMALL LOW MEEM +0711 ; Mn # SYRIAC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALAPH +0730..074A ; Mn # [27] SYRIAC PTHAHA ABOVE..SYRIAC BARREKH +07A6..07B0 ; Mn # [11] THAANA ABAFILI..THAANA SUKUN +07EB..07F3 ; Mn # [9] NKO COMBINING SHORT HIGH TONE..NKO COMBINING DOUBLE DOT ABOVE +07FD ; Mn # NKO DANTAYALAN +0816..0819 ; Mn # [4] SAMARITAN MARK IN..SAMARITAN MARK DAGESH +081B..0823 ; Mn # [9] SAMARITAN MARK EPENTHETIC YUT..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN A +0825..0827 ; Mn # [3] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN SHORT A..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN U +0829..082D ; Mn # [5] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN LONG I..SAMARITAN MARK NEQUDAA +0859..085B ; Mn # [3] MANDAIC AFFRICATION MARK..MANDAIC GEMINATION MARK +0898..089F ; Mn # [8] ARABIC SMALL HIGH WORD AL-JUZ..ARABIC HALF MADDA OVER MADDA +08CA..08E1 ; Mn # [24] ARABIC SMALL HIGH FARSI YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SIGN SAFHA +08E3..0902 ; Mn # [32] ARABIC TURNED DAMMA BELOW..DEVANAGARI SIGN ANUSVARA +093A ; Mn # DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OE +093C ; Mn # DEVANAGARI SIGN NUKTA +0941..0948 ; Mn # [8] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +094D ; Mn # DEVANAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +0951..0957 ; Mn # [7] DEVANAGARI STRESS SIGN UDATTA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN UUE +0962..0963 ; Mn # [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0981 ; Mn # BENGALI SIGN CANDRABINDU +09BC ; Mn # BENGALI SIGN NUKTA +09C1..09C4 ; Mn # [4] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN U..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +09CD ; Mn # BENGALI SIGN VIRAMA +09E2..09E3 ; Mn # [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +09FE ; Mn # BENGALI SANDHI MARK +0A01..0A02 ; Mn # [2] GURMUKHI SIGN ADAK BINDI..GURMUKHI SIGN BINDI +0A3C ; Mn # GURMUKHI SIGN NUKTA +0A41..0A42 ; Mn # [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN U..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN UU +0A47..0A48 ; Mn # [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN EE..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AI +0A4B..0A4D ; Mn # [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN OO..GURMUKHI SIGN VIRAMA +0A51 ; Mn # GURMUKHI SIGN UDAAT +0A70..0A71 ; Mn # [2] GURMUKHI TIPPI..GURMUKHI ADDAK +0A75 ; Mn # GURMUKHI SIGN YAKASH +0A81..0A82 ; Mn # [2] GUJARATI SIGN CANDRABINDU..GUJARATI SIGN ANUSVARA +0ABC ; Mn # GUJARATI SIGN NUKTA +0AC1..0AC5 ; Mn # [5] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN U..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA E +0AC7..0AC8 ; Mn # [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN E..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AI +0ACD ; Mn # GUJARATI SIGN VIRAMA +0AE2..0AE3 ; Mn # [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0AFA..0AFF ; Mn # [6] GUJARATI SIGN SUKUN..GUJARATI SIGN TWO-CIRCLE NUKTA ABOVE +0B01 ; Mn # ORIYA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0B3C ; Mn # ORIYA SIGN NUKTA +0B3F ; Mn # ORIYA VOWEL SIGN I +0B41..0B44 ; Mn # [4] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN U..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0B4D ; Mn # ORIYA SIGN VIRAMA +0B55..0B56 ; Mn # [2] ORIYA SIGN OVERLINE..ORIYA AI LENGTH MARK +0B62..0B63 ; Mn # [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0B82 ; Mn # TAMIL SIGN ANUSVARA +0BC0 ; Mn # TAMIL VOWEL SIGN II +0BCD ; Mn # TAMIL SIGN VIRAMA +0C00 ; Mn # TELUGU SIGN COMBINING CANDRABINDU ABOVE +0C04 ; Mn # TELUGU SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE +0C3C ; Mn # TELUGU SIGN NUKTA +0C3E..0C40 ; Mn # [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AA..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN II +0C46..0C48 ; Mn # [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN E..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AI +0C4A..0C4D ; Mn # [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN O..TELUGU SIGN VIRAMA +0C55..0C56 ; Mn # [2] TELUGU LENGTH MARK..TELUGU AI LENGTH MARK +0C62..0C63 ; Mn # [2] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0C81 ; Mn # KANNADA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0CBC ; Mn # KANNADA SIGN NUKTA +0CBF ; Mn # KANNADA VOWEL SIGN I +0CC6 ; Mn # KANNADA VOWEL SIGN E +0CCC..0CCD ; Mn # [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AU..KANNADA SIGN VIRAMA +0CE2..0CE3 ; Mn # [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D00..0D01 ; Mn # [2] MALAYALAM SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..MALAYALAM SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D3B..0D3C ; Mn # [2] MALAYALAM SIGN VERTICAL BAR VIRAMA..MALAYALAM SIGN CIRCULAR VIRAMA +0D41..0D44 ; Mn # [4] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN U..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0D4D ; Mn # MALAYALAM SIGN VIRAMA +0D62..0D63 ; Mn # [2] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D81 ; Mn # SINHALA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0DCA ; Mn # SINHALA SIGN AL-LAKUNA +0DD2..0DD4 ; Mn # [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI IS-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI PAA-PILLA +0DD6 ; Mn # SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA PAA-PILLA +0E31 ; Mn # THAI CHARACTER MAI HAN-AKAT +0E34..0E3A ; Mn # [7] THAI CHARACTER SARA I..THAI CHARACTER PHINTHU +0E47..0E4E ; Mn # [8] THAI CHARACTER MAITAIKHU..THAI CHARACTER YAMAKKAN +0EB1 ; Mn # LAO VOWEL SIGN MAI KAN +0EB4..0EBC ; Mn # [9] LAO VOWEL SIGN I..LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN LO +0EC8..0ECD ; Mn # [6] LAO TONE MAI EK..LAO NIGGAHITA +0F18..0F19 ; Mn # [2] TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN -KHYUD PA..TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN SDONG TSHUGS +0F35 ; Mn # TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG NYI ZLA +0F37 ; Mn # TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG SGOR RTAGS +0F39 ; Mn # TIBETAN MARK TSA -PHRU +0F71..0F7E ; Mn # [14] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN AA..TIBETAN SIGN RJES SU NGA RO +0F80..0F84 ; Mn # [5] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN REVERSED I..TIBETAN MARK HALANTA +0F86..0F87 ; Mn # [2] TIBETAN SIGN LCI RTAGS..TIBETAN SIGN YANG RTAGS +0F8D..0F97 ; Mn # [11] TIBETAN SUBJOINED SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER JA +0F99..0FBC ; Mn # [36] TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER NYA..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER FIXED-FORM RA +0FC6 ; Mn # TIBETAN SYMBOL PADMA GDAN +102D..1030 ; Mn # [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN UU +1032..1037 ; Mn # [6] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AI..MYANMAR SIGN DOT BELOW +1039..103A ; Mn # [2] MYANMAR SIGN VIRAMA..MYANMAR SIGN ASAT +103D..103E ; Mn # [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL WA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL HA +1058..1059 ; Mn # [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +105E..1060 ; Mn # [3] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL NA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL LA +1071..1074 ; Mn # [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN GEBA KAREN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN KAYAH EE +1082 ; Mn # MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN SHAN MEDIAL WA +1085..1086 ; Mn # [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E ABOVE..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN FINAL Y +108D ; Mn # MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL EMPHATIC TONE +109D ; Mn # MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON AI +135D..135F ; Mn # [3] ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION AND VOWEL LENGTH MARK..ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION MARK +1712..1714 ; Mn # [3] TAGALOG VOWEL SIGN I..TAGALOG SIGN VIRAMA +1732..1733 ; Mn # [2] HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN I..HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN U +1752..1753 ; Mn # [2] BUHID VOWEL SIGN I..BUHID VOWEL SIGN U +1772..1773 ; Mn # [2] TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN I..TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN U +17B4..17B5 ; Mn # [2] KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AQ..KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AA +17B7..17BD ; Mn # [7] KHMER VOWEL SIGN I..KHMER VOWEL SIGN UA +17C6 ; Mn # KHMER SIGN NIKAHIT +17C9..17D3 ; Mn # [11] KHMER SIGN MUUSIKATOAN..KHMER SIGN BATHAMASAT +17DD ; Mn # KHMER SIGN ATTHACAN +180B..180D ; Mn # [3] MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR ONE..MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR THREE +180F ; Mn # MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR FOUR +1885..1886 ; Mn # [2] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI BALUDA..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI THREE BALUDA +18A9 ; Mn # MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI DAGALGA +1920..1922 ; Mn # [3] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN A..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN U +1927..1928 ; Mn # [2] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN E..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN O +1932 ; Mn # LIMBU SMALL LETTER ANUSVARA +1939..193B ; Mn # [3] LIMBU SIGN MUKPHRENG..LIMBU SIGN SA-I +1A17..1A18 ; Mn # [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN I..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN U +1A1B ; Mn # BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN AE +1A56 ; Mn # TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA +1A58..1A5E ; Mn # [7] TAI THAM SIGN MAI KANG LAI..TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN SA +1A60 ; Mn # TAI THAM SIGN SAKOT +1A62 ; Mn # TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN MAI SAT +1A65..1A6C ; Mn # [8] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN I..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA BELOW +1A73..1A7C ; Mn # [10] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA ABOVE..TAI THAM SIGN KHUEN-LUE KARAN +1A7F ; Mn # TAI THAM COMBINING CRYPTOGRAMMIC DOT +1AB0..1ABD ; Mn # [14] COMBINING DOUBLED CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..COMBINING PARENTHESES BELOW +1ABF..1ACE ; Mn # [16] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER W BELOW..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +1B00..1B03 ; Mn # [4] BALINESE SIGN ULU RICEM..BALINESE SIGN SURANG +1B34 ; Mn # BALINESE SIGN REREKAN +1B36..1B3A ; Mn # [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN ULU..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA +1B3C ; Mn # BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA +1B42 ; Mn # BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET +1B6B..1B73 ; Mn # [9] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TEGEH..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING GONG +1B80..1B81 ; Mn # [2] SUNDANESE SIGN PANYECEK..SUNDANESE SIGN PANGLAYAR +1BA2..1BA5 ; Mn # [4] SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PANYAKRA..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANYUKU +1BA8..1BA9 ; Mn # [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PAMEPET..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANEULEUNG +1BAB..1BAD ; Mn # [3] SUNDANESE SIGN VIRAMA..SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PASANGAN WA +1BE6 ; Mn # BATAK SIGN TOMPI +1BE8..1BE9 ; Mn # [2] BATAK VOWEL SIGN PAKPAK E..BATAK VOWEL SIGN EE +1BED ; Mn # BATAK VOWEL SIGN KARO O +1BEF..1BF1 ; Mn # [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN U FOR SIMALUNGUN SA..BATAK CONSONANT SIGN H +1C2C..1C33 ; Mn # [8] LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN E..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN T +1C36..1C37 ; Mn # [2] LEPCHA SIGN RAN..LEPCHA SIGN NUKTA +1CD0..1CD2 ; Mn # [3] VEDIC TONE KARSHANA..VEDIC TONE PRENKHA +1CD4..1CE0 ; Mn # [13] VEDIC SIGN YAJURVEDIC MIDLINE SVARITA..VEDIC TONE RIGVEDIC KASHMIRI INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE2..1CE8 ; Mn # [7] VEDIC SIGN VISARGA SVARITA..VEDIC SIGN VISARGA ANUDATTA WITH TAIL +1CED ; Mn # VEDIC SIGN TIRYAK +1CF4 ; Mn # VEDIC TONE CANDRA ABOVE +1CF8..1CF9 ; Mn # [2] VEDIC TONE RING ABOVE..VEDIC TONE DOUBLE RING ABOVE +1DC0..1DFF ; Mn # [64] COMBINING DOTTED GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING RIGHT ARROWHEAD AND DOWN ARROWHEAD BELOW +20D0..20DC ; Mn # [13] COMBINING LEFT HARPOON ABOVE..COMBINING FOUR DOTS ABOVE +20E1 ; Mn # COMBINING LEFT RIGHT ARROW ABOVE +20E5..20F0 ; Mn # [12] COMBINING REVERSE SOLIDUS OVERLAY..COMBINING ASTERISK ABOVE +2CEF..2CF1 ; Mn # [3] COPTIC COMBINING NI ABOVE..COPTIC COMBINING SPIRITUS LENIS +2D7F ; Mn # TIFINAGH CONSONANT JOINER +2DE0..2DFF ; Mn # [32] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER BE..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +302A..302D ; Mn # [4] IDEOGRAPHIC LEVEL TONE MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ENTERING TONE MARK +3099..309A ; Mn # [2] COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +A66F ; Mn # COMBINING CYRILLIC VZMET +A674..A67D ; Mn # [10] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER UKRAINIAN IE..COMBINING CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A69E..A69F ; Mn # [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER EF..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED E +A6F0..A6F1 ; Mn # [2] BAMUM COMBINING MARK KOQNDON..BAMUM COMBINING MARK TUKWENTIS +A802 ; Mn # SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN DVISVARA +A806 ; Mn # SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN HASANTA +A80B ; Mn # SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ANUSVARA +A825..A826 ; Mn # [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN U..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN E +A82C ; Mn # SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ALTERNATE HASANTA +A8C4..A8C5 ; Mn # [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN VIRAMA..SAURASHTRA SIGN CANDRABINDU +A8E0..A8F1 ; Mn # [18] COMBINING DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +A8FF ; Mn # DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AY +A926..A92D ; Mn # [8] KAYAH LI VOWEL UE..KAYAH LI TONE CALYA PLOPHU +A947..A951 ; Mn # [11] REJANG VOWEL SIGN I..REJANG CONSONANT SIGN R +A980..A982 ; Mn # [3] JAVANESE SIGN PANYANGGA..JAVANESE SIGN LAYAR +A9B3 ; Mn # JAVANESE SIGN CECAK TELU +A9B6..A9B9 ; Mn # [4] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN WULU..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN SUKU MENDUT +A9BC..A9BD ; Mn # [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET..JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN KERET +A9E5 ; Mn # MYANMAR SIGN SHAN SAW +AA29..AA2E ; Mn # [6] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAM VOWEL SIGN OE +AA31..AA32 ; Mn # [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AU..CHAM VOWEL SIGN UE +AA35..AA36 ; Mn # [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN LA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN WA +AA43 ; Mn # CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL NG +AA4C ; Mn # CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL M +AA7C ; Mn # MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-2 +AAB0 ; Mn # TAI VIET MAI KANG +AAB2..AAB4 ; Mn # [3] TAI VIET VOWEL I..TAI VIET VOWEL U +AAB7..AAB8 ; Mn # [2] TAI VIET MAI KHIT..TAI VIET VOWEL IA +AABE..AABF ; Mn # [2] TAI VIET VOWEL AM..TAI VIET TONE MAI EK +AAC1 ; Mn # TAI VIET TONE MAI THO +AAEC..AAED ; Mn # [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAI +AAF6 ; Mn # MEETEI MAYEK VIRAMA +ABE5 ; Mn # MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ANAP +ABE8 ; Mn # MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UNAP +ABED ; Mn # MEETEI MAYEK APUN IYEK +FB1E ; Mn # HEBREW POINT JUDEO-SPANISH VARIKA +FE00..FE0F ; Mn # [16] VARIATION SELECTOR-1..VARIATION SELECTOR-16 +FE20..FE2F ; Mn # [16] COMBINING LIGATURE LEFT HALF..COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO RIGHT HALF +101FD ; Mn # PHAISTOS DISC SIGN COMBINING OBLIQUE STROKE +102E0 ; Mn # COPTIC EPACT THOUSANDS MARK +10376..1037A ; Mn # [5] COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER SII +10A01..10A03 ; Mn # [3] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN I..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +10A05..10A06 ; Mn # [2] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN E..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN O +10A0C..10A0F ; Mn # [4] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL LENGTH MARK..KHAROSHTHI SIGN VISARGA +10A38..10A3A ; Mn # [3] KHAROSHTHI SIGN BAR ABOVE..KHAROSHTHI SIGN DOT BELOW +10A3F ; Mn # KHAROSHTHI VIRAMA +10AE5..10AE6 ; Mn # [2] MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK ABOVE..MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK BELOW +10D24..10D27 ; Mn # [4] HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN HARBAHAY..HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN TASSI +10EAB..10EAC ; Mn # [2] YEZIDI COMBINING HAMZA MARK..YEZIDI COMBINING MADDA MARK +10F46..10F50 ; Mn # [11] SOGDIAN COMBINING DOT BELOW..SOGDIAN COMBINING STROKE BELOW +10F82..10F85 ; Mn # [4] OLD UYGHUR COMBINING DOT ABOVE..OLD UYGHUR COMBINING TWO DOTS BELOW +11001 ; Mn # BRAHMI SIGN ANUSVARA +11038..11046 ; Mn # [15] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN AA..BRAHMI VIRAMA +11070 ; Mn # BRAHMI SIGN OLD TAMIL VIRAMA +11073..11074 ; Mn # [2] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT O +1107F..11081 ; Mn # [3] BRAHMI NUMBER JOINER..KAITHI SIGN ANUSVARA +110B3..110B6 ; Mn # [4] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN U..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AI +110B9..110BA ; Mn # [2] KAITHI SIGN VIRAMA..KAITHI SIGN NUKTA +110C2 ; Mn # KAITHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11100..11102 ; Mn # [3] CHAKMA SIGN CANDRABINDU..CHAKMA SIGN VISARGA +11127..1112B ; Mn # [5] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN A..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN UU +1112D..11134 ; Mn # [8] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AI..CHAKMA MAAYYAA +11173 ; Mn # MAHAJANI SIGN NUKTA +11180..11181 ; Mn # [2] SHARADA SIGN CANDRABINDU..SHARADA SIGN ANUSVARA +111B6..111BE ; Mn # [9] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN U..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN O +111C9..111CC ; Mn # [4] SHARADA SANDHI MARK..SHARADA EXTRA SHORT VOWEL MARK +111CF ; Mn # SHARADA SIGN INVERTED CANDRABINDU +1122F..11231 ; Mn # [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN U..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AI +11234 ; Mn # KHOJKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11236..11237 ; Mn # [2] KHOJKI SIGN NUKTA..KHOJKI SIGN SHADDA +1123E ; Mn # KHOJKI SIGN SUKUN +112DF ; Mn # KHUDAWADI SIGN ANUSVARA +112E3..112EA ; Mn # [8] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN U..KHUDAWADI SIGN VIRAMA +11300..11301 ; Mn # [2] GRANTHA SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..GRANTHA SIGN CANDRABINDU +1133B..1133C ; Mn # [2] COMBINING BINDU BELOW..GRANTHA SIGN NUKTA +11340 ; Mn # GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN II +11366..1136C ; Mn # [7] COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT SIX +11370..11374 ; Mn # [5] COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER A..COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER PA +11438..1143F ; Mn # [8] NEWA VOWEL SIGN U..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AI +11442..11444 ; Mn # [3] NEWA SIGN VIRAMA..NEWA SIGN ANUSVARA +11446 ; Mn # NEWA SIGN NUKTA +1145E ; Mn # NEWA SANDHI MARK +114B3..114B8 ; Mn # [6] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN U..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +114BA ; Mn # TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN SHORT E +114BF..114C0 ; Mn # [2] TIRHUTA SIGN CANDRABINDU..TIRHUTA SIGN ANUSVARA +114C2..114C3 ; Mn # [2] TIRHUTA SIGN VIRAMA..TIRHUTA SIGN NUKTA +115B2..115B5 ; Mn # [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +115BC..115BD ; Mn # [2] SIDDHAM SIGN CANDRABINDU..SIDDHAM SIGN ANUSVARA +115BF..115C0 ; Mn # [2] SIDDHAM SIGN VIRAMA..SIDDHAM SIGN NUKTA +115DC..115DD ; Mn # [2] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE UU +11633..1163A ; Mn # [8] MODI VOWEL SIGN U..MODI VOWEL SIGN AI +1163D ; Mn # MODI SIGN ANUSVARA +1163F..11640 ; Mn # [2] MODI SIGN VIRAMA..MODI SIGN ARDHACANDRA +116AB ; Mn # TAKRI SIGN ANUSVARA +116AD ; Mn # TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AA +116B0..116B5 ; Mn # [6] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN U..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AU +116B7 ; Mn # TAKRI SIGN NUKTA +1171D..1171F ; Mn # [3] AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA..AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LIGATING RA +11722..11725 ; Mn # [4] AHOM VOWEL SIGN I..AHOM VOWEL SIGN UU +11727..1172B ; Mn # [5] AHOM VOWEL SIGN AW..AHOM SIGN KILLER +1182F..11837 ; Mn # [9] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN U..DOGRA SIGN ANUSVARA +11839..1183A ; Mn # [2] DOGRA SIGN VIRAMA..DOGRA SIGN NUKTA +1193B..1193C ; Mn # [2] DIVES AKURU SIGN ANUSVARA..DIVES AKURU SIGN CANDRABINDU +1193E ; Mn # DIVES AKURU VIRAMA +11943 ; Mn # DIVES AKURU SIGN NUKTA +119D4..119D7 ; Mn # [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +119DA..119DB ; Mn # [2] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN E..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +119E0 ; Mn # NANDINAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +11A01..11A0A ; Mn # [10] ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN I..ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A33..11A38 ; Mn # [6] ZANABAZAR SQUARE FINAL CONSONANT MARK..ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN ANUSVARA +11A3B..11A3E ; Mn # [4] ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER YA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER VA +11A47 ; Mn # ZANABAZAR SQUARE SUBJOINER +11A51..11A56 ; Mn # [6] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN I..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN OE +11A59..11A5B ; Mn # [3] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..SOYOMBO VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A8A..11A96 ; Mn # [13] SOYOMBO FINAL CONSONANT SIGN G..SOYOMBO SIGN ANUSVARA +11A98..11A99 ; Mn # [2] SOYOMBO GEMINATION MARK..SOYOMBO SUBJOINER +11C30..11C36 ; Mn # [7] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN I..BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L +11C38..11C3D ; Mn # [6] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN E..BHAIKSUKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11C3F ; Mn # BHAIKSUKI SIGN VIRAMA +11C92..11CA7 ; Mn # [22] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER KA..MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER ZA +11CAA..11CB0 ; Mn # [7] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER RA..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN AA +11CB2..11CB3 ; Mn # [2] MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN U..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN E +11CB5..11CB6 ; Mn # [2] MARCHEN SIGN ANUSVARA..MARCHEN SIGN CANDRABINDU +11D31..11D36 ; Mn # [6] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11D3A ; Mn # MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN E +11D3C..11D3D ; Mn # [2] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN O +11D3F..11D45 ; Mn # [7] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU..MASARAM GONDI VIRAMA +11D47 ; Mn # MASARAM GONDI RA-KARA +11D90..11D91 ; Mn # [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN EE..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI +11D95 ; Mn # GUNJALA GONDI SIGN ANUSVARA +11D97 ; Mn # GUNJALA GONDI VIRAMA +11EF3..11EF4 ; Mn # [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN I..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN U +16AF0..16AF4 ; Mn # [5] BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH TONE..BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH-LOW TONE +16B30..16B36 ; Mn # [7] PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TUB..PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TAUM +16F4F ; Mn # MIAO SIGN CONSONANT MODIFIER BAR +16F8F..16F92 ; Mn # [4] MIAO TONE RIGHT..MIAO TONE BELOW +16FE4 ; Mn # KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT FILLER +1BC9D..1BC9E ; Mn # [2] DUPLOYAN THICK LETTER SELECTOR..DUPLOYAN DOUBLE MARK +1CF00..1CF2D ; Mn # [46] ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK GORAZDO NIZKO S KRYZHEM ON LEFT..ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK KRYZH ON LEFT +1CF30..1CF46 ; Mn # [23] ZNAMENNY COMBINING TONAL RANGE MARK MRACHNO..ZNAMENNY PRIZNAK MODIFIER ROG +1D167..1D169 ; Mn # [3] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-3 +1D17B..1D182 ; Mn # [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING ACCENT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING LOURE +1D185..1D18B ; Mn # [7] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOIT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TRIPLE TONGUE +1D1AA..1D1AD ; Mn # [4] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOWN BOW..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SNAP PIZZICATO +1D242..1D244 ; Mn # [3] COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL TRISEME..COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL PENTASEME +1DA00..1DA36 ; Mn # [55] SIGNWRITING HEAD RIM..SIGNWRITING AIR SUCKING IN +1DA3B..1DA6C ; Mn # [50] SIGNWRITING MOUTH CLOSED NEUTRAL..SIGNWRITING EXCITEMENT +1DA75 ; Mn # SIGNWRITING UPPER BODY TILTING FROM HIP JOINTS +1DA84 ; Mn # SIGNWRITING LOCATION HEAD NECK +1DA9B..1DA9F ; Mn # [5] SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-6 +1DAA1..1DAAF ; Mn # [15] SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-16 +1E000..1E006 ; Mn # [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER AZU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZHIVETE +1E008..1E018 ; Mn # [17] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZEMLJA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER HERU +1E01B..1E021 ; Mn # [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SHTA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YATI +1E023..1E024 ; Mn # [2] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SMALL YUS +1E026..1E02A ; Mn # [5] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YO..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER FITA +1E130..1E136 ; Mn # [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-B..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-D +1E2AE ; Mn # TOTO SIGN RISING TONE +1E2EC..1E2EF ; Mn # [4] WANCHO TONE TUP..WANCHO TONE KOINI +1E8D0..1E8D6 ; Mn # [7] MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER TEENS..MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER MILLIONS +1E944..1E94A ; Mn # [7] ADLAM ALIF LENGTHENER..ADLAM NUKTA +E0100..E01EF ; Mn # [240] VARIATION SELECTOR-17..VARIATION SELECTOR-256 + +# Total code points: 1950 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Enclosing_Mark + +0488..0489 ; Me # [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC HUNDRED THOUSANDS SIGN..COMBINING CYRILLIC MILLIONS SIGN +1ABE ; Me # COMBINING PARENTHESES OVERLAY +20DD..20E0 ; Me # [4] COMBINING ENCLOSING CIRCLE..COMBINING ENCLOSING CIRCLE BACKSLASH +20E2..20E4 ; Me # [3] COMBINING ENCLOSING SCREEN..COMBINING ENCLOSING UPWARD POINTING TRIANGLE +A670..A672 ; Me # [3] COMBINING CYRILLIC TEN MILLIONS SIGN..COMBINING CYRILLIC THOUSAND MILLIONS SIGN + +# Total code points: 13 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Spacing_Mark + +0903 ; Mc # DEVANAGARI SIGN VISARGA +093B ; Mc # DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OOE +093E..0940 ; Mc # [3] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +0949..094C ; Mc # [4] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AU +094E..094F ; Mc # [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AW +0982..0983 ; Mc # [2] BENGALI SIGN ANUSVARA..BENGALI SIGN VISARGA +09BE..09C0 ; Mc # [3] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AA..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN II +09C7..09C8 ; Mc # [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN E..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AI +09CB..09CC ; Mc # [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN O..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AU +09D7 ; Mc # BENGALI AU LENGTH MARK +0A03 ; Mc # GURMUKHI SIGN VISARGA +0A3E..0A40 ; Mc # [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AA..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN II +0A83 ; Mc # GUJARATI SIGN VISARGA +0ABE..0AC0 ; Mc # [3] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN II +0AC9 ; Mc # GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O +0ACB..0ACC ; Mc # [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN O..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AU +0B02..0B03 ; Mc # [2] ORIYA SIGN ANUSVARA..ORIYA SIGN VISARGA +0B3E ; Mc # ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AA +0B40 ; Mc # ORIYA VOWEL SIGN II +0B47..0B48 ; Mc # [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN E..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AI +0B4B..0B4C ; Mc # [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN O..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AU +0B57 ; Mc # ORIYA AU LENGTH MARK +0BBE..0BBF ; Mc # [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AA..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN I +0BC1..0BC2 ; Mc # [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN U..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN UU +0BC6..0BC8 ; Mc # [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN E..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AI +0BCA..0BCC ; Mc # [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN O..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AU +0BD7 ; Mc # TAMIL AU LENGTH MARK +0C01..0C03 ; Mc # [3] TELUGU SIGN CANDRABINDU..TELUGU SIGN VISARGA +0C41..0C44 ; Mc # [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN U..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0C82..0C83 ; Mc # [2] KANNADA SIGN ANUSVARA..KANNADA SIGN VISARGA +0CBE ; Mc # KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AA +0CC0..0CC4 ; Mc # [5] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN II..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0CC7..0CC8 ; Mc # [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN EE..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AI +0CCA..0CCB ; Mc # [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN O..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN OO +0CD5..0CD6 ; Mc # [2] KANNADA LENGTH MARK..KANNADA AI LENGTH MARK +0D02..0D03 ; Mc # [2] MALAYALAM SIGN ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM SIGN VISARGA +0D3E..0D40 ; Mc # [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AA..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN II +0D46..0D48 ; Mc # [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN E..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AI +0D4A..0D4C ; Mc # [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN O..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AU +0D57 ; Mc # MALAYALAM AU LENGTH MARK +0D82..0D83 ; Mc # [2] SINHALA SIGN ANUSVARAYA..SINHALA SIGN VISARGAYA +0DCF..0DD1 ; Mc # [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN AELA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA AEDA-PILLA +0DD8..0DDF ; Mc # [8] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAYANUKITTA +0DF2..0DF3 ; Mc # [2] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAYANUKITTA +0F3E..0F3F ; Mc # [2] TIBETAN SIGN YAR TSHES..TIBETAN SIGN MAR TSHES +0F7F ; Mc # TIBETAN SIGN RNAM BCAD +102B..102C ; Mc # [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN TALL AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AA +1031 ; Mc # MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN E +1038 ; Mc # MYANMAR SIGN VISARGA +103B..103C ; Mc # [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL YA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +1056..1057 ; Mc # [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +1062..1064 ; Mc # [3] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SGAW KAREN EU..MYANMAR TONE MARK SGAW KAREN KE PHO +1067..106D ; Mc # [7] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN EU..MYANMAR SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN TONE-5 +1083..1084 ; Mc # [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E +1087..108C ; Mc # [6] MYANMAR SIGN SHAN TONE-2..MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL TONE-3 +108F ; Mc # MYANMAR SIGN RUMAI PALAUNG TONE-5 +109A..109C ; Mc # [3] MYANMAR SIGN KHAMTI TONE-1..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON A +1715 ; Mc # TAGALOG SIGN PAMUDPOD +1734 ; Mc # HANUNOO SIGN PAMUDPOD +17B6 ; Mc # KHMER VOWEL SIGN AA +17BE..17C5 ; Mc # [8] KHMER VOWEL SIGN OE..KHMER VOWEL SIGN AU +17C7..17C8 ; Mc # [2] KHMER SIGN REAHMUK..KHMER SIGN YUUKALEAPINTU +1923..1926 ; Mc # [4] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN EE..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN AU +1929..192B ; Mc # [3] LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER WA +1930..1931 ; Mc # [2] LIMBU SMALL LETTER KA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER NGA +1933..1938 ; Mc # [6] LIMBU SMALL LETTER TA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER LA +1A19..1A1A ; Mc # [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN E..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN O +1A55 ; Mc # TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +1A57 ; Mc # TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN LA TANG LAI +1A61 ; Mc # TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN A +1A63..1A64 ; Mc # [2] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN AA..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN TALL AA +1A6D..1A72 ; Mc # [6] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OY..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN THAM AI +1B04 ; Mc # BALINESE SIGN BISAH +1B35 ; Mc # BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TEDUNG +1B3B ; Mc # BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA TEDUNG +1B3D..1B41 ; Mc # [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA TEDUNG..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TALING REPA TEDUNG +1B43..1B44 ; Mc # [2] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET TEDUNG..BALINESE ADEG ADEG +1B82 ; Mc # SUNDANESE SIGN PANGWISAD +1BA1 ; Mc # SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PAMINGKAL +1BA6..1BA7 ; Mc # [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANAELAENG..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANOLONG +1BAA ; Mc # SUNDANESE SIGN PAMAAEH +1BE7 ; Mc # BATAK VOWEL SIGN E +1BEA..1BEC ; Mc # [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN I..BATAK VOWEL SIGN O +1BEE ; Mc # BATAK VOWEL SIGN U +1BF2..1BF3 ; Mc # [2] BATAK PANGOLAT..BATAK PANONGONAN +1C24..1C2B ; Mc # [8] LEPCHA SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN UU +1C34..1C35 ; Mc # [2] LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN NYIN-DO..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN KANG +1CE1 ; Mc # VEDIC TONE ATHARVAVEDIC INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CF7 ; Mc # VEDIC SIGN ATIKRAMA +302E..302F ; Mc # [2] HANGUL SINGLE DOT TONE MARK..HANGUL DOUBLE DOT TONE MARK +A823..A824 ; Mc # [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN A..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN I +A827 ; Mc # SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN OO +A880..A881 ; Mc # [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN ANUSVARA..SAURASHTRA SIGN VISARGA +A8B4..A8C3 ; Mc # [16] SAURASHTRA CONSONANT SIGN HAARU..SAURASHTRA VOWEL SIGN AU +A952..A953 ; Mc # [2] REJANG CONSONANT SIGN H..REJANG VIRAMA +A983 ; Mc # JAVANESE SIGN WIGNYAN +A9B4..A9B5 ; Mc # [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TARUNG..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TOLONG +A9BA..A9BB ; Mc # [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TALING..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN DIRGA MURE +A9BE..A9C0 ; Mc # [3] JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN PENGKAL..JAVANESE PANGKON +AA2F..AA30 ; Mc # [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN O..CHAM VOWEL SIGN AI +AA33..AA34 ; Mc # [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN YA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN RA +AA4D ; Mc # CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL H +AA7B ; Mc # MYANMAR SIGN PAO KAREN TONE +AA7D ; Mc # MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-5 +AAEB ; Mc # MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN II +AAEE..AAEF ; Mc # [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAU +AAF5 ; Mc # MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN VISARGA +ABE3..ABE4 ; Mc # [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ONAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN INAP +ABE6..ABE7 ; Mc # [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN YENAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN SOUNAP +ABE9..ABEA ; Mc # [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN CHEINAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN NUNG +ABEC ; Mc # MEETEI MAYEK LUM IYEK +11000 ; Mc # BRAHMI SIGN CANDRABINDU +11002 ; Mc # BRAHMI SIGN VISARGA +11082 ; Mc # KAITHI SIGN VISARGA +110B0..110B2 ; Mc # [3] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AA..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN II +110B7..110B8 ; Mc # [2] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN O..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AU +1112C ; Mc # CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN E +11145..11146 ; Mc # [2] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN EI +11182 ; Mc # SHARADA SIGN VISARGA +111B3..111B5 ; Mc # [3] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AA..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN II +111BF..111C0 ; Mc # [2] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AU..SHARADA SIGN VIRAMA +111CE ; Mc # SHARADA VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +1122C..1122E ; Mc # [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN II +11232..11233 ; Mc # [2] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN O..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AU +11235 ; Mc # KHOJKI SIGN VIRAMA +112E0..112E2 ; Mc # [3] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN II +11302..11303 ; Mc # [2] GRANTHA SIGN ANUSVARA..GRANTHA SIGN VISARGA +1133E..1133F ; Mc # [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AA..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN I +11341..11344 ; Mc # [4] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN U..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +11347..11348 ; Mc # [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN EE..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AI +1134B..1134D ; Mc # [3] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN OO..GRANTHA SIGN VIRAMA +11357 ; Mc # GRANTHA AU LENGTH MARK +11362..11363 ; Mc # [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +11435..11437 ; Mc # [3] NEWA VOWEL SIGN AA..NEWA VOWEL SIGN II +11440..11441 ; Mc # [2] NEWA VOWEL SIGN O..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AU +11445 ; Mc # NEWA SIGN VISARGA +114B0..114B2 ; Mc # [3] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AA..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN II +114B9 ; Mc # TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN E +114BB..114BE ; Mc # [4] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AI..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AU +114C1 ; Mc # TIRHUTA SIGN VISARGA +115AF..115B1 ; Mc # [3] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN II +115B8..115BB ; Mc # [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN E..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AU +115BE ; Mc # SIDDHAM SIGN VISARGA +11630..11632 ; Mc # [3] MODI VOWEL SIGN AA..MODI VOWEL SIGN II +1163B..1163C ; Mc # [2] MODI VOWEL SIGN O..MODI VOWEL SIGN AU +1163E ; Mc # MODI SIGN VISARGA +116AC ; Mc # TAKRI SIGN VISARGA +116AE..116AF ; Mc # [2] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN I..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN II +116B6 ; Mc # TAKRI SIGN VIRAMA +11720..11721 ; Mc # [2] AHOM VOWEL SIGN A..AHOM VOWEL SIGN AA +11726 ; Mc # AHOM VOWEL SIGN E +1182C..1182E ; Mc # [3] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN AA..DOGRA VOWEL SIGN II +11838 ; Mc # DOGRA SIGN VISARGA +11930..11935 ; Mc # [6] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AA..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN E +11937..11938 ; Mc # [2] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AI..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN O +1193D ; Mc # DIVES AKURU SIGN HALANTA +11940 ; Mc # DIVES AKURU MEDIAL YA +11942 ; Mc # DIVES AKURU MEDIAL RA +119D1..119D3 ; Mc # [3] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +119DC..119DF ; Mc # [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN O..NANDINAGARI SIGN VISARGA +119E4 ; Mc # NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +11A39 ; Mc # ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN VISARGA +11A57..11A58 ; Mc # [2] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AI..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AU +11A97 ; Mc # SOYOMBO SIGN VISARGA +11C2F ; Mc # BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN AA +11C3E ; Mc # BHAIKSUKI SIGN VISARGA +11CA9 ; Mc # MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER YA +11CB1 ; Mc # MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN I +11CB4 ; Mc # MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN O +11D8A..11D8E ; Mc # [5] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN UU +11D93..11D94 ; Mc # [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN OO..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU +11D96 ; Mc # GUNJALA GONDI SIGN VISARGA +11EF5..11EF6 ; Mc # [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN E..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN O +16F51..16F87 ; Mc # [55] MIAO SIGN ASPIRATION..MIAO VOWEL SIGN UI +16FF0..16FF1 ; Mc # [2] VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK CA..VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK NHAY +1D165..1D166 ; Mc # [2] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING STEM..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SPRECHGESANG STEM +1D16D..1D172 ; Mc # [6] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING AUGMENTATION DOT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING FLAG-5 + +# Total code points: 445 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Decimal_Number + +0030..0039 ; Nd # [10] DIGIT ZERO..DIGIT NINE +0660..0669 ; Nd # [10] ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT ZERO..ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT NINE +06F0..06F9 ; Nd # [10] EXTENDED ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT ZERO..EXTENDED ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT NINE +07C0..07C9 ; Nd # [10] NKO DIGIT ZERO..NKO DIGIT NINE +0966..096F ; Nd # [10] DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..DEVANAGARI DIGIT NINE +09E6..09EF ; Nd # [10] BENGALI DIGIT ZERO..BENGALI DIGIT NINE +0A66..0A6F ; Nd # [10] GURMUKHI DIGIT ZERO..GURMUKHI DIGIT NINE +0AE6..0AEF ; Nd # [10] GUJARATI DIGIT ZERO..GUJARATI DIGIT NINE +0B66..0B6F ; Nd # [10] ORIYA DIGIT ZERO..ORIYA DIGIT NINE +0BE6..0BEF ; Nd # [10] TAMIL DIGIT ZERO..TAMIL DIGIT NINE +0C66..0C6F ; Nd # [10] TELUGU DIGIT ZERO..TELUGU DIGIT NINE +0CE6..0CEF ; Nd # [10] KANNADA DIGIT ZERO..KANNADA DIGIT NINE +0D66..0D6F ; Nd # [10] MALAYALAM DIGIT ZERO..MALAYALAM DIGIT NINE +0DE6..0DEF ; Nd # [10] SINHALA LITH DIGIT ZERO..SINHALA LITH DIGIT NINE +0E50..0E59 ; Nd # [10] THAI DIGIT ZERO..THAI DIGIT NINE +0ED0..0ED9 ; Nd # [10] LAO DIGIT ZERO..LAO DIGIT NINE +0F20..0F29 ; Nd # [10] TIBETAN DIGIT ZERO..TIBETAN DIGIT NINE +1040..1049 ; Nd # [10] MYANMAR DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR DIGIT NINE +1090..1099 ; Nd # [10] MYANMAR SHAN DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR SHAN DIGIT NINE +17E0..17E9 ; Nd # [10] KHMER DIGIT ZERO..KHMER DIGIT NINE +1810..1819 ; Nd # [10] MONGOLIAN DIGIT ZERO..MONGOLIAN DIGIT NINE +1946..194F ; Nd # [10] LIMBU DIGIT ZERO..LIMBU DIGIT NINE +19D0..19D9 ; Nd # [10] NEW TAI LUE DIGIT ZERO..NEW TAI LUE DIGIT NINE +1A80..1A89 ; Nd # [10] TAI THAM HORA DIGIT ZERO..TAI THAM HORA DIGIT NINE +1A90..1A99 ; Nd # [10] TAI THAM THAM DIGIT ZERO..TAI THAM THAM DIGIT NINE +1B50..1B59 ; Nd # [10] BALINESE DIGIT ZERO..BALINESE DIGIT NINE +1BB0..1BB9 ; Nd # [10] SUNDANESE DIGIT ZERO..SUNDANESE DIGIT NINE +1C40..1C49 ; Nd # [10] LEPCHA DIGIT ZERO..LEPCHA DIGIT NINE +1C50..1C59 ; Nd # [10] OL CHIKI DIGIT ZERO..OL CHIKI DIGIT NINE +A620..A629 ; Nd # [10] VAI DIGIT ZERO..VAI DIGIT NINE +A8D0..A8D9 ; Nd # [10] SAURASHTRA DIGIT ZERO..SAURASHTRA DIGIT NINE +A900..A909 ; Nd # [10] KAYAH LI DIGIT ZERO..KAYAH LI DIGIT NINE +A9D0..A9D9 ; Nd # [10] JAVANESE DIGIT ZERO..JAVANESE DIGIT NINE +A9F0..A9F9 ; Nd # [10] MYANMAR TAI LAING DIGIT ZERO..MYANMAR TAI LAING DIGIT NINE +AA50..AA59 ; Nd # [10] CHAM DIGIT ZERO..CHAM DIGIT NINE +ABF0..ABF9 ; Nd # [10] MEETEI MAYEK DIGIT ZERO..MEETEI MAYEK DIGIT NINE +FF10..FF19 ; Nd # [10] FULLWIDTH DIGIT ZERO..FULLWIDTH DIGIT NINE +104A0..104A9 ; Nd # [10] OSMANYA DIGIT ZERO..OSMANYA DIGIT NINE +10D30..10D39 ; Nd # [10] HANIFI ROHINGYA DIGIT ZERO..HANIFI ROHINGYA DIGIT NINE +11066..1106F ; Nd # [10] BRAHMI DIGIT ZERO..BRAHMI DIGIT NINE +110F0..110F9 ; Nd # [10] SORA SOMPENG DIGIT ZERO..SORA SOMPENG DIGIT NINE +11136..1113F ; Nd # [10] CHAKMA DIGIT ZERO..CHAKMA DIGIT NINE +111D0..111D9 ; Nd # [10] SHARADA DIGIT ZERO..SHARADA DIGIT NINE +112F0..112F9 ; Nd # [10] KHUDAWADI DIGIT ZERO..KHUDAWADI DIGIT NINE +11450..11459 ; Nd # [10] NEWA DIGIT ZERO..NEWA DIGIT NINE +114D0..114D9 ; Nd # [10] TIRHUTA DIGIT ZERO..TIRHUTA DIGIT NINE +11650..11659 ; Nd # [10] MODI DIGIT ZERO..MODI DIGIT NINE +116C0..116C9 ; Nd # [10] TAKRI DIGIT ZERO..TAKRI DIGIT NINE +11730..11739 ; Nd # [10] AHOM DIGIT ZERO..AHOM DIGIT NINE +118E0..118E9 ; Nd # [10] WARANG CITI DIGIT ZERO..WARANG CITI DIGIT NINE +11950..11959 ; Nd # [10] DIVES AKURU DIGIT ZERO..DIVES AKURU DIGIT NINE +11C50..11C59 ; Nd # [10] BHAIKSUKI DIGIT ZERO..BHAIKSUKI DIGIT NINE +11D50..11D59 ; Nd # [10] MASARAM GONDI DIGIT ZERO..MASARAM GONDI DIGIT NINE +11DA0..11DA9 ; Nd # [10] GUNJALA GONDI DIGIT ZERO..GUNJALA GONDI DIGIT NINE +16A60..16A69 ; Nd # [10] MRO DIGIT ZERO..MRO DIGIT NINE +16AC0..16AC9 ; Nd # [10] TANGSA DIGIT ZERO..TANGSA DIGIT NINE +16B50..16B59 ; Nd # [10] PAHAWH HMONG DIGIT ZERO..PAHAWH HMONG DIGIT NINE +1D7CE..1D7FF ; Nd # [50] MATHEMATICAL BOLD DIGIT ZERO..MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE DIGIT NINE +1E140..1E149 ; Nd # [10] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG DIGIT ZERO..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG DIGIT NINE +1E2F0..1E2F9 ; Nd # [10] WANCHO DIGIT ZERO..WANCHO DIGIT NINE +1E950..1E959 ; Nd # [10] ADLAM DIGIT ZERO..ADLAM DIGIT NINE +1FBF0..1FBF9 ; Nd # [10] SEGMENTED DIGIT ZERO..SEGMENTED DIGIT NINE + +# Total code points: 660 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Letter_Number + +16EE..16F0 ; Nl # [3] RUNIC ARLAUG SYMBOL..RUNIC BELGTHOR SYMBOL +2160..2182 ; Nl # [35] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..ROMAN NUMERAL TEN THOUSAND +2185..2188 ; Nl # [4] ROMAN NUMERAL SIX LATE FORM..ROMAN NUMERAL ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND +3007 ; Nl # IDEOGRAPHIC NUMBER ZERO +3021..3029 ; Nl # [9] HANGZHOU NUMERAL ONE..HANGZHOU NUMERAL NINE +3038..303A ; Nl # [3] HANGZHOU NUMERAL TEN..HANGZHOU NUMERAL THIRTY +A6E6..A6EF ; Nl # [10] BAMUM LETTER MO..BAMUM LETTER KOGHOM +10140..10174 ; Nl # [53] GREEK ACROPHONIC ATTIC ONE QUARTER..GREEK ACROPHONIC STRATIAN FIFTY MNAS +10341 ; Nl # GOTHIC LETTER NINETY +1034A ; Nl # GOTHIC LETTER NINE HUNDRED +103D1..103D5 ; Nl # [5] OLD PERSIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD PERSIAN NUMBER HUNDRED +12400..1246E ; Nl # [111] CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN TWO ASH..CUNEIFORM NUMERIC SIGN NINE U VARIANT FORM + +# Total code points: 236 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Other_Number + +00B2..00B3 ; No # [2] SUPERSCRIPT TWO..SUPERSCRIPT THREE +00B9 ; No # SUPERSCRIPT ONE +00BC..00BE ; No # [3] VULGAR FRACTION ONE QUARTER..VULGAR FRACTION THREE QUARTERS +09F4..09F9 ; No # [6] BENGALI CURRENCY NUMERATOR ONE..BENGALI CURRENCY DENOMINATOR SIXTEEN +0B72..0B77 ; No # [6] ORIYA FRACTION ONE QUARTER..ORIYA FRACTION THREE SIXTEENTHS +0BF0..0BF2 ; No # [3] TAMIL NUMBER TEN..TAMIL NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +0C78..0C7E ; No # [7] TELUGU FRACTION DIGIT ZERO FOR ODD POWERS OF FOUR..TELUGU FRACTION DIGIT THREE FOR EVEN POWERS OF FOUR +0D58..0D5E ; No # [7] MALAYALAM FRACTION ONE ONE-HUNDRED-AND-SIXTIETH..MALAYALAM FRACTION ONE FIFTH +0D70..0D78 ; No # [9] MALAYALAM NUMBER TEN..MALAYALAM FRACTION THREE SIXTEENTHS +0F2A..0F33 ; No # [10] TIBETAN DIGIT HALF ONE..TIBETAN DIGIT HALF ZERO +1369..137C ; No # [20] ETHIOPIC DIGIT ONE..ETHIOPIC NUMBER TEN THOUSAND +17F0..17F9 ; No # [10] KHMER SYMBOL LEK ATTAK SON..KHMER SYMBOL LEK ATTAK PRAM-BUON +19DA ; No # NEW TAI LUE THAM DIGIT ONE +2070 ; No # SUPERSCRIPT ZERO +2074..2079 ; No # [6] SUPERSCRIPT FOUR..SUPERSCRIPT NINE +2080..2089 ; No # [10] SUBSCRIPT ZERO..SUBSCRIPT NINE +2150..215F ; No # [16] VULGAR FRACTION ONE SEVENTH..FRACTION NUMERATOR ONE +2189 ; No # VULGAR FRACTION ZERO THIRDS +2460..249B ; No # [60] CIRCLED DIGIT ONE..NUMBER TWENTY FULL STOP +24EA..24FF ; No # [22] CIRCLED DIGIT ZERO..NEGATIVE CIRCLED DIGIT ZERO +2776..2793 ; No # [30] DINGBAT NEGATIVE CIRCLED DIGIT ONE..DINGBAT NEGATIVE CIRCLED SANS-SERIF NUMBER TEN +2CFD ; No # COPTIC FRACTION ONE HALF +3192..3195 ; No # [4] IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION ONE MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION FOUR MARK +3220..3229 ; No # [10] PARENTHESIZED IDEOGRAPH ONE..PARENTHESIZED IDEOGRAPH TEN +3248..324F ; No # [8] CIRCLED NUMBER TEN ON BLACK SQUARE..CIRCLED NUMBER EIGHTY ON BLACK SQUARE +3251..325F ; No # [15] CIRCLED NUMBER TWENTY ONE..CIRCLED NUMBER THIRTY FIVE +3280..3289 ; No # [10] CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH ONE..CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH TEN +32B1..32BF ; No # [15] CIRCLED NUMBER THIRTY SIX..CIRCLED NUMBER FIFTY +A830..A835 ; No # [6] NORTH INDIC FRACTION ONE QUARTER..NORTH INDIC FRACTION THREE SIXTEENTHS +10107..10133 ; No # [45] AEGEAN NUMBER ONE..AEGEAN NUMBER NINETY THOUSAND +10175..10178 ; No # [4] GREEK ONE HALF SIGN..GREEK THREE QUARTERS SIGN +1018A..1018B ; No # [2] GREEK ZERO SIGN..GREEK ONE QUARTER SIGN +102E1..102FB ; No # [27] COPTIC EPACT DIGIT ONE..COPTIC EPACT NUMBER NINE HUNDRED +10320..10323 ; No # [4] OLD ITALIC NUMERAL ONE..OLD ITALIC NUMERAL FIFTY +10858..1085F ; No # [8] IMPERIAL ARAMAIC NUMBER ONE..IMPERIAL ARAMAIC NUMBER TEN THOUSAND +10879..1087F ; No # [7] PALMYRENE NUMBER ONE..PALMYRENE NUMBER TWENTY +108A7..108AF ; No # [9] NABATAEAN NUMBER ONE..NABATAEAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +108FB..108FF ; No # [5] HATRAN NUMBER ONE..HATRAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10916..1091B ; No # [6] PHOENICIAN NUMBER ONE..PHOENICIAN NUMBER THREE +109BC..109BD ; No # [2] MEROITIC CURSIVE FRACTION ELEVEN TWELFTHS..MEROITIC CURSIVE FRACTION ONE HALF +109C0..109CF ; No # [16] MEROITIC CURSIVE NUMBER ONE..MEROITIC CURSIVE NUMBER SEVENTY +109D2..109FF ; No # [46] MEROITIC CURSIVE NUMBER ONE HUNDRED..MEROITIC CURSIVE FRACTION TEN TWELFTHS +10A40..10A48 ; No # [9] KHAROSHTHI DIGIT ONE..KHAROSHTHI FRACTION ONE HALF +10A7D..10A7E ; No # [2] OLD SOUTH ARABIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD SOUTH ARABIAN NUMBER FIFTY +10A9D..10A9F ; No # [3] OLD NORTH ARABIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD NORTH ARABIAN NUMBER TWENTY +10AEB..10AEF ; No # [5] MANICHAEAN NUMBER ONE..MANICHAEAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10B58..10B5F ; No # [8] INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN NUMBER ONE..INSCRIPTIONAL PARTHIAN NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +10B78..10B7F ; No # [8] INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI NUMBER ONE..INSCRIPTIONAL PAHLAVI NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +10BA9..10BAF ; No # [7] PSALTER PAHLAVI NUMBER ONE..PSALTER PAHLAVI NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10CFA..10CFF ; No # [6] OLD HUNGARIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD HUNGARIAN NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +10E60..10E7E ; No # [31] RUMI DIGIT ONE..RUMI FRACTION TWO THIRDS +10F1D..10F26 ; No # [10] OLD SOGDIAN NUMBER ONE..OLD SOGDIAN FRACTION ONE HALF +10F51..10F54 ; No # [4] SOGDIAN NUMBER ONE..SOGDIAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +10FC5..10FCB ; No # [7] CHORASMIAN NUMBER ONE..CHORASMIAN NUMBER ONE HUNDRED +11052..11065 ; No # [20] BRAHMI NUMBER ONE..BRAHMI NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +111E1..111F4 ; No # [20] SINHALA ARCHAIC DIGIT ONE..SINHALA ARCHAIC NUMBER ONE THOUSAND +1173A..1173B ; No # [2] AHOM NUMBER TEN..AHOM NUMBER TWENTY +118EA..118F2 ; No # [9] WARANG CITI NUMBER TEN..WARANG CITI NUMBER NINETY +11C5A..11C6C ; No # [19] BHAIKSUKI NUMBER ONE..BHAIKSUKI HUNDREDS UNIT MARK +11FC0..11FD4 ; No # [21] TAMIL FRACTION ONE THREE-HUNDRED-AND-TWENTIETH..TAMIL FRACTION DOWNSCALING FACTOR KIIZH +16B5B..16B61 ; No # [7] PAHAWH HMONG NUMBER TENS..PAHAWH HMONG NUMBER TRILLIONS +16E80..16E96 ; No # [23] MEDEFAIDRIN DIGIT ZERO..MEDEFAIDRIN DIGIT THREE ALTERNATE FORM +1D2E0..1D2F3 ; No # [20] MAYAN NUMERAL ZERO..MAYAN NUMERAL NINETEEN +1D360..1D378 ; No # [25] COUNTING ROD UNIT DIGIT ONE..TALLY MARK FIVE +1E8C7..1E8CF ; No # [9] MENDE KIKAKUI DIGIT ONE..MENDE KIKAKUI DIGIT NINE +1EC71..1ECAB ; No # [59] INDIC SIYAQ NUMBER ONE..INDIC SIYAQ NUMBER PREFIXED NINE +1ECAD..1ECAF ; No # [3] INDIC SIYAQ FRACTION ONE QUARTER..INDIC SIYAQ FRACTION THREE QUARTERS +1ECB1..1ECB4 ; No # [4] INDIC SIYAQ NUMBER ALTERNATE ONE..INDIC SIYAQ ALTERNATE LAKH MARK +1ED01..1ED2D ; No # [45] OTTOMAN SIYAQ NUMBER ONE..OTTOMAN SIYAQ NUMBER NINETY THOUSAND +1ED2F..1ED3D ; No # [15] OTTOMAN SIYAQ ALTERNATE NUMBER TWO..OTTOMAN SIYAQ FRACTION ONE SIXTH +1F100..1F10C ; No # [13] DIGIT ZERO FULL STOP..DINGBAT NEGATIVE CIRCLED SANS-SERIF DIGIT ZERO + +# Total code points: 895 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Space_Separator + +0020 ; Zs # SPACE +00A0 ; Zs # NO-BREAK SPACE +1680 ; Zs # OGHAM SPACE MARK +2000..200A ; Zs # [11] EN QUAD..HAIR SPACE +202F ; Zs # NARROW NO-BREAK SPACE +205F ; Zs # MEDIUM MATHEMATICAL SPACE +3000 ; Zs # IDEOGRAPHIC SPACE + +# Total code points: 17 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Line_Separator + +2028 ; Zl # LINE SEPARATOR + +# Total code points: 1 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Paragraph_Separator + +2029 ; Zp # PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR + +# Total code points: 1 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Control + +0000..001F ; Cc # [32] .. +007F..009F ; Cc # [33] .. + +# Total code points: 65 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Format + +00AD ; Cf # SOFT HYPHEN +0600..0605 ; Cf # [6] ARABIC NUMBER SIGN..ARABIC NUMBER MARK ABOVE +061C ; Cf # ARABIC LETTER MARK +06DD ; Cf # ARABIC END OF AYAH +070F ; Cf # SYRIAC ABBREVIATION MARK +0890..0891 ; Cf # [2] ARABIC POUND MARK ABOVE..ARABIC PIASTRE MARK ABOVE +08E2 ; Cf # ARABIC DISPUTED END OF AYAH +180E ; Cf # MONGOLIAN VOWEL SEPARATOR +200B..200F ; Cf # [5] ZERO WIDTH SPACE..RIGHT-TO-LEFT MARK +202A..202E ; Cf # [5] LEFT-TO-RIGHT EMBEDDING..RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE +2060..2064 ; Cf # [5] WORD JOINER..INVISIBLE PLUS +2066..206F ; Cf # [10] LEFT-TO-RIGHT ISOLATE..NOMINAL DIGIT SHAPES +FEFF ; Cf # ZERO WIDTH NO-BREAK SPACE +FFF9..FFFB ; Cf # [3] INTERLINEAR ANNOTATION ANCHOR..INTERLINEAR ANNOTATION TERMINATOR +110BD ; Cf # KAITHI NUMBER SIGN +110CD ; Cf # KAITHI NUMBER SIGN ABOVE +13430..13438 ; Cf # [9] EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH VERTICAL JOINER..EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH END SEGMENT +1BCA0..1BCA3 ; Cf # [4] SHORTHAND FORMAT LETTER OVERLAP..SHORTHAND FORMAT UP STEP +1D173..1D17A ; Cf # [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL BEGIN BEAM..MUSICAL SYMBOL END PHRASE +E0001 ; Cf # LANGUAGE TAG +E0020..E007F ; Cf # [96] TAG SPACE..CANCEL TAG + +# Total code points: 163 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Private_Use + +E000..F8FF ; Co # [6400] .. +F0000..FFFFD ; Co # [65534] .. +100000..10FFFD; Co # [65534] .. + +# Total code points: 137468 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Surrogate + +D800..DFFF ; Cs # [2048] .. + +# Total code points: 2048 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Dash_Punctuation + +002D ; Pd # HYPHEN-MINUS +058A ; Pd # ARMENIAN HYPHEN +05BE ; Pd # HEBREW PUNCTUATION MAQAF +1400 ; Pd # CANADIAN SYLLABICS HYPHEN +1806 ; Pd # MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN +2010..2015 ; Pd # [6] HYPHEN..HORIZONTAL BAR +2E17 ; Pd # DOUBLE OBLIQUE HYPHEN +2E1A ; Pd # HYPHEN WITH DIAERESIS +2E3A..2E3B ; Pd # [2] TWO-EM DASH..THREE-EM DASH +2E40 ; Pd # DOUBLE HYPHEN +2E5D ; Pd # OBLIQUE HYPHEN +301C ; Pd # WAVE DASH +3030 ; Pd # WAVY DASH +30A0 ; Pd # KATAKANA-HIRAGANA DOUBLE HYPHEN +FE31..FE32 ; Pd # [2] PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL EM DASH..PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL EN DASH +FE58 ; Pd # SMALL EM DASH +FE63 ; Pd # SMALL HYPHEN-MINUS +FF0D ; Pd # FULLWIDTH HYPHEN-MINUS +10EAD ; Pd # YEZIDI HYPHENATION MARK + +# Total code points: 26 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Open_Punctuation + +0028 ; Ps # LEFT PARENTHESIS +005B ; Ps # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET +007B ; Ps # LEFT CURLY BRACKET +0F3A ; Ps # TIBETAN MARK GUG RTAGS GYON +0F3C ; Ps # TIBETAN MARK ANG KHANG GYON +169B ; Ps # OGHAM FEATHER MARK +201A ; Ps # SINGLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK +201E ; Ps # DOUBLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK +2045 ; Ps # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH QUILL +207D ; Ps # SUPERSCRIPT LEFT PARENTHESIS +208D ; Ps # SUBSCRIPT LEFT PARENTHESIS +2308 ; Ps # LEFT CEILING +230A ; Ps # LEFT FLOOR +2329 ; Ps # LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET +2768 ; Ps # MEDIUM LEFT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276A ; Ps # MEDIUM FLATTENED LEFT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276C ; Ps # MEDIUM LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +276E ; Ps # HEAVY LEFT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK ORNAMENT +2770 ; Ps # HEAVY LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +2772 ; Ps # LIGHT LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET ORNAMENT +2774 ; Ps # MEDIUM LEFT CURLY BRACKET ORNAMENT +27C5 ; Ps # LEFT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27E6 ; Ps # MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E8 ; Ps # MATHEMATICAL LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +27EA ; Ps # MATHEMATICAL LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EC ; Ps # MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27EE ; Ps # MATHEMATICAL LEFT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +2983 ; Ps # LEFT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2985 ; Ps # LEFT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2987 ; Ps # Z NOTATION LEFT IMAGE BRACKET +2989 ; Ps # Z NOTATION LEFT BINDING BRACKET +298B ; Ps # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298D ; Ps # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +298F ; Ps # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +2991 ; Ps # LEFT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2993 ; Ps # LEFT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2995 ; Ps # DOUBLE LEFT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2997 ; Ps # LEFT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +29D8 ; Ps # LEFT WIGGLY FENCE +29DA ; Ps # LEFT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29FC ; Ps # LEFT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +2E22 ; Ps # TOP LEFT HALF BRACKET +2E24 ; Ps # BOTTOM LEFT HALF BRACKET +2E26 ; Ps # LEFT SIDEWAYS U BRACKET +2E28 ; Ps # LEFT DOUBLE PARENTHESIS +2E42 ; Ps # DOUBLE LOW-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK +2E55 ; Ps # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH STROKE +2E57 ; Ps # LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH DOUBLE STROKE +2E59 ; Ps # TOP HALF LEFT PARENTHESIS +2E5B ; Ps # BOTTOM HALF LEFT PARENTHESIS +3008 ; Ps # LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +300A ; Ps # LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +300C ; Ps # LEFT CORNER BRACKET +300E ; Ps # LEFT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +3010 ; Ps # LEFT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +3014 ; Ps # LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3016 ; Ps # LEFT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +3018 ; Ps # LEFT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +301A ; Ps # LEFT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +301D ; Ps # REVERSED DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK +FD3F ; Ps # ORNATE RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FE17 ; Ps # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +FE35 ; Ps # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT PARENTHESIS +FE37 ; Ps # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT CURLY BRACKET +FE39 ; Ps # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FE3B ; Ps # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +FE3D ; Ps # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +FE3F ; Ps # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +FE41 ; Ps # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT CORNER BRACKET +FE43 ; Ps # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +FE47 ; Ps # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT SQUARE BRACKET +FE59 ; Ps # SMALL LEFT PARENTHESIS +FE5B ; Ps # SMALL LEFT CURLY BRACKET +FE5D ; Ps # SMALL LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FF08 ; Ps # FULLWIDTH LEFT PARENTHESIS +FF3B ; Ps # FULLWIDTH LEFT SQUARE BRACKET +FF5B ; Ps # FULLWIDTH LEFT CURLY BRACKET +FF5F ; Ps # FULLWIDTH LEFT WHITE PARENTHESIS +FF62 ; Ps # HALFWIDTH LEFT CORNER BRACKET + +# Total code points: 79 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Close_Punctuation + +0029 ; Pe # RIGHT PARENTHESIS +005D ; Pe # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET +007D ; Pe # RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +0F3B ; Pe # TIBETAN MARK GUG RTAGS GYAS +0F3D ; Pe # TIBETAN MARK ANG KHANG GYAS +169C ; Pe # OGHAM REVERSED FEATHER MARK +2046 ; Pe # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH QUILL +207E ; Pe # SUPERSCRIPT RIGHT PARENTHESIS +208E ; Pe # SUBSCRIPT RIGHT PARENTHESIS +2309 ; Pe # RIGHT CEILING +230B ; Pe # RIGHT FLOOR +232A ; Pe # RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET +2769 ; Pe # MEDIUM RIGHT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276B ; Pe # MEDIUM FLATTENED RIGHT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276D ; Pe # MEDIUM RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +276F ; Pe # HEAVY RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK ORNAMENT +2771 ; Pe # HEAVY RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +2773 ; Pe # LIGHT RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET ORNAMENT +2775 ; Pe # MEDIUM RIGHT CURLY BRACKET ORNAMENT +27C6 ; Pe # RIGHT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27E7 ; Pe # MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E9 ; Pe # MATHEMATICAL RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +27EB ; Pe # MATHEMATICAL RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27ED ; Pe # MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27EF ; Pe # MATHEMATICAL RIGHT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +2984 ; Pe # RIGHT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2986 ; Pe # RIGHT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2988 ; Pe # Z NOTATION RIGHT IMAGE BRACKET +298A ; Pe # Z NOTATION RIGHT BINDING BRACKET +298C ; Pe # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298E ; Pe # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +2990 ; Pe # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +2992 ; Pe # RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2994 ; Pe # RIGHT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2996 ; Pe # DOUBLE RIGHT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2998 ; Pe # RIGHT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +29D9 ; Pe # RIGHT WIGGLY FENCE +29DB ; Pe # RIGHT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29FD ; Pe # RIGHT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +2E23 ; Pe # TOP RIGHT HALF BRACKET +2E25 ; Pe # BOTTOM RIGHT HALF BRACKET +2E27 ; Pe # RIGHT SIDEWAYS U BRACKET +2E29 ; Pe # RIGHT DOUBLE PARENTHESIS +2E56 ; Pe # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH STROKE +2E58 ; Pe # RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH DOUBLE STROKE +2E5A ; Pe # TOP HALF RIGHT PARENTHESIS +2E5C ; Pe # BOTTOM HALF RIGHT PARENTHESIS +3009 ; Pe # RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +300B ; Pe # RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +300D ; Pe # RIGHT CORNER BRACKET +300F ; Pe # RIGHT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +3011 ; Pe # RIGHT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +3015 ; Pe # RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3017 ; Pe # RIGHT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +3019 ; Pe # RIGHT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +301B ; Pe # RIGHT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +301E..301F ; Pe # [2] DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK..LOW DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK +FD3E ; Pe # ORNATE LEFT PARENTHESIS +FE18 ; Pe # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT WHITE LENTICULAR BRAKCET +FE36 ; Pe # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FE38 ; Pe # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +FE3A ; Pe # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FE3C ; Pe # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +FE3E ; Pe # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +FE40 ; Pe # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +FE42 ; Pe # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT CORNER BRACKET +FE44 ; Pe # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +FE48 ; Pe # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET +FE5A ; Pe # SMALL RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FE5C ; Pe # SMALL RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +FE5E ; Pe # SMALL RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +FF09 ; Pe # FULLWIDTH RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FF3D ; Pe # FULLWIDTH RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET +FF5D ; Pe # FULLWIDTH RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +FF60 ; Pe # FULLWIDTH RIGHT WHITE PARENTHESIS +FF63 ; Pe # HALFWIDTH RIGHT CORNER BRACKET + +# Total code points: 77 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Connector_Punctuation + +005F ; Pc # LOW LINE +203F..2040 ; Pc # [2] UNDERTIE..CHARACTER TIE +2054 ; Pc # INVERTED UNDERTIE +FE33..FE34 ; Pc # [2] PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LOW LINE..PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL WAVY LOW LINE +FE4D..FE4F ; Pc # [3] DASHED LOW LINE..WAVY LOW LINE +FF3F ; Pc # FULLWIDTH LOW LINE + +# Total code points: 10 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Other_Punctuation + +0021..0023 ; Po # [3] EXCLAMATION MARK..NUMBER SIGN +0025..0027 ; Po # [3] PERCENT SIGN..APOSTROPHE +002A ; Po # ASTERISK +002C ; Po # COMMA +002E..002F ; Po # [2] FULL STOP..SOLIDUS +003A..003B ; Po # [2] COLON..SEMICOLON +003F..0040 ; Po # [2] QUESTION MARK..COMMERCIAL AT +005C ; Po # REVERSE SOLIDUS +00A1 ; Po # INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +00A7 ; Po # SECTION SIGN +00B6..00B7 ; Po # [2] PILCROW SIGN..MIDDLE DOT +00BF ; Po # INVERTED QUESTION MARK +037E ; Po # GREEK QUESTION MARK +0387 ; Po # GREEK ANO TELEIA +055A..055F ; Po # [6] ARMENIAN APOSTROPHE..ARMENIAN ABBREVIATION MARK +0589 ; Po # ARMENIAN FULL STOP +05C0 ; Po # HEBREW PUNCTUATION PASEQ +05C3 ; Po # HEBREW PUNCTUATION SOF PASUQ +05C6 ; Po # HEBREW PUNCTUATION NUN HAFUKHA +05F3..05F4 ; Po # [2] HEBREW PUNCTUATION GERESH..HEBREW PUNCTUATION GERSHAYIM +0609..060A ; Po # [2] ARABIC-INDIC PER MILLE SIGN..ARABIC-INDIC PER TEN THOUSAND SIGN +060C..060D ; Po # [2] ARABIC COMMA..ARABIC DATE SEPARATOR +061B ; Po # ARABIC SEMICOLON +061D..061F ; Po # [3] ARABIC END OF TEXT MARK..ARABIC QUESTION MARK +066A..066D ; Po # [4] ARABIC PERCENT SIGN..ARABIC FIVE POINTED STAR +06D4 ; Po # ARABIC FULL STOP +0700..070D ; Po # [14] SYRIAC END OF PARAGRAPH..SYRIAC HARKLEAN ASTERISCUS +07F7..07F9 ; Po # [3] NKO SYMBOL GBAKURUNEN..NKO EXCLAMATION MARK +0830..083E ; Po # [15] SAMARITAN PUNCTUATION NEQUDAA..SAMARITAN PUNCTUATION ANNAAU +085E ; Po # MANDAIC PUNCTUATION +0964..0965 ; Po # [2] DEVANAGARI DANDA..DEVANAGARI DOUBLE DANDA +0970 ; Po # DEVANAGARI ABBREVIATION SIGN +09FD ; Po # BENGALI ABBREVIATION SIGN +0A76 ; Po # GURMUKHI ABBREVIATION SIGN +0AF0 ; Po # GUJARATI ABBREVIATION SIGN +0C77 ; Po # TELUGU SIGN SIDDHAM +0C84 ; Po # KANNADA SIGN SIDDHAM +0DF4 ; Po # SINHALA PUNCTUATION KUNDDALIYA +0E4F ; Po # THAI CHARACTER FONGMAN +0E5A..0E5B ; Po # [2] THAI CHARACTER ANGKHANKHU..THAI CHARACTER KHOMUT +0F04..0F12 ; Po # [15] TIBETAN MARK INITIAL YIG MGO MDUN MA..TIBETAN MARK RGYA GRAM SHAD +0F14 ; Po # TIBETAN MARK GTER TSHEG +0F85 ; Po # TIBETAN MARK PALUTA +0FD0..0FD4 ; Po # [5] TIBETAN MARK BSKA- SHOG GI MGO RGYAN..TIBETAN MARK CLOSING BRDA RNYING YIG MGO SGAB MA +0FD9..0FDA ; Po # [2] TIBETAN MARK LEADING MCHAN RTAGS..TIBETAN MARK TRAILING MCHAN RTAGS +104A..104F ; Po # [6] MYANMAR SIGN LITTLE SECTION..MYANMAR SYMBOL GENITIVE +10FB ; Po # GEORGIAN PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR +1360..1368 ; Po # [9] ETHIOPIC SECTION MARK..ETHIOPIC PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR +166E ; Po # CANADIAN SYLLABICS FULL STOP +16EB..16ED ; Po # [3] RUNIC SINGLE PUNCTUATION..RUNIC CROSS PUNCTUATION +1735..1736 ; Po # [2] PHILIPPINE SINGLE PUNCTUATION..PHILIPPINE DOUBLE PUNCTUATION +17D4..17D6 ; Po # [3] KHMER SIGN KHAN..KHMER SIGN CAMNUC PII KUUH +17D8..17DA ; Po # [3] KHMER SIGN BEYYAL..KHMER SIGN KOOMUUT +1800..1805 ; Po # [6] MONGOLIAN BIRGA..MONGOLIAN FOUR DOTS +1807..180A ; Po # [4] MONGOLIAN SIBE SYLLABLE BOUNDARY MARKER..MONGOLIAN NIRUGU +1944..1945 ; Po # [2] LIMBU EXCLAMATION MARK..LIMBU QUESTION MARK +1A1E..1A1F ; Po # [2] BUGINESE PALLAWA..BUGINESE END OF SECTION +1AA0..1AA6 ; Po # [7] TAI THAM SIGN WIANG..TAI THAM SIGN REVERSED ROTATED RANA +1AA8..1AAD ; Po # [6] TAI THAM SIGN KAAN..TAI THAM SIGN CAANG +1B5A..1B60 ; Po # [7] BALINESE PANTI..BALINESE PAMENENG +1B7D..1B7E ; Po # [2] BALINESE PANTI LANTANG..BALINESE PAMADA LANTANG +1BFC..1BFF ; Po # [4] BATAK SYMBOL BINDU NA METEK..BATAK SYMBOL BINDU PANGOLAT +1C3B..1C3F ; Po # [5] LEPCHA PUNCTUATION TA-ROL..LEPCHA PUNCTUATION TSHOOK +1C7E..1C7F ; Po # [2] OL CHIKI PUNCTUATION MUCAAD..OL CHIKI PUNCTUATION DOUBLE MUCAAD +1CC0..1CC7 ; Po # [8] SUNDANESE PUNCTUATION BINDU SURYA..SUNDANESE PUNCTUATION BINDU BA SATANGA +1CD3 ; Po # VEDIC SIGN NIHSHVASA +2016..2017 ; Po # [2] DOUBLE VERTICAL LINE..DOUBLE LOW LINE +2020..2027 ; Po # [8] DAGGER..HYPHENATION POINT +2030..2038 ; Po # [9] PER MILLE SIGN..CARET +203B..203E ; Po # [4] REFERENCE MARK..OVERLINE +2041..2043 ; Po # [3] CARET INSERTION POINT..HYPHEN BULLET +2047..2051 ; Po # [11] DOUBLE QUESTION MARK..TWO ASTERISKS ALIGNED VERTICALLY +2053 ; Po # SWUNG DASH +2055..205E ; Po # [10] FLOWER PUNCTUATION MARK..VERTICAL FOUR DOTS +2CF9..2CFC ; Po # [4] COPTIC OLD NUBIAN FULL STOP..COPTIC OLD NUBIAN VERSE DIVIDER +2CFE..2CFF ; Po # [2] COPTIC FULL STOP..COPTIC MORPHOLOGICAL DIVIDER +2D70 ; Po # TIFINAGH SEPARATOR MARK +2E00..2E01 ; Po # [2] RIGHT ANGLE SUBSTITUTION MARKER..RIGHT ANGLE DOTTED SUBSTITUTION MARKER +2E06..2E08 ; Po # [3] RAISED INTERPOLATION MARKER..DOTTED TRANSPOSITION MARKER +2E0B ; Po # RAISED SQUARE +2E0E..2E16 ; Po # [9] EDITORIAL CORONIS..DOTTED RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE +2E18..2E19 ; Po # [2] INVERTED INTERROBANG..PALM BRANCH +2E1B ; Po # TILDE WITH RING ABOVE +2E1E..2E1F ; Po # [2] TILDE WITH DOT ABOVE..TILDE WITH DOT BELOW +2E2A..2E2E ; Po # [5] TWO DOTS OVER ONE DOT PUNCTUATION..REVERSED QUESTION MARK +2E30..2E39 ; Po # [10] RING POINT..TOP HALF SECTION SIGN +2E3C..2E3F ; Po # [4] STENOGRAPHIC FULL STOP..CAPITULUM +2E41 ; Po # REVERSED COMMA +2E43..2E4F ; Po # [13] DASH WITH LEFT UPTURN..CORNISH VERSE DIVIDER +2E52..2E54 ; Po # [3] TIRONIAN SIGN CAPITAL ET..MEDIEVAL QUESTION MARK +3001..3003 ; Po # [3] IDEOGRAPHIC COMMA..DITTO MARK +303D ; Po # PART ALTERNATION MARK +30FB ; Po # KATAKANA MIDDLE DOT +A4FE..A4FF ; Po # [2] LISU PUNCTUATION COMMA..LISU PUNCTUATION FULL STOP +A60D..A60F ; Po # [3] VAI COMMA..VAI QUESTION MARK +A673 ; Po # SLAVONIC ASTERISK +A67E ; Po # CYRILLIC KAVYKA +A6F2..A6F7 ; Po # [6] BAMUM NJAEMLI..BAMUM QUESTION MARK +A874..A877 ; Po # [4] PHAGS-PA SINGLE HEAD MARK..PHAGS-PA MARK DOUBLE SHAD +A8CE..A8CF ; Po # [2] SAURASHTRA DANDA..SAURASHTRA DOUBLE DANDA +A8F8..A8FA ; Po # [3] DEVANAGARI SIGN PUSHPIKA..DEVANAGARI CARET +A8FC ; Po # DEVANAGARI SIGN SIDDHAM +A92E..A92F ; Po # [2] KAYAH LI SIGN CWI..KAYAH LI SIGN SHYA +A95F ; Po # REJANG SECTION MARK +A9C1..A9CD ; Po # [13] JAVANESE LEFT RERENGGAN..JAVANESE TURNED PADA PISELEH +A9DE..A9DF ; Po # [2] JAVANESE PADA TIRTA TUMETES..JAVANESE PADA ISEN-ISEN +AA5C..AA5F ; Po # [4] CHAM PUNCTUATION SPIRAL..CHAM PUNCTUATION TRIPLE DANDA +AADE..AADF ; Po # [2] TAI VIET SYMBOL HO HOI..TAI VIET SYMBOL KOI KOI +AAF0..AAF1 ; Po # [2] MEETEI MAYEK CHEIKHAN..MEETEI MAYEK AHANG KHUDAM +ABEB ; Po # MEETEI MAYEK CHEIKHEI +FE10..FE16 ; Po # [7] PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL COMMA..PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL QUESTION MARK +FE19 ; Po # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL HORIZONTAL ELLIPSIS +FE30 ; Po # PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL TWO DOT LEADER +FE45..FE46 ; Po # [2] SESAME DOT..WHITE SESAME DOT +FE49..FE4C ; Po # [4] DASHED OVERLINE..DOUBLE WAVY OVERLINE +FE50..FE52 ; Po # [3] SMALL COMMA..SMALL FULL STOP +FE54..FE57 ; Po # [4] SMALL SEMICOLON..SMALL EXCLAMATION MARK +FE5F..FE61 ; Po # [3] SMALL NUMBER SIGN..SMALL ASTERISK +FE68 ; Po # SMALL REVERSE SOLIDUS +FE6A..FE6B ; Po # [2] SMALL PERCENT SIGN..SMALL COMMERCIAL AT +FF01..FF03 ; Po # [3] FULLWIDTH EXCLAMATION MARK..FULLWIDTH NUMBER SIGN +FF05..FF07 ; Po # [3] FULLWIDTH PERCENT SIGN..FULLWIDTH APOSTROPHE +FF0A ; Po # FULLWIDTH ASTERISK +FF0C ; Po # FULLWIDTH COMMA +FF0E..FF0F ; Po # [2] FULLWIDTH FULL STOP..FULLWIDTH SOLIDUS +FF1A..FF1B ; Po # [2] FULLWIDTH COLON..FULLWIDTH SEMICOLON +FF1F..FF20 ; Po # [2] FULLWIDTH QUESTION MARK..FULLWIDTH COMMERCIAL AT +FF3C ; Po # FULLWIDTH REVERSE SOLIDUS +FF61 ; Po # HALFWIDTH IDEOGRAPHIC FULL STOP +FF64..FF65 ; Po # [2] HALFWIDTH IDEOGRAPHIC COMMA..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA MIDDLE DOT +10100..10102 ; Po # [3] AEGEAN WORD SEPARATOR LINE..AEGEAN CHECK MARK +1039F ; Po # UGARITIC WORD DIVIDER +103D0 ; Po # OLD PERSIAN WORD DIVIDER +1056F ; Po # CAUCASIAN ALBANIAN CITATION MARK +10857 ; Po # IMPERIAL ARAMAIC SECTION SIGN +1091F ; Po # PHOENICIAN WORD SEPARATOR +1093F ; Po # LYDIAN TRIANGULAR MARK +10A50..10A58 ; Po # [9] KHAROSHTHI PUNCTUATION DOT..KHAROSHTHI PUNCTUATION LINES +10A7F ; Po # OLD SOUTH ARABIAN NUMERIC INDICATOR +10AF0..10AF6 ; Po # [7] MANICHAEAN PUNCTUATION STAR..MANICHAEAN PUNCTUATION LINE FILLER +10B39..10B3F ; Po # [7] AVESTAN ABBREVIATION MARK..LARGE ONE RING OVER TWO RINGS PUNCTUATION +10B99..10B9C ; Po # [4] PSALTER PAHLAVI SECTION MARK..PSALTER PAHLAVI FOUR DOTS WITH DOT +10F55..10F59 ; Po # [5] SOGDIAN PUNCTUATION TWO VERTICAL BARS..SOGDIAN PUNCTUATION HALF CIRCLE WITH DOT +10F86..10F89 ; Po # [4] OLD UYGHUR PUNCTUATION BAR..OLD UYGHUR PUNCTUATION FOUR DOTS +11047..1104D ; Po # [7] BRAHMI DANDA..BRAHMI PUNCTUATION LOTUS +110BB..110BC ; Po # [2] KAITHI ABBREVIATION SIGN..KAITHI ENUMERATION SIGN +110BE..110C1 ; Po # [4] KAITHI SECTION MARK..KAITHI DOUBLE DANDA +11140..11143 ; Po # [4] CHAKMA SECTION MARK..CHAKMA QUESTION MARK +11174..11175 ; Po # [2] MAHAJANI ABBREVIATION SIGN..MAHAJANI SECTION MARK +111C5..111C8 ; Po # [4] SHARADA DANDA..SHARADA SEPARATOR +111CD ; Po # SHARADA SUTRA MARK +111DB ; Po # SHARADA SIGN SIDDHAM +111DD..111DF ; Po # [3] SHARADA CONTINUATION SIGN..SHARADA SECTION MARK-2 +11238..1123D ; Po # [6] KHOJKI DANDA..KHOJKI ABBREVIATION SIGN +112A9 ; Po # MULTANI SECTION MARK +1144B..1144F ; Po # [5] NEWA DANDA..NEWA ABBREVIATION SIGN +1145A..1145B ; Po # [2] NEWA DOUBLE COMMA..NEWA PLACEHOLDER MARK +1145D ; Po # NEWA INSERTION SIGN +114C6 ; Po # TIRHUTA ABBREVIATION SIGN +115C1..115D7 ; Po # [23] SIDDHAM SIGN SIDDHAM..SIDDHAM SECTION MARK WITH CIRCLES AND FOUR ENCLOSURES +11641..11643 ; Po # [3] MODI DANDA..MODI ABBREVIATION SIGN +11660..1166C ; Po # [13] MONGOLIAN BIRGA WITH ORNAMENT..MONGOLIAN TURNED SWIRL BIRGA WITH DOUBLE ORNAMENT +116B9 ; Po # TAKRI ABBREVIATION SIGN +1173C..1173E ; Po # [3] AHOM SIGN SMALL SECTION..AHOM SIGN RULAI +1183B ; Po # DOGRA ABBREVIATION SIGN +11944..11946 ; Po # [3] DIVES AKURU DOUBLE DANDA..DIVES AKURU END OF TEXT MARK +119E2 ; Po # NANDINAGARI SIGN SIDDHAM +11A3F..11A46 ; Po # [8] ZANABAZAR SQUARE INITIAL HEAD MARK..ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLOSING DOUBLE-LINED HEAD MARK +11A9A..11A9C ; Po # [3] SOYOMBO MARK TSHEG..SOYOMBO MARK DOUBLE SHAD +11A9E..11AA2 ; Po # [5] SOYOMBO HEAD MARK WITH MOON AND SUN AND TRIPLE FLAME..SOYOMBO TERMINAL MARK-2 +11C41..11C45 ; Po # [5] BHAIKSUKI DANDA..BHAIKSUKI GAP FILLER-2 +11C70..11C71 ; Po # [2] MARCHEN HEAD MARK..MARCHEN MARK SHAD +11EF7..11EF8 ; Po # [2] MAKASAR PASSIMBANG..MAKASAR END OF SECTION +11FFF ; Po # TAMIL PUNCTUATION END OF TEXT +12470..12474 ; Po # [5] CUNEIFORM PUNCTUATION SIGN OLD ASSYRIAN WORD DIVIDER..CUNEIFORM PUNCTUATION SIGN DIAGONAL QUADCOLON +12FF1..12FF2 ; Po # [2] CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM301..CYPRO-MINOAN SIGN CM302 +16A6E..16A6F ; Po # [2] MRO DANDA..MRO DOUBLE DANDA +16AF5 ; Po # BASSA VAH FULL STOP +16B37..16B3B ; Po # [5] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS THOM..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS FEEM +16B44 ; Po # PAHAWH HMONG SIGN XAUS +16E97..16E9A ; Po # [4] MEDEFAIDRIN COMMA..MEDEFAIDRIN EXCLAMATION OH +16FE2 ; Po # OLD CHINESE HOOK MARK +1BC9F ; Po # DUPLOYAN PUNCTUATION CHINOOK FULL STOP +1DA87..1DA8B ; Po # [5] SIGNWRITING COMMA..SIGNWRITING PARENTHESIS +1E95E..1E95F ; Po # [2] ADLAM INITIAL EXCLAMATION MARK..ADLAM INITIAL QUESTION MARK + +# Total code points: 605 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Math_Symbol + +002B ; Sm # PLUS SIGN +003C..003E ; Sm # [3] LESS-THAN SIGN..GREATER-THAN SIGN +007C ; Sm # VERTICAL LINE +007E ; Sm # TILDE +00AC ; Sm # NOT SIGN +00B1 ; Sm # PLUS-MINUS SIGN +00D7 ; Sm # MULTIPLICATION SIGN +00F7 ; Sm # DIVISION SIGN +03F6 ; Sm # GREEK REVERSED LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +0606..0608 ; Sm # [3] ARABIC-INDIC CUBE ROOT..ARABIC RAY +2044 ; Sm # FRACTION SLASH +2052 ; Sm # COMMERCIAL MINUS SIGN +207A..207C ; Sm # [3] SUPERSCRIPT PLUS SIGN..SUPERSCRIPT EQUALS SIGN +208A..208C ; Sm # [3] SUBSCRIPT PLUS SIGN..SUBSCRIPT EQUALS SIGN +2118 ; Sm # SCRIPT CAPITAL P +2140..2144 ; Sm # [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK N-ARY SUMMATION..TURNED SANS-SERIF CAPITAL Y +214B ; Sm # TURNED AMPERSAND +2190..2194 ; Sm # [5] LEFTWARDS ARROW..LEFT RIGHT ARROW +219A..219B ; Sm # [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH STROKE..RIGHTWARDS ARROW WITH STROKE +21A0 ; Sm # RIGHTWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW +21A3 ; Sm # RIGHTWARDS ARROW WITH TAIL +21A6 ; Sm # RIGHTWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21AE ; Sm # LEFT RIGHT ARROW WITH STROKE +21CE..21CF ; Sm # [2] LEFT RIGHT DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE..RIGHTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE +21D2 ; Sm # RIGHTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D4 ; Sm # LEFT RIGHT DOUBLE ARROW +21F4..22FF ; Sm # [268] RIGHT ARROW WITH SMALL CIRCLE..Z NOTATION BAG MEMBERSHIP +2320..2321 ; Sm # [2] TOP HALF INTEGRAL..BOTTOM HALF INTEGRAL +237C ; Sm # RIGHT ANGLE WITH DOWNWARDS ZIGZAG ARROW +239B..23B3 ; Sm # [25] LEFT PARENTHESIS UPPER HOOK..SUMMATION BOTTOM +23DC..23E1 ; Sm # [6] TOP PARENTHESIS..BOTTOM TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +25B7 ; Sm # WHITE RIGHT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25C1 ; Sm # WHITE LEFT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25F8..25FF ; Sm # [8] UPPER LEFT TRIANGLE..LOWER RIGHT TRIANGLE +266F ; Sm # MUSIC SHARP SIGN +27C0..27C4 ; Sm # [5] THREE DIMENSIONAL ANGLE..OPEN SUPERSET +27C7..27E5 ; Sm # [31] OR WITH DOT INSIDE..WHITE SQUARE WITH RIGHTWARDS TICK +27F0..27FF ; Sm # [16] UPWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW..LONG RIGHTWARDS SQUIGGLE ARROW +2900..2982 ; Sm # [131] RIGHTWARDS TWO-HEADED ARROW WITH VERTICAL STROKE..Z NOTATION TYPE COLON +2999..29D7 ; Sm # [63] DOTTED FENCE..BLACK HOURGLASS +29DC..29FB ; Sm # [32] INCOMPLETE INFINITY..TRIPLE PLUS +29FE..2AFF ; Sm # [258] TINY..N-ARY WHITE VERTICAL BAR +2B30..2B44 ; Sm # [21] LEFT ARROW WITH SMALL CIRCLE..RIGHTWARDS ARROW THROUGH SUPERSET +2B47..2B4C ; Sm # [6] REVERSE TILDE OPERATOR ABOVE RIGHTWARDS ARROW..RIGHTWARDS ARROW ABOVE REVERSE TILDE OPERATOR +FB29 ; Sm # HEBREW LETTER ALTERNATIVE PLUS SIGN +FE62 ; Sm # SMALL PLUS SIGN +FE64..FE66 ; Sm # [3] SMALL LESS-THAN SIGN..SMALL EQUALS SIGN +FF0B ; Sm # FULLWIDTH PLUS SIGN +FF1C..FF1E ; Sm # [3] FULLWIDTH LESS-THAN SIGN..FULLWIDTH GREATER-THAN SIGN +FF5C ; Sm # FULLWIDTH VERTICAL LINE +FF5E ; Sm # FULLWIDTH TILDE +FFE2 ; Sm # FULLWIDTH NOT SIGN +FFE9..FFEC ; Sm # [4] HALFWIDTH LEFTWARDS ARROW..HALFWIDTH DOWNWARDS ARROW +1D6C1 ; Sm # MATHEMATICAL BOLD NABLA +1D6DB ; Sm # MATHEMATICAL BOLD PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D6FB ; Sm # MATHEMATICAL ITALIC NABLA +1D715 ; Sm # MATHEMATICAL ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D735 ; Sm # MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC NABLA +1D74F ; Sm # MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D76F ; Sm # MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD NABLA +1D789 ; Sm # MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1D7A9 ; Sm # MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC NABLA +1D7C3 ; Sm # MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL +1EEF0..1EEF1 ; Sm # [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL OPERATOR MEEM WITH HAH WITH TATWEEL..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL OPERATOR HAH WITH DAL + +# Total code points: 948 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Currency_Symbol + +0024 ; Sc # DOLLAR SIGN +00A2..00A5 ; Sc # [4] CENT SIGN..YEN SIGN +058F ; Sc # ARMENIAN DRAM SIGN +060B ; Sc # AFGHANI SIGN +07FE..07FF ; Sc # [2] NKO DOROME SIGN..NKO TAMAN SIGN +09F2..09F3 ; Sc # [2] BENGALI RUPEE MARK..BENGALI RUPEE SIGN +09FB ; Sc # BENGALI GANDA MARK +0AF1 ; Sc # GUJARATI RUPEE SIGN +0BF9 ; Sc # TAMIL RUPEE SIGN +0E3F ; Sc # THAI CURRENCY SYMBOL BAHT +17DB ; Sc # KHMER CURRENCY SYMBOL RIEL +20A0..20C0 ; Sc # [33] EURO-CURRENCY SIGN..SOM SIGN +A838 ; Sc # NORTH INDIC RUPEE MARK +FDFC ; Sc # RIAL SIGN +FE69 ; Sc # SMALL DOLLAR SIGN +FF04 ; Sc # FULLWIDTH DOLLAR SIGN +FFE0..FFE1 ; Sc # [2] FULLWIDTH CENT SIGN..FULLWIDTH POUND SIGN +FFE5..FFE6 ; Sc # [2] FULLWIDTH YEN SIGN..FULLWIDTH WON SIGN +11FDD..11FE0 ; Sc # [4] TAMIL SIGN KAACU..TAMIL SIGN VARAAKAN +1E2FF ; Sc # WANCHO NGUN SIGN +1ECB0 ; Sc # INDIC SIYAQ RUPEE MARK + +# Total code points: 63 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Modifier_Symbol + +005E ; Sk # CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +0060 ; Sk # GRAVE ACCENT +00A8 ; Sk # DIAERESIS +00AF ; Sk # MACRON +00B4 ; Sk # ACUTE ACCENT +00B8 ; Sk # CEDILLA +02C2..02C5 ; Sk # [4] MODIFIER LETTER LEFT ARROWHEAD..MODIFIER LETTER DOWN ARROWHEAD +02D2..02DF ; Sk # [14] MODIFIER LETTER CENTRED RIGHT HALF RING..MODIFIER LETTER CROSS ACCENT +02E5..02EB ; Sk # [7] MODIFIER LETTER EXTRA-HIGH TONE BAR..MODIFIER LETTER YANG DEPARTING TONE MARK +02ED ; Sk # MODIFIER LETTER UNASPIRATED +02EF..02FF ; Sk # [17] MODIFIER LETTER LOW DOWN ARROWHEAD..MODIFIER LETTER LOW LEFT ARROW +0375 ; Sk # GREEK LOWER NUMERAL SIGN +0384..0385 ; Sk # [2] GREEK TONOS..GREEK DIALYTIKA TONOS +0888 ; Sk # ARABIC RAISED ROUND DOT +1FBD ; Sk # GREEK KORONIS +1FBF..1FC1 ; Sk # [3] GREEK PSILI..GREEK DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FCD..1FCF ; Sk # [3] GREEK PSILI AND VARIA..GREEK PSILI AND PERISPOMENI +1FDD..1FDF ; Sk # [3] GREEK DASIA AND VARIA..GREEK DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1FED..1FEF ; Sk # [3] GREEK DIALYTIKA AND VARIA..GREEK VARIA +1FFD..1FFE ; Sk # [2] GREEK OXIA..GREEK DASIA +309B..309C ; Sk # [2] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +A700..A716 ; Sk # [23] MODIFIER LETTER CHINESE TONE YIN PING..MODIFIER LETTER EXTRA-LOW LEFT-STEM TONE BAR +A720..A721 ; Sk # [2] MODIFIER LETTER STRESS AND HIGH TONE..MODIFIER LETTER STRESS AND LOW TONE +A789..A78A ; Sk # [2] MODIFIER LETTER COLON..MODIFIER LETTER SHORT EQUALS SIGN +AB5B ; Sk # MODIFIER BREVE WITH INVERTED BREVE +AB6A..AB6B ; Sk # [2] MODIFIER LETTER LEFT TACK..MODIFIER LETTER RIGHT TACK +FBB2..FBC2 ; Sk # [17] ARABIC SYMBOL DOT ABOVE..ARABIC SYMBOL WASLA ABOVE +FF3E ; Sk # FULLWIDTH CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +FF40 ; Sk # FULLWIDTH GRAVE ACCENT +FFE3 ; Sk # FULLWIDTH MACRON +1F3FB..1F3FF ; Sk # [5] EMOJI MODIFIER FITZPATRICK TYPE-1-2..EMOJI MODIFIER FITZPATRICK TYPE-6 + +# Total code points: 125 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Other_Symbol + +00A6 ; So # BROKEN BAR +00A9 ; So # COPYRIGHT SIGN +00AE ; So # REGISTERED SIGN +00B0 ; So # DEGREE SIGN +0482 ; So # CYRILLIC THOUSANDS SIGN +058D..058E ; So # [2] RIGHT-FACING ARMENIAN ETERNITY SIGN..LEFT-FACING ARMENIAN ETERNITY SIGN +060E..060F ; So # [2] ARABIC POETIC VERSE SIGN..ARABIC SIGN MISRA +06DE ; So # ARABIC START OF RUB EL HIZB +06E9 ; So # ARABIC PLACE OF SAJDAH +06FD..06FE ; So # [2] ARABIC SIGN SINDHI AMPERSAND..ARABIC SIGN SINDHI POSTPOSITION MEN +07F6 ; So # NKO SYMBOL OO DENNEN +09FA ; So # BENGALI ISSHAR +0B70 ; So # ORIYA ISSHAR +0BF3..0BF8 ; So # [6] TAMIL DAY SIGN..TAMIL AS ABOVE SIGN +0BFA ; So # TAMIL NUMBER SIGN +0C7F ; So # TELUGU SIGN TUUMU +0D4F ; So # MALAYALAM SIGN PARA +0D79 ; So # MALAYALAM DATE MARK +0F01..0F03 ; So # [3] TIBETAN MARK GTER YIG MGO TRUNCATED A..TIBETAN MARK GTER YIG MGO -UM GTER TSHEG MA +0F13 ; So # TIBETAN MARK CARET -DZUD RTAGS ME LONG CAN +0F15..0F17 ; So # [3] TIBETAN LOGOTYPE SIGN CHAD RTAGS..TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN SGRA GCAN -CHAR RTAGS +0F1A..0F1F ; So # [6] TIBETAN SIGN RDEL DKAR GCIG..TIBETAN SIGN RDEL DKAR RDEL NAG +0F34 ; So # TIBETAN MARK BSDUS RTAGS +0F36 ; So # TIBETAN MARK CARET -DZUD RTAGS BZHI MIG CAN +0F38 ; So # TIBETAN MARK CHE MGO +0FBE..0FC5 ; So # [8] TIBETAN KU RU KHA..TIBETAN SYMBOL RDO RJE +0FC7..0FCC ; So # [6] TIBETAN SYMBOL RDO RJE RGYA GRAM..TIBETAN SYMBOL NOR BU BZHI -KHYIL +0FCE..0FCF ; So # [2] TIBETAN SIGN RDEL NAG RDEL DKAR..TIBETAN SIGN RDEL NAG GSUM +0FD5..0FD8 ; So # [4] RIGHT-FACING SVASTI SIGN..LEFT-FACING SVASTI SIGN WITH DOTS +109E..109F ; So # [2] MYANMAR SYMBOL SHAN ONE..MYANMAR SYMBOL SHAN EXCLAMATION +1390..1399 ; So # [10] ETHIOPIC TONAL MARK YIZET..ETHIOPIC TONAL MARK KURT +166D ; So # CANADIAN SYLLABICS CHI SIGN +1940 ; So # LIMBU SIGN LOO +19DE..19FF ; So # [34] NEW TAI LUE SIGN LAE..KHMER SYMBOL DAP-PRAM ROC +1B61..1B6A ; So # [10] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL DONG..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL DANG GEDE +1B74..1B7C ; So # [9] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL RIGHT-HAND OPEN DUG..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL LEFT-HAND OPEN PING +2100..2101 ; So # [2] ACCOUNT OF..ADDRESSED TO THE SUBJECT +2103..2106 ; So # [4] DEGREE CELSIUS..CADA UNA +2108..2109 ; So # [2] SCRUPLE..DEGREE FAHRENHEIT +2114 ; So # L B BAR SYMBOL +2116..2117 ; So # [2] NUMERO SIGN..SOUND RECORDING COPYRIGHT +211E..2123 ; So # [6] PRESCRIPTION TAKE..VERSICLE +2125 ; So # OUNCE SIGN +2127 ; So # INVERTED OHM SIGN +2129 ; So # TURNED GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA +212E ; So # ESTIMATED SYMBOL +213A..213B ; So # [2] ROTATED CAPITAL Q..FACSIMILE SIGN +214A ; So # PROPERTY LINE +214C..214D ; So # [2] PER SIGN..AKTIESELSKAB +214F ; So # SYMBOL FOR SAMARITAN SOURCE +218A..218B ; So # [2] TURNED DIGIT TWO..TURNED DIGIT THREE +2195..2199 ; So # [5] UP DOWN ARROW..SOUTH WEST ARROW +219C..219F ; So # [4] LEFTWARDS WAVE ARROW..UPWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW +21A1..21A2 ; So # [2] DOWNWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW..LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH TAIL +21A4..21A5 ; So # [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW FROM BAR..UPWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21A7..21AD ; So # [7] DOWNWARDS ARROW FROM BAR..LEFT RIGHT WAVE ARROW +21AF..21CD ; So # [31] DOWNWARDS ZIGZAG ARROW..LEFTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE +21D0..21D1 ; So # [2] LEFTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW..UPWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D3 ; So # DOWNWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D5..21F3 ; So # [31] UP DOWN DOUBLE ARROW..UP DOWN WHITE ARROW +2300..2307 ; So # [8] DIAMETER SIGN..WAVY LINE +230C..231F ; So # [20] BOTTOM RIGHT CROP..BOTTOM RIGHT CORNER +2322..2328 ; So # [7] FROWN..KEYBOARD +232B..237B ; So # [81] ERASE TO THE LEFT..NOT CHECK MARK +237D..239A ; So # [30] SHOULDERED OPEN BOX..CLEAR SCREEN SYMBOL +23B4..23DB ; So # [40] TOP SQUARE BRACKET..FUSE +23E2..2426 ; So # [69] WHITE TRAPEZIUM..SYMBOL FOR SUBSTITUTE FORM TWO +2440..244A ; So # [11] OCR HOOK..OCR DOUBLE BACKSLASH +249C..24E9 ; So # [78] PARENTHESIZED LATIN SMALL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +2500..25B6 ; So # [183] BOX DRAWINGS LIGHT HORIZONTAL..BLACK RIGHT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25B8..25C0 ; So # [9] BLACK RIGHT-POINTING SMALL TRIANGLE..BLACK LEFT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25C2..25F7 ; So # [54] BLACK LEFT-POINTING SMALL TRIANGLE..WHITE CIRCLE WITH UPPER RIGHT QUADRANT +2600..266E ; So # [111] BLACK SUN WITH RAYS..MUSIC NATURAL SIGN +2670..2767 ; So # [248] WEST SYRIAC CROSS..ROTATED FLORAL HEART BULLET +2794..27BF ; So # [44] HEAVY WIDE-HEADED RIGHTWARDS ARROW..DOUBLE CURLY LOOP +2800..28FF ; So # [256] BRAILLE PATTERN BLANK..BRAILLE PATTERN DOTS-12345678 +2B00..2B2F ; So # [48] NORTH EAST WHITE ARROW..WHITE VERTICAL ELLIPSE +2B45..2B46 ; So # [2] LEFTWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW..RIGHTWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW +2B4D..2B73 ; So # [39] DOWNWARDS TRIANGLE-HEADED ZIGZAG ARROW..DOWNWARDS TRIANGLE-HEADED ARROW TO BAR +2B76..2B95 ; So # [32] NORTH WEST TRIANGLE-HEADED ARROW TO BAR..RIGHTWARDS BLACK ARROW +2B97..2BFF ; So # [105] SYMBOL FOR TYPE A ELECTRONICS..HELLSCHREIBER PAUSE SYMBOL +2CE5..2CEA ; So # [6] COPTIC SYMBOL MI RO..COPTIC SYMBOL SHIMA SIMA +2E50..2E51 ; So # [2] CROSS PATTY WITH RIGHT CROSSBAR..CROSS PATTY WITH LEFT CROSSBAR +2E80..2E99 ; So # [26] CJK RADICAL REPEAT..CJK RADICAL RAP +2E9B..2EF3 ; So # [89] CJK RADICAL CHOKE..CJK RADICAL C-SIMPLIFIED TURTLE +2F00..2FD5 ; So # [214] KANGXI RADICAL ONE..KANGXI RADICAL FLUTE +2FF0..2FFB ; So # [12] IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTER LEFT TO RIGHT..IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTER OVERLAID +3004 ; So # JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL STANDARD SYMBOL +3012..3013 ; So # [2] POSTAL MARK..GETA MARK +3020 ; So # POSTAL MARK FACE +3036..3037 ; So # [2] CIRCLED POSTAL MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC TELEGRAPH LINE FEED SEPARATOR SYMBOL +303E..303F ; So # [2] IDEOGRAPHIC VARIATION INDICATOR..IDEOGRAPHIC HALF FILL SPACE +3190..3191 ; So # [2] IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION LINKING MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION REVERSE MARK +3196..319F ; So # [10] IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION TOP MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ANNOTATION MAN MARK +31C0..31E3 ; So # [36] CJK STROKE T..CJK STROKE Q +3200..321E ; So # [31] PARENTHESIZED HANGUL KIYEOK..PARENTHESIZED KOREAN CHARACTER O HU +322A..3247 ; So # [30] PARENTHESIZED IDEOGRAPH MOON..CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH KOTO +3250 ; So # PARTNERSHIP SIGN +3260..327F ; So # [32] CIRCLED HANGUL KIYEOK..KOREAN STANDARD SYMBOL +328A..32B0 ; So # [39] CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH MOON..CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH NIGHT +32C0..33FF ; So # [320] IDEOGRAPHIC TELEGRAPH SYMBOL FOR JANUARY..SQUARE GAL +4DC0..4DFF ; So # [64] HEXAGRAM FOR THE CREATIVE HEAVEN..HEXAGRAM FOR BEFORE COMPLETION +A490..A4C6 ; So # [55] YI RADICAL QOT..YI RADICAL KE +A828..A82B ; So # [4] SYLOTI NAGRI POETRY MARK-1..SYLOTI NAGRI POETRY MARK-4 +A836..A837 ; So # [2] NORTH INDIC QUARTER MARK..NORTH INDIC PLACEHOLDER MARK +A839 ; So # NORTH INDIC QUANTITY MARK +AA77..AA79 ; So # [3] MYANMAR SYMBOL AITON EXCLAMATION..MYANMAR SYMBOL AITON TWO +FD40..FD4F ; So # [16] ARABIC LIGATURE RAHIMAHU ALLAAH..ARABIC LIGATURE RAHIMAHUM ALLAAH +FDCF ; So # ARABIC LIGATURE SALAAMUHU ALAYNAA +FDFD..FDFF ; So # [3] ARABIC LIGATURE BISMILLAH AR-RAHMAN AR-RAHEEM..ARABIC LIGATURE AZZA WA JALL +FFE4 ; So # FULLWIDTH BROKEN BAR +FFE8 ; So # HALFWIDTH FORMS LIGHT VERTICAL +FFED..FFEE ; So # [2] HALFWIDTH BLACK SQUARE..HALFWIDTH WHITE CIRCLE +FFFC..FFFD ; So # [2] OBJECT REPLACEMENT CHARACTER..REPLACEMENT CHARACTER +10137..1013F ; So # [9] AEGEAN WEIGHT BASE UNIT..AEGEAN MEASURE THIRD SUBUNIT +10179..10189 ; So # [17] GREEK YEAR SIGN..GREEK TRYBLION BASE SIGN +1018C..1018E ; So # [3] GREEK SINUSOID SIGN..NOMISMA SIGN +10190..1019C ; So # [13] ROMAN SEXTANS SIGN..ASCIA SYMBOL +101A0 ; So # GREEK SYMBOL TAU RHO +101D0..101FC ; So # [45] PHAISTOS DISC SIGN PEDESTRIAN..PHAISTOS DISC SIGN WAVY BAND +10877..10878 ; So # [2] PALMYRENE LEFT-POINTING FLEURON..PALMYRENE RIGHT-POINTING FLEURON +10AC8 ; So # MANICHAEAN SIGN UD +1173F ; So # AHOM SYMBOL VI +11FD5..11FDC ; So # [8] TAMIL SIGN NEL..TAMIL SIGN MUKKURUNI +11FE1..11FF1 ; So # [17] TAMIL SIGN PAARAM..TAMIL SIGN VAKAIYARAA +16B3C..16B3F ; So # [4] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN XYEEM NTXIV..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN XYEEM FAIB +16B45 ; So # PAHAWH HMONG SIGN CIM TSOV ROG +1BC9C ; So # DUPLOYAN SIGN O WITH CROSS +1CF50..1CFC3 ; So # [116] ZNAMENNY NEUME KRYUK..ZNAMENNY NEUME PAUK +1D000..1D0F5 ; So # [246] BYZANTINE MUSICAL SYMBOL PSILI..BYZANTINE MUSICAL SYMBOL GORGON NEO KATO +1D100..1D126 ; So # [39] MUSICAL SYMBOL SINGLE BARLINE..MUSICAL SYMBOL DRUM CLEF-2 +1D129..1D164 ; So # [60] MUSICAL SYMBOL MULTIPLE MEASURE REST..MUSICAL SYMBOL ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHTH NOTE +1D16A..1D16C ; So # [3] MUSICAL SYMBOL FINGERED TREMOLO-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL FINGERED TREMOLO-3 +1D183..1D184 ; So # [2] MUSICAL SYMBOL ARPEGGIATO UP..MUSICAL SYMBOL ARPEGGIATO DOWN +1D18C..1D1A9 ; So # [30] MUSICAL SYMBOL RINFORZANDO..MUSICAL SYMBOL DEGREE SLASH +1D1AE..1D1EA ; So # [61] MUSICAL SYMBOL PEDAL MARK..MUSICAL SYMBOL KORON +1D200..1D241 ; So # [66] GREEK VOCAL NOTATION SYMBOL-1..GREEK INSTRUMENTAL NOTATION SYMBOL-54 +1D245 ; So # GREEK MUSICAL LEIMMA +1D300..1D356 ; So # [87] MONOGRAM FOR EARTH..TETRAGRAM FOR FOSTERING +1D800..1D9FF ; So # [512] SIGNWRITING HAND-FIST INDEX..SIGNWRITING HEAD +1DA37..1DA3A ; So # [4] SIGNWRITING AIR BLOW SMALL ROTATIONS..SIGNWRITING BREATH EXHALE +1DA6D..1DA74 ; So # [8] SIGNWRITING SHOULDER HIP SPINE..SIGNWRITING TORSO-FLOORPLANE TWISTING +1DA76..1DA83 ; So # [14] SIGNWRITING LIMB COMBINATION..SIGNWRITING LOCATION DEPTH +1DA85..1DA86 ; So # [2] SIGNWRITING LOCATION TORSO..SIGNWRITING LOCATION LIMBS DIGITS +1E14F ; So # NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG CIRCLED CA +1ECAC ; So # INDIC SIYAQ PLACEHOLDER +1ED2E ; So # OTTOMAN SIYAQ MARRATAN +1F000..1F02B ; So # [44] MAHJONG TILE EAST WIND..MAHJONG TILE BACK +1F030..1F093 ; So # [100] DOMINO TILE HORIZONTAL BACK..DOMINO TILE VERTICAL-06-06 +1F0A0..1F0AE ; So # [15] PLAYING CARD BACK..PLAYING CARD KING OF SPADES +1F0B1..1F0BF ; So # [15] PLAYING CARD ACE OF HEARTS..PLAYING CARD RED JOKER +1F0C1..1F0CF ; So # [15] PLAYING CARD ACE OF DIAMONDS..PLAYING CARD BLACK JOKER +1F0D1..1F0F5 ; So # [37] PLAYING CARD ACE OF CLUBS..PLAYING CARD TRUMP-21 +1F10D..1F1AD ; So # [161] CIRCLED ZERO WITH SLASH..MASK WORK SYMBOL +1F1E6..1F202 ; So # [29] REGIONAL INDICATOR SYMBOL LETTER A..SQUARED KATAKANA SA +1F210..1F23B ; So # [44] SQUARED CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-624B..SQUARED CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-914D +1F240..1F248 ; So # [9] TORTOISE SHELL BRACKETED CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-672C..TORTOISE SHELL BRACKETED CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-6557 +1F250..1F251 ; So # [2] CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH ADVANTAGE..CIRCLED IDEOGRAPH ACCEPT +1F260..1F265 ; So # [6] ROUNDED SYMBOL FOR FU..ROUNDED SYMBOL FOR CAI +1F300..1F3FA ; So # [251] CYCLONE..AMPHORA +1F400..1F6D7 ; So # [728] RAT..ELEVATOR +1F6DD..1F6EC ; So # [16] PLAYGROUND SLIDE..AIRPLANE ARRIVING +1F6F0..1F6FC ; So # [13] SATELLITE..ROLLER SKATE +1F700..1F773 ; So # [116] ALCHEMICAL SYMBOL FOR QUINTESSENCE..ALCHEMICAL SYMBOL FOR HALF OUNCE +1F780..1F7D8 ; So # [89] BLACK LEFT-POINTING ISOSCELES RIGHT TRIANGLE..NEGATIVE CIRCLED SQUARE +1F7E0..1F7EB ; So # [12] LARGE ORANGE CIRCLE..LARGE BROWN SQUARE +1F7F0 ; So # HEAVY EQUALS SIGN +1F800..1F80B ; So # [12] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH SMALL TRIANGLE ARROWHEAD..DOWNWARDS ARROW WITH LARGE TRIANGLE ARROWHEAD +1F810..1F847 ; So # [56] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH SMALL EQUILATERAL ARROWHEAD..DOWNWARDS HEAVY ARROW +1F850..1F859 ; So # [10] LEFTWARDS SANS-SERIF ARROW..UP DOWN SANS-SERIF ARROW +1F860..1F887 ; So # [40] WIDE-HEADED LEFTWARDS LIGHT BARB ARROW..WIDE-HEADED SOUTH WEST VERY HEAVY BARB ARROW +1F890..1F8AD ; So # [30] LEFTWARDS TRIANGLE ARROWHEAD..WHITE ARROW SHAFT WIDTH TWO THIRDS +1F8B0..1F8B1 ; So # [2] ARROW POINTING UPWARDS THEN NORTH WEST..ARROW POINTING RIGHTWARDS THEN CURVING SOUTH WEST +1F900..1FA53 ; So # [340] CIRCLED CROSS FORMEE WITH FOUR DOTS..BLACK CHESS KNIGHT-BISHOP +1FA60..1FA6D ; So # [14] XIANGQI RED GENERAL..XIANGQI BLACK SOLDIER +1FA70..1FA74 ; So # [5] BALLET SHOES..THONG SANDAL +1FA78..1FA7C ; So # [5] DROP OF BLOOD..CRUTCH +1FA80..1FA86 ; So # [7] YO-YO..NESTING DOLLS +1FA90..1FAAC ; So # [29] RINGED PLANET..HAMSA +1FAB0..1FABA ; So # [11] FLY..NEST WITH EGGS +1FAC0..1FAC5 ; So # [6] ANATOMICAL HEART..PERSON WITH CROWN +1FAD0..1FAD9 ; So # [10] BLUEBERRIES..JAR +1FAE0..1FAE7 ; So # [8] MELTING FACE..BUBBLES +1FAF0..1FAF6 ; So # [7] HAND WITH INDEX FINGER AND THUMB CROSSED..HEART HANDS +1FB00..1FB92 ; So # [147] BLOCK SEXTANT-1..UPPER HALF INVERSE MEDIUM SHADE AND LOWER HALF BLOCK +1FB94..1FBCA ; So # [55] LEFT HALF INVERSE MEDIUM SHADE AND RIGHT HALF BLOCK..WHITE UP-POINTING CHEVRON + +# Total code points: 6605 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Initial_Punctuation + +00AB ; Pi # LEFT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +2018 ; Pi # LEFT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK +201B..201C ; Pi # [2] SINGLE HIGH-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK..LEFT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK +201F ; Pi # DOUBLE HIGH-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK +2039 ; Pi # SINGLE LEFT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +2E02 ; Pi # LEFT SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E04 ; Pi # LEFT DOTTED SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E09 ; Pi # LEFT TRANSPOSITION BRACKET +2E0C ; Pi # LEFT RAISED OMISSION BRACKET +2E1C ; Pi # LEFT LOW PARAPHRASE BRACKET +2E20 ; Pi # LEFT VERTICAL BAR WITH QUILL + +# Total code points: 12 + +# ================================================ + +# General_Category=Final_Punctuation + +00BB ; Pf # RIGHT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +2019 ; Pf # RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK +201D ; Pf # RIGHT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK +203A ; Pf # SINGLE RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +2E03 ; Pf # RIGHT SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E05 ; Pf # RIGHT DOTTED SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E0A ; Pf # RIGHT TRANSPOSITION BRACKET +2E0D ; Pf # RIGHT RAISED OMISSION BRACKET +2E1D ; Pf # RIGHT LOW PARAPHRASE BRACKET +2E21 ; Pf # RIGHT VERTICAL BAR WITH QUILL + +# Total code points: 10 + +# EOF diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/GraphemeBreakProperty.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/GraphemeBreakProperty.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dd256906 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/GraphemeBreakProperty.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1459 @@ +# GraphemeBreakProperty-14.0.0.txt +# Date: 2021-08-12, 23:13:02 GMT +# © 2021 Unicode®, Inc. +# Unicode and the Unicode Logo are registered trademarks of Unicode, Inc. in the U.S. and other countries. +# For terms of use, see http://www.unicode.org/terms_of_use.html +# +# Unicode Character Database +# For documentation, see http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr44/ + +# ================================================ + +# Property: Grapheme_Cluster_Break + +# All code points not explicitly listed for Grapheme_Cluster_Break +# have the value Other (XX). + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Other + +# ================================================ + +0600..0605 ; Prepend # Cf [6] ARABIC NUMBER SIGN..ARABIC NUMBER MARK ABOVE +06DD ; Prepend # Cf ARABIC END OF AYAH +070F ; Prepend # Cf SYRIAC ABBREVIATION MARK +0890..0891 ; Prepend # Cf [2] ARABIC POUND MARK ABOVE..ARABIC PIASTRE MARK ABOVE +08E2 ; Prepend # Cf ARABIC DISPUTED END OF AYAH +0D4E ; Prepend # Lo MALAYALAM LETTER DOT REPH +110BD ; Prepend # Cf KAITHI NUMBER SIGN +110CD ; Prepend # Cf KAITHI NUMBER SIGN ABOVE +111C2..111C3 ; Prepend # Lo [2] SHARADA SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..SHARADA SIGN UPADHMANIYA +1193F ; Prepend # Lo DIVES AKURU PREFIXED NASAL SIGN +11941 ; Prepend # Lo DIVES AKURU INITIAL RA +11A3A ; Prepend # Lo ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER RA +11A84..11A89 ; Prepend # Lo [6] SOYOMBO SIGN JIHVAMULIYA..SOYOMBO CLUSTER-INITIAL LETTER SA +11D46 ; Prepend # Lo MASARAM GONDI REPHA + +# Total code points: 26 + +# ================================================ + +000D ; CR # Cc + +# Total code points: 1 + +# ================================================ + +000A ; LF # Cc + +# Total code points: 1 + +# ================================================ + +0000..0009 ; Control # Cc [10] .. +000B..000C ; Control # Cc [2] .. +000E..001F ; Control # Cc [18] .. +007F..009F ; Control # Cc [33] .. +00AD ; Control # Cf SOFT HYPHEN +061C ; Control # Cf ARABIC LETTER MARK +180E ; Control # Cf MONGOLIAN VOWEL SEPARATOR +200B ; Control # Cf ZERO WIDTH SPACE +200E..200F ; Control # Cf [2] LEFT-TO-RIGHT MARK..RIGHT-TO-LEFT MARK +2028 ; Control # Zl LINE SEPARATOR +2029 ; Control # Zp PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR +202A..202E ; Control # Cf [5] LEFT-TO-RIGHT EMBEDDING..RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE +2060..2064 ; Control # Cf [5] WORD JOINER..INVISIBLE PLUS +2065 ; Control # Cn +2066..206F ; Control # Cf [10] LEFT-TO-RIGHT ISOLATE..NOMINAL DIGIT SHAPES +FEFF ; Control # Cf ZERO WIDTH NO-BREAK SPACE +FFF0..FFF8 ; Control # Cn [9] .. +FFF9..FFFB ; Control # Cf [3] INTERLINEAR ANNOTATION ANCHOR..INTERLINEAR ANNOTATION TERMINATOR +13430..13438 ; Control # Cf [9] EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH VERTICAL JOINER..EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPH END SEGMENT +1BCA0..1BCA3 ; Control # Cf [4] SHORTHAND FORMAT LETTER OVERLAP..SHORTHAND FORMAT UP STEP +1D173..1D17A ; Control # Cf [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL BEGIN BEAM..MUSICAL SYMBOL END PHRASE +E0000 ; Control # Cn +E0001 ; Control # Cf LANGUAGE TAG +E0002..E001F ; Control # Cn [30] .. +E0080..E00FF ; Control # Cn [128] .. +E01F0..E0FFF ; Control # Cn [3600] .. + +# Total code points: 3886 + +# ================================================ + +0300..036F ; Extend # Mn [112] COMBINING GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER X +0483..0487 ; Extend # Mn [5] COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO..COMBINING CYRILLIC POKRYTIE +0488..0489 ; Extend # Me [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC HUNDRED THOUSANDS SIGN..COMBINING CYRILLIC MILLIONS SIGN +0591..05BD ; Extend # Mn [45] HEBREW ACCENT ETNAHTA..HEBREW POINT METEG +05BF ; Extend # Mn HEBREW POINT RAFE +05C1..05C2 ; Extend # Mn [2] HEBREW POINT SHIN DOT..HEBREW POINT SIN DOT +05C4..05C5 ; Extend # Mn [2] HEBREW MARK UPPER DOT..HEBREW MARK LOWER DOT +05C7 ; Extend # Mn HEBREW POINT QAMATS QATAN +0610..061A ; Extend # Mn [11] ARABIC SIGN SALLALLAHOU ALAYHE WASSALLAM..ARABIC SMALL KASRA +064B..065F ; Extend # Mn [21] ARABIC FATHATAN..ARABIC WAVY HAMZA BELOW +0670 ; Extend # Mn ARABIC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALEF +06D6..06DC ; Extend # Mn [7] ARABIC SMALL HIGH LIGATURE SAD WITH LAM WITH ALEF MAKSURA..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SEEN +06DF..06E4 ; Extend # Mn [6] ARABIC SMALL HIGH ROUNDED ZERO..ARABIC SMALL HIGH MADDA +06E7..06E8 ; Extend # Mn [2] ARABIC SMALL HIGH YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH NOON +06EA..06ED ; Extend # Mn [4] ARABIC EMPTY CENTRE LOW STOP..ARABIC SMALL LOW MEEM +0711 ; Extend # Mn SYRIAC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALAPH +0730..074A ; Extend # Mn [27] SYRIAC PTHAHA ABOVE..SYRIAC BARREKH +07A6..07B0 ; Extend # Mn [11] THAANA ABAFILI..THAANA SUKUN +07EB..07F3 ; Extend # Mn [9] NKO COMBINING SHORT HIGH TONE..NKO COMBINING DOUBLE DOT ABOVE +07FD ; Extend # Mn NKO DANTAYALAN +0816..0819 ; Extend # Mn [4] SAMARITAN MARK IN..SAMARITAN MARK DAGESH +081B..0823 ; Extend # Mn [9] SAMARITAN MARK EPENTHETIC YUT..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN A +0825..0827 ; Extend # Mn [3] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN SHORT A..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN U +0829..082D ; Extend # Mn [5] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN LONG I..SAMARITAN MARK NEQUDAA +0859..085B ; Extend # Mn [3] MANDAIC AFFRICATION MARK..MANDAIC GEMINATION MARK +0898..089F ; Extend # Mn [8] ARABIC SMALL HIGH WORD AL-JUZ..ARABIC HALF MADDA OVER MADDA +08CA..08E1 ; Extend # Mn [24] ARABIC SMALL HIGH FARSI YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SIGN SAFHA +08E3..0902 ; Extend # Mn [32] ARABIC TURNED DAMMA BELOW..DEVANAGARI SIGN ANUSVARA +093A ; Extend # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OE +093C ; Extend # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN NUKTA +0941..0948 ; Extend # Mn [8] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +094D ; Extend # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +0951..0957 ; Extend # Mn [7] DEVANAGARI STRESS SIGN UDATTA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN UUE +0962..0963 ; Extend # Mn [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0981 ; Extend # Mn BENGALI SIGN CANDRABINDU +09BC ; Extend # Mn BENGALI SIGN NUKTA +09BE ; Extend # Mc BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AA +09C1..09C4 ; Extend # Mn [4] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN U..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +09CD ; Extend # Mn BENGALI SIGN VIRAMA +09D7 ; Extend # Mc BENGALI AU LENGTH MARK +09E2..09E3 ; Extend # Mn [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +09FE ; Extend # Mn BENGALI SANDHI MARK +0A01..0A02 ; Extend # Mn [2] GURMUKHI SIGN ADAK BINDI..GURMUKHI SIGN BINDI +0A3C ; Extend # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN NUKTA +0A41..0A42 ; Extend # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN U..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN UU +0A47..0A48 ; Extend # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN EE..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AI +0A4B..0A4D ; Extend # Mn [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN OO..GURMUKHI SIGN VIRAMA +0A51 ; Extend # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN UDAAT +0A70..0A71 ; Extend # Mn [2] GURMUKHI TIPPI..GURMUKHI ADDAK +0A75 ; Extend # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN YAKASH +0A81..0A82 ; Extend # Mn [2] GUJARATI SIGN CANDRABINDU..GUJARATI SIGN ANUSVARA +0ABC ; Extend # Mn GUJARATI SIGN NUKTA +0AC1..0AC5 ; Extend # Mn [5] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN U..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA E +0AC7..0AC8 ; Extend # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN E..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AI +0ACD ; Extend # Mn GUJARATI SIGN VIRAMA +0AE2..0AE3 ; Extend # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0AFA..0AFF ; Extend # Mn [6] GUJARATI SIGN SUKUN..GUJARATI SIGN TWO-CIRCLE NUKTA ABOVE +0B01 ; Extend # Mn ORIYA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0B3C ; Extend # Mn ORIYA SIGN NUKTA +0B3E ; Extend # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AA +0B3F ; Extend # Mn ORIYA VOWEL SIGN I +0B41..0B44 ; Extend # Mn [4] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN U..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0B4D ; Extend # Mn ORIYA SIGN VIRAMA +0B55..0B56 ; Extend # Mn [2] ORIYA SIGN OVERLINE..ORIYA AI LENGTH MARK +0B57 ; Extend # Mc ORIYA AU LENGTH MARK +0B62..0B63 ; Extend # Mn [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0B82 ; Extend # Mn TAMIL SIGN ANUSVARA +0BBE ; Extend # Mc TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AA +0BC0 ; Extend # Mn TAMIL VOWEL SIGN II +0BCD ; Extend # Mn TAMIL SIGN VIRAMA +0BD7 ; Extend # Mc TAMIL AU LENGTH MARK +0C00 ; Extend # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING CANDRABINDU ABOVE +0C04 ; Extend # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE +0C3C ; Extend # Mn TELUGU SIGN NUKTA +0C3E..0C40 ; Extend # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AA..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN II +0C46..0C48 ; Extend # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN E..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AI +0C4A..0C4D ; Extend # Mn [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN O..TELUGU SIGN VIRAMA +0C55..0C56 ; Extend # Mn [2] TELUGU LENGTH MARK..TELUGU AI LENGTH MARK +0C62..0C63 ; Extend # Mn [2] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0C81 ; Extend # Mn KANNADA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0CBC ; Extend # Mn KANNADA SIGN NUKTA +0CBF ; Extend # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN I +0CC2 ; Extend # Mc KANNADA VOWEL SIGN UU +0CC6 ; Extend # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN E +0CCC..0CCD ; Extend # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AU..KANNADA SIGN VIRAMA +0CD5..0CD6 ; Extend # Mc [2] KANNADA LENGTH MARK..KANNADA AI LENGTH MARK +0CE2..0CE3 ; Extend # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D00..0D01 ; Extend # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..MALAYALAM SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D3B..0D3C ; Extend # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN VERTICAL BAR VIRAMA..MALAYALAM SIGN CIRCULAR VIRAMA +0D3E ; Extend # Mc MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AA +0D41..0D44 ; Extend # Mn [4] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN U..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0D4D ; Extend # Mn MALAYALAM SIGN VIRAMA +0D57 ; Extend # Mc MALAYALAM AU LENGTH MARK +0D62..0D63 ; Extend # Mn [2] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D81 ; Extend # Mn SINHALA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0DCA ; Extend # Mn SINHALA SIGN AL-LAKUNA +0DCF ; Extend # Mc SINHALA VOWEL SIGN AELA-PILLA +0DD2..0DD4 ; Extend # Mn [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI IS-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI PAA-PILLA +0DD6 ; Extend # Mn SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA PAA-PILLA +0DDF ; Extend # Mc SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAYANUKITTA +0E31 ; Extend # Mn THAI CHARACTER MAI HAN-AKAT +0E34..0E3A ; Extend # Mn [7] THAI CHARACTER SARA I..THAI CHARACTER PHINTHU +0E47..0E4E ; Extend # Mn [8] THAI CHARACTER MAITAIKHU..THAI CHARACTER YAMAKKAN +0EB1 ; Extend # Mn LAO VOWEL SIGN MAI KAN +0EB4..0EBC ; Extend # Mn [9] LAO VOWEL SIGN I..LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN LO +0EC8..0ECD ; Extend # Mn [6] LAO TONE MAI EK..LAO NIGGAHITA +0F18..0F19 ; Extend # Mn [2] TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN -KHYUD PA..TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN SDONG TSHUGS +0F35 ; Extend # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG NYI ZLA +0F37 ; Extend # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG SGOR RTAGS +0F39 ; Extend # Mn TIBETAN MARK TSA -PHRU +0F71..0F7E ; Extend # Mn [14] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN AA..TIBETAN SIGN RJES SU NGA RO +0F80..0F84 ; Extend # Mn [5] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN REVERSED I..TIBETAN MARK HALANTA +0F86..0F87 ; Extend # Mn [2] TIBETAN SIGN LCI RTAGS..TIBETAN SIGN YANG RTAGS +0F8D..0F97 ; Extend # Mn [11] TIBETAN SUBJOINED SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER JA +0F99..0FBC ; Extend # Mn [36] TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER NYA..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER FIXED-FORM RA +0FC6 ; Extend # Mn TIBETAN SYMBOL PADMA GDAN +102D..1030 ; Extend # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN UU +1032..1037 ; Extend # Mn [6] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AI..MYANMAR SIGN DOT BELOW +1039..103A ; Extend # Mn [2] MYANMAR SIGN VIRAMA..MYANMAR SIGN ASAT +103D..103E ; Extend # Mn [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL WA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL HA +1058..1059 ; Extend # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +105E..1060 ; Extend # Mn [3] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL NA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL LA +1071..1074 ; Extend # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN GEBA KAREN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN KAYAH EE +1082 ; Extend # Mn MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN SHAN MEDIAL WA +1085..1086 ; Extend # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E ABOVE..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN FINAL Y +108D ; Extend # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL EMPHATIC TONE +109D ; Extend # Mn MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON AI +135D..135F ; Extend # Mn [3] ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION AND VOWEL LENGTH MARK..ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION MARK +1712..1714 ; Extend # Mn [3] TAGALOG VOWEL SIGN I..TAGALOG SIGN VIRAMA +1732..1733 ; Extend # Mn [2] HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN I..HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN U +1752..1753 ; Extend # Mn [2] BUHID VOWEL SIGN I..BUHID VOWEL SIGN U +1772..1773 ; Extend # Mn [2] TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN I..TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN U +17B4..17B5 ; Extend # Mn [2] KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AQ..KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AA +17B7..17BD ; Extend # Mn [7] KHMER VOWEL SIGN I..KHMER VOWEL SIGN UA +17C6 ; Extend # Mn KHMER SIGN NIKAHIT +17C9..17D3 ; Extend # Mn [11] KHMER SIGN MUUSIKATOAN..KHMER SIGN BATHAMASAT +17DD ; Extend # Mn KHMER SIGN ATTHACAN +180B..180D ; Extend # Mn [3] MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR ONE..MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR THREE +180F ; Extend # Mn MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR FOUR +1885..1886 ; Extend # Mn [2] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI BALUDA..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI THREE BALUDA +18A9 ; Extend # Mn MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI DAGALGA +1920..1922 ; Extend # Mn [3] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN A..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN U +1927..1928 ; Extend # Mn [2] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN E..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN O +1932 ; Extend # Mn LIMBU SMALL LETTER ANUSVARA +1939..193B ; Extend # Mn [3] LIMBU SIGN MUKPHRENG..LIMBU SIGN SA-I +1A17..1A18 ; Extend # Mn [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN I..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN U +1A1B ; Extend # Mn BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN AE +1A56 ; Extend # Mn TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA +1A58..1A5E ; Extend # Mn [7] TAI THAM SIGN MAI KANG LAI..TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN SA +1A60 ; Extend # Mn TAI THAM SIGN SAKOT +1A62 ; Extend # Mn TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN MAI SAT +1A65..1A6C ; Extend # Mn [8] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN I..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA BELOW +1A73..1A7C ; Extend # Mn [10] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA ABOVE..TAI THAM SIGN KHUEN-LUE KARAN +1A7F ; Extend # Mn TAI THAM COMBINING CRYPTOGRAMMIC DOT +1AB0..1ABD ; Extend # Mn [14] COMBINING DOUBLED CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..COMBINING PARENTHESES BELOW +1ABE ; Extend # Me COMBINING PARENTHESES OVERLAY +1ABF..1ACE ; Extend # Mn [16] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER W BELOW..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +1B00..1B03 ; Extend # Mn [4] BALINESE SIGN ULU RICEM..BALINESE SIGN SURANG +1B34 ; Extend # Mn BALINESE SIGN REREKAN +1B35 ; Extend # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TEDUNG +1B36..1B3A ; Extend # Mn [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN ULU..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA +1B3C ; Extend # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA +1B42 ; Extend # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET +1B6B..1B73 ; Extend # Mn [9] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TEGEH..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING GONG +1B80..1B81 ; Extend # Mn [2] SUNDANESE SIGN PANYECEK..SUNDANESE SIGN PANGLAYAR +1BA2..1BA5 ; Extend # Mn [4] SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PANYAKRA..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANYUKU +1BA8..1BA9 ; Extend # Mn [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PAMEPET..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANEULEUNG +1BAB..1BAD ; Extend # Mn [3] SUNDANESE SIGN VIRAMA..SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PASANGAN WA +1BE6 ; Extend # Mn BATAK SIGN TOMPI +1BE8..1BE9 ; Extend # Mn [2] BATAK VOWEL SIGN PAKPAK E..BATAK VOWEL SIGN EE +1BED ; Extend # Mn BATAK VOWEL SIGN KARO O +1BEF..1BF1 ; Extend # Mn [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN U FOR SIMALUNGUN SA..BATAK CONSONANT SIGN H +1C2C..1C33 ; Extend # Mn [8] LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN E..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN T +1C36..1C37 ; Extend # Mn [2] LEPCHA SIGN RAN..LEPCHA SIGN NUKTA +1CD0..1CD2 ; Extend # Mn [3] VEDIC TONE KARSHANA..VEDIC TONE PRENKHA +1CD4..1CE0 ; Extend # Mn [13] VEDIC SIGN YAJURVEDIC MIDLINE SVARITA..VEDIC TONE RIGVEDIC KASHMIRI INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE2..1CE8 ; Extend # Mn [7] VEDIC SIGN VISARGA SVARITA..VEDIC SIGN VISARGA ANUDATTA WITH TAIL +1CED ; Extend # Mn VEDIC SIGN TIRYAK +1CF4 ; Extend # Mn VEDIC TONE CANDRA ABOVE +1CF8..1CF9 ; Extend # Mn [2] VEDIC TONE RING ABOVE..VEDIC TONE DOUBLE RING ABOVE +1DC0..1DFF ; Extend # Mn [64] COMBINING DOTTED GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING RIGHT ARROWHEAD AND DOWN ARROWHEAD BELOW +200C ; Extend # Cf ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER +20D0..20DC ; Extend # Mn [13] COMBINING LEFT HARPOON ABOVE..COMBINING FOUR DOTS ABOVE +20DD..20E0 ; Extend # Me [4] COMBINING ENCLOSING CIRCLE..COMBINING ENCLOSING CIRCLE BACKSLASH +20E1 ; Extend # Mn COMBINING LEFT RIGHT ARROW ABOVE +20E2..20E4 ; Extend # Me [3] COMBINING ENCLOSING SCREEN..COMBINING ENCLOSING UPWARD POINTING TRIANGLE +20E5..20F0 ; Extend # Mn [12] COMBINING REVERSE SOLIDUS OVERLAY..COMBINING ASTERISK ABOVE +2CEF..2CF1 ; Extend # Mn [3] COPTIC COMBINING NI ABOVE..COPTIC COMBINING SPIRITUS LENIS +2D7F ; Extend # Mn TIFINAGH CONSONANT JOINER +2DE0..2DFF ; Extend # Mn [32] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER BE..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +302A..302D ; Extend # Mn [4] IDEOGRAPHIC LEVEL TONE MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ENTERING TONE MARK +302E..302F ; Extend # Mc [2] HANGUL SINGLE DOT TONE MARK..HANGUL DOUBLE DOT TONE MARK +3099..309A ; Extend # Mn [2] COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +A66F ; Extend # Mn COMBINING CYRILLIC VZMET +A670..A672 ; Extend # Me [3] COMBINING CYRILLIC TEN MILLIONS SIGN..COMBINING CYRILLIC THOUSAND MILLIONS SIGN +A674..A67D ; Extend # Mn [10] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER UKRAINIAN IE..COMBINING CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A69E..A69F ; Extend # Mn [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER EF..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED E +A6F0..A6F1 ; Extend # Mn [2] BAMUM COMBINING MARK KOQNDON..BAMUM COMBINING MARK TUKWENTIS +A802 ; Extend # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN DVISVARA +A806 ; Extend # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN HASANTA +A80B ; Extend # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ANUSVARA +A825..A826 ; Extend # Mn [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN U..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN E +A82C ; Extend # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ALTERNATE HASANTA +A8C4..A8C5 ; Extend # Mn [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN VIRAMA..SAURASHTRA SIGN CANDRABINDU +A8E0..A8F1 ; Extend # Mn [18] COMBINING DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +A8FF ; Extend # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AY +A926..A92D ; Extend # Mn [8] KAYAH LI VOWEL UE..KAYAH LI TONE CALYA PLOPHU +A947..A951 ; Extend # Mn [11] REJANG VOWEL SIGN I..REJANG CONSONANT SIGN R +A980..A982 ; Extend # Mn [3] JAVANESE SIGN PANYANGGA..JAVANESE SIGN LAYAR +A9B3 ; Extend # Mn JAVANESE SIGN CECAK TELU +A9B6..A9B9 ; Extend # Mn [4] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN WULU..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN SUKU MENDUT +A9BC..A9BD ; Extend # Mn [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET..JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN KERET +A9E5 ; Extend # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN SAW +AA29..AA2E ; Extend # Mn [6] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAM VOWEL SIGN OE +AA31..AA32 ; Extend # Mn [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AU..CHAM VOWEL SIGN UE +AA35..AA36 ; Extend # Mn [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN LA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN WA +AA43 ; Extend # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL NG +AA4C ; Extend # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL M +AA7C ; Extend # Mn MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-2 +AAB0 ; Extend # Mn TAI VIET MAI KANG +AAB2..AAB4 ; Extend # Mn [3] TAI VIET VOWEL I..TAI VIET VOWEL U +AAB7..AAB8 ; Extend # Mn [2] TAI VIET MAI KHIT..TAI VIET VOWEL IA +AABE..AABF ; Extend # Mn [2] TAI VIET VOWEL AM..TAI VIET TONE MAI EK +AAC1 ; Extend # Mn TAI VIET TONE MAI THO +AAEC..AAED ; Extend # Mn [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAI +AAF6 ; Extend # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VIRAMA +ABE5 ; Extend # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ANAP +ABE8 ; Extend # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UNAP +ABED ; Extend # Mn MEETEI MAYEK APUN IYEK +FB1E ; Extend # Mn HEBREW POINT JUDEO-SPANISH VARIKA +FE00..FE0F ; Extend # Mn [16] VARIATION SELECTOR-1..VARIATION SELECTOR-16 +FE20..FE2F ; Extend # Mn [16] COMBINING LIGATURE LEFT HALF..COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO RIGHT HALF +FF9E..FF9F ; Extend # Lm [2] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA VOICED SOUND MARK..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +101FD ; Extend # Mn PHAISTOS DISC SIGN COMBINING OBLIQUE STROKE +102E0 ; Extend # Mn COPTIC EPACT THOUSANDS MARK +10376..1037A ; Extend # Mn [5] COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER SII +10A01..10A03 ; Extend # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN I..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +10A05..10A06 ; Extend # Mn [2] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN E..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN O +10A0C..10A0F ; Extend # Mn [4] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL LENGTH MARK..KHAROSHTHI SIGN VISARGA +10A38..10A3A ; Extend # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI SIGN BAR ABOVE..KHAROSHTHI SIGN DOT BELOW +10A3F ; Extend # Mn KHAROSHTHI VIRAMA +10AE5..10AE6 ; Extend # Mn [2] MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK ABOVE..MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK BELOW +10D24..10D27 ; Extend # Mn [4] HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN HARBAHAY..HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN TASSI +10EAB..10EAC ; Extend # Mn [2] YEZIDI COMBINING HAMZA MARK..YEZIDI COMBINING MADDA MARK +10F46..10F50 ; Extend # Mn [11] SOGDIAN COMBINING DOT BELOW..SOGDIAN COMBINING STROKE BELOW +10F82..10F85 ; Extend # Mn [4] OLD UYGHUR COMBINING DOT ABOVE..OLD UYGHUR COMBINING TWO DOTS BELOW +11001 ; Extend # Mn BRAHMI SIGN ANUSVARA +11038..11046 ; Extend # Mn [15] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN AA..BRAHMI VIRAMA +11070 ; Extend # Mn BRAHMI SIGN OLD TAMIL VIRAMA +11073..11074 ; Extend # Mn [2] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT O +1107F..11081 ; Extend # Mn [3] BRAHMI NUMBER JOINER..KAITHI SIGN ANUSVARA +110B3..110B6 ; Extend # Mn [4] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN U..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AI +110B9..110BA ; Extend # Mn [2] KAITHI SIGN VIRAMA..KAITHI SIGN NUKTA +110C2 ; Extend # Mn KAITHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11100..11102 ; Extend # Mn [3] CHAKMA SIGN CANDRABINDU..CHAKMA SIGN VISARGA +11127..1112B ; Extend # Mn [5] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN A..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN UU +1112D..11134 ; Extend # Mn [8] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AI..CHAKMA MAAYYAA +11173 ; Extend # Mn MAHAJANI SIGN NUKTA +11180..11181 ; Extend # Mn [2] SHARADA SIGN CANDRABINDU..SHARADA SIGN ANUSVARA +111B6..111BE ; Extend # Mn [9] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN U..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN O +111C9..111CC ; Extend # Mn [4] SHARADA SANDHI MARK..SHARADA EXTRA SHORT VOWEL MARK +111CF ; Extend # Mn SHARADA SIGN INVERTED CANDRABINDU +1122F..11231 ; Extend # Mn [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN U..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AI +11234 ; Extend # Mn KHOJKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11236..11237 ; Extend # Mn [2] KHOJKI SIGN NUKTA..KHOJKI SIGN SHADDA +1123E ; Extend # Mn KHOJKI SIGN SUKUN +112DF ; Extend # Mn KHUDAWADI SIGN ANUSVARA +112E3..112EA ; Extend # Mn [8] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN U..KHUDAWADI SIGN VIRAMA +11300..11301 ; Extend # Mn [2] GRANTHA SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..GRANTHA SIGN CANDRABINDU +1133B..1133C ; Extend # Mn [2] COMBINING BINDU BELOW..GRANTHA SIGN NUKTA +1133E ; Extend # Mc GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AA +11340 ; Extend # Mn GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN II +11357 ; Extend # Mc GRANTHA AU LENGTH MARK +11366..1136C ; Extend # Mn [7] COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT SIX +11370..11374 ; Extend # Mn [5] COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER A..COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER PA +11438..1143F ; Extend # Mn [8] NEWA VOWEL SIGN U..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AI +11442..11444 ; Extend # Mn [3] NEWA SIGN VIRAMA..NEWA SIGN ANUSVARA +11446 ; Extend # Mn NEWA SIGN NUKTA +1145E ; Extend # Mn NEWA SANDHI MARK +114B0 ; Extend # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AA +114B3..114B8 ; Extend # Mn [6] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN U..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +114BA ; Extend # Mn TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN SHORT E +114BD ; Extend # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN SHORT O +114BF..114C0 ; Extend # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN CANDRABINDU..TIRHUTA SIGN ANUSVARA +114C2..114C3 ; Extend # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN VIRAMA..TIRHUTA SIGN NUKTA +115AF ; Extend # Mc SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AA +115B2..115B5 ; Extend # Mn [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +115BC..115BD ; Extend # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN CANDRABINDU..SIDDHAM SIGN ANUSVARA +115BF..115C0 ; Extend # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN VIRAMA..SIDDHAM SIGN NUKTA +115DC..115DD ; Extend # Mn [2] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE UU +11633..1163A ; Extend # Mn [8] MODI VOWEL SIGN U..MODI VOWEL SIGN AI +1163D ; Extend # Mn MODI SIGN ANUSVARA +1163F..11640 ; Extend # Mn [2] MODI SIGN VIRAMA..MODI SIGN ARDHACANDRA +116AB ; Extend # Mn TAKRI SIGN ANUSVARA +116AD ; Extend # Mn TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AA +116B0..116B5 ; Extend # Mn [6] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN U..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AU +116B7 ; Extend # Mn TAKRI SIGN NUKTA +1171D..1171F ; Extend # Mn [3] AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA..AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LIGATING RA +11722..11725 ; Extend # Mn [4] AHOM VOWEL SIGN I..AHOM VOWEL SIGN UU +11727..1172B ; Extend # Mn [5] AHOM VOWEL SIGN AW..AHOM SIGN KILLER +1182F..11837 ; Extend # Mn [9] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN U..DOGRA SIGN ANUSVARA +11839..1183A ; Extend # Mn [2] DOGRA SIGN VIRAMA..DOGRA SIGN NUKTA +11930 ; Extend # Mc DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AA +1193B..1193C ; Extend # Mn [2] DIVES AKURU SIGN ANUSVARA..DIVES AKURU SIGN CANDRABINDU +1193E ; Extend # Mn DIVES AKURU VIRAMA +11943 ; Extend # Mn DIVES AKURU SIGN NUKTA +119D4..119D7 ; Extend # Mn [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +119DA..119DB ; Extend # Mn [2] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN E..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +119E0 ; Extend # Mn NANDINAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +11A01..11A0A ; Extend # Mn [10] ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN I..ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A33..11A38 ; Extend # Mn [6] ZANABAZAR SQUARE FINAL CONSONANT MARK..ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN ANUSVARA +11A3B..11A3E ; Extend # Mn [4] ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER YA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER VA +11A47 ; Extend # Mn ZANABAZAR SQUARE SUBJOINER +11A51..11A56 ; Extend # Mn [6] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN I..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN OE +11A59..11A5B ; Extend # Mn [3] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..SOYOMBO VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A8A..11A96 ; Extend # Mn [13] SOYOMBO FINAL CONSONANT SIGN G..SOYOMBO SIGN ANUSVARA +11A98..11A99 ; Extend # Mn [2] SOYOMBO GEMINATION MARK..SOYOMBO SUBJOINER +11C30..11C36 ; Extend # Mn [7] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN I..BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L +11C38..11C3D ; Extend # Mn [6] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN E..BHAIKSUKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11C3F ; Extend # Mn BHAIKSUKI SIGN VIRAMA +11C92..11CA7 ; Extend # Mn [22] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER KA..MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER ZA +11CAA..11CB0 ; Extend # Mn [7] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER RA..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN AA +11CB2..11CB3 ; Extend # Mn [2] MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN U..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN E +11CB5..11CB6 ; Extend # Mn [2] MARCHEN SIGN ANUSVARA..MARCHEN SIGN CANDRABINDU +11D31..11D36 ; Extend # Mn [6] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11D3A ; Extend # Mn MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN E +11D3C..11D3D ; Extend # Mn [2] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN O +11D3F..11D45 ; Extend # Mn [7] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU..MASARAM GONDI VIRAMA +11D47 ; Extend # Mn MASARAM GONDI RA-KARA +11D90..11D91 ; Extend # Mn [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN EE..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI +11D95 ; Extend # Mn GUNJALA GONDI SIGN ANUSVARA +11D97 ; Extend # Mn GUNJALA GONDI VIRAMA +11EF3..11EF4 ; Extend # Mn [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN I..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN U +16AF0..16AF4 ; Extend # Mn [5] BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH TONE..BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH-LOW TONE +16B30..16B36 ; Extend # Mn [7] PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TUB..PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TAUM +16F4F ; Extend # Mn MIAO SIGN CONSONANT MODIFIER BAR +16F8F..16F92 ; Extend # Mn [4] MIAO TONE RIGHT..MIAO TONE BELOW +16FE4 ; Extend # Mn KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT FILLER +1BC9D..1BC9E ; Extend # Mn [2] DUPLOYAN THICK LETTER SELECTOR..DUPLOYAN DOUBLE MARK +1CF00..1CF2D ; Extend # Mn [46] ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK GORAZDO NIZKO S KRYZHEM ON LEFT..ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK KRYZH ON LEFT +1CF30..1CF46 ; Extend # Mn [23] ZNAMENNY COMBINING TONAL RANGE MARK MRACHNO..ZNAMENNY PRIZNAK MODIFIER ROG +1D165 ; Extend # Mc MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING STEM +1D167..1D169 ; Extend # Mn [3] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-3 +1D16E..1D172 ; Extend # Mc [5] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING FLAG-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING FLAG-5 +1D17B..1D182 ; Extend # Mn [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING ACCENT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING LOURE +1D185..1D18B ; Extend # Mn [7] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOIT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TRIPLE TONGUE +1D1AA..1D1AD ; Extend # Mn [4] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOWN BOW..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SNAP PIZZICATO +1D242..1D244 ; Extend # Mn [3] COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL TRISEME..COMBINING GREEK MUSICAL PENTASEME +1DA00..1DA36 ; Extend # Mn [55] SIGNWRITING HEAD RIM..SIGNWRITING AIR SUCKING IN +1DA3B..1DA6C ; Extend # Mn [50] SIGNWRITING MOUTH CLOSED NEUTRAL..SIGNWRITING EXCITEMENT +1DA75 ; Extend # Mn SIGNWRITING UPPER BODY TILTING FROM HIP JOINTS +1DA84 ; Extend # Mn SIGNWRITING LOCATION HEAD NECK +1DA9B..1DA9F ; Extend # Mn [5] SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING FILL MODIFIER-6 +1DAA1..1DAAF ; Extend # Mn [15] SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-2..SIGNWRITING ROTATION MODIFIER-16 +1E000..1E006 ; Extend # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER AZU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZHIVETE +1E008..1E018 ; Extend # Mn [17] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZEMLJA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER HERU +1E01B..1E021 ; Extend # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SHTA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YATI +1E023..1E024 ; Extend # Mn [2] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SMALL YUS +1E026..1E02A ; Extend # Mn [5] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YO..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER FITA +1E130..1E136 ; Extend # Mn [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-B..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-D +1E2AE ; Extend # Mn TOTO SIGN RISING TONE +1E2EC..1E2EF ; Extend # Mn [4] WANCHO TONE TUP..WANCHO TONE KOINI +1E8D0..1E8D6 ; Extend # Mn [7] MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER TEENS..MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER MILLIONS +1E944..1E94A ; Extend # Mn [7] ADLAM ALIF LENGTHENER..ADLAM NUKTA +1F3FB..1F3FF ; Extend # Sk [5] EMOJI MODIFIER FITZPATRICK TYPE-1-2..EMOJI MODIFIER FITZPATRICK TYPE-6 +E0020..E007F ; Extend # Cf [96] TAG SPACE..CANCEL TAG +E0100..E01EF ; Extend # Mn [240] VARIATION SELECTOR-17..VARIATION SELECTOR-256 + +# Total code points: 2095 + +# ================================================ + +1F1E6..1F1FF ; Regional_Indicator # So [26] REGIONAL INDICATOR SYMBOL LETTER A..REGIONAL INDICATOR SYMBOL LETTER Z + +# Total code points: 26 + +# ================================================ + +0903 ; SpacingMark # Mc DEVANAGARI SIGN VISARGA +093B ; SpacingMark # Mc DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OOE +093E..0940 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +0949..094C ; SpacingMark # Mc [4] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AU +094E..094F ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AW +0982..0983 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] BENGALI SIGN ANUSVARA..BENGALI SIGN VISARGA +09BF..09C0 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN I..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN II +09C7..09C8 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN E..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AI +09CB..09CC ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN O..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AU +0A03 ; SpacingMark # Mc GURMUKHI SIGN VISARGA +0A3E..0A40 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AA..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN II +0A83 ; SpacingMark # Mc GUJARATI SIGN VISARGA +0ABE..0AC0 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN II +0AC9 ; SpacingMark # Mc GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O +0ACB..0ACC ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN O..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AU +0B02..0B03 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] ORIYA SIGN ANUSVARA..ORIYA SIGN VISARGA +0B40 ; SpacingMark # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN II +0B47..0B48 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN E..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AI +0B4B..0B4C ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN O..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AU +0BBF ; SpacingMark # Mc TAMIL VOWEL SIGN I +0BC1..0BC2 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN U..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN UU +0BC6..0BC8 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN E..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AI +0BCA..0BCC ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN O..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AU +0C01..0C03 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] TELUGU SIGN CANDRABINDU..TELUGU SIGN VISARGA +0C41..0C44 ; SpacingMark # Mc [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN U..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0C82..0C83 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] KANNADA SIGN ANUSVARA..KANNADA SIGN VISARGA +0CBE ; SpacingMark # Mc KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AA +0CC0..0CC1 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN II..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN U +0CC3..0CC4 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0CC7..0CC8 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN EE..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AI +0CCA..0CCB ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN O..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN OO +0D02..0D03 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] MALAYALAM SIGN ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM SIGN VISARGA +0D3F..0D40 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN I..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN II +0D46..0D48 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN E..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AI +0D4A..0D4C ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN O..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AU +0D82..0D83 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] SINHALA SIGN ANUSVARAYA..SINHALA SIGN VISARGAYA +0DD0..0DD1 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI AEDA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA AEDA-PILLA +0DD8..0DDE ; SpacingMark # Mc [7] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KOMBUVA HAA GAYANUKITTA +0DF2..0DF3 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAYANUKITTA +0E33 ; SpacingMark # Lo THAI CHARACTER SARA AM +0EB3 ; SpacingMark # Lo LAO VOWEL SIGN AM +0F3E..0F3F ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] TIBETAN SIGN YAR TSHES..TIBETAN SIGN MAR TSHES +0F7F ; SpacingMark # Mc TIBETAN SIGN RNAM BCAD +1031 ; SpacingMark # Mc MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN E +103B..103C ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL YA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +1056..1057 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +1084 ; SpacingMark # Mc MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E +1715 ; SpacingMark # Mc TAGALOG SIGN PAMUDPOD +1734 ; SpacingMark # Mc HANUNOO SIGN PAMUDPOD +17B6 ; SpacingMark # Mc KHMER VOWEL SIGN AA +17BE..17C5 ; SpacingMark # Mc [8] KHMER VOWEL SIGN OE..KHMER VOWEL SIGN AU +17C7..17C8 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] KHMER SIGN REAHMUK..KHMER SIGN YUUKALEAPINTU +1923..1926 ; SpacingMark # Mc [4] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN EE..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN AU +1929..192B ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER WA +1930..1931 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] LIMBU SMALL LETTER KA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER NGA +1933..1938 ; SpacingMark # Mc [6] LIMBU SMALL LETTER TA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER LA +1A19..1A1A ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN E..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN O +1A55 ; SpacingMark # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +1A57 ; SpacingMark # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN LA TANG LAI +1A6D..1A72 ; SpacingMark # Mc [6] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OY..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN THAM AI +1B04 ; SpacingMark # Mc BALINESE SIGN BISAH +1B3B ; SpacingMark # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA TEDUNG +1B3D..1B41 ; SpacingMark # Mc [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA TEDUNG..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TALING REPA TEDUNG +1B43..1B44 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET TEDUNG..BALINESE ADEG ADEG +1B82 ; SpacingMark # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PANGWISAD +1BA1 ; SpacingMark # Mc SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PAMINGKAL +1BA6..1BA7 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANAELAENG..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANOLONG +1BAA ; SpacingMark # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PAMAAEH +1BE7 ; SpacingMark # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN E +1BEA..1BEC ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN I..BATAK VOWEL SIGN O +1BEE ; SpacingMark # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN U +1BF2..1BF3 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] BATAK PANGOLAT..BATAK PANONGONAN +1C24..1C2B ; SpacingMark # Mc [8] LEPCHA SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN UU +1C34..1C35 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN NYIN-DO..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN KANG +1CE1 ; SpacingMark # Mc VEDIC TONE ATHARVAVEDIC INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CF7 ; SpacingMark # Mc VEDIC SIGN ATIKRAMA +A823..A824 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN A..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN I +A827 ; SpacingMark # Mc SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN OO +A880..A881 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN ANUSVARA..SAURASHTRA SIGN VISARGA +A8B4..A8C3 ; SpacingMark # Mc [16] SAURASHTRA CONSONANT SIGN HAARU..SAURASHTRA VOWEL SIGN AU +A952..A953 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] REJANG CONSONANT SIGN H..REJANG VIRAMA +A983 ; SpacingMark # Mc JAVANESE SIGN WIGNYAN +A9B4..A9B5 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TARUNG..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TOLONG +A9BA..A9BB ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TALING..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN DIRGA MURE +A9BE..A9C0 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN PENGKAL..JAVANESE PANGKON +AA2F..AA30 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN O..CHAM VOWEL SIGN AI +AA33..AA34 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN YA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN RA +AA4D ; SpacingMark # Mc CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL H +AAEB ; SpacingMark # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN II +AAEE..AAEF ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAU +AAF5 ; SpacingMark # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN VISARGA +ABE3..ABE4 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ONAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN INAP +ABE6..ABE7 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN YENAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN SOUNAP +ABE9..ABEA ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN CHEINAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN NUNG +ABEC ; SpacingMark # Mc MEETEI MAYEK LUM IYEK +11000 ; SpacingMark # Mc BRAHMI SIGN CANDRABINDU +11002 ; SpacingMark # Mc BRAHMI SIGN VISARGA +11082 ; SpacingMark # Mc KAITHI SIGN VISARGA +110B0..110B2 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AA..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN II +110B7..110B8 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN O..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AU +1112C ; SpacingMark # Mc CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN E +11145..11146 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN EI +11182 ; SpacingMark # Mc SHARADA SIGN VISARGA +111B3..111B5 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AA..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN II +111BF..111C0 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AU..SHARADA SIGN VIRAMA +111CE ; SpacingMark # Mc SHARADA VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +1122C..1122E ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN II +11232..11233 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN O..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AU +11235 ; SpacingMark # Mc KHOJKI SIGN VIRAMA +112E0..112E2 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN II +11302..11303 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] GRANTHA SIGN ANUSVARA..GRANTHA SIGN VISARGA +1133F ; SpacingMark # Mc GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN I +11341..11344 ; SpacingMark # Mc [4] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN U..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +11347..11348 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN EE..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AI +1134B..1134D ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN OO..GRANTHA SIGN VIRAMA +11362..11363 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +11435..11437 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] NEWA VOWEL SIGN AA..NEWA VOWEL SIGN II +11440..11441 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] NEWA VOWEL SIGN O..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AU +11445 ; SpacingMark # Mc NEWA SIGN VISARGA +114B1..114B2 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN I..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN II +114B9 ; SpacingMark # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN E +114BB..114BC ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AI..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN O +114BE ; SpacingMark # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AU +114C1 ; SpacingMark # Mc TIRHUTA SIGN VISARGA +115B0..115B1 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN I..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN II +115B8..115BB ; SpacingMark # Mc [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN E..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AU +115BE ; SpacingMark # Mc SIDDHAM SIGN VISARGA +11630..11632 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] MODI VOWEL SIGN AA..MODI VOWEL SIGN II +1163B..1163C ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] MODI VOWEL SIGN O..MODI VOWEL SIGN AU +1163E ; SpacingMark # Mc MODI SIGN VISARGA +116AC ; SpacingMark # Mc TAKRI SIGN VISARGA +116AE..116AF ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN I..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN II +116B6 ; SpacingMark # Mc TAKRI SIGN VIRAMA +11726 ; SpacingMark # Mc AHOM VOWEL SIGN E +1182C..1182E ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN AA..DOGRA VOWEL SIGN II +11838 ; SpacingMark # Mc DOGRA SIGN VISARGA +11931..11935 ; SpacingMark # Mc [5] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN I..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN E +11937..11938 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AI..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN O +1193D ; SpacingMark # Mc DIVES AKURU SIGN HALANTA +11940 ; SpacingMark # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL YA +11942 ; SpacingMark # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL RA +119D1..119D3 ; SpacingMark # Mc [3] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +119DC..119DF ; SpacingMark # Mc [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN O..NANDINAGARI SIGN VISARGA +119E4 ; SpacingMark # Mc NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +11A39 ; SpacingMark # Mc ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN VISARGA +11A57..11A58 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AI..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AU +11A97 ; SpacingMark # Mc SOYOMBO SIGN VISARGA +11C2F ; SpacingMark # Mc BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN AA +11C3E ; SpacingMark # Mc BHAIKSUKI SIGN VISARGA +11CA9 ; SpacingMark # Mc MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER YA +11CB1 ; SpacingMark # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN I +11CB4 ; SpacingMark # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN O +11D8A..11D8E ; SpacingMark # Mc [5] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN UU +11D93..11D94 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN OO..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU +11D96 ; SpacingMark # Mc GUNJALA GONDI SIGN VISARGA +11EF5..11EF6 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN E..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN O +16F51..16F87 ; SpacingMark # Mc [55] MIAO SIGN ASPIRATION..MIAO VOWEL SIGN UI +16FF0..16FF1 ; SpacingMark # Mc [2] VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK CA..VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK NHAY +1D166 ; SpacingMark # Mc MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SPRECHGESANG STEM +1D16D ; SpacingMark # Mc MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING AUGMENTATION DOT + +# Total code points: 388 + +# ================================================ + +1100..115F ; L # Lo [96] HANGUL CHOSEONG KIYEOK..HANGUL CHOSEONG FILLER +A960..A97C ; L # Lo [29] HANGUL CHOSEONG TIKEUT-MIEUM..HANGUL CHOSEONG SSANGYEORINHIEUH + +# Total code points: 125 + +# ================================================ + +1160..11A7 ; V # Lo [72] HANGUL JUNGSEONG FILLER..HANGUL JUNGSEONG O-YAE +D7B0..D7C6 ; V # Lo [23] HANGUL JUNGSEONG O-YEO..HANGUL JUNGSEONG ARAEA-E + +# Total code points: 95 + +# ================================================ + +11A8..11FF ; T # Lo [88] HANGUL JONGSEONG KIYEOK..HANGUL JONGSEONG SSANGNIEUN +D7CB..D7FB ; T # Lo [49] HANGUL JONGSEONG NIEUN-RIEUL..HANGUL JONGSEONG PHIEUPH-THIEUTH + +# Total code points: 137 + +# ================================================ + +AC00 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GA +AC1C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GAE +AC38 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GYA +AC54 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GYAE +AC70 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GEO +AC8C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GE +ACA8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GYEO +ACC4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GYE +ACE0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GO +ACFC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GWA +AD18 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GWAE +AD34 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GOE +AD50 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GYO +AD6C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GU +AD88 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GWEO +ADA4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GWE +ADC0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GWI +ADDC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GYU +ADF8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GEU +AE14 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GYI +AE30 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GI +AE4C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGA +AE68 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGAE +AE84 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYA +AEA0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYAE +AEBC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGEO +AED8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGE +AEF4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYEO +AF10 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYE +AF2C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGO +AF48 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWA +AF64 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWAE +AF80 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGOE +AF9C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYO +AFB8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGU +AFD4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWEO +AFF0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWE +B00C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWI +B028 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYU +B044 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGEU +B060 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYI +B07C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE GGI +B098 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NA +B0B4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NAE +B0D0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NYA +B0EC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NYAE +B108 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NEO +B124 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NE +B140 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NYEO +B15C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NYE +B178 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NO +B194 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NWA +B1B0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NWAE +B1CC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NOE +B1E8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NYO +B204 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NU +B220 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NWEO +B23C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NWE +B258 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NWI +B274 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NYU +B290 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NEU +B2AC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NYI +B2C8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE NI +B2E4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DA +B300 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DAE +B31C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DYA +B338 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DYAE +B354 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DEO +B370 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DE +B38C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DYEO +B3A8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DYE +B3C4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DO +B3E0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DWA +B3FC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DWAE +B418 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DOE +B434 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DYO +B450 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DU +B46C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DWEO +B488 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DWE +B4A4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DWI +B4C0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DYU +B4DC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DEU +B4F8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DYI +B514 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DI +B530 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDA +B54C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDAE +B568 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYA +B584 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYAE +B5A0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDEO +B5BC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDE +B5D8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYEO +B5F4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYE +B610 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDO +B62C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWA +B648 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWAE +B664 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDOE +B680 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYO +B69C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDU +B6B8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWEO +B6D4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWE +B6F0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWI +B70C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYU +B728 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDEU +B744 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYI +B760 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE DDI +B77C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RA +B798 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RAE +B7B4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RYA +B7D0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RYAE +B7EC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE REO +B808 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RE +B824 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RYEO +B840 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RYE +B85C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RO +B878 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RWA +B894 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RWAE +B8B0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE ROE +B8CC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RYO +B8E8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RU +B904 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RWEO +B920 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RWE +B93C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RWI +B958 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RYU +B974 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE REU +B990 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RYI +B9AC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE RI +B9C8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MA +B9E4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MAE +BA00 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MYA +BA1C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MYAE +BA38 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MEO +BA54 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE ME +BA70 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MYEO +BA8C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MYE +BAA8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MO +BAC4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MWA +BAE0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MWAE +BAFC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MOE +BB18 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MYO +BB34 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MU +BB50 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MWEO +BB6C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MWE +BB88 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MWI +BBA4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MYU +BBC0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MEU +BBDC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MYI +BBF8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE MI +BC14 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BA +BC30 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BAE +BC4C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BYA +BC68 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BYAE +BC84 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BEO +BCA0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BE +BCBC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BYEO +BCD8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BYE +BCF4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BO +BD10 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BWA +BD2C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BWAE +BD48 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BOE +BD64 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BYO +BD80 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BU +BD9C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BWEO +BDB8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BWE +BDD4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BWI +BDF0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BYU +BE0C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BEU +BE28 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BYI +BE44 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BI +BE60 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBA +BE7C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBAE +BE98 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYA +BEB4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYAE +BED0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBEO +BEEC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBE +BF08 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYEO +BF24 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYE +BF40 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBO +BF5C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWA +BF78 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWAE +BF94 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBOE +BFB0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYO +BFCC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBU +BFE8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWEO +C004 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWE +C020 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWI +C03C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYU +C058 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBEU +C074 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYI +C090 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE BBI +C0AC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SA +C0C8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SAE +C0E4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SYA +C100 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SYAE +C11C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SEO +C138 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SE +C154 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SYEO +C170 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SYE +C18C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SO +C1A8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SWA +C1C4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SWAE +C1E0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SOE +C1FC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SYO +C218 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SU +C234 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SWEO +C250 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SWE +C26C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SWI +C288 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SYU +C2A4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SEU +C2C0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SYI +C2DC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SI +C2F8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSA +C314 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSAE +C330 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYA +C34C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYAE +C368 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSEO +C384 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSE +C3A0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYEO +C3BC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYE +C3D8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSO +C3F4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWA +C410 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWAE +C42C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSOE +C448 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYO +C464 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSU +C480 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWEO +C49C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWE +C4B8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWI +C4D4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYU +C4F0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSEU +C50C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYI +C528 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE SSI +C544 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE A +C560 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE AE +C57C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE YA +C598 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE YAE +C5B4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE EO +C5D0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE E +C5EC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE YEO +C608 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE YE +C624 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE O +C640 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE WA +C65C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE WAE +C678 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE OE +C694 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE YO +C6B0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE U +C6CC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE WEO +C6E8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE WE +C704 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE WI +C720 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE YU +C73C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE EU +C758 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE YI +C774 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE I +C790 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JA +C7AC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JAE +C7C8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JYA +C7E4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JYAE +C800 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JEO +C81C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JE +C838 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JYEO +C854 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JYE +C870 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JO +C88C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JWA +C8A8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JWAE +C8C4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JOE +C8E0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JYO +C8FC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JU +C918 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JWEO +C934 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JWE +C950 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JWI +C96C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JYU +C988 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JEU +C9A4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JYI +C9C0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JI +C9DC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJA +C9F8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJAE +CA14 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYA +CA30 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYAE +CA4C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJEO +CA68 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJE +CA84 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYEO +CAA0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYE +CABC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJO +CAD8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWA +CAF4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWAE +CB10 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJOE +CB2C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYO +CB48 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJU +CB64 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWEO +CB80 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWE +CB9C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWI +CBB8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYU +CBD4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJEU +CBF0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYI +CC0C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE JJI +CC28 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CA +CC44 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CAE +CC60 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CYA +CC7C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CYAE +CC98 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CEO +CCB4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CE +CCD0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CYEO +CCEC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CYE +CD08 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CO +CD24 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CWA +CD40 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CWAE +CD5C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE COE +CD78 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CYO +CD94 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CU +CDB0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CWEO +CDCC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CWE +CDE8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CWI +CE04 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CYU +CE20 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CEU +CE3C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CYI +CE58 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE CI +CE74 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KA +CE90 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KAE +CEAC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KYA +CEC8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KYAE +CEE4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KEO +CF00 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KE +CF1C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KYEO +CF38 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KYE +CF54 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KO +CF70 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KWA +CF8C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KWAE +CFA8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KOE +CFC4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KYO +CFE0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KU +CFFC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KWEO +D018 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KWE +D034 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KWI +D050 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KYU +D06C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KEU +D088 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KYI +D0A4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE KI +D0C0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TA +D0DC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TAE +D0F8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TYA +D114 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TYAE +D130 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TEO +D14C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TE +D168 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TYEO +D184 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TYE +D1A0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TO +D1BC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TWA +D1D8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TWAE +D1F4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TOE +D210 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TYO +D22C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TU +D248 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TWEO +D264 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TWE +D280 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TWI +D29C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TYU +D2B8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TEU +D2D4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TYI +D2F0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE TI +D30C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PA +D328 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PAE +D344 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PYA +D360 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PYAE +D37C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PEO +D398 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PE +D3B4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PYEO +D3D0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PYE +D3EC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PO +D408 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PWA +D424 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PWAE +D440 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE POE +D45C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PYO +D478 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PU +D494 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PWEO +D4B0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PWE +D4CC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PWI +D4E8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PYU +D504 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PEU +D520 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PYI +D53C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE PI +D558 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HA +D574 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HAE +D590 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HYA +D5AC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HYAE +D5C8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HEO +D5E4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HE +D600 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HYEO +D61C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HYE +D638 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HO +D654 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HWA +D670 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HWAE +D68C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HOE +D6A8 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HYO +D6C4 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HU +D6E0 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HWEO +D6FC ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HWE +D718 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HWI +D734 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HYU +D750 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HEU +D76C ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HYI +D788 ; LV # Lo HANGUL SYLLABLE HI + +# Total code points: 399 + +# ================================================ + +AC01..AC1B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GAH +AC1D..AC37 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GAEH +AC39..AC53 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GYAH +AC55..AC6F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GYAEH +AC71..AC8B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GEOH +AC8D..ACA7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GEH +ACA9..ACC3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GYEOH +ACC5..ACDF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GYEH +ACE1..ACFB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GOH +ACFD..AD17 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GWAH +AD19..AD33 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GWAEH +AD35..AD4F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GOEH +AD51..AD6B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GYOH +AD6D..AD87 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GUH +AD89..ADA3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GWEOH +ADA5..ADBF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GWEH +ADC1..ADDB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GWIH +ADDD..ADF7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GYUH +ADF9..AE13 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GEUH +AE15..AE2F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GYIH +AE31..AE4B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GIH +AE4D..AE67 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGAH +AE69..AE83 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGAEH +AE85..AE9F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYAH +AEA1..AEBB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYAEH +AEBD..AED7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGEOH +AED9..AEF3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGEH +AEF5..AF0F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYEOH +AF11..AF2B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYEH +AF2D..AF47 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGOH +AF49..AF63 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWAH +AF65..AF7F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWAEH +AF81..AF9B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGOEH +AF9D..AFB7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYOH +AFB9..AFD3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGUH +AFD5..AFEF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWEOH +AFF1..B00B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWEH +B00D..B027 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGWIH +B029..B043 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYUH +B045..B05F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGEUH +B061..B07B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGYIH +B07D..B097 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE GGIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE GGIH +B099..B0B3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NAH +B0B5..B0CF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NAEH +B0D1..B0EB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NYAH +B0ED..B107 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NYAEH +B109..B123 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NEOH +B125..B13F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NEH +B141..B15B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NYEOH +B15D..B177 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NYEH +B179..B193 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NOH +B195..B1AF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NWAH +B1B1..B1CB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NWAEH +B1CD..B1E7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NOEH +B1E9..B203 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NYOH +B205..B21F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NUH +B221..B23B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NWEOH +B23D..B257 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NWEH +B259..B273 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NWIH +B275..B28F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NYUH +B291..B2AB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NEUH +B2AD..B2C7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NYIH +B2C9..B2E3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE NIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE NIH +B2E5..B2FF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DAH +B301..B31B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DAEH +B31D..B337 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DYAH +B339..B353 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DYAEH +B355..B36F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DEOH +B371..B38B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DEH +B38D..B3A7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DYEOH +B3A9..B3C3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DYEH +B3C5..B3DF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DOH +B3E1..B3FB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DWAH +B3FD..B417 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DWAEH +B419..B433 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DOEH +B435..B44F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DYOH +B451..B46B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DUH +B46D..B487 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DWEOH +B489..B4A3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DWEH +B4A5..B4BF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DWIH +B4C1..B4DB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DYUH +B4DD..B4F7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DEUH +B4F9..B513 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DYIH +B515..B52F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DIH +B531..B54B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDAH +B54D..B567 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDAEH +B569..B583 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYAH +B585..B59F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYAEH +B5A1..B5BB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDEOH +B5BD..B5D7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDEH +B5D9..B5F3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYEOH +B5F5..B60F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYEH +B611..B62B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDOH +B62D..B647 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWAH +B649..B663 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWAEH +B665..B67F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDOEH +B681..B69B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYOH +B69D..B6B7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDUH +B6B9..B6D3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWEOH +B6D5..B6EF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWEH +B6F1..B70B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDWIH +B70D..B727 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYUH +B729..B743 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDEUH +B745..B75F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDYIH +B761..B77B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE DDIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE DDIH +B77D..B797 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RAH +B799..B7B3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RAEH +B7B5..B7CF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RYAH +B7D1..B7EB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RYAEH +B7ED..B807 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE REOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE REOH +B809..B823 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE REG..HANGUL SYLLABLE REH +B825..B83F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RYEOH +B841..B85B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RYEH +B85D..B877 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE ROG..HANGUL SYLLABLE ROH +B879..B893 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RWAH +B895..B8AF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RWAEH +B8B1..B8CB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE ROEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE ROEH +B8CD..B8E7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RYOH +B8E9..B903 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RUH +B905..B91F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RWEOH +B921..B93B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RWEH +B93D..B957 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RWIH +B959..B973 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RYUH +B975..B98F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE REUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE REUH +B991..B9AB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RYIH +B9AD..B9C7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE RIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE RIH +B9C9..B9E3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MAH +B9E5..B9FF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MAEH +BA01..BA1B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MYAH +BA1D..BA37 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MYAEH +BA39..BA53 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MEOH +BA55..BA6F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MEH +BA71..BA8B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MYEOH +BA8D..BAA7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MYEH +BAA9..BAC3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MOH +BAC5..BADF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MWAH +BAE1..BAFB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MWAEH +BAFD..BB17 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MOEH +BB19..BB33 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MYOH +BB35..BB4F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MUH +BB51..BB6B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MWEOH +BB6D..BB87 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MWEH +BB89..BBA3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MWIH +BBA5..BBBF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MYUH +BBC1..BBDB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MEUH +BBDD..BBF7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MYIH +BBF9..BC13 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE MIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE MIH +BC15..BC2F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BAH +BC31..BC4B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BAEH +BC4D..BC67 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BYAH +BC69..BC83 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BYAEH +BC85..BC9F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BEOH +BCA1..BCBB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BEH +BCBD..BCD7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BYEOH +BCD9..BCF3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BYEH +BCF5..BD0F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BOH +BD11..BD2B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BWAH +BD2D..BD47 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BWAEH +BD49..BD63 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BOEH +BD65..BD7F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BYOH +BD81..BD9B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BUH +BD9D..BDB7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BWEOH +BDB9..BDD3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BWEH +BDD5..BDEF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BWIH +BDF1..BE0B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BYUH +BE0D..BE27 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BEUH +BE29..BE43 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BYIH +BE45..BE5F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BIH +BE61..BE7B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBAH +BE7D..BE97 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBAEH +BE99..BEB3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYAH +BEB5..BECF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYAEH +BED1..BEEB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBEOH +BEED..BF07 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBEH +BF09..BF23 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYEOH +BF25..BF3F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYEH +BF41..BF5B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBOH +BF5D..BF77 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWAH +BF79..BF93 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWAEH +BF95..BFAF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBOEH +BFB1..BFCB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYOH +BFCD..BFE7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBUH +BFE9..C003 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWEOH +C005..C01F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWEH +C021..C03B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBWIH +C03D..C057 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYUH +C059..C073 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBEUH +C075..C08F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBYIH +C091..C0AB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE BBIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE BBIH +C0AD..C0C7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SAH +C0C9..C0E3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SAEH +C0E5..C0FF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SYAH +C101..C11B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SYAEH +C11D..C137 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SEOH +C139..C153 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SEH +C155..C16F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SYEOH +C171..C18B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SYEH +C18D..C1A7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SOH +C1A9..C1C3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SWAH +C1C5..C1DF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SWAEH +C1E1..C1FB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SOEH +C1FD..C217 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SYOH +C219..C233 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SUH +C235..C24F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SWEOH +C251..C26B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SWEH +C26D..C287 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SWIH +C289..C2A3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SYUH +C2A5..C2BF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SEUH +C2C1..C2DB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SYIH +C2DD..C2F7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SIH +C2F9..C313 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSAH +C315..C32F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSAEH +C331..C34B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYAH +C34D..C367 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYAEH +C369..C383 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSEOH +C385..C39F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSEH +C3A1..C3BB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYEOH +C3BD..C3D7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYEH +C3D9..C3F3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSOH +C3F5..C40F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWAH +C411..C42B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWAEH +C42D..C447 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSOEH +C449..C463 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYOH +C465..C47F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSUH +C481..C49B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWEOH +C49D..C4B7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWEH +C4B9..C4D3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSWIH +C4D5..C4EF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYUH +C4F1..C50B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSEUH +C50D..C527 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSYIH +C529..C543 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE SSIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE SSIH +C545..C55F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE AG..HANGUL SYLLABLE AH +C561..C57B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE AEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE AEH +C57D..C597 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE YAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE YAH +C599..C5B3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE YAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE YAEH +C5B5..C5CF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE EOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE EOH +C5D1..C5EB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE EG..HANGUL SYLLABLE EH +C5ED..C607 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE YEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE YEOH +C609..C623 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE YEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE YEH +C625..C63F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE OG..HANGUL SYLLABLE OH +C641..C65B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE WAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE WAH +C65D..C677 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE WAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE WAEH +C679..C693 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE OEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE OEH +C695..C6AF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE YOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE YOH +C6B1..C6CB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE UG..HANGUL SYLLABLE UH +C6CD..C6E7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE WEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE WEOH +C6E9..C703 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE WEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE WEH +C705..C71F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE WIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE WIH +C721..C73B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE YUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE YUH +C73D..C757 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE EUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE EUH +C759..C773 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE YIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE YIH +C775..C78F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE IG..HANGUL SYLLABLE IH +C791..C7AB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JAH +C7AD..C7C7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JAEH +C7C9..C7E3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JYAH +C7E5..C7FF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JYAEH +C801..C81B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JEOH +C81D..C837 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JEH +C839..C853 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JYEOH +C855..C86F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JYEH +C871..C88B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JOH +C88D..C8A7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JWAH +C8A9..C8C3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JWAEH +C8C5..C8DF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JOEH +C8E1..C8FB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JYOH +C8FD..C917 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JUH +C919..C933 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JWEOH +C935..C94F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JWEH +C951..C96B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JWIH +C96D..C987 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JYUH +C989..C9A3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JEUH +C9A5..C9BF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JYIH +C9C1..C9DB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JIH +C9DD..C9F7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJAH +C9F9..CA13 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJAEH +CA15..CA2F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYAH +CA31..CA4B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYAEH +CA4D..CA67 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJEOH +CA69..CA83 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJEH +CA85..CA9F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYEOH +CAA1..CABB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYEH +CABD..CAD7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJOH +CAD9..CAF3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWAH +CAF5..CB0F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWAEH +CB11..CB2B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJOEH +CB2D..CB47 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYOH +CB49..CB63 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJUH +CB65..CB7F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWEOH +CB81..CB9B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWEH +CB9D..CBB7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJWIH +CBB9..CBD3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYUH +CBD5..CBEF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJEUH +CBF1..CC0B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJYIH +CC0D..CC27 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE JJIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE JJIH +CC29..CC43 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CAH +CC45..CC5F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CAEH +CC61..CC7B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CYAH +CC7D..CC97 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CYAEH +CC99..CCB3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CEOH +CCB5..CCCF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CEH +CCD1..CCEB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CYEOH +CCED..CD07 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CYEH +CD09..CD23 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE COG..HANGUL SYLLABLE COH +CD25..CD3F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CWAH +CD41..CD5B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CWAEH +CD5D..CD77 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE COEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE COEH +CD79..CD93 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CYOH +CD95..CDAF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CUH +CDB1..CDCB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CWEOH +CDCD..CDE7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CWEH +CDE9..CE03 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CWIH +CE05..CE1F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CYUH +CE21..CE3B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CEUH +CE3D..CE57 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CYIH +CE59..CE73 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE CIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE CIH +CE75..CE8F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KAH +CE91..CEAB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KAEH +CEAD..CEC7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KYAH +CEC9..CEE3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KYAEH +CEE5..CEFF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KEOH +CF01..CF1B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KEH +CF1D..CF37 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KYEOH +CF39..CF53 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KYEH +CF55..CF6F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KOH +CF71..CF8B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KWAH +CF8D..CFA7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KWAEH +CFA9..CFC3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KOEH +CFC5..CFDF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KYOH +CFE1..CFFB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KUH +CFFD..D017 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KWEOH +D019..D033 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KWEH +D035..D04F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KWIH +D051..D06B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KYUH +D06D..D087 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KEUH +D089..D0A3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KYIH +D0A5..D0BF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE KIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE KIH +D0C1..D0DB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TAH +D0DD..D0F7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TAEH +D0F9..D113 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TYAH +D115..D12F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TYAEH +D131..D14B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TEOH +D14D..D167 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TEH +D169..D183 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TYEOH +D185..D19F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TYEH +D1A1..D1BB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TOH +D1BD..D1D7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TWAH +D1D9..D1F3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TWAEH +D1F5..D20F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TOEH +D211..D22B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TYOH +D22D..D247 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TUH +D249..D263 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TWEOH +D265..D27F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TWEH +D281..D29B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TWIH +D29D..D2B7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TYUH +D2B9..D2D3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TEUH +D2D5..D2EF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TYIH +D2F1..D30B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE TIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE TIH +D30D..D327 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PAH +D329..D343 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PAEH +D345..D35F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PYAH +D361..D37B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PYAEH +D37D..D397 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PEOH +D399..D3B3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PEH +D3B5..D3CF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PYEOH +D3D1..D3EB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PYEH +D3ED..D407 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE POG..HANGUL SYLLABLE POH +D409..D423 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PWAH +D425..D43F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PWAEH +D441..D45B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE POEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE POEH +D45D..D477 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PYOH +D479..D493 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PUH +D495..D4AF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PWEOH +D4B1..D4CB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PWEH +D4CD..D4E7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PWIH +D4E9..D503 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PYUH +D505..D51F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PEUH +D521..D53B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PYIH +D53D..D557 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE PIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE PIH +D559..D573 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HAH +D575..D58F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HAEH +D591..D5AB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HYAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HYAH +D5AD..D5C7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HYAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HYAEH +D5C9..D5E3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HEOH +D5E5..D5FF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HEH +D601..D61B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HYEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HYEOH +D61D..D637 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HYEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HYEH +D639..D653 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HOH +D655..D66F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HWAG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HWAH +D671..D68B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HWAEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HWAEH +D68D..D6A7 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HOEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HOEH +D6A9..D6C3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HYOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HYOH +D6C5..D6DF ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HUH +D6E1..D6FB ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HWEOG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HWEOH +D6FD..D717 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HWEG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HWEH +D719..D733 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HWIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HWIH +D735..D74F ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HYUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HYUH +D751..D76B ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HEUG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HEUH +D76D..D787 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HYIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HYIH +D789..D7A3 ; LVT # Lo [27] HANGUL SYLLABLE HIG..HANGUL SYLLABLE HIH + +# Total code points: 10773 + +# ================================================ + +200D ; ZWJ # Cf ZERO WIDTH JOINER + +# Total code points: 1 + +# EOF diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/PropList.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/PropList.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0a5a9346 --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/PropList.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1743 @@ +# PropList-14.0.0.txt +# Date: 2021-08-12, 23:13:05 GMT +# © 2021 Unicode®, Inc. +# Unicode and the Unicode Logo are registered trademarks of Unicode, Inc. in the U.S. and other countries. +# For terms of use, see http://www.unicode.org/terms_of_use.html +# +# Unicode Character Database +# For documentation, see http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr44/ + +# ================================================ + +0009..000D ; White_Space # Cc [5] .. +0020 ; White_Space # Zs SPACE +0085 ; White_Space # Cc +00A0 ; White_Space # Zs NO-BREAK SPACE +1680 ; White_Space # Zs OGHAM SPACE MARK +2000..200A ; White_Space # Zs [11] EN QUAD..HAIR SPACE +2028 ; White_Space # Zl LINE SEPARATOR +2029 ; White_Space # Zp PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR +202F ; White_Space # Zs NARROW NO-BREAK SPACE +205F ; White_Space # Zs MEDIUM MATHEMATICAL SPACE +3000 ; White_Space # Zs IDEOGRAPHIC SPACE + +# Total code points: 25 + +# ================================================ + +061C ; Bidi_Control # Cf ARABIC LETTER MARK +200E..200F ; Bidi_Control # Cf [2] LEFT-TO-RIGHT MARK..RIGHT-TO-LEFT MARK +202A..202E ; Bidi_Control # Cf [5] LEFT-TO-RIGHT EMBEDDING..RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE +2066..2069 ; Bidi_Control # Cf [4] LEFT-TO-RIGHT ISOLATE..POP DIRECTIONAL ISOLATE + +# Total code points: 12 + +# ================================================ + +200C..200D ; Join_Control # Cf [2] ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER..ZERO WIDTH JOINER + +# Total code points: 2 + +# ================================================ + +002D ; Dash # Pd HYPHEN-MINUS +058A ; Dash # Pd ARMENIAN HYPHEN +05BE ; Dash # Pd HEBREW PUNCTUATION MAQAF +1400 ; Dash # Pd CANADIAN SYLLABICS HYPHEN +1806 ; Dash # Pd MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN +2010..2015 ; Dash # Pd [6] HYPHEN..HORIZONTAL BAR +2053 ; Dash # Po SWUNG DASH +207B ; Dash # Sm SUPERSCRIPT MINUS +208B ; Dash # Sm SUBSCRIPT MINUS +2212 ; Dash # Sm MINUS SIGN +2E17 ; Dash # Pd DOUBLE OBLIQUE HYPHEN +2E1A ; Dash # Pd HYPHEN WITH DIAERESIS +2E3A..2E3B ; Dash # Pd [2] TWO-EM DASH..THREE-EM DASH +2E40 ; Dash # Pd DOUBLE HYPHEN +2E5D ; Dash # Pd OBLIQUE HYPHEN +301C ; Dash # Pd WAVE DASH +3030 ; Dash # Pd WAVY DASH +30A0 ; Dash # Pd KATAKANA-HIRAGANA DOUBLE HYPHEN +FE31..FE32 ; Dash # Pd [2] PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL EM DASH..PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL EN DASH +FE58 ; Dash # Pd SMALL EM DASH +FE63 ; Dash # Pd SMALL HYPHEN-MINUS +FF0D ; Dash # Pd FULLWIDTH HYPHEN-MINUS +10EAD ; Dash # Pd YEZIDI HYPHENATION MARK + +# Total code points: 30 + +# ================================================ + +002D ; Hyphen # Pd HYPHEN-MINUS +00AD ; Hyphen # Cf SOFT HYPHEN +058A ; Hyphen # Pd ARMENIAN HYPHEN +1806 ; Hyphen # Pd MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN +2010..2011 ; Hyphen # Pd [2] HYPHEN..NON-BREAKING HYPHEN +2E17 ; Hyphen # Pd DOUBLE OBLIQUE HYPHEN +30FB ; Hyphen # Po KATAKANA MIDDLE DOT +FE63 ; Hyphen # Pd SMALL HYPHEN-MINUS +FF0D ; Hyphen # Pd FULLWIDTH HYPHEN-MINUS +FF65 ; Hyphen # Po HALFWIDTH KATAKANA MIDDLE DOT + +# Total code points: 11 + +# ================================================ + +0022 ; Quotation_Mark # Po QUOTATION MARK +0027 ; Quotation_Mark # Po APOSTROPHE +00AB ; Quotation_Mark # Pi LEFT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +00BB ; Quotation_Mark # Pf RIGHT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +2018 ; Quotation_Mark # Pi LEFT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK +2019 ; Quotation_Mark # Pf RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK +201A ; Quotation_Mark # Ps SINGLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK +201B..201C ; Quotation_Mark # Pi [2] SINGLE HIGH-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK..LEFT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK +201D ; Quotation_Mark # Pf RIGHT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK +201E ; Quotation_Mark # Ps DOUBLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK +201F ; Quotation_Mark # Pi DOUBLE HIGH-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK +2039 ; Quotation_Mark # Pi SINGLE LEFT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +203A ; Quotation_Mark # Pf SINGLE RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +2E42 ; Quotation_Mark # Ps DOUBLE LOW-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK +300C ; Quotation_Mark # Ps LEFT CORNER BRACKET +300D ; Quotation_Mark # Pe RIGHT CORNER BRACKET +300E ; Quotation_Mark # Ps LEFT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +300F ; Quotation_Mark # Pe RIGHT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +301D ; Quotation_Mark # Ps REVERSED DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK +301E..301F ; Quotation_Mark # Pe [2] DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK..LOW DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK +FE41 ; Quotation_Mark # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT CORNER BRACKET +FE42 ; Quotation_Mark # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT CORNER BRACKET +FE43 ; Quotation_Mark # Ps PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL LEFT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +FE44 ; Quotation_Mark # Pe PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL RIGHT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +FF02 ; Quotation_Mark # Po FULLWIDTH QUOTATION MARK +FF07 ; Quotation_Mark # Po FULLWIDTH APOSTROPHE +FF62 ; Quotation_Mark # Ps HALFWIDTH LEFT CORNER BRACKET +FF63 ; Quotation_Mark # Pe HALFWIDTH RIGHT CORNER BRACKET + +# Total code points: 30 + +# ================================================ + +0021 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po EXCLAMATION MARK +002C ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po COMMA +002E ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po FULL STOP +003A..003B ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] COLON..SEMICOLON +003F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po QUESTION MARK +037E ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po GREEK QUESTION MARK +0387 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po GREEK ANO TELEIA +0589 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po ARMENIAN FULL STOP +05C3 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po HEBREW PUNCTUATION SOF PASUQ +060C ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po ARABIC COMMA +061B ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po ARABIC SEMICOLON +061D..061F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] ARABIC END OF TEXT MARK..ARABIC QUESTION MARK +06D4 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po ARABIC FULL STOP +0700..070A ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [11] SYRIAC END OF PARAGRAPH..SYRIAC CONTRACTION +070C ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po SYRIAC HARKLEAN METOBELUS +07F8..07F9 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] NKO COMMA..NKO EXCLAMATION MARK +0830..083E ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [15] SAMARITAN PUNCTUATION NEQUDAA..SAMARITAN PUNCTUATION ANNAAU +085E ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po MANDAIC PUNCTUATION +0964..0965 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] DEVANAGARI DANDA..DEVANAGARI DOUBLE DANDA +0E5A..0E5B ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] THAI CHARACTER ANGKHANKHU..THAI CHARACTER KHOMUT +0F08 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po TIBETAN MARK SBRUL SHAD +0F0D..0F12 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [6] TIBETAN MARK SHAD..TIBETAN MARK RGYA GRAM SHAD +104A..104B ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] MYANMAR SIGN LITTLE SECTION..MYANMAR SIGN SECTION +1361..1368 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [8] ETHIOPIC WORDSPACE..ETHIOPIC PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR +166E ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po CANADIAN SYLLABICS FULL STOP +16EB..16ED ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] RUNIC SINGLE PUNCTUATION..RUNIC CROSS PUNCTUATION +1735..1736 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] PHILIPPINE SINGLE PUNCTUATION..PHILIPPINE DOUBLE PUNCTUATION +17D4..17D6 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] KHMER SIGN KHAN..KHMER SIGN CAMNUC PII KUUH +17DA ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po KHMER SIGN KOOMUUT +1802..1805 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [4] MONGOLIAN COMMA..MONGOLIAN FOUR DOTS +1808..1809 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] MONGOLIAN MANCHU COMMA..MONGOLIAN MANCHU FULL STOP +1944..1945 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] LIMBU EXCLAMATION MARK..LIMBU QUESTION MARK +1AA8..1AAB ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [4] TAI THAM SIGN KAAN..TAI THAM SIGN SATKAANKUU +1B5A..1B5B ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] BALINESE PANTI..BALINESE PAMADA +1B5D..1B5F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] BALINESE CARIK PAMUNGKAH..BALINESE CARIK PAREREN +1B7D..1B7E ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] BALINESE PANTI LANTANG..BALINESE PAMADA LANTANG +1C3B..1C3F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [5] LEPCHA PUNCTUATION TA-ROL..LEPCHA PUNCTUATION TSHOOK +1C7E..1C7F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] OL CHIKI PUNCTUATION MUCAAD..OL CHIKI PUNCTUATION DOUBLE MUCAAD +203C..203D ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] DOUBLE EXCLAMATION MARK..INTERROBANG +2047..2049 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] DOUBLE QUESTION MARK..EXCLAMATION QUESTION MARK +2E2E ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po REVERSED QUESTION MARK +2E3C ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po STENOGRAPHIC FULL STOP +2E41 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po REVERSED COMMA +2E4C ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po MEDIEVAL COMMA +2E4E..2E4F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] PUNCTUS ELEVATUS MARK..CORNISH VERSE DIVIDER +2E53..2E54 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] MEDIEVAL EXCLAMATION MARK..MEDIEVAL QUESTION MARK +3001..3002 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] IDEOGRAPHIC COMMA..IDEOGRAPHIC FULL STOP +A4FE..A4FF ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] LISU PUNCTUATION COMMA..LISU PUNCTUATION FULL STOP +A60D..A60F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] VAI COMMA..VAI QUESTION MARK +A6F3..A6F7 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [5] BAMUM FULL STOP..BAMUM QUESTION MARK +A876..A877 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] PHAGS-PA MARK SHAD..PHAGS-PA MARK DOUBLE SHAD +A8CE..A8CF ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] SAURASHTRA DANDA..SAURASHTRA DOUBLE DANDA +A92F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po KAYAH LI SIGN SHYA +A9C7..A9C9 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] JAVANESE PADA PANGKAT..JAVANESE PADA LUNGSI +AA5D..AA5F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] CHAM PUNCTUATION DANDA..CHAM PUNCTUATION TRIPLE DANDA +AADF ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po TAI VIET SYMBOL KOI KOI +AAF0..AAF1 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] MEETEI MAYEK CHEIKHAN..MEETEI MAYEK AHANG KHUDAM +ABEB ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po MEETEI MAYEK CHEIKHEI +FE50..FE52 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] SMALL COMMA..SMALL FULL STOP +FE54..FE57 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [4] SMALL SEMICOLON..SMALL EXCLAMATION MARK +FF01 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po FULLWIDTH EXCLAMATION MARK +FF0C ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po FULLWIDTH COMMA +FF0E ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po FULLWIDTH FULL STOP +FF1A..FF1B ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] FULLWIDTH COLON..FULLWIDTH SEMICOLON +FF1F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po FULLWIDTH QUESTION MARK +FF61 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po HALFWIDTH IDEOGRAPHIC FULL STOP +FF64 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po HALFWIDTH IDEOGRAPHIC COMMA +1039F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po UGARITIC WORD DIVIDER +103D0 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po OLD PERSIAN WORD DIVIDER +10857 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po IMPERIAL ARAMAIC SECTION SIGN +1091F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po PHOENICIAN WORD SEPARATOR +10A56..10A57 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] KHAROSHTHI PUNCTUATION DANDA..KHAROSHTHI PUNCTUATION DOUBLE DANDA +10AF0..10AF5 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [6] MANICHAEAN PUNCTUATION STAR..MANICHAEAN PUNCTUATION TWO DOTS +10B3A..10B3F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [6] TINY TWO DOTS OVER ONE DOT PUNCTUATION..LARGE ONE RING OVER TWO RINGS PUNCTUATION +10B99..10B9C ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [4] PSALTER PAHLAVI SECTION MARK..PSALTER PAHLAVI FOUR DOTS WITH DOT +10F55..10F59 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [5] SOGDIAN PUNCTUATION TWO VERTICAL BARS..SOGDIAN PUNCTUATION HALF CIRCLE WITH DOT +10F86..10F89 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [4] OLD UYGHUR PUNCTUATION BAR..OLD UYGHUR PUNCTUATION FOUR DOTS +11047..1104D ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [7] BRAHMI DANDA..BRAHMI PUNCTUATION LOTUS +110BE..110C1 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [4] KAITHI SECTION MARK..KAITHI DOUBLE DANDA +11141..11143 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] CHAKMA DANDA..CHAKMA QUESTION MARK +111C5..111C6 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] SHARADA DANDA..SHARADA DOUBLE DANDA +111CD ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po SHARADA SUTRA MARK +111DE..111DF ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] SHARADA SECTION MARK-1..SHARADA SECTION MARK-2 +11238..1123C ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [5] KHOJKI DANDA..KHOJKI DOUBLE SECTION MARK +112A9 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po MULTANI SECTION MARK +1144B..1144D ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] NEWA DANDA..NEWA COMMA +1145A..1145B ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] NEWA DOUBLE COMMA..NEWA PLACEHOLDER MARK +115C2..115C5 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [4] SIDDHAM DANDA..SIDDHAM SEPARATOR BAR +115C9..115D7 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [15] SIDDHAM END OF TEXT MARK..SIDDHAM SECTION MARK WITH CIRCLES AND FOUR ENCLOSURES +11641..11642 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] MODI DANDA..MODI DOUBLE DANDA +1173C..1173E ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] AHOM SIGN SMALL SECTION..AHOM SIGN RULAI +11944 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po DIVES AKURU DOUBLE DANDA +11946 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po DIVES AKURU END OF TEXT MARK +11A42..11A43 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] ZANABAZAR SQUARE MARK SHAD..ZANABAZAR SQUARE MARK DOUBLE SHAD +11A9B..11A9C ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] SOYOMBO MARK SHAD..SOYOMBO MARK DOUBLE SHAD +11AA1..11AA2 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] SOYOMBO TERMINAL MARK-1..SOYOMBO TERMINAL MARK-2 +11C41..11C43 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] BHAIKSUKI DANDA..BHAIKSUKI WORD SEPARATOR +11C71 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po MARCHEN MARK SHAD +11EF7..11EF8 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] MAKASAR PASSIMBANG..MAKASAR END OF SECTION +12470..12474 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [5] CUNEIFORM PUNCTUATION SIGN OLD ASSYRIAN WORD DIVIDER..CUNEIFORM PUNCTUATION SIGN DIAGONAL QUADCOLON +16A6E..16A6F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] MRO DANDA..MRO DOUBLE DANDA +16AF5 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po BASSA VAH FULL STOP +16B37..16B39 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [3] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS THOM..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN CIM CHEEM +16B44 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po PAHAWH HMONG SIGN XAUS +16E97..16E98 ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [2] MEDEFAIDRIN COMMA..MEDEFAIDRIN FULL STOP +1BC9F ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po DUPLOYAN PUNCTUATION CHINOOK FULL STOP +1DA87..1DA8A ; Terminal_Punctuation # Po [4] SIGNWRITING COMMA..SIGNWRITING COLON + +# Total code points: 276 + +# ================================================ + +005E ; Other_Math # Sk CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +03D0..03D2 ; Other_Math # L& [3] GREEK BETA SYMBOL..GREEK UPSILON WITH HOOK SYMBOL +03D5 ; Other_Math # L& GREEK PHI SYMBOL +03F0..03F1 ; Other_Math # L& [2] GREEK KAPPA SYMBOL..GREEK RHO SYMBOL +03F4..03F5 ; Other_Math # L& [2] GREEK CAPITAL THETA SYMBOL..GREEK LUNATE EPSILON SYMBOL +2016 ; Other_Math # Po DOUBLE VERTICAL LINE +2032..2034 ; Other_Math # Po [3] PRIME..TRIPLE PRIME +2040 ; Other_Math # Pc CHARACTER TIE +2061..2064 ; Other_Math # Cf [4] FUNCTION APPLICATION..INVISIBLE PLUS +207D ; Other_Math # Ps SUPERSCRIPT LEFT PARENTHESIS +207E ; Other_Math # Pe SUPERSCRIPT RIGHT PARENTHESIS +208D ; Other_Math # Ps SUBSCRIPT LEFT PARENTHESIS +208E ; Other_Math # Pe SUBSCRIPT RIGHT PARENTHESIS +20D0..20DC ; Other_Math # Mn [13] COMBINING LEFT HARPOON ABOVE..COMBINING FOUR DOTS ABOVE +20E1 ; Other_Math # Mn COMBINING LEFT RIGHT ARROW ABOVE +20E5..20E6 ; Other_Math # Mn [2] COMBINING REVERSE SOLIDUS OVERLAY..COMBINING DOUBLE VERTICAL STROKE OVERLAY +20EB..20EF ; Other_Math # Mn [5] COMBINING LONG DOUBLE SOLIDUS OVERLAY..COMBINING RIGHT ARROW BELOW +2102 ; Other_Math # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL C +2107 ; Other_Math # L& EULER CONSTANT +210A..2113 ; Other_Math # L& [10] SCRIPT SMALL G..SCRIPT SMALL L +2115 ; Other_Math # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL N +2119..211D ; Other_Math # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL P..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL R +2124 ; Other_Math # L& DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Z +2128 ; Other_Math # L& BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL Z +2129 ; Other_Math # So TURNED GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA +212C..212D ; Other_Math # L& [2] SCRIPT CAPITAL B..BLACK-LETTER CAPITAL C +212F..2131 ; Other_Math # L& [3] SCRIPT SMALL E..SCRIPT CAPITAL F +2133..2134 ; Other_Math # L& [2] SCRIPT CAPITAL M..SCRIPT SMALL O +2135..2138 ; Other_Math # Lo [4] ALEF SYMBOL..DALET SYMBOL +213C..213F ; Other_Math # L& [4] DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL PI..DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL PI +2145..2149 ; Other_Math # L& [5] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC CAPITAL D..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +2195..2199 ; Other_Math # So [5] UP DOWN ARROW..SOUTH WEST ARROW +219C..219F ; Other_Math # So [4] LEFTWARDS WAVE ARROW..UPWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW +21A1..21A2 ; Other_Math # So [2] DOWNWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW..LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH TAIL +21A4..21A5 ; Other_Math # So [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW FROM BAR..UPWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21A7 ; Other_Math # So DOWNWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21A9..21AD ; Other_Math # So [5] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH HOOK..LEFT RIGHT WAVE ARROW +21B0..21B1 ; Other_Math # So [2] UPWARDS ARROW WITH TIP LEFTWARDS..UPWARDS ARROW WITH TIP RIGHTWARDS +21B6..21B7 ; Other_Math # So [2] ANTICLOCKWISE TOP SEMICIRCLE ARROW..CLOCKWISE TOP SEMICIRCLE ARROW +21BC..21CD ; Other_Math # So [18] LEFTWARDS HARPOON WITH BARB UPWARDS..LEFTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE +21D0..21D1 ; Other_Math # So [2] LEFTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW..UPWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D3 ; Other_Math # So DOWNWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D5..21DB ; Other_Math # So [7] UP DOWN DOUBLE ARROW..RIGHTWARDS TRIPLE ARROW +21DD ; Other_Math # So RIGHTWARDS SQUIGGLE ARROW +21E4..21E5 ; Other_Math # So [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW TO BAR..RIGHTWARDS ARROW TO BAR +2308 ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT CEILING +2309 ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT CEILING +230A ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT FLOOR +230B ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT FLOOR +23B4..23B5 ; Other_Math # So [2] TOP SQUARE BRACKET..BOTTOM SQUARE BRACKET +23B7 ; Other_Math # So RADICAL SYMBOL BOTTOM +23D0 ; Other_Math # So VERTICAL LINE EXTENSION +23E2 ; Other_Math # So WHITE TRAPEZIUM +25A0..25A1 ; Other_Math # So [2] BLACK SQUARE..WHITE SQUARE +25AE..25B6 ; Other_Math # So [9] BLACK VERTICAL RECTANGLE..BLACK RIGHT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25BC..25C0 ; Other_Math # So [5] BLACK DOWN-POINTING TRIANGLE..BLACK LEFT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25C6..25C7 ; Other_Math # So [2] BLACK DIAMOND..WHITE DIAMOND +25CA..25CB ; Other_Math # So [2] LOZENGE..WHITE CIRCLE +25CF..25D3 ; Other_Math # So [5] BLACK CIRCLE..CIRCLE WITH UPPER HALF BLACK +25E2 ; Other_Math # So BLACK LOWER RIGHT TRIANGLE +25E4 ; Other_Math # So BLACK UPPER LEFT TRIANGLE +25E7..25EC ; Other_Math # So [6] SQUARE WITH LEFT HALF BLACK..WHITE UP-POINTING TRIANGLE WITH DOT +2605..2606 ; Other_Math # So [2] BLACK STAR..WHITE STAR +2640 ; Other_Math # So FEMALE SIGN +2642 ; Other_Math # So MALE SIGN +2660..2663 ; Other_Math # So [4] BLACK SPADE SUIT..BLACK CLUB SUIT +266D..266E ; Other_Math # So [2] MUSIC FLAT SIGN..MUSIC NATURAL SIGN +27C5 ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27C6 ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27E6 ; Other_Math # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E7 ; Other_Math # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E8 ; Other_Math # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +27E9 ; Other_Math # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +27EA ; Other_Math # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EB ; Other_Math # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EC ; Other_Math # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27ED ; Other_Math # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27EE ; Other_Math # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +27EF ; Other_Math # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +2983 ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2984 ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2985 ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2986 ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2987 ; Other_Math # Ps Z NOTATION LEFT IMAGE BRACKET +2988 ; Other_Math # Pe Z NOTATION RIGHT IMAGE BRACKET +2989 ; Other_Math # Ps Z NOTATION LEFT BINDING BRACKET +298A ; Other_Math # Pe Z NOTATION RIGHT BINDING BRACKET +298B ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298C ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298D ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +298E ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +298F ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +2990 ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +2991 ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2992 ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2993 ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2994 ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2995 ; Other_Math # Ps DOUBLE LEFT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2996 ; Other_Math # Pe DOUBLE RIGHT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2997 ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +2998 ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +29D8 ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT WIGGLY FENCE +29D9 ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT WIGGLY FENCE +29DA ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29DB ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29FC ; Other_Math # Ps LEFT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +29FD ; Other_Math # Pe RIGHT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +FE61 ; Other_Math # Po SMALL ASTERISK +FE63 ; Other_Math # Pd SMALL HYPHEN-MINUS +FE68 ; Other_Math # Po SMALL REVERSE SOLIDUS +FF3C ; Other_Math # Po FULLWIDTH REVERSE SOLIDUS +FF3E ; Other_Math # Sk FULLWIDTH CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +1D400..1D454 ; Other_Math # L& [85] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL G +1D456..1D49C ; Other_Math # L& [71] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A +1D49E..1D49F ; Other_Math # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL C..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D +1D4A2 ; Other_Math # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL G +1D4A5..1D4A6 ; Other_Math # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K +1D4A9..1D4AC ; Other_Math # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL Q +1D4AE..1D4B9 ; Other_Math # L& [12] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL D +1D4BB ; Other_Math # L& MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL F +1D4BD..1D4C3 ; Other_Math # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL H..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL N +1D4C5..1D505 ; Other_Math # L& [65] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL P..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL B +1D507..1D50A ; Other_Math # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL G +1D50D..1D514 ; Other_Math # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL J..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Q +1D516..1D51C ; Other_Math # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR CAPITAL Y +1D51E..1D539 ; Other_Math # L& [28] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL B +1D53B..1D53E ; Other_Math # L& [4] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL D..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL G +1D540..1D544 ; Other_Math # L& [5] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL M +1D546 ; Other_Math # L& MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL O +1D54A..1D550 ; Other_Math # L& [7] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL S..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL Y +1D552..1D6A5 ; Other_Math # L& [340] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL A..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL DOTLESS J +1D6A8..1D6C0 ; Other_Math # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6C2..1D6DA ; Other_Math # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D6DC..1D6FA ; Other_Math # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D6FC..1D714 ; Other_Math # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D716..1D734 ; Other_Math # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D736..1D74E ; Other_Math # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D750..1D76E ; Other_Math # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD CAPITAL OMEGA +1D770..1D788 ; Other_Math # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL OMEGA +1D78A..1D7A8 ; Other_Math # L& [31] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC CAPITAL OMEGA +1D7AA..1D7C2 ; Other_Math # L& [25] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL ALPHA..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL OMEGA +1D7C4..1D7CB ; Other_Math # L& [8] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC EPSILON SYMBOL..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL DIGAMMA +1D7CE..1D7FF ; Other_Math # Nd [50] MATHEMATICAL BOLD DIGIT ZERO..MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE DIGIT NINE +1EE00..1EE03 ; Other_Math # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DAL +1EE05..1EE1F ; Other_Math # Lo [27] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOTLESS QAF +1EE21..1EE22 ; Other_Math # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL JEEM +1EE24 ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HEH +1EE27 ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL HAH +1EE29..1EE32 ; Other_Math # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL YEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL QAF +1EE34..1EE37 ; Other_Math # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL KHAH +1EE39 ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL DAD +1EE3B ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL INITIAL GHAIN +1EE42 ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED JEEM +1EE47 ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED HAH +1EE49 ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED YEH +1EE4B ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED LAM +1EE4D..1EE4F ; Other_Math # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED NOON..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED AIN +1EE51..1EE52 ; Other_Math # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED QAF +1EE54 ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED SHEEN +1EE57 ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED KHAH +1EE59 ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DAD +1EE5B ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED GHAIN +1EE5D ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS NOON +1EE5F ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL TAILED DOTLESS QAF +1EE61..1EE62 ; Other_Math # Lo [2] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED JEEM +1EE64 ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HEH +1EE67..1EE6A ; Other_Math # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED HAH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KAF +1EE6C..1EE72 ; Other_Math # Lo [7] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED MEEM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED QAF +1EE74..1EE77 ; Other_Math # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED SHEEN..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED KHAH +1EE79..1EE7C ; Other_Math # Lo [4] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DAD..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS BEH +1EE7E ; Other_Math # Lo ARABIC MATHEMATICAL STRETCHED DOTLESS FEH +1EE80..1EE89 ; Other_Math # Lo [10] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED ALEF..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED YEH +1EE8B..1EE9B ; Other_Math # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL LOOPED GHAIN +1EEA1..1EEA3 ; Other_Math # Lo [3] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK BEH..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK DAL +1EEA5..1EEA9 ; Other_Math # Lo [5] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK WAW..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK YEH +1EEAB..1EEBB ; Other_Math # Lo [17] ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK LAM..ARABIC MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK GHAIN + +# Total code points: 1362 + +# ================================================ + +0030..0039 ; Hex_Digit # Nd [10] DIGIT ZERO..DIGIT NINE +0041..0046 ; Hex_Digit # L& [6] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F +0061..0066 ; Hex_Digit # L& [6] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER F +FF10..FF19 ; Hex_Digit # Nd [10] FULLWIDTH DIGIT ZERO..FULLWIDTH DIGIT NINE +FF21..FF26 ; Hex_Digit # L& [6] FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F +FF41..FF46 ; Hex_Digit # L& [6] FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER A..FULLWIDTH LATIN SMALL LETTER F + +# Total code points: 44 + +# ================================================ + +0030..0039 ; ASCII_Hex_Digit # Nd [10] DIGIT ZERO..DIGIT NINE +0041..0046 ; ASCII_Hex_Digit # L& [6] LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..LATIN CAPITAL LETTER F +0061..0066 ; ASCII_Hex_Digit # L& [6] LATIN SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SMALL LETTER F + +# Total code points: 22 + +# ================================================ + +0345 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn COMBINING GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +05B0..05BD ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [14] HEBREW POINT SHEVA..HEBREW POINT METEG +05BF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn HEBREW POINT RAFE +05C1..05C2 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] HEBREW POINT SHIN DOT..HEBREW POINT SIN DOT +05C4..05C5 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] HEBREW MARK UPPER DOT..HEBREW MARK LOWER DOT +05C7 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn HEBREW POINT QAMATS QATAN +0610..061A ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [11] ARABIC SIGN SALLALLAHOU ALAYHE WASSALLAM..ARABIC SMALL KASRA +064B..0657 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [13] ARABIC FATHATAN..ARABIC INVERTED DAMMA +0659..065F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [7] ARABIC ZWARAKAY..ARABIC WAVY HAMZA BELOW +0670 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn ARABIC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALEF +06D6..06DC ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [7] ARABIC SMALL HIGH LIGATURE SAD WITH LAM WITH ALEF MAKSURA..ARABIC SMALL HIGH SEEN +06E1..06E4 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] ARABIC SMALL HIGH DOTLESS HEAD OF KHAH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH MADDA +06E7..06E8 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] ARABIC SMALL HIGH YEH..ARABIC SMALL HIGH NOON +06ED ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn ARABIC SMALL LOW MEEM +0711 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn SYRIAC LETTER SUPERSCRIPT ALAPH +0730..073F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [16] SYRIAC PTHAHA ABOVE..SYRIAC RWAHA +07A6..07B0 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [11] THAANA ABAFILI..THAANA SUKUN +0816..0817 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] SAMARITAN MARK IN..SAMARITAN MARK IN-ALAF +081B..0823 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [9] SAMARITAN MARK EPENTHETIC YUT..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN A +0825..0827 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN SHORT A..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN U +0829..082C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN LONG I..SAMARITAN VOWEL SIGN SUKUN +08D4..08DF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [12] ARABIC SMALL HIGH WORD AR-RUB..ARABIC SMALL HIGH WORD WAQFA +08E3..08E9 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [7] ARABIC TURNED DAMMA BELOW..ARABIC CURLY KASRATAN +08F0..0902 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [19] ARABIC OPEN FATHATAN..DEVANAGARI SIGN ANUSVARA +0903 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc DEVANAGARI SIGN VISARGA +093A ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OE +093B ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN OOE +093E..0940 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +0941..0948 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [8] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +0949..094C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [4] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AU +094E..094F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AW +0955..0957 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA LONG E..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN UUE +0962..0963 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0981 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn BENGALI SIGN CANDRABINDU +0982..0983 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] BENGALI SIGN ANUSVARA..BENGALI SIGN VISARGA +09BE..09C0 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AA..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN II +09C1..09C4 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN U..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +09C7..09C8 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN E..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AI +09CB..09CC ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN O..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AU +09D7 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc BENGALI AU LENGTH MARK +09E2..09E3 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..BENGALI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0A01..0A02 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] GURMUKHI SIGN ADAK BINDI..GURMUKHI SIGN BINDI +0A03 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc GURMUKHI SIGN VISARGA +0A3E..0A40 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AA..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN II +0A41..0A42 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN U..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN UU +0A47..0A48 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN EE..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AI +0A4B..0A4C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN OO..GURMUKHI VOWEL SIGN AU +0A51 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN UDAAT +0A70..0A71 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] GURMUKHI TIPPI..GURMUKHI ADDAK +0A75 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN YAKASH +0A81..0A82 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] GUJARATI SIGN CANDRABINDU..GUJARATI SIGN ANUSVARA +0A83 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc GUJARATI SIGN VISARGA +0ABE..0AC0 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN II +0AC1..0AC5 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [5] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN U..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA E +0AC7..0AC8 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN E..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AI +0AC9 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN CANDRA O +0ACB..0ACC ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN O..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN AU +0AE2..0AE3 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GUJARATI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0AFA..0AFC ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] GUJARATI SIGN SUKUN..GUJARATI SIGN MADDAH +0B01 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn ORIYA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0B02..0B03 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] ORIYA SIGN ANUSVARA..ORIYA SIGN VISARGA +0B3E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AA +0B3F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn ORIYA VOWEL SIGN I +0B40 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN II +0B41..0B44 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN U..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0B47..0B48 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN E..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AI +0B4B..0B4C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN O..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AU +0B56 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn ORIYA AI LENGTH MARK +0B57 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc ORIYA AU LENGTH MARK +0B62..0B63 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..ORIYA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0B82 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn TAMIL SIGN ANUSVARA +0BBE..0BBF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AA..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN I +0BC0 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn TAMIL VOWEL SIGN II +0BC1..0BC2 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN U..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN UU +0BC6..0BC8 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN E..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AI +0BCA..0BCC ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] TAMIL VOWEL SIGN O..TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AU +0BD7 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc TAMIL AU LENGTH MARK +0C00 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn TELUGU SIGN COMBINING CANDRABINDU ABOVE +0C01..0C03 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] TELUGU SIGN CANDRABINDU..TELUGU SIGN VISARGA +0C3E..0C40 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AA..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN II +0C41..0C44 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [4] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN U..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0C46..0C48 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN E..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AI +0C4A..0C4C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN O..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN AU +0C55..0C56 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] TELUGU LENGTH MARK..TELUGU AI LENGTH MARK +0C62..0C63 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..TELUGU VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0C81 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn KANNADA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0C82..0C83 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] KANNADA SIGN ANUSVARA..KANNADA SIGN VISARGA +0CBE ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AA +0CBF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN I +0CC0..0CC4 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [5] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN II..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0CC6 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN E +0CC7..0CC8 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN EE..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AI +0CCA..0CCB ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN O..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN OO +0CCC ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn KANNADA VOWEL SIGN AU +0CD5..0CD6 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] KANNADA LENGTH MARK..KANNADA AI LENGTH MARK +0CE2..0CE3 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..KANNADA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D00..0D01 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..MALAYALAM SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D02..0D03 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] MALAYALAM SIGN ANUSVARA..MALAYALAM SIGN VISARGA +0D3E..0D40 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AA..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN II +0D41..0D44 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN U..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0D46..0D48 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN E..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AI +0D4A..0D4C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN O..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AU +0D57 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc MALAYALAM AU LENGTH MARK +0D62..0D63 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +0D81 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn SINHALA SIGN CANDRABINDU +0D82..0D83 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] SINHALA SIGN ANUSVARAYA..SINHALA SIGN VISARGAYA +0DCF..0DD1 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN AELA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA AEDA-PILLA +0DD2..0DD4 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI IS-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN KETTI PAA-PILLA +0DD6 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA PAA-PILLA +0DD8..0DDF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [8] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAYANUKITTA +0DF2..0DF3 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAETTA-PILLA..SINHALA VOWEL SIGN DIGA GAYANUKITTA +0E31 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn THAI CHARACTER MAI HAN-AKAT +0E34..0E3A ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [7] THAI CHARACTER SARA I..THAI CHARACTER PHINTHU +0E4D ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn THAI CHARACTER NIKHAHIT +0EB1 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn LAO VOWEL SIGN MAI KAN +0EB4..0EB9 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [6] LAO VOWEL SIGN I..LAO VOWEL SIGN UU +0EBB..0EBC ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] LAO VOWEL SIGN MAI KON..LAO SEMIVOWEL SIGN LO +0ECD ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn LAO NIGGAHITA +0F71..0F7E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [14] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN AA..TIBETAN SIGN RJES SU NGA RO +0F7F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc TIBETAN SIGN RNAM BCAD +0F80..0F81 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN REVERSED I..TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN REVERSED II +0F8D..0F97 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [11] TIBETAN SUBJOINED SIGN LCE TSA CAN..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER JA +0F99..0FBC ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [36] TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER NYA..TIBETAN SUBJOINED LETTER FIXED-FORM RA +102B..102C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN TALL AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AA +102D..1030 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN UU +1031 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN E +1032..1036 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [5] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AI..MYANMAR SIGN ANUSVARA +1038 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc MYANMAR SIGN VISARGA +103B..103C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL YA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +103D..103E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL WA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL HA +1056..1057 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +1058..1059 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +105E..1060 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL NA..MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN MON MEDIAL LA +1062..1064 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SGAW KAREN EU..MYANMAR TONE MARK SGAW KAREN KE PHO +1067..106D ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [7] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN EU..MYANMAR SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN TONE-5 +1071..1074 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN GEBA KAREN I..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN KAYAH EE +1082 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MYANMAR CONSONANT SIGN SHAN MEDIAL WA +1083..1084 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN AA..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E +1085..1086 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN E ABOVE..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN SHAN FINAL Y +1087..108C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [6] MYANMAR SIGN SHAN TONE-2..MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL TONE-3 +108D ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL EMPHATIC TONE +108F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc MYANMAR SIGN RUMAI PALAUNG TONE-5 +109A..109C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] MYANMAR SIGN KHAMTI TONE-1..MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON A +109D ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MYANMAR VOWEL SIGN AITON AI +1712..1713 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] TAGALOG VOWEL SIGN I..TAGALOG VOWEL SIGN U +1732..1733 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN I..HANUNOO VOWEL SIGN U +1752..1753 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] BUHID VOWEL SIGN I..BUHID VOWEL SIGN U +1772..1773 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN I..TAGBANWA VOWEL SIGN U +17B6 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc KHMER VOWEL SIGN AA +17B7..17BD ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [7] KHMER VOWEL SIGN I..KHMER VOWEL SIGN UA +17BE..17C5 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [8] KHMER VOWEL SIGN OE..KHMER VOWEL SIGN AU +17C6 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn KHMER SIGN NIKAHIT +17C7..17C8 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] KHMER SIGN REAHMUK..KHMER SIGN YUUKALEAPINTU +1885..1886 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI BALUDA..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI THREE BALUDA +18A9 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI DAGALGA +1920..1922 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN A..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN U +1923..1926 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [4] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN EE..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN AU +1927..1928 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] LIMBU VOWEL SIGN E..LIMBU VOWEL SIGN O +1929..192B ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LIMBU SUBJOINED LETTER WA +1930..1931 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] LIMBU SMALL LETTER KA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER NGA +1932 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn LIMBU SMALL LETTER ANUSVARA +1933..1938 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [6] LIMBU SMALL LETTER TA..LIMBU SMALL LETTER LA +1A17..1A18 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN I..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN U +1A19..1A1A ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN E..BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN O +1A1B ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn BUGINESE VOWEL SIGN AE +1A55 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL RA +1A56 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA +1A57 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN LA TANG LAI +1A58..1A5E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [7] TAI THAM SIGN MAI KANG LAI..TAI THAM CONSONANT SIGN SA +1A61 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN A +1A62 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN MAI SAT +1A63..1A64 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN AA..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN TALL AA +1A65..1A6C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [8] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN I..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA BELOW +1A6D..1A72 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [6] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OY..TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN THAM AI +1A73..1A74 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] TAI THAM VOWEL SIGN OA ABOVE..TAI THAM SIGN MAI KANG +1ABF..1AC0 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER W BELOW..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER TURNED W BELOW +1ACC..1ACE ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR G..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER INSULAR T +1B00..1B03 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] BALINESE SIGN ULU RICEM..BALINESE SIGN SURANG +1B04 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc BALINESE SIGN BISAH +1B35 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TEDUNG +1B36..1B3A ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN ULU..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA +1B3B ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN RA REPA TEDUNG +1B3C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA +1B3D..1B41 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [5] BALINESE VOWEL SIGN LA LENGA TEDUNG..BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TALING REPA TEDUNG +1B42 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET +1B43 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET TEDUNG +1B80..1B81 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] SUNDANESE SIGN PANYECEK..SUNDANESE SIGN PANGLAYAR +1B82 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PANGWISAD +1BA1 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PAMINGKAL +1BA2..1BA5 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PANYAKRA..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANYUKU +1BA6..1BA7 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANAELAENG..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANOLONG +1BA8..1BA9 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PAMEPET..SUNDANESE VOWEL SIGN PANEULEUNG +1BAC..1BAD ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PASANGAN MA..SUNDANESE CONSONANT SIGN PASANGAN WA +1BE7 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN E +1BE8..1BE9 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] BATAK VOWEL SIGN PAKPAK E..BATAK VOWEL SIGN EE +1BEA..1BEC ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN I..BATAK VOWEL SIGN O +1BED ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn BATAK VOWEL SIGN KARO O +1BEE ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc BATAK VOWEL SIGN U +1BEF..1BF1 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] BATAK VOWEL SIGN U FOR SIMALUNGUN SA..BATAK CONSONANT SIGN H +1C24..1C2B ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [8] LEPCHA SUBJOINED LETTER YA..LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN UU +1C2C..1C33 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [8] LEPCHA VOWEL SIGN E..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN T +1C34..1C35 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN NYIN-DO..LEPCHA CONSONANT SIGN KANG +1C36 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn LEPCHA SIGN RAN +1DE7..1DF4 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [14] COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER ALPHA..COMBINING LATIN SMALL LETTER U WITH DIAERESIS +24B6..24E9 ; Other_Alphabetic # So [52] CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +2DE0..2DFF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [32] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER BE..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED BIG YUS +A674..A67B ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [8] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER UKRAINIAN IE..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER OMEGA +A69E..A69F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER EF..COMBINING CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED E +A802 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN DVISVARA +A80B ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn SYLOTI NAGRI SIGN ANUSVARA +A823..A824 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN A..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN I +A825..A826 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN U..SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN E +A827 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc SYLOTI NAGRI VOWEL SIGN OO +A880..A881 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] SAURASHTRA SIGN ANUSVARA..SAURASHTRA SIGN VISARGA +A8B4..A8C3 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [16] SAURASHTRA CONSONANT SIGN HAARU..SAURASHTRA VOWEL SIGN AU +A8C5 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn SAURASHTRA SIGN CANDRABINDU +A8FF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn DEVANAGARI VOWEL SIGN AY +A926..A92A ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [5] KAYAH LI VOWEL UE..KAYAH LI VOWEL O +A947..A951 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [11] REJANG VOWEL SIGN I..REJANG CONSONANT SIGN R +A952 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc REJANG CONSONANT SIGN H +A980..A982 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] JAVANESE SIGN PANYANGGA..JAVANESE SIGN LAYAR +A983 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc JAVANESE SIGN WIGNYAN +A9B4..A9B5 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TARUNG..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TOLONG +A9B6..A9B9 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN WULU..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN SUKU MENDUT +A9BA..A9BB ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN TALING..JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN DIRGA MURE +A9BC..A9BD ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] JAVANESE VOWEL SIGN PEPET..JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN KERET +A9BE..A9BF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN PENGKAL..JAVANESE CONSONANT SIGN CAKRA +A9E5 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN SAW +AA29..AA2E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [6] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAM VOWEL SIGN OE +AA2F..AA30 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN O..CHAM VOWEL SIGN AI +AA31..AA32 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] CHAM VOWEL SIGN AU..CHAM VOWEL SIGN UE +AA33..AA34 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN YA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN RA +AA35..AA36 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] CHAM CONSONANT SIGN LA..CHAM CONSONANT SIGN WA +AA43 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL NG +AA4C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL M +AA4D ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc CHAM CONSONANT SIGN FINAL H +AA7B ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc MYANMAR SIGN PAO KAREN TONE +AA7C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-2 +AA7D ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-5 +AAB0 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn TAI VIET MAI KANG +AAB2..AAB4 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] TAI VIET VOWEL I..TAI VIET VOWEL U +AAB7..AAB8 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] TAI VIET MAI KHIT..TAI VIET VOWEL IA +AABE ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn TAI VIET VOWEL AM +AAEB ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN II +AAEC..AAED ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAI +AAEE..AAEF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AU..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN AAU +AAF5 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN VISARGA +ABE3..ABE4 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ONAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN INAP +ABE5 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN ANAP +ABE6..ABE7 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN YENAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN SOUNAP +ABE8 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN UNAP +ABE9..ABEA ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN CHEINAP..MEETEI MAYEK VOWEL SIGN NUNG +FB1E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn HEBREW POINT JUDEO-SPANISH VARIKA +10376..1037A ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [5] COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER AN..COMBINING OLD PERMIC LETTER SII +10A01..10A03 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN I..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +10A05..10A06 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN E..KHAROSHTHI VOWEL SIGN O +10A0C..10A0F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] KHAROSHTHI VOWEL LENGTH MARK..KHAROSHTHI SIGN VISARGA +10D24..10D27 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN HARBAHAY..HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN TASSI +10EAB..10EAC ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] YEZIDI COMBINING HAMZA MARK..YEZIDI COMBINING MADDA MARK +11000 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc BRAHMI SIGN CANDRABINDU +11001 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn BRAHMI SIGN ANUSVARA +11002 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc BRAHMI SIGN VISARGA +11038..11045 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [14] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN AA..BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN AU +11073..11074 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT E..BRAHMI VOWEL SIGN OLD TAMIL SHORT O +11082 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc KAITHI SIGN VISARGA +110B0..110B2 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AA..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN II +110B3..110B6 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN U..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AI +110B7..110B8 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] KAITHI VOWEL SIGN O..KAITHI VOWEL SIGN AU +110C2 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn KAITHI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11100..11102 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] CHAKMA SIGN CANDRABINDU..CHAKMA SIGN VISARGA +11127..1112B ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [5] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN A..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN UU +1112C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN E +1112D..11132 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [6] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AI..CHAKMA AU MARK +11145..11146 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN AA..CHAKMA VOWEL SIGN EI +11180..11181 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] SHARADA SIGN CANDRABINDU..SHARADA SIGN ANUSVARA +11182 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc SHARADA SIGN VISARGA +111B3..111B5 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AA..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN II +111B6..111BE ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [9] SHARADA VOWEL SIGN U..SHARADA VOWEL SIGN O +111BF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc SHARADA VOWEL SIGN AU +111CE ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc SHARADA VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +111CF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn SHARADA SIGN INVERTED CANDRABINDU +1122C..1122E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN II +1122F..11231 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN U..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AI +11232..11233 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN O..KHOJKI VOWEL SIGN AU +11234 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn KHOJKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11237 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn KHOJKI SIGN SHADDA +1123E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn KHOJKI SIGN SUKUN +112DF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn KHUDAWADI SIGN ANUSVARA +112E0..112E2 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN AA..KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN II +112E3..112E8 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [6] KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN U..KHUDAWADI VOWEL SIGN AU +11300..11301 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] GRANTHA SIGN COMBINING ANUSVARA ABOVE..GRANTHA SIGN CANDRABINDU +11302..11303 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] GRANTHA SIGN ANUSVARA..GRANTHA SIGN VISARGA +1133E..1133F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AA..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN I +11340 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN II +11341..11344 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [4] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN U..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +11347..11348 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN EE..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AI +1134B..1134C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN OO..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AU +11357 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc GRANTHA AU LENGTH MARK +11362..11363 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L..GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +11435..11437 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] NEWA VOWEL SIGN AA..NEWA VOWEL SIGN II +11438..1143F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [8] NEWA VOWEL SIGN U..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AI +11440..11441 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] NEWA VOWEL SIGN O..NEWA VOWEL SIGN AU +11443..11444 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] NEWA SIGN CANDRABINDU..NEWA SIGN ANUSVARA +11445 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc NEWA SIGN VISARGA +114B0..114B2 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AA..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN II +114B3..114B8 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [6] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN U..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +114B9 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN E +114BA ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN SHORT E +114BB..114BE ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [4] TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AI..TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AU +114BF..114C0 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN CANDRABINDU..TIRHUTA SIGN ANUSVARA +114C1 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc TIRHUTA SIGN VISARGA +115AF..115B1 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AA..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN II +115B2..115B5 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +115B8..115BB ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [4] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN E..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AU +115BC..115BD ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN CANDRABINDU..SIDDHAM SIGN ANUSVARA +115BE ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc SIDDHAM SIGN VISARGA +115DC..115DD ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE U..SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN ALTERNATE UU +11630..11632 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] MODI VOWEL SIGN AA..MODI VOWEL SIGN II +11633..1163A ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [8] MODI VOWEL SIGN U..MODI VOWEL SIGN AI +1163B..1163C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] MODI VOWEL SIGN O..MODI VOWEL SIGN AU +1163D ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MODI SIGN ANUSVARA +1163E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc MODI SIGN VISARGA +11640 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MODI SIGN ARDHACANDRA +116AB ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn TAKRI SIGN ANUSVARA +116AC ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc TAKRI SIGN VISARGA +116AD ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AA +116AE..116AF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN I..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN II +116B0..116B5 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [6] TAKRI VOWEL SIGN U..TAKRI VOWEL SIGN AU +1171D..1171F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LA..AHOM CONSONANT SIGN MEDIAL LIGATING RA +11720..11721 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] AHOM VOWEL SIGN A..AHOM VOWEL SIGN AA +11722..11725 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] AHOM VOWEL SIGN I..AHOM VOWEL SIGN UU +11726 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc AHOM VOWEL SIGN E +11727..1172A ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] AHOM VOWEL SIGN AW..AHOM VOWEL SIGN AM +1182C..1182E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN AA..DOGRA VOWEL SIGN II +1182F..11837 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [9] DOGRA VOWEL SIGN U..DOGRA SIGN ANUSVARA +11838 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc DOGRA SIGN VISARGA +11930..11935 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [6] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AA..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN E +11937..11938 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AI..DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN O +1193B..1193C ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] DIVES AKURU SIGN ANUSVARA..DIVES AKURU SIGN CANDRABINDU +11940 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL YA +11942 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc DIVES AKURU MEDIAL RA +119D1..119D3 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [3] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AA..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN II +119D4..119D7 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN U..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +119DA..119DB ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN E..NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN AI +119DC..119DF ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [4] NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN O..NANDINAGARI SIGN VISARGA +119E4 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc NANDINAGARI VOWEL SIGN PRISHTHAMATRA E +11A01..11A0A ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [10] ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL SIGN I..ZANABAZAR SQUARE VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A35..11A38 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN CANDRABINDU..ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN ANUSVARA +11A39 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN VISARGA +11A3B..11A3E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER YA..ZANABAZAR SQUARE CLUSTER-FINAL LETTER VA +11A51..11A56 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [6] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN I..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN OE +11A57..11A58 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AI..SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN AU +11A59..11A5B ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] SOYOMBO VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R..SOYOMBO VOWEL LENGTH MARK +11A8A..11A96 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [13] SOYOMBO FINAL CONSONANT SIGN G..SOYOMBO SIGN ANUSVARA +11A97 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc SOYOMBO SIGN VISARGA +11C2F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN AA +11C30..11C36 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [7] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN I..BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC L +11C38..11C3D ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [6] BHAIKSUKI VOWEL SIGN E..BHAIKSUKI SIGN ANUSVARA +11C3E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc BHAIKSUKI SIGN VISARGA +11C92..11CA7 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [22] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER KA..MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER ZA +11CA9 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER YA +11CAA..11CB0 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [7] MARCHEN SUBJOINED LETTER RA..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN AA +11CB1 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN I +11CB2..11CB3 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN U..MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN E +11CB4 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc MARCHEN VOWEL SIGN O +11CB5..11CB6 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] MARCHEN SIGN ANUSVARA..MARCHEN SIGN CANDRABINDU +11D31..11D36 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [6] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC R +11D3A ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN E +11D3C..11D3D ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI..MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN O +11D3F..11D41 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [3] MASARAM GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU..MASARAM GONDI SIGN VISARGA +11D43 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MASARAM GONDI SIGN CANDRA +11D47 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MASARAM GONDI RA-KARA +11D8A..11D8E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [5] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AA..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN UU +11D90..11D91 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN EE..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AI +11D93..11D94 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN OO..GUNJALA GONDI VOWEL SIGN AU +11D95 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn GUNJALA GONDI SIGN ANUSVARA +11D96 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc GUNJALA GONDI SIGN VISARGA +11EF3..11EF4 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN I..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN U +11EF5..11EF6 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN E..MAKASAR VOWEL SIGN O +16F4F ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn MIAO SIGN CONSONANT MODIFIER BAR +16F51..16F87 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [55] MIAO SIGN ASPIRATION..MIAO VOWEL SIGN UI +16F8F..16F92 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [4] MIAO TONE RIGHT..MIAO TONE BELOW +16FF0..16FF1 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mc [2] VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK CA..VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK NHAY +1BC9E ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn DUPLOYAN DOUBLE MARK +1E000..1E006 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER AZU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZHIVETE +1E008..1E018 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [17] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER ZEMLJA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER HERU +1E01B..1E021 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [7] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SHTA..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YATI +1E023..1E024 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [2] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YU..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER SMALL YUS +1E026..1E02A ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn [5] COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER YO..COMBINING GLAGOLITIC LETTER FITA +1E947 ; Other_Alphabetic # Mn ADLAM HAMZA +1F130..1F149 ; Other_Alphabetic # So [26] SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +1F150..1F169 ; Other_Alphabetic # So [26] NEGATIVE CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..NEGATIVE CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +1F170..1F189 ; Other_Alphabetic # So [26] NEGATIVE SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..NEGATIVE SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z + +# Total code points: 1404 + +# ================================================ + +3006 ; Ideographic # Lo IDEOGRAPHIC CLOSING MARK +3007 ; Ideographic # Nl IDEOGRAPHIC NUMBER ZERO +3021..3029 ; Ideographic # Nl [9] HANGZHOU NUMERAL ONE..HANGZHOU NUMERAL NINE +3038..303A ; Ideographic # Nl [3] HANGZHOU NUMERAL TEN..HANGZHOU NUMERAL THIRTY +3400..4DBF ; Ideographic # Lo [6592] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3400..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4DBF +4E00..9FFF ; Ideographic # Lo [20992] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4E00..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-9FFF +F900..FA6D ; Ideographic # Lo [366] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-F900..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA6D +FA70..FAD9 ; Ideographic # Lo [106] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA70..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FAD9 +16FE4 ; Ideographic # Mn KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT FILLER +17000..187F7 ; Ideographic # Lo [6136] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-17000..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-187F7 +18800..18CD5 ; Ideographic # Lo [1238] TANGUT COMPONENT-001..KHITAN SMALL SCRIPT CHARACTER-18CD5 +18D00..18D08 ; Ideographic # Lo [9] TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D00..TANGUT IDEOGRAPH-18D08 +1B170..1B2FB ; Ideographic # Lo [396] NUSHU CHARACTER-1B170..NUSHU CHARACTER-1B2FB +20000..2A6DF ; Ideographic # Lo [42720] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-20000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A6DF +2A700..2B738 ; Ideographic # Lo [4153] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A700..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B738 +2B740..2B81D ; Ideographic # Lo [222] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B740..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B81D +2B820..2CEA1 ; Ideographic # Lo [5762] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B820..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEA1 +2CEB0..2EBE0 ; Ideographic # Lo [7473] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEB0..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2EBE0 +2F800..2FA1D ; Ideographic # Lo [542] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2F800..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-2FA1D +30000..3134A ; Ideographic # Lo [4939] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-30000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3134A + +# Total code points: 101661 + +# ================================================ + +005E ; Diacritic # Sk CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +0060 ; Diacritic # Sk GRAVE ACCENT +00A8 ; Diacritic # Sk DIAERESIS +00AF ; Diacritic # Sk MACRON +00B4 ; Diacritic # Sk ACUTE ACCENT +00B7 ; Diacritic # Po MIDDLE DOT +00B8 ; Diacritic # Sk CEDILLA +02B0..02C1 ; Diacritic # Lm [18] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02C2..02C5 ; Diacritic # Sk [4] MODIFIER LETTER LEFT ARROWHEAD..MODIFIER LETTER DOWN ARROWHEAD +02C6..02D1 ; Diacritic # Lm [12] MODIFIER LETTER CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..MODIFIER LETTER HALF TRIANGULAR COLON +02D2..02DF ; Diacritic # Sk [14] MODIFIER LETTER CENTRED RIGHT HALF RING..MODIFIER LETTER CROSS ACCENT +02E0..02E4 ; Diacritic # Lm [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02E5..02EB ; Diacritic # Sk [7] MODIFIER LETTER EXTRA-HIGH TONE BAR..MODIFIER LETTER YANG DEPARTING TONE MARK +02EC ; Diacritic # Lm MODIFIER LETTER VOICING +02ED ; Diacritic # Sk MODIFIER LETTER UNASPIRATED +02EE ; Diacritic # Lm MODIFIER LETTER DOUBLE APOSTROPHE +02EF..02FF ; Diacritic # Sk [17] MODIFIER LETTER LOW DOWN ARROWHEAD..MODIFIER LETTER LOW LEFT ARROW +0300..034E ; Diacritic # Mn [79] COMBINING GRAVE ACCENT..COMBINING UPWARDS ARROW BELOW +0350..0357 ; Diacritic # Mn [8] COMBINING RIGHT ARROWHEAD ABOVE..COMBINING RIGHT HALF RING ABOVE +035D..0362 ; Diacritic # Mn [6] COMBINING DOUBLE BREVE..COMBINING DOUBLE RIGHTWARDS ARROW BELOW +0374 ; Diacritic # Lm GREEK NUMERAL SIGN +0375 ; Diacritic # Sk GREEK LOWER NUMERAL SIGN +037A ; Diacritic # Lm GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +0384..0385 ; Diacritic # Sk [2] GREEK TONOS..GREEK DIALYTIKA TONOS +0483..0487 ; Diacritic # Mn [5] COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO..COMBINING CYRILLIC POKRYTIE +0559 ; Diacritic # Lm ARMENIAN MODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RING +0591..05A1 ; Diacritic # Mn [17] HEBREW ACCENT ETNAHTA..HEBREW ACCENT PAZER +05A3..05BD ; Diacritic # Mn [27] HEBREW ACCENT MUNAH..HEBREW POINT METEG +05BF ; Diacritic # Mn HEBREW POINT RAFE +05C1..05C2 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] HEBREW POINT SHIN DOT..HEBREW POINT SIN DOT +05C4 ; Diacritic # Mn HEBREW MARK UPPER DOT +064B..0652 ; Diacritic # Mn [8] ARABIC FATHATAN..ARABIC SUKUN +0657..0658 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] ARABIC INVERTED DAMMA..ARABIC MARK NOON GHUNNA +06DF..06E0 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] ARABIC SMALL HIGH ROUNDED ZERO..ARABIC SMALL HIGH UPRIGHT RECTANGULAR ZERO +06E5..06E6 ; Diacritic # Lm [2] ARABIC SMALL WAW..ARABIC SMALL YEH +06EA..06EC ; Diacritic # Mn [3] ARABIC EMPTY CENTRE LOW STOP..ARABIC ROUNDED HIGH STOP WITH FILLED CENTRE +0730..074A ; Diacritic # Mn [27] SYRIAC PTHAHA ABOVE..SYRIAC BARREKH +07A6..07B0 ; Diacritic # Mn [11] THAANA ABAFILI..THAANA SUKUN +07EB..07F3 ; Diacritic # Mn [9] NKO COMBINING SHORT HIGH TONE..NKO COMBINING DOUBLE DOT ABOVE +07F4..07F5 ; Diacritic # Lm [2] NKO HIGH TONE APOSTROPHE..NKO LOW TONE APOSTROPHE +0818..0819 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] SAMARITAN MARK OCCLUSION..SAMARITAN MARK DAGESH +0898..089F ; Diacritic # Mn [8] ARABIC SMALL HIGH WORD AL-JUZ..ARABIC HALF MADDA OVER MADDA +08C9 ; Diacritic # Lm ARABIC SMALL FARSI YEH +08CA..08D2 ; Diacritic # Mn [9] ARABIC SMALL HIGH FARSI YEH..ARABIC LARGE ROUND DOT INSIDE CIRCLE BELOW +08E3..08FE ; Diacritic # Mn [28] ARABIC TURNED DAMMA BELOW..ARABIC DAMMA WITH DOT +093C ; Diacritic # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN NUKTA +094D ; Diacritic # Mn DEVANAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +0951..0954 ; Diacritic # Mn [4] DEVANAGARI STRESS SIGN UDATTA..DEVANAGARI ACUTE ACCENT +0971 ; Diacritic # Lm DEVANAGARI SIGN HIGH SPACING DOT +09BC ; Diacritic # Mn BENGALI SIGN NUKTA +09CD ; Diacritic # Mn BENGALI SIGN VIRAMA +0A3C ; Diacritic # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN NUKTA +0A4D ; Diacritic # Mn GURMUKHI SIGN VIRAMA +0ABC ; Diacritic # Mn GUJARATI SIGN NUKTA +0ACD ; Diacritic # Mn GUJARATI SIGN VIRAMA +0AFD..0AFF ; Diacritic # Mn [3] GUJARATI SIGN THREE-DOT NUKTA ABOVE..GUJARATI SIGN TWO-CIRCLE NUKTA ABOVE +0B3C ; Diacritic # Mn ORIYA SIGN NUKTA +0B4D ; Diacritic # Mn ORIYA SIGN VIRAMA +0B55 ; Diacritic # Mn ORIYA SIGN OVERLINE +0BCD ; Diacritic # Mn TAMIL SIGN VIRAMA +0C3C ; Diacritic # Mn TELUGU SIGN NUKTA +0C4D ; Diacritic # Mn TELUGU SIGN VIRAMA +0CBC ; Diacritic # Mn KANNADA SIGN NUKTA +0CCD ; Diacritic # Mn KANNADA SIGN VIRAMA +0D3B..0D3C ; Diacritic # Mn [2] MALAYALAM SIGN VERTICAL BAR VIRAMA..MALAYALAM SIGN CIRCULAR VIRAMA +0D4D ; Diacritic # Mn MALAYALAM SIGN VIRAMA +0DCA ; Diacritic # Mn SINHALA SIGN AL-LAKUNA +0E47..0E4C ; Diacritic # Mn [6] THAI CHARACTER MAITAIKHU..THAI CHARACTER THANTHAKHAT +0E4E ; Diacritic # Mn THAI CHARACTER YAMAKKAN +0EBA ; Diacritic # Mn LAO SIGN PALI VIRAMA +0EC8..0ECC ; Diacritic # Mn [5] LAO TONE MAI EK..LAO CANCELLATION MARK +0F18..0F19 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN -KHYUD PA..TIBETAN ASTROLOGICAL SIGN SDONG TSHUGS +0F35 ; Diacritic # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG NYI ZLA +0F37 ; Diacritic # Mn TIBETAN MARK NGAS BZUNG SGOR RTAGS +0F39 ; Diacritic # Mn TIBETAN MARK TSA -PHRU +0F3E..0F3F ; Diacritic # Mc [2] TIBETAN SIGN YAR TSHES..TIBETAN SIGN MAR TSHES +0F82..0F84 ; Diacritic # Mn [3] TIBETAN SIGN NYI ZLA NAA DA..TIBETAN MARK HALANTA +0F86..0F87 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] TIBETAN SIGN LCI RTAGS..TIBETAN SIGN YANG RTAGS +0FC6 ; Diacritic # Mn TIBETAN SYMBOL PADMA GDAN +1037 ; Diacritic # Mn MYANMAR SIGN DOT BELOW +1039..103A ; Diacritic # Mn [2] MYANMAR SIGN VIRAMA..MYANMAR SIGN ASAT +1063..1064 ; Diacritic # Mc [2] MYANMAR TONE MARK SGAW KAREN HATHI..MYANMAR TONE MARK SGAW KAREN KE PHO +1069..106D ; Diacritic # Mc [5] MYANMAR SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN TONE-1..MYANMAR SIGN WESTERN PWO KAREN TONE-5 +1087..108C ; Diacritic # Mc [6] MYANMAR SIGN SHAN TONE-2..MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL TONE-3 +108D ; Diacritic # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN COUNCIL EMPHATIC TONE +108F ; Diacritic # Mc MYANMAR SIGN RUMAI PALAUNG TONE-5 +109A..109B ; Diacritic # Mc [2] MYANMAR SIGN KHAMTI TONE-1..MYANMAR SIGN KHAMTI TONE-3 +135D..135F ; Diacritic # Mn [3] ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION AND VOWEL LENGTH MARK..ETHIOPIC COMBINING GEMINATION MARK +1714 ; Diacritic # Mn TAGALOG SIGN VIRAMA +1715 ; Diacritic # Mc TAGALOG SIGN PAMUDPOD +17C9..17D3 ; Diacritic # Mn [11] KHMER SIGN MUUSIKATOAN..KHMER SIGN BATHAMASAT +17DD ; Diacritic # Mn KHMER SIGN ATTHACAN +1939..193B ; Diacritic # Mn [3] LIMBU SIGN MUKPHRENG..LIMBU SIGN SA-I +1A75..1A7C ; Diacritic # Mn [8] TAI THAM SIGN TONE-1..TAI THAM SIGN KHUEN-LUE KARAN +1A7F ; Diacritic # Mn TAI THAM COMBINING CRYPTOGRAMMIC DOT +1AB0..1ABD ; Diacritic # Mn [14] COMBINING DOUBLED CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT..COMBINING PARENTHESES BELOW +1ABE ; Diacritic # Me COMBINING PARENTHESES OVERLAY +1AC1..1ACB ; Diacritic # Mn [11] COMBINING LEFT PARENTHESIS ABOVE LEFT..COMBINING TRIPLE ACUTE ACCENT +1B34 ; Diacritic # Mn BALINESE SIGN REREKAN +1B44 ; Diacritic # Mc BALINESE ADEG ADEG +1B6B..1B73 ; Diacritic # Mn [9] BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TEGEH..BALINESE MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING GONG +1BAA ; Diacritic # Mc SUNDANESE SIGN PAMAAEH +1BAB ; Diacritic # Mn SUNDANESE SIGN VIRAMA +1C36..1C37 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] LEPCHA SIGN RAN..LEPCHA SIGN NUKTA +1C78..1C7D ; Diacritic # Lm [6] OL CHIKI MU TTUDDAG..OL CHIKI AHAD +1CD0..1CD2 ; Diacritic # Mn [3] VEDIC TONE KARSHANA..VEDIC TONE PRENKHA +1CD3 ; Diacritic # Po VEDIC SIGN NIHSHVASA +1CD4..1CE0 ; Diacritic # Mn [13] VEDIC SIGN YAJURVEDIC MIDLINE SVARITA..VEDIC TONE RIGVEDIC KASHMIRI INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE1 ; Diacritic # Mc VEDIC TONE ATHARVAVEDIC INDEPENDENT SVARITA +1CE2..1CE8 ; Diacritic # Mn [7] VEDIC SIGN VISARGA SVARITA..VEDIC SIGN VISARGA ANUDATTA WITH TAIL +1CED ; Diacritic # Mn VEDIC SIGN TIRYAK +1CF4 ; Diacritic # Mn VEDIC TONE CANDRA ABOVE +1CF7 ; Diacritic # Mc VEDIC SIGN ATIKRAMA +1CF8..1CF9 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] VEDIC TONE RING ABOVE..VEDIC TONE DOUBLE RING ABOVE +1D2C..1D6A ; Diacritic # Lm [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1DC4..1DCF ; Diacritic # Mn [12] COMBINING MACRON-ACUTE..COMBINING ZIGZAG BELOW +1DF5..1DFF ; Diacritic # Mn [11] COMBINING UP TACK ABOVE..COMBINING RIGHT ARROWHEAD AND DOWN ARROWHEAD BELOW +1FBD ; Diacritic # Sk GREEK KORONIS +1FBF..1FC1 ; Diacritic # Sk [3] GREEK PSILI..GREEK DIALYTIKA AND PERISPOMENI +1FCD..1FCF ; Diacritic # Sk [3] GREEK PSILI AND VARIA..GREEK PSILI AND PERISPOMENI +1FDD..1FDF ; Diacritic # Sk [3] GREEK DASIA AND VARIA..GREEK DASIA AND PERISPOMENI +1FED..1FEF ; Diacritic # Sk [3] GREEK DIALYTIKA AND VARIA..GREEK VARIA +1FFD..1FFE ; Diacritic # Sk [2] GREEK OXIA..GREEK DASIA +2CEF..2CF1 ; Diacritic # Mn [3] COPTIC COMBINING NI ABOVE..COPTIC COMBINING SPIRITUS LENIS +2E2F ; Diacritic # Lm VERTICAL TILDE +302A..302D ; Diacritic # Mn [4] IDEOGRAPHIC LEVEL TONE MARK..IDEOGRAPHIC ENTERING TONE MARK +302E..302F ; Diacritic # Mc [2] HANGUL SINGLE DOT TONE MARK..HANGUL DOUBLE DOT TONE MARK +3099..309A ; Diacritic # Mn [2] COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..COMBINING KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +309B..309C ; Diacritic # Sk [2] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +30FC ; Diacritic # Lm KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK +A66F ; Diacritic # Mn COMBINING CYRILLIC VZMET +A67C..A67D ; Diacritic # Mn [2] COMBINING CYRILLIC KAVYKA..COMBINING CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A67F ; Diacritic # Lm CYRILLIC PAYEROK +A69C..A69D ; Diacritic # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A6F0..A6F1 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] BAMUM COMBINING MARK KOQNDON..BAMUM COMBINING MARK TUKWENTIS +A700..A716 ; Diacritic # Sk [23] MODIFIER LETTER CHINESE TONE YIN PING..MODIFIER LETTER EXTRA-LOW LEFT-STEM TONE BAR +A717..A71F ; Diacritic # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER DOT VERTICAL BAR..MODIFIER LETTER LOW INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +A720..A721 ; Diacritic # Sk [2] MODIFIER LETTER STRESS AND HIGH TONE..MODIFIER LETTER STRESS AND LOW TONE +A788 ; Diacritic # Lm MODIFIER LETTER LOW CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +A789..A78A ; Diacritic # Sk [2] MODIFIER LETTER COLON..MODIFIER LETTER SHORT EQUALS SIGN +A7F8..A7F9 ; Diacritic # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +A8C4 ; Diacritic # Mn SAURASHTRA SIGN VIRAMA +A8E0..A8F1 ; Diacritic # Mn [18] COMBINING DEVANAGARI DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING DEVANAGARI SIGN AVAGRAHA +A92B..A92D ; Diacritic # Mn [3] KAYAH LI TONE PLOPHU..KAYAH LI TONE CALYA PLOPHU +A92E ; Diacritic # Po KAYAH LI SIGN CWI +A953 ; Diacritic # Mc REJANG VIRAMA +A9B3 ; Diacritic # Mn JAVANESE SIGN CECAK TELU +A9C0 ; Diacritic # Mc JAVANESE PANGKON +A9E5 ; Diacritic # Mn MYANMAR SIGN SHAN SAW +AA7B ; Diacritic # Mc MYANMAR SIGN PAO KAREN TONE +AA7C ; Diacritic # Mn MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-2 +AA7D ; Diacritic # Mc MYANMAR SIGN TAI LAING TONE-5 +AABF ; Diacritic # Mn TAI VIET TONE MAI EK +AAC0 ; Diacritic # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI NUENG +AAC1 ; Diacritic # Mn TAI VIET TONE MAI THO +AAC2 ; Diacritic # Lo TAI VIET TONE MAI SONG +AAF6 ; Diacritic # Mn MEETEI MAYEK VIRAMA +AB5B ; Diacritic # Sk MODIFIER BREVE WITH INVERTED BREVE +AB5C..AB5F ; Diacritic # Lm [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +AB69 ; Diacritic # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED W +AB6A..AB6B ; Diacritic # Sk [2] MODIFIER LETTER LEFT TACK..MODIFIER LETTER RIGHT TACK +ABEC ; Diacritic # Mc MEETEI MAYEK LUM IYEK +ABED ; Diacritic # Mn MEETEI MAYEK APUN IYEK +FB1E ; Diacritic # Mn HEBREW POINT JUDEO-SPANISH VARIKA +FE20..FE2F ; Diacritic # Mn [16] COMBINING LIGATURE LEFT HALF..COMBINING CYRILLIC TITLO RIGHT HALF +FF3E ; Diacritic # Sk FULLWIDTH CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +FF40 ; Diacritic # Sk FULLWIDTH GRAVE ACCENT +FF70 ; Diacritic # Lm HALFWIDTH KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK +FF9E..FF9F ; Diacritic # Lm [2] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA VOICED SOUND MARK..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +FFE3 ; Diacritic # Sk FULLWIDTH MACRON +102E0 ; Diacritic # Mn COPTIC EPACT THOUSANDS MARK +10780..10785 ; Diacritic # Lm [6] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; Diacritic # Lm [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; Diacritic # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL +10AE5..10AE6 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK ABOVE..MANICHAEAN ABBREVIATION MARK BELOW +10D22..10D23 ; Diacritic # Lo [2] HANIFI ROHINGYA MARK SAKIN..HANIFI ROHINGYA MARK NA KHONNA +10D24..10D27 ; Diacritic # Mn [4] HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN HARBAHAY..HANIFI ROHINGYA SIGN TASSI +10F46..10F50 ; Diacritic # Mn [11] SOGDIAN COMBINING DOT BELOW..SOGDIAN COMBINING STROKE BELOW +10F82..10F85 ; Diacritic # Mn [4] OLD UYGHUR COMBINING DOT ABOVE..OLD UYGHUR COMBINING TWO DOTS BELOW +11046 ; Diacritic # Mn BRAHMI VIRAMA +11070 ; Diacritic # Mn BRAHMI SIGN OLD TAMIL VIRAMA +110B9..110BA ; Diacritic # Mn [2] KAITHI SIGN VIRAMA..KAITHI SIGN NUKTA +11133..11134 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] CHAKMA VIRAMA..CHAKMA MAAYYAA +11173 ; Diacritic # Mn MAHAJANI SIGN NUKTA +111C0 ; Diacritic # Mc SHARADA SIGN VIRAMA +111CA..111CC ; Diacritic # Mn [3] SHARADA SIGN NUKTA..SHARADA EXTRA SHORT VOWEL MARK +11235 ; Diacritic # Mc KHOJKI SIGN VIRAMA +11236 ; Diacritic # Mn KHOJKI SIGN NUKTA +112E9..112EA ; Diacritic # Mn [2] KHUDAWADI SIGN NUKTA..KHUDAWADI SIGN VIRAMA +1133C ; Diacritic # Mn GRANTHA SIGN NUKTA +1134D ; Diacritic # Mc GRANTHA SIGN VIRAMA +11366..1136C ; Diacritic # Mn [7] COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT ZERO..COMBINING GRANTHA DIGIT SIX +11370..11374 ; Diacritic # Mn [5] COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER A..COMBINING GRANTHA LETTER PA +11442 ; Diacritic # Mn NEWA SIGN VIRAMA +11446 ; Diacritic # Mn NEWA SIGN NUKTA +114C2..114C3 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] TIRHUTA SIGN VIRAMA..TIRHUTA SIGN NUKTA +115BF..115C0 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] SIDDHAM SIGN VIRAMA..SIDDHAM SIGN NUKTA +1163F ; Diacritic # Mn MODI SIGN VIRAMA +116B6 ; Diacritic # Mc TAKRI SIGN VIRAMA +116B7 ; Diacritic # Mn TAKRI SIGN NUKTA +1172B ; Diacritic # Mn AHOM SIGN KILLER +11839..1183A ; Diacritic # Mn [2] DOGRA SIGN VIRAMA..DOGRA SIGN NUKTA +1193D ; Diacritic # Mc DIVES AKURU SIGN HALANTA +1193E ; Diacritic # Mn DIVES AKURU VIRAMA +11943 ; Diacritic # Mn DIVES AKURU SIGN NUKTA +119E0 ; Diacritic # Mn NANDINAGARI SIGN VIRAMA +11A34 ; Diacritic # Mn ZANABAZAR SQUARE SIGN VIRAMA +11A47 ; Diacritic # Mn ZANABAZAR SQUARE SUBJOINER +11A99 ; Diacritic # Mn SOYOMBO SUBJOINER +11C3F ; Diacritic # Mn BHAIKSUKI SIGN VIRAMA +11D42 ; Diacritic # Mn MASARAM GONDI SIGN NUKTA +11D44..11D45 ; Diacritic # Mn [2] MASARAM GONDI SIGN HALANTA..MASARAM GONDI VIRAMA +11D97 ; Diacritic # Mn GUNJALA GONDI VIRAMA +16AF0..16AF4 ; Diacritic # Mn [5] BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH TONE..BASSA VAH COMBINING HIGH-LOW TONE +16B30..16B36 ; Diacritic # Mn [7] PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TUB..PAHAWH HMONG MARK CIM TAUM +16F8F..16F92 ; Diacritic # Mn [4] MIAO TONE RIGHT..MIAO TONE BELOW +16F93..16F9F ; Diacritic # Lm [13] MIAO LETTER TONE-2..MIAO LETTER REFORMED TONE-8 +16FF0..16FF1 ; Diacritic # Mc [2] VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK CA..VIETNAMESE ALTERNATE READING MARK NHAY +1AFF0..1AFF3 ; Diacritic # Lm [4] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-2..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-5 +1AFF5..1AFFB ; Diacritic # Lm [7] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-5 +1AFFD..1AFFE ; Diacritic # Lm [2] KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-7..KATAKANA LETTER MINNAN NASALIZED TONE-8 +1CF00..1CF2D ; Diacritic # Mn [46] ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK GORAZDO NIZKO S KRYZHEM ON LEFT..ZNAMENNY COMBINING MARK KRYZH ON LEFT +1CF30..1CF46 ; Diacritic # Mn [23] ZNAMENNY COMBINING TONAL RANGE MARK MRACHNO..ZNAMENNY PRIZNAK MODIFIER ROG +1D167..1D169 ; Diacritic # Mn [3] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TREMOLO-3 +1D16D..1D172 ; Diacritic # Mc [6] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING AUGMENTATION DOT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING FLAG-5 +1D17B..1D182 ; Diacritic # Mn [8] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING ACCENT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING LOURE +1D185..1D18B ; Diacritic # Mn [7] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOIT..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING TRIPLE TONGUE +1D1AA..1D1AD ; Diacritic # Mn [4] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING DOWN BOW..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING SNAP PIZZICATO +1E130..1E136 ; Diacritic # Mn [7] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-B..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG TONE-D +1E2AE ; Diacritic # Mn TOTO SIGN RISING TONE +1E2EC..1E2EF ; Diacritic # Mn [4] WANCHO TONE TUP..WANCHO TONE KOINI +1E8D0..1E8D6 ; Diacritic # Mn [7] MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER TEENS..MENDE KIKAKUI COMBINING NUMBER MILLIONS +1E944..1E946 ; Diacritic # Mn [3] ADLAM ALIF LENGTHENER..ADLAM GEMINATION MARK +1E948..1E94A ; Diacritic # Mn [3] ADLAM CONSONANT MODIFIER..ADLAM NUKTA + +# Total code points: 1064 + +# ================================================ + +00B7 ; Extender # Po MIDDLE DOT +02D0..02D1 ; Extender # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER TRIANGULAR COLON..MODIFIER LETTER HALF TRIANGULAR COLON +0640 ; Extender # Lm ARABIC TATWEEL +07FA ; Extender # Lm NKO LAJANYALAN +0B55 ; Extender # Mn ORIYA SIGN OVERLINE +0E46 ; Extender # Lm THAI CHARACTER MAIYAMOK +0EC6 ; Extender # Lm LAO KO LA +180A ; Extender # Po MONGOLIAN NIRUGU +1843 ; Extender # Lm MONGOLIAN LETTER TODO LONG VOWEL SIGN +1AA7 ; Extender # Lm TAI THAM SIGN MAI YAMOK +1C36 ; Extender # Mn LEPCHA SIGN RAN +1C7B ; Extender # Lm OL CHIKI RELAA +3005 ; Extender # Lm IDEOGRAPHIC ITERATION MARK +3031..3035 ; Extender # Lm [5] VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK..VERTICAL KANA REPEAT MARK LOWER HALF +309D..309E ; Extender # Lm [2] HIRAGANA ITERATION MARK..HIRAGANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +30FC..30FE ; Extender # Lm [3] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA VOICED ITERATION MARK +A015 ; Extender # Lm YI SYLLABLE WU +A60C ; Extender # Lm VAI SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +A9CF ; Extender # Lm JAVANESE PANGRANGKEP +A9E6 ; Extender # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER SHAN REDUPLICATION +AA70 ; Extender # Lm MYANMAR MODIFIER LETTER KHAMTI REDUPLICATION +AADD ; Extender # Lm TAI VIET SYMBOL SAM +AAF3..AAF4 ; Extender # Lm [2] MEETEI MAYEK SYLLABLE REPETITION MARK..MEETEI MAYEK WORD REPETITION MARK +FF70 ; Extender # Lm HALFWIDTH KATAKANA-HIRAGANA PROLONGED SOUND MARK +10781..10782 ; Extender # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER SUPERSCRIPT TRIANGULAR COLON..MODIFIER LETTER SUPERSCRIPT HALF TRIANGULAR COLON +1135D ; Extender # Lo GRANTHA SIGN PLUTA +115C6..115C8 ; Extender # Po [3] SIDDHAM REPETITION MARK-1..SIDDHAM REPETITION MARK-3 +11A98 ; Extender # Mn SOYOMBO GEMINATION MARK +16B42..16B43 ; Extender # Lm [2] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS NRUA..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN IB YAM +16FE0..16FE1 ; Extender # Lm [2] TANGUT ITERATION MARK..NUSHU ITERATION MARK +16FE3 ; Extender # Lm OLD CHINESE ITERATION MARK +1E13C..1E13D ; Extender # Lm [2] NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SIGN XW XW..NYIAKENG PUACHUE HMONG SYLLABLE LENGTHENER +1E944..1E946 ; Extender # Mn [3] ADLAM ALIF LENGTHENER..ADLAM GEMINATION MARK + +# Total code points: 50 + +# ================================================ + +00AA ; Other_Lowercase # Lo FEMININE ORDINAL INDICATOR +00BA ; Other_Lowercase # Lo MASCULINE ORDINAL INDICATOR +02B0..02B8 ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL H..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL Y +02C0..02C1 ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER GLOTTAL STOP..MODIFIER LETTER REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +02E0..02E4 ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [5] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL GAMMA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL REVERSED GLOTTAL STOP +0345 ; Other_Lowercase # Mn COMBINING GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +037A ; Other_Lowercase # Lm GREEK YPOGEGRAMMENI +1D2C..1D6A ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [63] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL A..GREEK SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER CHI +1D78 ; Other_Lowercase # Lm MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC EN +1D9B..1DBF ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [37] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL TURNED ALPHA..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL THETA +2071 ; Other_Lowercase # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +207F ; Other_Lowercase # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER N +2090..209C ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [13] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER A..LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER T +2170..217F ; Other_Lowercase # Nl [16] SMALL ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..SMALL ROMAN NUMERAL ONE THOUSAND +24D0..24E9 ; Other_Lowercase # So [26] CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER Z +2C7C..2C7D ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [2] LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J..MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL V +A69C..A69D ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC HARD SIGN..MODIFIER LETTER CYRILLIC SOFT SIGN +A770 ; Other_Lowercase # Lm MODIFIER LETTER US +A7F8..A7F9 ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [2] MODIFIER LETTER CAPITAL H WITH STROKE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL LIGATURE OE +AB5C..AB5F ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [4] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL HENG..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL U WITH LEFT HOOK +10780 ; Other_Lowercase # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL AA +10783..10785 ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [3] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL AE..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL B WITH HOOK +10787..107B0 ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [42] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL DZ DIGRAPH..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL V WITH RIGHT HOOK +107B2..107BA ; Other_Lowercase # Lm [9] MODIFIER LETTER SMALL CAPITAL Y..MODIFIER LETTER SMALL S WITH CURL + +# Total code points: 244 + +# ================================================ + +2160..216F ; Other_Uppercase # Nl [16] ROMAN NUMERAL ONE..ROMAN NUMERAL ONE THOUSAND +24B6..24CF ; Other_Uppercase # So [26] CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +1F130..1F149 ; Other_Uppercase # So [26] SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +1F150..1F169 ; Other_Uppercase # So [26] NEGATIVE CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..NEGATIVE CIRCLED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z +1F170..1F189 ; Other_Uppercase # So [26] NEGATIVE SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A..NEGATIVE SQUARED LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z + +# Total code points: 120 + +# ================================================ + +FDD0..FDEF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [32] .. +FFFE..FFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +1FFFE..1FFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +2FFFE..2FFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +3FFFE..3FFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +4FFFE..4FFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +5FFFE..5FFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +6FFFE..6FFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +7FFFE..7FFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +8FFFE..8FFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +9FFFE..9FFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +AFFFE..AFFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +BFFFE..BFFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +CFFFE..CFFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +DFFFE..DFFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +EFFFE..EFFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +FFFFE..FFFFF ; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. +10FFFE..10FFFF; Noncharacter_Code_Point # Cn [2] .. + +# Total code points: 66 + +# ================================================ + +09BE ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc BENGALI VOWEL SIGN AA +09D7 ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc BENGALI AU LENGTH MARK +0B3E ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc ORIYA VOWEL SIGN AA +0B57 ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc ORIYA AU LENGTH MARK +0BBE ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc TAMIL VOWEL SIGN AA +0BD7 ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc TAMIL AU LENGTH MARK +0CC2 ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc KANNADA VOWEL SIGN UU +0CD5..0CD6 ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc [2] KANNADA LENGTH MARK..KANNADA AI LENGTH MARK +0D3E ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc MALAYALAM VOWEL SIGN AA +0D57 ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc MALAYALAM AU LENGTH MARK +0DCF ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc SINHALA VOWEL SIGN AELA-PILLA +0DDF ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc SINHALA VOWEL SIGN GAYANUKITTA +1B35 ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc BALINESE VOWEL SIGN TEDUNG +200C ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Cf ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER +302E..302F ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc [2] HANGUL SINGLE DOT TONE MARK..HANGUL DOUBLE DOT TONE MARK +FF9E..FF9F ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Lm [2] HALFWIDTH KATAKANA VOICED SOUND MARK..HALFWIDTH KATAKANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK +1133E ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc GRANTHA VOWEL SIGN AA +11357 ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc GRANTHA AU LENGTH MARK +114B0 ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN AA +114BD ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc TIRHUTA VOWEL SIGN SHORT O +115AF ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc SIDDHAM VOWEL SIGN AA +11930 ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc DIVES AKURU VOWEL SIGN AA +1D165 ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING STEM +1D16E..1D172 ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Mc [5] MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING FLAG-1..MUSICAL SYMBOL COMBINING FLAG-5 +E0020..E007F ; Other_Grapheme_Extend # Cf [96] TAG SPACE..CANCEL TAG + +# Total code points: 127 + +# ================================================ + +2FF0..2FF1 ; IDS_Binary_Operator # So [2] IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTER LEFT TO RIGHT..IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTER ABOVE TO BELOW +2FF4..2FFB ; IDS_Binary_Operator # So [8] IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTER FULL SURROUND..IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTER OVERLAID + +# Total code points: 10 + +# ================================================ + +2FF2..2FF3 ; IDS_Trinary_Operator # So [2] IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTER LEFT TO MIDDLE AND RIGHT..IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTER ABOVE TO MIDDLE AND BELOW + +# Total code points: 2 + +# ================================================ + +2E80..2E99 ; Radical # So [26] CJK RADICAL REPEAT..CJK RADICAL RAP +2E9B..2EF3 ; Radical # So [89] CJK RADICAL CHOKE..CJK RADICAL C-SIMPLIFIED TURTLE +2F00..2FD5 ; Radical # So [214] KANGXI RADICAL ONE..KANGXI RADICAL FLUTE + +# Total code points: 329 + +# ================================================ + +3400..4DBF ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo [6592] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3400..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4DBF +4E00..9FFF ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo [20992] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-4E00..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-9FFF +FA0E..FA0F ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo [2] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA0E..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA0F +FA11 ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA11 +FA13..FA14 ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo [2] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA13..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA14 +FA1F ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA1F +FA21 ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA21 +FA23..FA24 ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo [2] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA23..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA24 +FA27..FA29 ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo [3] CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA27..CJK COMPATIBILITY IDEOGRAPH-FA29 +20000..2A6DF ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo [42720] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-20000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A6DF +2A700..2B738 ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo [4153] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2A700..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B738 +2B740..2B81D ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo [222] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B740..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B81D +2B820..2CEA1 ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo [5762] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2B820..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEA1 +2CEB0..2EBE0 ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo [7473] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2CEB0..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-2EBE0 +30000..3134A ; Unified_Ideograph # Lo [4939] CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-30000..CJK UNIFIED IDEOGRAPH-3134A + +# Total code points: 92865 + +# ================================================ + +034F ; Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Mn COMBINING GRAPHEME JOINER +115F..1160 ; Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Lo [2] HANGUL CHOSEONG FILLER..HANGUL JUNGSEONG FILLER +17B4..17B5 ; Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Mn [2] KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AQ..KHMER VOWEL INHERENT AA +2065 ; Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cn +3164 ; Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Lo HANGUL FILLER +FFA0 ; Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Lo HALFWIDTH HANGUL FILLER +FFF0..FFF8 ; Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cn [9] .. +E0000 ; Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cn +E0002..E001F ; Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cn [30] .. +E0080..E00FF ; Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cn [128] .. +E01F0..E0FFF ; Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point # Cn [3600] .. + +# Total code points: 3776 + +# ================================================ + +0149 ; Deprecated # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER N PRECEDED BY APOSTROPHE +0673 ; Deprecated # Lo ARABIC LETTER ALEF WITH WAVY HAMZA BELOW +0F77 ; Deprecated # Mn TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC RR +0F79 ; Deprecated # Mn TIBETAN VOWEL SIGN VOCALIC LL +17A3..17A4 ; Deprecated # Lo [2] KHMER INDEPENDENT VOWEL QAQ..KHMER INDEPENDENT VOWEL QAA +206A..206F ; Deprecated # Cf [6] INHIBIT SYMMETRIC SWAPPING..NOMINAL DIGIT SHAPES +2329 ; Deprecated # Ps LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET +232A ; Deprecated # Pe RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET +E0001 ; Deprecated # Cf LANGUAGE TAG + +# Total code points: 15 + +# ================================================ + +0069..006A ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] LATIN SMALL LETTER I..LATIN SMALL LETTER J +012F ; Soft_Dotted # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH OGONEK +0249 ; Soft_Dotted # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH STROKE +0268 ; Soft_Dotted # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH STROKE +029D ; Soft_Dotted # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER J WITH CROSSED-TAIL +02B2 ; Soft_Dotted # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL J +03F3 ; Soft_Dotted # L& GREEK LETTER YOT +0456 ; Soft_Dotted # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER BYELORUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN I +0458 ; Soft_Dotted # L& CYRILLIC SMALL LETTER JE +1D62 ; Soft_Dotted # Lm LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER I +1D96 ; Soft_Dotted # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH RETROFLEX HOOK +1DA4 ; Soft_Dotted # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL I WITH STROKE +1DA8 ; Soft_Dotted # Lm MODIFIER LETTER SMALL J WITH CROSSED-TAIL +1E2D ; Soft_Dotted # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH TILDE BELOW +1ECB ; Soft_Dotted # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH DOT BELOW +2071 ; Soft_Dotted # Lm SUPERSCRIPT LATIN SMALL LETTER I +2148..2149 ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL I..DOUBLE-STRUCK ITALIC SMALL J +2C7C ; Soft_Dotted # Lm LATIN SUBSCRIPT SMALL LETTER J +1D422..1D423 ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SMALL J +1D456..1D457 ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL ITALIC SMALL J +1D48A..1D48B ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL BOLD ITALIC SMALL J +1D4BE..1D4BF ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT SMALL J +1D4F2..1D4F3 ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL BOLD SCRIPT SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL BOLD SCRIPT SMALL J +1D526..1D527 ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL FRAKTUR SMALL J +1D55A..1D55B ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK SMALL J +1D58E..1D58F ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL BOLD FRAKTUR SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL BOLD FRAKTUR SMALL J +1D5C2..1D5C3 ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF SMALL J +1D5F6..1D5F7 ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD SMALL J +1D62A..1D62B ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF ITALIC SMALL J +1D65E..1D65F ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL SANS-SERIF BOLD ITALIC SMALL J +1D692..1D693 ; Soft_Dotted # L& [2] MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE SMALL I..MATHEMATICAL MONOSPACE SMALL J +1DF1A ; Soft_Dotted # L& LATIN SMALL LETTER I WITH STROKE AND RETROFLEX HOOK + +# Total code points: 47 + +# ================================================ + +0E40..0E44 ; Logical_Order_Exception # Lo [5] THAI CHARACTER SARA E..THAI CHARACTER SARA AI MAIMALAI +0EC0..0EC4 ; Logical_Order_Exception # Lo [5] LAO VOWEL SIGN E..LAO VOWEL SIGN AI +19B5..19B7 ; Logical_Order_Exception # Lo [3] NEW TAI LUE VOWEL SIGN E..NEW TAI LUE VOWEL SIGN O +19BA ; Logical_Order_Exception # Lo NEW TAI LUE VOWEL SIGN AY +AAB5..AAB6 ; Logical_Order_Exception # Lo [2] TAI VIET VOWEL E..TAI VIET VOWEL O +AAB9 ; Logical_Order_Exception # Lo TAI VIET VOWEL UEA +AABB..AABC ; Logical_Order_Exception # Lo [2] TAI VIET VOWEL AUE..TAI VIET VOWEL AY + +# Total code points: 19 + +# ================================================ + +1885..1886 ; Other_ID_Start # Mn [2] MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI BALUDA..MONGOLIAN LETTER ALI GALI THREE BALUDA +2118 ; Other_ID_Start # Sm SCRIPT CAPITAL P +212E ; Other_ID_Start # So ESTIMATED SYMBOL +309B..309C ; Other_ID_Start # Sk [2] KATAKANA-HIRAGANA VOICED SOUND MARK..KATAKANA-HIRAGANA SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK + +# Total code points: 6 + +# ================================================ + +00B7 ; Other_ID_Continue # Po MIDDLE DOT +0387 ; Other_ID_Continue # Po GREEK ANO TELEIA +1369..1371 ; Other_ID_Continue # No [9] ETHIOPIC DIGIT ONE..ETHIOPIC DIGIT NINE +19DA ; Other_ID_Continue # No NEW TAI LUE THAM DIGIT ONE + +# Total code points: 12 + +# ================================================ + +0021 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po EXCLAMATION MARK +002E ; Sentence_Terminal # Po FULL STOP +003F ; Sentence_Terminal # Po QUESTION MARK +0589 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po ARMENIAN FULL STOP +061D..061F ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [3] ARABIC END OF TEXT MARK..ARABIC QUESTION MARK +06D4 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po ARABIC FULL STOP +0700..0702 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [3] SYRIAC END OF PARAGRAPH..SYRIAC SUBLINEAR FULL STOP +07F9 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po NKO EXCLAMATION MARK +0837 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po SAMARITAN PUNCTUATION MELODIC QITSA +0839 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po SAMARITAN PUNCTUATION QITSA +083D..083E ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] SAMARITAN PUNCTUATION SOF MASHFAAT..SAMARITAN PUNCTUATION ANNAAU +0964..0965 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] DEVANAGARI DANDA..DEVANAGARI DOUBLE DANDA +104A..104B ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] MYANMAR SIGN LITTLE SECTION..MYANMAR SIGN SECTION +1362 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po ETHIOPIC FULL STOP +1367..1368 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] ETHIOPIC QUESTION MARK..ETHIOPIC PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR +166E ; Sentence_Terminal # Po CANADIAN SYLLABICS FULL STOP +1735..1736 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] PHILIPPINE SINGLE PUNCTUATION..PHILIPPINE DOUBLE PUNCTUATION +1803 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po MONGOLIAN FULL STOP +1809 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po MONGOLIAN MANCHU FULL STOP +1944..1945 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] LIMBU EXCLAMATION MARK..LIMBU QUESTION MARK +1AA8..1AAB ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [4] TAI THAM SIGN KAAN..TAI THAM SIGN SATKAANKUU +1B5A..1B5B ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] BALINESE PANTI..BALINESE PAMADA +1B5E..1B5F ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] BALINESE CARIK SIKI..BALINESE CARIK PAREREN +1B7D..1B7E ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] BALINESE PANTI LANTANG..BALINESE PAMADA LANTANG +1C3B..1C3C ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] LEPCHA PUNCTUATION TA-ROL..LEPCHA PUNCTUATION NYET THYOOM TA-ROL +1C7E..1C7F ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] OL CHIKI PUNCTUATION MUCAAD..OL CHIKI PUNCTUATION DOUBLE MUCAAD +203C..203D ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] DOUBLE EXCLAMATION MARK..INTERROBANG +2047..2049 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [3] DOUBLE QUESTION MARK..EXCLAMATION QUESTION MARK +2E2E ; Sentence_Terminal # Po REVERSED QUESTION MARK +2E3C ; Sentence_Terminal # Po STENOGRAPHIC FULL STOP +2E53..2E54 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] MEDIEVAL EXCLAMATION MARK..MEDIEVAL QUESTION MARK +3002 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po IDEOGRAPHIC FULL STOP +A4FF ; Sentence_Terminal # Po LISU PUNCTUATION FULL STOP +A60E..A60F ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] VAI FULL STOP..VAI QUESTION MARK +A6F3 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po BAMUM FULL STOP +A6F7 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po BAMUM QUESTION MARK +A876..A877 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] PHAGS-PA MARK SHAD..PHAGS-PA MARK DOUBLE SHAD +A8CE..A8CF ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] SAURASHTRA DANDA..SAURASHTRA DOUBLE DANDA +A92F ; Sentence_Terminal # Po KAYAH LI SIGN SHYA +A9C8..A9C9 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] JAVANESE PADA LINGSA..JAVANESE PADA LUNGSI +AA5D..AA5F ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [3] CHAM PUNCTUATION DANDA..CHAM PUNCTUATION TRIPLE DANDA +AAF0..AAF1 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] MEETEI MAYEK CHEIKHAN..MEETEI MAYEK AHANG KHUDAM +ABEB ; Sentence_Terminal # Po MEETEI MAYEK CHEIKHEI +FE52 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po SMALL FULL STOP +FE56..FE57 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] SMALL QUESTION MARK..SMALL EXCLAMATION MARK +FF01 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po FULLWIDTH EXCLAMATION MARK +FF0E ; Sentence_Terminal # Po FULLWIDTH FULL STOP +FF1F ; Sentence_Terminal # Po FULLWIDTH QUESTION MARK +FF61 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po HALFWIDTH IDEOGRAPHIC FULL STOP +10A56..10A57 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] KHAROSHTHI PUNCTUATION DANDA..KHAROSHTHI PUNCTUATION DOUBLE DANDA +10F55..10F59 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [5] SOGDIAN PUNCTUATION TWO VERTICAL BARS..SOGDIAN PUNCTUATION HALF CIRCLE WITH DOT +10F86..10F89 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [4] OLD UYGHUR PUNCTUATION BAR..OLD UYGHUR PUNCTUATION FOUR DOTS +11047..11048 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] BRAHMI DANDA..BRAHMI DOUBLE DANDA +110BE..110C1 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [4] KAITHI SECTION MARK..KAITHI DOUBLE DANDA +11141..11143 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [3] CHAKMA DANDA..CHAKMA QUESTION MARK +111C5..111C6 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] SHARADA DANDA..SHARADA DOUBLE DANDA +111CD ; Sentence_Terminal # Po SHARADA SUTRA MARK +111DE..111DF ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] SHARADA SECTION MARK-1..SHARADA SECTION MARK-2 +11238..11239 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] KHOJKI DANDA..KHOJKI DOUBLE DANDA +1123B..1123C ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] KHOJKI SECTION MARK..KHOJKI DOUBLE SECTION MARK +112A9 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po MULTANI SECTION MARK +1144B..1144C ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] NEWA DANDA..NEWA DOUBLE DANDA +115C2..115C3 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] SIDDHAM DANDA..SIDDHAM DOUBLE DANDA +115C9..115D7 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [15] SIDDHAM END OF TEXT MARK..SIDDHAM SECTION MARK WITH CIRCLES AND FOUR ENCLOSURES +11641..11642 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] MODI DANDA..MODI DOUBLE DANDA +1173C..1173E ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [3] AHOM SIGN SMALL SECTION..AHOM SIGN RULAI +11944 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po DIVES AKURU DOUBLE DANDA +11946 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po DIVES AKURU END OF TEXT MARK +11A42..11A43 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] ZANABAZAR SQUARE MARK SHAD..ZANABAZAR SQUARE MARK DOUBLE SHAD +11A9B..11A9C ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] SOYOMBO MARK SHAD..SOYOMBO MARK DOUBLE SHAD +11C41..11C42 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] BHAIKSUKI DANDA..BHAIKSUKI DOUBLE DANDA +11EF7..11EF8 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] MAKASAR PASSIMBANG..MAKASAR END OF SECTION +16A6E..16A6F ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] MRO DANDA..MRO DOUBLE DANDA +16AF5 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po BASSA VAH FULL STOP +16B37..16B38 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po [2] PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS THOM..PAHAWH HMONG SIGN VOS TSHAB CEEB +16B44 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po PAHAWH HMONG SIGN XAUS +16E98 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po MEDEFAIDRIN FULL STOP +1BC9F ; Sentence_Terminal # Po DUPLOYAN PUNCTUATION CHINOOK FULL STOP +1DA88 ; Sentence_Terminal # Po SIGNWRITING FULL STOP + +# Total code points: 152 + +# ================================================ + +180B..180D ; Variation_Selector # Mn [3] MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR ONE..MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR THREE +180F ; Variation_Selector # Mn MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR FOUR +FE00..FE0F ; Variation_Selector # Mn [16] VARIATION SELECTOR-1..VARIATION SELECTOR-16 +E0100..E01EF ; Variation_Selector # Mn [240] VARIATION SELECTOR-17..VARIATION SELECTOR-256 + +# Total code points: 260 + +# ================================================ + +0009..000D ; Pattern_White_Space # Cc [5] .. +0020 ; Pattern_White_Space # Zs SPACE +0085 ; Pattern_White_Space # Cc +200E..200F ; Pattern_White_Space # Cf [2] LEFT-TO-RIGHT MARK..RIGHT-TO-LEFT MARK +2028 ; Pattern_White_Space # Zl LINE SEPARATOR +2029 ; Pattern_White_Space # Zp PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR + +# Total code points: 11 + +# ================================================ + +0021..0023 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [3] EXCLAMATION MARK..NUMBER SIGN +0024 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sc DOLLAR SIGN +0025..0027 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [3] PERCENT SIGN..APOSTROPHE +0028 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT PARENTHESIS +0029 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT PARENTHESIS +002A ; Pattern_Syntax # Po ASTERISK +002B ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm PLUS SIGN +002C ; Pattern_Syntax # Po COMMA +002D ; Pattern_Syntax # Pd HYPHEN-MINUS +002E..002F ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [2] FULL STOP..SOLIDUS +003A..003B ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [2] COLON..SEMICOLON +003C..003E ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [3] LESS-THAN SIGN..GREATER-THAN SIGN +003F..0040 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [2] QUESTION MARK..COMMERCIAL AT +005B ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET +005C ; Pattern_Syntax # Po REVERSE SOLIDUS +005D ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET +005E ; Pattern_Syntax # Sk CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT +0060 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sk GRAVE ACCENT +007B ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT CURLY BRACKET +007C ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm VERTICAL LINE +007D ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT CURLY BRACKET +007E ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm TILDE +00A1 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK +00A2..00A5 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sc [4] CENT SIGN..YEN SIGN +00A6 ; Pattern_Syntax # So BROKEN BAR +00A7 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po SECTION SIGN +00A9 ; Pattern_Syntax # So COPYRIGHT SIGN +00AB ; Pattern_Syntax # Pi LEFT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +00AC ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm NOT SIGN +00AE ; Pattern_Syntax # So REGISTERED SIGN +00B0 ; Pattern_Syntax # So DEGREE SIGN +00B1 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm PLUS-MINUS SIGN +00B6 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po PILCROW SIGN +00BB ; Pattern_Syntax # Pf RIGHT-POINTING DOUBLE ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +00BF ; Pattern_Syntax # Po INVERTED QUESTION MARK +00D7 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm MULTIPLICATION SIGN +00F7 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm DIVISION SIGN +2010..2015 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pd [6] HYPHEN..HORIZONTAL BAR +2016..2017 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [2] DOUBLE VERTICAL LINE..DOUBLE LOW LINE +2018 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pi LEFT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK +2019 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pf RIGHT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK +201A ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps SINGLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK +201B..201C ; Pattern_Syntax # Pi [2] SINGLE HIGH-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK..LEFT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK +201D ; Pattern_Syntax # Pf RIGHT DOUBLE QUOTATION MARK +201E ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps DOUBLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK +201F ; Pattern_Syntax # Pi DOUBLE HIGH-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK +2020..2027 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [8] DAGGER..HYPHENATION POINT +2030..2038 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [9] PER MILLE SIGN..CARET +2039 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pi SINGLE LEFT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +203A ; Pattern_Syntax # Pf SINGLE RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK +203B..203E ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [4] REFERENCE MARK..OVERLINE +2041..2043 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [3] CARET INSERTION POINT..HYPHEN BULLET +2044 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm FRACTION SLASH +2045 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH QUILL +2046 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH QUILL +2047..2051 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [11] DOUBLE QUESTION MARK..TWO ASTERISKS ALIGNED VERTICALLY +2052 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm COMMERCIAL MINUS SIGN +2053 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po SWUNG DASH +2055..205E ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [10] FLOWER PUNCTUATION MARK..VERTICAL FOUR DOTS +2190..2194 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [5] LEFTWARDS ARROW..LEFT RIGHT ARROW +2195..2199 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [5] UP DOWN ARROW..SOUTH WEST ARROW +219A..219B ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH STROKE..RIGHTWARDS ARROW WITH STROKE +219C..219F ; Pattern_Syntax # So [4] LEFTWARDS WAVE ARROW..UPWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW +21A0 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm RIGHTWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW +21A1..21A2 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [2] DOWNWARDS TWO HEADED ARROW..LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH TAIL +21A3 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm RIGHTWARDS ARROW WITH TAIL +21A4..21A5 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [2] LEFTWARDS ARROW FROM BAR..UPWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21A6 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm RIGHTWARDS ARROW FROM BAR +21A7..21AD ; Pattern_Syntax # So [7] DOWNWARDS ARROW FROM BAR..LEFT RIGHT WAVE ARROW +21AE ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm LEFT RIGHT ARROW WITH STROKE +21AF..21CD ; Pattern_Syntax # So [31] DOWNWARDS ZIGZAG ARROW..LEFTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE +21CE..21CF ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [2] LEFT RIGHT DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE..RIGHTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW WITH STROKE +21D0..21D1 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [2] LEFTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW..UPWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D2 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm RIGHTWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D3 ; Pattern_Syntax # So DOWNWARDS DOUBLE ARROW +21D4 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm LEFT RIGHT DOUBLE ARROW +21D5..21F3 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [31] UP DOWN DOUBLE ARROW..UP DOWN WHITE ARROW +21F4..22FF ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [268] RIGHT ARROW WITH SMALL CIRCLE..Z NOTATION BAG MEMBERSHIP +2300..2307 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [8] DIAMETER SIGN..WAVY LINE +2308 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT CEILING +2309 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT CEILING +230A ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT FLOOR +230B ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT FLOOR +230C..231F ; Pattern_Syntax # So [20] BOTTOM RIGHT CROP..BOTTOM RIGHT CORNER +2320..2321 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [2] TOP HALF INTEGRAL..BOTTOM HALF INTEGRAL +2322..2328 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [7] FROWN..KEYBOARD +2329 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET +232A ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET +232B..237B ; Pattern_Syntax # So [81] ERASE TO THE LEFT..NOT CHECK MARK +237C ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm RIGHT ANGLE WITH DOWNWARDS ZIGZAG ARROW +237D..239A ; Pattern_Syntax # So [30] SHOULDERED OPEN BOX..CLEAR SCREEN SYMBOL +239B..23B3 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [25] LEFT PARENTHESIS UPPER HOOK..SUMMATION BOTTOM +23B4..23DB ; Pattern_Syntax # So [40] TOP SQUARE BRACKET..FUSE +23DC..23E1 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [6] TOP PARENTHESIS..BOTTOM TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +23E2..2426 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [69] WHITE TRAPEZIUM..SYMBOL FOR SUBSTITUTE FORM TWO +2427..243F ; Pattern_Syntax # Cn [25] .. +2440..244A ; Pattern_Syntax # So [11] OCR HOOK..OCR DOUBLE BACKSLASH +244B..245F ; Pattern_Syntax # Cn [21] .. +2500..25B6 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [183] BOX DRAWINGS LIGHT HORIZONTAL..BLACK RIGHT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25B7 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm WHITE RIGHT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25B8..25C0 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [9] BLACK RIGHT-POINTING SMALL TRIANGLE..BLACK LEFT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25C1 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm WHITE LEFT-POINTING TRIANGLE +25C2..25F7 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [54] BLACK LEFT-POINTING SMALL TRIANGLE..WHITE CIRCLE WITH UPPER RIGHT QUADRANT +25F8..25FF ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [8] UPPER LEFT TRIANGLE..LOWER RIGHT TRIANGLE +2600..266E ; Pattern_Syntax # So [111] BLACK SUN WITH RAYS..MUSIC NATURAL SIGN +266F ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm MUSIC SHARP SIGN +2670..2767 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [248] WEST SYRIAC CROSS..ROTATED FLORAL HEART BULLET +2768 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps MEDIUM LEFT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +2769 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe MEDIUM RIGHT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276A ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps MEDIUM FLATTENED LEFT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276B ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe MEDIUM FLATTENED RIGHT PARENTHESIS ORNAMENT +276C ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps MEDIUM LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +276D ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe MEDIUM RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +276E ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps HEAVY LEFT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK ORNAMENT +276F ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe HEAVY RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE QUOTATION MARK ORNAMENT +2770 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps HEAVY LEFT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +2771 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe HEAVY RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE BRACKET ORNAMENT +2772 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LIGHT LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET ORNAMENT +2773 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe LIGHT RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET ORNAMENT +2774 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps MEDIUM LEFT CURLY BRACKET ORNAMENT +2775 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe MEDIUM RIGHT CURLY BRACKET ORNAMENT +2794..27BF ; Pattern_Syntax # So [44] HEAVY WIDE-HEADED RIGHTWARDS ARROW..DOUBLE CURLY LOOP +27C0..27C4 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [5] THREE DIMENSIONAL ANGLE..OPEN SUPERSET +27C5 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27C6 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT S-SHAPED BAG DELIMITER +27C7..27E5 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [31] OR WITH DOT INSIDE..WHITE SQUARE WITH RIGHTWARDS TICK +27E6 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E7 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +27E8 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +27E9 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +27EA ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EB ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +27EC ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27ED ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +27EE ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps MATHEMATICAL LEFT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +27EF ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe MATHEMATICAL RIGHT FLATTENED PARENTHESIS +27F0..27FF ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [16] UPWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW..LONG RIGHTWARDS SQUIGGLE ARROW +2800..28FF ; Pattern_Syntax # So [256] BRAILLE PATTERN BLANK..BRAILLE PATTERN DOTS-12345678 +2900..2982 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [131] RIGHTWARDS TWO-HEADED ARROW WITH VERTICAL STROKE..Z NOTATION TYPE COLON +2983 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2984 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT WHITE CURLY BRACKET +2985 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2986 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT WHITE PARENTHESIS +2987 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps Z NOTATION LEFT IMAGE BRACKET +2988 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe Z NOTATION RIGHT IMAGE BRACKET +2989 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps Z NOTATION LEFT BINDING BRACKET +298A ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe Z NOTATION RIGHT BINDING BRACKET +298B ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298C ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH UNDERBAR +298D ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +298E ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +298F ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN BOTTOM CORNER +2990 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH TICK IN TOP CORNER +2991 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2992 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET WITH DOT +2993 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2994 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2995 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps DOUBLE LEFT ARC GREATER-THAN BRACKET +2996 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe DOUBLE RIGHT ARC LESS-THAN BRACKET +2997 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +2998 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT BLACK TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +2999..29D7 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [63] DOTTED FENCE..BLACK HOURGLASS +29D8 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT WIGGLY FENCE +29D9 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT WIGGLY FENCE +29DA ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29DB ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT DOUBLE WIGGLY FENCE +29DC..29FB ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [32] INCOMPLETE INFINITY..TRIPLE PLUS +29FC ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +29FD ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT-POINTING CURVED ANGLE BRACKET +29FE..2AFF ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [258] TINY..N-ARY WHITE VERTICAL BAR +2B00..2B2F ; Pattern_Syntax # So [48] NORTH EAST WHITE ARROW..WHITE VERTICAL ELLIPSE +2B30..2B44 ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [21] LEFT ARROW WITH SMALL CIRCLE..RIGHTWARDS ARROW THROUGH SUPERSET +2B45..2B46 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [2] LEFTWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW..RIGHTWARDS QUADRUPLE ARROW +2B47..2B4C ; Pattern_Syntax # Sm [6] REVERSE TILDE OPERATOR ABOVE RIGHTWARDS ARROW..RIGHTWARDS ARROW ABOVE REVERSE TILDE OPERATOR +2B4D..2B73 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [39] DOWNWARDS TRIANGLE-HEADED ZIGZAG ARROW..DOWNWARDS TRIANGLE-HEADED ARROW TO BAR +2B74..2B75 ; Pattern_Syntax # Cn [2] .. +2B76..2B95 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [32] NORTH WEST TRIANGLE-HEADED ARROW TO BAR..RIGHTWARDS BLACK ARROW +2B96 ; Pattern_Syntax # Cn +2B97..2BFF ; Pattern_Syntax # So [105] SYMBOL FOR TYPE A ELECTRONICS..HELLSCHREIBER PAUSE SYMBOL +2E00..2E01 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [2] RIGHT ANGLE SUBSTITUTION MARKER..RIGHT ANGLE DOTTED SUBSTITUTION MARKER +2E02 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pi LEFT SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E03 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pf RIGHT SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E04 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pi LEFT DOTTED SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E05 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pf RIGHT DOTTED SUBSTITUTION BRACKET +2E06..2E08 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [3] RAISED INTERPOLATION MARKER..DOTTED TRANSPOSITION MARKER +2E09 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pi LEFT TRANSPOSITION BRACKET +2E0A ; Pattern_Syntax # Pf RIGHT TRANSPOSITION BRACKET +2E0B ; Pattern_Syntax # Po RAISED SQUARE +2E0C ; Pattern_Syntax # Pi LEFT RAISED OMISSION BRACKET +2E0D ; Pattern_Syntax # Pf RIGHT RAISED OMISSION BRACKET +2E0E..2E16 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [9] EDITORIAL CORONIS..DOTTED RIGHT-POINTING ANGLE +2E17 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pd DOUBLE OBLIQUE HYPHEN +2E18..2E19 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [2] INVERTED INTERROBANG..PALM BRANCH +2E1A ; Pattern_Syntax # Pd HYPHEN WITH DIAERESIS +2E1B ; Pattern_Syntax # Po TILDE WITH RING ABOVE +2E1C ; Pattern_Syntax # Pi LEFT LOW PARAPHRASE BRACKET +2E1D ; Pattern_Syntax # Pf RIGHT LOW PARAPHRASE BRACKET +2E1E..2E1F ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [2] TILDE WITH DOT ABOVE..TILDE WITH DOT BELOW +2E20 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pi LEFT VERTICAL BAR WITH QUILL +2E21 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pf RIGHT VERTICAL BAR WITH QUILL +2E22 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps TOP LEFT HALF BRACKET +2E23 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe TOP RIGHT HALF BRACKET +2E24 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps BOTTOM LEFT HALF BRACKET +2E25 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe BOTTOM RIGHT HALF BRACKET +2E26 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT SIDEWAYS U BRACKET +2E27 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT SIDEWAYS U BRACKET +2E28 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT DOUBLE PARENTHESIS +2E29 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT DOUBLE PARENTHESIS +2E2A..2E2E ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [5] TWO DOTS OVER ONE DOT PUNCTUATION..REVERSED QUESTION MARK +2E2F ; Pattern_Syntax # Lm VERTICAL TILDE +2E30..2E39 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [10] RING POINT..TOP HALF SECTION SIGN +2E3A..2E3B ; Pattern_Syntax # Pd [2] TWO-EM DASH..THREE-EM DASH +2E3C..2E3F ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [4] STENOGRAPHIC FULL STOP..CAPITULUM +2E40 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pd DOUBLE HYPHEN +2E41 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po REVERSED COMMA +2E42 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps DOUBLE LOW-REVERSED-9 QUOTATION MARK +2E43..2E4F ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [13] DASH WITH LEFT UPTURN..CORNISH VERSE DIVIDER +2E50..2E51 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [2] CROSS PATTY WITH RIGHT CROSSBAR..CROSS PATTY WITH LEFT CROSSBAR +2E52..2E54 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [3] TIRONIAN SIGN CAPITAL ET..MEDIEVAL QUESTION MARK +2E55 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH STROKE +2E56 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH STROKE +2E57 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT SQUARE BRACKET WITH DOUBLE STROKE +2E58 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT SQUARE BRACKET WITH DOUBLE STROKE +2E59 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps TOP HALF LEFT PARENTHESIS +2E5A ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe TOP HALF RIGHT PARENTHESIS +2E5B ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps BOTTOM HALF LEFT PARENTHESIS +2E5C ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe BOTTOM HALF RIGHT PARENTHESIS +2E5D ; Pattern_Syntax # Pd OBLIQUE HYPHEN +2E5E..2E7F ; Pattern_Syntax # Cn [34] .. +3001..3003 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [3] IDEOGRAPHIC COMMA..DITTO MARK +3008 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT ANGLE BRACKET +3009 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT ANGLE BRACKET +300A ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +300B ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT DOUBLE ANGLE BRACKET +300C ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT CORNER BRACKET +300D ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT CORNER BRACKET +300E ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +300F ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT WHITE CORNER BRACKET +3010 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +3011 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT BLACK LENTICULAR BRACKET +3012..3013 ; Pattern_Syntax # So [2] POSTAL MARK..GETA MARK +3014 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3015 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3016 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +3017 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT WHITE LENTICULAR BRACKET +3018 ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +3019 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT WHITE TORTOISE SHELL BRACKET +301A ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps LEFT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +301B ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe RIGHT WHITE SQUARE BRACKET +301C ; Pattern_Syntax # Pd WAVE DASH +301D ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps REVERSED DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK +301E..301F ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe [2] DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK..LOW DOUBLE PRIME QUOTATION MARK +3020 ; Pattern_Syntax # So POSTAL MARK FACE +3030 ; Pattern_Syntax # Pd WAVY DASH +FD3E ; Pattern_Syntax # Pe ORNATE LEFT PARENTHESIS +FD3F ; Pattern_Syntax # Ps ORNATE RIGHT PARENTHESIS +FE45..FE46 ; Pattern_Syntax # Po [2] SESAME DOT..WHITE SESAME DOT + +# Total code points: 2760 + +# ================================================ + +0600..0605 ; Prepended_Concatenation_Mark # Cf [6] ARABIC NUMBER SIGN..ARABIC NUMBER MARK ABOVE +06DD ; Prepended_Concatenation_Mark # Cf ARABIC END OF AYAH +070F ; Prepended_Concatenation_Mark # Cf SYRIAC ABBREVIATION MARK +0890..0891 ; Prepended_Concatenation_Mark # Cf [2] ARABIC POUND MARK ABOVE..ARABIC PIASTRE MARK ABOVE +08E2 ; Prepended_Concatenation_Mark # Cf ARABIC DISPUTED END OF AYAH +110BD ; Prepended_Concatenation_Mark # Cf KAITHI NUMBER SIGN +110CD ; Prepended_Concatenation_Mark # Cf KAITHI NUMBER SIGN ABOVE + +# Total code points: 13 + +# ================================================ + +1F1E6..1F1FF ; Regional_Indicator # So [26] REGIONAL INDICATOR SYMBOL LETTER A..REGIONAL INDICATOR SYMBOL LETTER Z + +# Total code points: 26 + +# EOF diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/PropertyAliases.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/PropertyAliases.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3e4b429e --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/PropertyAliases.txt @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +# PropertyAliases-14.0.0.txt +# Date: 2021-03-08, 19:35:48 GMT +# © 2021 Unicode®, Inc. +# Unicode and the Unicode Logo are registered trademarks of Unicode, Inc. in the U.S. and other countries. +# For terms of use, see http://www.unicode.org/terms_of_use.html +# +# Unicode Character Database +# For documentation, see http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr44/ +# +# This file contains aliases for properties used in the UCD. +# These names can be used for XML formats of UCD data, for regular-expression +# property tests, and other programmatic textual descriptions of Unicode data. +# +# The names may be translated in appropriate environments, and additional +# aliases may be useful. +# +# FORMAT +# +# Each line has two or more fields, separated by semicolons. +# +# First Field: The first field is the short name for the property. +# It is typically an abbreviation, but in a number of cases it is simply +# a duplicate of the "long name" in the second field. +# For Unihan database tags, the short name is actually a longer string than +# the tag specified in the second field. +# +# Second Field: The second field is the long name for the property, +# typically the formal name used in documentation about the property. +# +# The above are the preferred aliases. Other aliases may be listed in additional fields. +# +# Loose matching should be applied to all property names and property values, with +# the exception of String Property values. With loose matching of property names and +# values, the case distinctions, whitespace, and '_' are ignored. For Numeric Property +# values, numeric equivalencies are applied: thus "01.00" is equivalent to "1". +# +# NOTE: Property value names are NOT unique across properties. For example: +# +# AL means Arabic Letter for the Bidi_Class property, and +# AL means Above_Left for the Combining_Class property, and +# AL means Alphabetic for the Line_Break property. +# +# In addition, some property names may be the same as some property value names. +# For example: +# +# sc means the Script property, and +# Sc means the General_Category property value Currency_Symbol (Sc) +# +# The combination of property value and property name is, however, unique. +# +# For more information, see UAX #44, Unicode Character Database, and +# UTS #18, Unicode Regular Expressions. +# ================================================ + + +# ================================================ +# Numeric Properties +# ================================================ +cjkAccountingNumeric ; kAccountingNumeric +cjkOtherNumeric ; kOtherNumeric +cjkPrimaryNumeric ; kPrimaryNumeric +nv ; Numeric_Value + +# ================================================ +# String Properties +# ================================================ +cf ; Case_Folding +cjkCompatibilityVariant ; kCompatibilityVariant +dm ; Decomposition_Mapping +FC_NFKC ; FC_NFKC_Closure +lc ; Lowercase_Mapping +NFKC_CF ; NFKC_Casefold +scf ; Simple_Case_Folding ; sfc +slc ; Simple_Lowercase_Mapping +stc ; Simple_Titlecase_Mapping +suc ; Simple_Uppercase_Mapping +tc ; Titlecase_Mapping +uc ; Uppercase_Mapping + +# ================================================ +# Miscellaneous Properties +# ================================================ +bmg ; Bidi_Mirroring_Glyph +bpb ; Bidi_Paired_Bracket +cjkIICore ; kIICore +cjkIRG_GSource ; kIRG_GSource +cjkIRG_HSource ; kIRG_HSource +cjkIRG_JSource ; kIRG_JSource +cjkIRG_KPSource ; kIRG_KPSource +cjkIRG_KSource ; kIRG_KSource +cjkIRG_MSource ; kIRG_MSource +cjkIRG_SSource ; kIRG_SSource +cjkIRG_TSource ; kIRG_TSource +cjkIRG_UKSource ; kIRG_UKSource +cjkIRG_USource ; kIRG_USource +cjkIRG_VSource ; kIRG_VSource +cjkRSUnicode ; kRSUnicode ; Unicode_Radical_Stroke; URS +EqUIdeo ; Equivalent_Unified_Ideograph +isc ; ISO_Comment +JSN ; Jamo_Short_Name +na ; Name +na1 ; Unicode_1_Name +Name_Alias ; Name_Alias +scx ; Script_Extensions + +# ================================================ +# Catalog Properties +# ================================================ +age ; Age +blk ; Block +sc ; Script + +# ================================================ +# Enumerated Properties +# ================================================ +bc ; Bidi_Class +bpt ; Bidi_Paired_Bracket_Type +ccc ; Canonical_Combining_Class +dt ; Decomposition_Type +ea ; East_Asian_Width +gc ; General_Category +GCB ; Grapheme_Cluster_Break +hst ; Hangul_Syllable_Type +InPC ; Indic_Positional_Category +InSC ; Indic_Syllabic_Category +jg ; Joining_Group +jt ; Joining_Type +lb ; Line_Break +NFC_QC ; NFC_Quick_Check +NFD_QC ; NFD_Quick_Check +NFKC_QC ; NFKC_Quick_Check +NFKD_QC ; NFKD_Quick_Check +nt ; Numeric_Type +SB ; Sentence_Break +vo ; Vertical_Orientation +WB ; Word_Break + +# ================================================ +# Binary Properties +# ================================================ +AHex ; ASCII_Hex_Digit +Alpha ; Alphabetic +Bidi_C ; Bidi_Control +Bidi_M ; Bidi_Mirrored +Cased ; Cased +CE ; Composition_Exclusion +CI ; Case_Ignorable +Comp_Ex ; Full_Composition_Exclusion +CWCF ; Changes_When_Casefolded +CWCM ; Changes_When_Casemapped +CWKCF ; Changes_When_NFKC_Casefolded +CWL ; Changes_When_Lowercased +CWT ; Changes_When_Titlecased +CWU ; Changes_When_Uppercased +Dash ; Dash +Dep ; Deprecated +DI ; Default_Ignorable_Code_Point +Dia ; Diacritic +EBase ; Emoji_Modifier_Base +EComp ; Emoji_Component +EMod ; Emoji_Modifier +Emoji ; Emoji +EPres ; Emoji_Presentation +Ext ; Extender +ExtPict ; Extended_Pictographic +Gr_Base ; Grapheme_Base +Gr_Ext ; Grapheme_Extend +Gr_Link ; Grapheme_Link +Hex ; Hex_Digit +Hyphen ; Hyphen +IDC ; ID_Continue +Ideo ; Ideographic +IDS ; ID_Start +IDSB ; IDS_Binary_Operator +IDST ; IDS_Trinary_Operator +Join_C ; Join_Control +LOE ; Logical_Order_Exception +Lower ; Lowercase +Math ; Math +NChar ; Noncharacter_Code_Point +OAlpha ; Other_Alphabetic +ODI ; Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point +OGr_Ext ; Other_Grapheme_Extend +OIDC ; Other_ID_Continue +OIDS ; Other_ID_Start +OLower ; Other_Lowercase +OMath ; Other_Math +OUpper ; Other_Uppercase +Pat_Syn ; Pattern_Syntax +Pat_WS ; Pattern_White_Space +PCM ; Prepended_Concatenation_Mark +QMark ; Quotation_Mark +Radical ; Radical +RI ; Regional_Indicator +SD ; Soft_Dotted +STerm ; Sentence_Terminal +Term ; Terminal_Punctuation +UIdeo ; Unified_Ideograph +Upper ; Uppercase +VS ; Variation_Selector +WSpace ; White_Space ; space +XIDC ; XID_Continue +XIDS ; XID_Start +XO_NFC ; Expands_On_NFC +XO_NFD ; Expands_On_NFD +XO_NFKC ; Expands_On_NFKC +XO_NFKD ; Expands_On_NFKD + +# ================================================ +# Total: 129 + +# EOF diff --git a/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/PropertyValueAliases.txt b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/PropertyValueAliases.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f0cb26bd --- /dev/null +++ b/Kha/Backends/Kore-hxcpp/khacpp/project/thirdparty/pcre2-10.42-16/maint/Unicode.tables/PropertyValueAliases.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1615 @@ +# PropertyValueAliases-14.0.0.txt +# Date: 2021-05-10, 21:08:53 GMT +# © 2021 Unicode®, Inc. +# Unicode and the Unicode Logo are registered trademarks of Unicode, Inc. in the U.S. and other countries. +# For terms of use, see http://www.unicode.org/terms_of_use.html +# +# Unicode Character Database +# For documentation, see http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr44/ +# +# This file contains aliases for property values used in the UCD. +# These names can be used for XML formats of UCD data, for regular-expression +# property tests, and other programmatic textual descriptions of Unicode data. +# +# The names may be translated in appropriate environments, and additional +# aliases may be useful. +# +# FORMAT +# +# Each line describes a property value name. +# This consists of three or more fields, separated by semicolons. +# +# First Field: The first field describes the property for which that +# property value name is used. +# +# Second Field: The second field is the short name for the property value. +# It is typically an abbreviation, but in a number of cases it is simply +# a duplicate of the "long name" in the third field. +# +# Third Field: The third field is the long name for the property value, +# typically the formal name used in documentation about the property value. +# +# In the case of Canonical_Combining_Class (ccc), there are 4 fields: +# The second field is numeric, the third is the short name, and the fourth is the long name. +# +# The above are the preferred aliases. Other aliases may be listed in additional fields. +# +# Loose matching should be applied to all property names and property values, with +# the exception of String Property values. With loose matching of property names and +# values, the case distinctions, whitespace, hyphens, and '_' are ignored. +# For Numeric Property values, numeric equivalence is applied: thus "01.00" +# is equivalent to "1". +# +# NOTE: Property value names are NOT unique across properties. For example: +# +# AL means Arabic Letter for the Bidi_Class property, and +# AL means Above_Left for the Canonical_Combining_Class property, and +# AL means Alphabetic for the Line_Break property. +# +# In addition, some property names may be the same as some property value names. +# For example: +# +# sc means the Script property, and +# Sc means the General_Category property value Currency_Symbol (Sc) +# +# The combination of property value and property name is, however, unique. +# +# For more information, see UAX #44, Unicode Character Database, and +# UTS #18, Unicode Regular Expressions. +# ================================================ + + +# ASCII_Hex_Digit (AHex) + +AHex; N ; No ; F ; False +AHex; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Age (age) + +age; 1.1 ; V1_1 +age; 2.0 ; V2_0 +age; 2.1 ; V2_1 +age; 3.0 ; V3_0 +age; 3.1 ; V3_1 +age; 3.2 ; V3_2 +age; 4.0 ; V4_0 +age; 4.1 ; V4_1 +age; 5.0 ; V5_0 +age; 5.1 ; V5_1 +age; 5.2 ; V5_2 +age; 6.0 ; V6_0 +age; 6.1 ; V6_1 +age; 6.2 ; V6_2 +age; 6.3 ; V6_3 +age; 7.0 ; V7_0 +age; 8.0 ; V8_0 +age; 9.0 ; V9_0 +age; 10.0 ; V10_0 +age; 11.0 ; V11_0 +age; 12.0 ; V12_0 +age; 12.1 ; V12_1 +age; 13.0 ; V13_0 +age; 14.0 ; V14_0 +age; NA ; Unassigned + +# Alphabetic (Alpha) + +Alpha; N ; No ; F ; False +Alpha; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Bidi_Class (bc) + +bc ; AL ; Arabic_Letter +bc ; AN ; Arabic_Number +bc ; B ; Paragraph_Separator +bc ; BN ; Boundary_Neutral +bc ; CS ; Common_Separator +bc ; EN ; European_Number +bc ; ES ; European_Separator +bc ; ET ; European_Terminator +bc ; FSI ; First_Strong_Isolate +bc ; L ; Left_To_Right +bc ; LRE ; Left_To_Right_Embedding +bc ; LRI ; Left_To_Right_Isolate +bc ; LRO ; Left_To_Right_Override +bc ; NSM ; Nonspacing_Mark +bc ; ON ; Other_Neutral +bc ; PDF ; Pop_Directional_Format +bc ; PDI ; Pop_Directional_Isolate +bc ; R ; Right_To_Left +bc ; RLE ; Right_To_Left_Embedding +bc ; RLI ; Right_To_Left_Isolate +bc ; RLO ; Right_To_Left_Override +bc ; S ; Segment_Separator +bc ; WS ; White_Space + +# Bidi_Control (Bidi_C) + +Bidi_C; N ; No ; F ; False +Bidi_C; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Bidi_Mirrored (Bidi_M) + +Bidi_M; N ; No ; F ; False +Bidi_M; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Bidi_Mirroring_Glyph (bmg) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Bidi_Mirroring_Glyph; + +# Bidi_Paired_Bracket (bpb) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Bidi_Paired_Bracket; + +# Bidi_Paired_Bracket_Type (bpt) + +bpt; c ; Close +bpt; n ; None +bpt; o ; Open +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Bidi_Paired_Bracket_Type; n + +# Block (blk) + +blk; Adlam ; Adlam +blk; Aegean_Numbers ; Aegean_Numbers +blk; Ahom ; Ahom +blk; Alchemical ; Alchemical_Symbols +blk; Alphabetic_PF ; Alphabetic_Presentation_Forms +blk; Anatolian_Hieroglyphs ; Anatolian_Hieroglyphs +blk; Ancient_Greek_Music ; Ancient_Greek_Musical_Notation +blk; Ancient_Greek_Numbers ; Ancient_Greek_Numbers +blk; Ancient_Symbols ; Ancient_Symbols +blk; Arabic ; Arabic +blk; Arabic_Ext_A ; Arabic_Extended_A +blk; Arabic_Ext_B ; Arabic_Extended_B +blk; Arabic_Math ; Arabic_Mathematical_Alphabetic_Symbols +blk; Arabic_PF_A ; Arabic_Presentation_Forms_A ; Arabic_Presentation_Forms-A +blk; Arabic_PF_B ; Arabic_Presentation_Forms_B +blk; Arabic_Sup ; Arabic_Supplement +blk; Armenian ; Armenian +blk; Arrows ; Arrows +blk; ASCII ; Basic_Latin +blk; Avestan ; Avestan +blk; Balinese ; Balinese +blk; Bamum ; Bamum +blk; Bamum_Sup ; Bamum_Supplement +blk; Bassa_Vah ; Bassa_Vah +blk; Batak ; Batak +blk; Bengali ; Bengali +blk; Bhaiksuki ; Bhaiksuki +blk; Block_Elements ; Block_Elements +blk; Bopomofo ; Bopomofo +blk; Bopomofo_Ext ; Bopomofo_Extended +blk; Box_Drawing ; Box_Drawing +blk; Brahmi ; Brahmi +blk; Braille ; Braille_Patterns +blk; Buginese ; Buginese +blk; Buhid ; Buhid +blk; Byzantine_Music ; Byzantine_Musical_Symbols +blk; Carian ; Carian +blk; Caucasian_Albanian ; Caucasian_Albanian +blk; Chakma ; Chakma +blk; Cham ; Cham +blk; Cherokee ; Cherokee +blk; Cherokee_Sup ; Cherokee_Supplement +blk; Chess_Symbols ; Chess_Symbols +blk; Chorasmian ; Chorasmian +blk; CJK ; CJK_Unified_Ideographs +blk; CJK_Compat ; CJK_Compatibility +blk; CJK_Compat_Forms ; CJK_Compatibility_Forms +blk; CJK_Compat_Ideographs ; CJK_Compatibility_Ideographs +blk; CJK_Compat_Ideographs_Sup ; CJK_Compatibility_Ideographs_Supplement +blk; CJK_Ext_A ; CJK_Unified_Ideographs_Extension_A +blk; CJK_Ext_B ; CJK_Unified_Ideographs_Extension_B +blk; CJK_Ext_C ; CJK_Unified_Ideographs_Extension_C +blk; CJK_Ext_D ; CJK_Unified_Ideographs_Extension_D +blk; CJK_Ext_E ; CJK_Unified_Ideographs_Extension_E +blk; CJK_Ext_F ; CJK_Unified_Ideographs_Extension_F +blk; CJK_Ext_G ; CJK_Unified_Ideographs_Extension_G +blk; CJK_Radicals_Sup ; CJK_Radicals_Supplement +blk; CJK_Strokes ; CJK_Strokes +blk; CJK_Symbols ; CJK_Symbols_And_Punctuation +blk; Compat_Jamo ; Hangul_Compatibility_Jamo +blk; Control_Pictures ; Control_Pictures +blk; Coptic ; Coptic +blk; Coptic_Epact_Numbers ; Coptic_Epact_Numbers +blk; Counting_Rod ; Counting_Rod_Numerals +blk; Cuneiform ; Cuneiform +blk; Cuneiform_Numbers ; Cuneiform_Numbers_And_Punctuation +blk; Currency_Symbols ; Currency_Symbols +blk; Cypriot_Syllabary ; Cypriot_Syllabary +blk; Cypro_Minoan ; Cypro_Minoan +blk; Cyrillic ; Cyrillic +blk; Cyrillic_Ext_A ; Cyrillic_Extended_A +blk; Cyrillic_Ext_B ; Cyrillic_Extended_B +blk; Cyrillic_Ext_C ; Cyrillic_Extended_C +blk; Cyrillic_Sup ; Cyrillic_Supplement ; Cyrillic_Supplementary +blk; Deseret ; Deseret +blk; Devanagari ; Devanagari +blk; Devanagari_Ext ; Devanagari_Extended +blk; Diacriticals ; Combining_Diacritical_Marks +blk; Diacriticals_Ext ; Combining_Diacritical_Marks_Extended +blk; Diacriticals_For_Symbols ; Combining_Diacritical_Marks_For_Symbols; Combining_Marks_For_Symbols +blk; Diacriticals_Sup ; Combining_Diacritical_Marks_Supplement +blk; Dingbats ; Dingbats +blk; Dives_Akuru ; Dives_Akuru +blk; Dogra ; Dogra +blk; Domino ; Domino_Tiles +blk; Duployan ; Duployan +blk; Early_Dynastic_Cuneiform ; Early_Dynastic_Cuneiform +blk; Egyptian_Hieroglyph_Format_Controls; Egyptian_Hieroglyph_Format_Controls +blk; Egyptian_Hieroglyphs ; Egyptian_Hieroglyphs +blk; Elbasan ; Elbasan +blk; Elymaic ; Elymaic +blk; Emoticons ; Emoticons +blk; Enclosed_Alphanum ; Enclosed_Alphanumerics +blk; Enclosed_Alphanum_Sup ; Enclosed_Alphanumeric_Supplement +blk; Enclosed_CJK ; Enclosed_CJK_Letters_And_Months +blk; Enclosed_Ideographic_Sup ; Enclosed_Ideographic_Supplement +blk; Ethiopic ; Ethiopic +blk; Ethiopic_Ext ; Ethiopic_Extended +blk; Ethiopic_Ext_A ; Ethiopic_Extended_A +blk; Ethiopic_Ext_B ; Ethiopic_Extended_B +blk; Ethiopic_Sup ; Ethiopic_Supplement +blk; Geometric_Shapes ; Geometric_Shapes +blk; Geometric_Shapes_Ext ; Geometric_Shapes_Extended +blk; Georgian ; Georgian +blk; Georgian_Ext ; Georgian_Extended +blk; Georgian_Sup ; Georgian_Supplement +blk; Glagolitic ; Glagolitic +blk; Glagolitic_Sup ; Glagolitic_Supplement +blk; Gothic ; Gothic +blk; Grantha ; Grantha +blk; Greek ; Greek_And_Coptic +blk; Greek_Ext ; Greek_Extended +blk; Gujarati ; Gujarati +blk; Gunjala_Gondi ; Gunjala_Gondi +blk; Gurmukhi ; Gurmukhi +blk; Half_And_Full_Forms ; Halfwidth_And_Fullwidth_Forms +blk; Half_Marks ; Combining_Half_Marks +blk; Hangul ; Hangul_Syllables +blk; Hanifi_Rohingya ; Hanifi_Rohingya +blk; Hanunoo ; Hanunoo +blk; Hatran ; Hatran +blk; Hebrew ; Hebrew +blk; High_PU_Surrogates ; High_Private_Use_Surrogates +blk; High_Surrogates ; High_Surrogates +blk; Hiragana ; Hiragana +blk; IDC ; Ideographic_Description_Characters +blk; Ideographic_Symbols ; Ideographic_Symbols_And_Punctuation +blk; Imperial_Aramaic ; Imperial_Aramaic +blk; Indic_Number_Forms ; Common_Indic_Number_Forms +blk; Indic_Siyaq_Numbers ; Indic_Siyaq_Numbers +blk; Inscriptional_Pahlavi ; Inscriptional_Pahlavi +blk; Inscriptional_Parthian ; Inscriptional_Parthian +blk; IPA_Ext ; IPA_Extensions +blk; Jamo ; Hangul_Jamo +blk; Jamo_Ext_A ; Hangul_Jamo_Extended_A +blk; Jamo_Ext_B ; Hangul_Jamo_Extended_B +blk; Javanese ; Javanese +blk; Kaithi ; Kaithi +blk; Kana_Ext_A ; Kana_Extended_A +blk; Kana_Ext_B ; Kana_Extended_B +blk; Kana_Sup ; Kana_Supplement +blk; Kanbun ; Kanbun +blk; Kangxi ; Kangxi_Radicals +blk; Kannada ; Kannada +blk; Katakana ; Katakana +blk; Katakana_Ext ; Katakana_Phonetic_Extensions +blk; Kayah_Li ; Kayah_Li +blk; Kharoshthi ; Kharoshthi +blk; Khitan_Small_Script ; Khitan_Small_Script +blk; Khmer ; Khmer +blk; Khmer_Symbols ; Khmer_Symbols +blk; Khojki ; Khojki +blk; Khudawadi ; Khudawadi +blk; Lao ; Lao +blk; Latin_1_Sup ; Latin_1_Supplement ; Latin_1 +blk; Latin_Ext_A ; Latin_Extended_A +blk; Latin_Ext_Additional ; Latin_Extended_Additional +blk; Latin_Ext_B ; Latin_Extended_B +blk; Latin_Ext_C ; Latin_Extended_C +blk; Latin_Ext_D ; Latin_Extended_D +blk; Latin_Ext_E ; Latin_Extended_E +blk; Latin_Ext_F ; Latin_Extended_F +blk; Latin_Ext_G ; Latin_Extended_G +blk; Lepcha ; Lepcha +blk; Letterlike_Symbols ; Letterlike_Symbols +blk; Limbu ; Limbu +blk; Linear_A ; Linear_A +blk; Linear_B_Ideograms ; Linear_B_Ideograms +blk; Linear_B_Syllabary ; Linear_B_Syllabary +blk; Lisu ; Lisu +blk; Lisu_Sup ; Lisu_Supplement +blk; Low_Surrogates ; Low_Surrogates +blk; Lycian ; Lycian +blk; Lydian ; Lydian +blk; Mahajani ; Mahajani +blk; Mahjong ; Mahjong_Tiles +blk; Makasar ; Makasar +blk; Malayalam ; Malayalam +blk; Mandaic ; Mandaic +blk; Manichaean ; Manichaean +blk; Marchen ; Marchen +blk; Masaram_Gondi ; Masaram_Gondi +blk; Math_Alphanum ; Mathematical_Alphanumeric_Symbols +blk; Math_Operators ; Mathematical_Operators +blk; Mayan_Numerals ; Mayan_Numerals +blk; Medefaidrin ; Medefaidrin +blk; Meetei_Mayek ; Meetei_Mayek +blk; Meetei_Mayek_Ext ; Meetei_Mayek_Extensions +blk; Mende_Kikakui ; Mende_Kikakui +blk; Meroitic_Cursive ; Meroitic_Cursive +blk; Meroitic_Hieroglyphs ; Meroitic_Hieroglyphs +blk; Miao ; Miao +blk; Misc_Arrows ; Miscellaneous_Symbols_And_Arrows +blk; Misc_Math_Symbols_A ; Miscellaneous_Mathematical_Symbols_A +blk; Misc_Math_Symbols_B ; Miscellaneous_Mathematical_Symbols_B +blk; Misc_Pictographs ; Miscellaneous_Symbols_And_Pictographs +blk; Misc_Symbols ; Miscellaneous_Symbols +blk; Misc_Technical ; Miscellaneous_Technical +blk; Modi ; Modi +blk; Modifier_Letters ; Spacing_Modifier_Letters +blk; Modifier_Tone_Letters ; Modifier_Tone_Letters +blk; Mongolian ; Mongolian +blk; Mongolian_Sup ; Mongolian_Supplement +blk; Mro ; Mro +blk; Multani ; Multani +blk; Music ; Musical_Symbols +blk; Myanmar ; Myanmar +blk; Myanmar_Ext_A ; Myanmar_Extended_A +blk; Myanmar_Ext_B ; Myanmar_Extended_B +blk; Nabataean ; Nabataean +blk; Nandinagari ; Nandinagari +blk; NB ; No_Block +blk; New_Tai_Lue ; New_Tai_Lue +blk; Newa ; Newa +blk; NKo ; NKo +blk; Number_Forms ; Number_Forms +blk; Nushu ; Nushu +blk; Nyiakeng_Puachue_Hmong ; Nyiakeng_Puachue_Hmong +blk; OCR ; Optical_Character_Recognition +blk; Ogham ; Ogham +blk; Ol_Chiki ; Ol_Chiki +blk; Old_Hungarian ; Old_Hungarian +blk; Old_Italic ; Old_Italic +blk; Old_North_Arabian ; Old_North_Arabian +blk; Old_Permic ; Old_Permic +blk; Old_Persian ; Old_Persian +blk; Old_Sogdian ; Old_Sogdian +blk; Old_South_Arabian ; Old_South_Arabian +blk; Old_Turkic ; Old_Turkic +blk; Old_Uyghur ; Old_Uyghur +blk; Oriya ; Oriya +blk; Ornamental_Dingbats ; Ornamental_Dingbats +blk; Osage ; Osage +blk; Osmanya ; Osmanya +blk; Ottoman_Siyaq_Numbers ; Ottoman_Siyaq_Numbers +blk; Pahawh_Hmong ; Pahawh_Hmong +blk; Palmyrene ; Palmyrene +blk; Pau_Cin_Hau ; Pau_Cin_Hau +blk; Phags_Pa ; Phags_Pa +blk; Phaistos ; Phaistos_Disc +blk; Phoenician ; Phoenician +blk; Phonetic_Ext ; Phonetic_Extensions +blk; Phonetic_Ext_Sup ; Phonetic_Extensions_Supplement +blk; Playing_Cards ; Playing_Cards +blk; Psalter_Pahlavi ; Psalter_Pahlavi +blk; PUA ; Private_Use_Area ; Private_Use +blk; Punctuation ; General_Punctuation +blk; Rejang ; Rejang +blk; Rumi ; Rumi_Numeral_Symbols +blk; Runic ; Runic +blk; Samaritan ; Samaritan +blk; Saurashtra ; Saurashtra +blk; Sharada ; Sharada +blk; Shavian ; Shavian +blk; Shorthand_Format_Controls ; Shorthand_Format_Controls +blk; Siddham ; Siddham +blk; Sinhala ; Sinhala +blk; Sinhala_Archaic_Numbers ; Sinhala_Archaic_Numbers +blk; Small_Forms ; Small_Form_Variants +blk; Small_Kana_Ext ; Small_Kana_Extension +blk; Sogdian ; Sogdian +blk; Sora_Sompeng ; Sora_Sompeng +blk; Soyombo ; Soyombo +blk; Specials ; Specials +blk; Sundanese ; Sundanese +blk; Sundanese_Sup ; Sundanese_Supplement +blk; Sup_Arrows_A ; Supplemental_Arrows_A +blk; Sup_Arrows_B ; Supplemental_Arrows_B +blk; Sup_Arrows_C ; Supplemental_Arrows_C +blk; Sup_Math_Operators ; Supplemental_Mathematical_Operators +blk; Sup_PUA_A ; Supplementary_Private_Use_Area_A +blk; Sup_PUA_B ; Supplementary_Private_Use_Area_B +blk; Sup_Punctuation ; Supplemental_Punctuation +blk; Sup_Symbols_And_Pictographs ; Supplemental_Symbols_And_Pictographs +blk; Super_And_Sub ; Superscripts_And_Subscripts +blk; Sutton_SignWriting ; Sutton_SignWriting +blk; Syloti_Nagri ; Syloti_Nagri +blk; Symbols_And_Pictographs_Ext_A ; Symbols_And_Pictographs_Extended_A +blk; Symbols_For_Legacy_Computing ; Symbols_For_Legacy_Computing +blk; Syriac ; Syriac +blk; Syriac_Sup ; Syriac_Supplement +blk; Tagalog ; Tagalog +blk; Tagbanwa ; Tagbanwa +blk; Tags ; Tags +blk; Tai_Le ; Tai_Le +blk; Tai_Tham ; Tai_Tham +blk; Tai_Viet ; Tai_Viet +blk; Tai_Xuan_Jing ; Tai_Xuan_Jing_Symbols +blk; Takri ; Takri +blk; Tamil ; Tamil +blk; Tamil_Sup ; Tamil_Supplement +blk; Tangsa ; Tangsa +blk; Tangut ; Tangut +blk; Tangut_Components ; Tangut_Components +blk; Tangut_Sup ; Tangut_Supplement +blk; Telugu ; Telugu +blk; Thaana ; Thaana +blk; Thai ; Thai +blk; Tibetan ; Tibetan +blk; Tifinagh ; Tifinagh +blk; Tirhuta ; Tirhuta +blk; Toto ; Toto +blk; Transport_And_Map ; Transport_And_Map_Symbols +blk; UCAS ; Unified_Canadian_Aboriginal_Syllabics; Canadian_Syllabics +blk; UCAS_Ext ; Unified_Canadian_Aboriginal_Syllabics_Extended +blk; UCAS_Ext_A ; Unified_Canadian_Aboriginal_Syllabics_Extended_A +blk; Ugaritic ; Ugaritic +blk; Vai ; Vai +blk; Vedic_Ext ; Vedic_Extensions +blk; Vertical_Forms ; Vertical_Forms +blk; Vithkuqi ; Vithkuqi +blk; VS ; Variation_Selectors +blk; VS_Sup ; Variation_Selectors_Supplement +blk; Wancho ; Wancho +blk; Warang_Citi ; Warang_Citi +blk; Yezidi ; Yezidi +blk; Yi_Radicals ; Yi_Radicals +blk; Yi_Syllables ; Yi_Syllables +blk; Yijing ; Yijing_Hexagram_Symbols +blk; Zanabazar_Square ; Zanabazar_Square +blk; Znamenny_Music ; Znamenny_Musical_Notation + +# Canonical_Combining_Class (ccc) + +ccc; 0; NR ; Not_Reordered +ccc; 1; OV ; Overlay +ccc; 6; HANR ; Han_Reading +ccc; 7; NK ; Nukta +ccc; 8; KV ; Kana_Voicing +ccc; 9; VR ; Virama +ccc; 10; CCC10 ; CCC10 +ccc; 11; CCC11 ; CCC11 +ccc; 12; CCC12 ; CCC12 +ccc; 13; CCC13 ; CCC13 +ccc; 14; CCC14 ; CCC14 +ccc; 15; CCC15 ; CCC15 +ccc; 16; CCC16 ; CCC16 +ccc; 17; CCC17 ; CCC17 +ccc; 18; CCC18 ; CCC18 +ccc; 19; CCC19 ; CCC19 +ccc; 20; CCC20 ; CCC20 +ccc; 21; CCC21 ; CCC21 +ccc; 22; CCC22 ; CCC22 +ccc; 23; CCC23 ; CCC23 +ccc; 24; CCC24 ; CCC24 +ccc; 25; CCC25 ; CCC25 +ccc; 26; CCC26 ; CCC26 +ccc; 27; CCC27 ; CCC27 +ccc; 28; CCC28 ; CCC28 +ccc; 29; CCC29 ; CCC29 +ccc; 30; CCC30 ; CCC30 +ccc; 31; CCC31 ; CCC31 +ccc; 32; CCC32 ; CCC32 +ccc; 33; CCC33 ; CCC33 +ccc; 34; CCC34 ; CCC34 +ccc; 35; CCC35 ; CCC35 +ccc; 36; CCC36 ; CCC36 +ccc; 84; CCC84 ; CCC84 +ccc; 91; CCC91 ; CCC91 +ccc; 103; CCC103 ; CCC103 +ccc; 107; CCC107 ; CCC107 +ccc; 118; CCC118 ; CCC118 +ccc; 122; CCC122 ; CCC122 +ccc; 129; CCC129 ; CCC129 +ccc; 130; CCC130 ; CCC130 +ccc; 132; CCC132 ; CCC132 +ccc; 133; CCC133 ; CCC133 # RESERVED +ccc; 200; ATBL ; Attached_Below_Left +ccc; 202; ATB ; Attached_Below +ccc; 214; ATA ; Attached_Above +ccc; 216; ATAR ; Attached_Above_Right +ccc; 218; BL ; Below_Left +ccc; 220; B ; Below +ccc; 222; BR ; Below_Right +ccc; 224; L ; Left +ccc; 226; R ; Right +ccc; 228; AL ; Above_Left +ccc; 230; A ; Above +ccc; 232; AR ; Above_Right +ccc; 233; DB ; Double_Below +ccc; 234; DA ; Double_Above +ccc; 240; IS ; Iota_Subscript + +# Case_Folding (cf) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Case_Folding; + +# Case_Ignorable (CI) + +CI ; N ; No ; F ; False +CI ; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Cased (Cased) + +Cased; N ; No ; F ; False +Cased; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Changes_When_Casefolded (CWCF) + +CWCF; N ; No ; F ; False +CWCF; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Changes_When_Casemapped (CWCM) + +CWCM; N ; No ; F ; False +CWCM; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Changes_When_Lowercased (CWL) + +CWL; N ; No ; F ; False +CWL; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Changes_When_NFKC_Casefolded (CWKCF) + +CWKCF; N ; No ; F ; False +CWKCF; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Changes_When_Titlecased (CWT) + +CWT; N ; No ; F ; False +CWT; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Changes_When_Uppercased (CWU) + +CWU; N ; No ; F ; False +CWU; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Composition_Exclusion (CE) + +CE ; N ; No ; F ; False +CE ; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Dash (Dash) + +Dash; N ; No ; F ; False +Dash; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Decomposition_Mapping (dm) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Decomposition_Mapping; + +# Decomposition_Type (dt) + +dt ; Can ; Canonical ; can +dt ; Com ; Compat ; com +dt ; Enc ; Circle ; enc +dt ; Fin ; Final ; fin +dt ; Font ; Font ; font +dt ; Fra ; Fraction ; fra +dt ; Init ; Initial ; init +dt ; Iso ; Isolated ; iso +dt ; Med ; Medial ; med +dt ; Nar ; Narrow ; nar +dt ; Nb ; Nobreak ; nb +dt ; None ; None ; none +dt ; Sml ; Small ; sml +dt ; Sqr ; Square ; sqr +dt ; Sub ; Sub ; sub +dt ; Sup ; Super ; sup +dt ; Vert ; Vertical ; vert +dt ; Wide ; Wide ; wide + +# Default_Ignorable_Code_Point (DI) + +DI ; N ; No ; F ; False +DI ; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Deprecated (Dep) + +Dep; N ; No ; F ; False +Dep; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Diacritic (Dia) + +Dia; N ; No ; F ; False +Dia; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# East_Asian_Width (ea) + +ea ; A ; Ambiguous +ea ; F ; Fullwidth +ea ; H ; Halfwidth +ea ; N ; Neutral +ea ; Na ; Narrow +ea ; W ; Wide + +# Emoji (Emoji) + +Emoji; N ; No ; F ; False +Emoji; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Emoji_Component (EComp) + +EComp; N ; No ; F ; False +EComp; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Emoji_Modifier (EMod) + +EMod; N ; No ; F ; False +EMod; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Emoji_Modifier_Base (EBase) + +EBase; N ; No ; F ; False +EBase; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Emoji_Presentation (EPres) + +EPres; N ; No ; F ; False +EPres; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Equivalent_Unified_Ideograph (EqUIdeo) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Equivalent_Unified_Ideograph; + +# Expands_On_NFC (XO_NFC) + +XO_NFC; N ; No ; F ; False +XO_NFC; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Expands_On_NFD (XO_NFD) + +XO_NFD; N ; No ; F ; False +XO_NFD; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Expands_On_NFKC (XO_NFKC) + +XO_NFKC; N ; No ; F ; False +XO_NFKC; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Expands_On_NFKD (XO_NFKD) + +XO_NFKD; N ; No ; F ; False +XO_NFKD; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Extended_Pictographic (ExtPict) + +ExtPict; N ; No ; F ; False +ExtPict; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Extender (Ext) + +Ext; N ; No ; F ; False +Ext; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# FC_NFKC_Closure (FC_NFKC) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; FC_NFKC_Closure; + +# Full_Composition_Exclusion (Comp_Ex) + +Comp_Ex; N ; No ; F ; False +Comp_Ex; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# General_Category (gc) + +gc ; C ; Other # Cc | Cf | Cn | Co | Cs +gc ; Cc ; Control ; cntrl +gc ; Cf ; Format +gc ; Cn ; Unassigned +gc ; Co ; Private_Use +gc ; Cs ; Surrogate +gc ; L ; Letter # Ll | Lm | Lo | Lt | Lu +gc ; LC ; Cased_Letter # Ll | Lt | Lu +gc ; Ll ; Lowercase_Letter +gc ; Lm ; Modifier_Letter +gc ; Lo ; Other_Letter +gc ; Lt ; Titlecase_Letter +gc ; Lu ; Uppercase_Letter +gc ; M ; Mark ; Combining_Mark # Mc | Me | Mn +gc ; Mc ; Spacing_Mark +gc ; Me ; Enclosing_Mark +gc ; Mn ; Nonspacing_Mark +gc ; N ; Number # Nd | Nl | No +gc ; Nd ; Decimal_Number ; digit +gc ; Nl ; Letter_Number +gc ; No ; Other_Number +gc ; P ; Punctuation ; punct # Pc | Pd | Pe | Pf | Pi | Po | Ps +gc ; Pc ; Connector_Punctuation +gc ; Pd ; Dash_Punctuation +gc ; Pe ; Close_Punctuation +gc ; Pf ; Final_Punctuation +gc ; Pi ; Initial_Punctuation +gc ; Po ; Other_Punctuation +gc ; Ps ; Open_Punctuation +gc ; S ; Symbol # Sc | Sk | Sm | So +gc ; Sc ; Currency_Symbol +gc ; Sk ; Modifier_Symbol +gc ; Sm ; Math_Symbol +gc ; So ; Other_Symbol +gc ; Z ; Separator # Zl | Zp | Zs +gc ; Zl ; Line_Separator +gc ; Zp ; Paragraph_Separator +gc ; Zs ; Space_Separator +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; General_Category; Unassigned + +# Grapheme_Base (Gr_Base) + +Gr_Base; N ; No ; F ; False +Gr_Base; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Grapheme_Cluster_Break (GCB) + +GCB; CN ; Control +GCB; CR ; CR +GCB; EB ; E_Base +GCB; EBG ; E_Base_GAZ +GCB; EM ; E_Modifier +GCB; EX ; Extend +GCB; GAZ ; Glue_After_Zwj +GCB; L ; L +GCB; LF ; LF +GCB; LV ; LV +GCB; LVT ; LVT +GCB; PP ; Prepend +GCB; RI ; Regional_Indicator +GCB; SM ; SpacingMark +GCB; T ; T +GCB; V ; V +GCB; XX ; Other +GCB; ZWJ ; ZWJ + +# Grapheme_Extend (Gr_Ext) + +Gr_Ext; N ; No ; F ; False +Gr_Ext; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Grapheme_Link (Gr_Link) + +Gr_Link; N ; No ; F ; False +Gr_Link; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Hangul_Syllable_Type (hst) + +hst; L ; Leading_Jamo +hst; LV ; LV_Syllable +hst; LVT ; LVT_Syllable +hst; NA ; Not_Applicable +hst; T ; Trailing_Jamo +hst; V ; Vowel_Jamo + +# Hex_Digit (Hex) + +Hex; N ; No ; F ; False +Hex; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Hyphen (Hyphen) + +Hyphen; N ; No ; F ; False +Hyphen; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# IDS_Binary_Operator (IDSB) + +IDSB; N ; No ; F ; False +IDSB; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# IDS_Trinary_Operator (IDST) + +IDST; N ; No ; F ; False +IDST; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# ID_Continue (IDC) + +IDC; N ; No ; F ; False +IDC; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# ID_Start (IDS) + +IDS; N ; No ; F ; False +IDS; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# ISO_Comment (isc) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; ISO_Comment; + +# Ideographic (Ideo) + +Ideo; N ; No ; F ; False +Ideo; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Indic_Positional_Category (InPC) + +InPC; Bottom ; Bottom +InPC; Bottom_And_Left ; Bottom_And_Left +InPC; Bottom_And_Right ; Bottom_And_Right +InPC; Left ; Left +InPC; Left_And_Right ; Left_And_Right +InPC; NA ; NA +InPC; Overstruck ; Overstruck +InPC; Right ; Right +InPC; Top ; Top +InPC; Top_And_Bottom ; Top_And_Bottom +InPC; Top_And_Bottom_And_Left ; Top_And_Bottom_And_Left +InPC; Top_And_Bottom_And_Right ; Top_And_Bottom_And_Right +InPC; Top_And_Left ; Top_And_Left +InPC; Top_And_Left_And_Right ; Top_And_Left_And_Right +InPC; Top_And_Right ; Top_And_Right +InPC; Visual_Order_Left ; Visual_Order_Left + +# Indic_Syllabic_Category (InSC) + +InSC; Avagraha ; Avagraha +InSC; Bindu ; Bindu +InSC; Brahmi_Joining_Number ; Brahmi_Joining_Number +InSC; Cantillation_Mark ; Cantillation_Mark +InSC; Consonant ; Consonant +InSC; Consonant_Dead ; Consonant_Dead +InSC; Consonant_Final ; Consonant_Final +InSC; Consonant_Head_Letter ; Consonant_Head_Letter +InSC; Consonant_Initial_Postfixed ; Consonant_Initial_Postfixed +InSC; Consonant_Killer ; Consonant_Killer +InSC; Consonant_Medial ; Consonant_Medial +InSC; Consonant_Placeholder ; Consonant_Placeholder +InSC; Consonant_Preceding_Repha ; Consonant_Preceding_Repha +InSC; Consonant_Prefixed ; Consonant_Prefixed +InSC; Consonant_Subjoined ; Consonant_Subjoined +InSC; Consonant_Succeeding_Repha ; Consonant_Succeeding_Repha +InSC; Consonant_With_Stacker ; Consonant_With_Stacker +InSC; Gemination_Mark ; Gemination_Mark +InSC; Invisible_Stacker ; Invisible_Stacker +InSC; Joiner ; Joiner +InSC; Modifying_Letter ; Modifying_Letter +InSC; Non_Joiner ; Non_Joiner +InSC; Nukta ; Nukta +InSC; Number ; Number +InSC; Number_Joiner ; Number_Joiner +InSC; Other ; Other +InSC; Pure_Killer ; Pure_Killer +InSC; Register_Shifter ; Register_Shifter +InSC; Syllable_Modifier ; Syllable_Modifier +InSC; Tone_Letter ; Tone_Letter +InSC; Tone_Mark ; Tone_Mark +InSC; Virama ; Virama +InSC; Visarga ; Visarga +InSC; Vowel ; Vowel +InSC; Vowel_Dependent ; Vowel_Dependent +InSC; Vowel_Independent ; Vowel_Independent + +# Jamo_Short_Name (JSN) + +JSN; A ; A +JSN; AE ; AE +JSN; B ; B +JSN; BB ; BB +JSN; BS ; BS +JSN; C ; C +JSN; D ; D +JSN; DD ; DD +JSN; E ; E +JSN; EO ; EO +JSN; EU ; EU +JSN; G ; G +JSN; GG ; GG +JSN; GS ; GS +JSN; H ; H +JSN; I ; I +JSN; J ; J +JSN; JJ ; JJ +JSN; K ; K +JSN; L ; L +JSN; LB ; LB +JSN; LG ; LG +JSN; LH ; LH +JSN; LM ; LM +JSN; LP ; LP +JSN; LS ; LS +JSN; LT ; LT +JSN; M ; M +JSN; N ; N +JSN; NG ; NG +JSN; NH ; NH +JSN; NJ ; NJ +JSN; O ; O +JSN; OE ; OE +JSN; P ; P +JSN; R ; R +JSN; S ; S +JSN; SS ; SS +JSN; T ; T +JSN; U ; U +JSN; WA ; WA +JSN; WAE ; WAE +JSN; WE ; WE +JSN; WEO ; WEO +JSN; WI ; WI +JSN; YA ; YA +JSN; YAE ; YAE +JSN; YE ; YE +JSN; YEO ; YEO +JSN; YI ; YI +JSN; YO ; YO +JSN; YU ; YU +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Jamo_Short_Name; + +# Join_Control (Join_C) + +Join_C; N ; No ; F ; False +Join_C; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Joining_Group (jg) + +jg ; African_Feh ; African_Feh +jg ; African_Noon ; African_Noon +jg ; African_Qaf ; African_Qaf +jg ; Ain ; Ain +jg ; Alaph ; Alaph +jg ; Alef ; Alef +jg ; Beh ; Beh +jg ; Beth ; Beth +jg ; Burushaski_Yeh_Barree ; Burushaski_Yeh_Barree +jg ; Dal ; Dal +jg ; Dalath_Rish ; Dalath_Rish +jg ; E ; E +jg ; Farsi_Yeh ; Farsi_Yeh +jg ; Fe ; Fe +jg ; Feh ; Feh +jg ; Final_Semkath ; Final_Semkath +jg ; Gaf ; Gaf +jg ; Gamal ; Gamal +jg ; Hah ; Hah +jg ; Hanifi_Rohingya_Kinna_Ya ; Hanifi_Rohingya_Kinna_Ya +jg ; Hanifi_Rohingya_Pa ; Hanifi_Rohingya_Pa +jg ; He ; He +jg ; Heh ; Heh +jg ; Heh_Goal ; Heh_Goal +jg ; Heth ; Heth +jg ; Kaf ; Kaf +jg ; Kaph ; Kaph +jg ; Khaph ; Khaph +jg ; Knotted_Heh ; Knotted_Heh +jg ; Lam ; Lam +jg ; Lamadh ; Lamadh +jg ; Malayalam_Bha ; Malayalam_Bha +jg ; Malayalam_Ja ; Malayalam_Ja +jg ; Malayalam_Lla ; Malayalam_Lla +jg ; Malayalam_Llla ; Malayalam_Llla +jg ; Malayalam_Nga ; Malayalam_Nga +jg ; Malayalam_Nna ; Malayalam_Nna +jg ; Malayalam_Nnna ; Malayalam_Nnna +jg ; Malayalam_Nya ; Malayalam_Nya +jg ; Malayalam_Ra ; Malayalam_Ra +jg ; Malayalam_Ssa ; Malayalam_Ssa +jg ; Malayalam_Tta ; Malayalam_Tta +jg ; Manichaean_Aleph ; Manichaean_Aleph +jg ; Manichaean_Ayin ; Manichaean_Ayin +jg ; Manichaean_Beth ; Manichaean_Beth +jg ; Manichaean_Daleth ; Manichaean_Daleth +jg ; Manichaean_Dhamedh ; Manichaean_Dhamedh +jg ; Manichaean_Five ; Manichaean_Five +jg ; Manichaean_Gimel ; Manichaean_Gimel +jg ; Manichaean_Heth ; Manichaean_Heth +jg ; Manichaean_Hundred ; Manichaean_Hundred +jg ; Manichaean_Kaph ; Manichaean_Kaph +jg ; Manichaean_Lamedh ; Manichaean_Lamedh +jg ; Manichaean_Mem ; Manichaean_Mem +jg ; Manichaean_Nun ; Manichaean_Nun +jg ; Manichaean_One ; Manichaean_One +jg ; Manichaean_Pe ; Manichaean_Pe +jg ; Manichaean_Qoph ; Manichaean_Qoph +jg ; Manichaean_Resh ; Manichaean_Resh +jg ; Manichaean_Sadhe ; Manichaean_Sadhe +jg ; Manichaean_Samekh ; Manichaean_Samekh +jg ; Manichaean_Taw ; Manichaean_Taw +jg ; Manichaean_Ten ; Manichaean_Ten +jg ; Manichaean_Teth ; Manichaean_Teth +jg ; Manichaean_Thamedh ; Manichaean_Thamedh +jg ; Manichaean_Twenty ; Manichaean_Twenty +jg ; Manichaean_Waw ; Manichaean_Waw +jg ; Manichaean_Yodh ; Manichaean_Yodh +jg ; Manichaean_Zayin ; Manichaean_Zayin +jg ; Meem ; Meem +jg ; Mim ; Mim +jg ; No_Joining_Group ; No_Joining_Group +jg ; Noon ; Noon +jg ; Nun ; Nun +jg ; Nya ; Nya +jg ; Pe ; Pe +jg ; Qaf ; Qaf +jg ; Qaph ; Qaph +jg ; Reh ; Reh +jg ; Reversed_Pe ; Reversed_Pe +jg ; Rohingya_Yeh ; Rohingya_Yeh +jg ; Sad ; Sad +jg ; Sadhe ; Sadhe +jg ; Seen ; Seen +jg ; Semkath ; Semkath +jg ; Shin ; Shin +jg ; Straight_Waw ; Straight_Waw +jg ; Swash_Kaf ; Swash_Kaf +jg ; Syriac_Waw ; Syriac_Waw +jg ; Tah ; Tah +jg ; Taw ; Taw +jg ; Teh_Marbuta ; Teh_Marbuta +jg ; Teh_Marbuta_Goal ; Hamza_On_Heh_Goal +jg ; Teth ; Teth +jg ; Thin_Yeh ; Thin_Yeh +jg ; Vertical_Tail ; Vertical_Tail +jg ; Waw ; Waw +jg ; Yeh ; Yeh +jg ; Yeh_Barree ; Yeh_Barree +jg ; Yeh_With_Tail ; Yeh_With_Tail +jg ; Yudh ; Yudh +jg ; Yudh_He ; Yudh_He +jg ; Zain ; Zain +jg ; Zhain ; Zhain + +# Joining_Type (jt) + +jt ; C ; Join_Causing +jt ; D ; Dual_Joining +jt ; L ; Left_Joining +jt ; R ; Right_Joining +jt ; T ; Transparent +jt ; U ; Non_Joining + +# Line_Break (lb) + +lb ; AI ; Ambiguous +lb ; AL ; Alphabetic +lb ; B2 ; Break_Both +lb ; BA ; Break_After +lb ; BB ; Break_Before +lb ; BK ; Mandatory_Break +lb ; CB ; Contingent_Break +lb ; CJ ; Conditional_Japanese_Starter +lb ; CL ; Close_Punctuation +lb ; CM ; Combining_Mark +lb ; CP ; Close_Parenthesis +lb ; CR ; Carriage_Return +lb ; EB ; E_Base +lb ; EM ; E_Modifier +lb ; EX ; Exclamation +lb ; GL ; Glue +lb ; H2 ; H2 +lb ; H3 ; H3 +lb ; HL ; Hebrew_Letter +lb ; HY ; Hyphen +lb ; ID ; Ideographic +lb ; IN ; Inseparable ; Inseperable +lb ; IS ; Infix_Numeric +lb ; JL ; JL +lb ; JT ; JT +lb ; JV ; JV +lb ; LF ; Line_Feed +lb ; NL ; Next_Line +lb ; NS ; Nonstarter +lb ; NU ; Numeric +lb ; OP ; Open_Punctuation +lb ; PO ; Postfix_Numeric +lb ; PR ; Prefix_Numeric +lb ; QU ; Quotation +lb ; RI ; Regional_Indicator +lb ; SA ; Complex_Context +lb ; SG ; Surrogate +lb ; SP ; Space +lb ; SY ; Break_Symbols +lb ; WJ ; Word_Joiner +lb ; XX ; Unknown +lb ; ZW ; ZWSpace +lb ; ZWJ ; ZWJ + +# Logical_Order_Exception (LOE) + +LOE; N ; No ; F ; False +LOE; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Lowercase (Lower) + +Lower; N ; No ; F ; False +Lower; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Lowercase_Mapping (lc) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Lowercase_Mapping; + +# Math (Math) + +Math; N ; No ; F ; False +Math; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# NFC_Quick_Check (NFC_QC) + +NFC_QC; M ; Maybe +NFC_QC; N ; No +NFC_QC; Y ; Yes + +# NFD_Quick_Check (NFD_QC) + +NFD_QC; N ; No +NFD_QC; Y ; Yes + +# NFKC_Casefold (NFKC_CF) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; NFKC_Casefold; + +# NFKC_Quick_Check (NFKC_QC) + +NFKC_QC; M ; Maybe +NFKC_QC; N ; No +NFKC_QC; Y ; Yes + +# NFKD_Quick_Check (NFKD_QC) + +NFKD_QC; N ; No +NFKD_QC; Y ; Yes + +# Name (na) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Name; + +# Name_Alias (Name_Alias) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Name_Alias; + +# Noncharacter_Code_Point (NChar) + +NChar; N ; No ; F ; False +NChar; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Numeric_Type (nt) + +nt ; De ; Decimal +nt ; Di ; Digit +nt ; None ; None +nt ; Nu ; Numeric + +# Numeric_Value (nv) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Numeric_Value; NaN + +# Other_Alphabetic (OAlpha) + +OAlpha; N ; No ; F ; False +OAlpha; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Other_Default_Ignorable_Code_Point (ODI) + +ODI; N ; No ; F ; False +ODI; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Other_Grapheme_Extend (OGr_Ext) + +OGr_Ext; N ; No ; F ; False +OGr_Ext; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Other_ID_Continue (OIDC) + +OIDC; N ; No ; F ; False +OIDC; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Other_ID_Start (OIDS) + +OIDS; N ; No ; F ; False +OIDS; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Other_Lowercase (OLower) + +OLower; N ; No ; F ; False +OLower; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Other_Math (OMath) + +OMath; N ; No ; F ; False +OMath; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Other_Uppercase (OUpper) + +OUpper; N ; No ; F ; False +OUpper; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Pattern_Syntax (Pat_Syn) + +Pat_Syn; N ; No ; F ; False +Pat_Syn; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Pattern_White_Space (Pat_WS) + +Pat_WS; N ; No ; F ; False +Pat_WS; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Prepended_Concatenation_Mark (PCM) + +PCM; N ; No ; F ; False +PCM; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Quotation_Mark (QMark) + +QMark; N ; No ; F ; False +QMark; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Radical (Radical) + +Radical; N ; No ; F ; False +Radical; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Regional_Indicator (RI) + +RI ; N ; No ; F ; False +RI ; Y ; Yes ; T ; True + +# Script (sc) + +sc ; Adlm ; Adlam +sc ; Aghb ; Caucasian_Albanian +sc ; Ahom ; Ahom +sc ; Arab ; Arabic +sc ; Armi ; Imperial_Aramaic +sc ; Armn ; Armenian +sc ; Avst ; Avestan +sc ; Bali ; Balinese +sc ; Bamu ; Bamum +sc ; Bass ; Bassa_Vah +sc ; Batk ; Batak +sc ; Beng ; Bengali +sc ; Bhks ; Bhaiksuki +sc ; Bopo ; Bopomofo +sc ; Brah ; Brahmi +sc ; Brai ; Braille +sc ; Bugi ; Buginese +sc ; Buhd ; Buhid +sc ; Cakm ; Chakma +sc ; Cans ; Canadian_Aboriginal +sc ; Cari ; Carian +sc ; Cham ; Cham +sc ; Cher ; Cherokee +sc ; Chrs ; Chorasmian +sc ; Copt ; Coptic ; Qaac +sc ; Cpmn ; Cypro_Minoan +sc ; Cprt ; Cypriot +sc ; Cyrl ; Cyrillic +sc ; Deva ; Devanagari +sc ; Diak ; Dives_Akuru +sc ; Dogr ; Dogra +sc ; Dsrt ; Deseret +sc ; Dupl ; Duployan +sc ; Egyp ; Egyptian_Hieroglyphs +sc ; Elba ; Elbasan +sc ; Elym ; Elymaic +sc ; Ethi ; Ethiopic +sc ; Geor ; Georgian +sc ; Glag ; Glagolitic +sc ; Gong ; Gunjala_Gondi +sc ; Gonm ; Masaram_Gondi +sc ; Goth ; Gothic +sc ; Gran ; Grantha +sc ; Grek ; Greek +sc ; Gujr ; Gujarati +sc ; Guru ; Gurmukhi +sc ; Hang ; Hangul +sc ; Hani ; Han +sc ; Hano ; Hanunoo +sc ; Hatr ; Hatran +sc ; Hebr ; Hebrew +sc ; Hira ; Hiragana +sc ; Hluw ; Anatolian_Hieroglyphs +sc ; Hmng ; Pahawh_Hmong +sc ; Hmnp ; Nyiakeng_Puachue_Hmong +sc ; Hrkt ; Katakana_Or_Hiragana +sc ; Hung ; Old_Hungarian +sc ; Ital ; Old_Italic +sc ; Java ; Javanese +sc ; Kali ; Kayah_Li +sc ; Kana ; Katakana +sc ; Khar ; Kharoshthi +sc ; Khmr ; Khmer +sc ; Khoj ; Khojki +sc ; Kits ; Khitan_Small_Script +sc ; Knda ; Kannada +sc ; Kthi ; Kaithi +sc ; Lana ; Tai_Tham +sc ; Laoo ; Lao +sc ; Latn ; Latin +sc ; Lepc ; Lepcha +sc ; Limb ; Limbu +sc ; Lina ; Linear_A +sc ; Linb ; Linear_B +sc ; Lisu ; Lisu +sc ; Lyci ; Lycian +sc ; Lydi ; Lydian +sc ; Mahj ; Mahajani +sc ; Maka ; Makasar +sc ; Mand ; Mandaic +sc ; Mani ; Manichaean +sc ; Marc ; Marchen +sc ; Medf ; Medefaidrin +sc ; Mend ; Mende_Kikakui +sc ; Merc ; Meroitic_Cursive +sc ; Mero ; Meroitic_Hieroglyphs +sc ; Mlym ; Malayalam +sc ; Modi ; Modi +sc ; Mong ; Mongolian +sc ; Mroo ; Mro +sc ; Mtei ; Meetei_Mayek +sc ; Mult ; Multani +sc ; Mymr ; Myanmar +sc ; Nand ; Nandinagari +sc ; Narb ; Old_North_Arabian +sc ; Nbat ; Nabataean +sc ; Newa ; Newa +sc ; Nkoo ; Nko +sc ; Nshu ; Nushu +sc ; Ogam ; Ogham +sc ; Olck ; Ol_Chiki +sc ; Orkh ; Old_Turkic +sc ; Orya ; Oriya +sc ; Osge ; Osage +sc ; Osma ; Osmanya +sc ; Ougr ; Old_Uyghur +sc ; Palm ; Palmyrene +sc ; Pauc ; Pau_Cin_Hau +sc ; Perm ; Old_Permic +sc ; Phag ; Phags_Pa +sc ; Phli ; Inscriptional_Pahlavi +sc ; Phlp ; Psalter_Pahlavi +sc ; Phnx ; Phoenician +sc ; Plrd ; Miao +sc ; Prti ; Inscriptional_Parthian +sc ; Rjng ; Rejang +sc ; Rohg ; Hanifi_Rohingya +sc ; Runr ; Runic +sc ; Samr ; Samaritan +sc ; Sarb ; Old_South_Arabian +sc ; Saur ; Saurashtra +sc ; Sgnw ; SignWriting +sc ; Shaw ; Shavian +sc ; Shrd ; Sharada +sc ; Sidd ; Siddham +sc ; Sind ; Khudawadi +sc ; Sinh ; Sinhala +sc ; Sogd ; Sogdian +sc ; Sogo ; Old_Sogdian +sc ; Sora ; Sora_Sompeng +sc ; Soyo ; Soyombo +sc ; Sund ; Sundanese +sc ; Sylo ; Syloti_Nagri +sc ; Syrc ; Syriac +sc ; Tagb ; Tagbanwa +sc ; Takr ; Takri +sc ; Tale ; Tai_Le +sc ; Talu ; New_Tai_Lue +sc ; Taml ; Tamil +sc ; Tang ; Tangut +sc ; Tavt ; Tai_Viet +sc ; Telu ; Telugu +sc ; Tfng ; Tifinagh +sc ; Tglg ; Tagalog +sc ; Thaa ; Thaana +sc ; Thai ; Thai +sc ; Tibt ; Tibetan +sc ; Tirh ; Tirhuta +sc ; Tnsa ; Tangsa +sc ; Toto ; Toto +sc ; Ugar ; Ugaritic +sc ; Vaii ; Vai +sc ; Vith ; Vithkuqi +sc ; Wara ; Warang_Citi +sc ; Wcho ; Wancho +sc ; Xpeo ; Old_Persian +sc ; Xsux ; Cuneiform +sc ; Yezi ; Yezidi +sc ; Yiii ; Yi +sc ; Zanb ; Zanabazar_Square +sc ; Zinh ; Inherited ; Qaai +sc ; Zyyy ; Common +sc ; Zzzz ; Unknown + +# Script_Extensions (scx) + +# @missing: 0000..10FFFF; Script_Extensions;